MISCELLANEOUS 1945 SEVENTH ARMY REPORTS ON GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 166
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 22, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

ORM O.
1I
.AY 1949 5.6 A
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CLASSIFICATION SECia,T "4"111.1"11111.1.11.6"r".
CENTRAL- INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NU,
Alp FOR M6,TION VitE0ORT
CD NO.
25X1
UNTRY
BJECT.
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QUIRED
11E OF INFO.
:QUIRED
I. /
norm y
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Ilisce4aneous 1945 Seventh Army
32portJ on Germany
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The attached miscellaneous U.S. Seventh Army reports on the interrogation
of various praninent Nazis are sent to you for retention.
'CLASSIFICATION S-.:117,T.
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JOI37,4,1c-J-Ret.
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3-00415R006200030002-7
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: SEC
:Auth: CG
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init:
APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 25
RET
, 7th Army :
I
May 1945
?
OBSERVATIONS ON ARMORED TACTICS
25X1 (Cf also Report Ref No SAIC/17, 24 May 45)
i) GUDERIAN, Hans, GENOBST (Col Gen), FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool),
former-Chief of Staff, German G. and Forces, and Inspector General of
Armored 'Units, is a 57-year old officer who apparently wants to appear
anil-Nazi. He talked freely and answered all questions willingly, but
stated emphatically that he did so only because HITLER's death freed him
from his oath of allegiance.
1141as: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: R.W.
ii) VON GEYR, Leo, GEN DTZTRUPPE (Lt Gen), Inspector of Armored Units.
Proud of his profession, of the old Prussian general type, source gave
information grudgingly; his personal pride borders upon the ridiculous.
Having been Military Attache in LONDON for several years, source claims
to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs.
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: R.W.
1. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN GUDERIAN
17 Jun 1888
1894-1901
01-03
03-07 Main Off Candidate Institution (HAUPTKADETTENANSTALT) LICHT-
ERFELDE.
.07 Assigned as 0 C (FAEHNRICH) to HANNOVERSCHES JAEGER BN 10
at BITCHE.
27 Jan 08 Promoted to 2d Lt. ,
09 Transferred to GOS:AR with Bn.
12-13
13-14
?
AU I4Niovdt.
8 Nov 14
Spring 15
18 Dec 15
Spring?-fallt17
Born at CULM/VISTULA.
School at-COLMAR.
0ffiCer8 candidate institute -(KADETTENANSTALT) at KARLSRUHE.
Feb-Nov 18
Dec 18-Sep 19
On DS with TELEGRAFEN BN 3 (3 Telegraph Bn).
War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN.
. .
CO of Radio Posts with various hqs.
Promoted to 1st Lt.'
Intelligence officer with various hqs.
Promoted to Capt.
On DS on Staff of various hqs.
(up to that time, his basic organization was still 10
JAEGER Bn)
With a hq staff in Italy.
FREIKORPS (GRENZSCHUTZ) -(Frontier Guards) for the EAST.
Source helped to organize these units.
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Oct 19-Jan 20
Jan 20-Apr 22
Apr 22-fa11 24'
Oct 24-Sep
1 Feb
Oct 27-Jan
Feb 30-Sep
1 Feb
Oct 31-Jun
1 Oct
Jul 34-Oct
Oct 35-Feb
1 Aug
1 Feb
Mar 38-Nov
Nov 38-Aug
Nov
Sep 39-May
Jun 40-Jun
Jul
Jun 41-Dec
Dec
Feb
41-Feb
43-Mar
21 Jul
27
27
30
31
31
34
33
35
38
36
38
38
39
38
40
41
40
41
43
45
44
28 Mar 45
SECRET
REICHSWEHR BRIGADE 10, HANNOVER.
Company commander with 10 JAEG.ER Bn of 17 Inf Regt, GOSLAR.
REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry) INSPEKTEUR DER KRAFT-
FAHRTRUPPEN (Inspector of M/T Units).
On 2d Div Staff, STETTIN: -
Promoted to Maj.
REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry),
TRUPPENALTS.
CO, KRAFTFAHRABT j (j M/T Bn), BERLIN LANKI'VITZ:
Promoted to Lt Col*
C of S, Inspector of M/T units.
Promoted to Col
TRANSPORT ABT DES
14
C of S, KomuaDo DER PANZERTRUPPEN (command of armored
troops).
Commanding 2 Armored Div.
Promoted to Brig Gen.
Promoted to Maj Gen.
CG XVI Corpsi BERLIN,
OKH, CHEF DER SCHNELLEN TRUPPEN (Chief of Mobile Units).
Promoted to Lt Gen (GENERL DER PANZERTRUPPE).
CG, XIX Pz Corps (Poland and France).
CG PANZERGRUPPE GUDERIAN
Promoted to GENOBST (Col Gen).
CG of PANZERGRUPPE 2 (Pz Group 2 later changed to 2 Pz
Army).
Placed in FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool).
Inspector General of Armored Troops.
In addition to other duties, Chief ofStaff, German
Forces.
FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool).
2. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN VON GEYR
2 Mar 1886
1892-1904
04-11
05
11-14
13
Aug 14-Nov 14
Nov 14-summer 16
Jan 15
Born at POTSDAM..
Gymnasium at 'STUTTGART.
26 WUERITEMBERGISCHES KOENIGSDRAGONER REGIMENT.
Promoted to 2d Lt.
War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN.
Promoted to 1st Lt.
Regt Adj, 7 Cav Div.
With 9 Cay Div Hq, as Russian interpreter.
Promoted to Capt.
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summer,46.7Jan 17
.,Jan.17,4Apr
1.7
Apr,17fall
17
fall,17,Apr
18
Apr,18.41ay
18
May' 18-Jun 18
Jul.
Aug 18Sep 18-
S'elo. 18
19-Oct 19
Mar
Jun 20-Sep 22
Sep 2?-Jan 25
Jan 2.5-Oct28
Oat 28-Jan 31
Jan 31-Apr 33
30
Oct 32
Apr 33-Oct 37
Sep 35
Oct 37
Oct 37-Feb 40
Feb 40-Dec 41
' Apr, 40
Det 41-Jun 42
Jun 42-Sep 42
:Oct +2-Jan 45
Feb 43-summer 43,
SEC R ET
On DS with XXII Res Corps Staff.
Liaison Officer, First Bulgarian Army.
ASsigned to XXII Res Corps Staff.
G-2, Army Group (HERhOG) ALBRECHT.
C of S, 30 Inf
C of S, 26 LANDWEHR Inf Div.
G-2, Army Group SCHOLZ.
On Staff of Bulgarian ORCHRIDA Div.
Ill with malaria until end of war.
GROSSER GENERALSTAB (Higher General Stai0';
and Russian questions).
Instructor of tactics at
at MUNICH.
Squadron Commande of 18 Cay Reg , LUDWIGSBURG.
Premoted,to Maj,
1-A (First Staff Officer) 5 Cay Div.
1-A (First Staff officer) WEHRKREIS IV DRESDEN,
CO, 14 Cay Regt LUDWIGSLUST/MEC=NBURG.
Promoted to Lt Col.
Promoted to Col.
Military and Air Attache,
the legations at BRUSSELS
Promoted to Brig Gen.
Promoted to Maj Gen.
CG, 3 Armored Div, BaLIN.
CG XXIV Corps (later changed to XL ArMored Corps).
Promoted to Lt Gen.
Ill. ,
CG, XL Armored Corps,.
Deputy CG, LXXXVI Corps.
BERLIN (Polish
OCS WUENSDORP near BERLIN and
German EmbassyLONDON, and in
and The HAGUE. ,
summer '+3-Jul 44, GENERAL DER PANZERTRUPPE WEST (Gen of Armored Forces, West),
which was nucleus for the PANZER4RMEE DER PANZERGRUPPE-
WEST (Panzor Arm:: of Panzer Group, West), later renamed
5 Pz Army.
Aug 44-Kay 45 Inspector of Armored Units!
In July 44., source was relieved from his command in the WEST
because of differences in opinions regarding armored tactics.
3 NOTES ON ARMORED TACTICS GEN GUDERIAN
_ .
Gen'GUDERIAN considers air superiority an essential factor in a good
coordinated tank attack. .Another important point is that tanks should
3
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always be employed in masses. On ideal terrain and with all necessary tanks
avaiable, a good attack can employ three armored divs, each with 300-400
tanks. If the attacking force has more than one corps available, all diva
can be employed on a broad front without any reserves, while the other corps
takes up positions to the rear as reserve unit. In the Case of tank units
in reserve, the General points out, it is difficult to bring them up to
the critical points in time to be of decisive value._ As an illustration,
source recalls that when he attacked the'MAGINOT Line-in 1940, he employed
three armored diva on a broad front, leaving the question of reserves to
another corps.
The leader of tank units should always be far up to the front, since
quick decisions and forceful leadership are by far tore important in armored
tactics than in engagements of any other arm. It is of paramount importance
to recogniae the exact moment when the unit should advance into battle to
its best advantage.
' Armored tactics, source points out, were substantially known even before
the war. Source's "ACHTUNG PANZER", Gen de GAULLE's "L'ARMEE DE CHOC", and
British tactics were essentially the same. However, these tactics were
employed neither by the British nor by the Frenchthus, despite inferiority
in heavy tanks, the Germans achieved victory in 40, mainly due to superior
communications equipment, and through correct employment of armored tactics.
As regards tank production, it is better, in Gen GUDERIAN's opinion, to
have quantities of an older-type tank available than toexperimentwitlatoomany
models and lack the necessary amount of armor. ,Through series production
the many changes of the experitental stages (KINDEMaNKHEITEN - "children
diseases") are avoided.
4. NOTES ON ARMORED TACTICS - GEN VON GUR
Source stresses the importance of speed of decision as applied to armored
tactics. A leader of tank units must be able to make decisions on a min-
ute's notice, work constantly under the pressure of time; he must have a
"stop-watch mind" (GEDANKEN DER STOPPUHR). American regtl, bn, and co
commanders still require too much time for making decisions, source believes,
and are thereby losing the surprise element. Leadership of armored units of
div and greater strength should be characterized by its dynamic qualities,
and should "deliver punches at the right time and at the weak spot". '
Armored tactics must vary according to the oponents, source.points out.
He himself developed different tactics for the Eastern and Western fronts.
The amount and execution of air-tank coordination are decisive in tank
battles. In this connection, the failure of ....the GAF is mainly responsible
for the Allied break-out in Normandy.
The ability of the individual tank gunner to aim a good shot at long
ranges is also a most important factor in the outcome of tank engagements.
Generally, proper organization and leadership of fire fights has to be
stressed.
(NOTE: All information below has been obtained from Gen GUDERIAN)
5. FUTURE. DEVELOPMENTS .
Land warfare will be dominated by the use of the tank as long as no
more efficient A/T weapons are developed. Three types of tanks will con-
tinue to be essential: a heavy penetration tank (SCHWERER DURCHBRUCHPANZER)
for the main thrusts; a light reconnaissance tank (LEICHTER AUFKLAERER);
and a tank destroyer, which should be heavily armed and speedy. Source
points out that during this war there has been A German tendency to replace
the light tank with a heavy one, and that only on account of his specific
1+
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requests the production of light tanks was taken up again.
For close combat developments of the flamethrower tank are to be ex-
pected. The German flamethrowers suffered from the bad quality of the oil;
also, the inflammable liquid was placed within the tank, The American
solution of placing the inflammable liquid on a trailer was much more effic-
ient and comfortable for the tank crew, and American oil is excellent. As
a weapon, the flame throwing tank is limited to .street fighting and fight-
ing against an enemy that cannot be reached by the straight flight of the
machine gun bullet. It should be used as support weapon only. Source, how-
ever, expects further developments of its fire techniqUe which, he believes,
will be carried along artillery lines. The morale effect of the flame throw-
ing tanks upon the enemy is conaiderable.
Rockets, having the obvious advantages as to weight, -etc, canneetyet en-
gage point targets and are therefore unsuitable for mounting On tanks. Once?
this disadvantage of the rocket projectors is overcome', however, tank-moun-
ted rocket projectors will be commonly ueed.. , a
Source does net believe that tank-mounted arty weapons will undergo con
siderable changes. He points out that tank crews had already enough trouble
with a long barrelled 88 mm gun, especially in the case of _a gain with
muzzle brake, when passing a.ditch, for instance. A longer barrel would
seriously limit the tanks' mobility. A.limited number of tanks used for
penetration only might be. the exception.
Howitzers mounted on $P chassis did net prove very successful, except for
specifically assigned special mieSions. .The best suited weapons for,mount-
ing on tanks at present are guns of calibers between 75 and 90 mm.
German technicians had quite some trouble in finding a good tank engine;
dust in Russia had a destructive effect Oh German engines t Source thinks
that similar difficulties might be encountered b Y the Americans when em-
ploying tanks in China. He believes Mass employment of tanks against the: :
Japanese in China possible, but difficulties might be encountered trying to
employ armor on a large scale on the Japanese islands. Due to the numerous.,
rivers in China, further developments of amphibious tanks Would beof value.
Source believes that extensive adaptations of infra-red rays to tank
warfare are.. to be expected. He is of the opinion that years to come, might
bring in the field developments comparable to these in the field of radio
equipment between 1918 and the outbreak of 'the present war.
6. COMPARISON OF EXISTING TANKS
Source rates the German Royal Tiger as the best tank employed ,at present.
Next is the Russian T-34, especially the model mounting a 85 mm gun. Next
is the American SHERMAN the main shortcoming of which are its too narrow
tracks. The Russian T-34 has excellent tracks as well as a light Metal
DIESEL engine. The quality Of the steel in Russian tanks was slowly de-
clining, however, and the lack of easily turnable turrets as well as good
radio communication equipment were obvious disadvantages.
Source credits the German Army with having the best tank units.
7. GERMAN JAPANESE COOPERATION
Source doee.not be
were coordinated. To
given to the Japanese
matic representatives
During nine months of
anese Ambassador, Mr
Attache, Mr KOMATSU,
On the Japanese diplo
American questions,
hove that any attacks by the Germans and the Japeneee
his knowledge, information on German tactics was
only once, in 1940. Afterwards the Japanese diplo-
were seen by source with HITLER on rare occasions.
working close to the FUEHRER, source saw the Jap-
OSHIMA, only twice with HITLER. The Japanese Military
was seen five times with HITLER during the same period,
matic staff was also a Mr NISHI (?), specialist in
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Source does not know whether Japanese aggressive measures which led to
the declaration of'war were coordinated with German efforts, but he be-
lieves that they were.
8. DETAILS CONCERNING HITTRR
Source saw HITLER last 28 Mar 45, before being placed in FUEHRERRESERVE.
At that time the FUEHRER was suffering from nervous attacks, and his left
arM, and leg were shaking strongly. HITLER was also still suffering from
bruises on his right arm and from the injured right ear drum, results of the
20 July attempt on his life. HITTER talked clearly and in a precise manner,
and was well informed about the last details of the military situation at
that time.
Source thinks that after his rial to power in 33, HITLER worked in the
interests and to the good of the Gean people.' The following events source
thirks passable, if not entirely Pcorrect". This refers to the increase of
the German Army, the occupation of the Rhineland, the Saar plebiscite and
the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland. German annexation of the
remainder of Czechoslovakia and of Poland.did not find source's approval.
HITLER, source states, was able to convince everybody that his decisions
were right through his personal charm, throughout the war. Field Marshal
KEITEL, whom source does not consider very clever, was particularly succept-
ible to HITLER's arguments. The German General Staff raised objections as
to various Contemplated operations, but HITLER had his successes to back
him up, and repeatedly accused his generals of a lack of imagination.
Source states that the General Staff did not like the idea of attacking
Poland in 39, but that the generals finally agreed to attack knowing that
they could not resist HITLER's wishes,
9, THE-EVACUATIONAT DUNKIRK
Source claims he was not allowed to enter the Port of DUNKTM with his
tanks. The British forces there were to be destroyed by the GAF. alone. The
Air Force, however, failed in this task, and the British evacuation at
DUNKIRK was thus made possible. Source believes that, given permission to
enter DUNKIRK, he could have annihilated all troops assembled there.
10. NORMANDY INVASION
While a number of mistakes were made in the German preparations for an
Allied invasion of France, the factor mainly responsible for Allied success-
es was the failure of the GAF! At ?ie time of the invasion the GAF was
still at the level of 1940, with no new-type planes., The lack of air-super-
iority led to the complete breakdown of the German net of communications.
Other failures were the neglect to modernize the SIEGFRIED Line, the neglect
to fortify cities like PARIS, LIEGE, ANTWERP, and the wrong distribution of
armor. Source claims that the sole responsibility for all these errors lies
with HITLER alone who neglected to follow advice given by the General Staff.
It was HITLER who decided that the Atlantic Wall was strong enough to with-
stand all attacks. Commanders of tank units opposing Gen PATTON were unable
to use their, initiative,, but had to follow HITLER's own plans. Source
thinks he could have stopped Gen PATTON in France, had he been left free to
employ his own strategy. .
11. NOTES ON THE RUSSIAN ATTACK OF FALL 44.
. After source had been appointed Chief of Staff, German Ground Forces,
he tried to work out a plan to stop the Russian advances. He found condi-
tions similar to those prevailing in the WEST, namely that important places
had not been fortified,
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The GAF, unable to cope with Allied air superiority in the WEST, was
completely absent from the Eastern front. Source believed that because of
Inferior technical developments of -(he Russian Air. Force as compared to the
Allied, the GAF could achieve more in the EAST. He asked for air support,
but it was denied. When the situation became more critical, HIMMLER, for-
merly commanding ArmTGroupaUpper RHINE, whose primary function was, at '
first, to catch deserters, appeared at the Eastern front entrusted with the
task of stopping the Russians. Source told HIMMLER that he considered his
function as leader of the German Police more important, and asked him, to
tistop playing troop leader". HIMMLER reported this conversation to HITLER,
and eventually brought about source's ousting as Chief of Staff. Source
also had a conversation with RIBBENTROPP, in which he pointed out that a
two-front war was too much to cope with, end asked him to make peace either
in the WEST or in the EAST. This conversation was also reported to the
FUEHREP, and helped in bringing about GUDERIAN's dismissal. Source claims
that as early as 43 he had conversations with SPEER and GOEBBELS in regard
to the seriousness of the situation., Both agreed with source's point of
view, but were unable to influence HITLER to stop his "intuition warfare".
.The contemplated date and location of the Russian thrust were well known
to the top Eastern front leaders, source claims. HITLER, however, did not
believe that the situation was dangous, believing Russia too weak after
the summer campaign to start a new offensive. All materiel prepared by
source for the Eastern front was shipped to the WEST in Sept 44. HITLER
also erroneously overestimated the value of the RUHR, in source's opinion.
The RUHRwap,at that time-already'crippled by Allied air attacks, while the
Upper Silesian coal mines were still working full blast. Still, it was de-
cided to concentrate on the defense of the RUHR. Source points out that
stronger resistance in the EAST would have helped German food problems,
since East Prussia was an essential :actor in assuring the necessary crops.
12. ARDENNES OFFENSIVE
Although source was not involved in this offensive in any Official
capacity, he was watching it closely, since all his reinforcements for the
Eastern front were used up during this campaign. Source thinks that in the
beginning the front, limited to valleys, was too narrow. According to his
estimate, the offensive should have been broken off on 20 Dec, after Amer-
ican resistance on a larger scale appeared. RUNSTEDT, however, was ordered
to hold his gains at all costs.
13. PERSONALITIES
Source considers VON RUNDSTEDT ap the best of all German generals at
the present time. He is serious and still commands the confidence of the
German people. Sauce suggests him as a candidate for a role similar to that
of HINDENBURG in 25.
HIMMLER, source believes, is responsible for the deeds of the SS. He is
a man with bad illusions. Source expected HIMMLER to change the policy of
Germany by putting HITLER in his proper place.
KESSELRING, source says, is very intelligent, clever, but an opportunist.
14. PERSONAL NOTE
When Gen PATTON broke out of Normandy, HITLER told his generals that they
would be unable to employ such daring tactics. Gen GUDERIAN objected, re-
calling his historic breakthrough in the ARDENNES, in 1940.
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15. MISCELLANY
a) On 16 Jan 45 a German corps had to reture toward WARSAW. The WARSAW
garrison was weak, but the FUEHRER ordered the city held at all costs.
Source gave this order to his C of Sy Col VON BONIN. In th,e afternoon
Col VON BONIN reported that the troops as well as the WARSAW garrison
were withdrawing and source, after checking this information as best he
could, designated the next stand of the' withdrawing troops. At the
FUEHRER's conference, source was asked by HITLER whether he had known
of the seriousness of the situation. Source said he had; while they
were conferring, a radiogram arrived stating that the WARSAW garrison
was still holding Out. HITLER again gave orders to hold to the last.
At that time GUDERIAN'S orders as to a next stand had not yet arrive d at
WARSAW and when they finally came, the WARSAW.commander preferred to
follow those orders than those of HITLER. When the FUEHRER received th,
news, he-decided to hold VON BONIN responsible and put him, together wit
two ,junior officers into the S-AFGEFAENGNIS (Prison) BERLIN-MOABIT,
despite source's prOtesta that he was the only responsible person. The
, two junior officers were finally released and given front assignments,
,*hile VON SONINJs case was transferred to the RSHA (Central Security
Office), The RSHA investigation cleared VON BONIN of all charges, but
HITLER stated he did not trust the investigating officers. VON BONIN
stayed in prison for two months and was then transferred to the DACHAU
.concentration. camp.
b) Col GRAF VC11 RITTBERG, an intelligent German officer,. realized in
Apr 45 that the war was lost for Germany. He said so, and was shot for
his careless remark
cY"Russia wants to eliminate Poland. The American and British policy
in regard to the Russian question is not understandable".
d) Source believes that Germany cannot supply her own food as long as
Russia keeps her Eastern provinces.
e) "Negro troops either from French colonies or from the United States
used as occupatior,1 forces will damage all signs of good will". ?
25 May 1945 SEVENTH ARLY INTERROGATION CENTER
12(.7?,(1
PAUL KUALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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415R006200030002-7
25X1
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 ? US ARMY
gAuth: CG, 7th Army
anit:
:Date: 24 May, 1945 :
REICH MINISTRY .OF THE I1TERIOR
(This Report is being published i answer to Special Questionnaire
provided by US Group CC, G-g, T-Section, 6th Army Group, 14 May 45).
I. PREAMBLE
The following information was obtained from Otto EHRENSBERGER, Dr KUrt HEINRICHS,
Dr LAUBE, Dr Walther OTT, and Ernst PA3ST, all of whom are officials in the Ministry
of the Interior. Most of the records and personnel of the Ministry are located in
the followitv places:
i) QUERFURTF, near HALLE
ii) SCHLOSS LEUOHTENBURG, near JENA (KL A RR Station)
iii) SCHLOSS SONNENSTEI7 in PIEM, near DRESDEN
iv) BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 46
v) GARMISCH- PARTENKIRCHEN
It is possible that the personnel and records which were in BERLIN in March 1945
Were recently evacuated elsewhere or the papers were destroyed.
Date of Information: See Text Interrvator: G.P.M.
ORGANIZATION CF TFE MINISTRY OF THE TTITERTOR
The chart as found in the Organization Charts of the German Ministries and Cen-
tral Agencies is out or Date, due to the fact that certain changes were made in 1944
when H/MMLER became Minister. Por revised chart showing the )rincipal changss see
Appendix. Personalities and their probable locations are listed under the reSpective
Departments, below:
A. CENTRAL DEPARTMENT
1. Personnel
Ministerialdirektor 10ELLKE - possibly in BAD SACHSA, in the Southern Harz.
Ministerialdirigent BURKART - AUGSBURG.
Ministerialrat Dr GRAU vicinity ofSTUTTGART.
Ministerialrat Dr OTT - AUGSBURG (SAIC).
Reichsrichter HAHN - Southern Germany.
A number of intermediate officials are in GARMIS07-PA17T7KIROFEN.
2. Records
The records of the Central Denartment are partially in QUERFURT and partially
in SCHLOSS LTUONTS"BURG, near JENA. A few are in GAT:ISCH. The records in KRLIN
are believed to have been totally destroyed.
B. DEPARTMENT I
1. Personnel
Ministerialrat Dr GLOBK7 KOCHEL, HI1nE113URGSTRASSE 292.
Ministerialdirigent Dr KESSLER - AUGSBURG.
Reichsrichter SOFEIDT-BRUEOKT - AUGSBURG.
Regierungsrat STIETIALDT - AUGSBURG.
Yinistorialdirektor Dr FAUST - presumably in Northern Germany.
Ministerialrat Dr VONT q0LFF - QUERFURT.
Oberrogierungsrat Dr HOFFMA'T - in Southern Germany.
2. Records
The records are in QUERFURT, LEUIFTENBURG, and BERLIN.
1
SECRET
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Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7
Ref,yo SAIO/22
23. May
LO.DinARTMENT-II
1. Personnel
SECRT
Ministerialdirektor EFRENSBERGER, AUGSBURG
Reichsrichter Dr ?AST, AUGSBM.1- (SAIO).
Johannes KAIBEL,. AUGSBURG) (SAN). .
Oberregierungsrat VOLLPREOHT, AUGSBURG.
Ministerialrat MUTTRAY, TRAUNSTEIY.
Regierungsrat VO7 110577SURG, TRAUNSTETY.
Oberregierungsrat Dr FISCHER, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.
Reicherichter Dr DANKELMANN, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.
Oberriegerungsrat MAYER-jESTPHALEN, qUETPURT.
Oberregierungsrat RITTER 'ION LEX, tZUERFURT.
Ministerialrat BUOKOV, EUTIN. .
Ministerialdirigent JACOBI, Presumably in
Minieterialrat KLAS,
Ministerialrat GUELOT7PFENNIG
Oberverwaltungsrichter lEISE
Oberregierungsrat Dr PETZ
2. Accords,
Most of the records were leatroyed in air raids, at BERLIN and KussTim.
Some records may be found in lUERFURT, and possibly a few at GARMISCH-PARTEN-
KIRCHEN. -
H
H .
fI
It
Northern
0
Germany.
ft
It
D. DEPARTMENT III
Most of this Department, both personnel .and records, is located at SCHLOSS
SCNYENSTEIN, in PIR7A. A smaller part remained in BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 46.
