INTELLIGENCE ROLE VITAL, SAYS FORMER CIA MAN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00001R000200190024-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 14, 2003
Sequence Number: 
24
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 9, 1966
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00001R000200190024-0.pdf76.29 KB
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STAT 0 Approved For Release 2003/12/02: CIA-RDP7' P R0'i iiEidCE, , Me BULLETIN E. 145,796 FEB 9 1966 V 0.7 r_ If the intelligence network available to the President today had existed in' 1941 "the likeli- hood of Pearl Harbor would have been much less," accord- ing _t0_-.EzA ,, Lyman _ B. Kirk- patrick, , Jr., Prown_University political scientist and former executive director and, control- ler of the ,Central-Intelligence Agency. Professor Kirkpatrick stressed as vital in Presidential decision- making the evaluation processes which are integral parts of present: day national Intelli- gence systems in a speech be- fore the Providence \ Rotary Club yesterday. Not only do the CIA and the intelligence units of the Army, Navy, Defense Department, Atomic Energy Commission and others pool raw information but it is routinely evaluated, he said. "The ' President gets an esti- mate as to, what is likely to happen," he said adding that to a former intelligence officer the most "chilling" thought is to consider the possibility of a piece of raw information reach-III that a 'truly professional in.; can War' our intelligence was such "that we sent troops to .'; Cuba in winter uniforms," he added. In World War I this country relied on the undependable in- telligence work on our allies, the French and British. At the` end of World War II, the Of- '?+ free of -Strategic Services, which had developed into an organi-, zation employing 30,000 persons, left a trained cadre of intelli-' gence experts, important files. and overseas contacts available to us in constructing the pres- ent national intelligence sys- tem. ' He describedthe;present sys-, t m as "constantly improving" and staffed by "extreniely' dedi- cated personnel." Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200190024-0 ing the President without prior telligence system.'developed, he evaluation, said. Prior to the work of Wil- The l3rowil University pro- Liam J. "Wild Bill" Donovan for . fessor, who came to Rhode Is- President Roosevelt which led land last year after 23 years to formation of the Office of in government intelligence work, Strategic Services "our intelli- said he feels criticism of this gence was rather spotty," . lie country's intelligence system as said. "irresponsible" is unjustified. ' George Washington had a "It is under the direct orders good intelligence system in the of the President, is carefully Revolutionary War but in the supervised by four congressional Civil War. neither the . Union committees and, itt' my opinion, nor. Conferedate forces knew is highly responsible," he said. what the other side was doing, Careful collection of raw iii- he said. In the Spanish-Ameri- formation, coordinated through the National Intelligence Board, resulted in President Kennedy's successful moves in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, he said. Once it was known definitely that the Russians were building missile bases in Cuba, he said, the intelligence system was able to tell the President what the Russians would do if the Presi- dent ordered them to take the missiles and bombers out of Cuba. "It was our estimate that they would take them out, ba'sed' on a careful analysis of Russian behavior," he said. It wasn't until World WaF