LETTER TO HONORABLE JOHN A. MCONE FROM CY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400040003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 298
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 6, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
We are now in the process of re-evaluating Department
of Defense command and control capabilities. As a part of this
process, we initiated a study of the requirements for command
and control support to the President. Although this was primarily
an "in-house" effort, a certain amount of advice and information
was obtained from non-Defense sources including your agency.
The study focus was mainly on our own responsibilities for
presidential support, but, of course, it was necessary to consider
the roles played by others as well. In view of this we would
appreciate having the benefit of your comments on the report,
particularly those parts of it which impact on CIA support for
the President or on interagency relationships. A copy of the
report is attached.
Sincerely,
Attachments
Honorable John A. McCone
Director, Central Intellige-nce
upon re,uoval of at,taonluents CIA - 188628
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NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
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2
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3
DD/I - CGS
4
8.
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
To 3: for action, in coordination with
War Plans/DDP. (This is the only
copy received, so War Plans does not
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FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
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9 Mar 65
Use previous editions
FORM 10. 237
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Copy No. 115
Department of Defense
COMMAND AND CONTROL
SUPPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
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INTRODUCTION
Establishment of the Study
This Study was prepared in response to a memorandum from
the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Subject: "Conceptual Approach to the
NMCS, " dated 27 February 1964, included as Annex A). In the
memorandum, Mr. Vance indicated:
As an initial step in re.-evaluating Department of
Defense command and control activities, ... , I desire
that an appraisal be undertaken of the requirements
for command and control support to the President
during crisis situations. This appraisal will furnish
the standard against which Department of Defense
capabilities and plans, particularly for the National
Military Command System (NMCS), can be compared
to insure that our conceptual approach to command and
control is valid, effective, and understandable. "
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c:, guidance for the Study has been provided b Mr. Solis Horwitz,
scant Secretary of Defense (Administration , ad by Lieutet.ant
avid Burcninal, USAF, Director of the Ant Staff. 1 ^rms
rence for the Study were issued by Mr? as ce and are incluae
l"he Study effort has been chaired by rear lclrniral P,:t:>J P.
jl, ckUurn, Jr. , Chief, Joint Command and C.,ortr i .equirer:.er.ts -1:rc ap,
it a~ization of the Joint Chiefs or Sta i. Shortiy ..iter estab.isiunerit ~f
,riffs atudy, an Advisory Group was formed consist -g of:
t ..__ , t'levance
II - NMCS Relationships with CINCs ar.d
'e rv ce f-i.eadauart:ers
UiNCs and the NMC S
Liervice i-eadouarters and the NMCS
At.-2rns in Crisis Management
;.ruing., Organization and Functions of the AM( Today
nw:(.ions of the Current NMCC
rnergencyr unctions of the NMCC
-e9ent_ Normal Manning of the NMCC
3grrentation of the NMCC Staff
4.:ata_onship Between the Joint Staff and the '4M(
'I a is
J - it)
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Relationship Between Intelligence and the NMCC
IV-19
NMCC Support for OSD
IV-2.1
The Relationship of the NMCC to Other Agencies
IV-2.5
Operational Concepts for Future Development of the NMCC
IV-26
Operational Implications for the Development of the NMCC
IV-29
Physical Arrangements
IV-31
Evaluation
IV-33
Exercising
IV-35
CHAPTER V - Presidential Needs During Crises and General War
The Need for Relocation Short of General War
V-4
The Use of Alternate Decision Groups During Crisis
V-11
Situations That May be Faced at the Alternates
V-19
Centers for Protecting the President
V-29
The No-Warning Situation
V-36
CHAPTER VI - The Role of the NMCS Alternates
Functional Roles of the Alternates
VI _2
Operational Criteria for Alternates
VI-5
Personnel Capacity at an Alternate
VI- 12
The President or the Presidential Successor
plus his Immediate Advisory Staff
VI- 12
Communication and Staff Support to the
Presidential Group for Intense Crises
VI- 13
Direct Staff Support to the Presidential Group
of an Alternate Successor Group for General War
VI-15
Personnel for Operation of the Alternate
VI-16
Personnel for Reconstitution, Mobilization and
Direction of an Extended War
VI-16
Evaluation of Individual Alternates
VI-29
The Fort Ritchie Complex and the ANMCC
VI-30
National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA)
VI-37
National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)
VI-40
Proposed NMCS Facilities
VI-43
Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC)
VI-44
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Nt.tional Mobile Land Command Post (NMLC P s
~' i - 5 1
+.3.uation of Best Combination of Alternates
nrnary Conclusions
~i1-53
"I' -R VII - Summary of Conclusions and eccrnm naations
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CHAPTERI
CRISIS SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT
The President's Role During a Crisis
In the foreseeable future crisis management in the U. S.
Government will increasingly focus at the Presidency. There are
several reasons for this. Primary is the fact that contemporary
crises are symptomatic of and directly related to the world power
picture. They cannot be handled in isolation or treated on the basis
of local issues. They must be dealt with by men who are broadly and
currently informed and who have the authority to direct the course of
the nation. Inevitably, these requirements bring such matters close
to the President.
The capability of modern communications is another fact which
tends to move crisis management into the presidential orbit. Modern
technology has made it possible for the President to be informed to a
level of detail previously unknown on problems and issues far away.
Similarly, it has enabled him to communicate directly and immediately
with U. S. representatives anywhere and hence to control them closely.
Moreover, this capability has a secondary effect also in that the
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possibility of presidential control gives rise to the presumption in
foreign minds that most U. S. actions in a crisis are White House
directed. Faced with the probability that any U. S. crisis actions will
be attributed to him, the President naturally tends to direct those actions
to a far greater extent than was the case in earlier times.
Finally, there is the obvious f-act that the consequences of a
crisis miscue are far greater now than previously. No President in the
nuclear age feels at liberty to remain apart from situations containing
risks of escalation. The American public is conscious of the risks
involved in crises and expects top level attention to such problems. No
matter how much the President would prefer to give free rein to sub-
ordinate officials, the very nature of our times drives him into personal
involvement with crisis decisions.
The nuclear reality under which we live has brought with it an
increasing recognition of the merit of a national policy of limited
objectives, attained by the commitment of limited power. In recent
years this trend has produced the concept of "controlled response."
Although usually used in connection with U. S. SLOP options, the phrase
is equally apt for lesser levels of conflict. Indeed, it is accurately
descriptive of our normal cold war conduct of foreign affairs. For the
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concept of controlled response simply calls for the consideration of
thrusts by an adversary on a case-by-case basis. In each instance, the
U. S. reaction must be carefully calculated in order to achieve U. S.
objectives while preventing an inadvertent chain reaction and while
providing positive deterrence to the possibility of uncontrollable
escalation. It seems clear that for the foreseeable future the President
will reserve unto himself the ultimate responsibility for interpreting
hostile actions against the U. S. and that of determining what the U. S.
reaction will be. Undoubtedly, there will be delegation of authority to
implement decisions once they have been made, but those decisions
related to escalation, as well as close control of the operational probing
which may precede them, will inevitably be personal responsibilities of
the President.
Presidential Requirements
In order to meet his responsibilities in international crisis manage-
ment, the President needs extensive support. In its broadest terms such
support could be categorized as follows:
a. Warning and Alert -- Knowledge that a crisis
exists or that one is expected.
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b. Descriptive Information -- Summary information
on the nature of the crisis, identification of
friendly and hostile elements, and a complete up-
dating as the situation develops.
C. Analysis -- The possible effects of the crisis on
U. S. and Free World interests and in those
countries involved whose interests (military,
political, economic, etc.) may be inimical to the
U. S., including the nature of U. S. commitment
involved.
d. Enemy Intent and Capabilities -- Anticipatory
studies concerning possible future moves by the
enemy or by forces hostile to U. S. interests.
e. U. S. Alternatives -- The development of possible
military, political, diplomatic, psychological and
economic courses of action by the U. S. together
with an analysis of their anticipated effects and
consequences.
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f. Communications Facilities -- The capability
to communicate rapidly with heads of foreign
governments, and appropriate U. S. diplomatic
and military representatives, and the capability
to disseminate his decisions for implementation.
g. Counsel -- The availability of presidential advisors
Responsibility for the provision of this support for the President
is divided among various executive departments and agencies. The lines
of cognizance are not distinct, and often responsibility for a given category
is shared interdepartmentally. The following general statements apply:
a. The warning and alert function is performed jointly
by Defense, State, and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
b. Informational support is a function of Defense,
State, CIA, and OEP in their respective areas
of cognizance.
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C, The analytical function, the appraisal of the
enemy actions, and the development of
alternative courses of action are accomplished
by individual agencies or by various combinations
of persons from the State and Defense Depart-
ments, from CIA and from the White House Staff.
d. Communications are furnished the President by
State, CIA and Defense, as well as commercially,
except that during a general war this is predomi-
nantly an NMCS function.
Presidential Decision-Making
Before focusing on the DoD portion of crisis management support
for the President, it will be useful to examine briefly the way White
House business is carried on.
Reduced to its elements, the Presidential decision-making
process is not unlike other categories of decision-making. Much
concerning it can be inferred from observation of White House affairs
and most of the remaining gaps are filled by the writings of presidential
intimates, of political analysts, or of the Presidents themselves. This
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is not to imply that something, which is rather obvious in concept,
is simple in execution. Rather, it is to say that however complex the
problem, however grave the consequences of an associated decision,
and however crushing the weight of personal responsibility, the
mechanics of the presidential decision process remain simple. There
must be (1) information, (2) analysis, (3) development of alternatives,
(4) recommendations, and (5) there must be the decision itself.
Beyond these basics, it must be understood that presidential
decision-making is a highly individual process. One President may
want to participate personally and directly with interested parties in
even the preliminary steps toward the decision. Another may prefer
to leave such matters to his staff and participate himself only in the
development of alternatives and the choice. A third may reserve only
the choice for himself. To assist him the President may include, in
addition to his statutory advisors, others in whose judgment, experience
or special knowledge he has confidence. These advisors may function
within a wide variety of organizational structures. They may be
carefully organized and chartered as is the National Security Council;
they may be less formally assembled as in the case of the Executive
Committee during the Cuban missile crisis; or they may communicate
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privately and individually with the President. Within this larger body
of advisors, the careful observer will discern an inner circle of
particularly close personal associates of the President. This
"Presidential Group" usually includes the White House staff as well as
a few government officials of cabinet or sub-cabinet rank. Its member-
ship is neither fixed nor formal. Admission is limited to those few
persons who, in addition to their other qualifications are chosen by the
President to share his most sensitive confidences. Within the Presidential
Group there may be and usually is an organizational division of interest,
but for the most part, its members function at large. Typically,
presidential problems are dealt with by the Group on an informal basis
with each member involved viewing the problem frorn the broadest possible
perspective rather than as a specialist or an advocate. Sometimes a
problem may require the application of special knowledge or experience.
In such instances, mission-oriented task forces are often formed including,
in all likelihood, one or more members of the Presidential Group.
In reality there is no uniquely "Presidential" decision-making
process; but rather there is a presidential level of decision-making within
which each President functions according to his personal work habits and
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desires and according to the amount of time available. In this arena,
the highest councils of our government are held, the various depart-
mental and agency views are heard, divergencies are aired, and
decisions are made. Ideally, in the preparation of these views,
departmental advocacy is assiduously subordinated to the broadest
conception of the national interest. However, inevitably, individuals
often may tend to think within their own organizational frames of
reference. For this and other reasons divergencies of view will
appear. At the presidential level these are heard, argued, and
resolved and national policy decisions are forged.
Considering the varied inputs into White House decision-making,
the view is sometimes heard that this process would be facilitated by
the establishment of a National Command Center. The usual conception
of such a center is one of a combined command post and situation room
in which inputs would be received from supporting agencies and depart-
ments and integrated into one picture for the President and his advisors.
The staff would be composed of individuals expert in the functions of one
or several agencies. The President would spend most of his time during
crises in the center, making his decisions there, and disseminating them
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from there. Although the concept is certainly highly applicable to
other management situations -- it is essentially what the alternate sites
provide for the President during general war -- the NCC does not fill
the bill for support to presidential decision-making in crises short of
general war. The amorphous and dynamic character of the presidential
decision-making apparatus suggests a far less regularized support.
Presidential decision-making is normally consultative. It is better
served by the conference table than the situation room. Moreover,
presidential advisors are in turn supported by their own staffs within
their own departments. Most of the policy alternatives, analyses and
recommendations which they offer for White House consideration are
prepared by these staffs. Necessarily, this support reflects information
which was introduced at the departmental level. Thus when the President
hears analyses and alternatives from advisors, he is in effect receiving
information support with it, and he is receiving it in the form which is
most useful to him and with which he is most familiar.
Therefore, an NCC in an information support role would duplicate
facilities which already exist and which are more appropriately placed
at the Department level in the decision-making support structure.
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Moreover, unless carefully controlled, the NCC as an advisory device
in the support of the President could easily fall into a role which would
place it in direct competition with the cabinet and other principal
advisors.
Decision-support for the President in situations short of general
war should maximize flexibility. Not only does this requirement militate
against an elaborate NCC, but it materially affects the manner in which
departmental systems support the President. An expanded discussion
of this will be found in Chapter II,
Factors in Crisis Management
This study has analyzed many specific situations and the impli-
cations they have for command and control support. These include
actual crises such as Suez, Berlin, and Cuba; war games that have been
conducted by the Joint War Games Agency dealing with Berlin, East
Germany and Southeast Asia; exercises of the NMCS such as the HIGH
HEELS series for general war and the KEY CHAIN exercise for
contingency operations; scenarios developed by several agencies for
analyzing force needs and interactions for various levels of crisis; and
finally, actual war plans of the Unified and Specified Commands and
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NATO where these plans anticipate threats and possible responses.
Annex C to this study provides some specific references to these
studies,
From this analysis it is apparent that each crisis presents some
unique demands for command and control support. The variety of these
demands stems from the particular character of the crisis with respect:
to a number of interrelated factors:
a. Each crisis has its own set of timing factors.