/II-4
Dr JOACHIM GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN
Ministarialrat BOETTCHER PITA
Ministerialrat BO!( E BERLIN
JIB
Direktor Dr FOFFMEISTER
Ministerialrat 1r TITTEL
Oberregierungsrat KNAUT
Ministerialrat SIBETH
/II-0
Ministerialrat Dr LOBE
Ministerialrat KAEMPER
Ministerialrat ULRICH
Praesident KNE/P
Ministerialrat GOEDECKE
Ministerialrat moLsEN
Oberregierungsrat KOBE
E. DEPARTMENT IV
1. Personnel
Ministerialrat Or HEINRICTS
Ministerialrat Dr HOMM.N.T
Ministerialdirigent Dr FUCHS
Regierungs-Kassenrat TESCHNER
Gauhauptmann Dr KREISSL
Reichsrichter BERNER
Ministerialrat VO7 LUCAS
BERLIN
PIRNA
AUGSBURG (SAII)
PIRNA
n-
It
BAD HEILBRUNN, near BAD TOELZ
BERLIN
I)
AUGSBURG (SAIC)
0 It
AUGSBURG
LEUCHTENBURG, near JENA
REICHENBURG
PIRNA
BERLIN
Ministerialdirigent Dr LOSOHELDER "
In addition, there are seven minor officials and
PARTENKIRCHEY,
seven employees in GARMISCH-
2
SECRET
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S ECRET
Ref No SAIC/22
25 May 45
2. Records
Most of the records of this Department were destroyed in an air attack on
BERLIN in Nov 1943. Of the new records, part are in PIRMA, part in QUERFURT,
and part in LEUCHTENBUIG, near JENA. A few records were left in BERLIN, DOR01.-
THEENSTRASSE 49, and a few were it. GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, in the RATHAUS.
F. PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS
1. Personnel
Dr KAUFMANN (MD) GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN
Ministerialrat NGEL
25 May 1945
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
r7.7
PAUL K LA.
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
SECRET
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CENTRAL DEPT
Budget Dis-
bursing,Accoun*
ting,Distribu.
tion of work,
Internal rou-
tine, etc.
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REICH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
HIMMLER
i
HEAD STATE SECRETARY
STUCKART
DEPARTMENT I
Constitution,
Legislation,
Administration.
IO Constitution
IV Legislation
& Admin Law
I "Sued Ost"
I "BM" new order
in Bohemia
I "Ost"
I "West"
DEPARTMENT II
Civil Defense
of REICH
I-RW Civ Defense
I.-RW Mil Law and
Policy
I- RS War Damage
'STATE SECRETARY AND
tREICH HEALTH LEADER
CONTI
1
:VP TWAT TIT DEPARTMENT IV
A;Pol appointments
Civil servants
B. Higher Services
C.Civ Servants Law,
Policy, training,
salaries ,expenses
welfare ,pensions,
salaried employees
and workers.
'Control of
Local Govt
fro-1,$ if
DEPARTMENT A
DEPARTMENT B
C
N
Public
Health
Public
Welfare
iDEPARTMENT
Veterinary
Matters
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elifis:ttellsase 2004/02/1 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7
S. Z C HIE T "rm AN ENCL1
? -
I ? . Z,`,.1 '01111',
SEVENTH ARMY INTtRAGATION CtNTER
APO 756 US ARMY
HERMANN GOERING - INANCIAL NOPS
: SECRET
:Auth: CG7th Arm
:Init:
:Date: 29 May 19'+5
"Thefollowin g notes candrning Hermann e GOERINGs '
. , , , income, covering the
erio'd 1937 - 42, were found in his ledger:
4
Date of Deposit
, Check troth HAMBURG
12 Jul 1937
10 Oct 1937
31 Jan 196
19 Ve111938'
7 Jul 1138
8 Dec 1938
Feb 1139
13 Apr 1939
1 jun 1939 '
26 Oct 1939,
:12 Jul 1939
-
Dee 1139
24 Jan 19O
141)r 1940 -
11 Jul 1940
25 Oct 1940
Feb 1941'
r 1941'
ft
it
,11 J11,1 1541
&fill. 194-2:
Jun 1942
,5 Sp 1942
3..? Oct 1943
It
ti
It
It
ft
It
it
' ti
It
2 checks from RAMBt
(Special account HOFER)
check from HAMBURG
Bank
DEUTSCHE BANK
THYSSEN BANK
THYSSEN BANK
btUTSCHE BANK
THYSSEN BANK
btUTSCHE BANK
THYSSEN BANK
DEUTSCHE BANK
THYSSEN BANK
DEVTSCHE BANK
'DEUTSCHE BANK'
cTitY8ftN BANK
THYSSEN BANK
'THYSStN BANK'
DEUTSCHE BANK-
THYSSIN BANK
THY8StN BANK
TH(SSEN BANK
'THYSSEN BANK
'DEUTSCHE BANK
THYSStN BANK
THYSSEN BANK
'THYSSEN BANK
'TOM.
RM
It
It
II
ft
It
It
Sum
250,000.--
250;000.--
125,000.--
300,000.--
125,000.--
250,000.--
250;000.--
125;000. --
125;000.--
125,000.--
125,000.--
125,000.--
fl
250,600.--
250,000.--
250,d00.--
236,000.--
25d,d00.--
250,000.-=
230,000.-=
256,600.--
1,226,000.-
256.000.-=
to
It
0
st
RM 5,901,000.--
i
According o statements'by Minister Dr FUNK' these are checks of theCig-
Ote Factoq REMTSLA, with the owners of which GOERING had very good
hee.tiOns: A tax trial agaihit this firm involving about 12 million marks
7sSaii?preSI1ablY with GOERING's help. The president of the finance
dept in HAMBURG would probably know out this matter.
'
1 ?WingI noteS in the ledger:
Attattii
6S.Am"
sTiAttgAt'arnINN
THtSUN'HOK,
THYSStN BAItt
THYi8EN't-
THYSSEN BANK
THY8Zhil'atl\l'
150,000.--
160;060.--
10000.-
100 ,b00,
?ft 11000 1_000.
RM 1,450t000.--
25X1
TOTAL
For Release 26
ApOrOved For Re ease 200410
Ref No 8AIC/31
29 May 45
1.14Rld wils A Publiailar of
161Ped him a great deal: The
ur#F 1540/41 there are
Check
. - ?
insurance periodicals. GOING reportedly
connections With the other firms are unknown.
_ I
following transfers of larger
30 Oct 1440 'pihthMtTAix 06iPtivii)
30 oe. j;54b JUN
Nov 1940 BANK 15-trz` tUFTPAHnT
'Nov WITTKOWITEt B2RGI3A11
19 Nov 1940 REICHSWERKE HERM.G0211ING
,,,Tan 1941 FtEICHSWERKE HERVI:GOET{ING
,
3 Jan 1241 (RHEiNlyiETALL)
7 or 1,941 JUN-
t8 Apr 1941 BANK DtR IMFAHRT
30 4i)r. 1541 RHtiNMETALL (ROHNERT
1,6'. Aug dliNkgq I'Mnd
, 17 Sep jLjiHEI1M.00211/ga WRKE
1941 HERM:GOthaNG WERKE
Bank
BANK DER DEUT:m.
P.1,17,41 01.
It -77
tt
11
"
11
11
It
850,000.--
1,4,? qQtreING received nearly 2 million marks within two year's through his
control of these _:?,,laxits under' the tour?Year Plan, GOERrNG admitted that he
Ba "ask:0'1 all these Plants to tralsfer Some funds occasionally to his
'Ter's anal account, since Under Party 're ons members in public offibis
we riot 'liowed. to accept renumerei.ations for services as board members.
1945 8EVENTH' ARMY INTilltio.GATrib cEvinok
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30002-7
SECREI:
auth: OG 7th Armyt
IR Ant ZIITERROGAndig 'gl\rt411
An 7,8 US ARMY sDate:
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 11
W R $
R IC $v 0
4at OTAINt!
g4ftNalf6OZRIM.
Of Questionnaire A 0 of S, G-5, Seventh Army, 10 May 1945)
Date of Information: See Text Interregater:
" 1
Although he has been depicted in many news reports as being half mad, GOERTNG
gives the impression or being a highly intelligent and cunning man, with charming
mannera and a certain knowledge of art. He is very talkative, and once he has
started to develop a favorite theme he can hardly be stopped.
_
Re ,insist, that he has no desire to: conceal anything about the works of art
which he hae obtained in foreign countries. He explains his tremendous accumula-
tion of treaeures by claiming to be a Feat lover of artistic works, and by stat-
ing that it was his intention to transform CARINHALL into a National Museum. He
says, ?ICH BIN NUN MAL EIN RENAISSANCETYP" ("After all, I'm a Renaissance type").
,
GOERING also states that the low prices of jewelry and works of art in the occu-
Pied countries provided an incentive to buy them wholesale. He adds that he was,
astoundpd by the cheapness of diamonds at CARTIER's in PARIS in 1940. From 1942
onwards, the prices of antiques and artistic works rose enormously, and he had to
exercise all,hie cleverness and every 'Fuse in order to avoid being "ptung" by the
dealerP.
,S0Vree ote,.tes thP-t in addition to 4.1e treasures which he bought, others were
sent to hil;L,as gifts by Party members and units of the GAF, and that he also ex-
changed articles with dealers and other collectors, as a stamp collector Wwapi
stamPs- Olaims that oily about one percent of his collection comes from France.
GOWNS COLLS0TIOTT
A . .
GONG states that no works of art were taken away from the French National
,
, . 1 , . ,
Museums.. Re ,Claims to have been very helpful to the directors of the French MuseuM
iin ProVidfng,sate repositories for their treasures in specially constructed air',
r4i4 shelters. He otatee that he exohanged two statues and a couple ot paintings
., ,
for one, WOOdfan etatUette and ono Tainting which he Was very fond of at the 10t.J.7E. ,
The negotiations, he states? were lona and difficult, but there was no exercise of
, . . , , , t ?
pressure on his part.
' The Jewieh properties were exhibited in the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME under the
_,
supervision 'of trench and German officlales The most valuable of thee() wee sent,
on HITIRO's orders, to the Royal Castles of NEU-SCHWANSTEIN and HOHENSOHWANGAUI
, , . ,
Bavaria, to, the shelters of the FUEHR4BAUT3N in MUNICH and of :the RICHsCH4Nq.14-
Lay in ga441, and to O3ERSALZBL!2G. Their ultimate destination was the new Na-
tional:XUseum at ,LINZ. Altheugh ho admits that some of those treasures wore sent
41eewhere, GOERING pretends to have no-knowledge of their whereabouts.
, . ,
The remaining works of, art exhibited at the SALLE DES J2UX DE PAUME were sold
at public auction, ?W bought some paintings, statues, antique furniture, and GOBE-
aN tapestries. In those deals GOERIA. was advised by a French expert, a Museum
'
-, ' f ,
,grriow., and his bids never exceeded :the evaluation sot by this advisor. The on-
ly jewelry which he bought was antique. French and German antique dealerswore
also. authotiiod to take part in those auctions. PW claims that the FUEHRER ao-
man4041)110,tos:raphe of all works of art bought by other amateurs, and that the 1st-
' t,Or-Otoli ISto turn 0,110 Oloir purchases to 14iTunie representative, for Oventual
'' Litz' . -
shipment to the Museum.
_Woe that he, 'braught contain atoms direct from dealers in Paris; liko.
. e _
Vate collector. Also, ho occasionally Mado purchases from chateaux and Pri-
eatipne through an intermediary.
Approved For Release 2004/02/19: CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7
SEQRET
Ref No SAM/14
19 May 45
3. CONDITION 2E TEr COLLECTION
Source states that two specialists were responsible for the care of the works
of art in his collection, and that all items werq in an excellent state of pre-
servation at the time of their evacuation to Southern Germany (Zee next section)6
4. pEPosiTonss OF THE FRErCH WORKS OF An
- There was not sufficient time to evacuate GOERING's entire collection when the
Russian advance menaced CARINHALk. A number of GOBELIN tapestries (no French
ones) and a certain amount of furniture (Louis XV and Louis XVI) which came from
the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME had to be left behind.
The most precious collections were pent to 3ERCHTE3GADEN, by RR. At the time
of PW's arrest there by the SS, 2, April 45, these treasures were loaded on freight
cars which were inside the unfinished. tunnel of the BERCHTEZGADEN RR station, and
en some other oars which stood on the tracks of the RR line from BEROBTBSGADEN to
KOENIGSEE. (Note: This information has since been confirmed.) Before his arrest
GOERING had time to give orders for the security of these freight Cars. Neverthe-
less he wap informed that some of the guards attached to him (GESTAPO and SD map)
had started to plunder the cars, as well as his villa at OBERSALZBERG, under pre-
text of putting them in greater safety. Source believes, however, that all the
valuable works of art which he obtained from the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME can be
located and returned!
Following the interrogation source made a written statement pledging his cooper-
ation in the recovery of these art treasures (See Appendix). He also gave the fol-
lowing additional locations where some other works or art acquired at the JEUX DE
PAUME might be found;
a) A certain number of GOBELINS at the BURG. VELDENSTEIN near, NEUHAUS on the PEG-
KITZ(RR limtrom'BUREMBERG to BAYREUTH).
b) A certain number of GOBELINS in the air raid shelters of the LUFTWAFFE War
' Academy at WILDPARK-WERDER, near POTSDAM.
0) One painting called the "Madonna of MEMLING
at ZELL an GEE. (This painting was returned by
this unit.)
GotnING ..0104m0 to have had nothing to do with
ables other than those mentioned in this report.
]..9 144Y 1945.
at PWs wife's present dwelling
PW to G-5, Seventh Army, through
any French works of art' orvalu-
SEVENTH ARMY-INTERROGATION-OUTER
?
PAUL KUBALA,
Ma, MI,
Commanding,
AEORET
or. 'or or. orro
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8 e_c T
tRer No $A10/14
19 May 4,
-I hereby declares
1) That / am ready to return art treasures (exhibited in JEUX DE PAUME) which I
40qtlired and bought at auctions of requisitioned property.
?
.2) That I will do my utmost to find out about the location of these articles and
that I will give all the pertinent information possible.
That the,greater part of these al-icles and of my total property of art trea-
sures are packed in several freight care in BERCHTESGADEN. The storing of these
articles in air raid shelters did not occur because of my imprisonment by HITLER
-the day after my arrival there.
That T informed the French liaison officer in charge about several other
places where there could be some boa important worka.of art.
) That I am convinced that a conference with my former art custodian HOFER in
?the:presenee of Allled officers will lead to a speedy and extensive clarifica-
tion of all questions.
AUGSNRG 18 May 194,.
./s/ HERMANN GOERING
REIOH$MARSOHA11
CIA.RDP88-00418?R40,?qP,993002
4 g2.R 11 T g
tiRof NO SAX0/29 sAuth$ Ca, 7th Army;
46 liel 45ApprovedtRrRelease 2004/02/19? : CIA-RDP83-00415ROGGIOdopri 9, $
'pat : 2 Ma 194
SlImxTH Am 4JITOGATIaN QENTER
APO 7,8 IJS ARMY
P;P 221
TRAIAL JAPAPII
Ar.on49,.
Atace
,
- very geOd Russian he was able to makefriendawith Gen ONODERA, who Speaks no
Other European language well and who therefore had few friends in STOCKHOLM.
8ol4rce.tal:ked freely and appears to .be entirely sincere and truthful.
8-2 , Date of Information: See text Interrogator:
25X1
a 49-year-Old Hungarian diplomat who was Asst Milit ry
om Dec 4, to Nev 44. Owing to the fact that he speaks
2 Tqc,0N4 HISTORY OF dF,N ONODERA
, Gen ONODERA, who is 45 years old, comes from a family of the Japanese nobility.
Hiswife belengs to a Japanese family Of the highest nobility and is said to be
-
relgted to the Emperor, a fact of which the Gen is very proud. They have three
sons; the eldest, who is 15 years old., is at a cadet school in Japan. They ap-
parently live a Modest, harmonious family life, go out rarely, and receive few
guests. Gen ONODEHA is a moderate man, iirinks very little and does not smoke.
He sufferS from low blood pressure. Once Or twice a month he communicates by tele-
phone with his sons and relatives in Japan.
.11ifs Gen is a. diligent and tireless Worker. He speaks and writes good Russian,
Speaks and writes Gorman poorly, and understands some English. He deliberates for
SOMe time before making a statement. 'Ho has frequently told source that the Japan-
es0 General qwf, as well as the Emperor, was highly satisfied with his work in
STOMOW, and on several occasions he has has given source to understand that he was
a future O.S.n4iaate for the post of Chief of the Japanese General Staff. He has
)r140Or'sPeken to source in detail about, his career, but during the course of fro-
1.uent conversations between Feb and Nov 44 source was able to obtain the following
:Information about the General's history:
23 GradUated.frora War College, where he had learned to speak Russian.
24-27 Various assignments with higher commands.
28.*50 Served as Capt (Intelligence Officer) on General Staff with troops op-
posing the Aussians in Manchuria. There ho perfected his knowledge of
the Russian language, and is said to have done excellent work.
50-56 Assigned to various higher commands. Also served as instructor of tac-
ties at War College.
36-37 Organized the pro-Japanese "National Chinese Movaaent" in China. Ac-
cording to his own statements, he did a "perfect? job and received groat
PrOit for this work.,
40 ? Qoqmanded an inf div fighting in China for an entire year. Source be-
,,,lieVosIt was in 40., .
40- ? Rellwnod to War College as instructor,
? Assigned to ST00E:HOLM as Military Attache.
3. OFFICE OF IMPERIAL JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE, STOCKHOLM
a) Lodation
, This office is located on the fifth floor at LINN:4-GATAN 38, adjoining the
Gener41's private apartment. In Nov 44 Con ONODERA iold source that he intended
to rent another small apartment so that he would not have to receive visitors
in hieeffico. Source believes that this MOVO was contoviated in order to
Safeguard the security of the work at the office.
.0 Mission
The Punetion
penal Japanese
precedence over
of this office is tO furnish military intelligence to the
Im-
Government. It importance VMS 00/1SidOrOd SO great that it took
the Japanese Legation at STOCKHOLM. Gon ONODERAls reports
R .4
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28 May 45
went via Oteri?lan Military transmitters in BERLIN directly to the Emperor, where-
as 'tlIP reports of the Minister atentto the Prime Minister, who submitted to the
Etperor only such portions of the reports as he considered of particular im-
portange, Furthermore, Gen ONODERA claimed that he had-orders to check the
Legation's seourity measures, and that he could request the recall of the Minis-
ter if he d4 net consider him euitable for the post.
Atter_the,agedessful Allied invasion of France, Gen ONODERA told souroe
that he had recoived Orders to remain at his post after Germany's collapse ia
Order to take oharge of the Japanese intelligence system for all Europe. In
source's ,opinion he already has a very considerable network of espionage agents
at his disposal.
0) Offioo Dutios and Poreonnol
Gen ONODE4 and his wife do all the code work themselves in a special room
of their privflte apartment. No one else has access to this room.
NO engineer specialists, whom sour describes as co-workers, work at this
?Moe. Ono of them, SATO, is supposed to be an authority on aircraft con-
struction. JHo is about 32 years old, and speaks vory poor English. During 44
he mado frosuont trips to Gormany. The othor,name unknown to source, is said
tO be nava. construction engineer. Ho speaks Gorman fluently. Gon ONODERA
rerwked that,this man was very familiar with tho compoetion of the Rumanian
Vtd. RusSian inaOlz ,Soa floots,
T" MgthenlAn women, one of them the wifo of a Swedish cavalry Capt, work
in an antbeToom. They translate Swodish newspapor articlos and do general of-
fioo work. #
During 44 source frequently saw three or four othor young Japanese in tho
?Moo. ONOARA atatod,that thy had boon studying in Europe and wore unable
to return hemq; so ho had given thom employmont in his offico. In early Nov .44,
C4ODER4 mOntiOnod that ho was expecting throe additional Japanoso for his of-
aid that five moro would be added to tho Logation Staff. At that time ho
Wasoalso trying to got evJapanoso radio toohnician, as well as oquipmont,'in
Order to have offootivo communications ,with Japan after tho anticipatod
eel-
lapse ef_GerillanY?
4. AP.4.99.14X12Pi
In 041,704):4 .0.111s many meotings with source, Gon ONODERA froquontly assOciatod
with tho fellOwinos
o ,
,
Tho yln44,11 Military Attache and his ptaff
Tho Gorman 4ilitary Attache and his Staff
Tho Gorman Air Attacho and his Staff
Lots frequont4' ho associated with!,
The Rumanian Military Attache
Tho,Swisp-Militar-AttaOho
Gen K4LGRESM, Diroctor of the Swodiall. Attapho Group
Maj PETERSON, Dirootor of tho Swedish,Oommqnioation Group
Ho novor mado any montion of his rolations with tho Russian Military Attache.
Gon OMODMA visited his own Logation sovoral times wookly. Ho sometimes made
derogatory remarks about their work, such as, ?Thoso p000lo don't do anything.
They only road tho nowspapors, translate them, and that is what thoY send to Japan.?
Ho montionod that ho had ofton argued with tho Ministor about thisetypo of work
and also that ho had found negligence in tho code work.
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284Ay 45
5. SORT AFFILIATIONS
a) Intelligence Oonoerning Russia
An ?Athenian, who according to repeated statements did excellent work, was
. a chief source of Gen'ONODERXts intelligence on Russia. After the capitulation
of Finland, Gen ONODEAL established connections with Finnish intelligence of-
ficers who had escaped and who were anxious to work against the Russians.
b) Intelligence Ooncerning the Allies
OMURA boasted of having an agent .in the British Passport Dept in the B/R-
. GEL-JARS-GATAN, STOCKHOLM. He claimed that he regularly read the reports of
the Secretary of the British Legation, OHESHIRE, who is said to be a Capt and
chief Of tlae British Intelligence Corps. This was a source of considerable
amusement to ONODERA, which is illustrated by the following story:
One day a SWediSh journalist, Oipt Goosta AELIN, invited VOECZKOENDY (source)
to 14neheon at the RC HE Restaurant. The journalist asked VOMOMENDY several
Political questions; among. others 'Jib asked him what would be the reaction of the
Hungarian Army to an Allied landing in the Balkans. Source replied that Hun-
gary would be very pleased about it, but stated that such an operation would
reqUire at loast 20 divs, as tho Germans were very strong in the Balkans. On
- the following day source visitod:the genoralts office and noticed immediately
that ONODERA was suspicious of him. Just as source was leaving ONODERA sudden-
ly askod him how ho happened to know Capt MELIN. In reply source asked, "How
do you. know that / know him? Did you perhaps see me with him at tho RIOH2?"
?NOMA ropliod that ho had road the report which CHESHIRE had received fram.
MELIN.. Source then told the Gon what he had told Oapt ONODMIA then
etated; "The roport which CHESHIRE sot to LONDON was not the same; apparently
.ho had work6d.it over."
Gen =DEM always waited for tlio British courier piano, and froquontly he
,statO4 that ho had r000ivod "something intoroitine from England. He also sent
,.Money to England, as he inadvertently revealed to souroo. on Moro than one oc-.
:easion by such romarka'ae, "People say I am stingy, but I believe my mon in
'.England are satisfied; /always send money." Source boliovas that ONODERAts -
informants wore British lournalista, because ho once montionod knowing nows-
: papor reportors formorly stationed In STOCKHOLM who had boon recalled to Eng-
land.
o) Intolligonco Concorning Germany
As ago674RA frequently remarked, 'ho know practically everything about tho
disposition of Gorman military forCoa.:, He and his assistants ofton travelled
to Denmark, Norway and Gormany to Meet German officers.
,8. GIN =DEWS OPINIONS ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS
?
a) Ra/iability of ONODERAts Doductions
Gon ONODERA io.a fine oxamplo'of the Intelligence Officer. Ho is industrious,
disoroot, suspicious, and intelligent. Ho spares no effort in building up his
not of agents. His deductions concerning tho military situation in Europo
wore corroot, and his predictions havo boon borne out by events. Prom infor-
mation roopivbel from %%gland rogarding tho buildup of supplios, ho was ablo to
oetimato tho dato of the invasion of tho Continont to within a month of the
actual landing. After tho-landings-in Normandy, ho prodictod that tho Germans
would not be able to ropol Alliod forces. Based upon his oxporioncos in the
Far Mast, ho declared that to bridgohoad would be destroyed within tho first
24 hours, or not at.all. He anticipatod tilt) destruction of Germany soon after
the bridgehead was succossfully established, and by early 1945 he was making
every effort to rovamp his espionage network accordingly.
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b) The European Situation after Allied Victory
At the end of lug 44, ONODERA declared that all Europe would be exposed to
the dangers of Bolshevism after Allied victory. Russia is slowly but surely
gaining control of the Continent. /n Scandinavia she is already at the At-
lantic, and from there and from the Baltic Sea she already surrounds Sweden
and threatens Denmark. After conquering Northern Germany, she will be able
to work her way to the English Channel. Russia already dominates the Balkans,
and from there she threatens the Middle East. The smoothly functioning Soviet
propaganda machine will do everything possible to provoke revolutions in the
Iberian Peninsula, in France, and in Italy, and then to tackle Europe from the
Southwest. Soviet activitiocin North Africa are becoming more and more dan-
gerous. Ultimately England will contiont Russia alone, because the US will
have no time to attend to Europe once she is fully committed in the East.
Japan will confront tho US. with eVeincroasing difficulties, and will tie down
US forcos completoly;
The R4sSians, ot the, other hand, will receive military reinforcements from
the 40 millions Germans in tho occupied areas, and will also engage in strong
propaganda activities among the impoverishod Gorman masses.. Once Soviet Rus-
sia has had time to reorganize her disrupted agriculture and to bring her fac-
tories into Pull operation again, sho will be so strong that she will tolerate
no counter power in Europe.
o) Russo-Japanoso Relations
ONODERA sp01 frequently of Japanese hatred of tho Russians, but he pointod
out that Japanis primary enemy was the USA. In 44 he was firmly convinced that
RusSiayould not attack Japan. Ho asod his reasoning on Russiats need to re-
habilitate her industrial and agricultural systoms. Russia, ho stated; must
reorganize her KOLHOS and SOWHOS (collective farms), build more and more trac-
torst'and gonorally rovamp her agriCultural sot-up, which had proved a failure
during the War. Tho Russian farmer -would have to take to scythe and shovel to
odeaPe'dtarVation. If tho US had not shipped vast quantitios of food to Russia
in 43, a major disaster in the food 'situation would have occurred.
a
d) Tho USA
ONODERA ,statod in Oct 44 that ho expected the European War to end in Fob 145.
