MORSE CALLS REFUGEES 'REAL ENEMIES' TO U.S.
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00149R000300200011-8
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RIPPUB
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K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 21, 1998
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 27, 1963
Content Type:
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HUMAN EVENTS APR 2 7 1963
Morsea s s o d For Release:
`Real Enemies' to U.S.
Castro and anti- Communist refugees.
Already it is aft the Communists
w to are cur enemies. but the anti-
S ator Wayne 1iorse tells theta off
in a brisk speech urging them to re-
in tuber that it is not for them to make
A erikan foreign policy and that they
re not In the t'n;te(j States with any
ri ht_s, legally or ,aurally, to use the
to ritory of the (Jutted States for ac-
ti itits atimed at implicating A ncrica.,
ft reign policy in siuationy t,'at might
w 11 lead to war"-or, more plausibly,
t a Soviet retreat from this hemis
p ere, which we are supposed to wan
Bpsi i,?~ the refugee nuisance, 'there
fa the Goldwater-Keating nuisance
w ich, according to 1984 logic, is
t sing away the- great "victory" o
missile withdrawal. It takes a bi CPYRGHT
0 ci, ing to figure this one,
them publisher of Lie 171~d1;]i "
4_s ,...*
tit r, se to the W&. It seem
at "by refusing to bring Castr
d )wn by the brute force of Yanke
a s, Mr. Kennedy has restored fat
s i,0 with South America now infusin
n
L.;, policy." 'T'his victory, accordi
t Mr. Graham, is "being recklessi
s uandered by the partisan brawliti
over Cuba.
In building his argument, M
raham comes out with the most r
.arkable 1984-ism I have encou
t red yet. Castro, it appears, "occuple
t ie place of Syngnian Rhec or Diem
r. unpopular leader propped by ma
. ve support of a major power . .
he responsibilit for the final do
y f 11 of Castro lies with the people
Cuba." They, with tactics "imitati-
f Mao Tse-rung and Ho Chi Minh'
re poised to fight the only kind f
var of liberation' that the free wort
an countenance."
It sound, like
a war of libera-
tion that i~ un-
likely to lib, rate
anybody- rspe-
t lalty since we
are determined
t:) clap into jail
any Cubans
,,=ho might like
enlist it, it!
The trouble is
W.'ing in the Orwellian Age, men I kV
CPYRGHT
::tL1 tpt to suggest that there is some-
thi::i screwy . ,)out it run the risk of
bt ie;t; brushed aside as nuts. In the
Kingdom of the Blind, the man with
2()!`0 vision is under a serious handi-
can. bus I confess I haven't observed
any erious dissent from the view that
it is "irresponsible" to take the Soviet
occultation seriously. Few -complain
of the effort to ass'.)ciatethem wit:i some
mythical war mongers who demand
immediate invasion of Cuba.
inaction on Cuba
,"Oiled 'Understanding'
^t r ,r h ;m insists ? that the real
Cuban revolution must not be given
"tltc sort of support that would make
them American satellites," because the
reve??.'ion is one "which will never be
unfit - ,.)od' i r;1,,pfficers who ask
for } raises a ton: Lie fulurg rate of
the Xi:if; Ranch :xr other US invest-
ments-,(: Cuba."` A- pre- 1984 mind
would en.ertain the possibility that the
restc rat`,,! of freedom to Cuba might
not be, in. .;istent with a responsible
attitude tt..,.rd US property there,
una in a:., .t,e that such matters can
be settled i.t:t-:, when the Communist
base at our Jo.,rstep has been phaabd
out.. But, I suppose that is negative
thinking.
1111 in a14 A rnjoyed .1984 more
when it uWas fctivn!
Sanitized - Approved For Release,: CIA-RDP75-00149R000300200011-8
,1_.
ponenta of near appeasement.
The United States speedily gathered
around Miami an array of armed power that
could have bounced Castro all the way to the
South Pole. While this "big stick" was be-
ing created, the President practiced the sort
of intensively skilled diplomacy that alone
can find an option different from nuclear
warfare or surrender.
A single instance showed the value of in-
structed and informed reflex action. That
was the President's peremptory refusal to
consider . any trade involving our Turkish
bases-and this despite a widespread afflic-
tion of weak-kneed jitters on the part of
many in and out of Government.
