CLOUDY INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100840016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 29, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

APR L J 1~Ju
Sanitized - Approved For Rele
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AIpLs'H S. OcHs, Publisher 11196.1935
PUBLISHED EVERY Di-Y IN Tilt YEAR BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY
ARTHUR If/1Ya SULZaERGRR,Ch'nrmmtt of the Board
ORVIL E. DaYFOos, President and Publisher
A tosv H. BRADFORD, Vr'tae President HARDING F. BANCROrT, Secretary
CPYRGHT
Cloudy Intelligence
op-level estimates that reach the President to
'eniain completely objective, The men who pro-
Ade these judgments are appointees of the Presi-
colored or distorted by policy? ??"` " ?."""6?"`` ?` "?"" a' '?
The differences between President Kennedy,'specially hard for minority views, which might
and Senator Keating about how many Sovietx'iappen to be right, to reach the top.
troops are in Cuba could reflect a serious weak-' This problem will not :ie helped by the ap-
ness in the elaborate apparatus the nation main-, ointment of Clark X Clifford to replace Dr.
fain:; for collecting and evaluating the data on. lames R. Killian, chairman of the board of dl-
which policy must be built. -?ectora of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
The problem is not new to this Administration, iology,.as chairman of the Foreign Intelligence
originate with the Cuban crisis. But tdviaory Board. The board was established as a'
nor did it oexult
when intelligence becomes- as it has become ' of a recommendation of the Hoover Com-
today-the very cornerstone of policy, an almost nission in 1956 to monitor continuously C.I.A.
superhuman objectivity Is required on the part tad other intelligence activities.
of our intelligence chiefs to avoid estimates and Air. Clifford has a brilliant mind, but, as a'
evaluations tailored to policy. Intelligence. if it ong-time trouble-shooter for the Democratic
is to be worth anything, must be completely tarty, he is inextricably associated with partisan
otitics. He replaced askilled and objective t clen-
nonpartisan. 1st-administrator. The selection is at "best un-.
A Senate subcommittee, which has been quietly ortunate. It is bound to give the impression that
investigating the Cuban crisis, has already found our intelligence activities will now be monitored
considerable evidence that. the intelligence ea-, -not by a chairman who to at expert in the
.
timates of last summer and fall were keyed to.-
the "it can't happen here" atmosphere, then prey- `cold-but by one who is gssentially. a politician.,
:silent In Washington. The belief of all the
:ration's top Soviet experts that Premier Khru-
'hchev would never risk installing Russian mis-
siles in Cuba appears to have influenced most of.
the intelligence judgments that reached the Prea-l
ident in that period. The awakening led to a'
concentration on missiles only, that caused us.
to downgrade the significance of the small Soviet'
force that had been sent to Cuba.
Today, the basic difference` between the Presi-
dent and his critics concern the size of thin force,
and whether it is being reduced. Both Mr. Ken-i
nedy and Senator Keating are getting their in
or?mation from the same sourue t .overnntent
ntelligence agencies. But, because Cunt liar be-
'~ome a partisan issue, it is not easy for. the,
001
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7-4980100840016-5