Ho doclared_that the US had already won tho "American War" by binding to hoz...,
solf Canada, Contral'Amorica, and South Amorica. With the acquisition ofinu-
morous air and naval bases, the US had gained unquestionable superiority over
iMPOvoriahod Britain. However, Soviet propaganda in South America will greatly
increase) and aside from tho probleMs created for tho US by Japan, the US will
have to face others provided by. Russia in Scandinavia, tho Balkans, and the oil
regions of tho liddlo East:. With tho discharge of many AmeriCan'aoldiors after
tho European War, the US will bo faced with severe labor troubles. All those
factors, ONODTRA hoped, would prevent the US from deploying all her forces in
tho Op4tinu4tion of the war against Japan.
o) Gorman Policies
At tho end. of May 44, source had ,a lengthy oonforonce with ONODERA, during
which the latter severely condemnod German policies. ONODERA stated that EOCH,
Gorman Pldnipotontiary for Eastern Torritorios, had so coaductod affairs in the
occupation of tho Ukraino that ho might as well have boon working for the So-
viets and deserved the "Ordor of STALIN". Tho Ukrainians, who had greeted tho
Gorman Army as liberators in 41, had already turnod their backs on the German
civilian ocoupational authoritios as far back as 42, simply because of maltreat-
ment and the transgreasions of a few subbrdinatos. Tho Gorman civilian author-
ities, through their iduoasurablo lack of understanding of tho pooplo and throui
their ignoranoo concorning tho Ukrainian question, had made onomios of tho
Ukrainians, whoroas with understanding and cooporation they could have gained
an army of throe million mon.
Gori ONODERA wont on to say that tho troatmont of Japazaby the German High
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Ref No sAIV29
28 May 45
Command had been equally stupid. No conferences were held concerning coordi-
nated conduct of the war. The last thing that the Japanese wanted was the
Germaneattackupon:Russia. The Japanese High Command had a quite different plan.
They wanted Germany to drive through the Balkans, Turkey., Iran, and Iran to
the Persian Gulf, and finally to link up with a coordinated Japanese drive
in India. ONtltRA said that it was high time, in these last hours, to try to
work together. He had received word fromeTOKYO that conferences between the
two high commands would shortly take place at the FUEHRER's Hq. Immediately
-afterwards, the German newspapers announced that extremely important confer-
ences were pending concerning the common conduct of the war ia future operatione.
Ten days later the subject was dropped completely, and no further word was
published or spoken regarding the conferences. When source questioned =URA
on the matter, the latter answered evasively, merely stating that Japan would
continue the war to the end, regardless of the outcome in Europe. Source be-
lieves, that the Japanese offer: of Common action in the conduct of the war was -
intended. to mielead the German High Command and to influence Russia to Conclude
a "special agreement" with Japan, a different form of agreement from the "Five
Year Nen-Aggression Pact". Gen ONODERA appeared very pleased when he mentioned
this pact. '
7. CONCLUSION
From thattime on,yroxd,ONODERA mentioned again and again that he would have to
stay in STOOpOLM for a long time. Prior to Nov 44 he had been receiving additional
sums of money from various sources, including 150,000 Swiss francs from the Japan-
ese Attache in Finland. Source believes that, owing to the present European situ-
ation and to the disruption of Communications, there may be loopholes in ONODERA's
organization; but he declares that a man of ONODERA's perseverance and ability
would be able,to repair them without great lose of time. He is cenvinced that Gen
oNopaRA has built an espionage and intelligence service which from henceforth will
bothe center of such Japanese activity in Europe.
28 May 1945. SEVENTH ARMY_ENTERROGATION CENTER
riot :Xt-tft- rd,
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MT,
Commanding.
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8 E`CI R Lt. T
14 Apr 45
Copy No
r"qqS
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If the information
tion, it should be so
or of the methods by
The following are
this report%
SECRET
Or.
RnnA7nnnfinnn7-7
SEVENTH ARMY CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY -
SECRET
tAuth:OG th Arm
:Inits ,A
.Date: 1 A r
contained in this report is required for further distribu-
paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names
which the information has been obtained.
the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in
' Name
Rank Secret No
Unit Place and Date of Capture
PAUTR, Friedrich
GENLT 'a.D.(Maj GeA)
45/998
Retired
WUERZBURG, 9 Apr 45
(retired)
GAME, Heinrich
GENMAJ i.G.(BrigGen; 45/950
001719.
BERGZABERN050 Mar 45.
GS0)
Inf.Div.
STEINBACH, Paul
GENMAJ (Brig Gen)
45/969
FUEHRER- KLEINRINDERFELD 2
RESERVI,OKH . 2 Apr. 45
RODENWALD, Ernst
GENARZT (Surgeon
45/975
Mil Med
HEIDELBERG,1 Apr 45.
Prof
Gen) .
Academy,
BERLIN
WITKINHAUS,Hubert
GENMAJ a.D. (Brig
45/978
Retired
MOSBACH, 4 Apr 45.
Gen)(retired)
MILTZOW,Hermann
.OBSTLT i..G.(Lt Col,
G8C)'
45/951
Ia,719 Inf
Div
BERGZABERN,50 Mar 45.
HACKEMANN, Ernst
OBSTLT (Lt Col
45/992
Battle
Group GERS-
GERSFELD, 6 Apr 4,
FELD
SCHREIBER, Kurt
LT 204 Lt)
45/976
LUFTWAFFE
HEIDELBERG,51 Mar 45..
BA z.b.V.6
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SECaEZ
bommisissell
I. SOURCES:
a) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Heinrich GAEDE, CG 719 Inf Div, a 47-year old General
Staff Officer, intelligent, arrogant, very Prussian, and violently anti-
American. From 1942-1944 he was in Bulgaria as Chief of the Getman Train-
ing Staff attached to the Royal Bulgarian Army Staff.
b) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Paul STEINBACH, FUEHRERRESERVE OKH (German Army
Officers' Replacement Pool), a 58-year old professional soldier with a non-
Nazi attitude.
c) OBSTLT (Lt Col) Hermann MILTZOW, Ia, 719 Div, a 5..year old General
Staff Officer of typical Prussian caliber..
1. Personalities
M: They seem to have respect for KEITEL.
KEITEL is only a messenger boy; when the FUEHRER calls, he runs.
* * * * * *
G: I wrote to Gen SEIFFERT in HAMBURG to do something about my wife, and I
(also wrote to) the General of III Corps in BERLIN.
GI I was with the Arty Inspectorate in BERLIN before the war.
S: With EASE ?
G: Yes.
S: I made HASE's acquaintance in NUERNBERG when he was CG of a dig, the 3rd.
Then he became Arty Inspector.
S: ROMMEL and RUNESTEDT are supposed to have told the FUSHRER on 25 July, i.o.
after the invasion, that the war could no longer be won.
M: HIMMLER's train was always marked SZH.
G: What does that moan ?
M: SONDERZUG HIMMLER (Special Train HIMMLER). It was always well guarded.
* * * * * * *
M: Did you know LATTMANN (?) at the War College in DRESDEN ?
G: Recently he was a colonel with MODEL; an efficient fellow.
* * * * * * *
Are you the same ago as SEIDOWSKI (?), ho was also ./a under.me, and so
was ROTHA (?).
2
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M: SEIDOWSKI (?) was fat and blond ?
No, tall and thin; he is engaged to be married now.
M: VON ROTBA (?) was in my olass; we were together in STUTTGART with the MT
troops.
G: They were all with me in SOFIA.
* * * * * * *
M: SEYDLITZ was always a blabbermouth, and so was his wife.
G: PFELSCH (?) was first Ib with Army Group, then he was Id (?), then he was
transferred,
M: And Gen MERK (?) ?
G: Gen MERK oy, was first with (Army) Group BLACK SEA, then he was together
with us.
2. Miscellany
The General Staff is the only good thing still left in Germany, and it will
certainly still have a great influence on the civilian population.
G: As soon as the Party joined in the conduct of tha war, the course of the
war could be foreseen.
G: If this thing oollapsee, and we lose the war, we will have to work for the
people with all our strength. The German people just cannot be destroyed. Many
things that Were done are difficult to defend, for example the mass murder of
the Jews. As an officer it was sometimes difficult to participate in these ac-
tions. They should have solved the problem in another way, Sometimes it was
horrible the way they shot women and children.
G: They want to sound out our attitude now; they expect us at any rate to sup-
port the military government.
G: We were sold out by Dutch and Russian workers.
S:? That was bound to end badly, what with 25-50 nations running around in Ger-
many.
* * * * * * *
S: Why do you dislike the Navy so much ?
G: Because they gorged themselves with hundreds of thousands of youths (int)..
$ And the Luftwaffe, too. Young fellows, classified 1A, who never heard a
shot fired; they were on duty with searchlight units.
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SE CHET
G: All the men in the Navy are young kids, while we had only 47 and 48-year
olds.
G: They are all in flight at the approach of the Russians. The fields are not
taken care of anymore, and we have to feed ourselves again. The SEYDLITZ gov-
ernment is supposed to be alread3r-on German soil. The Russians are rebuilding
German industry for them, and after that the war against England will follow.
3:
S
G:
S :
0:
3:
0:
The war in the EAST has taken a shameful course. Women have been raped.
The Germans are no better than the others. In the beginning the Germans shot
all commfssars who were taken prisoner. Plenty of Russian prisoners have sim-
ply been beaten to death.
How long does it take until a request for a decoration goes through?
24 hours by telephone, three weeks by mail. I had an UFFZ in charge of a
pillbox; he received the Knight's Cross and a lieutenancy immediately by order
of the FUEHRER. He never went to OCS.
I was always horrified about concentration camps,
Well now, that depends on how you look at it, one could also consider them
as penitentiaries.
Wore the Bulgarians only committed to combat partisans?
They Were not committed at all. They were used as guards along the rail-
road lines. They wore only provisional dive, and not regular ones.
0: I was Chief of the Training Staff in Bulgaria. I had 20,000 mon under me.
had a combat school. All the shipping on the Danube, security of mines, all
that was under my control, the entire ABWEHR (Intelligence Service).
II. SOURCES:
a) GENLT (Maj Gen), GENERALSTABSINTENDANT (4uarterm'aster Gen), a.D. (
Friodrioh ?AUER, a 70-year old Bavarian who is too old to worry about
and too senile to do anything else.
b) GENARZT (Medical Corps Gon) Prof Dr Ernst RODENWALD, a 66-year old
BERG Professor, ono-time head of the Institute for Tropical Diseases
who is well acquainted with scientists all over the world. (Soo Roper
SAIC/7, 13 Apr 45).
c) LT (2nd Lt) Hans SCHREIBER, ASSISTENTARZT (Junior Medical Officer)
BEWAEHRUNGSBTL (Punishment Bn), a 28-year old medical officer who did
research in connection with criminal investigations in civilian life.
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retired)
politics
HEIDELe..
in BERLIN,
t Ref No
Luftwaffe
medical
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1, BacterioloAdcal Warfare
R: My personal opinion is that bacteriological warfare is impossible'. I do not
know anything about it, and do not think that a German scientist will permit
himself to be used for that, especially for ethical reasons.
P: If there had been any preparations made for bacteriological warfare, then we
people from the Housing Administration would also have known about it, since we
would have, to make preparations for the protection of the population.
R: The following motto is valid in this case: what you yourself are working on,
you do not talk about, and what others are working on, you do not ask about. I
have received no indications of bacteriological warfare. What I worked on my-
self - malaria control - I will gladly tell them about.
P: I knew the man in charge of the Hygiene Dept in the OKH, Prof SOHREIBER.
R: Yes, hetes now head of Training Group 0, at present in POTSDAM. I myself
from the Institute for Tropical Hygiene, and also consultant of the SANI-
TAETSINSPEKTOR (Medical Inspector) for tropical hygiene. Besides that I had
my work at the University of HEIDELBERG.
S: Wasntt there a bacteriological institute in LEMBERG?
R: No, I think you are mistaken. It is in KRAKOW.
S: I knew a GENERALSTABSARZT (Surgeon Gen) who had worked as a bacteriologist,
but I can't remember his name.
Ft: There is nobody outside of Prof ZEISS and myself. Altogether there are
only 10 GENERALSTABSAERZTE (Surgeon Generals) in. the Germany Army.
R: I bred 80,000 mosquitoes (anopheles) in a mosquito breeding station near'
BERLIN for experiments with sprays.
III. SOURCES'
a) GENMAJ-(Brig Gen) Hubert LUETKENHAUS, a 54-year old professional soldier,
ex-WEHRMAOHTSKOMMANDANT (Army Oommandant)MANNHEIM-LUDW1GSHAFEN, who was put
on the retired list on 31 Mar 45.
b) OBSTLT (Lt 001) Ernst HAOKEMANN, Battle Group GERSFELD, a reserve officer,
who was employed at I.G. FARBEN before the war.
1. Dr ILGNER, Director of I.G. FARBEN
(Note: Dr ILGNER was a detainee at the Seventh Army Interrogation Oeinter dur-
ing'the samo.poriod as.sourcos above.)
H: Dr ILGNER, the plant manager of I.G. shoUld not remain unpunished either.
A Democrat until 1930, he then changed horses, a real profiteering Nazi. When
I saw him again in 1940, 10 years later, he greeted me with "HEIL HITLER", ? es
5
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Nazi from top to bottom. These swine!, People like us have to sit here, and they
run around free. (See note above).
H: You know, of course, that I.G. is a great concern with many branches in for-
eign countries. During the war these branches are not in direct contact with
FRANKFURT. If, for instance, the branch in.Argentina,has a lot of foreign cur-
rency, and the branch in Chile does not have any, but needs money to build a
branch office, then Argentina can send the money to Chile, and ILGNER super-
vises and approves these transmissions. For that purpose he travelled all over
the world. He was the central financier.
This ILGNER is a miserable character, completely uninteresting as a person.
He lets everybody down if it is to his own advantage.
2. Plannitts for the Future
It would be funny if I were to work for the military government now.
Ht It would be a neat trick to be sent to BERLIN by the Americans. Then you
would have something to eat, and you could still do what you wanted.
But we still have to feed ourselves.
H: We'll get something out of them yet. And imagine what freedom of movement
you would, have. You could travel again through all the countries.
H: Did you hear anything about the partition of Germany? As far as I know,
Southern Germany, Baden, etc, will be occupied by the Americans. Thatle a good
thing; we will be safe that way. All Northern Germany will supposedly be occu-
pied by the British, and the rest will be given to the Russiane. Well, that's
terrible, and quite unthinkable.
L: Yos, the so-called ELBE Line for the Russians. There will be a mixed occu-
pation for BERLIN.
H: What will happen to Austria and the Tyrol ?
L: We shall soon see.
L: (Re Nazis) The responsible persons must be hanged, and the others must be
put in labor battalions whore they will have to pay for their guilt.
3. Miscellany
H: Shortly before Christmas / was a member of an Honour Court. A paymaster Made
some typical remarks. HtMMLER did not sanction tho verdict. We acquitted the
man shertly.hefore Christmas, which had a resounding effect (KNALLEFFEKT)..A
miserable Party wench excused herself. She was one of the worst kind. Thank.
heaven the prosecutor and the foreman of the jury wore decent people..
Then there was another case whore a medical capt in the Army, a Party member,
was supposed to have said, "the FUEHRER should stick to architecture inotoad of
the conduct of the war". That follow was also acquitted; but HIMMLER revers40
the verdict,' with the demand that ho bo condemned to death.'
6
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L: (Talking about his days as WEHRMAOHTSKOMMANDANT, MANNHEIM). A few months
ago I officially invited a bishop for dinner. The bishop appeared, and so did
the Party big shots (PARTEIRONZEN) - the bishop came in Tull regalia. Every-
thing wont off smoothly, but after a few weeks I received a notico saying that
it was forbidden to invite bishops to official receptions. Well, I am a Cath-
olic, but I let it go anyway.
H: (Re the hopeless situation near FULDA) There were no maps of the sector in
which we wore fighting; we made our retreat by moans of an old atlas.
14 April 1945.
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
? )
/ PAUL KUHAL
Commanding.
21(
Maj,MI
7
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A ENCla
Copir No 30
SEC
E T
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY
06200030002-7
; SECRET:
:utri CG
:Init: a
:Date l 21 Apr 5
If the information contained in this report is required for further distribu-
tion, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners names
or of the methods by which the information has been obtained.
The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in
this report:
Name
.010.1.1?1110.?
Rank
Secret No
Unit Place and Date of Capture
RODENWALD, Ernst
GENARZT (Medical
45/975
Mil Med
HEIDELBERG, 1 Apr 45
Prof Or
Corps Gen)
Academy,
BERLIN
LUETKINHAUS, Hubert
GENMAJ a.D. (Brig
45/978
Retired ?
MOSSACH, 4 Apr 45
Gen, Retired)
WESCH, Ludwig,
Prof Dr
Prof of Physics
45/987
HEIDELBERG
Univ
Beg Apr 45
ET
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SOURCES:
a) GENARZT (Medical Corps Gen) Prof Dr Ernst RODENWALD, a 66-year old HEIDEL-
BERG professor, one-time head of the Institute for Tropical Diseases in BER-
LIN who is well acquainted With scientists all over the world. (Of Reports
Ref Nos SALO/7, 13 Apr 45 and SAIC/X/1, 14 Apr 45)
b) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Hubert LUETKEZVAUS, a 54-year old professional soldier,
ex-WEHRMACHTSKOMMANDANT (Army Commandant) MANNHEIM-LUDWIGSHAFEN, who was put
on the retired list on 31 Mar 45. (Of Reports Ref Nos SAIO/X/1, 14 Apr 45,
and PW Intelligence Bulletin MFIU 5/751, 16 Apr 45)
c) Prof Dr Ludwig WESCH, a physics professor from the University of HEIDELBERG,
who was engaged in research work on secret weapons.
* * * * * * *
I. Medical and Other Scientific Experiments
R; /t.is a pity that all the work ol,s has done will be wasted. I have tade
. a specific Series- of.experiments,'which were, so to say, concluded. They
dealt with physical fitness tests of officials destined to work in the tropics.
They were supposed to be put into practice with the acquisition of the Came-,
reonsby the .Germans. Everything wae prepared to the last detail: The mili-
tary organization and the medical installations for the troops were such that
each company had special equipment, organic transportation for six people,
a doctor specialized in tropical diseases and chemicals. In thoee days we could
still get everything,
_
R: Three years ago I took a three-week course for colonial doOtors.(KOLONIAL-
AERZTE) on the subject of sleeping siokness at the Prince LEOPOLD Institute
at ANTTIERP. The course was expellent.
R: In 1940 when I was in a Negro prison camp in the neighborhood of where we
were making our studies, and I wanted to go to STARGARD, I had to get the sig-
,nature of Gen OLBRIGHT (since executed). This always took 2 days.
W: What was the T/0 in your organization?
R: It was about as follows:
. .
16 technical assistants
10 Army doctors (Fib SULLEN)
4 positions for scientific sterlIes
2 officers' positions - technical officers
2 - personnel ( " ?)
At one time I had 25 professors under me. Most recently the following Were
still with me: Prof MARTINI; Prof ?LIEGE (?), zoologist, University of MARBURG;
Prof MATTES (?), zoologist, University of MARBURG; Prof LENZ (LINZ?), entomolo-
gist; Prof-Dr PIKORWSKI (?), staff member (DOZW); REGIERUNGSRAT (Government
Oeunsellor) Dr prox BAURAT (construction engineer); AM Dr INMEOKER (?),
TIEFBAUER (excavation engineer).
S ORTT
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R: A few weeks ago I received an order stating that research work was to be
carried on only in connection with vital war-decisive weapons. This rescinded
an order I had received a few months before. Nothing but contradictions. - -
The sathe confusion reigned in the question of SONDERFUEHRERB. There, too,
they never found a proper solution. In the EAST in the occupied territories
all kinds of people were ,tat into SONDERFUEHRER uniforms.
R: The entomological station MALOHOW, BERLIN, where I was, and where 40,000
mosquitoes were beingbredwas directed by a Dr MEIER (?). He was an exter-
minator (SOHAEJLINGSBEKLIIPFER) and the station was the information office
for the Army. He was shipped to the front as a lieutenant.
W: (Re KREBS Institute) At that time it was vary interesting (at the Insti-
tute); I worked with ultraviolet and inorganic light-rays. I cured 85-90%
of the tumour cases with ultraviolet rays... The bacilli were stimulated
through X-rays. The knowledge gained (by these experiments) came in very
handy when in 1939 parachute flares (1,ZU0HTOHIRAE) (?) and accessories were
to be predUced.
R: When I was at the Negro hospital at BORDEAUX, I had the opportunity of train-
Img young doctors in the subject of tropical diseases. ? -,
W; It is'a pity that we cannot continuo with our work. You undoubtedly know
that we have produced insulin from the pancreas. A now method which I have
just completedprovided fot the manufacture of a now antidote for . . (?). .
from mould and other plants. First it was supposed to have boon manufactured
in PRAGUE, and SIEBERT (?) had it ready in HEIDELBERG.
* * * .* * * *
W: Until the end, I had a Dutchman as my colleague. He was very intelligent,
industrious and thorough.
R: What kind of work did you do?
W: I worked in the U-boat. . .The work i8 more concerned with defensive wea-
pons which can do Germany no harm (if thoy fall into Allied hands). Therefore
my institute W0.8 allowed to remain.
W: I have made very groat experiments. For the past year I worked on a par-
ticularly important now experiment. Everything was worked out and ready. And
now everything is over, and we have to start afresh. Itls awful to have to
go through all that.
0 0 :1/4 0 7.1
W:
As GEHEIMRAT WHMITZ (?) told me, five-ton nitrogen (bombs?) were supposed
to have been manufactured, but that is a ridiculous idea.
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II. Porsqnalitios
E T
W: I would like to know the whereabouts of my father-in-law, Dr PLASCHER (?).
Ho was direotor of milk distribution.
R
Is that your father-in-law? I know bit too.
Wt tots, he always had
ber of the Party,
Dr REICIERT (?) is
there. Consequently,
(HTIDELBERG?)
to be very careful about informants. He was not a mom-
deputy KREISLEITER (VS District Leader) and ho is still
there is hope that my father-in-law stayed thoro too.
Ho makes such a youthful appearance, about 45.
No, ho is about 55.
R: Mr FERRL E (?) is the only one who left 1-121.03LBERG days before (the arrival
of the Americans). He is a vice-director (?ROR=R) and also a nomber of the
SS, but that's really no r?ason (to run away). Th, people were very angry
about it. It's different idth SCHAIDHENN:R (?) - after all he is a minister.
W:I also gave myself up as an SS man - there is really nothiAg wrong with
that. We really haven't done anything.
* * ,!? * ? *- *-
you know that HAGGT1\- fled just in time?
R: r could have escaped with the last Red Crosa ambulance, as S EFZ (9).fro14,--
mArtrITIm did, but I did not want to do that.
R: I also have worries obout my Institute. Perhaps ILX (?) is still there,
but he is an SA STNCARTEYFURER (Col), although only as a doctor. He could
be denounced very easily. Dr STETTEBIL(?), an understanding man, is in charge
of the (buainoss) affairs in HEIDELBERG I believe.
Rs- .Prime Minister (MINDiTERPR:IDENT) XOEHLER (?) is a nice man, straightfor-
ward and unassuming. But GAUL.LITER SPRENG:R (?) is a pig.
*
* *
R: Do you know'XIMSCHT (?) of the REICH Biological Institute (BIOLCGICHE
MICHSANSTALT)?
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W: I have given all my employees permission to talk about their work. I
wonder if they know (the Americans) that I was at the KREBS Institute from
1929-1934. At that time I was together with IERNER (?), whom I helped con-
siderably in 1933. He came from the hULTSJHINER LAEL\TOr_EN and had a Jewish
grandmother. After tha.t heleft for BRUEN'. He was a very decent man; he
work_)d on chemical and physical therapy.
W: I have be- n active in the HEIDELBERGER TEUTONEN, a LANDSMANNSCHAFT (student
fraternity).
W: The Party r HEIDELBERG was quite moderate, not like in Saxony and Thuringia.
In our town (HEIDELBERG) they never shot anybody. Do you remember AMBERGER,
a foreer Social-Democrat, and STAFFERT (?)? The latter was a clear and under-
standing person, who recently was the mediator between the Americans and the
civilian population.
R: I had some Dutch stocks which were very low. I wanted to sell them immedi-
ately. The government received next to nothing from it, or only a ridiculous
amount. You could not get along with the RM 10.00 which were permitted for
private foreign travels. Had I not visited so many conferences in CAIRO, LON-
DON and PARIS I could not have escaped the mouse trap In this manner I al-
ways had a little more money.
W: I married into a somewhat questionable democratic family, on account of which
I had difficulties with the Nazis. My wifels uncle, for instance, was a Com-
munist and interned in the concentration camp at ORANIENBURG. My marriage was
very much resented in Party circles_.
L: Have you been across (the ocean)?
W:No, but I hold many American patents. I also worked for TELEFUrIEN. Near
. . .(?) I maintained an experimental station for I- G. FARBEN. My work,had
very little connection with military things; it was mainly research work.
* * * *
R:? I am glad, after all, to have declined the invitation of the University.
It is better for the present, and besides, a proposed salary of 50,000 marks
would be insecure and without a firm basis.
* * *
R: I had a conference with the Dean of the University, SOFi,IIDT (?) (of STRAS-
IYURG?) this last January, together with STEIN and ? ? . At the time the tak-
ing over of the'BUERGERHOSPITAL (STRASBCURG) by the University clinic was un-
der way. STEIN was involved in this affair, for which he is being reproached
severely in Alsace. The faculty became very rich through the acquisition.
Besides, STIUNT is rumored to be receiving salaries amounting to 300,000 REIOHS-
MARK. He Is a somewhat mtantically inclined person".
S EORE
Isommionli ??????
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W: I remained faithful to Scierce even as a-Party member, and besides, I did
not kill anybody,
L: Have you taken an active phrt in Army or Party life?
W: No, I had a serious operation, and was unable to do so-
* * * * * *
III. Covering the Retreat
R: It was acTime that all the bridges in H.:EIDTIBMG were blown up, but you
couldn't talk the general out of it. Since theG217 affair the military
are soared to death. You couldn't get over the NECKAR; all:the traffic was -
bottled up. Not even boat transportation uas prepared. The people asked the
general at least not to blow up the old bridge, .butile said that he had re-
ceived orders from higher up, to blow up all tha bridges.
W: I received orders from the armament inspectorate (RnSTITGSINSPEKTION) to
save the equipment, since it was the only equipment of its kind in Germany.
G73HTIMRAT LOGT,RSTAL (?) was also still with me. I had an argument with the
regimental commander that ho shoul' not erect a roadbloaok in the vicinity.
. I-finally succeeded.
W: Shortly before the Americans arrived, an officer from the armament inspec-
torate came to see me. I turned over the establisment to him, because my
instruments are irreplaceable and must not be destroyed.