Major decisions regarding initiative or response
can be needed in minutes or hours (e, g. Gulf of
Tonkin or Berlin); in days (Korea or Hungary);
in weeks (Cuba or Laos) or in months (South
Vietnam), As indicated below, timing may be
determined by military or diplomatic factors or
a combination of these. An important aspect of
timing is that it determines the number of advisors
who can be brought to bear on the crisis, the
completeness of the analysis and advisory support,
and the volume of factual data that can be marshalled.
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in support of the decision making process. Most
of the remaining factors discussed below
similarly affect these support elements.
b. The degree and nature of diplomatic consultation
and negotiation needed during a crisis is even
more complex and varied than the timing factor.
In some cases the U. S. may choose to act as one
member of a multilateral alliance and the U. S.
commitments can unfold no more quickly than the
alliance is prepared to move. In other cases the
United States moves independently and merely
informs its allies. Diplomatic considerations affect
the extent of the information exchange needed between
the Department of Defense and other executive de-
partments such as State and CIA. This exchange
must take place at several levels between each
department.
C. The scope and level of conflict contemplated or
underway when the crisis develops affects the
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nature and extent of command and control support.
If the crisis has not developed to 'the point that
extensive military commitments have been made,
then the President and Presidential Group may want
detailed data on very small scale: military operations
such as reconnaissance flight or a particular
blockade encounter. This information can be
obtained directly from the CINC's; little staffing
and analysis is possible at the Washington level
before it is first presented to the, Presidential
Group. However, if widespread military operations
are underway such as was the case in the Korean war
or could have been the case if the Cuban missile
crisis had escalated, then considerable information
from the theatre must be collected, collated, analyzed
and presented.
d. The appropriateness of preplanned military responses
to a particular crisis will determine the extent of
replanning that must be accomplished before forces
can be deployed or committed. In some of the Berlin
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confrontations, extensive preplanning on the
basis of earlier experiences had simplified the
staffing process to one of deciding the options
to select and the timing of their use. In contrast,
in the Cuban missile crisis extensive replanning
was required for the blockade, for air strikes and
for invasion. Where such replanning is needed,
much of the staffing is performed by the Unified
and Specified Commands. But Washington level
staffing is still needed to aid the development of
broad strategic guidance for the CINCs; to integrate
operations and logistic support that will affect
several CINCs; and to review the CINC's plan in
terms of appropriateness, flexibility and risks.
e. To the extent that a crisis has high escalatory potential,
the President and Presidential Group will be concerned
that staff analysis and planning have developed a
number of options of increasing scope, that these
options leave room for enemy withdrawal, that
execution of these options will demonstrate U. S. goals
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and objectives to the enemy as precisely and
unequivocally as possible, and that the enemy
in his response to U. S. commitments will be
forced to reveal his objectives. Such careful
planning as well as its reivew will demand a pro-
found awareness of operational, intelligence, and
diplomatic factors.
f. The degree to which highly significant intelligence
and diplomatic information is closely held by
senior officials will have a major impact on the
size and composition of staff support during crisis
planning. Of the crises considered by the Study
Group, the Cuban missile crisis and the Cypriot
negotiations are but two examples, of situations where
early application of extensive staff support was pre-
cluded by stringent security directives applied within
the Executive Branch.
In summary, command and control support must be developed
to be able to cope with an almost infinite variety of, crises. Of these,
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we have so far actually experienced only a small number. Only once
since World War II have U. S. forces been actually committed to battle
on a large scale, and that experience was more than a decade ago.
Since that time there have been significant changes in weaponry, in
alliances, in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and in command organization and
technology. It is not surprising that each new crisis produces its own
surprises.
Very Intense Crises
Increasing emphasis must be placed on the conduct (and,
accordingly the command and control support) of very intense crises
that are short of general nuclear war, but where the crisis is
sufficiently intense that one of the parties may be considering the use
of strategic strikes against other parties as an early necessary step in
escalating the crisis.
If both the Soviet Union and the U. S. continue to increase their
nuclear weapons stockpile and to improve their capability to protect and
deliver these weapons, the likelihood of widespread nuclear exchanges
will lessen. Notwithstanding this, crises can develop and escalate,
lines can be drawn, and conflict can spread so that one or the other nation
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with its back close to the wall must, in its desperation, increasingly
consider the use of strategic nuclear attacks. The development of
protected strategic forces by two sides would not make the use of
these forces impossible but it would relegate such use to last resort
status. As this option becomes less viable, the greater will be the
inventiveness of a threatened side in discovering options that, although
short of widespread strategic attack, also serve to remind the other
side that the nuclear brink is approaching.
There are many plausible scenarios that have been developed
in support of the above assertion that greater emphasis must be placed
on developing capabilities for the conduct of the very intense crisis.
Any development of a scenario which leads to a general war usually has
a preliminary intense crisis. However, in many o such analyses, since
the object is to examine the general war situation, the penultimate crisis
gets quick and perfunctory treatment and the real scrutiny is reserved
for the general war phase. But if strategic forces develop in the
directions indicated above, national decision makers in real life may be
far more concerned with the preliminaries. Indeed, the hope of staving
off general war may rest heavily on skillful handling of intense crises,.
Planning of command and control must increasingly consider the
penultimate crises.
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Situations that could lead to very intense crisis might include:
a. Unexpected strong Soviet support of a major Chinese
aggression in Asia following a United States commit-
ment to counter the Chinese.
b, A strong, unprecedented Soviet initiative in Berlin
backed up by a series of clear ultimata that are
successively enforced.
C. A Soviet denouncement of U. S. offensive naval or
air presence near the Soviet Union, backed by
ultimata demanding its withdrawal.
d. A popular revolution in one of the satellites supported
by the U. S. with the expectations that the Soviets
would not interfere; followed by dissension within
or overthrow of the existing Soviet government and
the threat of Soviet support to the old order in the
satellite. More generally, crisis situations which
lead to dissension within the Soviet leadership and
erratic changes of Soviet objectives.
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e. A rapid Soviet build-up in East Gerr_zany and
Czechoslovakia followed by a weak, disunited
NATO response.
f. A Soviet-supported but strongly indigenous
Such crises could unfold in many directions. On the one
hand, they could quickly lead to broad diplomatic negc.tiations and
summit meetings accompanied by a relaxation (temporarily at least)
of military alert and tension. On the other hand, theme,.- might lead to the
early and widespread use of nuclear weapois. But in between these
two extremes, it is easily conceivable that the above situations might
lead to high states of alert of strategic forces on both sides; limited
nuclear or non-nuclear engagements between U. S. and Soviet forces,
such as attack on U. S. reconnaissance aircraft or or: Soviet ships
masquerading as trawlers; attacks by Soviet submarines on U. S. naval
or merchant ships with consequent antisubmarine measure-s by the U. S.;
escalating or igniting of minor tension areas throughc:ut the world; changes
of government and policy within the NATO alliance, or by neutrals or
Soviet satellites; declaration of mobilization and revocation of arms
control agreements; promulgation and activation of civil defense measures;
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U. S. or Soviet threat or actions to takeover of neighboring inimical
regimes such as Cuba or Turkey. Some of these actions might be
unilaterally undertaken by either power; some could clearly take place
independent of the wishes of either power; some might result or cease
after tacit or overt negotiation. The intense crisis might unfold over
several days or over several months. It might seem to be relaxing but
then flare up with renewed intensity.
Command and Control Implications of Intense Crises
Although the possibility of a strategic exchange of nuclear weapons
is extremely remote, it has nevertheless commanded considerable
attention from those who have been concerned with future command and
control requirements. Corresponding attention must be given to the
possibility of a world that has escalated to the nuclear brink but not
beyond, and to the unique command and control needs of this situation.
It is becoming increasingly recognized that the outbreak of a
general war would very likely be preceded by a prolonged period of
dynamic, volatile and intense crisis. hiring this period, the safety of
the President is most threatened. This is the period when an unprotected
President and Presidential Group could be attacked without warning by
a small scale strike designed to paralyse national command and timed
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for consumation at the moment when the main weight, of the attack
was being detected by BMEWS or other warning apparatus. (Submarine--
launched or extended range missiles might be used in such a precursor
strike, ) In addition, the intense crisis is a period that maximizes
other dangers including unauthorized and accidental launches by highly
alerted Soviet Forces and catalytic attacks by third parties. In short,
protection of the President should not depend on the Presidentts seeking
haven after the onset of a general war. Rather, the President and
Presidential Group must be located in a protected facility during the
intense crisis and be able to manage the crisis from'this center with
the same effectiveness as if they were located in the Cabinet Room
at the White House.
There are two general approaches to the problem of protecting
the President and his capability to act from nuclear attack. First, he
may travel to a protected center out-side the Washington area. This is
the approach which is embodied in the present systen of alternates
within the NMCS. Throughout this report, such action by the President
or others to seek shelter outside Washington has beers. termed "relocation.
The second approach is that of providing an easily accessible hardened
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facility in Washington from which national command could be exercised.
This approach underlies the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC)
proposal which is now under consideration.
The Terms of Reference indicate that, "it is extremely unlikely
that the President would leave the Washington area during a crisis
situation which could result in a nuclear exchange." Discussion between
members of the Study Group and individuals who have worked closely
with the President confirm the' historical truth of this assumption and
the widespread belief that it will continue to be true in the future. The
factors that inhibit relocation are predominantly political and include
effects on both governments and publics of the U. S. , Allies, and
enemies.
Only a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) will avoid
the problems associated with relocation of the President during intense
crisis. A DUCC can be readily accessible and utilized inconspicuously.
However, a DUCC cannot be available for more than five years. In the
interim, some of the NMCS alternates and other sites (such as High
Point) should be capable of supporting a relocated President and
Presidential Group during both intense crisis and general war. Specific
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advantages, roles and priorities for these centers are elaborated in
Chapters V and VI. Also, if a DUCC is built, alternate centers will
continue to be requiredin order to continue to provide" redundancy,
flexibility, and protection against the contingency in which the President
might be away from Washington at the time of an attacounder understanding of the costs of NMCS-wi:ie functions and
may indicate savings that would not reduce the coerational
effectiveness of the NMCS.
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National Emerency Command Post Afloat (NECPA)
The NECPA is an emergency command post afloat which
provides survivability through mobility while at sea and which
requires two ships to insure that one is at sea and fully operational
at all times. The use of two ships adds most to the survivability
of the entire NMCS. If only one ship were available in the NMCS,
it would not be available during its dockside maintenance periods.
Also, the need to keep one ship in a high state of readiness or near
readiness would preclude the extensive exercising and operational
experimentation necessary for evolution of operational capabilities.
It would also inhibit the introduction of the many minor improvements
in equipment and facilities that temporarily disrupt operational
capability but that are necessary for long term improvement.
The NECPA is capable of accommodating a Presidential
Group and approximately 300 supporting staff members. It is
capable of independent operations in a general war environment
for a period of at least two weeks without external logistical
support.
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Under current concepts of operation the'NECPA is not
readily accessible to the Presidential Group. lr; addition a major
weakness may be its vulnerability to submarine or air attack.
These problems could be considerably reduced by providing adequate
fleet protection when appropriate. By operating in protected waters
such as the Chesapeake Bay, it would be not on1 much more
accessible and relatively safe from submarines":)ut would still have
to be targeted with many weapons to insure destruction. Another
problem is the difficulty of transporting large groups of personnel
to the ship; this situation could be alleviated by having adequate
numbers of standby helicopters immediately available for this
purpose. Operating the NECPA nearer to the Wi:shingto.n area would
also ease this problem.
Staff and communications support for intense crisis
situations and for general war is adequate. The ship is large
enough to accommodate a data base of the size ard scope to provide
the essential information required. Greater capability could be
attained, however, with the addition of improved'' ::ommu.nications
and technical staff support. Finally, space avai L.ble on one of
the NECPAs is adequate to provide the flexibility required for
future growth and modification of the system.
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At the present time, the two NECPA ships authorized are
the USS NORTHAMPTON and the USS WRIGHT. The NORTHAMPTON
was placed in operation as an interim measure pending conversion
of the WRIGHT and the SAIPAN. Due to the interim nature of her
planned service and inherent limitations in her design, the
NORTHAMPTON was not outfitted with optimum facilities, and,
through operational experience to date, she is known to have
many deficiencies. For example (1) there is extremely limited
contiguous deck space, (2) there is limited space for operating
helicopters, (3) there is an undesirable placement of communications
equipment, (4) unsuitable antenna system configuration causes mutual
circuit interference particularly on voice channels, (5) there are no
VLF communications, (6) there is no automatic data processing
capability, no manual display, or voice conferencing capability,
and (7) available space is not adequate for growth.
On the other hand, the SAIPAN, which was eliminated from the
NMCS program, contains 12, 000 square feet of contiguous command
post deck space (as opposed to only 2, 400 square feet on the
NORTHAMPTON), improved design and installation of communications
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and antenna systems including space for digital data systems and
VLF, and space for simultaneous operation of two' helicopters.
These deficiencies in the NORTHAMPTON and the
dissimilarity in configuration with the WRIGHT place serious
operational limitations on the ability of this NECPA. to perform
its assigned mission. Without costly modifications, there is little
or no space to permit a growth potential in the NORTHAMPTON.
Separate Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) and different operating
instructions are required for each NECPA because of the different
accommodations and facilities.
National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)
The NEACP provides for (1) a ground alert facility for
use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group; (2) the
ability to transport or accompany designated authorities on trips
outside the Washington area while acting as an operational
facility; and (3) an airborne communications relay facility as
required. The present program consists of three aircraft.
The NEACP, once airborne, is the most survivable of all
the alternates because of its high degree of mobility. Due to its
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location, it is the most accessible existing alternate in a short
time; however, unless relocation of the President or successor
is resorted to prior to tactical warning, it cannot be considered
as being survivable. Under no warning or tactical warning attack
conditions, it could be a bonus target if Washington were destroyed.