A THROWBACK TO KIPLING
One who visits the Caribbean area, even
brieflly, cannot help being appalled by the
cacophony of abuse and jingoism that has
come out of the United States on the heels
of the President's success.
First came a caterwauling over the rela-
tively ineffective Soviet bomber contingent,
that remained briefly In Cuba. Next came
a blather of criticisms of the U.S. intelligence
system-either naively amateur in nature or
viciously reckless of U.S. security if the
sources happened to hold any responsible
positions in our security organization.
Finally, there have come the trumpeting
swivel-chair warriors, stirred by blurred
recollections of Kipling's days, who demand
such belligerent acts as blockades. It is sur-
prising that Mr. Nixon could so quickly
parole himself from his self-announced sen-
tence of long-term silence. It is appropri-
ate, however, that he selected the setting of
Mr. Jack Paar's program for the announce-
ment of what in other circumstances would
have constituted a grave. demand for acts
of war.
Seen from the Caribbean area, Mr. Ken-
nedy's victory over the Cuban missiles is not
diluted by these strangely _ motivated do-
mestic attacks. The Kennedy policy has
established, for the last Latin doubter, Cas-
tro's suppliant role as a Communist satellite.
And by refusing to bring Castro down by the
brute force of Yankee arms, Mr. Kennedy
has restored faith in the maturity and sense
of partnership with South America now in-
fusing U.S. policy.
RESCUE IS NOT THE ANSWER
The Cuban exiles in the Caribbean area
have fairly easy and constant communica-
tions with Cuba. They know that dissatis-
faction with Castro is constantly growing.
But they also know that within Cuba there
is little desire to be rescued from. Castro by
Yankee arms, only to be returned to the
chaos of corruption existing before Castro's
tyranny.
throw of Castro, but the creation of a new
governmental system that will permit Cu-
bans, by themselves, to find a democratic
destiny.
Cubans of this school of thought are hor-
rified by the bellicosity of a Nixon. They
are depressed by the partisan speeches in
the United States which indicate that we
should reassume a benevolent guardianship
over Cuba.
Those Cubans who engaged in the early
planning of the Bay of Pigs fiasco still re-
member the callous ideas of superiority held
by CIA officials. "The first thing I was asked
by the CIA officer in charge," says a leading
Cuban exile, -'was to state ' my attitude
toward restoration of the King Ranch
properties."
These exiles-predominantly young pro-
fessional men of moderately liberal and
'democratic leanings-are determined that
Castro will be overthrown from within Cuba.
They- have no interest in a Guatemala type
coup d'etat directed by the CIA-or any
other outside organization.
They are seeking financial support with-
out strings. And support is just beginning
to come, in trickles, from among the exiles
themselves and from other Caribbean dem-
ocratic forces. This is aid without. any
strings, without any commitments aside
from the moral assurance of these men that
of corruption.
TOPSY-TURVY SETTING
From the United States, these exiles and
their working colleagues now in Cuba will
welcome only a form of support for which
we have little governmental experience.
They do not want the large-scale, massively
supervised support that has been America's
method in South Korea and South Vietnam.
For in Cuba the tables are turned about
topsy-turvy. from the usual cold war setting.
Here Castro occupies the place of Syngman
Rhee or Diem-an unpopular leader propped
by massive support of a major power. And
in Cuba it is the Communist bloc, for once,
.that is trying to prop an unpopular govern-
ment with an expensive supply line running
across thousands of oceanic miles.
The anti-Castro resistance that is already
a-building takes heart from the lessons of
other areas. These Cubans know that 500,-
000 French soldle,.s, including the ruthless
professionals of the Foreign Legion, could
not conquer the relatively weak bands of
native Algerian rebels. They know how
large a threat to massive U.S. efforts a few
thousand well-trained and dedicated Viet-_
Cong Communists have become. They
know that ours is an age when force can
impose an unpopular dictatorship only when
it is as totally overwhelming as the So-
viet divisions in East Germany.
The greatest U.S. aid to the free Cuban
movement will not come from military ac-
tion against Castro. The sort of action rec-
ommended by Mr. Nixon smacks so much
of Yankee imperialism that in the final
analysis it could only help Castro.