W: MITTLHAUSZY was defended for four days by Navy petty officers, equipped
only with PANZMFATUSTEN, without any heavy weapons - about 100 men, including
two holders of the Knights' Cross. Finally only two men wore left. Tho potty
officers came from a school in MITTELHAUSEN.
W: Thad to leave my wife in MITTTIDORF with our three children. The young-
est is 20 days old. The peasants are hostile to us, because they think that
we wore tha cause of the battle for the village.
* * * :*4 * * *
IV. Chemical Warfare
W: It has been learned that the Russians manufactured gases to cause anaes-
thesia, and that they experimented with them in factories. They have never
actually used them, however.
R: We Germans are very much afraid of it (gas) and would never make use of it
ourselves. None of my colleagues would make himself available foz such a
thing - primarily on ethical grounds and also because it might boomerang (02GEN
ZWZISCHNI:IOIMIT). My friend Z-ZISS has never mentioned anything about it
to me, and that is proof that it does not exist.
6
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W: The WHRER is Voted as saying,. "When the:Fr arrive they will only find a
sloeping Germany." What do you suppose he means?
, I am glad I do not know; it is ale
* * 7?$ * * * *
it4Ty govormont
much simpler that way.
The AMorioans conduotod themselves quite differently from the way HITLER
predicted that they would. They arrived in our little town, they did not
' destroy anything, did not steal or repo, but behaved like real gentlemen.
Amorioana ar-31 of oeurso, to a large extent of Gorman origin. Ration cards
in MOS8A0Whave boon issued and everything is going on as before.
* * * * * * *
..loinOr,(SOHRUCHWEISTER) BRAUN in MOSBAOH, a :Comer democrat, is in chargo
-Of the gasworks. They (the Americans) kept him, because he is a particularly
'able fellow.
* * * * * *
W: The future leeks dark to pc. The Allies Will take away the small amount
of gold we have loft - and all the treasures we robbed in Franco as well. The
country will be occupied and since it is impo9sible to hide in the w,:oda, it
is bettor to give up.
ilhat,?dA you think the poop
do?
from the SS STANDART3N (Regts) are going to
I= If the peasants keep their mouthe shut, many people may be able to hide in
the ,bAXRISPH2N WALD or in the valloYs of the Alps. That's a good idoa and
it being carried out in practice.
* * *
: Then.) fig a price ot four million:dollars on HTMivILR's head.
would turn
hIM over tp the Allies, if 1 knew whore he was.
* * * * * * *
1
R: We must not think about future.devolopments. I saili in the last faculty
Mooting (AIDSIBERG University) that we would have to appeal to the sentiments
of the BritiSh and Americans. Perhass we can got the University going again
f'
in this way.
W; Porhaps?the stone plaque with th o names of the Jewish founders such as AR-
BURG is still there. That might also help to samo extent.
*!* * *
W: Now the question arises, how can l'help
the cmth 6:tallegiancel 1 believe ihat th
. ,
wl.th the, AMeriCans.- T? can help derri!any th
any harm.
*
the Fatherland without breaking
o best thing to do is to collaborate
at way very much without doing myself
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L: W3 have to forget the p'7,et and we have to work with tho new masters. .
W: Yes, that's right, that is the only way to preserve the German people,
and we have to do it as good Germans.
* * *
.R: I believe that our chemical industry will be the only one to remain in
existence; also possibly the optical industry since we are, so far ahead in
that field. Whether the heavy industry will remain is very doubtful.
R: No, other nation has accomplished what. Germany has done. We stood from the
Northern tip of Norway (ITCRIDCAP) to the SUEZ Canal, from the Atlantic to
MOSCOW. We introduced German art, culture, and way of living. That cannot
be forgotten. And surely we shall became and shall bo a groat nation. The
Gorman idea will live, ,31731] if it takes twenty-five or fifty years. - Germany
will be victorious. What can America do against it? They 'willbuild a few
factories and get industry into high gear. But they are still backward, with-
out culture and barbaric. They can still learn from us. Imagine what We
have accomplish:ed in the war against malaria. Prof MARTINI and two of my as-
sistants have achieved great things during the war. And on the Italian front,
people such as medical Capt -STIEBEL (?) worked splendidly.
W;I mn a confirmed National Sooialiet and a Gorman. It is wonderful to live
at ft time like this. YSJAP, NS, NSV, are all marvelous institutionS! Prof
BUTTEN .(?) in PRAGUE is the only colleague in my field who comes up to my
standards.
* * * * * * *
Wt
The lost war has shown Germany that she is a nation of: leaders that she
will become a nation of leaders again, and that she will always remain one.
Of course when the white flags hang out in HEILELBERG, and when people run
around -with Red Cross armbands, it looks ridiculous to the Americans, and it
is degrading for us.
R: The British want to take revenge, but they'll have to forget about that.
We'll surely have it ?nuch easier under American occupation in Southern Ger-
many.
VEM. German Occupational and Foreign Pelicy
R: In Belgium the Flemish expected great things from us when we came, but we
were outsmarted by the Walloons; we wanted to unify the Belgian people. In
the medical faculty in BRUSSELS we wanted to work together with Walloons and
Flemish alike but it never got beyond the experimental stage. whom did we
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,
send as our representative? A German district physician (KREISARZT) to re-
present the German medical profession.
Yes, the Department of Education (KULTUSMITISTERIUM) and. the foreign policy
(AUSSENROLITIK) have been beyond all description (UNTER ALL.R KANONE). in Ger-
many lately.
21. April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
AAJ
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
9
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ENCLOP!
R E T
No
????7;,..t....?!??, re, r trdi
!Tr7f7,77'
06200030002-7
- ,..... ......... .
r........... SECRET
FTITEId7-7.1-7-7th Am,y:
., . '
, 4 Dae; 1 may 4
1
;
1 mit;
if,t_6.,
.g. -.4._
:
?
'SEVENTH RvtY INT RROGATIO11 ontR.
'
AO 756 . US ARMY
,
If the information containeid in this report is required for
further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention
is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the
information'has been obtained.
The fol.lowing are the namr,s and secret numbers of the prison-
ers mentioned in this report:
?
Eat
dank, Position Secret No
1
,
GORING, Hermann REICHSMARSCHALI 45/1409
,
LAMMERS, Hans Heinrich MIMI Minister and ' 45/1495
Chie of Chancellery
t'
?
;
gaRET
6?????=11110
4'? -0 ;
//.. .
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NOTE: The following is a literal tra-Islaion of a conversation bet-
ween GO?RING, LAMEERS, and several interrogating officers.
I. HITIER's Successor
4,??
GORING: T must tell you something. You are the head of the Chancel-
lery, you signed all documents, You became aware of a
change in the situation only by accident, not through any
official papers. You knew about it only after Do11.11TV
radio address, Anybody could appear tomorrow and declare,
"T received a radio nesSage after PONIT,Z received his; I
am the head of the state now..." I, for one, have written
proof (about the nomination of a successor)...., and when
DONITZ appears now, he must ha-e some sort of written or-
ders.
LAMMERS: Yes, that's clear; he will have to produce documentary
proof.
G: If he has any, he has to make it known to the German
people in the REICHSANZEIGER (Official Legal Record). Here
we have a case of a he7,.i of a state who really is not a
head of a state, since no proof can be found. On the other
114.4, I am the only one who, as legal head of the state,
could possibly be recognized by the American Government
at the present time, and who could negotiate. This is the
greatest deception ever foisted.. The Law of 13 Sept 34,
the original of which we have here, is the basis for the
.ease. According to this decree, HITLER can name only one
successor. There is also a decree issued after HESS'
? flight (reads HITLER's Decree of 29 Jan 41): "In the
;eventuality that I would be hindered in the execution of
'duties, even if only temporarily, and should I be un-
able to give special directives during the time of my in-
diSposition.l. appoint as my successor in all my offices
REICHSMARSCHAIL of the Greater German REICH, Hermann
.04ING. Signed HITLER; This Decree voids the Decret of 23
Aptil 38 eoneerning the FUHRER's successor." This is the
Son why the REICHSMARSCHALL (GORING himself) sent an
1,114.14iting telegram (in April)
It wasn't really necessary that I inquire (whether HITLER
had died) it was only out of loyalty that I did
The coup d'etat was made only because I wanted to avoid
further bloodshed, on 23 Ap-i' 45.... You can well say that
BORMANN is crazy!
L.; had received the order concerning the FtHRER's successor
from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the WEHRMACHTSFIYHRUNGS-
SAB (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) in the followin
manner. Gen WINTER Wrote, "Inclosed I am sending you the
cOntents of'an order whch was received by Grand Admiral
DONITZ: 'In the place Of REICHSMARSCHALL GORING, the
PUHRER appoints you, HERR GROSSADMIRAI, as his successor.
Official documents follow. As of now, you will take all
measUres which are necessary according to the present situ-
ation' - from this it can be concluded that HITLER was
dead - 'signed: REICHSLEITER BORMANN".
G: Is there anything more fantastic than this fraud committed
by nORMANX?...You know, the decisive point in my inquiry
VM8 (the request for) freedom of action in foreign matters.
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O. : Could he
broimmiat
,
have don.cl-ww-egall:y?
I. No, in that case he would have ha 6 to put it on paper.
G. Now I ask you, HERR L.AinS, do you really believe that
alter the PtJHRER had publicly declared my appointment as
his successor, and since he further announced my illness or
poky withdrawal from office, he would not have been able to
aandunce over the radio such an important change as that
,of his successor?
1.0.: Now, I'd like to know, aid you withdraw from all your duties
because of ill health, or was this step ordered from else-
where?
? G: It was ordered from elseWhere. Ee (HITLER) threatened to
shoot me Or to throw me Out of all jobs, except My appoint-
m4t as his Successor.
I.O.: NOT to relieve you as his successor?
G: No, That has he connection with any office.
I.O.: Youadmit.that you did not actually resign?
G: No. I was forced to do so. Otherwise I would have been execu-
ted.iMmediately.
1: I would like to point out another thing which is of import-
ance. After this action (GORING's demotion) a press notice
appeared which stated that the REICHSNARSCHAIL resigned as
Oompander of the Air Porce, because of a heart ailment...
he still retained his title as REICHSMARSCHAIL... and the
decree (about HITLER'S successor) was therefore still effect-
,
'
????
G ieU, 1 must say, these ?mn crooks have put over a coup
that is outstanding.... I have always known that, ih the
event of something hapnening to the IITERER, my life would
: be in the greatest danger for the following 48 hours. After
?that time I would have performed the swearing in, and it
would have been a legal fact. At any rate, I would have ar-
e 12WN within 48 hours. , ?o. I
wou? ave carr ci ou wo personal ac ions imflediately:
the arrest of BORMANN and the firing of RIBBENTROP.... They
Were the two thorns in my ,side.
sor 4* *
G: I told some GAMITERs w o were close to me, about a year
and a half ago, when everything became clear to me, that if
tate ever designated me as (HITDER's) ;successor, I would
place a High Court over Mei I told myself that no man should
assame,the responsibility of not having anybody over him...
A dictatorship must never come again, it does not work. We
see it now. As long as d' man is good, as HITLER was in the
beginning, everything is wonderful... but (then) it came to
"-PremeS.
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II. Chemical Warfare
1.0.: I believed that HITLER would use gas t the last minute.
G: No, Once, toward the end, he cOnsidered CW, but we told him
that gas was out of the question. I was told that all your
gas' masks would have offered no protection. The gas Was so
dangerous that I wouldn't permit another demonstration. I
knew:that the gas would have had to be transported to the
tear when the Americans came, and the effect of an air attabk
on the train might have been catastrophic. Just imagine; a
train of 75 loaded freight cars attacked from the airi.a bomb
frees the gas, and the -fragments which fly 6,7,8, or even
10 km spread it!
1.0.: But experts are of the opItlioA that one needs many.more gas
bombs than HE Or incendiaries' to destroy a city.
G: Let mei tell yeu this asa specialist; the most dangerous are
the incendiaries. The Ametcans have really given us the -
works with HE bombs... A 'small incendiary falls into a house
and the whole side of the street burrs If incendiaries are
. .
tArown against railroad yards, then, of course, it doesn't
Make sense at Some of the factories (which had been
aitapkeC) - if you stood in front of them you could never
believe thatthey"d be rebuilt. CITROEN, in PARIS, for instance.
". After six weeks tbeystarted working again. The whole roof
was down. But where there was a fire, all machines were ?
ruined. Fire is the worst of all...
We knew that we were more advanced in chemical warfare and
that we had more dangerOUS gases.
When 'one has such gases, one must expect to use them some day.
G: Well, we thought America 'would start chemical warfare. It was
pointed out that America did not have to fear for her cities.
4Aa the troops who attack with gas can protect themselves
better than the population. We also planned to attack England
Ith, gas in case the Americans resorted to chemical warfare.
Tha question of possible consequences of a bombing attack
against a gas-manufacturing factory was raised on numerous
OecaSions:. Was the population to be evacuated? (But) the
ITHRER never wanted to get the population excited about gas.
That, of course, is understandable; I would have acted the
same way. During the last few years the air superiority was
.so one-sided, so pronounced. We told ourselves that every-
thing would be spoiled by bringing up the topic of chemical
warfare.
as?
IX,: What did HITLER moan by his well-known saying: "God forgive
me the last three days of the war"?
G: Ho NEVER said that.
III. HITLER's Death
L
'00.: Do you actually believe ihat HITLER is dead?
G: Well he WAS sick. A cerebral liemorthage was doubtlessly with-
4
linommiummi
)11minmeimmirOi
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in the realm of possibility, in that condition. Whether this
led to his end, or IhheIher the man committed suicide.
I.O.: Are you definitely sure that he is dead?
0: I have no doubts about
pm. so. hr.
40 mar owe
G: The PW.IRER collapsed on the evening of the 22nd (April), as
a result of the war situation. The whole thing was set off by
my telegram in which I alroct for freedom of action in matters
of foreign policy. Since I had talked about negotiations
(with the Allies) for weeks and months, they knew exactly
that I would attempt to negotiate immediately, the very same ,
day. Several generals we-ted to surrender.
-IV. Epreign Illtunpz Account
LI There is an aceount with the RE-ICI-MBANK which originates from
donations made in various,currencjea, even in gold coins. We
opened the account for him (HITLER) under my name, but it be-
longs to the POHRER.
IX.: You say the 76,000 dollars are with the RBICHSBANK?
L: Yes, they are there. The kEICHSBANK holds a gift from a man
from Transvaal who donat4 69,000 dollars; German- Americans
donated 2,400 dollars, anonymous gifts amount to 478 dollars.
I want to emphasize that it is not my account that I .m turn-
in over here - it is proved by the documents, too.
Egua - SPEER Conference
G: The talk he (RITLER) had with SPEER was very interesting. Ten
days before the collapse, on the 17th (April), HITLER called
SPEER and accused him of pabotaging the "scorched earth" poli-
cy. SPEER replied, that the people did not want this policy
and that there wasn't enovgh time. The PtHRER then said,
oThat's the end, then! Why don't you toll me you know that thf.
war Will be won?. ." "No," said SPEER, "I can't saY7--"Ehat:"
Said the POIMER: ;"Can't you .say that ysa believe that this
war will be won?" "No", replied SPEER, "I can't say that".
The rUHRER then asked, "Can't you say at least that you hope
that' the_ war eAri. 0141.,b),w94?',QuOth SEER, "I can't say
that, it is perfectly clear to me that everything is over."
HITLER then said, "SPEER, it HAS to be done, everything de-
.
ponds on it". "We are short of everything", was SPEER's reply.
"Can't you say y.21.1 wish that the war will be won?" asked:
gITIJER, "Yes, can-"gE7 that", said SPEER. The FUHRER then
ApPrOached him and said, "I thank you for saying, at least,
the' b'pst you could. But lean see only this"- perspiration
stood on his forehead -"wc must realize that we must hold out
until the last hour, no matter how much lightning and thunder.
know we will come through!"
VI. 414.9Nly
100.: as resistance in tho'mou4tains not anticipated?
4
G: 011.4 .yes, it was anticipated. The SS was working on it bUt
}
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Vistammargi
3 ..[OR._C I
they made a Mess of it, that's quite clear tome. It was also
too late, Like in ther instances, nobody ever listened
to the officers.
400 .00' 0?0 . 0,
?111.1. ??11111
L: We want to offer our services to the Allies. We are not war
criiinals.
G: We want to see to it that there is order and peace, especial-
ly until matters regarding the rblationship to the Allied
forces have been cleared up; to avoid uprisings in connection
to CommuniSm, etc, which would be very embarrassing to the
Americans and English. This is the only aim we can possibly
have after the collapse, and I am the one who can not only
helps but who also knows all the episodes of the past.
mar kw. Ira
L: The last time I was with the FIIHRFP oa 27 March. A lot of
papers awaited his signature. Some were weeks old. He said,
HIYou sign them!" I declined. His main opic was that Frede-
rick the Great did not know when the war would end, either.
...HITLER was greatly excited about the REICHSMARSCHALL at-
tempting to start negotiations with the Allies. And then they
mentioned in the last leaflet that the REICHSHARSCHAIL was
going to flee...
19 May 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
Yt.t.?6,1
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.
6
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-
24 May 45
Copy No 30
00030002-7
Dictoscullt
SECRET
lio
: S,ECRET:
:Auth: CGL, 7th Army :
iInit:
:Date: 24 May l95 :
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 us ARMY
If the information contained in this report is required for further
distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the
prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been
obtained.
The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners men-
tioned in this report:
Name
GOERING, Hermann
Rank, Position
REICHSMARSCHALL ?
VON BRAUCHITSCH, Bernd Walter Col, GAF, GOERING's Adjutant
Secret No
45/1409
45/1410
This report should be read in conjunction with Reports Ref No SAIC/X/3,
/9 May 45 and Ref No SAIC/X/4, 21 May 45.
1
S E
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SECRET
wommillimmoommommon
24 May 45
lomm.
I. PERSONALITIES
INTERROGATING OFFICER: When was the last time that you personally saw
HITLER alive?
GOERING: In the evening of the 20 Apr, around half past
eight. We raced away.
IO: To get away that same evening?
G: Yes, yes. Afterwards he retracted his order that I was to go South--,
in his usual manner, and ordered me to be at his cave on the follow?
ff
ing day. The room was very small. He (HITLER) sat at a large table,
and we all stood around it--about twenty of us. ?
IO: Was that in the cellar of the chancellory?
G: Yes, deep down in the shelter. I can't believe that he let himself
be shot. You should have seen him--his whole body shook violently.
And he grew more vicious with every moment.
+ + +
IO i By the way, this Professor HOFFLANN, the photographer, should be able
to tell quite A bit about the FUEHRER.
G: More than anyone else.
+ + +
G: You ought to know how he (HITLER) lived in the last two or three
years. As long as nothing unusual was going on, he would get up
at half past eleven, after being awakened at nine o'clock. He would
read the newspapers and then sleep some more. Then he'd get up and
the daily routine would start. Then came the discussion of the
(military) situation. Ordinarily this discussion lasted from three
to four hours--during which he would- get terribly excited. We had
to remain throughout the conference. Then he would eat dinner and
during the evening he used to talk to some officer from headquarters
After discussing the evening situation he would go to bed at nine
o'clock, and at twelve o'clock he would get up again.
IO: Wasn't there a discussion of the evening situation in the morning?
G: Yes, the second one was at half past twelve or one o'clocki and -
lasted two'houra After that we had the 'conference. It waS
attended by GUDERIAN, BORMANN, FEGELEIN (HIMMLER's liaison 111.an to
HITLER) and BURCKHARDT(?).Everything was brought up there to the
least little detail. All sorts of things were rushed through at
this conference.
G: BORMANN was not only head of the party offices, but one day--about
a year and a half ago--we were surprised by the following interest?
ing letter: "The FUEHRER has repeatedly given me assignments and
orders which do not come under the jurisdiction of the party, but
2
s E cf-7/mmowna
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MIMIOMINIIII.0".1.111111111111MMINiii
are of a military nature. He did this In' oder to give .me the'
authority to pass his orders along in this line as' well, and to',
supervise .their execution. As of today,,the FUEHREH has made me his
Secretary." So now he was secretary to' the FUEHRER! And then there
Was Another thing. The Minister of justice had to submit to him the
sentences pertaining to disloyalty trials in the Army. HOHMANN
returned them with the remark, that they were a disgrace, that such
an antagonism of the court was impossible--he would see to it that
the attorneys would be dismissed from office. He had the minister
of justice completely under his thumb. By rights; SEYSS-INQUART in
Holland should have made his roPorts to the State inspector, SOYMEHSU
But no, he had td give his reports directly to HOHMANN. The only
one who put up a struggle was 2OVEN in Norway, but he was taken
' care of.
+ + +
1
G: ?RIMER said that Count HERNADOTTE had come to see him. He told me4
"You know, he must have been the man EISENHOWER sent as a negotiator.
I replied: "I can't believe that. Don't take offense, but I doubt
whether they will accept You as a negotiator." Than he retorted: ,
"Sorry to contradict you, but I have undeniable proof that I am
considered abroad to be the only person who can maintain peace and
order," And after :that, he didn't care what happened. And I thought
he might have more proof than I, and restrained myself. So I said,:
"I just can't picture that." And he always came back tty the?
samething: "If anything should happen to the FUEHRER, and you art
unable to take over--after that might happen-'-can I say such
and such?" That occurred at least 10 times during those 2 or 3 hours
I kept wondering: "Why should I be unable to take ov,er?-- Why. should
I be cut off?a....Theil it suddenly dawned upon me....POPITI, (?) al-
ready had mentioned something like that...And when I mentioned that
to him (HIMMLER), he said: "Well, maYbe POPIN (?y may have said
something like that. He might claim to know something. But as far
as I am concerned it is an unheard-of 'impertinence." I wanted to
? talk with POPITZ (?) again, and they said: "Of course, of course!"
And when I asked, when our talk could be arranged, they told me:It
may not be possible to arrange it today, but,on the day after to-
morrow," That day passed without .the talk. Then I heard one day
that the FUEHRER had ordered POPITZ (?) sentenced to death. The
,eXecution was postponed until later... Well, I couldn't help that
either....
G: This HIMMLER--he really startled me during this last conversation
Of ours. He made the ridiculous suggestion, that I nominate him
as Chancellor upon becoming HITLANH's successor. I replied to him:
"I cannot do that, because according to our constitution the offices
of Chancellor and President are combined." Then he said: "Sir, if
anything should prevent you from becoming the successor, can I have
the job then?" There I replied: "My dear HIMMLER', we'll have to
wait and see. That will depend upon the circumstances. I can't
see what should prevent me from taking the office. What could stop
me?".... And that happened in our last conversation at least ten .
times. As I sat there, I pleaded with him. All he would have to do,
3
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24 May 45
would be to say just one word to his SS men, and I would be free.
(G was arrested by SS end of Apr 45) But he dodged the question,
and said that unfortunately my detention had been ordered by the
FUEHRER, He knew for sure that it was a mistake. Everything would
be cleared up shortly. So he just let me sit there. Lt Col FRANKE
of the SS can testify to that
II, ART TREASURES AND FUNDS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
G: I'd like to get the whole thing straightened out. I can tell you
confidentially, that certain objects were destroyed completely. And
I will confide a secret to you: there are some things buried at
KARIN HALL. There are large objects--four beautiful sculptures.
I'll tell you what's there-- including these-sculptures. Then you'l:
have the whole story. Where I have traded things, I'll give you
others. Those things which belong to me, can be stored for the
time being.. ..But I am not responsible for the FUEHRER's stuff. All
I can do for you is to tell you where my own things are. It will
do good to be able to say: 'These items are taken care of--I can
forget about them."
+ + +
G: One day I was approached by a man who owned an insignificant house
in a suburb. He had his own glass workshop. He owned a tremendous
collection, and sold me a few valuable pieces. From him I bought
two church windows, 8 m high.
IO: You must have built some sort of a chapel.
G: No, I did not. However, I bought an entire chapel in France, an
old one. I took only its windows. I was given a Gothic house in
ABBEVILLE with all the trimmings. All I could use were the inside
panelling, the winding stair-case and the big gate. Then a woman
wanted to sell me a Spanish Harem, So I looked at it. There were
wonderful things in it. But I couldn't use anything with the ex-
ception of a beautiful davenport, which I purchased. Hardly six
months later FRANCO asked me what had happened. He said he had
heard that I purchased a castle in Spain. Thank goodness that
wasn't so.
+ + +
G: I don't have a cent abroad. A number of the most crooked deals
were made in the name of the FUEHRER or the REICHSMARSCHALL (himself,
And everything passed through the German customs sanctioned with
our names.
von BRAUCHITSCH: And some of the most notorious orders, of which no one
knew whether they were genuine, were given in the name
of the FUEHRER or REICHSLIARSCHALL
G: I made a present to my sistex-in-law in Sweden, so that she. could
buy a small house for herself. That was a famous Swedish castle...
The last time I was in Sweden, was in 1935....
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III. AIR FORCE
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G: I have looked through, all these 'casualty, reports,. And I found
more losses than we had announced.. It was important for us, of
course, to prove that We had. shot down always one or two more
planes than the Others. You shoUld have seen what ridiculous
statements we made--you co'Tldn't help laughing when you read
them. Take for example ti .. time when we wrote that we were to
get a plane with a 12 cm cannon
+ + +
IO: Did you know anything about remote-controlled bombs?
G: They had one disadvantage. They (the planes) had to reach an
altitude of 6000 meters and had to fly in an absolutely straight
line toward their targets for two minutes, without being able to
dodge.
IO: Did you know where EISENHOWER's headquarters were in Africa?
G: No. But we knew that there was et 'fleeting in CASABLANCA. We
' did not like to attack'hedquarters anyway. We thought that
might be a mutual understanding.
G: The heaviest Casualties Were in HAL=G, UUPPERTAL, and DRESDEN.
It was terrible. The people of DRESDEN couldn't believe that
You would bomb the city, because they thought MESDEN was too well
known as a cultural center. The city was overcrowded.
+ + +
(G on planned air attack on Russia's power plants)
'
G: In spite of the existing fuel shortage, enough gasoline was re-
served for this attack, Everything was ready. And then the
FUEHRER would have to order the demolition of these ridiculous
bridges across the ODER river, which the Russians could repair
overnight anyway! Ridiculous to use this magnificent machinery
just to destroy these bridges.--It was maddening. All these large-
scale plans had to fall through. I just couldn't stand it anymore.
I finally worked myself into a nervous condition.
It); And what did you do for relaxation?
G: I took vitamin tablets, read detective stories, and smoked my
cigars very slowly. You know, I Can read the, sane detective story
three times without tiring of it.