Considering the fact that under these conditions the NEACP would
not be accessible in time for the Presidential Group to occupy it,
there may be merit in considering dispersal of the aircraft to bases
outside of the Washington area (e, g. , Patuxent River Naval Air
Station). This would greatly increase their survivability and the
survivability of the NMCS system as a whole. Such dispersal would
make them at least as accessible as the NECPA is at present.
Providing faster means of transportation to remove the
Presidential Group from the White House would improve the use of
the NEACP in those crises where relocation appears to be a
feasible action. High speed helicopters located at the White House
on a permanent basis or jet aircraft based at National Airport may
be reasonable approaches to the problem. Another possibility would
be to keep a NEACP at a location closer to the White House such as
basing one at Washington National Airport during times of tension.
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The endurance in flight of the NEACP is limited. Bases
away from the Washington area are required from which to operate
during prolonged periods of world tension. Air bases require
preplanned logistical and ground communication terminal support
if the endurance of the NEACP is not to be seriously questioned.
Transportable ground communication terminals must be provided
for rapid deployment to areas not adequately covered in the fixed
ground environment. An inflight refueling capability would markedly
increase the endurance of the aircraft.
The space available in the aircraft restricts the size of the
Decision Group, supporting staff, communications support and
data base that can be used. Working space is available for 33
personnel, consisting of 17 operating personnel anti 16 additional
persons. Six additional people can be accommodated if necessary.
The NEACP is specifically intended for general war operations only;
if the President and the Presidential Group relocated during an intense
crisis, they would not select the NEACP because of these limitations.
The President might, however, position an Alterna*.e Decision Group
on board one or more of the aircraft and have these planes dispersed
outside of the Washington area. Also, if an intense crisis escalated
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into general war, the President might choose to use the NEACP
immediately on the receipt of warning or, if Washington was not
attacked, after he had reviewed the immediate situation and issued
the initial retaliatory orders. In any event the NEACP should
accompany the President whenever he leaves the Washington area.
Space also restricts the flexibility of the NEACP to permit
growth and evolutionary change; however, it may be feasible to
improve both the flexibility and independent operating capability
of the aircraft by i.nternetting several aircraft in flight and so
providing additional staff support, equipment and communications.
Proposed NMCS Facilities
When it is considered that: (1) the President is the only
one who can legally authorize the use of nuclear weapons; (2) depend-
ence on predelegation of this authority is not desirable; (3) the
President may not leave the Washington area during an intense crisis
prior to general war; (4) relocation of successor groups provides
a capability definitely inferior to protecting the President; (5) many
unforeseen events may develop during nuclear exchanges; (6) and it
is national policy to pursue a strategy of controlled response, then
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it becomes clear that the NMCS as presently configured could be
further improved to enhance the protection and accessibility. required
for the President and his immediate advisors.
The Study considered a number of additional types of
alternates that might be added to or substituted for: the current
alternates. Some of these were rejected; two seepri to offer
considerable promise; a DUCC and a National Mob le Land Command
Post (NMLCP). These are now considered.
)eep Underground Command Center (DUCC)
At this time the development of a DUCC in the immediate
Washington area appears to be a means for providi ig a survivable
facility that would be readily accessible to the Pre .dential Group
and could be used as the White House control centeir during any
stage of crisis. In addition, a DUCC would provide for inconspicuous
relocation of the President and his advisors and would permit the
:Presidential Group to remain together for continuity, of operations.
It would add to the survivability of the NMCS by prt -riding additional
redundancy and different form of protection. A DUCC could be
hardened to provide considerable assurance that it would survive
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several direct hits of multimegaton weapons. Its capability for at
least 30 days of buttoned-up operation would provide adequate
endurance. The survivability of the DUCC would be enhanced by the
installation of an ABM defense in the Washington area when it
becomes available. Such a defense could be made particularly
effective against the high-yield weapons that would need to be
penetrating or surface burst if the capsule itself were to be attacked.
This defense could be deployed even if it were decided not to deploy
ABM installations nationwide.
Although there are significant advantages to a DUCC, three
significant disadvantages should be recognized:
a. It is important to note that no experimental
weapons effect data has been obtained close to the
scale of the physical phenomena that would be
encountered. Extrapolations involved in the design
might be very much in error so that a DUCC, if
attacked, might easily survive; or, it might be
destroyed by a much smaller attack than the one
for which it was designed. Actual data cannot be
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obtained by the U. S. or the Soviets under the current
nuclear test ban treaty. If this treaty is revoked,
subsequent testing might resolve tl?ese questions
after a DUCC was under constructi )n or completed
However, it is possible that the factors that
inhibited the U. S. and the USSR from conducting
such effects tests before the treaty would still
obtain if the treaty were revoked. There is a
general consensus among technical experts that a
DUCC has been conservatively designed in light of
the defined attack.
b. A DUCC will entail substantial cost--probably on
the order of half of the NMCS funds during the next
five years. However, the price of -,he DUCC can
also be compared with elements of he strategic
forces: it will cost about as much as one squadron
of Minutemen, or one conventional y powered
Forrestal-class attack carrier, or two Polaris
submarines.
T
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c. A heavy attack on Washington might not destroy
the President but might deny his subsequent escape.
If this were the case, a DUCC would have preserved
the President during crisis and nuclear exchange
but would have lost him for the aftermath. Mobile
alternates are not as vulnerable in this regard.
Nonetheless, this Study feels that the advantages of protection and
accessibility outweigh the disadvantages of uncertainty, cost, and,
possibly, escape.
As indicated in earlier sections of this Chapter, there seems
to be little point in constructing a DUCC which would only be used
after a crisis had escalated to general war. Presidential access
to such a facility could probably be denied by the Soviets (or a third
party) without providing tactical warning and at a cost much lower
than the lowest cost estimate for a small DUCC. The importance
of short access time to the DUCC is not predicated on the use of
tactical warning but rather on (1) making it accessible to the Pres-
ident so that he feels free to come and go during conditions short
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of general war, (2) making it accessible to the changing Presidential
Group and their immediate advisors during times of crisis so that
face-to-face conferences can be readily held as the "nature of the
crisis expands.
Accordingly, if a DUCC program is approved, the minimum
DUCC considered should provide capabilities for management of
intense crises as well as for conduct of general war The lowest
possible access times should be provided for the President and a
few principal advisors. Somewhat longer access times could be
used for the higher volume transportation of other staff advisors
and of day-to-day operations and maintenance personnel.
The size of a DUCC could vary extensively as a function of
its assigned missions and operational concept. The degree of
centralization of control envisaged in its use is an important
variable. As centralization of decision and staff sur)oort increases
from requirements to authorize the execution of plains to the
capability to select and modify plans, to the capabill,Fy for flexible
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Aft
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and detailed control of all national power, then the manning require-
ments escalate rapidly. With staff support and information provided
from other facilities, a DUCC could be smaller.
The general war mission would require a minimum of 25
supporting staff personnel within the DUCC. Adding to this
approximately 20 for the Presidential Group and ten for support of
intense crises would more than fill up a 50-man facility. To this
number must be added the maintenance personnel required for the
communications, data processing equipment, generators, air con-
ditioning, and utilities, medical and food service technicians; and
hard-rock miners to repair or reopen communication and escape
tunnels. Cross training of personnel would keep the numbers down,
but the highly technical nature of much of the equipment coupled
with a DUCC's possible complete isolation limits the extent to which this
can be done. Finally, if the principles stated above (pages 24-29 )
are adopted, the 25 personnel indicated above for general war support
would be completely inadequate.
For a small, 50-man DUCC, its general war capabilities
would approximate the operational capabilities of a NEACP; for a
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300-man facility, they would be somewhat less than the capabilities
of a NECPA. These estimates assume a self-sufficient DUCC that
does not depend on other NMCS alternates for post-strike staff support.
If other alternates were continued after a DUCC became operational,
then it would be possible for a DUCC to operate in several modes
depending on the post-strike availability of the other alternates and
their communications with a DUCC. In its most austere mode, a
DUCC would deal directly with the surviving centers of the Unified
and Specified Commands. If the NECPA were available, a DUCC
would depend on it for more extensive staff support. In this way,
a smaller DUCC could be built with the attendant risk of somewhat
less overall system survivability and the operational and technical
difficulties of coupling two remote staffs.
The flexibility of a DUCC for change and growth is critically
dependent upon the number, size, and configuration of the under-
ground capsules constructed. Because of this, considerable care
should be taken to determine the mission, functions to be performed
and. who will use this facility prior to finalizing development and
construction plans in order to minimize the cost and maximize the
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utility of a DUCC. Even so, irreducible uncertainties in planning
and the confining nature of the underground facility make it one of
the least flexible alternates.
Consideration should be given to adding a National Mobile
Land Command Post (NMLCP) to the NMCS. Other than the NECPA,
this is the only facility that could provide the staff supporting
communications and protection that might be needed by the President
and the Presidential Group in the six or more years before a DUCC
could be operational.
The operational and technical feasibility of an NMLCP have
been studied. These studies indicate that communications equipment
and operational facilities permanently installed on a train, or
installed in special purpose motor vehicles using a piggy-back
concept of rail transportation combined with an off-train capability,
would provide survivability through mobility and additional redundancy
to the NMCS as a whole. An NMLCP kept on the move and configured
to look like any other train would be extremely hard to target and
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difficult to sabotage; there are thousands of miles of single track
rail and tens of thousands of miles of road within several hundred
miles of the Washington area.
The train could be made at least as accessible as any of the
other alternates or could be located in any area of the nation where
fallout and blast damage would be least likely to odcur. It could
provide transportation for the President on trips, for relocation
of successors, and could be used as a ground mobile system to tie
in with the NEACP at whatever air base it used when outside the
ground communication system.
A moderate size NMLCP could provide a capability comparable
to the NECPA. It could provide any size staff regl4ired by merely
adding cars or an additional section of train. There would be adequate
space for communication and data processing equipment needed to
function during both crises and general war (assuming, of course,
dependence on soft centers for crises less than general war).
An NMLCP could be tied into fixed communication facilities
within the U. S. while on the move; however, for adequate long
range communications in certain modes it might h.ve to stop. It
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might also have difficulty communicating while travelling through
tunnels and over heavily girdered bridges but the magnitude of
these limitations couldn't be precisely determined until operational
experience was gained. In any case, survivability does not
require that an NMLCP be continually on the move; only that move-
ments be frequently made in an irregular manner. It could be
protected from fallout and even blast damage by operating in
tunnels. It has the capability of providing additional communication
relay facilities for any element of the NMCS.
A train is easy to maintain, has a long life, and its endurance
is only limited by normal logistical support required for any facility.
It possesses considerable flexibility for growth, expansion and change.
It is probably the cheapest way to provide a capable mobile alternate.
If it is decided to add an NMLCP to the NMCS, it could become
operational within eighteen months.
Evaluation of Best Combination of Alternates
Finally, for the time period 1965 - 1970, this section analyzes
various combinations of alternates ranging from most austere to most
capable. Configurations of alternates for a later time period that
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could include a DUCC have been excluded for several reasons:
First, if a DUCC is approved, decisions on future alternates
will depend on its detailed functional design and on the degree
of its operational dependence on the other NMCS alternates. Second,
these decisions will depend onfurther experience gained with the
current alternates. They have been operational for about three
years. Three times this much experience will havo been gained by
the time a DUCC could be operational.
This section only considers confirgurations of alternates that
are primarily intended to support the President or an Alternate
Decision Group during the strategic weapons exchaige phase defined
on page V-23 . (These are the Class I and II faclities discussed
on pages V- 33 - 34. )
The design of the current system of NMCS.lternates is
based on several principles:
a. Survivability is best achieved thr }ugh a multiplicity
of alternates that have different t rpes of vulnera-
bility so that the enemy must pursue different
tactics and timing in attacking each one.
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Multiplicity greatly increases the cost of a
successful attack against all the alternates and
promises, even if an attack is eventually
successful, to force the enemy to show his hand
by presenting problems of timing the attack. This
concept argues that a system of one ship at sea
and one plane airborne is more survivable than a
system of two ships at sea.
b. Because of the different sizes of the various
alternates, the system provides for many different
levels of staff and communication support ranging
from the very austere capabilities of the NEACP
to the three-thousand-rnan capacity of Site R.
C. Except for small prelocated operations teams at
each of the alternates, the main staff support for
the NECPA and the ANMCC will be derived during
periods of crisis through augmentation by hundreds
of personnel from the Joint Staff, OSD, the Defense
Agencies, the Services, and other Executive
Departments.
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d. To the extent that warning permits, the President
and presidential successors will, relocate to
different alternates so that one surviving alternate
will carry duly constituted authority on board.
Although there is considerable merit to each of the above
principles, each one can also present problems and disadvantages.
Multiplicity in types of alternates, in size of staff% and in roles
assigned can only be capitalized on if there is multiplicity and
specialization in development of operational procedures, in providing
for relocation and accessibility, in organizing and:assigning qualified
manpower, in specialized exercising and evaluatioti, in communications
internetting, and in research and development supp3rt. There is a
danger that too much multiplicity supported by too little authority,
staff, and resources can lead to a multiplicity of second-class
facilities.
Recent discussions of the NMCS budget lend credence to this
danger. If resources are limited, there is a tendericy to remove
one ship from the NECPA, to delay the procurement of significantly
improved aircraft for the NEACP, to reduce personnel, development
and procurement for each alternate.
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If only a very austere system of alternates could be provided,
then a two-ship NECPA program would appear to be the most desirable.
Such a system would have the following important capabilities:
a. One ship could be maintained on station at all
times to receive the President or an Alternate
Decision Group should strategic or tactical warning
be received; or should the President decide to
relocate during intense crises.
b. Even if the ship continuously- on- station was not
used by the President or an Alternate Decision Group,
its high survivability would do most to insure
availability of at least one NMCS command center
after loss of the President and Washington. This
situation might arise after a Soviet initiative strike
"out of the blue", that is a strike no preceded by
a crisis. Or, it might arise during an intense
crisis if the President did not choose to relocate
himself or an Alternate Decision Group. In either
case, the ship's capability to inform the CINCs,
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to assist in information inter.hange between therm,
and to seek out a Presidential successor would be
essential.