The major things needed from U.S. policy
are already coming forth under President
Kennedy. His firm and courageous elimi-
nation of the Soviet missiles, and his subse-
quent actions, have prevented the Commu-
nists from turning Cuba into a satellite
firmly held by Soviet might.
The responsibility for the final downfall
of Castro lies with the people of Cuba. They
are now just beginning the gathering of
their forces, inside Cuba and among the
exiles in the Caribbean area and on the U.S.
mainland.
The young men who today are forming
these revoluntary forces of freedom are not
prominent on our TV screens or in our press
photographs. And they are revolutionaries-
in the classic sense-not merely opponents
of Castro but opponents of his betrayal of
the revolution which Cuba under Batista
and his predecessors had so long needed.
They are gathering now, and have been
for 15 months since their morale began re-
covering from the almost fatal defeat of
the Bay of Pigs. They are resolute in their
determination to see Cuba liberated by
Cubans. They are, not merely wary of. but
in fact openly hostile toward, the sort of
U.S. support that would make them Ameri-
can satellites.
This is the dominant characteristic of the
new Cuban democratic revolutionary move-
ment. It is a characteristic which will never
be understood by CIA officers who ask for
promises about the future fate of the King
Ranch or other U.S. Investments in Cuba.
In the final analysis, these Cuban freedom
forces are poised to fight the only kind of
war of liberation that the free world can
countenance. Their guerrilla tactics will
be ? frankly imitative of Mao Tse-tung and
Ho Chi Minh. But their political strategy
will be drawn from the experience of Wash-
ington and Franklin and Jefferson. For
their war will not be aimed to establish
a U.S. hegemony but rather to create a new
free land.
SUCCOR THAT FAILED
The extent of the determination of the
Cuban liberation movement can be shown by
a recent poignant example.
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1963
MAR 2 1 1963 FOIAb3b
Sanitized - Ag~~FII~R~IA-~
some guile, is required to sort out the truth
from the facts. But certainly the celebra-
tion of St. Patrick's Day 1s centuries old in
America. It began before the Revolution;
it has never ceased; may it never do so. It
has taken root among us because it is an
occasion dedicated to freedom; to national
freedom and religious freedom, and to the
great St. Patrick.
There was never a better cause. We stand
In the mighty succession of those who first
proclaimed it, and those who brought it .to
fulfillment in our land. It 1s our cause to
defend and ours to advance. In that con-
JOHN P. KENNEDY.
Partisan Brawling Squanders Fruits 'o
Cuba Triumph
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OP
HON. GEORGE P. MILLER .
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 21,1963
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr.
Speaker, all Americans should deplore
the 'unfortunate political charges that
have been made recently concerning
Cuba.
The petty bickering which has been
taking place can only give aid and com-
fort to the enemy.
In last Sunday's Washington Post, I
feel that a penetrating analysis of the
foibles of such. a discussion at this time
is made in an editorial by Philip L.
Graham. This editorial entitled "Parti-
san Brawling Squanders Fruits of Cuba
Triumph," is certainly an excellent ac-
count of where we stand now on the
Cuban matter.
Under leave to extend my remarks, I
am pleased to incorporate this editorial
in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
CUBA TRIUMPH -"have done more fundamental political
'thinking in the past 4 years than in the pre-
(By Phili .GrahU
S "ERTO Rico c`o.,:-Th~~-
SAN JUAN, PUERTO e fruits of
America's greatest cold war triump4 are be-
ing recklessly squandered by the -partisan
brawling over Cuba.
The triumph came on Sunday morning,
last October 28, when Chairman Khrushchev
announced the surrender of the Soviet mis-
sile systems in Cuba. Considering Khru-
shchev's usual prose style, the announce-
-ment was an-epic of unambiguous brevity.
The missile systems would be taken down'
and this would be certified by the U.N.
This came less than 6 days after the Presi-
dent's tough TV speech. Thus Mr. Kennedy
forced the Soviet Union- to agree to "dis-
armament with inspection," a reversal of
years and years of obstinate Soviet rhetoric.
The ensuing reaction is enough' to drive
toward near despair any observer of our two-
party system. Here was an indisputable ex-
ample of the U.S. Government working
soundly, sensibly, sagely under. crisis condi-
tions. The President turned his back-alike
on proponents of armed invasion and pro-