IO: Did the FUEHRER read stories like that too?
G: No, that Was only I. He got them. for me. The FUEHRER read only
very serious literature ' And so, little by.iittle, I was
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24 May 45
disgraced. But what was I to do? I'd give an order, only to find
out on the next day that it was all nonsense He attacked
my friends, but he meant me. And then, toward the end, just
because he heard the word "negotiations" he wanted to cut me off
from everything--and that after 23 years
+ + + + + + + ,
IV. CONCENTRATION CAMPS
Gs These pictures (of DACHAU) which you showed me yesterday must
depict theactivities of the last few days. It is beyond me, just -
what was behind all that. ELLER must have suddenly gotten .a
fiendish pleasure out of such things. I have heard such stories
before, for example that a large. load of Jews left for Poland
during the winter, where some of the pEeple froze to death in their
vehicles.. I heard of these things mostly from the ranks of my
employees and from the people. When I made inquiries, I was told,
that such things would not happen again--it was claimed that the
trains had been sent on the wrong route. Then there was some -talk
about what you call "VERNICHTUNGSTRUPPEN" (Extermination troops).
It was claimed that there were many diseased people in these camps
and that many died of pestilence. These troops had the job of
bringing- the corpses to a crematorium where they would be burned.
+++
G: All cruelty was repulsive co me. I can name many people whom I
have helped,- even Communists and Jews. My wife was so kind--I
really have to be grateful for that. I often thought, if only
the FUEHREll would have had a sensible wife who would have said to
him: "Here is a case where you can do some good, and here another,
and this one " that would have been better for everyone
It was very depressing for me. In some cases I had to write to
HIMMLER, that he shouldrelease this one and that one. And he
would reply, that he was very sorry, but that he could not do it,
or perhaps that he didn't want to do it. But there were quite a
few cases, where he did it anyhow.... But now it is pretty clear
to me that all my efforts were wasted. Whoever attacked HIL,,
was eliminated. On top of. that, he lied to me. Not a single
report was read to the FUEHRER
G: I wanted the foreign workers to be rounded up so that they could
be turned over to the advancing enemy troops at some central point
.instead of being allowed to run around loose. And then I told him
(HITLER) that the concentration camps should be guarded if at all
possible, until the British or the Americans arrived, because we
were detaining quite a number of criminals there whiCh neither we
nor they would want to release. They should have been guarded, and
the enemy should have taken the responsibility of segregating those
whom he did not wish to release. You surely can't be interested
in freeing a lot of criminals. And the same thing goes for workerk
from foreign territories--that was my biggest worry. I told him
that something would have to be done about them, as well as about
prisoners of war. We also mentioned Russian prisoners of war--but
1111111111410111111111111011141.01111011.111114.1111%
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there we knew what would happen if-they broke loose. The French
were very decent.,, they were mainly employed as farmhands.
T
+ + + + 4 4 +
V. JEW BAITING AND RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES
G: These NUREMBERG laws came as a great surprise to Me. I am still
wondering today, where they could haVe originated. I knew only
too well that they would cause bad feelings 'abroad. ,.. I was in
charge of the Four-Year Plan. At that time SCHACHT came to see
me and said: "Sir, these incidents will cause us serious economic
difficulties abroad." So I went there, and they showed me the
laws, saying that they had not beell approved yet. Some of the
clauses were being changed, but there were no major changes. And
from then on the Jew-baiting really started. The United States
? respended with a most disr7reeable boycott. And I was given a
' lecture, that from now on it would-be very difficult to maintain
any kind of commercial relation with America. But all this was
temporarily forgotten in the excitement over the Sudeten incident
in Sep 38, Then the war started in '39. For the time being, all
was well. Then, early in '40 they went to it again--paying par-
ticular attention to the Jews in the occupied countries. I have
to admit that things kept'getting worse, and that they were
sanctioned by various groups. All.sorts of impossible excesses
? occurred. I didn't approve of thea, but unfortunately I couldn't
do' anythingagainst them. I didn't have too good a name with the
party myself. The first time when'theY really attacked me was in
'3,8. They didn't say anything about the wedding, but when I had
my child christened Ln the first year of my marriage, I was attack-
ed vehemently. It was claimed by the party, that the christening
bf my child would put the FUEHRET1 into a terrible diletma if it
ever'became known. They wanted me to name my child, without a
:religious ceremony. That may all be well arid good, except that the
? FUEHRER had been put up to this--particularly by the Minister of
the Interior and GOEBBELS. Then IPTZE, chief of the SA, started
to reproach' me, saying that such a step against the Nazi party was
intolerable. And from then Oil there wasno end .of trouble--someone
would always point out this incident. Later on we had some serious
arguments. It was intended to merge the two religions.. ..Next we
had these terrible days in Tirol?there were some uprisings when
these silly Hitler youth boys started trouble in a church. KERRL,
who is a smart man? said: "I am a,eatholic myself, I do not want
to haVe,anytking to do tiththat." WAGNER ofMUNICH had. the same
attitude. The whole thing was jst plain madness.
VI, MISCELLANY
G: It was only since very recently--say for the last 4 weeks--that
he (HITLER) said: "We can't help it anymore."
+ + +
G: I had ihe feeling that it would take nothing short of a miracle to
save our cause. But I believed we might be able to fight to a
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draw by taking more radical measures. Unfortunately I wasn't
boss. There were a lot of ether things too. The Army was so
unwieldy--it should have been reorganized. The leadership of the
Army was broken up through SS interference--there was a serious
split. The maddest scheme hadn't even been introduced yet, that
was to cooe soon. There was to be a merger of the party leader-
ship with the Army command. BORLANN was to draw up the necessary
legal measures. He would have had to pass judgement on every
little general.
++.
G: If you'd ask me now, when .I first gave up the war for lost, I'll
have to admit that I had some doubts and worries for quite a while--
but I only realized our illaY.j,t4hle defeat since.the very last few
days. You see, I made every effort to find a way out, because I
believed we had a good chance to hold out much longer. , I think I
can tell you frankly that things would have gone differently, if I
had been supreme commander. We would have used jet-propelled
planes much earlier--and that would have been most unpleasant for
you.
+ +
(Re: Counterattack in Hungary)
G: DIETRICH then went down there with the Sixth Panzer Army. The
order to attack was given,. The offensive was made by two divisions
after a km forced march, and repelled. When HITLER received
the news he went raving mad. He said: "If we lose, the war it will
be his (SEPP.DIETRICH's) fault." And he immediately issued these
two orders: First of all, the four divisions, "HITLER,JUGEND",
l'ADOLF HITLER", "DAS REICH," and another one, were to take off their
brassard& immediately, and were not to wear any decorations for
throe days. And HINVILER was to go to VIENNA right away in order
tc. tell SPP DIETRICH, he should by rights be sentenced to death.
Also that he (HIMMLER) was to' set an example of this man who had
been a traitor to his country. Then all was quiet ,for a few days.
Bul, later it started all over again. We were really done far.
G; But BORMANN charged Frau SCHOLTZ-KLINK with the formation of a
women battalions. Many already had participated in anti-aircraft
work, such as operation of searchlights; that is true. But just
pyiton!,, such women's battalions were to be committed against the
PuWans in the second line. Their training was supposed to in-
clude the use of machine guns.
+ + +
IO: T9 what extent did Germany use liquid air?
G; Liquid air, how do you mean that?
B: Liquid air was an addition to explosives, since they became scarce.
IO: We440 that it had been used in Russia. The Russians demanded
t1a it be discontinued immediately, otherwise, they would use gas.
4.11.11.1111101111.111111111.1041.11PREPIIMMOOMMEMpop
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Gs No, that is a lot of Aonsense.
+ + +
G: THE PEUPLE NEVER CALLED ME ANYTHING ELSE BUT dHERINANN"! ONLY
HERMANN! NEVER ANYTHING ELSE BUT HERMANN! TO BE CALLED BY
ONE'S FIRST NAME - THAT IS THE HEIGHT OF POPULARITY.
24 May 1+5
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
,5(4,j
_PAUL KnALA, Maj, MI i!
Commanding.
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ECUISt RE
iMflt
, ***** .......
L _
:Autiv CG, 7-Th Army ;
,:init: ' .',...4'z 04_,...ret, ?
?
:pate: 28 May 1947"?:
SEVENTH ARMY INTEERWATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY
Copy .No ?
#4,4,4 ***
If ,the inforationcontaj.ned in this report is, required for further
distribution, it should be so paraphrased _that no mention is made of the
prisoners' .names or of the methods by which the information has been
obtained.
,
?
The _following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners men-
tioned in. this rpTcrt4
110,11.
GUDERIAN Heinz
Rank Position
GEN01.38T (Co]. Ge) FUEHRERRESERVE
(Officers Pool). Formerly Chief
Of Staff German, Ground Forces and
Inspector General of Armored Units.
GEN D_PHRUPPX, (Lt Gen), Inspector
of Arripred units, formerly German
Attach'e in i.Olv'DQN,.
? OBSTGRUF (Col Gpn of WAN ss ) ,
ex-CG, Army Group "G"..
VON GYRI, Leo
HAUSS
Secret No
45/1559
? `,
45/3561
Pit43-0 ,13
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25X1A
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28 May 45
I. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
GUDERIAN: Everything went well at the Start. After the fall of SMOLENSK
our high command was faced with the Bathe choice of decisions as
NAPOLEON in 1812; Should I first go to MOSCOW, or should I first con-
quer the UKRAINE and Occupy Russia's national granary,: ....
or should. I go to conquer LENINGRAD in order to get the Baltic Sea
under my control. This problem hid been considered earlier, because
everyone knew that such a decision would have to be made sometime.
Even before this campaign the FUERRER had decided to take LENINGRAD
first, in order to have the entire Baltic Sea under his control, and
,thus establish a naval base supporting the German left flank. At
the time when our troops stood at the gates of LENINGRAD, and when
the drive was held up at KIEV, on our right flank, he suddenly chang-
ed his mind, He abandoned the idea to take LENINGRAD first-74n
attempt which could have succeeded. Nor did he attempt to take
MOSCOW as NAPOLEON had done--in spite of our firm conviction that
MOSCOW could be taken. In fact, I had already given orders for an
attack on MOSCOW for 15 Aug with my PANZER Army. Instead he decided,
after weeks of thought, to conquer the UKRAINE first. Thus, on 25
Aug, I had to head back in a southwesterly direction toward KIEV,
instead of being allowed to ?Aartmy drive toward MOSCOW. Well, at
least the capture of KIEV resulted in the isolation and surrenaer
of an; army group. But it set us back 4 weeks in our advance toward
MOSCOW. It got us into the muddy season, where the mud made traffic
on ordinary roads impossible, and retarded it very much even on hard-
surfaced roads. It was Winter be4ore it got too cold: You mustn't
underestimate NOSCOW's importance., MOSCOW is not only the capital
of Russia, but considering the conditions of 1941, it was the hub of
Russia's communication system. .All the connections between North and
.South whien were still usable, all double-track railroad line, all
the main telegraph and telephone fines, all canals and navigable
rivers,.. everything passed throuah MOSCOW. Whoever controlled
MOSCOW also controlled the political affairs, a powerful armament
industry, and a traffic and comMuriications center of that nation, and
could split Russia into two parts. I personally presented this case
to the FUERRER on the night of 23 Aug 1941. Then he was still un-
decided. Later the order was given to take the UKRAINE. I was called
to him to present my plan for the attack on MOSCOW once again. And
once again I tried to change his Mind. At that time he still could
control himself sufficiently to listen to me and let me finish my
Story. Once more I pictured the vital importance of MOSCOW to us and
eXplained to him, that if we could capture MOSCOW in the early Vaal
toward the end of September, we could cut Russia in two parts. And
..then we could still decide whether to occupy the Southern or the
Northern half first. That was the purely military angle of the
affair. Now let us consider the political angle, which was equally
important. It was believed that the STALIN regime would break down
politically. But in order to bring this regime to a collapse it was
necessary to occupy MOSCOW. We should have pursued a policy of con-
vincing the Russian people that they would get a better deal if they
cooperated with us. We should not have said, as we did: "We shall
cut Russia. into small pieces. We shall divide it and make a German
colony out of it." Thus the Russians, even those who were against
- STALIN, the White Russians, said: "No, we won't have that." This
Was our great political error. The decision to take the UKRAINE
first, which resulted in the unsuccessful winter campaign against
MOSCOW, and the misguided policy toward the Russian people--these
two were the reasons why we did not find the nec,P,-- _support among
ii.._.-mormsorarsaisinswegaganai
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.the population, nor the military*strength to finish this campaign
as quickly as possible. And 'this was so essential, because there
Still was an undefeated enemy in the West. On top of everything,
, .
Japan and America came to grips., and we thought we might have to
enter that conflict too. So we -issued a new declaration of war,
Which'aaaed America to the 'side of Our enemies. I don't know the
reasons for this last decision. But I was at the front, commanding
Ly'army1 -and thus couldn't fariliarize myself with every detail.
(Re: Why' X/EV was
taken first and
t"iMsaa)
A
GUD; I onferr'ed with the FUEHPER tWice about this question, once on 3 Aug
(5Once.on 23 Aug. At that tithe the general staff, too, was in
'laver Of attacking IWSCOW first:
G: When the PANZER Army GuntnIAN finally did attack, we had a temper-
ature or aeg ll0;) below and an icy 'wind
, ,
At that time the
Only way to employ armored diviSions, was to gather the tanks of a
?nUMber different' divisions. That shows how few tanks we had
left. There was no time for rebairs, nor did we have the necessary
lquipmenl and spare parts. My Own division, which I had led up to
that campaign, was reduced to 12 tanks at 10SC0Vq.
?\INTERROGATING OFFICER: How high do you estimate the casualties at that time?
GD: During,the winter damPhigh Of 1141 they were not too'high. Our
?
Vrincipal losses were causedthrough the cold. But to be honest,
. , _
OasUalties weren't abnormally high until we came to STALINGRAD.
JI*c were our,firSt Catastrophic lasses. Then we had these
terrific enve1opMent6 Ire had -some 300,000 casualties there. From
thn n, with these COntinued ehvelopMents of large units, we suff-
ered our first irrepIacable losses. That was also where the German
OtiUier!s morale started.its-dOWAWard slide. There he lost his
Sense of invincibility. :Our meh took, part in practically every
attack, without complaint.' But' in this final campaign'we no longer
could attack. None of our attacks succeeded; And before that, not
-? -
even our most diffidalt attacki failed,
.J
Re;
Count VON SC1IULENBU16)
4
GUD; He was a native of M08COW, went to school there, and Was said to be
exCeedingly well acquainted with the country. From a military point
, .
cif view, he was one Of the besf authorities on Russian tactics, and
'in addition to that he had vergood connections in -Russian military
circles,' T knew that for a Cerltainty.' Be operated just like a
Russian,. The RuSsians were mote open and more friendly ,toward him
than they were toward'moat foreigners. Thus we always were well
informed, Nobody can say that his reports were incorrect, but no
one would believe t4e;ii.
4
GUD; IT fewer of our outstanding strategists had been dismissed in 1943
' and at the end of 1941, we would have fought an entirely different
I myself, was relie'Ved of mY Commaid on the basis of a false
report whiCh a senior general had made'about me. In Jan 1942, after
returning from Russia, -I demanded-an investigation by a military
clQurt. It was my intention to'have the facts straightened out. My
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request was net granted. In the case of another general, an in-
veStigaiion was also refused, One general filed a suit, Which, how-
ever,' *0 hot carried through, In the following spring a law was
passed which suspended the regular courts. Thus the dictatorship
wasj#mly entrenched in the ariy. ' From then on it was imposs-
ible to file a suit, or to demand a trial. Later, when the law was
intensified, it even became T'Aripossible to resign, my predecessor as
Chief of the General Staff handed in his resignation five times, but
it_was_never)accepted. ,When I was assigned to the General Staff
Without peing consulted about tie assignment, I was received with
these_words'; "I do not want you Start out by tendering Your res-
ignation. It wouldn't be granted anyway. It is up to me (HITLER)
whether yeu stay in your Office or not?your wishes are of no con- ,
sequence:. I alone am responsible for what happens--not you!"
+ + + + +
II, THE INVASION"
IO: There is, a sharp difference between the tank battles on the Eastern
.front, and those of the Western front. Those in the EAST were al-
ways on a larger scale.
?
MR: That is just what we wanted. wanted to spare our tanks, in
, ,
qrApr to be abletto engage the Americans and the English in a real
fight where we could put our experiences of the Eastern front to
good use'. .1 was of .a different opinion than ROMEt. I.expected your
landing to:be:successful. The Angio-Saxon world had prepared itself
fer,alanding-and we could not stop the guns Of the Anglo-American
lleet and its aircover with merely a few mineS. The troops would
:pimply walk ashore, There was our one chance ,to engage the Allies in
a real tank battle while PATTOt was still assembling his units.
It would. have .been. a boon to my,old had another chance
to fight with the divisions I had trained myself. But fate wouldn't
have it po ROMMEL,'s armored,divisionS were largely dispersed, and
Under constant AT lire.
IO: But it was almost 2 months aftei. the invasion before PATTON broke
through at AVR.SCHES.
dEYR: That made our mistake a worse one yet,
TO: He forced yo U into a Very Smallpocket.
GaR: That is the reason why I was relieved. After CHERBOURG was taken,
'?.elloile realized, including' NAPSCHALL RUNDSTEDT that the CAEN bridge
head v4604 have to be vacated I proposed that in order to savethe
armorSd divisiOns, so that I could let them get Some rest and then
cominit them on the left ,flank, ,Every would-be officer realized that
the Americans would come down from CHERBOURG to break, through our
7th Army positions. I had the divisions (to stop them) but was not
permitted to employ them in this manner.
was too late, even then, We already had CHEROURG.
;
GEM There wap slim chance of succesq., t our chances would have been
e0h-better'at AVRAIIONES. At 4at time you could have been defeated.
0: I still remember that tilere weri arr:ored divisiOns opposing u. And
we always wondered when t be committed.
If
ihommommimmumlum...mmd
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GEYR: I can, te)-1,You exactly, which divisions I had in store for you. The
17 SS Division and the aivision ubAS'REICH,? a first rate outfit
were reSerVed for the Americans 'Then we had saved for you the
114444404114TE" and "HITLERJUGEND6' divisions and large components
the 2iArmored and tho 5 Armord. , That was ouite a far cry from
/ , , . T.
the overstrained 17 Divisioh. They were a brave new unit, more or.
le,ss the only ones in the 7 Army sector who fought brilliantly.
. .
. ,
iqes that there were a few medium-sized armored units which did
.. , ,
t bolong to the 7 Army sector.
- ,
HAUSSER; There was also the LEHR division. It was further back on the
ht flank.
ant According to the original plan, t e (PANZER) tEHR division was not
to be comMittecl, Butl could nat'withdraw it from the vicinity of
BAYEUX except by vacating the CAEt bridgehead. That bridgehead was
no ',onger of any use to us c yway : The time for throwing the Brit-
ish from t.he bridgehead back into the sea had long passed. It was
only a matter of holding a few pliin fields..:. Unfortunately 1
Wap_ not :to have the pleaSure of crossing swords with General PATTON.
X really Would have enjoyed that. It was beyond me, why we could
115A, have committed a PANZER army in this decisive battle against
Y'our forces. Then at least we would have fought on an even basis.
4
GEO: The Situation at CAEll was as follows: On the morning after the
attack there were but OO men left with the surviving commander of
the aivision which had teen hit on the coast! That is What I found
,
When I took over two,:daya later, having missed the beginning. The
rexliihder.of the divis4-011,had heell destroyed by the allied warships
hich,you know more than I do.. But I know how effective they arel
nd then no one wantedyto believe us when we told them how far in-
an. the guns of these warships could fire. They just Wouldn't be-
'eve our ,reports. There f had but one reply: "Gentlemen, just
tand there for a while and you'll find out how far they can fire."
GU: In our reports to headquarters these and many other descriptions were
Simply not believed. That was our hard luck. Our misfortune in
,this war, one of many, was that the Majority of our leading person-
alities never had any front line *commands during the war. When it
y,tas reported, for example, that the British fleet was outside CAEN,
that they could fire as far as-307km inland, and that therefore it
WOUld be senseless to leave our 4-mored divisons within therange of
ther artillery--someone would simply maintain that they couldn't
are that far. And they viol .d claim next, that :just these last 3
or 5 km would make all the difference The people who made these
etatementq never took an active part in the war themselves. They got
all their ,experience at `sessions around ,conference tables.
10: 1,44 could not understand why the invasion in the South of France
,SuOeeede.d.se easily. You must have been prepared. 'After all, you
had daiXy'reconnaissance-miSsiens'oVer Corsica, North 'Africa, and
It-aly You must have suspected something And jou must nave seen
our boats whi.Ch were Oi_r000nnaiaPce.ipatrol'alOng the coasi.
SEM
1111011011101?11?10011.111.111.111.1.8111.11.4
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2,8 May 4,
SOO
QUD: The,reason for this lies in our :peculiar evaluation of defensive
strength, which is indicative of Our strategy during the last year
of this war, It was purely a strategy of lines (LINEAR-STRATEGIE).
Our system of fortifications was arranged along a number of lines.
First the WE8TWALL, which was only one line for all practicall pur-
poses. The line behind it had not been completed. Then the ATLANTIE,
,
WALL was built, again nothing but one line. And this was the line in
which all available divisions were committed. When it was suggested
to assemble Qur armored divisions behind it, as a mobile reserve
which could be used to oppose an attack, regardless of .where it may
come frpm,we were told: "No, they 'would be too late, everything will
have to be thrown into the front line." ROMMEL was the main propon-
f
ent of this strategy.
IO: How is it, that ROMMEL favored such a theory? He should have learned
his lesson in North Africa.
CUD: IMAWEL was the principal proponent of this theory in France. -Later
on KLUGE followed suit. And it was impossible for me to do anything
against it, A fortress such as AtTWERP, for example, was not util-
ic,ed. It had neither ammunition Or armament worth mentioning. That
was the worst blunder we could poSsibly have made. And we did not
fortify PARIS! Nor did we repair the fortresses VERDUN, EPINAL,
alsonT, METZ, or STRASSBURG so that they could be used. Vie simply
had two lines: the ATLANgIKWALL--Which was expected to fail like any
other installation of its kind wherever the enemy would attack; and
then the WESTVALL--another line wich was expected to succumb wher-
ever the enemy would concentrate all his efforts.
H. POMMEL and I were at odds about ttlis for rany months. Then General
GUDERIAN himself came to France in order to bask me up. But un-
fortunately it was impossible to achieve anything.
GUD: fwas sent to ROEL for that particular purpose. But HITLER told
me: "I can't tell the Fieldmarshai in command how to run his bus-
iness.
H: We knew exactly, even before the Invasion started, that the ratio
of allied an ored recn cars (PANI',ERSPAEHaGEN) to Ours was 15 to 1;
tanks, 10 to 1; and planes, 30 or'50 to 1. And in view of this sit-
uation oUr only hope for victory lay with mobile warfare.
GEYR: ROMMEL was a fairly'good tactician, but he didn't have the faintest
idea about strategy.
GUD: ROMMEL was excellent as high up as a corps commander. He was a'first
rate divisional commander, because. he was courageous, Went to the
front, and participated in Oerything. But later, when he commanded
an army., Using the same technique; he lacked the vision which is
essential for such a task. You knoW,. it takes time to learn to lead
Urge and fast armored units. .Ana ROMMEL was not a tank expert.
After all, you can't suddenly replace years of schooling by intuition.
IMMEL loet-Some of his nerve in Africa.
IO: What
do you think of our General PATTON?
GUD: General'PATTON did what we would Lye 'liked to have done and what we
veed to do. He was very ast which could already be seen in NOR-
,
MANDY. I was with the FU Rihen PATION's drive started. He said:
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y145
.3., -,-,-
.[AtT's amete'sS jdEn-Ing Of -a I`eW"lankS. Our 'Gen-
rirr-er-1-... .O.?-:.i- c1-' 11-P' -7'. 6-: 4:..6.4'6. -.11:17?.:-.1:1,.., ,1'...611.=.1:hilin...9:1/.... au.--- .11-1.....-eaki-hnd
Prendh'kaginOr line 'toward fhe At !antic coait ine a
.ifed 'in. the-. ea-me-ina-nn.-er-,; ' -0-ul;-brez...ilythrOugh to the Swiss border,
pr
ordi_
.;i
ern,
iii.' Or flie:4PUS,Si;aii.,`,.piaket.; - both were based On the am
'tiiiiii - O'Oitiaiia-pi-i- iiho7 ab, e-s:i.ilt re'
a.a.
--- re b
recklessly can never e
Tio...-' rat'e. g' i-ie-s-liii-uSt: a', feiLininutes or I.:, few ,hours ;...,,n_
.4,. to do.i h. 1ss..v,:fiiLi:-..'f.:(...., ,..-.,..?,_ ..T'',4 .-- i ...., ,_ i . , , . ,. ? .,....-
-'..... ..i.' .,-!-...!.,'...:?,.,; .::',-;'..i.s.''''-'-'
, . . - - -'-' ? ' ' , :. , ' ''' \ .-,,,-.;--.? --
;
''''' . e'd' i"c5r-ce In fl he
inatiO61'4Y.Oa'ir"" tar!,ce' 'with your armor
Mpaigri Wei 's.O t taria irig , that :I immediately included
Amerifeefic-s- Into he -curriculum of our armored:forces'
ioo a?'
-
Ten ;earlier thnht, n *h 01;1511, coudirtinctly' recognize
ri pan spearheaffs by Ete
in order to clr Erie way--n& 'whlcli gave u no'- en of
'4 idrou noTThc he-.71.:,.E8-*( London Pines) gave us the
ag?.'tO ?theien3h o? flme for 79.-iiii6Fia"- Cilia On
nOtbe able:lo?a;t3:acit.jir '6aw. article myself' Where the
sd it, 1.71- aiso isiiowe"ct it to tikiztnAIL ..ntriqrsirtrtiv.