C. The second ship could be occasionally withdrawn
from operational readiness fcr a period of days
or weeks in order to be main ained, modified or
exercised at sea.
d. In the event that a severe crii;is developed,
both ships could often be mad- available so that
the President and an Alternates Decision Group
could be relocated, and so th.t the enemy would
be faced with the problem of simultaneously
attacking two mobile alternates. Possibly this
is not as difficult a task as attacking a ship and
a plane but it is considerably :more difficult than
attacking only one ship.
e. Staff support of at least three' hundred personnel.
in each ship could be provided the National Decision
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Groups. In addition, there is expansion capability
for increased use of automated equipment and
expanded communications as new techniques are
developed and proven.
f. If the authority and resources available to develop
improved operational capability in the NMCS
alternates is limited, then these resources could
be focused in a concerted fashion on these two
alternates.
g. When the President travelled for an extended period
to a location far from Washington, one of the ships
could often be prepositioned for readier access
when he arrived at his destination.
The Study considered a second austere configuration consisting
of one ship and three NEACP aircraft. Compared with the two-ship
only alternative, this configuration would have the following advantages:
a. It would be more survivable in that the enemy
would be forces to target both a ship and a plane
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moving randomly (assuming that both were mobile
at the time of the enemy attack.).
b. It would cost somewhat less over a 5-year period
than the 2-ship configuration.
C. It would provide an airborne communication relay,.
d. The aircraft could be made sos ewhat more
accessible than the ship for rapid relocation
of the President or an Alternate Decision Group
on receipt of tactical warning.
e. The aircarft could accompany "he President on
trips outside the Washington area.
However, a three aircraft - one ship cow-iguration would
have the disadvantage that there would be nurner ;us intermittent
periods when a ship would not be available on sh. rt notice. If
the single NECPA ship were to be modified and :exercised as
necessary, then we would estimate only 80 perca ant availability of
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the ship on a 24-hour or less notice,* and only 90 percent availability
on 1-week notice. At times when the ship was unavailable, the
President would be unable to relocate to an alternate during intense
crises since the NEACP does not possess the capability of supporting
him for prolonged periods in situations short of general war.
Also, it is difficult to assess the significance of any added
survivability of a plane and ship configuration over that of a 2-ship
configuration. The primary role of the NMCS in providing presidential
protection is to insure that a National Decision Group will not be
destroyed by an attack on Washington and that a very concerted
attack would be required to destroy their center. In this sense,
there seems to be much less value in raising the price of attack
from 25 to 50 weapons compared with insuring that the price is at
least 25 weapons.
Finally, the lower endurance after the onset of general war
of the aircraft element compared with the NECPA element is significant.
*This relatively high availability figure assumes two full crews for
the single NECPA ship similar to the Blue and Gold crews used for
Polaris submarines.
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Accordingly, this Study concludes that the 2-ship configuration
would be the preferred austere system if priority is assigned to
providing a capability for presidential relocation during an intense
crisis. On the other hand, if it were considered 'highly unlikely
that the President would relocate under these conditions, that he
would utilize an Alternate Decision Group instead, and that he
planned to relocate himself after the onset of a general war, then
the 1-ship - 3-aircraft option seems preferable.
The second increment in improving this austere NMCS
system would depend on the priority attached to the following
different objectives:
a. Provide a multiplicity of centers to which the
President could relocate during an intense crisis;
b. Provide a multiplicity of centers to which the
President or an Alternate Decision Group could
relocate after strategic or tactical warning;
c. Provide a very large, flexible c'rnter that would
not be a bonus target for an attack on Washington.
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The first need implies: (1) a larger staff than can be provided
by the NEACP, (2) endurance and nondisrupted operational
capability during the crisis, and (3) extensive communication
support with soft national centers supporting the Presidential
Group. The most promising means of satisfying this need (in
the period before a DUCC could be built) would be the NMLCP.
If proper priority were given, such a capability could be developed
in less than eighteen months.
If priority were given to the second need, the austere
two-ship system should be enhanced by a NEACP system consisting
of three modern aircraft. This expanded alternative would also
have the advantage that a NEACP aircraft could readily follow the
President on his travels. It would also be capable of a limited,
continuous airborne alert during intense crises.
If priority were given to the third need above, the ANMCC
would be added. However, this study questions the wisdom of this
priority considering the extreme unlikelihood that the President
or a presidential successor would relocate to the ANMCC. However,
the study does recommend continuation of the AJCC with the mission
discussed on pages VI-34 - 36.
VI- 63
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If it is desirable to strengthen the NMCS even more, then
the third level of improvement would consist of one of the following,
depending on the priorities that had been stressed above:
a. A two-ship NECPA, a three aircraft NEACP,
a NMLCP.
b. A two-ship NECPA, a NMLCP, an ANMCC.
c. A two-ship NECPA, a three aircraft NEACP,
an ANMCC.
Alternative a. stresses survivability; Alternative b. stresses
relocation of the President during crises and flexibility of support;
Alternative c. (the current system) stresses flexibility, the use of
an Alternate Decision Group, and the relocation of the President
after tactical warning.
Finally, one could include all of the present and proposed
The Study Group recommends, for the time'roeriod before a
DUCC could be operational, that a two-ship NECPA element and a three-
aircraft NEACP element be continued and improved for use during
the strategic weapons exchange phase of a general war; that the
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NECPA ships be developed so that they are useable by the President
and the Presidential Group during intense crises short of general war;
and that the role of the AJCC stress its use in phases before and
after the strategic weapons exchange phase. Although a National
Mobile Land Command Post promises a capability comparable
with that of the NECPA ships at probably less cost, the Study Group
does not recommend that an NMLCP be developed at this time.
Essentially this is a comparative judgment. The NMLCP represents
an additional facility in support of the relocation option of the
President in severe or intense crises, short of general war. The
White House and other Executive Agencies have expressed relatively
little interest in this option. Capability to support it can be
explored and developed by expanding the role of the already available
NECPA ships. On the other hand, the DUCC offers a degree of
accessibility and communications support not duplicated in other
facilities and particularly well matched to the President's crisis
management needs. However, an NMLCP should be seriously
considered if the DUCC is not approved or if greater interest
develops in additional highly protected relocation sites during
the time period before a DUCC could become operational.
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As pointed out in the discussion of the current NECPA ships
(pages VI-37 - 40), the USS NORTHAMPTON has certain deficiencies
with regard to communications, helicopter operati:ig space, data
processing and display, and growth capability. Inddition, differences
in configuration between the NORTHAMPTON and the WRIGHT'
hamper operational effectiveness of the two NECPLs and increase
the cost of improvement.
The operational deficiencies of the current NECPA, indicated
above, can be reduced. There are many possibilities including:
a. Significantly improve the NORTAMPTON.
b. Convert a hull comparable to the USS WRIGHT
in physical and operational characteristics as a
replacement for the NORTHAMPT'ON.
c. Man the WRIGHT with two complete crews (the
Polaris Blue and Gold crew concept); keep her on
station to the maximum extent compatible with
effective operations, exercising, maintenance
and development; and place the I`+ORTHAMPTON
on station only when the WRIGH--` must be in port
or participating in exercises.
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d. Keep a somewhat improved NORTHAMPTON at
sea as much as feasible with one crew and two
primary missions: (1) provide for the no-warning
situation where Washington and the President are
destroyed, (2) support a Presidential Decision
Group. Keep the WRIGHT available, exercised
and up-to-date for Presidential relocation during
an intense crisis. This alternative is probably the
least expensive but it is significantly less desirable
than the first three considered above.
A detailed study would probably suggest that a combination
of these possibilities is indicated. For example, the extent of
delay in replacing the NORTHAMPTON would affect both the size
of a reasonable investment for improving the interim NORTHAMPTON
and the interim operational concepts. Accordi ngly, the Study
Group recommends that the JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy conduct
a study that develops plans for remedying the operational defects of the
current two-ship NECPA element. This study should: (1) detail
functional needs and criteria for supporting the Presidential Group
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during intense crises and during the strategic exchange phase;
(2) compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving
the NORTHAMPTON or obtaining a replacement hull; and, (3)
consider operating concepts with the cur-rent or new- ships.
Summary Conclusions
The following is a summary of the conclusions of the Study
Group regarding the alternates of the NMCS:
1. The alternates, unlike the NMCC:, are national
renters in that they must provide support to a decision-making group
concerned with more than Department of Defense resources and
with more than military considerations.
2. The most important functions of an alternate are to
protect and support the President and the Presidential Group during
both intense crises and general war. If the President and the
Presidential Group do not relocate during an intense crisis, th-en
their protection is marginal at the onset of general war. For
management of intense crises short of general war'., the Presidential
alternate would primarily depend on staff and communications support
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from the various soft-centers in Washington; the alternate would be
connected to these centers with high capacity communications that
are not necessarily protected. For management of general war, the
basic mode of operation would .not depend on survival of Washington
or of other NMCS alternates. For this mode, highly survivable,
lower capacity communications are required between the alternate
and the CINC Headquarters, the CINC alternates and other subordinate
centers.
3. Only the NECPA, an NMLCP and a DUCC could
satisfy the requirements of protection, endurance, staff support
and communications capability needed for both intense crises and
general war. The advantages of the DUCC with respect to
accessibility and communications support during intense crises
outweigh the disadvantages of cost, unknown weapons effects, and
uncertainty of escape. If a DUCC is undertaken, its precise size
should be determined by considering the factors indicated above
(see pages VI-18-29).
4. Provision should also be made for supporting an
Alternate Decision Group headed by a Presidential successor that
would relocate during intense crisis or after receipt of tactical warning.
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Since this group would require less communications and staff
support than the Presidential Group, all of the alternates listed
above plus the NEACP would be adequate. The Vice-President
seems uniquely suited to head an Alternate Decisiot Group. In
any case, the Study considers it unlikely that more, than one
Alternate Decision Group would be constituted during crises or
general war.
5. For the time period before a DUCC could be developed,
the Study has considered the following three different configurations
of alternates ranging from the most austere to the tnost adequate:
a. Two functionally similar NECPA ships
b. Three NEACP aircraft plus A. above
c. An NMLCP with a staff capacity somewhat
less than a NECPA plus b. above.
A selection of one of these alternatives depends oninany factors:
available funds, available personnel for prelocation and round-the-
clock operation, augmentation plans, priority assigned to Presidential
relocation during intense crises, and degree of dependence on
relocation Alternate Decision Groups. The Study recommends
Alternative b. -- Two NECPA ships and three NEAt`;P aircraft.
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6. If a DUCC is approved, mobile alternates will still
be needed after a DUCC is operational to provide flexibility and to
enhance the survivability of the entire NMCS. Selection of a precise
configuration of alternates for this time period should await detailed
functional design of a DUCC and further experience with the current
NMCS alternates.
7. The JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy should
conduct a study that develops plans for remedying the operational
defects of the current two-ship NECPA element. This study should:
(1) detail the functional needs and criteria for support of the
Presidential Group during intense crises and during the strategic
exchange phase; (2) compare the costs and schedules of significantly
improving the NORTHAMPTON or obtaining a replacement hull;
and, (3) consider operating concepts with the current or new ships.
8. The operational concept and support plans of the
NECPA and the NEACP should be revised to provide for greater
endurance, survivability and accessibility. For the NECPA, this
planning should include increased protection from various forms of
attack, larger and faster transportation capability between Washington
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and the ships, and operations closer to the Washington area during
crises. For the NEACP, the planning should include use of aerial
refueling, permanent dispersal of the aircraft, capability for
post-strike use of several bases that have prelocated logistics
and communications support, and plans for locating an aircraft
closer to Washington during severe crises.
9. Because of its relatively low survivability, the
ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an Alternate Decision
Group during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war.
The facility, however, should be continued as an AJCC with primarily
the following functions: act as a potential reconstitution site in
the follow-on phases of a general war; provide a dispersed back-up
to Washington communications; and support ottiez- NMCS centers
for day-to-day operations and crises. A detaili functional and
technical analysis of the current and planned AJC:C should be
conducted in order to develop a better understani ii.ng of how particular
capabilities and costs contribute to each of these tune tions. The study
should indicate potential savings.
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The President increasingly becomes the focal point of crisis
management as a crisis intensifies. He devotes more time to the
crisis and considers selected operations in greater detail. The
President needs and operates with extreme flexibility -- flexibility
in constituting his immediate decision group; in defining alternate
courses of action that must be considered; in determining, to the
extent feasible, the timing of the U. S. responses and therefore
the time allowable for staff inputs; flexibility in seeking detailed
information on selected military operations; in establishing and
employing the organization and operational command chain including
reducing the number of echelons of command; flexibility in determining
the sensitivity of selected information relating to the crisis; in
communicating with allied, neutral and enemy heads of state; and
in establishing constraints or accepting risks in conducting the crisis.
hePresident will select the Presidential Group that will assist
him in directing a given crisis. This has invariably been true in the
past and it is reasonable to assume that it will continue to be so in the
future. Since the Presidential Group will include personal advisors,
VII-I
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and statutory advisors and their subordinates, it will reflect
military, political, diplomatic, intelligence and other such
interests that might be relevant to the crisis. Asa crisis
develops, the composition of the Presidential Group will normally
grow and alter.
So far the U. S. has experienced only a very few of the
infinite number of crisis situations with which command and
control support arrangements must be prepared to cope. Crisis
situations, far more intense than any yet experienced, but never-
theless short of a large scale intercontinental nuclear exchange,
are possible. These should be given more consideration in the
development of U. S. command and control arrangements. For
example, as indicated below, consideration of intense crises can
have a significant impact on plans for presidential protection.
During a crisis the President and theresidential Group
will probably use miss* n-or' intern eny~ro s to assist
14.2-1 them in estimating the present situation, and in developing and
evaluating alternate courses of action. These groups may be asked
to consider broad or narrow aspects of the crisis. The President
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and the Presidential Group expect that such support has melded
military, political, domestic and diplomatic factors. Accordingly,
the constitution of the Presidential Group and their need for staff
support implies the need for interagency staffing before estimates
and advice ,are advanced to the Presidential Group.