,ewte Tnivit- yeti-welt, and therefore-read it very tioroughy If
3&w t1 bri.shWe1l! ?ou"ll know that -n-of one of hi'r?Tds
, fi's o econju of a parpe'r--iriC.rnairit censors. They
egican veit.-Y-LaCh 'irife're-s`f 6a-iir
:3-11 .5, te, , discovered '` the ?ge'C'Oilic
4ces or niiii.=a-*sharrf -re"fai7t of
etir e e n rereseu. a Ives of AmeriCan 'War
f lanAhqd.iis7,:d7e.a7.1..ing, with -neiol`fa-frOn'e-fOr-iiarieuv-ef
aad,pt wariing-
e anaowirs Save to expect -qUite a 1O't; a?' g
- the man en v r Pali-Lain/ *ril. thise
rintd in as wen as. the -feet that the `ctiiiisr6iis
49t rore let, IT remeniter fhe dale correc ly.
aO4.Uldt-de'duCe'lfrarV4af- iang it woula tale you to qet ready
or 4:X1 ,
- Fl 7: =
ht after the invasion started, and when the complaine
e as'- We ad heAr7erins. .ir116-the- -e-x-plaline7d' to
aralibiel"C-ofaigentS a7lOne 'Tar- the
'luxe Of the ftav and lir force.
. - ,
.4,
mrOtLtArry
COO- _
wa deeply grleve w en lieard that ASA was definitely to be-
- , -1--te)niTAITILr Yt/g- A
renchs ,
-- ?
; A4iiirig that there of ? romise using
, ctecieiOrght- be yos pone or'the
tiirlie German can ever forget.
__
Germany trO7ite.Sthe, ? . The first ti nie after
- 0 and aga.in this tim- e. The point at present: is not to incorpor.-
F1t 1440E ,?.n-to G,Fi^:-kin.;y:1: via:IA-a-be a tett if ?tile-
'4tiaris wolk):d have ?,,-a iquatr,al: that of the United
' T s few je-ars , and were "VI'', 1'v the 016:irde
'ID " Tfi "x". t t 'd- ^t
, e 2.SC 1 e. ere,, ore vva,, c onsl ere goo news, h- the
I
It
? - "
t-.
t,
,
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28 May 45
SAAR territory was to be under American jurisdiction. No European
can be unbiased about these questions, not even the British. The
idea of a "Balance of Power" is of prime importance to the English-
man. There was a bitter struggle between EDEN's and SAUEL HOARE's
schools of thought concerning this point. England under her present
leadership is not in the position to be as impartial toward European
problems as the United States would be. One must look at this
realistically. A farreaching and fair solution of Europe's economic
problems is possible only under the leadership of the United States.
+ + +
(Re: DACHAU)
GUD: We can't understand that. Even our own circle was affected. The
chief of my operational department was in DACHAU. I never got any
news from him. my wife coulLn't utter a word, or she, too, would
have been sent to DACHAU. We knew of a few of these dirty affairs
in the concentration camps.
IO: Couldn't you go there youself?
GUD: No, that was impossible.'....HIkELER was responsible for all the
atrocities.
+++
GEM: I was with RIBBENTROP for one year as a military attache. I only
stayed with him out of a sense of duty. He was no professional
diplomat who knew his business. He had lived in Canada for a while,
and thought that the British were just like the Canadians. But
they are quite different--you can't compare the two nations. And
guided by his ignorance he believed that he understood the English
people.
GUD: In the Summer of '43 and the Fall of '44 eur generals explained to
our Foreign Minister that a two-front war would be impossible. The
front in the East. could be held only if the 4-est could be pacified.
We would have to be free on one side. I presented these ideas not
only to the Foreign Minister, but also to the FUEHRER. It was im-
possible to get themi to consider these questions seriously.
-
GUD: During the Polish campaign, the FUEHRER was with me, only 50 meters
behind the front line--he was still with me in France--but never in
Russia.
IO: He would stay around as long as everything went well, but no longer.
GUD: That was not the reason--he left because he had to fly South. Only,
a few weeks ago he was still with some divisional headquarters near
the ODER, He was not to be blamed himself; the FUEHRER was no coward.
But the fault lay with his friends, who kept him more and more in the
dark, without themselves knowing anylhing about warfare. Too bad
he didn't follow my advice to join his men. However, his health
wasn't up to standard a ere actually were some men in his
8
- L'oquilms,
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28 May 45
ALM
.444
wit
circle, men of Supreme Headquarters such as JODL, ZEITZLER or DOR-
MANN, who never came anywhere near the front.
GEYR: At _least ZEITZLER commanded a Corps at one time.
R: But he never left his he.ldquarters to go forward. He never came
closer to the front than his corps headquarters. I remember him
ttaal the French campaign with the PANZERGRUPPE KLEIST, where he was
was my superior. Not once during the entire campaign did he come to
my headquarters.
+ + +
GM I never heard anyone present a viewpoint at the FUEHRER HQ which
dirfered from that of the FUEHRER.
. . .
IO; That is not what GOERING told'us. He claimed that he had numerous
quarrels with HITLER about the employment of the air force.
, .
. .
Gp: That is unquestionably true. They argued at every meeting. but
those were onesided arguments.
28 May 1945
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
AUL KUBALA,
Maj; MI,
' Commanding.
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:Auth: CG, 7th Army :
SEVENTH ARMY INTrRROGATION CENTER :Init: Xp
APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 26 May 1945 :
RISE OF NAZISM IN VIENNA
1. SOURCE
FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard, Major, GAF, former GAULEITER of VIENNA.
Subject was born 18 May 1898 in VIENNA, of a family of artists and archi-
tects* After finishing REALSCHULE (High School), he entered a TECHNISCHE
HOCUSCHULE (Technical College) but was obliged to leave because of financial
difficulties. He served, in World War I from 1916 to 1919 as Lieutenant
in the Austrian Air Corps. In 1923 he became a bank clerk. From about
1920, he became interested in literature and started to write.
Rating: C-3 Date of Information: May 45 Interrogator: E.H.
2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN VIENNA
Subject claims-he entered the Nazi Patty in 1929 because the financially
desparate situation of the State made existence for the individual almost
impossible. Young people met strong obstacles trying to obtain jobs (sub-
ject claims he tried through the Christian Social Party and Citizens Nation-
al Party, but in vain) and were therefore forced into one of the two radical
parties, Communist or Nazi. Subject believes that National Socialism is a
direct Product of the Versailles Treaty.
FRAUENFELD advanced quickly in the NSDAP and became GAUIEITER of VIENNA
in the beginning of 1930 ("or rather. made myself GAULEITER"). He held this
post until the party was officially banned in June 1933. Subject passes
over the political period lightly by saying, "The climax consisted of brawls
in pubs and fights among the students at the University. I myself was
beaten Up three times. In these four years our opponents had no dead, while
we suffered three dead as casualties of the struggle with the Communists."
FRAUENFELD became member .of the LANDESREGIERUNG (VIENNA Government)!
STADTRAT (City Counsellor), LANDTAGSABGEORDNETER (Member of Parliament),
and member of the GEMEINDERAT (City Administration). He founded Nazi pub-
lications. According to him the entire political fight was typical for the
usual political differences in VIENNA and did not tranSgress the usual level.
FRAUENFELD was only GAULEITER of VIENNA; the command of Austria was in LINZ,
entrusted to PROKSCH and THEO,HABICHT, who had been sent from Germany. In
1932 the Austrian leaders of the NSDAP started party action against FRAUEN-
FELD because of Jewish connections. This petered out after strong admon-
ition.
Things gradually became tougher. SS leaders arrived from Germany, and
"sinister" characters came to him as collaborators. ,In June 1933, after ,
HITLER's advent in Germany, acts of violence started, and as a result, the
party was outlawed. FRAUENFELD claims he opposed this violence, refused to
obey the order to flee to Germany like all ether Nazi leaders, and offered
to resign his party position. Except for being "shadowed" by detectives, he
was allowed to move freely in VIENNA from the time of the ban until Dec 33.
Arrested on suspicion of having authored a leaflet, and released a month
later, he was arrested again and was bent to prison in WOELLERSDORFibecause
of negotiations with Prince STARHEMBERG. He was released at the end of May
34 and this time DOLLFUSS, thru his representative STEPAN, started negoti-
ations of his own and offered him a position in his cabinet.
Meanwhile the LANDESLEITUNG of the NSDAP, whose seat was in MUNICH, had
repeatedly ordered him to flee Austria and threatened him with reprisals.
At the same time he found out that Prince STARHEM3ERG had discovered his
negotiations with DOLLFUSS and wanted to have him arrested. This concurrence
of events was decisive for FRAUENFELD - he fled to MUNICH.
At the LANDESLEITUNG in MUNICH he was rather ungraciously received, and
was subsequently assigned to minor propaganda activities. In July of that
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year he was involved- in 4 severe plane accident and suffered critical in-
juries plus nervous shock. It took several weeks until he recovered, and
immediately afterwards had an automobile accident. Offers this as proof
that he couldn't possibly have had any connection with the abortive uprising
in Austria and the assasination of Chancellor DOLLFUSS.
All Austrian Nazi offices in GerL,any were dissolved. FRAUENFELD himself,
who claims to have been profoundly shocked by the events of those last few
months, asked for permission to return to Austria. This was refused, and he
was told that if he wanted something to do, he would have to find a job in
Germany. He contacted Secretary of the Statee FUNK and accepted the post of
GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Financial Secretary). of the REICHSTHEATERKAMMER DER REICH&
KULTURKAMMER (Theatrical Wing of the National Dept of Culture). According
to FRAUENFELD this marked the 'end of his active political career in Austria
and Germany.
He claimed that within a year he already had differences and troubles at
his job, and that one of his close collaborators was removed from office,
and moreover, that his job was made impotent by the aivointment of a Chief
KAMMERPRAESIDENT. FRAUENFELD sought refuge in writing and in speaking tours.
This gave him opportunity to travel extensively and bemore independent than
it would have been possible under normal circumstances. His speeches and
lectures during the first years were at times contrary...to official policy,
and he was forbidden to lecture on several occasions. He also taught in the
School of the German Theater in BERLIN, at the Theater School in BOCHUM, and
at SCHOENBRUNN in VIENNA.
FRAUENFELD expected to return'to:VIENNA after the ANSCHLUSS,.but discov-
ered that the city was forbidden to him by Reich Commissar BUERCKEL, However,
under the pretense of scheduled lectures at SCHOENBRUNA And various other art
institutions, he managed to visit the city occasionally..
3. VIENNA DISILLUSIONED
In time, the "sobering up process", as he calls it, followed: "We Austrian
dreamers who fought for the old idea of the Reich now found ourselves sold
out. All that happened was the creation of a Greater Prussia (GROSSPREUSSIZ):
VIENNA, on the other hand, was robbed of her cultural importance and was.
degraded to a subordinate provincial town."...According to him the population
of VIENNA, tired of the machinations of GLOBOTSCHNIGG and BUERCKEL, demanded
a Viennese. FRAUENFELD denies having campaigned in any way, and claims that
the movement was entirely spontaneous. This brought about the second party
investigation of FRAUENFELD. The principal'cause for this action was the.
impression created by previous events in VIENNA. However, the accusations
against him included having used his official position to give aid and com-
fort to MISCHLINGE (half-Aryans) formerly active in theatrical circles. The
case arrived at a negative conclusion and was dropped. He asked to be
allowed to resign from public office in favor of a seat on the Board of a
VIENNA bank. This was flatly refused.
After that episode FRAUENFELD decided it would be safer for him in the
Army, and in 1940 entered the GAF as a Captain. He was detailed to the
Foreign Office as Liaison Officer for various Army headquarters in occupied
countries. His duties terminated with a spinal injury received in an auto-
mobile accident during the latter part of 1940. Thereafter his job consisted
of writing articles and giving lectures on the. political and economic situ-
ation of the world.
4. ACTIVITIES AS COMMISSAR IN THE UKRAINE ?
In 1942 he was suddenly pulled out of the Army, sent to the OST MINISTER-
IUM (Ministry for Eastern Affairs), and assigned as GENERALKOMMISSAR (General
Commissar) for the Crimea. He claims that he and GAULEITER ERICH KOCH, who
was Reich Commissar of the UKRAINEIclashed immediately. FRAUENFELD claims
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that KOCH's administrative policies, and not his, were directly responsible
for the "breeding of partisans". Source states that under his own methods
he obtained the best harvest in the Crimea, and never had a case of terror-
jam or partisan violence. He administered the northern half of the Crimea
from Sep 42 to Sep 43.
As a result of his differences with KOCH, two of his assistants were
arrested and removed from office. How he always managed to slip though
the fingers of the Gestapo has not as yet been clearly determined. Later,
disciplinary action was again started against him, but the Russian advance
interrupted proceedings. FRAUENFE'D returned to Germany and dissolved the
financial and personnel sections of his Crimean administration and, upon
his own request, re-entered the Army. He was assigned to the CKW WEST
PRUSSIA and travelled to various sectors of the front dispensing political
propaganda to the troops. In the course of his dutie8 he arrived in VIENNA
in the fall of 44, Here he was prohibited from lecturing by Baldur VON
SCHIRACH.
5, ANOTHER INNOCENT
Subject repeatedly claimed that since 1933 he has not been politically
active, and that all his friends were either artists, or businessmen who
were lukewarm toward the regime. He also claims that during his term as
GAULEITER, the police and other authorities never had occasion to arrest
him for any criminal acts, and that his two arrests wereof a purely polit-
ical nature. Of course FRAUENFELD did not explain what the authorities
recognized as criminal acts. He never belonged to the SA or SS, and did
not hold any rank (except GAULEITER) in any of the party organizations.
His party membership, in addition, was discontinued after his entry into
the army. The latter, it must be remembered, was not voluntary, since all
members of the Nazi Party had to relinquish their membership upon entry
into the SerVice.
26 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
1!;67*-,4,-,c X44.,
AUL KUBALA, 9
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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HANS FRANK'CLAIMS INNOCENCE
:Date: 27 May l95
1. SOURCE
FRANK, Hans, GOVERNOR GENERAL of POLAND. After reporting.for duty as a
lieutenant to the 9 In/ Regt upon the opening of German hostilities against
Poland, source received orders from HITLER to take over the administration
of Poland. ' He proceeded to Silesia, where the FUEHRER welcomed him in his
special train and gave him his final order, by which source claims to have
guided himself throughout the period of his regime in Poland: "(You will)
so administer the coUntry.that.we may draW from it the greatest possible
use for.the.war." ,
Source took office 7 Nov 39 in CRACOW. In 44 he returned to Germany,
with his staff and documents, having fled before the 'Russian Advance. He
was captured at his estate at NEUHAUS/SCHLIERSIE by American troops.
FRANK has attempted suicide twice since his captured.. Weakened through
less of blood, he talks only with effort.
Source is Clever and, knowing the danger of his present situation in the
light of his past record, is dramatic and persuasive in trying to vindicate
himself. He now condemns the Nazi ideals, although; as president of the
Academy of German Law (AKADEMIE DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTES).he had a strong voice
in the formulation of the Nazi conceptions of right.,
RatinK: 0-3 Date of Information: See text ,Interrogator: W.K.
2. ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY RECORD
Source isfamiliar, through the press, with the accusations made. against
him as!lbvernoraGeneral of Poland. He insists that he wanted only to further
Polish interests, but that he always encountered difficulties, and had
actually very little to say in the Administration of the country.
He says that the Poles, a Slavic people and not Asiatic, should be con-
sidered absolutely Western and European. Their upper Strata are enemies of
Bolshevism, and of Russia. But at the same,time unfortunately, they are
enemies of Germany.
Source made the following explanations, which he is very anxious to have
considered in the examination of his record:
a) ,"Beside Me in Poland stood the 'REICHS Commissioner for' the Strength-
eining of German Nationalism Abroad t (REICHSKOMMISSAR FUER DIE FESTIGUNG
DEUTSCHEN VOLKSTUMS IM AUSLAND), HILMLER, who commanded the Police, and
upon whom I had no influence."
b) "Economically the country was under GOERING, who, as chief of the
Four-Year-plan, could exploit the country as he pleased. GOERING's motto
was, "Let the Poles starve; I need grain for Germany."
c) ."GAULEITER SAUCKEL had the Polish manpower at his disposal, and could
deport Polish men and women for labor without consulting me."
(NOTE: The above statements, confirmed by REICHSMINISTER Dr LAMMERS,
do NOT remove FRANK's responsibility, but help to establish the, guilt,
of HIMMLER, GOERING and SAUCKEL.)
Source also tries to place respcasibility on the German military comm-
anders in Poland; particularly GENOBST. (Col Gen) VON BLASKOWITZ. He claims
that atrocities - murder and looting-+. had been committed by German troops
in Poland prior to his taking office there in Nov 39; and that it was at
that time that the Polish resistance movement originated.
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3. GOVERNOR GENERAL'S STAFF IN POLAND
Source gave the following as the
SEYSS-INQUART, Dr
BUEHLER, Dr
SIEBER, Dr
VON KRAUSHAAR (Later)
EMMERICH, Dr
SPINDLER
SENKOVSKY (Later)
FRAUNDORFER
WILLE
NAUMANN
GERDEIS
LAUXMANN
personnel
Deputy
of his staff in Poland:
to FRANK.
Chief of Government; Secretary
State.
Dept of Interior.
Dept of Economics.
President of the
Dept of Labor.
Dept of Justice.
Nutrition
Railways
Postal Dept
KRUEGER, HOEHERER. SS u. POLIZEIFUEHRER:
(Superior SS and Police Leader)
KOPPE, HOEHERER SS 11 POLIZEIFUEHRER:
(Superior SS,and Police Leader).
Treasury.
of
Liaison men to HIMMLER;
carried out his orders in
police matters without PW's
:knowledge.
4. CONCENTRATION CAMPS
Source declares that he had nothing to do with the establishment of
concentration camps, nor with sending persons to them. He claims he be-
came familiar with the atrocities committed in MAJDANEK only through the
foreign press after the entry of the Russians, and immediately addresSed a
letter to KOPPE demanding an explanation.
Previously he had laloWn of the camp only as the "Central Collecting
Point for the Security Service" (ZENTRALES SAMMELLAGER FUER DAS SICHERHEITS.
WESEN). His only other previous knowledge about concentration camps was
that early in the war the police 11.c1 been taking prisoners to the da14 at'
AUSCHWITZ, Silesia.
When the interrogator observed that the German governors in LUBLIN (uncles
FRANK) must have known Of the awful conditions in MAJTANEK, source became
involved in self-Contradictions, and finally-had to. admit that the question
had been brought up before the chief training leader (HaUPTSCHULUNGSLEITER)
of the Party, SCHMIDT. The responsible LUBLIN governors were:
Former OBERBUERGERMEISTER, DRESDEN.
Former BUERGERMEISTLR, HOF
ZOERNER, Dr
WENDLER, Dr
The man responsible for the MAJDANEK camp was GRUF (SS Maj Gen).GLOBOT-
SCHNIG, a native of KAERNTEN, and of Slovenian descent. Source says he was
a rather brutal man, and a one-time GAULEITER in VIENNA.
5, ANTI-SEMITIC ATROCITIES
Regarding the systematic murder of the Jews in Poland, source spoke as
follows: "As a lawyer lam opposed to lawless disregard and killing ofhumar
beings. I believe a secret law exists providing for the extermination of
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the Jews, and agreed upon only by HITLER, HIMMLER, and HEYDRICH."
Source further stated that HITLER must have known of these murders and
approved of them, Since he himself had once notified HITLER of the un-
lawful activities of the SS in Poland.
Source claims that besides HITLER, guilt is on the heads of HIMMLER,
HEYDRICH, GLOBOTSCHNIG, and the smaller SS leaders who carried out mass
murders without orders from. above.
27 May 1945
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
/ t
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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Arm :
REICHSKULTURXAMMEZ (NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE)
5
1. SOURCES
a) FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard, MAJ., OAF, GAULEITER of VIENNA until 1933;
GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Business Manager) THEATERKAMMER (Theatre Dept) of the
REICHSKULTURKAMMER (National Dep-tof Culture). (Cf Report Ref No SAIC/
25)
b) HINKEL, Hans, REICHSFIL1'IINT7NDANT
Film Department, Propaganda Mi_istry.
Report Ref No SAIC/28)
Rating.: B-2 Date of Information:
(National Film Director) under
Source for Appendix only (Cf
See Text Interrogator: E.E.
e. ORIGIN AN]) FUNCTIONS OF THE REICHSXULTURKAMMER
The REICHSKULTURKAMMER (Neaonal Dept of Culture) was an attempt to com-
bine the entire cultural life of the nation under one organization. Its
existence was provided for in law,- and the orders of its seven department
heads (KALMERPRAESIDENTEN) in turn had the powers of. law. During the life-
time' of the RKK (REICHSKULTURKANLER), other agencies were constantly de-
manding its manpower for their own uses, but it managed to maintain its
exiStence nevertheless.
The functions which the RKK was supposed to fulfill include the follow-
ing i Oireation and supervision of art and music schools, representation
of the interests of it members, social security, examination and class-
ification of talent, pensions, relief, and legal aid for members.
3. ORGANIZATION (See Appendix)
Heading the RICK were the following personalities:
President: REICHSLINISTER FUER VOLXS-
AUFKLAERUNG U. PROPAGANDA (Minister of
Public Enlightenuent and Propaganda)
Vice President: State Secretary of
Propaganda Ministry'
GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Business
Manager) - the actual head
Legal Expert
Dr PaulJoseph GOEBBELS.
Dr FUNK, GAULEITER HAHNKE,
State 'Secretary NAUMANN,
chronologically in the
order named.
Hans HINKEL, Dr SCHADE.
Dr SCHMIDT-LEONHARD
Source is of the epinien,that greater power was 77ested in the office of
the GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER,not for reasons of necessity or efficiency, but
?simply. as the result' pt the personal ambitions of HINKEL who, in additon
to hie post as GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER, held the title of General Secretary of
the organization.
The RKK was-further dixided into departments (KAMMER), each being de-
Voted to some. field such as the theater, music, radio, etc. The Propaganda
Ministry itself, however, had similar departments (music, film, literature,
There was no clear boundary between the province of these depart-
ments and those of the RICK. The result was an unnecessary duplication of
functions, and, frequently, Confusion and ,friction.
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During HINKEL's regime the power in the RKK was shifted at times to the
departments, then to departments in the Propaganda Ministry itself; yet
HINKEL would always manage to regain his place at the helm. The central-.
isation of authority in the RKK was accomplished through frequent changes
of the presidents and business managers of the different departments, thtis
undermining their influence and importance.
Source. says that HINKEL lacked technical background, and considers his
work to have been of small value, ,He says further that under HINKEL there
was a ruthless turnover of personnel, withreasons for dismissals Seldom '
given.
In addition to the titular head of the Pia, there was a REICHSKULTURSENAT
(Culture Senate) of 130 members,,at first divided equally between "culture
administrators" (KULTURVERWALTUNGSFUEHRER) and creative artists. After a
few years the administrative personnel were removed from this body. The
Senate convened once a year to hear a speech by the President of the RKK. -
4,
4. DEPARTMENTS OF THE RKK
Seven departments (KAMMER) functioned under the RKK: theater, music,
film, press, literature, creative arts, and radio. The last named depart-
ment was dissolved in 1939 or 1940. Each department had a president, vice-
president, and business manager, who as in the case of the RKK itself, was
? .
the actual head.
There
.
There was, however, a Certain amount of fluctuation in the division of
power among these various offices within the departments. For example,
Richard.STRAUSS, as president, was the leading figure in the music depart-
ment, followed by Prof Peter RAABE. Similarly, Richard BLUNK, as president,
led the literature department, followed later by Hans JOHST, while Prof
Richard SUCHENWIRTH was business manager.
The president a of the theater department were Otto LAUBINGER until 1935,
and Dr .Rainer SCHLOEMER until 1937 (both also in charge of the theater
department of the Propaganda Ministry); later the. actor Ludwig KQERNER Until ?
194a and finally Paul HARTMANN, with Eugen KLOEPPER as\vice-president.
The departments had from 100-400 employees each. The departments of the
Propaganda Ministry maintained branch offices in the districts (GAUE),.but -
the departments ct-the Er41( maintained only their central Officee.
Each department of the RIM was divided into-pections'(FACHSCHAFTEN),,
which were further divided: into special groups (FACHGRUPPEN). The theater
department, for example, was divided into thoJcllowing, sections: Stage
(MIME), light entertainment (ARTISTIK) (circus, vaudeville, etc), dance
(TAW, actors (SCHAUSPIELER),.publishers.for the stage (BUEHNZNV,ERLEGER).
Membership in the sections varied widely.' -Thestage section, for instance,
had about 40,000 members,, the dance section about 6,000, light entertainment,
about 13,000.
The stage section of the theater department was. divided into the follow-
ing special groups:
a) Producers: State, district, city, KRAFT DURCH FREUDE (Strength
Through Joy); private enterprises.
b) Directors: GENINTENDANTEN (General managers), INTENDANTEN (Managers), ?
DIREKTOPEN (directors).
0 Stage managers: play and opera managers; artistic, technical, comm-
ercial managers; conductors, ballet:masters, etc.
d) Actors.
e) 4ngers.
f) Dancers.
g) Choir singers.
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h) TechniCal .personnel, secretaries, etc,
5.. FUNCTION OF THE DEPARTMENTS
The primary function of the departments was the representation Of their
members in the securing of positions. Political directives were supposed
to emanate from the corresponding departments in the Propaganda Ministry.
The primary function was carried out individually by the various sec-
tions. Membership in the sections was subject to racial restrictions under
the NUREMBERG laws. Thus, membership was possible only for "pure" Aryans,
for "mixed Aryans Second Class" (MISCHLINGE 2. KL), and Aryans married
to "mixed Aryans First Class': (MISCHLINGE 1. KL). Special permits were
necessary for mixed Aryans First Class and Aryans married to non-Aryans.
As far as source knows, nobody who was eligible under the above rules was
denied membership in the theatre department, though it became necessary at
times to negotiate for members with local authorities who, through caution
or prejudice, were opposed to their employment. In 1937 the granting of
special permits was taken over from the departments by the central office
of the RKK since, in the opinion of that body, the departments had been too
liberal in their interpretation of the law.
Source states that in the cases of certain well-known artists the ques-
tion of their eligibility for membership was sometimes referred to higher
authority, and eventually decided upon by GOEBBEIS himself, The result of
this system was that prominent artists had the opportunity to receive
"favorable consideration", while those of lesser reknown were certain to
suffer.
6. FINAIJCING OF CULTURAL LIFE
Cultural life under the Propaganda Ministry was subsidized by the State.
Funds were allocated to the theatre ("T") departmeht of the Propaganda Min-
istry, and distributed to districts and cities through their local finance
facilities (the DEUTSCHER LANDTAG in the case of the cities). Thus the PKK
had no direct connection with the State subsidizationa
Public funds in the amount of RM 90-100,000,000 were allotted yearly to
the theatre. In addition, HITLER and GOEBBELS Made contributions running
into the millions.
7. THEATRE FACILITIES UNDER THE NAZIS
Germany had about 220 permanent theatres Two-thirds of these divided
their efforts among opera, light opera, plays and the dance, while the re-
mainder devoted themselves to one Or another of these fields. In addition
to the permanent theaters, there were about 100 traveling theaters, mostly'
presenting performances of plays. Many of these performed in small towns
during the summer mcnths, their tours being arranged under the supervision
of the RKK,
27 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
te."?.ta( "12r:44,4a
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
3
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' t,h.,WAriElki-J8.510)030401111P9OVIIPPrimiPermivvernell
27 May 45
APPENDIX
(Names shown are of those men who last held the positions.)
Source: H. H. HINKEL
?smi?????....e......
I MINISTER FOR PUBLIC ENLIGHTENMENT
AND PROPAGANDA% Dr GOEBBELS
-
NATIONAL DEPART:MITT]
OF CULTURE
BUSINESS MGR:
Dr SCHADE
LE4AL AFFAIRS:
Hats MEISTER
1
ADMINISTRATION:
Hans MEISTER
PERSONNEL%
Hans MEISTER
AID FOR ARTISTS:
Walter OWENS
SOLDIER SHOWS:
KOCHANOWSKI
-1
STATE SECRETARY: Dr NAUMANNI
A".........?imw........wii
THEATER DEPT:
Pres: Paul HARTMANN
Vice-Pres: Eugen KLOEPFER
.Business: Dr SCHADE ,
Stage Dept: Theo0or LOOS
Directors' Dept: SCHEFFELS
Circus, Vaudeville, etc:
SEIGER
FILM DEPT:
Press Prof Carl FROEHLICH
'Vice-Pres: Carl MELZER
Business: Carl MELZER
Films: Prof W. LIEBENEINER
MUSIC DEPT:
Pros: Prof Peter RAABE
'Vice-Pres: Prof Paul GRAENER
Business: Dr MORGENROTH
CREATIVE ARTS DEPT:
_Pres: Prof Wilhelm KREIS
Vice-Pres: BREKER0 GIESSLER
Business: Hans MEISTER
4.....-------
LITERATURE DEPT%
Pres: Hans JOHST
"Vice,-Pres: BAUR (from EHER
firm)
Business; GENTZ
PRESS DEPT:
-Pres: Max AMANN
Vice-Pres: Dr DIETRICH
ADMINISTRATION:
Dr OTT
LAW AFFAIRS:
SChMIDT-LEONHARD
PERSONNEL SEC:
VON DRATEIG
PROPAGANDA:
Wolfgang DIVERGE
G7RaANN PRESS:
FISCHER
1.0.???????k
FOREIGN PRESS:
BRAUWEILER
MUSIC:
Dr DREWES-
?.?????????-?
FILM:
PARBEL-
THEATER:
Dr SCHLOESSER
LITMATURE
???????????
SCULPTURE
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APO 758 1- O ARMYY
SEVENTH ARMY INTERR;Gi':-'T?I1VON:::'1T:k"R7-I::::-: CG 7th A'my
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R T
HANSHHEINRICH HINKEL
(Cf also Report Ref No 5A1C/27, 27 Mal 45)
25416
L. SOURCE
HINKEL, Hans Heinrich, Civ, Former Business Manager, REICHSKULTURKAMMER
(National Department-of:Culture).
Source is a 44-year-old native of WORMS, whose father Owned a butcher
shop and vineyard. Because of organic heart trouble Source was never drafted
into the army. He studied philosophy at the University of IpNN, and
attended the University of MUNICH in 1920-21. There he became a member of
the student organization OBERLAND, which was incorporated into the VATER-
LAENDISCHE:VERBAENDE (Fatherland Organizations) in spring 23. During the
same year he was forced for financial reasons to leave school and earn his
living, which he did by working first in a bank andlater on a canal con-
struction project. In Oct 23 he was overtaken by physical exhaustion and
retired to the farm of a friend in Lower Bavaria. On 8 Nov 23 he was called
to MUNICH by the OBERLAND organization and participated in the. HITLER Beer
Hall Putsch at that time. He received the BLUTORDEN (Order of Blood) in
1934 undoubtedly in recognition Of this participation; .From MUNICH he
returned to the farm, where he remained until Mar 24. In 27, through is,
COnneetien with the STRASSER publishing firm, source resumed his activity in
German sala Nazi politics. Hiscareer,.which reached its high point in his
appointment as businessmanager,Pf.the REICHSKULTURKAMMER, is described in
the following sections Of this report. ,
Though,a.generilly reliable type? source.tried,durin?nterrogation to
play down his own importance in Nazi cultural and political'life. He tries
to color the fats in his own favor; ?
Rating: C-3 . 2 Date of Informa ion:Idar 45
g?
ASSOCIATION WITH GREGOR STRASSER
Interrogator: E.H.
;
. _
DUring his stay on:the forMfollOwingthe-HITLER Putsch of 23,, source
. made the acquaintance of t4eTharmaOist Gregor STRASSER and hie two brothers,
Dr Otto. and Franz STRASSER,'the:latter a member of the Order of Benedictines.
In 1927, when source had been editor of the newspaper INN u. SALLACU WACHT
-..(NEUOETTING/-INN) for three years, Gregor STRASSER invited him to invest in
the publishing firm. VERLAG,GREGOR STRASSER GmbH, BERLIN. Source invested
RM 40,000 (which he had acquired through his marriage) in the venture. He
.thus *came into control of 49 per c'enipf the stock of the firm,-the.other,
51 per cent being divided among,the three STRASSER brothers.- Source 'was
nde administrative and bnsiness,directOr ef the firm, while the policies
Vert in 'the hands of Gregor and Otte,STRASSER, '
Gradually the firm was enlarged,. and after about three years.itowned all
-:SiX-weekly'papers of the Nazi Party .in Northern Germany. -Its position NORTH
of theMAIN was comparable tO that of the,Party publishing firm of Franz
r-EHER,1AUNICH? for Southern Germany.,
, The political:itrend of the brotherSSTRASSER differed in many respects
from:Tthe official Party line as expressed in the papers of. the NSDAP EHER
firm and in its chief paper, VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, published by Adolf
HITLER with Alfred ROSENBERG as chief editor. The differences centered arstmd
.questions of religion, the Jewish question, foreign policy and social policy.
The STRASSER papers considered themselves aligned against the "heathenistic-
Fascistic tone of anti-Semitism" of ROSENBERG, who, because of his "intellec-
tual superiortylLover HITLER, had free rein in the running of the VOELKISCHER
BEOBACHTER.
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Through the growing importance of STRASSER in Northern Germany -'especiaLly
among the workers in the industrial regions of the Ruhr, Saxony, HAMBURG,
etc - his papers continued to gain in circulation, and the expansion of the
firm demanded new funds. Source bent home for More money and contributed
sums of RM 40,000 and later RM 300)00 - the entire family .fortune - to the
firm. The growth continued, despite the fact that Dr. GOEBBELS, Who had been
called to BERLIN by HITTER, did not make use of their weekly to propound his
views, but founded a new paper, sharply anti-Semitic in tone, DER ANGRIFF.
DER ANGRIFF was the official Party organ of the BERLIN district and was
made possible through the cOntributions of thousands of the first Nazis,
mostly poor people, ii the national capital, Later when the EHER publishing
firm took over DER ANGRIFF, this fact was not taken into consideration, and
G0EBBEL4 received a large sum of money or it,
3. HINKEL'S REVOLT (?) AGAINST THE pARTY
In 1930 the first rebellion of Gregor STRASSER and his friends against the
Party took place. This was mainly against the more and more one-sided
interpretation of the program by ROSENBERG, GOEBBELS, STREICHER, ESSER, Gbtt-
fried FEDER, and others. Gregor STRASSER was considered an "outsider".
After a terrific struggle between the STRASSER publishing firm on one side
and HITLER's EHER publishing combine on the other; STRASSER consented to
liquidate his firm as rapidly as possible and to demand that his brother Otto
leave the NSDAP.
HITLER promised STRASSER and HINKEL that the money invested in the firm,
which would be lost through the liquidation, would be considered an "honor
debt of the Party" and would be repaid as soon as possible Thus through
A legal bankruptcy process the STRASSER firm was liquidated. HITLER, however,
never'kept his promise. When source later mentioned the debt to HITLER's
private secretary, Rudolf HESS, he was told that he would be given a seat in
the REICHSTAG as compensation. This Would give him a Monthly Salary of RM
600. Gregor STRiSSER advised him to accept, and in Sept 30, when the number
of Patty seats in the REICHSTAG increased from 12 to 107-, HINKEL was elected
a Member. He claims that he never received any of the RM 110,000 invested.
with STRASSER, and that he refused to collaborate in GOEBBEL's paper DER
ANGRIFF, as he was in favor of the political views represented by STRASSER
and his brother.
4-, "BATTLE UNION FOR GERMAN CULTURE"
Wishing to do some work outside his regular political job, source founded
a branch of the "Battle Union for German Culture" (KAMPFBUND FUER DEUTSCHE
KULTUR) in Berlin in 1930. This organization had been started a few months
before in MUNICH by the well-known art publisher BRUCKMANN, with the aid of
a few prominent artists. There was a danger, pointed out to him by BRUCKMANN
and STRASSER, that ROSENBERG might attempt to dominate this non-Party Organ-
ization, since HITLER had made ROSENBERG his "Pope of Culture".
Source called on all. artists in the national parties (DEUTSCHNATIONALE
PARTEI, DEUTSCHE VOLKSPARTEI, etc) to become members of his organization.
The principal attraction for most of these artists was the fact that member-
ship in the NSDAP was not necessary, while at the same time they were enabled
to participate in the reconstruction of the financially ruined theatrical and
musical professions. Members of "Marxist" parties were not accepted, as the
danger of "complete domination by the Communist Party" became more and more
threatening. In BERLIN the KPD (Communists) had polled over 1,000,000 Votes.
In the theatre all the classics and classical composers were slowly dis-
appearing from the programs. In attempting to restore them, the organization
became a success in certain circles, despite the fact that the Party through
DER ANGRIFF called it a "colorlessi.bourgeois union".
2
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5. PRUSSIAN THEATER COMMISSION
, .
In ,193l the revolt of the BERLINISA leader STENNES occurred. As in the
previous year during the STRASSER rebellion, source claims that an expulsion
process from. the Party was started against hip. As active participation in
the revolt could not be proved, he was let off, but was never to get an
office in the Party.
During the spring of 1933 source was put in charge of the Prussian Theatre
Commission (AUSSCHUSS) by Hermann GOERING. Members of this commission were
almost exclusively artists, among them Ludwig KOERNER, later president of
the National Department of the Theatre (REICHSTHEATERKAMMER) This comm-
ission WAS to submit plans concerning personnel and programs for all the
official theatres in Prussia to GOERING, after the Jewish Managers of the
theatres had been removed through national laws.
6. JEWISH CULTURAI,, ORGANI4ATION (KULTURBUND)
In July' 1933 various Jewish personalities, whom HINKEL knew from theatri-
cal and Musical circles, asked him if there was any possibility of their
finding employment in Germany, as they could not Or would not emigrate.
According to source, it was he who suggested to the Minister for Culture for
Prussia, Bernhard RUST, and to GOERING, the creation of a Jewish cultural
organization (KULTURBUND). This organization was to provide performances by
Jewish artists for exclusively Jewish audiences. This was very much desired
by many Jews, since, because of existing laws in many districts and cities',
it was forbidden for them to attend public artistic performances. The plan
was to Create the organization first in Prussia, and then on a national
scale, with the collaboration of the Jewish communiti:es. Despite the great
fanaticism in many circles, permission for this undertaking was granted
after a few days, first by RUST and then by GOERING. -(RUST is supposed to ,
have told source that "he had picked up an extremely hot iron" and that he
was curious to see how long the ROSENBERG-STREICHER-GOEBBELS clique would ?
remain silent).
In Aug 33 the BERLIN executive council of the Jewish KULTURBAND had its
first session. The chairman was the former conductor of the State Opera
(STAAISOPER) of BERLIN, Dr SINGER. The theatre,' formerly the HERRNFELD.,
THEATER,- was called the THEATER DES JUEDISCHEN KULTURBUNDES and was located
in the KOMMANDANTENSTRASSE. From among the artists of opera, stage and
music who had been dismissed after 30 Jan 33, groups for opera and stage
performances were formed. This .was carried out later on throughout Germany,
and resulted in a fairly well organized Jewish cultural life.
In Feb 34,after a conference with RUST, FRICK and GOERING, source was
made "Commissioner for non-Aryans Artistically Employed within REICHS Terr-
itory." He held this office Until 1941. Source claims that through this
activity he made himself many enemies and only the position of GOERING, which
Was untouchable until 2-3 years ago, made it possible for him to continue,
(He was considered GOERTNG's special agent.) Source claims that he was
supported in his endeavours by Dr Hjalmar SCHACHT and Dr Walter FUNK.
7. POSITION IN REICHSKULTURKAMMER (NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE)
,
During the autumn of 1933 the legal foundations were laid for a REICHS-
KULTURKAMMER (RICK) (National Dept of Cultnre). During the summer of. 35
source, allegedly much to his surprise, was made third business manager
(GESCHAEFTSFVEHRER) of this agency by Dr GOEBBELS. The other two business
managers were GRUF (SA Maj Gen) Franz MORALLER and Prof Dr SCHMIDT-LEONHARD.
The latter was the originator of all laws and executive regulations pertain.
ing to the REICHSKULTURKAMMER. For this legal work, done at the request of
Dr GOEBBELS, he was made Professor of Culture Law (KULTURRECHT) at the
3
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University of BERLIN. SCHMIDT-LEONHARD was notorious as a fanatical Party
member.
Source claims that he was gradually reduced in importance within the RKK,
despite great success in organizing a sort of USO organization for the troops
on the front. Finally he was left only two purely artistic jobs: since I
May 44 that of REICHSFILMINTENDANT (director in charge of the movie industry),
and since Apr 42, that of director of the artistic programs on the radio.
His successor in his job of general business manager (HATJPTGESCHAEFTSFUEBPER)
of the RKK, as well as thatof General Secretary, was Dr Hans SCHRADE, who
at the same time was business manager of the Department for Theatre (REICHS-
THEATREKAMMER).
a) Regulation of German Film Industry
When source took over the film industry in 1944, he says movies in
Germany were faced with cultural ruin. 'Dr Fritz HIPPLER, who had held
the position from 36 to 431, had completely failed.. He was followed in
rapid succession by three other Men within one year. Almost simultan-
eously with source's taking over his new position, the Film section in
the Propaganda Ministry received a new boss, GAU Propaganda Chief of
? HANOVER Kurt PARBEL, PAR34 a-former HITLER YoUth leader, was the "Party
mali"for the movie industry + and had been appointed td this job through
BORMANN, As Pre/Agenda Chief ot HANOVER he had coMe to the attention of
the GAULEITER for HANOVER, LAUTERBACHER, and later was brought to the
Party office of BORMANN.. Here he received a certain amount of schooling
and was known as a "coming man". Source concentrated on making movies
for entertainment+ While the special office under PARBEL's direction
made newsreels and special productions.
As,REICHSVILMINTENDANT (Director of the German film industry), source
was placed over the production chiefs of the various film studios, in-
cluding: UFA, TOE'S, TERRA, BAVARIA, WIENFILM, BERLINFILM and PRAGFILM,
Dr WINKLER, as Deputy for the film industry (REICHSBEAUFTRAGTER FUER
DIE FILMWIRTSCHAFT) was the governmental representative in control of
the financial heads of the same film companies It was also his respon-
? sibility to bring all movie firms under state control by buying them up
through the CAUTIO GmbH, of which he was the director.
Also through CAUTIO, which was financed by the REICHS Finance Min-
istry, Dr WINKLER bought the SCHERL magazine from HUGENBERG.
b) Regulation of German Radio
The agency in over-all control of the German radio was the Radio sec.-
tion of the Propaganda Ministry, whose function was exactly analogous
to that of the Film section. Subordinate to this section was the REICHS-
RUNDFUNK,(National Radio) GmbH, which actually presented the programs to
the .radio public. Hans FRITSCHE, besides heading the Radio section of
the Propaganda Ministry, was responsible for newsbroadcasts, speeches,
lectures, commentaries, and all "spoken words" emanating from the'REICHS-
RUNDFUNK.
In charge of administration of the REICHSRUNDFUNK was Dr GIASMEIER,
while source was head of music, Source claims to have had only two '
programs under his control, one at the REICHSSENDER, the other at the,
DEVTSCHLANPSENDEP. These were purely artistic, he claims, and received
the applause of soldiers, who were tired of the dry political program
served them by FRITSCHL
8. RESIGNATION AND CAPTURE
???????,..
On 15 Dec 44 source was dismissed at his own request, with his salary
as MINISTERIALDIREKTOR (title for high government official) continuing.
It was his intention to embark on a commercial undertaking in the film
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industry, which would not have been allowed while he held a government
position.
On 10 Apr 45 source received an order from GOEBBELS to go to Southern
Germany to supervise music at the radio stations, and if possible to assemble
officials of the Propaganda Ministry. This source did gladly, as it gave
him a chance to leave BERLIN and to visit his wife, who had been ill ever
since she was dismissed from the concentration camp in RAVENSBRUECK.
He Visitied the Bavaria Film Company in Munich for:a short time and
ordered a continuation of production, against the orders of the,GAULEITER
GIESSLER. From there he went to MITTENWALD, where other members of the
Music department of the REICHSRUNDAINK were assembled. He turned over all
his equipment to American authorities when they arrived at MITTENWALD, and
was arrested there by US soldiers.
Subject claims that the singer Anita SPADA, who later became his second
wife, was thrown into the RAVENSBRUECK Concentration Camp for five months
for "defeatism and pacifism". His subsequent marriage to her was considered
unfavorably by Dr GOEBBELS, whom source describes as his arch-enemy.
28 May 1945.
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
P..01.?
PA L K1 BALA, 4'
Maj, MI, ?
Commanding.
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Date: 29 May _19.45
APO 758 US ARMY
DR.RWIERT LEY
1. SOURCE
LEY, Robert,REIHSORGANISATIONSLEITER, Leader of the DAF (German Labor
Front) and REICHSWOHNUNGSKOMISSAR (Commissioner of Housing).
His thick, stocky, sullen composition makes him appear brutal and unpleas-
ant. Even after his world:collapsed, he remains the fanatical Nazi. Com
pared with other Nazi bigwigs, his attitude to share the blame is snrprising.
He says: ''Now they all want to picutre HITLER as a sick man who was lead by
BORMANN; HITLER is sick and BORMANN dead - a clever maneuver! No, all of
us who had a leading position are responsible for everything, so are the
"red pants" (generals) who claim to have "Wanted only the best," now that the
war is lest. He makes a theatrical impression, he Might even be slightly
demented. He willingly gives information regarding his own self, however,
his statements regarding other Nazi officials must be accepted with reser-
vation.
LEY claims that he did not become a follower ef HITLER out of ulterior
motives. He drew RM 1000 monthly as chemist for the IG FARBEN Works, be-
came enthused by a speech of HITLER, resigned his position, 'and worked ex-
clusively for HITLER. This action he based on his fighting nature, calling
attention to his having fought as a pilot until the last,minute of the first
World War.
About the accusations made against him by the press abroad that he was a
heavy drinker and a woran chaser, he said, heave been a teetotaler for the
last ten years (FUNK claimed this to be a lie, statin that he was drunk
repeatedly). . He admits that he appreciated women, Claiming that he needed
diversion since the death of his wife in,1942, which:affected him greatly.
He did not become rich in the party. He drew only RM k000 per month and his
property consisted only of a three hundred hectaro estate. The many houses
which were claimed to have belonged to him were property of the Workers'
organization and used for official business.
Rating: 0-3 Date of Information: May 1945 IaLeizawla: W.K.
2. LAST MEETING WITH HITLER
HITLER appreciated LEY to the last, LEY met HITLER for the last time
during the night 19 Apr in the shelter of the Chancellory. Although HITLER
had been. holding conferences since four o'clock that afternoon, he received
LEY at midnight appearing alert and fresh. it,wasarell known however that
HITLER had undergone an operation on hie vocal cords'and suffered from
trembling of his arms and legs. HITLER gave LEY the order to go south, add-
ing that he would fellow.
3, MEETING OF GOEBBEIS ANDSEPP DIETRICH
LET .talked with GOEBBEIS on 20 Apr and had asked him to take at least his
(GOEBBELS family td Safety. GOELBELS replied, "These generals are incapable
of defending BERLIN. I will have to do it myself. If necessary I shall die
here and Magdat(my wife) has decided to do likewise:"
-.LEY proceeded to the ALPS where he was joined by SEPP DIETRICH who
assured him that he would fight to his death with his SS men. LEY said,:
if he (DIETRICH) did not do it, his wife is to blame who later came to visit
him. DIETRICH is no army soldier - - only a political Soldier of HITLER."
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4,. LAST COMBAT MEASURES OF LEY
LEY denied having had a conference with HIMMLER on 12 Apr regarding the
continuation of underground activities after the collapse.
LEY however organized the "FREIKORPS HITLER" in mid-May, He consulted
with HITLER and begged him to form a "FREIKORPS" consisting of men, women and
children from the "German Labor Front", who were to fight to their death.
To this HITLER agreed. However, this Corps was formed only in the Hoi,th, it
was organized by the staff of the DA. It was put into action in the neigh-
borhood of BERLIN, where the people all died in action, according to LEY.
(LAMMERS and FUNK confirmed the formation of the "FREIKORPS HITLER"; LEY had
told them that the generals were wOrthless and the ministers had to lead the
army).
5. TRY'S ACTIVITIES
As chief of organization, LEY supervised the education of the replacements
for Party leaders, because HITLER considered him an especially fanatical
party member. Subordinated to him were the three ORDENSBURGEN (Schools for
Nazi Leaders) in Germany.
As leader of the DAF he administered the funds of the Workers' Association,
which he described as being the largest organization in the world. His
capital was 10 billion marks. This capital Originated from property of for-
mer trade guilds, and at the ,time of collapse consisted of the largest in-
surance company in the world, the VOLKSWAGEN automobile factory, the VULKAN
shipyards in STETTIN, large factories in the food industries, thousands of
homes and stores, hotels and convalescent homes,the"BANK DER DEUTSCHEN
ARBEIT" (Bank of German Labor) and a cash reserve of three-quarter billion
marks. The association was administered by experts in their fields and
belonged to the German workers. All documents are in BERLIN, from which LEY
claims, it can be seen that he did not acquire any property from these funds.
According to LEY, the workers believed in him, and his most loyal followers
are in the RUHR district. "During the war", said LEY," my workers naturally
worked for victory, and I strengthened their will to victory with speeches.
I would have liked to fight with weapons alongside my workers. I treated
the foreign workers well. They will see when they return to their homelands .
how little is being done for them and will insist that the truth come to
light; that the workers in Germany are better off than workers in .any other
country. No foreigners were put in concentration camps by me. However,
take responsibility with others for the cruelties which happened there.
"It is known that lam anti-Semitic, even if I could,. start over. again I
would not do otherwise; however, I would make changes in the racial laws.
Because .ofthem, primitive people are easily lead to acts of violence."
6. OPINIONS ABOUT OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES
In this respect LEY is very careful, he considers such expressions treason
to the party. Nevertheless he Made the following criticisms:
,a) GOERING:
"GOERING was never able to win the heart of the workers. He was con-
sidered a comical figure. I can best describe him as the "pus-bag" -
(EITERBEVLE) not only of the party but of Germany as well." LEY also
called him a conceited, egotistical windbag, who by his measures damaged
the party considerably, and now does not stand by the party.
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b) BORMANN'
BORMANN never controlled HITLER. LEY was present many times when
HITLER yelled at BORMANN, "BORMANN had many faults but was a loyal party
member, who may have died with HITLER."
c) FEGELEIN:
Herman PEGETPIN is not a politician like BORMANN. He was the liaison
officer between HIMMLER and HITLER because he was handsome and dashing.
He met Eva BRAUN, who was HITLER's mistress, at the Chancellory where he
met her sister Whom he married about two years ago, LEY believes that
FEGELEIN did not die in the shelter together with HITLER but that he received.
an assignment at the front.
29 May? 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
ie!:24j A.:LAgikfm
PAUL KU BALA ,
Maj, MI
Commanding.
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init:
APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 29, May 19
HEINRICH LAMMZRS, CHIEF. OF REICH CHANCELLORY
1. SOURCE.
oa
Heinrich LAMMERS represents the typical,Ger'man official and jurist. He
tries to emphasize the point that since the farty took over control of all
Matters of German policy, foreign and interior alike, he was not more than a
figurehead in the Reich Chancellory, but he apparently realizes that these
claims are subject to strong argument. He joined the Party in 32 and, as
expert in state and administrative law procedures, was indispensable in the
legal transfer of the state function 6 toParty authorities, especially in the
first period, when HINDENBURG was still alive. Due to his position he is a
highly important witness for unlawful,actions of the Nazi regime. ?
Source, like almost every REICH Minister and high-ranking military leader,
received a considerable monetary gift for hi S services, which apparently -
weighs heavily upon his conscience, .
Rating: C,-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K.
2, ACTIVITIES AS CHIEF OF REICH CHANCELLORY
According to his position as Chief of the Chancellory, source was to in-.
strudt the ReiehaChancellorconerning the current political situation. .This
task'was.performed by LAMMERS in the' first years of the regime; before HINDEN-
BURGIs death. .After the governing of Germany was taken ever by the Party
alone; source claims.matters of interior' policy were no longer the concern of
the Chief of the Chancellory, and after NEURATH was fired aS Foreign Minister
and RIBBENTROP took over his functions, this field was also eliminated as
one of LAMMERrs affairs.
The nominal functions of the Chief of the Chancellory were as follows:
a) State Legislation Matters
. Until 37, laws were either decreed by the Reich, cabinet or submitted
'in. writihg: -Th@y1Wera then submitted-to'ail'ministerS concerned'and-fi,-
441* signed by HITLER... Since 37, all laws were Counter-signed by LAMMERSa
who MAS responsible for the legal aspects of the drafts and was therefore
called,"Notary of the ROich".
. LAMMERS claims the NUREMBERG Laws "were prepared and made legal by the
National Socialist REICHSTAG. They had probably been prepared by Reich
Minister of the Interior Dr FRICK. I received.notice of them only after
they had been, made legal".
b) Matters Concerning FUEHRER Decrees
Such decrees were issued directly by the FUEHRERt for the most part'
upon suggestion by one of the Ministers. LAMMERS checked the drafts con-
cerning their form, and afterwards theywere published. .
c) Administration of Chancellory Fnnds
As Chief of Chacellory, Source administered special funds at the.dis-
poeal of the Head of State. These funds consisted of the following:
1) General Purpose Funds (FONDS FUER ALLGEMEINE ZWECKE), amounting to
30-40 million marks annually. HITLER used these funds for making
monetary gifts to his high-ranking collaborators, beth civil and mil-
itary. LAMMERS defends this procedure by recalling that Frederick the
Great granted his collaborators so called "dotations", and that Napo-
lean likewise gave large monetary rewards to his marshals.