For severe crises, the composition and extent of the advisory
staff support to the President will be uniquely determined at the time
of the crisis by the nature of the crisis including such factors as timing,
areas and participants, scope of conflict, the opportunity and the need
for secrecy, escalatory potential, and diplomatic constraints. On the
other hand, the routine information support capabilities needed to
support these individuals are much more predictable. These capabilities
include communications and message distribution, provision of factual
data on force status and plans, routine staff support in implementing
and promulgating decisions, conferencing and display facilities, and
the staff which operates and provides these capabilities. Accordingly,
it is desirable and feasible to a .crate conceptually and organizationally
the problem of providing the advisory staff support from that of providing
the routine information support. _ It is difficult to improvise information
support during a crisis and it is possible to anticipate the requirements
rbn
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for this support before the crisis. The reverse is true for staff
advisory support.
Presidential councils are informal and consultative in nature.
The President receives his information support through his advisor's
and, accordingly, crisis management would not be enhanced by
establishment at the national level of an elaborate "National Command
Center" manned by a large, permanent interag-ncy staff.
Many avenues are available that would improve interagency
effectiveness in crisis anticipation and management. The following
are recommended: increased attention at all levels of the Joint
Staff with crisis management, freer interaction at all levels between
members of the Joint Staff and their counterparts in other agencies,
greater interagency review of military and political contingency
plans, increased interagency participation in war gaming and
exercising, and increased attention within the Joint Staff on non-
military factors affecting crisis anticipation and management.
Within the military establishment the concept of handling
crises within command posts or operations centers is well
established. The NMCC is similar to, but both narrower and
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-broader in its scope than the conventional operations center. It is
narrower in that its support to decision makers is rendered through
the medium of their staff advisors, and ordinarily it does not itself
provide advisory staff support except when an emergency does not
permit referral to such advisors. It is broader in that the principal
users of NMCC information support are not only the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Staff, but also various elements of OSD and
authorized persons in the White House, State Department and CIA.
The NMCC performs the functions of (1) warning and alert,
(2) information support, and (3) implementation. Its principal
suppliers of information to the NMCC are the operating forces, the
service operations centers, and the DIA through the Intelligence
Support and Indications Center.
The fundamental character of the NMCC is that of a DoD
information suofa;y operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
the DoD as a whole. In the performance of its functions the NMCC
should exchange information freely with analogous information
centers elsewhere within the Government.
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The management arrangements under which the NMCC
operates should preserve its close working relationship with the
Directorate for Operations in the Joint Staff and also should reflect
its essentially informational character and Doll-wide scope.
Future development of the.NMCC_ shouLci emphasize
evolutionary improvement as opposed to sweeping change. Such
evolution will be helped by increased efforts to evaluate NMCC
performances both in actual crises and in exercises. The
establishment of suitable performance standards for the N.MCC
will also be helpful in its development.
Exercises of a variety of types and scope are necessary
not only for the improvement of the NMCC but also to familiarize
participating decision makers with its facilities and with command
problems. For some of these exercises, senior members from all
affected agencies and their staffs should participate.
At any stage of crisis or general nuclear war, enemy options
range from a deliberate heavy attack against national command
centers to strenuously avoiding these targets. In addition, there
are a host of foreseeable and unforeseeable events that could lead
to nuclear strikes on Washington or to Washington remaining
completely undamaged. In providing for command and control
VII-6
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support to the President, all of these contingencies must be
considered. In providing survivability for the President, the
worst cases must be planned for.
There are many factors militating against presidential
relgcation_,during crises short of general war. However, if the
enemy decides to escalate a crisis to general war, he can easily
destroy unprotected national centers without the President's
receiving tactical warning. If tactical warning of an attack is
received, it is not clear that the President's wisest course would
be to seek immediate protection. Accordingly, capabilities should
be provided for presidential protection in a highly survivable
command center during any phase of crisis. This Center must
allow the President and the Presidential Group to manage intense
crises short of general nuclear war as well as these can be managed
from the White House.
The unique value of the President required that all possible
measures be taken to insure his personal survival of an attack on
the U. S. However, ,provision for a successor is also necessary.
Accordipgly, capabilities should allow relocation to a highly
survivable center of an alternate Presidential Group headed by a
presidentially designated alternate Commander-in-Chief. The
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command and control support for this alternate group could be
It is important to recognize the national-level character
of those alternates that might be used by the President or an
Alternate Decision Group as contrasted with the DOD-level role
of the NMCC.
A DUCC in Washington would be the only facility that could
adequately satisfy the presidential needs for accessibility combined
with survivability and adequate staff support. However, since a
DUCC cannot be operational for at least five years, in the interim
only the NECPA ship and a National Mobile Land Command Post
(NMLCP) come close to approximating the requirements of:
:adequate staff support; high volume (not necessarily survivable)
communications between the alternate and soft Washington centers;
continuous operation for a period of days or weeks; and high survi--
viability of the alternate itself. The NEACP falls short of meeting
the first three criteria: the ANMCC fails on the last.
For the time period before a DUCC could be operational,
the study developed the following three different configurations. of
alternates ranging from most austere_ to the most adequate:
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3) A)(.~t
a. Two . funGt Qnally similar NECPA ships
b. Three ;,NEACP aircraft, plus (a) above
3)
c. An ,.CF with a staff. capacity somewhat less than a
NEC.PA, plus (b) above.
The Study recommends alternative (b) above. An NMLCP
is not recommended unless greater emphasis is placed on providing
flexible capabilities for presidential relocation during intense crises
short of general war.
The JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy should conduct a study
that develops plans for remedying the operational defects of the
current two-ship NECPA element. This study should: i) detail the
functional needs and criteria for support of the Presidential Group
during intense crises and during the strategic exchange phase; ii)
compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving the
NORTHHAMPTON or obtaining a replacement hull; and, iii)
consider operating concepts with the current or new ships.
The operational concept and support plans of the NECPA
and the NEACP should be revised to provide for greater endurance,
survivability and accessibility. For the NECPA, this planning
should include increased protection from various forms of attack,
UIP
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TOP
larger and faster transportation capability between Washington
and the ships, and operations closer to the Washington area
during crises. For the NEACP, the planning should include use
of aerial refueling, permanent dispersal of the aircraft, capability
for post-strike use of several bases that have prelocated logistics
and communications support, and plans for locating the aircraft
closer to Washington during severe crises.
Because of its relatively low survivability, the ANMCC is
not suited to use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group
during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war. The
AJCC should be continued with primarily the following functions: act
as a potential reconstitution site in the follow-on phases of a general
war; provide a dispersed back-up to Washington communications;
and support other NMCS centers for day-to-day operations and crises.
A detailed functional and technical analysis of the current and planned
AJCC should be conducted in order to develop a better understanding
of how particular capabilities and costs contribute to each of these
functions. The study should indicate potential savings.
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SECRET
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
2 7 F E 1. 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Director of Defense Research & Engineering
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
The Director, Defense Atomic Support Agency
The Director, Defense Communications Agency
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, Defense Supply Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
SUBJECT: Conceptual Approach to the NMCS
References: (a) CM-1151-64, ""Review of NMCS Planning,"
dated 27 January 1964
(b) Deputy Secretary of "Defense memorandum,
""Command, Control and Communications,"
dated 10 February 1964
As an initial step in re-evaluating Department of Defense command
and control activities, as proposed in reference (a), I desire that an
appraisal be undertaken of the requirements for command and control
support to the President during crisis situations. This appraisal will
furnish the standard against which Department of Defense capabilities
and plans, particularly for the National Military Command System
(NMCS), can be.compared to insure that our conceptual approach to
command and control is valid, effective, and understandable. Terms
of Reference for the appraisal are attached.
The Director of Organizational and Management Planning as
my representative, and Lieutenant General David A.- Burchinal,
designated to represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will provide policy
guidance for the study effort. In addition, the Director of Organizational
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and Management Planning will arrange for participation in the
Study Group by appropriate elements of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has designated Rear
Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., Chief, Command and Control
Requirements Group, to chair the Study Group and to arrange for
Joint Staff support, as required.
Following submission of the Study Group report, I will request
comments on the result prior to arranging for the subsequent steps in
clarifying our conceptual approach to command and control.
Actions designed to pursue the re-evaluation of other portions
of the over-all command and control problem, indicated in reference
(b), will be announced later.
C'
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COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT
OF THE
NATIONAL DECISION AUTHORITIES
TERMS OF REFERENCE
INTRODUCTION
1. There is a need for a re-evaluation of the purposes of;
conceptual approach to; detailed planning, designing
and engineering support efforts for; assignments of
functional responsibility for; and organizational arrange-
ments for command and control systems within the
Department of Defense.
2. The over-all re-evaluation will be divided into various
problem areas and separate efforts initiated to seek
solutions in each of these areas.
3. A problem with long range implications is the need
to establish a clearly defined conceptual approach to
command and control at the national level. The study
effort outlined in these Terms of Reference is designed
to provide a basis for developing a valid, universally
understood conceptual approach for Department of
Defense command and control support to the President. a4
*As used here the term "support to the President" is visualized to
include support to the President, to his personal and statutory advisors,
to the successors, and to existing organizational entities or organizational
entities which the President may establish which have as their purpose
providing assistance to the President in the management of crisis
situations.
1)OW
:JGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFj;f) AFTER 12 YEARS.
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The specific objective sought in this study effort is the
identification and cataloging of the command and control
support needs of the President during crisis and conflict
situations and the delimiting of those needs for which the
Department of Defense is, or should be, responsible.
The types of activities and resultant categories of support
to be investigated are as follows:
1. The information which the President will require
in order to reach decisions during crisis situations.
With respect to this informational need, it will be
necessary to determine the type (status of friendly
forces, intelligence, political, domestic, etc. ); the
nature (scope and degree of refinement); the form
(method of presentation which will be most useful);
the time factors involved; and the source (who provides
it and through what channels).
2. The statutory advisors or others with whom the
President may wish to confer directly during the
decision-making process and whether these individuals
should be co-located with the President.
3. The scheme for establishing alternate decision-making
groups composed of the President or his successors;
principal civilian statutory advisors, or their repre-
sentatives; principal military advisors; and immediate
staff support, and proposed methods of dispersing
these groups.
4. The types of decisions that will be made, the individuals
or activities who will require notification of such
decisions, and the form and method of such notification,,
5.. Staff required to support the principal statutory advisors
both:
a. At the President's location providing immediate
support to the advisors;.
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b., At locations where the alternate decision-making
groups may be located; and
co At locations where the more detailed activities
associated with the responsibilities of the advisors
are being performed and from which back-up
support can be provided.
C. RESULT DESIRED
1. A report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense having a
target date of 1 May 1964 which will:
a. Set forth the information requested in a manner
permitting subsequent evaluation as to whether
or not the present Department of Defense command
and control apparatus, particularly the NMCS, is.
capable of reasonably meeting the requirements
of the National Decision Authorities; and
b. Identify any need. to alter the conceptual approach
within the Department of Defense to command and
control.
D.. METHOD
I. The Study Group will develop the requirements for infor-
mation, decisions, instructions, and requisite staff support,
by investigating a range of crisis and conflict situations
(either hypothetical or historical) covering a spectrum of
intensity.
2. Particular emphasis should be placed on those periods
immediately preceding or following basic decisions,
identifying where possible the more critical needs of
the President and his personal and statutory advisors
as opposed to those needs which permit a useful, but
not vital,. degree of refinement.
3. The study should include consideration, under strategic
warning conditions, of a minor crisis, an intermediate
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crisis, and a major crisis where both sides are
on the brink of exchanging strategic weapons. The
major crisis situation should be escalated to include
consideration of support needs during a general war.
In addition, the major crisis should be varied to
include consideration of a situation in which Soviet
strategic nuclear weapons are launched against the
U. S. without (or with only minimum) strategic warning,
posing the need to obtain information, reach decisions
and take appropriate action under these conditions.
The study should also consider the needs of the President
and his principal advisors with respect to temporarily
stabilized conflict situations arising out of crises
(for example, the Congo and Korea) that may lead to
new crises and any unusual needs which may result from
multiple crises situations.
4. In conducting the review, analytic techniques employed
should include the following:
a. The analysis should be made in terms of the principal
types of political and military incidents, activities,
and problems that occur during crises and conflicts;
the relationship of these to the assessment and
decision roles of the President; and the resulting
implications for command and control support to
the President;
b. The development of scenarios for different types of
crises. To the extent feasible, it would be desirable
to employ scenarios that have already been developed
for other purposes; and
c. The testing of analytic conclusions against historical
situations.
E. LIMITS FOR THE INVESTIGATION
1. The study effort will be conducted within the confines
of current national policy and strategy as enunciated by
the President and other principal administration official's.
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2. Time frame to be considered will be 1965 through 1969.
3. The effort will be directed toward identifying require-
ments for the information and necessary staff support
,essential to decision-making and the issuance of
instructions rather than toward means for satisfying
these requirements.
4. The principal concern should be the immediate support
to be provided to the President at the Washington level
and the Department of Defense back-up required to
insure that this support is available.
5. The study effort will be conducted on a strictly in-house
basis until such time as clearance is obtained from the
Secretary of Defense to contact outside agencies.
Therefore, projections of support provided by outside
agencies will be based on information currently avail-
able within the Department of Defense, will be stated
in general terms, and will consider particularly that
support which interacts with support provided by the
Department of Defense.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions will be used by the Study Group. No
other assumptions will be used without prior approval from the
Deputy Secretary of Defense or his designee:
Because of political factors, it is extremely unlikely that
the President would leave the Washington area during a
crisis situation which could result in a nuclear exchange.
However, if located outside of the Washington area at the
initiation of a rapidly developing situation, the President
may not return to the Washington area.
2. For the foreseeable future, the President will not pre-
delegate authority for the initial expenditure of nuclear
weapons, except possibly for air or missile defense of
CONUS.
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3. The direct access between other Presidential advisors,
such as the Secretary of State and the Director of
Central Intelligence, and certain of their subordinate
advisors and staff support mechanisms will be main-
tained as long as these survive.
4. For most levels of conflict and to the extent possible, the
President and his principal advisors will exercise detailed
monitoring and control of some actions at low echelons
whenever these actions appear to have inherent national
significance.
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SCENARIOS, WAR GAMES, EXERCISES AND HISTORICAL INCIDENTS
PART I
INTRODUCTION
This annex indicates some of the scenarios, war games,
exercises, and actual crisis situations that were utilized during the
course of the Study. In studying these actual or hypothetical situations,
the goal was to determine the lessons applying to command, control
and communication support of the President. The technique used was
to consider the world situation at a point in crisis, to identify associated
decisions that faced the President and the Presidential Group; to develop
the information needs of the President and his advisory staff support
including the volume, detail and timing of this information; and, finally,
to derive the impact of these needs on concepts and operation of command
and control support. The goal was not to evaluate the quality of crisis
management in actual situations (e. g. could better decisions have been
made), nor to suggest principle-s of crisis management or strategic
policy for the future. In this regard, one conclusion of the Study Group
is that national level command and control support to the President is
more heavily influenced by the operating needs of the Presidency rather
than by the particular force postures and national strategies of parties
to the conflict. (Of course, this phenomenon become less and less
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true as one considers command and control capabilities at successively
lower echelons.)
The study of conflicts short of general war was particularly
assisted by an analysis of six war games conducted by the Joint War
Games Agency. Each of these games involved the threat or use of
extensive military action. In general, the game players on both sides
were senior policy-level officials within DOD and at State, CIA and the
White House. As such, this participation highlighted the concerns of
senior official-s and demonstrated ways in which military and non-
military factors must be integrated in crisis management. The six
games dealt with:
1. South Vietnam in 1964, where little escalation took place.
2. A large conflict in South East Asia in 1965
3. An Eastern German revolt in 1964
4. A Berlin confrontation in 1963
5. A battle for Laos and South Vietnam in 1962
6. Escalation in Iran in 1962.
For each of these games, succeeding sections discuss the game focus,
chronology and issues involved.
Although these games are invaluable in identifying the timing
and nature of key Presidential decisions during crises and the many
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interrelated factors that must be considered, they contain virtually
no data on the actual problems of coupling information support at
the national level with the advisory staffs supporting the President
and his key advisors. The study of command and control support
during actual crises is an invaluable, albeit restricted, tool in this
regard. It is restricted, as pointed out in a section below identifying
the particular historical crises that was considered, because even
the severest crisis in the past decade -- the Cuban Missile Crisis --
involved no battle, no commitment of major forces in crisis manage-
ment and many stages of escalation short of general war remained
available to both parties to the conflict. This observation coupled
with the possibility that general war will become in the future a less
viable option for both sides leads to the discussion and recommendation
in the body of the report that greater attention must be devoted to the
study of managing intense crises and to the command and control
implications.
The Joint Staff conducted Exercise Key Chain in October 1963
as a world-wide exercise of crisis and limited war in recognition
that at least simulated testing of the world-wide command and
control system was needed for a crisis such as would have occurred
had the Cuban missile crisis escalated several stages. As discussed
below, this Exercise was precluded from achieving its full goals
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but study of the conduct was nonetheless most revealing.
One of the key problems affecting command and control needs
is the situation in Central Europe and the many possible developments
in NATO strategy and forces. The scenarios developed in the Tac
Nuc 65 Study by the Chairman's Special Studies Group were among
those utilized for this purpose. The political and diplomatic questions
that would be present during such scenarios were not as fully developed
as the military factors. Nonetheless, these scenarios provide valuable
insights into questions of available options, timing, level of conflict,
and attack assessment needs even recognizing that political and
command and control restraints may preclude the development of as
rich a range of options as was presented in this study.
Regarding general war, the HIGH HEELS II exercise conducted.
by the JCS in October 1963 and the HIGH HEELS III exercise planned
for September 1964 (but cancelled as a result of the Gulf of Tonkin)
were studied. The HIGH HEELS exercises are very useful in studying
national level command and control support mechanisms to the
President. They reveal problems and needs related to vulnerability,
emergency procedures, augmentation, possible roles of the alternates,
alerting of forces and detection of major Soviet attacks. Since the
exercises are necessarily forced to widespread strategic exchanges
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(for exercise purposes) they do not shed light on war avoidance
measures that might be considered by the President at the time of
intense crisis. They also have not considered possibilities of intra-
war deterrence and war termination.
As an aid in illuminating some of the more complex politico-
military problems that might face the President during intense crisis
and the strategic exchange phase of a general war, the Study Group
used three scenarios developed in the NESC study on the Management
and Termination of Thermonuclear War with the Soviet Union (TS).
Several excursions of these scenarios involving strategy changes and
technological uncertainties are discussed briefly in the last section
of this annex.
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SIX W1R GAMES
This section considers six war games developed by the Joint
War Games Agency of the JCS.
1. South Vietnam -- 1964
a. Game Focus -- SIGMA 1-64 is a military political game
centered on the escalation of the war in South Vietnam and
its extension by the United States to North Vietnam by
attacking limited objectives.
The major U. S. objective is to compel reduction of
North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam through
military action against North Vietnam. Escalation is
carried out in two steps: (1) Republic of Vietnam (RVN)
ground and air action on a "tit-for-tat" basis, and
(2) strokes by U. S. aircraft against selected North
Vietnam (DRV) targets.
b. Chronology
(1) Pregame Events
Mar-June Increased Viet Conk; action supported
by North Vietnam.
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Decision by U. S. to create climate
of opinion favorable to escalation.
(2) Game Events
Jun 15-25 The U. S. and RVN decide to carry out
tit-for-tat raids against North Vietnam
with RVN ground and air forces. Action
to begin June 25 and to continue until
"indications" reveal a substantial
reduction of DRV support of Viet Cong
action.
DRV, Viet Cong and Pathet Laos rely on
parrying the U. S.. offensive through
diplomatic and psychological pressure
depicting the U. S. as aggressor.
Communist China declares support for
DRV and furnishes air defense fighters
and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
It refuses to supply tactical aircraft.
Jun 15 - U. S. intervenes and bombs DRV military
Jul 21
targets. Communist leaders turn world
opinion against U. S. As a result,
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American domestic opinion is sharply
split. UN Security Council action against
U. S. is staved off only through U. S. veto.
Soviet Union supplies" M1G 17 s and SAMs
to DRY.
Jul 22 President asks for Joint Congressional
Resolution noting DRY aggression against
RVN, warning other Communist powers
against intervention, and authorizing
President to use U. S. forces to repel
aggression in SE Asia.
Jul 22 U. S. bombs DRY targets. Communist
China recommends and prepares for support
of DRV offensive operations against
Thailand and Northern Burma.
The game ends with the U. S. and Communist
China on a direct collision course in SE
Asia. The U. S. is attacking military and
economic targets in North Vietnam and
conducting air recorniaissance over China,
while China is preparing for a ground
invasion of Southeast Asia.
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co Principal Issues for Presidential Decision
(1) Whether and when U. S. should switch from support
of counterinsurgency operations within South Vietnam
to indirect and direct support of military action
against North Vietnam?
(2) Which actions are best calculated to compel reduction
of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam without
bringing about war with Communist China?
(3) What can be done to prepare domestic and world opinion
for direct U. S. intervention and to minimize expected
adverse reaction?
2. Large Conflict in Southeast Asia -- 1965
a. Game Focus -- SIGMA 11-64 considers U. S. military
strategy to be followed in SE Asia in 1965, assuming a
belligerent Red China and large-scale U. S. intervention.
The U. S. objective is to stop broad Red Chinese incursions
into SE Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma) through
decisive military action backed by appropriate political
cover moves. Large U. S. ground, sea and air forces are
deployed and spread out over South Vietnam, Thailand and
Laos.
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b. Chronology
(1) Pregame Events
1964 War in S. Vietnam goes badly for U. S.
Fall
and the Khanh regime Limited U. S.
naval air strikes against N. Vietnamese
bases do not produce desired effect.
Red China deploys MIG's to North
Vietnamese airfields.
In December, Nosh Vietnamese ground
forces supported by U. S. air suffer a
serious defeat near Saigon.
1965 U. S. President announcies to Congress:
Feb 26
- debarkation of U. Marine force in
S. Vietnam;
- planned airlift of one U. S. Army brigade
to Thailand;
- policy of retaliatory air strikes against
selected North Vietnamese targets;
- intelligence indications of the presence
of a ChiCom division in Laos.
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Mar U. S. builds up logistics in SE Asia.
Incidents occur at Berlin.
(2) Game Events
April 1
President declares national emergency.
Three U. S. Army divisions, one Marine
division and supporting air units are
deployed to Thailand. An additional
Attack Carrier Group and one ASW
Carrier Group go to Western Pacific.
April 1 Red Chinese objective is to eliminate U. S.
from SE Asia while avoiding direct
collision with U. S. forces.
The supporting Red strategy calls for four
Chinese Communist divisions to move
surreptitiously into Laos and for one
additional North Vietnamese division
to infiltrate into South Vietnam.
April 1-15 U. S. air offensive against North
Vietnam destroys all military and
industrial targets of consequence.
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Apr 2 President refuses to delegate to
CINCPAC authority to use tactical
nuclear weapons against Chinese
Communist ground forces as needed.
SEATO powers do not actively support
U. S. offensive militarily or politically.
Chiang Kai-shek offers ground forces
for employment in S. Vietnam or against
the Chinese mainland.
Apr 15 Red Chinese infiltrate another N. Vietnamese
division into S. Vietnarr.
Apr 21 Fighters bearing N. Vietnamese markings
engage U. S. aircraft over N. Vietnam.
U. S. and Thailand agree on joint operations
East of Mekong for May,
May 1-25 U. S. air offensive against N. Vietnam
continues. Joint U. S. / Thai operations
in Laos.
Two Chinese Communist divisions advance
through Laos to the Vietnamese and Burmese
borders.
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May 25 French Government calls for international
conference of the Geneva powers and the
U. S. to arrange cease fire. Premier
Khanh considers situation hopeless and
wants to resign. Ambassador Taylor
talks him out of it. Game ends with
Blue considering three courses of
action (without coming to a conclusion):
(a) Negotiation;
(b) Take over of military command in
S. Vietnam, engagement of Chinese
Communists in Thailand and Burma,
and bombing of Chinese mainland
military and industrial targets;
(c) Execution of general war plans against
Red China, with conventional or
nuclear weapons.
The Chinese Communists decide to continue
their slow advance in Laos and to move
two divisions to Northern Burma.
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c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision
(1) What kind of provocative N. Vietnamese or Red
Chinese act should trigger a large scale deployment
of U. S. forces?
(2) What actions would constitute an appropriate tit-for-
tat response to Red provocation?
(3) If large forces are deployed to SE Asia, and if the
Red Chinese and N. Vietnamese then back down, what
should the U. S. do with these forces? Should they
be returned? Can they defend in place against a
"nibbling" Communist strategy? Should they take the
offensive in the absence of provocation?
(4) When would it be appropriate for U. S. to take over
command from S. Vietnamense? Should a SEATO
supreme command be formed?
3. Revolt in East Germany -- 1964
a. Game Focus -- Epsilon 1-64 is a military-political game
which focuses on the exploration of U. S. alternatives in,
the event of an East German uprising, brought on by a
conflict between two Communist factions. The scenario
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calls attention to the similarity of U. S. and Soviet
interests and highlights the problem of tacit and open
cooperation between the U. S. and the Soviet Union in
such an event.
b. Chronology
(1) Pregame Events
1964 Relaxation of East-West tension.
Summer
Fall Disastrously bad harvest in the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) leads to
production shortages, longer working
hours, and reinstitution of oppressive
political controls. General Stoph succeeds
Grotewohl as GDR Premier.
The Federal German Republic (FGR)
and the U. S. offer economic aid. GDR
leaders quarrel over whether to accept
aid from the FGR only or the U. S. as
well. The Stoph faction is willing to
accept aid from both. The opposing
Stalinist faction in the GDR compels a
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rupture of contacts and trade with
the West. It forms a plot to arrest
Stoph. The attempt to seize Stoph
fails. Security guards are killed in
the attempt.
Some GDR Army units and party formations
declare for Stoph, others support the
Stalinist faction. Civil war results.
(2) Game Events
Oct 1 Soviet forces in Germany go on alert.
U. S. wishes to limit risk of general war,
especially through miscalculation, while
expressing sympathy for GDR liberal
uprising. There is no eagerness to render
direct assistance to either side.
U. S. covertly offers asylum to Stoph.
U. S. decides not to move American or
NATO forces into the GDR.
Soviet objective is: first, to end revolt
in East Germany; second, to restore a
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GDR regime responsive to Moscow;
and, third, to avoid direct confrontation
with U. S. Soviet Union decides to
support Stoph for the moment and to
move reinforcements to the GDR from
Western Russia.
FGR military units move to zonal border
to assist refugees. Minor armed clashes
with GDR and Soviet border guards and
military forces result.
Chancellor Erhardt proposes 50-year
non-aggression pact to Soviet Union in
return for agreement to work out phased
program for German reunification.
Oct 2 Increasing civil war in the GDR.
U. S. opts for restoration of order in
the GDR, support of the "liberal" Stoph
regime, and prevention of FGR intervention.
Two STRICOM divisions are alerted for
move to Europe. France and Birtain oppose
risking war to assist East Germans.
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Neutralist East German labor leader
proclaims independent provisional
government in Halle. Several East
German generals declare support of
this revolutionary regime.
Mikoyan and Suslov arrive in Berlin to
take control of East German regime.
Soviet Union moves to stamp out uprising;
is prepared to teach militant FGR a
lesson (threat of conventional bombing);
and remains determined to conciliate U. S.
The game ends.
c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision
(1) Whether interests of the United States and the Soviet
Union are sufficiently alike in the event of an East
German uprising to permit localization of conflict
through Soviet-American cooperation.
(2) Should U. S. support move of FGR forces into GDR?
(3) How shall U. S. react to Soviet moves to stamp out
East German revolt? What can U. S. do to moderate
18
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(4) What should U. S. do in face of massive border
crossings by refugees?
(5) Shall U. S. acquiesce in the temporary closing of
access routes to West Berlin in the event of an East
German revolt?
(6) Can U. S. use East German revolt to bring about
change in status quo in Central Europe? Force moves
toward German reunification? Get FGR to accept the
permanence of Germany's division?
4. Battle For Laos and South Vietnam
a. Game Focus -- SIGMA. I-62 centers on the military-political
problem for the U. S. of preventing the complete Communist
take-over of Laos and the subversion of South Vietnam in
the face of stepped up North Vietnamese and Red Chinese
intervention. The solution attempted is a moderately large
direct intervention with U. S. ground and air forces in Laos
from bases in Thailand and South Vietnam.
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tul - t
Chronology
(1) Pregame Events
1962 Red Chinese do not comply with agreement
Spring
to withdraw allforeign personnel from
Laos by June 16.
U. S. protests to International Control
Commission to no avail.
U. S. operation BEEF-UP in South Vietnam
(RVN) results in improved performance
of RVN forces.
Jun 28 President Diem of RVN states that
Communists have taken over Laos and
that his own country was now threatened
due to massive VC infiltration from the
North. In case SEATO continues to refuse
to act promptly, Diem expects to ask for
Thai and Chinese Nationalist aid.
June Thailand calls for urgent SEATO meeting.
USSR asks UN to stop SEATO action.
Promises massive economic aid to Laos.
(in
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(2) Game Events
Aug 1- 31
Red (Chinese Communists and North
Vietnamese) shift from warfare in Laos
to concentration on transit of guerrillas
through Laos into RVN. They accuse
U. S. of imperialist intervention in RVN,
piracy on the high seas, and germ warfare
in Laos.
U. S. steps up aid to Thais and South
Vietnamese. Guides RVN propaganda and
supports RVN covert operations in North
Vietnam (DRV). Appeals to ICC to clear
Laotian corridor.
Reds pass 1500 guerrillas per month
through Laotian corridor and land additional
ones in South Vietnam from junks. Supplies
are air-dropped to VietCongs in aircraft
supplied by USSR.
U. S. succeeds in establishing SEATO
military command (minus U. K. and France)
in Thailand.
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U. S. deploys advance elements of a
Marine division and Air Wing to RVN and
sends air defense tudts to Thailand.
Joint Blue (U. S. and RVN) covert
operations are unde-taken to sever Laos
corridor and to min,. DRV harbors. U. S.
steps up support of FUNAT irregulars in
South China.
Sep 1-15 Stepped up warfare en Laotian corridor.
ChiComs move two divisions to Yunnan.
border and publicly alert others.
VietCong sabotage destroys much POL in
RVN.
Laotian neutralist g=wernment falls,
creating new crisis.
Sep 5 U. S. President announces that he has
ordered airlift of reinforcements to SE
Asia and the immediate move of U. S. units
in Thailand and South Vietnam to Laos.
Equivalent of two U. S. divisions and air
support are involved in latter move.
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Sep 15-30 Red'moves two ChiCom and two DRV
divisions into Laos.
U. S. forces in South Vietnam and Laos
replace loyal RVN and Laotian forces in
fixed positions, releasing the latter for
offensive action. U. S. air provides
close support.
Laotian corridor becomes major battle
area.
co Principal Issues for Presidential Decision
(1) How to skirt a SEATO veto prohibiting bold action in
Laos and South Vietnam.
(2) How to avoid "domino" effect expected as a result of
possible loss of Laos or coup against President Diem.
(3) How to make U. S. intentions clear and actions credible
to Communist regimes.
(4) Whether it would be militarily and politically sound to
risk turning the Laotian corridor into a battlefield.
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(5) Trade off between overt and covert (unconventional
warfare) action for U. S. Trade off between direct U. S.
intervention and greater support for Laotian and South
Vietnamese forces.
(6) Whether South Vietnam would really be more defensible
5. Escalation in Iran -- 1962
a. Game Focus -- MU 1-62 focuses on a political crisis in Iran
which escalates suddenly and unexpectedly into a large, local
conventional war which draws in Turkey, the United States and
the Soviet Union. Several major U. S. and Soviet moves
result from misunderstanding. Other actions are forced
upon them unwittingly by the Iranian factions which they
support.
b. Chronology
(1) Pregame Events
1962 Police brutality against rioters in Teheran
Oct 1-18
triggers revolution. Shah forced to flee to
Turkey. Riahi assumes presidency of :Iran.
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Riahi asks U. S. to recognize Iranian
neutrality. Warns that otherwise Iran
would be swept into Communist orbit.
Riahi controls most of country but not
the Tabriz area.
Shah calls on U. S. to honor treaty obli-
gations. He would then go to Tabriz and
lead loyal forces to victory.
U. K. wants to support Shah. Nehru and
Nasser recognize the new provisional
government of Iran.
Nasser also hints that he would close Suez
Canal to any belligerents.
(2) Game Events
Oct 19 Shah flies to Tabriz. Several squadrons
of Iranian F-86's fly to Tabriz area. Other
military units declare for Shah. U. S.
half-heartedly supports Shah.
Oct 20 Riahi rejects U. S. explanation of its
position. U. S. agent reports indicate
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public opinion at Teheran overwhelmingly
against Shah.
USSR warns U. S. against intervention.
Oct 22-24 Turkish forces cross into Iran and reach
Tabriz on the 24th. Turkey calls CENTO
Council meeting. U. S. tries for compromise
between Riahi and Shah and attempts to slow
Turkish intervention. No success.
Oct 26 Riahi asks for the aid of all government
recognizing his regime in repelling in-
vaders. Denounces U. S. and Britain.
Covertly asks for Soviet intervention: air
strikes against Tabriz targets and Turkish
troop concentrations.
Oct 27-28 Soviet tactical aircraft strike targets not
only in Tabriz area but attack all air force
bases in Iran loyal to Shah. This includes
Abadan, Shiraz and Hamadan fields. These
attacks compel U. S. to modify its plans
for deploying CASF and airborne troops.
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Elements of the U. S. 82nd AB Division
land instead at Adana, Turkey.
Turkey wants quick token U. S. inter-
vention in Iran to discourage Soviet
ground invasion.
U. S. tries to assemble an air strike
capability in the Middle East but NATO
allies and CINCEUR counsel against
withdrawal of air strength from Europe
at this tense moment.
Britain urges caution with firmness.
Large numbers of Soviet technicians and
advisors attach themselves to the Riahi
forces.
c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision
(1) Whether to support Shah outright from the moment
of his ouster.
(2) How to intervene militarily in Iran with major U. S.
forces without provoking large conflict with USSR.
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(3) How to screen U. S. military moves so as to mislead
USSR into believing that U. S. would not intervene.
(4) How to reconcile the Shah's and the Riahi factions in
time to keep the Soviets out.
(5) Once engaged with Soviet forces in Iran, how to avoid
escalation and find acceptable negotiable positions.
6. Confrontation Over Berlin -- 1963
a. Game Focus -- EPSILON 1-62 centers on a confrontation. over
Berlin which occurs between East and Nest following an
announcement by the Soviets of their intent to withdraw from
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and an announcement
by the GDR that all transportation routes to Berlin will be
closed to civilian traffic.
Major U. S. objectives are to maintain free access to Berlin,
to maintain Allied presence in Berlin, to assure freedom of
West Berlin, to avoid recognition of GDR, and (eventually)
to effect unification of Germany. Major Soviet objectives
are to break up the NATO shield, effect the withdrawal of
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U. S. forces to North America, and to split the common
market, incorporating as much of it as possible in the
Soviet economic system.
Determined to avoid general war, both sides react to crisis
conservatively, although there are numerous opportunities
for major gain to either side. Emphasis, therefore, is
on political rather than military considerations.
b. Chronology
(1) Pregame Events
12 Sep 62 Warsaw Pact nations, less Albania,
sign treaty to become effective in March
1963. Treaty denounced by West, with
U. S. calling on FRG to reaffirm its ties
to NATO.
12-17 USSR and GDR notify UN that treaty is
May 63
in effect. Under Article #5, East Germany
withdraws from the Pact, being protected
from attack by Warsaw Pact Protocol.
Khrushchev calls for withdrawal of FRG
from NATO to form a "peaceful German
federation. "
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24-25 Soviets announce withdrawal of forces
Mar
from GDR starting 31 March. No troops
to remain west of ROSTOCK-BERLIN-
LEIPZIG - PLAUEN line. Soviets ask
UN to move Headquarters to Berlin.
1 Apr GDR Foreign Minister announces 4-6
day suspension of traffic, effective 9 April,
on all transportation routes to Berlin from
West Germany on the grounds that the move
is essential to the Russian withdrawal to
the East and the relocation of NVA, SAP
and Frontier Police.
(2) Game Events
3-9 Soviets border guards replaced by East
April
Germans. Soviet units reported prepared
to move. Air France civilian aircraft
collides with military aircraft, British
Viscount forced down after straying out of
corridor on 9 April. By 0500, 9 April,
all civilian traffic is stopped.
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11-12 While practicing Berlin troop deploy-
April
ments, one small Allied probe unit breaks
out, but becomes trapped in heavy Soviet
GDR military traffic.
Despite pleas of Mayor Brandt, West
Berliners begin rioting the evening of
11 April, storming the Soviet War Memorial
and stoning GDR guards. Several rioters
are wounded accidentally by burp-guns.
13-14 Increased communist military activities
April
in the Far East, India and Latin America.
East Germany urges U Thant to fly to West
Berlin to review the critical situation. On
13 April, France and U. K. lead a hard
line NATO policy vote declaring a NATO
Reinforced Alert, authorizing full implemen-
tation of TREADMILL plans. NAC
authorizes a blockade of the Communist
Bloc if Berlin blockage continues past
1200, 17 April.
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USSR cables Tripartite Powers stating
penetration of GDR by FRG troops moving
into W. Berlin would be considered an
act of aggression.
On 14 April, West Berlin mobs become
increasingly vocal and impossible to
control. Finally an incident causes an
enraged mob of 50, 000 to charge the
Wall. By 2130 East German troops
supported by tanks attack the mob driving
it back into Berlin, killing and wounding
hundreds.
15-18 Within Berlin violence and rioting continues
April
with military forces on both sides anxious
to avoid a shooting war. In the U. S., the
President declares a national emergency,
effective 15 April, and U. S. forces go on
DEFCON II.
U Thant, in response to a vote in the
General Assembly, makes on the spot
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investigation and urgently requests
a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNPKF)
be sent to Berlin. On 17 April DeGaulle
warns Kennedy that the presence of a
UNPKF in Berlin foretells the end of
NATO. DeGaulle and Adenauer come
out for an iron fisted policy, urging
dispersal of forces, evacuation of major
cities, and preparations for launching a
nuclear demonstration, or multi-megaton
attack, if necessary, but state that the
decision must be made before the UN takes
over Berlin.
The game ends as UNPKF approach
Tempelhof, Shoenfeld and Tegel airfields.
c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision
(1) What statements should be made concerning Soviet
responsibility for maintaining free access to Berlin?
Should the West offer to assist the Soviet evacuation in
return for their help in maintaining free access to Berlin?
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(2) What actions are required relative to the NATO
alliance? Should a NATO embargo be imposed?
(3) What actions should be taken in Berlin itself? What
contingency plans are feasible for implementation?
How can Allied forces be maintained in Berlin without
becoming involved in a shooting war in the face of
West German rioting?
(4) What course of action should be taken to inhibit the
possibility that Warsaw Pact nations come to the aid
of the GDR?
(5) How should Allied forces in Europe be reinforced and
made ready, yet restrained? What orders must be
given to USCINCEUR - SACEUR? What is the U. S.
position regarding the use of U. S. forces and weapons
assigned to EUCOM, particularly nuclear delivery
systems and weapons?
(6) How should the situation be interpreted in terms of
threat to the U. S. continent? What DEFCON and
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mobilization status is required, and when?
(7) Should actions be considered to inhibit the possibility
of a "go-it-alone" course of action by the French and
FRG?
(8) What position should the U. S. take with regard to
neutralist sponsored UN intervention in Berlin,
particularly considering the possible effect of this
move on the NATO alliance?
(9) How can the USIA assist in the Berlin crises? How
should the situation be explained to U. S. and Allied
publics? What actions should be taken by CIA forces?
(10) What actions should be taken in response to stepped up
communist activities in the Far East, India and Latin
America?
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HISTORICAL CRISES
The Working Group used recent historical incidents as
subjects for analysis in those levels of crisis which have been
experienced. To the extent that it was available, information
on Korea, Hungary - Suez, Taiwan, Berlin 61, Lebanon, Cuba 62,
Panama 64, Brazil, RB 66 64, and Tonkin Gulf was examined.
Source material included JCS chronologies; crisis studies by
DOD, State, CIA and contractor groups; and interviews with
participants and observers.
The Cuba crisis of 1962 is easily the best documented
major crisis in recent experience. For this reason and because
it is the severest crisis available for scrutiny, the Study Group
concentrated on it.
It was concluded from this crisis study that there are two
principal variables which must be considered in determining the
intensity of a crisis. The first is the degree of escalatory
potential in the crisis situation. The second is the extent of the
actual combat operations directly employed as counters in the
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management of the crisis. Cuba and Berlin, for examples, were
high in escalatory potential, but involved negligible combat
operations.. Korea and Vietnam on the other hand included extensive
combat operations, but had far less escalatory potential. It is
significant that our command and control apparatus and decis ion-
makers have not yet been tested in an actual crisis which was both
highly escalatory and which involved extensive employment of
combat operations as a feature of its management.
e' er
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Exercise KEY CHAIN (October 1963) was designed and
conducted as a world-wide command post exercise. Its objective
was to exercise limited war contingency plans in such a way that
the National Command Authorities might have an opportunity to
observe and participate in the strategic direction of the Unified
and Specified Commands under realistic exercise conditions as
well as to provide subordinate commanders and their staffs with
a similar opportunity to exercise at their limited war emergency
duties. A further objective was to exercise command, control
and communications facilities and procedures as well as emergency
plans and procedures at all participating levels of command.
KEY CHAIN did not include escalation into a general war
situation, but it did provide a measure of "brink" operations in
that SIOP forces participated and responded in terms of readiness
to exercise requirements. In keeping with the limited war theme,
hot spots were developed in peripheral contact areas (Korea,
Middle East, etc.) as opposed to direct confrontations with the
Soviets. An actual crisis in Berlin caused premature termination
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of the exercise, but the most disappointing feature thereof
was the lack of participation by top level authorities. The
exercise was conducted by staff-level personnel. All back-
ground data for the exercise (intelligence, political, operations,
etc.) was predetermined. Movement of forces was simulated.
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CONVENTIONAL AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
The options and scenarios developed in the TacNuc- 65 Study
conducted by the Chairman's Special Studies Group represent some
of the typical scenarios used by the Study Group in considering
major crises in Central Europe and their command and control needs.
Military Postures and Objectives
Tactical nuclear war in Central Europe is considered in terms
of three alternate defense postures:
a. A stout non-nuclear forward defense against a
major non-nuclear Soviet Bloc assault with
escalation to controlled use of tactical nuclear
weapons when it is clear that the non-nuclear
defense is inadequate.
b. A forward defense providing for prompt nuclear
response to any but small-scale non-nuclear attacks
with two options: (1) initial .nuclear response is
restricted to employment of weapons of 2KT or less
within the engaged battle zone, or (2) initial nuclear.
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response emphasizes interdiction to neutralize
all military targets as necessary within the
Central European Satellite Areas.
c. A forward, multiple option, flexible response
defense which provides for the graduated application
of non-nuclear and tactical nuclear weapons and
which is designed to increase the survivability
and recuperability of NATO forces and to minimize
the risks of escalation.
Ten illustrative scenarios, consonant with the above defense
postures, are presented. For each scenario, optional plans for the
employment of tactical nuclear weapons are considered. The
scenarios are grouped under three headings: (1) deliberate attack
after force build-up, (2) non-deliberate warfare situations, and (3)
deliberate attack with surprise. The central plots of the ten scenarios
are sufficiently similar to present them here as a single, composite
scenario.
Military rather than political objectives and approaches are
stressed. The major Soviet military objective is to acquire a portion
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of Western Europe, with its industrial resources and associated
civilian population relatively intact, through the tactical use of
nuclear weapons (principally MRBM/IRBM forces land in Western
USSR). (The Soviets also may choose to employ chemical weapons
in view of their relative superiority in this are:., and their relative
inferiority in nuclear weaponry.) The NATO military objective is
to establish a military posture sufficient to deter Soviet aggression,
to preserve NATO territorial integrity, and tomai.ntain sea lines of
communication. The U. S. military objective is to tailor the
application of force both appropriate to the circumstance and
sufficient to attain NATO objectives.
Chronology of Events: A typical scenario proceeds as follows:
11 Aug 65 The Soviet Bloc decides to initiate
a war on 1 October and begins limited
covert mobilization.
26 Aug 65 NATO is concerned over reports of
mysterious USSR activity.
9 - 14
Sept In the guise of, maneuver, Soviet Bloc
begins low tempo troop movements.
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U. S. orders Airlift Emergency I
and begins movement of U. S.
roundout and filler personnel.
NATO declares :state of Military
Vigilance.
F5 - 27 Soviet Bloc begins rapid overt force
Sept
movements and steps up mobilization.
U. S. begins to airlift armored
divisions from CONUS and sends CASF
squadrons. NATO declares Simple
Alert. U. S. and some NATO countries
initiate mobilization. With continued
build-up by the Soviet Bloc, NATO
declares Reinforced alert on 27 Sept.
SACEUR orders limited air reconnaissance
over Satellite countries. Two aircraft
are shot down, USSR protests.
30 -Sept Soviet Bloc continues war preparations.
NATO increases readiness with emphasis
on nuclear capabilities. NATO and Warsaw
Pact nations issue strong warnings. SACEUR
declares State Orange.
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At this point, the scenarios differ depending on the options
selected and the Soviet reply. Over a dozen major options are
developed and some of these are successively applied in each scenario.
As a result, the ten scenarios present a rich family of different levels
of conflict, rates of escalation, and decision points.
Principal Issues for Presidential Decision
a. When and to what degree should the U. S. reinforce European
forces? How imminent is a nuclear attack by the Soviet
Union?
b. When and under what circumstances should authority be
predelegated to unlock nuclear weapons under the PAL
system? To release and employ nuclear weapons?
c. What emergency actions should be taken, and when,
relative to preparation of strategic forces in the
continential U. S. ?
d. If the Soviet Bloc initiates a non-nuclear attack with the
announced intent of limiting the attack and their goals
to W. Germany provided other NATO nations are not used
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as bases for attacks, to what extent should NATO
participate (versus with some other alliance structure?)
e. Should nuclear weapons be employed? Which option
should be selected? At this point should all nuclear
weapons be released? If not all, which ones? If
Group B weapons are considered for release, is
sufficient justification for this action provided by
SACEUR/USCINCEUR? Are NATO nations in agreement?
f. If, in response to limited NATO employment of tactical
nuclear weapons, the Soviets pre-empt by employing
their IRBM/MRBMs in quantity, what actions are
required? (See i, below).
g. If, in response to limited NATO employment of tactical
nuclear weapons, the Soviets reply in kind and do not
escalate, what actions can be taken to terminate the
conflict and negotiate a settlement?
h.. If, in response to limited NATO employment of tactical
nuclear weapons, the Soviets choose to escalate the
yield but not the perimeter of nuclear warfare, should the
Soviet escalation be matched?... should NATO expand
nuclear operations against interdiction targets? ... to
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include counter air operations? Depending upon NATO
actions and Soviet responses to these conditions, what
actions can be taken to terminate the conflict and negotiate
a settlement? If the Soviets offer an armistice while
still in NATO territory, what response should NATO
make?
i. If the Soviet Bloc escalates to use of all yields up to 1
or 2 MT in theater-wide counter air and interdiction
operations, but avoids civil damage, should the U. S.
release all nuclear weapons? Execute a SLOP option?
Should NATO attack SSP and RPP targets in East
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland? Should NATO)
release all R-Hour tasks in conjunction with U. S.
execution of a SLOP option?
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In 1963, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee completed a study
on the Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union
(TS). The three scenarios in this study were considered. In
addition, excursions and variations of these scenarios highlighted
particular command and control needs.
1. Focus of Study. The Study presents three basic types of
general war scenarios for the 1964 - 72 period:
a. War initiated by a Soviet massive intercontinental nation
killing attack (hereafter Scenario A).
b. War initiated by a U. S. discriminate pre-emptive strike
(hereafter Scenario B).
c. Limited war escalating to limited intercontinental exchange
(hereafter Scenario C).
2. Decisions in Scenarios A and B. There are relatively few
presidential decision points in the A and B large-scale nuclear wars.
The major decision points considered in the study and the questions at
issue can be summarized as follows:
Pre H-hour (Scenario B)
a. Launch U. S. counterforce attack without U. S. warning
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b. Launch U. S. counterforce and counter population
attack without warning.
c. Increase alert position and try to talk Soviet leaders
out of launching their massive attack.
After H-hour (Scenario A)
a. Maximum retaliatory strike against USSR, satellites
and Red China.
b. Counterforce strike only against USSR, satellites and
Red China.
c. Either of above but withholding attack on specific
satellites or Red China.
In case of Soviet offer to halt intercontinental exchange
Scenarios A and B
a. Accept it.
b. Offer to withhold counter-city strikes on stated conditions.
c. Reject it and, if applicable, extend option to anti-popula-
tion attack.
Post-Attack (Scenarios A and B)
Both sides have delivered their maximum initial attacks
and retain only small ready nuclear rese:r-ves. Damage is very
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great in U. S. and Communist China but greater yet in NATO
Europe, the satellites, and the Soviet Union. Armistice terms
have been agreed upon, calling for Soviet withdrawal from
Europe and destruction of remaining ICBM's and MRBM's.
Issues requiring presidential decision include:
a. How to reestablish order in CONUS.
b. How to enforce Soviet withdrawal from Europe.
c. How to insure initial and continued Soviet compliance
with armistice agreement.
d. How to reorganize and build-up of U. S. forces to
coerce Nth countries unwilling to cooperate with U. S.
allies..
3. Decisions in Escalating, Limited General War (Scenario C)
The typical scenario C starts with Communist instigated civil
war in a European NATO Country. NATO allies render conventional
GLc_~i.L`v~
military assistance to their fhion and Soviet Bloc countries to the
Communist insurgents. Conventional war spreads to neighboring NATO
and satellite countries. U. S. and Soviet bases and forces in these
countries suffer collateral damage. U. S. and Soviet forces in Central
Europe employ tactical nuclear weapons against military targets.
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Mutual threats lead the U. S. and Soviet Union to exchange inter-
continental nuclear blows. After several tit-fox-tat rounds, the
U. S. goes to a limited counterforce strategy. The Soviet Union
now signals its willingness to back off by responding with a much
smaller counterforce strike. Negotiations ensue and a truce is
agreed upon. This sort of scenario presents numerous decision
points. It will also afford repeated opportunities for managing the
war so as to prevent further escalation or to manipulate escalation
so as to enhance the probability of ending the war.
In this type of war, the need for constant central direction is
great; moreover, because the belligerents' basic objectives are apt
to change under the pressure of events. War objectives need to be
managed in a manner commensurate with the management of escalation
and termination of hostilities.
Major issues for presidential decision in this conflict include
the following:
a. Assuming Communist uprising, in Italy, for instance,
should U. S. intervene at all?
b. What should be the objective of!U. S. intervention, and
how can it be clearly conveyed to friend and foe?
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c. Are intervening forces adequate to do the job? Are
they so large as to provoke Soviet intervention?
d. Under what circumstances should sanctuary bases in
neighboring countries be attacked?
e. If conventional forces do not suffice to turn the battle,
at which point should tactical nuclear weapons be employed?
How many? Against which targets?
f. Will use of tactical nuclear weapons deter direct Soviet
intervention? What will U. S. do if Soviet Union retaliates with
tactical nuclear weapons?
g. In case of Soviet IRBM and medium bomber strikes
against NATO bases, the President may choose to:
(1) Launch ICBM strikes against Soviet MRBM and
medium bomber bases.
(2) Same as (1) but use Polaris.
(3) Same as (1) but use theater tactical bombers.
(4) Send ultimatum to Soviet Union threatening
destruction of certain military targets in Soviet Union
unless attacks cease.
(5) Do nothing.
h. Assuming Soviet continuation of MRBM offensive, the
issue for the United States is whether to make good its threat
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and, if so, which Soviet targets to attack.
i. If the Soviet Union follows with a tit-for-tat inter-
continental strike, the President must decide whether to
escalate further or negotiate.
j. If negotiation seems indicated, should a settlement
simply require the return to status quo ante or should other-
demands be made? If the latter, how much can the U. S.
demand at the end of a war which brought about great
destruction but did not result in a clear- cut outcome?
k. If a compromise settlement is reached which leaves
the Soviet Union with large nuclear forces and considerable
recuperative industrial potential, how shall terms be enforced
and peace be assured?
above scenarios were considered where there w+-ere major technical
and organizational malfunctions or where new strategies were adoped
(and possibly employed, if necessary,) by the U. S. , the Soviet Union
or other nuclear capable powers.
Some of the strategic variations that were considered include:
a. The Soviets procure extensive tactical warning systems
and modernize their existing systems. The new systems include
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a Midas-like satellite borne sensor and over- the -horizon
radars - both of which might give thirty-minutes or more
warning of attack. In addition, the Soviet classified and
open literature both stress the need for rapid, all-out
response.
b. The Soviets announce a policy of ''controlled response''
and intra war deterrence but state that counterforce attacks
are futile, difficult to distinguish, and entail inevitably high
collateral damage. Instead, they state that escalation should
proceed through stages of attacks on industrial capability,
natural resources and urban population.
c. One or both sides pursue massive civil defense programs
including nation-wide fallout shelter programs, limited blast
shelter facilities in major urban areas and evacuation capabili-
ties for periods of intense crisis.
Each of the above would affect the conduct of the war and the
command and control needs. In variation (c), civil defense activities
would play a greater role in management of crises and wars and,
therefore, the President would require information on both SU and
U. S.. status of population. In variation (b), attack assessment
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capabilities would need refinement.
The technical and organization malfunctions that were
considered included:
1. Soviet Command Failure. Durin` period of intense
crisis, a small portion of Soviet Command structure launches
a part of the Soviet ICBM force.
Issues for presidential decision:
a. Why does the Soviet Union launch a surprise attack?
b. What is the meaning of the crazy-quilt pattern of
attack? What is the enemy trying to convey?
c. What would be an appropriate response?
Incoming Soviet ICBM's
and SLBMs perform far more poorly than. U. S. intelligence
anticipated. (The number of aborts and duds is high and CEP's
appear to be excessive. )
a. In view of such performance, should the U. S. now
change its strategy?
b. Can U. S. convince Soviet leaders that their weapons
really perform so poorly?
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3. Ragged Soviet Attack or Response. Through command
misunderstanding, faulty communications, or other technical
difficulties, the Soviet Union attack is unexpectedly ragged.
Part of the ICBM force gets off too soon and the remainder of
of the force is launching at far too slow a rate.
Issues for presidential decision:
a.
Can the U. S. detect this situation?
b.
Should the U. S.
option?
switch to a different strategic
c.
Should the U. S.
attempt to negotiate immediately?
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