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The order for the payment of a larger sum was given either by HITLER,
by HITLER's Chief Adjutant, or by BORMANN. LAMMERS recalls that Field
Marshal RUNDSTEDT received RM 250,000 on 11 Dec 41; GENOBST (Col Gen)
Heinz GUDERIAN received nearly PM 1,000,000 to purchase an estate in
WARTHEGAU (Pomerania); Field Marshal LEEB received about RM 500,000 for
the acquisition of a forest estate in Bavaria; Field Marshal BRAUCHITSC-
aS far as source remembers,- also received a larger donation; as to
Field Marshals LISZT and WEICHS, source assumes that they were also
favired with monetary gifts, but he does not recall the exact figures;
but Field Marshal POMMEL received nothing and neither did Field Marshal
WITZLEBEN, The GAF Field Marshals received similar "allotments" di-
rect4rfrem GOERING. ,LAMMERS recalls that Field MarshaLMILCH received.
a large amount of money to purchase as estate somewhere near BRESLAU.'
"Representation Expenses" (AUFWANDSENTSCHAEDIGUNGEN) for the Ministerr
were also paid from thetoeneral Purpose Fund. GOERING, for example,
received as REICHSNARSCHALL at first RM 43,000, then RE 96,000, and
finally RE 240;000 a year,,in addition to his salaries through the
various other official posts he held (of Report Ref No SAIC/16, 23 May
45). LAMMERS admits that the simultaneous receipt of several salaries
was unlawful.
ii) Aid Fund (HILFSFOND), amounting to 90-100 million marks a year.
This fund was further subdivided into a Housing Fund (L) (BAUFOND), fro;
which HITLER financed special building projects, e.g. in LINZ, where
he had attended school; a Charity Fund (W) (WOHLTAETIGKEITSFOND), from
which subsidies were paid to hospitals and similar institutions; and a
Reserve Fund (R), which contained a reserve capital to replenish the
other funds. The assets for all these funds came from the Reich Min-
?
istry of Finance.
d) Coordination ofethe Reich Ministries
The task of Coordinating the activities of the various ministries also
was the concern of the Chle4 of the Chancellory. - Laws proposed by a min-
ister had to be submitted to all other ministers who were interested in
the matter LALLIERS alSo had to confer continuoualy with ,the Director of
the Party Chancellory, at first HESS, afterwards BORMANM, since all laws
had to be submitted to the Party authorities prior to their publication.
e) Decisions Concerning Petitions and Complaints were also part of the
functions of the Chief of the Chancellory.
3. REICH CHANCELLORY STAFF
GRITZINGER was Secretary of State and LAMMERS' deputy; In addition there
were four Cabinet Counsellors (KABINETTSRAETE): Dr MEERWALD, *MINISTERIAL-
DIREKTOR (rank equiv to Maj Gen); STUDTERHEIM, whose special field was
occupied territories; WILLUHN, commerce and communication; problems; Dr FICKER
administration, organization and state law matters; Dr KILLY, whose special
field was civil service law, social security, and finances, was finally re-
moved, because of his non-Aryan origins, under pressure by BORMANN. All these
officials were specialists.
4. DEALINGS WITH HITLM
In the beginning e when HITLER did not yet govern exclusively through the
Party, LAMMERS was an indispensable link between the Reich President and' the
Reich Chancellor. HINDENBURG at first disliked HITLER because of the latter'
loud manner and because HITLER did nOt fit into HINDENBURG's environment-.
LAMMERS coached HITLER into controling himself when reporting to HINDENBURG,
and finally the Field Marshal came under HITLER's spell. In this connection
LAMMERS recalls that when he came to the NEUDECK estate a few days prior to
HINDENBURG's death in order to have some papers signed, HINDENBURG, extremely
weak, told LAMMERS: "Give my regards to my dear HITLER".
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Until 37 LAMMERS reported to HITLER four times a week on the current
affairs of state. After 37 the Council of Ministers did no longer assemble,
and HITLER began to transmit his political will through orders addressed
directly to the respective ministers and generals. LAMMERS had no say in
matters regarding foreign policy since RISBENTROP's appointment, he claims.
.He learned about the attack on Poland only after the beginning of hostil-
ities, ummEns claims, and then he had to issue the necessary decrees.
GOEING according to source, was not very much in favor of the war against
Poland.
LAMMERS made his last official report to HITLER on 24 Sep 44. He does
not recall the subject matter of the report, but states that details are
noted in his diaries which are packed in wooden eases and are stored in his
official residence in SERCHTESGADEN.
LAMMERS last saw HITLER on 27 Mar 45, when HITLER signed some papers
without any comments. LAMMERS subsequently fell into complete disfavor and
was even sentenced to death upon BORUANN's urging, he claims.
5. NOTES ON HITLER, ,BORMANN, -RIBBENTROP
a) HITLER
During his first few years in office HITLER repeatedly demonstrated
his desire to. govern according to laid down laws. ,This tendency was
caused by the fact that HINDENBURG was still alive, and by the somewhat
insecure feeling of HITLER as executive. Already after the ROEHM Putsch,
however, HITLER started to pay less and less attention to his ministers
and goVerned.more. and moreas a dictator,. In matters elf foreign policy
he relied more on his intuition than on actual facts. He did not tolerat,
any Objeciioas or news of unpleasant happendings. Whoever talked back
fell into disgrace and was removed.
After the outbreak Of the war with Russia, the Party was the sole.
ruler in the inner administration of the country. HITLER was particular3a
annoyed that according to law he could not just fire generals and high
officials, but had to pension them. As a result, the REICHSTAG was ass-
embled in fall 45 arid a law stating that any man. in Germany could be re-
moved from office by HITLER without trial, HITLER being the.highest
judge in eitilar matters, was passed. On this occasion HITLER made his
speech in which, aside from the generals, he attacked the judges as
parasites of the state.
- HITLER always tried to avoid harsh measures against deserving Party
members who, in eource's opinion "did not deserve any decent treatment".
b) BORMANN
Source associated with BORMANN almost daily in line:of.duty, BORMANN,
already Chief. of Staff of the Party Chancellory (STABSLEITER DER PAR-
TEIKANZLEI) under Rudolf HESS, came into particularly close contact
withBIT4ER because he also looked after the OBERSALZBERG affairs. HESS
paid. lit1.4 attention to current Party matters and BORMANN, who was very
industrious, gained more and more irlimportance. .After HESS' flight,
HITLER nominated BORMANN as Chief of the Party Chancellory (LEITER DER
PARTEIkAN4EI), since he did not want to nominate a successor to HESS;
thus BORMANN was given the most important pest in the Party administra-
tion, and since 42 it could be stated that the Party governed the State,
BORMANN wasathe leading man. In spring 45 BORMANN. was appointed secretaa
to the,FUEHRER, which meant that no statesman or Party member could.
approach HITLER without seeing BORMANN first. Only the generals still
retained free access. Whoever objected to BORMANN was removed.
At:firat'BORMANN got along with HIMMLER, but later, when BORMANN tried
to interfere with HIMMLER's "Police State", their relationship deter:.
iorated. The unlawful treatment of concentration camp victims was un-
doubtedly known to BORMANN, but source claims that it had not been ordered
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29: May 45
by him. Most likely HIMMLER is the responsible person, source believes.
BORMANN, however, succeeded in removing even the last "non-Aryans" from
their positions.
BORMANN was by profession a farmer. He was a small, tough man,
intelligent, ambitious, double-faced. He learned quickly. He like
alcohol and was frequently criticized by HITLER, who had a dislike for
drunks. BORMANN was married to the daughter of Party Judge BUCH; he
ill-
treated his wife and had difficulties with his father-in-law, whose dis-
charge he finally brought about,.
BORMANN at first tried to maintain good relations with LAMMERS, since
he could learn a great deal from him. Later, when LAMS did not want
to submit to him, BORMANN became source's personal enemy. .
In source's opinion BORMANN did not dominate HITLER, but he had a
strong influence upon him.
0). RIBBENTROP
After HITLER's rise to pOwer, NEURATH's position became difficult,
since the Party Office for Matters of Foreign Policy strongly influenced
the foreign policy of Germany. HITLER finally dismissed NEURATH, whose
ideas he considered too old-fashioned.
HITLER's foreign policy was not stable, because of the multitude of
Party agencies interested in the subject. In addition to RIBBENTROP,
there was also ROSENBERG and even the Hitler Youth who maintained their
own foreign-political offices.
RIBBENTROP is described by source as a cool, realistic person, vain
and succeptible to flattery. HITLER thought highly of him, because he
encountered little opposition from his part. Source frequently had
occasion to report .to HITLER minor wishes of foreign diplomats, only to
receive the standard answer: "Tell it to RIBBENTROP".
Source claims that all important conferences concerning the war against
Poland were held by HITLER with AIBBENTROP and other statesmen under
four eyes only.
29 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
4 tA titialit
eet-Si /I
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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26 May 45
06200030002-7
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:Init: /-,010
APO 758 US ARMY:Date: 26 May 1245
AMANN 'S CONTROL OF GERMAN PRESS
SOURCE
MAX AMANN, Director of REICHSPRESSEKAMMER (State Press Commission).
Rating: C-3 Date of Information: May 45 ' Interrogator: W.K.
. .
AMANN made few appearances in the public life of the. party, but thrbugh
brutal seizure or suppression of German publications, he built up an .
enormous Nazi newspaper Concern. Through the books and newspapers he pub-
lished, he had a strong influence n the minds of the German people. AMANN
himself, despite mediocre business ability, became a multi-millionaire.
In appearance AMANN is homely and has only one arm; the other he lost in
a hunting accident. He is coarse by nature and speaks in a Bavarian dia-
lect.
His relationship to the party stems from the fact that as FeldWebel
(Sgt) he was HITIRR's immediate superior in World War I.
II. PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP TO HITLER
During World War I when HITLER joined the staff of the 16th Bavarian
Reserve Inf Rest as messenger, AMANN was regimental Sgt Major. AMANN
scribes HITLER as having been a homely, pale Soldier., whose civilian dee-
upation was listed as "Kunstmaler" (artist painter).. HITLER was Courageous
and stood up well under strain; even then he showed a passion for war. He
was not promoted because there was no opening-.
After the War AMANN was a clerk-accountant and rade good money. HITLER
met him on the street-and asked him to join his party and organize the
press AMANN joined only after his wife encouraged him.
AMANN describes HITLER as a sexually normal, man, HITLER'S only woman
friend, with whom he had occasional intimate relations, was EVA BRAUN, a
former employee of the photographer HOFFMAN. She had a little house in
MUNICH/BOGENHAUSEN. During the last months she was constantly around
HITLER.
Otherwise AMANN seldom met HITLER. HITLER had very little understanding
of economic matters; so.AMNN had less occasion than other party leaders
to visit HITLER in person. However, he alone had the right to address
HITLER with "Good morning, Herr HITLER". Since the beginning of 1943,
according to a decree by BORMANN, no party leader could come near HITLER
without BORMANN's permission. AMANN met HITLER for the last time on 24
Feb when HITLER Spoke to the leaders in the REICHSKANZLEI.. Even then HITLEI
appeared physically failing, and he was very much under the influence of
BORMANN.
III. OTHER POLITICAL PERSONALITIES
a) BORMANN Chief of the REICHKAN3LEI. After HESS' flight, BORMANN an
uneducated, brutal individual, gained more and more influence over .
HITLER. Together with HIMMLER he maintained a spy system against every-
body, including party leaders. During the last months he had made
HITLER a tool for himself and had the nickname, "HITLER'S RASPUTIN".
BORMANN's friend, GAUTRITER GIESSIER; of MUNICH, was also unscrupulouS.
The often met and conspired together.
b) HIMMLER. P.MANN's neighbor on the TEGERNSEE, HIMMLER seems to be of
a homely nature, and his outward appearance belies his tyrannical rule.
AMANN regards HIMMLER as a kind of Robespierre, or as a witch-burning
Jesuit. HIMMLER considered it his duty to eliminate all enemies of the
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26 May 45 .
Nazi ideolOgy, and he did so calmly and impersonally, without hate and
wiihoUt'sYmPathST.* DUring the last months HIMMLER's importance went to
his head and he played the great commander with a special train and
great surroundings. In.theenORMANN pushed even,gIMMLER aside.
c) GOERING. GOERING was no National Socialist, but always the big
gentleman. He never had contact with little party people like AMANN.
He alone led HITLER into the war, by giving him wrong impressions Of the
powerof the LUFTWAFFE, on which HITLER based hi 8 great hopes., (As AMANN
was saying this, GOERING, by coincidence, was being led past as a pris-
oner'. ANANN jumped-up excitedly, 'pointed oUt the ?window at GOERING, and
said, "This fat slob here, you should hang him. ? He is responsible for
the war and the death of my'son. Itis him, and not we small peopleM-
AMANN has no proof of GOERING's war responsibility. He states merely
that "the people say it".
d) GOEBBELS. AMANN Considers GOEBBELS his enemy because he always wanted
to interfere in the nianagement* the press, which AMANN says was solely
his responsibility.' AMANN believes BORMANN, HIMNLER, and GOEBBELS were
the three bad spirits of HITLER.
IV. THE EHER PUBLISHING CO.
a) Establishment.
AMANN, upon HITLERs wish, took over a Small MUNICH publishing house.
for the :party in 1?20,- This concern was owned by a widow named EHER..
It is characteristic that NANN allowed the moneyless widow a monthly
rental of only 50 RN until her death.
The paper, at that time the nrOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER", was not solvent,
and was kept going only through the sale of books. HITLER never re-
ceived a,fee from the concern for his articles. For his book, "MEIN
KAMPF", which the EHER firm published, HITLER asked only 10 per cent of
the sales price. A large sum was still owed to HITLER by the publish-
ing firm, was never claimed.
b) Organization. .
AMANN admits that he could l_ot have succeeded in the 'organization of
such a big concern without help of men experienced in the publishing
field. Especially helpful were Dr '67INCKLER and' Dr RIENHARDT, both of
BERLIN. After RIENHARDT went to HIMMLER, Wilhelm BAUER was AMANN's
right hand man.
The system controlled about 700 daily newspapers. The "VOELKISCHER
BEOBACHTER" with its three editions (BERLIN, MUNICH, VIENNA) had a
total circulation Of 1,500,000. AMANN admits that the small number
of subscriptions was.a result of poor contents. The "STUERMER",
STREICHER's organ; was independent; AMANN did not want it in his system
because it was too filthy. On the other hand, HIMMLER's paper, "DAS
SCHWARZE KORPS" was part of the chain, but was directed only by the
editor, D'ALQUEiN.
For organization of the system see appendix.'
AMANN himself was in charge of .the main officein MUNICH (bombed out
several months ago). Individual districts of the party received one-
third of the income of the district publishing)houses. The GAULEITERS
appointed district editors but AMANN,held.the'final jurisdiction.
To implications that AMANN had ruthleSsly destroyed other publica-
tions, AMANN replied that he'had compensated the owners. The ULLSTEIN
Publishers got 12 million RM, HUGENBERG got 65 million; and likewise
SCHERL Publishing Co., KNORR & HIRTH Publishing Co. in MUNICH, and the
Stock Exchange paper were paid. ,AMANN admits that some of these "made
trouble", but he sees-no injustice in his acquisition of these concerns.
a
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The suppression of the "kRANKFURTER ZEITUNG" was accomplished by
HITLER himself.
When asked which foreign newspapers were subsidized, AMANN replied he
did not know. That information is known to either the press department
of the Foreign Office or to Dr WINCKLER.
c) Financial Statement.
AMANN does not know the exact balances of the concern. These state-
ments could be made by his financial director BICKEL in MUNICH; Dr
RICHTER, also of the EHER concern.; or Dr RIENHARDT.
At any rate, the concern was one of the greatest, undertakings in
Germany, and equaled IG FARBEN in sales and profits. Net yearly income
averaged 100 millions. Net profits of about 500 millions have been de-
posited in the REICHSBANK. Asked why he did not use profits to acquire
paper factories, forests, etc., AMANN replies, "I don't want to let my-
self in for such things.'"
AMANN's.personal economic status is according to his own statements
as follows: As head of the EHER concern he received a yearly income of
120,000 RM, and 5 per cent of the net profit. He does not know the
exact sum of his capital; it is, however, several millions. Of real
estate he possesses the following: one apartment house in MUNICH/BOGEN-
HAUSEN, WASSEREURGERSTRASSE 6, and one villa in ST QUIRIN on the TEGERN-
SEE. Upon HITLERis request he furnished it luxuriously for display
purposes. In addition he had large hunting grounds. He did not invest
any money for himself or his concern in foreign lands.
26 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
11
3
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ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN PRESS
REICHSKULTURKAMMER
(State Culture Commission)
DR GOEBBEIS
REICHSVRRBAND D. DEUTSCHEN PRESSE
(German Press Association)
CAPT WEISS
II
REICHSPRESSEKAMMER
(State Press Commission)
AMANN
Eli
01
DEUTSCHES NACHTRICHTENBUERO
RUNDFUM
7-7EICHSVERBAND D:.:DEUTSCHEN ZEITUNGSVERLEGER --I
EA(
c=11
Of
tol
TUR PUBLISHING CO
(German News Bureau)
(Radio)
) (Association of German Newspaper Publishers)
REICHSVERBAND D. DEUTSCHEN ZEITSCHRIFTENVERLEGER
AMANN
(Association of German Magazine Publishers)
DR RIENHARDT, later WILHELL BAUER
APPENDIX
GAUVERLAGE
(District
Publishers)
STAMMVERLAG MUENC HEN
(Main Publishing
House - Munich)
"Voelkischer Beobachter;
Book Publishing
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Control of Other
Purchased Interests
New Establishments
in Occupied Territories.
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5 E G E IS AN ENCIAISIME
11E.10
: SECRET
:Auth: CG th Arm :
:
SEVENTH ARMY iNTERRO :Int.
APO
CENTER
APO 758 :Date: 2 May 95 :
US ARMY
t ?
INFORMATION ON THE GERMAN'MINISTRY OF POSTS
??????10.*".1.
25X1A
SOURCE
OHNESORGE, Wilhelm, Minister of Posts, joined the Nazi Party in 1920,
left it in 23, rejoined it again in 33. He held no position in the Party,
but was OGRUF (Lt Gen) in the NSKX since 37. Source was president of the
REIMPOST ZENTRALAMT (Central Of from 2.9 to 33; he then became Assis-'
tant Postmaster General' and finally, in '37, PostMaster General (Minister of
Posts). Source is the inventor of the "four way switch" for cables. He was
very cooperative during interrogation and stated that he was able and will-
ing to help in the reconstruction of the Post Ministry.
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: B.M.
GENERAL NOTE: This report is 'submitted in accordance with the questions pre-
sented by Sig 0, US Group CC, G-21 T-Section, 6th Army Group,
,APO 23. Many documents and records which were.notabsolutely
essential were destroyed because of transport difficulties,
source stated.
1. What responsibility did the REICESPOST (PRP) have it supplying facilities
for use'bf thoI)ropaganda Ministry?
REICHSPOST had responsibility for all mechanical matters such as trans,.
mitters, cables, frequencies, etc. Responsibility for network inside radio.,
stations was with Propaganda Ministry. Postal employees did not enter
stations.-
? .
2. What were the various units of the Central Division (MIN-Z or ZENTRAL
ABTEILUNG).? Very briefly, what was the function of each of the units?
i) REFERAT Party Chancellory?Political supervision of personnel matters.
ii) REFERAT Postage Stamps?New issues, etc.
iiiLREFERAT Fieldpost.
iv) REFERAT Social Benefits of Employees--Vacation and VERSORGUNGSANSTALT
(Welfare' Institutions).. Latter was a kind of additional insUrance,for
postal emploYees'whith was paid to them in addition to sOcial SecUrity.
v) REFERAT Instruction in Postal Matters.
'vi) REFERAT Press':
vii) REFERAT Postal Advertisements.
viii) REFERAT Statistics?Records of numbers Of letters, parcels, etc.
3. What private companies are partly owned by the DPP?
i) DEUTSCH ATLANTISCHE TELEGRAPHEN GESELLSCRAFT
ii) RADIO AUSTRIA, VIENNA..:
iii)-TERNKABEL GESELLSCHAFT,'
iv) POSTREKLiME GESELLSCHAFT (all shares were owned by RP but it was
chartered as a private company).
1
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4. Which grades of civil workers were placed strictly on merit?
From Postal Assistant up, all grades were strictly on merit. Lower
services had age and merit promotions.
5. Who was the Secretary of State working under you?
Jakob NAGEL
6. Do you and your chiefs of Telecommunications have a record of all the
permanent telecommunications installations in Germany, even of part of
the facilities used by the military? Who by name would have this infor-
mation?
These records should be in UNTER HACHLING, near MUNICH. MINISTERIALDIREK-
TOR FLEISCHMANN should have this information.
7. What is the function of the "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE" in the DRP?
Source claims there was no "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE in the DRP.
8. By whom and by what method has censorship of the German civilian mail
recently been carried out?
By the EHRMACHT and GESTAPO. The WEHRMACHT censored all mail going to
foreign countries. The GESTAPO gave certain addresses to post offices and
received letters addressed to them t Address lists were with the individual
post offices.
9. By whom and by what method has censorship of the German civil telecommun-
ications recently been carried out?
GESTAPO gave certain numbers to mail employees. These numbers were auto-
matically connected with a secret room in the telephone office. Arrangements
were made so that postal employees had no chance to listen in.
10. To what extent is the .6ILDTELEGRAMMDIENST ("Facsimile Telephotography
Service") used?
The DRP had a large network which was not used very often during the war.
Source thinks that television will be much more efficient. Facsimile Tele-
photography was not profitable.
11. Give the locations of the storage depots for telecommunications equip-
ment and spare parts.
REICHSPOST ZENTRALAMT. Storage depots of the RP ZENTRALAMT were moved
and MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANLE should know where they are now.
12. What is the basic system used in the Railway Post Office? For example,
who or what department ow t the RR.thail tars* (itc?
The DRP once owned approximately 5,500 Postal RR cars. Division VI
(MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH) Was in charge. One official of this depart-
ment, who is supposed to be an expert, is in KEHLHEIM/DANU3E.
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13. What general devices; such as a scrambling device, were used in the DRP:
telecommunications? What type, of messages, were sent on suchsystems?
, ,
The "Inverter" system. It was for military and Party use. Source
invented a new system which vis in use on the BERLIN-OSLO line.
14. In the DRP, how did the various division heads keep informed in a general
way of the work of the other divisions?
There was a monthly conference Where all :urgent questions were brought
up. The was also a weekly session within each section.
15. How does the GAF teletypewriter Aetwork fit into the teletypewriter net-
work of the DRP'?
Part of the network was rented to the Air Force. Special machinery was
Air Force operated and procured.
16. To what Ministries .(e.g. Propaganda Ministry) and in what proportion are
the Wireless license fees allotted?
Propaganda Ministry got half of first 8 million participants. For-all
participants over 8 million, theyroPagando. Ministry received 3/4 and the
DRP received 1/4. Each registered radio listener paid 2 RM monthly.
17. Approximately what proportion of the income of the DRP comes from each
of the income producing services'?
Approximately as follows:
Letters and
Telephone
Automobile
Telegrams
parcels 62%
35%
2%
1%
18. Does the DRP collect taxes? If so, what type?
The DPP does not collect taxes.
19. Where are the policy-making recerds (basic records) of the REICHSPOST?
Might be in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and/or UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH.
20. How many, and which ones, are left in BERLIN? Exact location?
Old, historically valuable records were left in BERLIN.
between LEIPZIGERSTRASSE and ZIL;MERSTRASSE.
21. When did OHNESORGE leave BERLIN?
On approximately 10 Apr 45.
22. Get data,pn his movements.
First he went to ALTMUENSTER/TRAUNSEE where he stayed
for 3 or 4 days. Then to THANNKIRCHEN, near. DITRAMS4ELL,
days with the ESSER family. Thence to the BAD TOELZ Post
WILHEILISTRASSE
at HAUS TRAUNBLICK
where he stayed 8
Office for 4 or 5
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days. Thence to KITZBUEHL Grand Hotel for 5 days; LOFER POSTHEIM for 3
days; and BAD GASTEIN Post Office and Hotel Mozart for 4 or 5 days.
23. Does the Advisory Board (BEIRAT) exist now? If
The Advisory Board still exists. Source cannot
the Advisory Board has not functioned for 6 years.
members. A list of names could be obtained through
limited advisory function.
24. Who makes up the National Defense Group (GRUPE
What were the basic functions of this group?
so, who are its members?
remember names because
The Board had up to 12
source. UBEIRAT" had only
REICHSVERTEIDIGUNG?)
MINISTERIALDIRIGENT HORNOTT) was head of the Group. All army orders as
to cable connections and networks were sent to him. In case the Army gave
up certain districts, the cables were returned to the Defense Group.
25. Why was the Postal Police (POS.?CHUTZ) taken over by the SS? What were
the functions of this group? How were its members obtained? What per-
centage of RP personnel were full time members? What percentage were
part-time members?
Source claims that there was no connection with the SS whatever, except
that uniforms were obtained through SS gm offices. Postal Police Officers
and men were not members oi the SS, but postal employees. Groups of em-
ployees were used mainly ap air raid protection squads. Later members were
put into the VOLKSSTURM. The members of the Postal Police were obtained on
a voluntary basis from among the employees. Only instructors were full time
members. A total of only about 80 people, in all directorates, were full
time members. Approximately 5% of personnel were members before the war.
26. REICHSPOSTFILLSTELLE in DAHLEM.
a. Who was in charge?
Postrat MACK
b. What were the functions of this organization?
To produce pictures concerning internal organization of postal
affairs and to procure instructive pictures for employees.
c. Number of employees?
About 15.
27, Where is the board for allotting frequencies within Germany, according
to the allottments of the World Frequency Board? Who is the head of
this Board?
RP ZENTRALAMT: National frequencies; Division VII: International fre-
quencies. MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE is head of the board.
28. Is there a long term development group for cables, other technical
installations, etc? If.-so, where is it in the RPM organization? Also
where is it located?
RP ZENTRALAMT for cables and machinery, Research Institute of the RPM
for television, infra-red, and relay stations; The RP ZiENTRALAMT was in
LI-
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BERLIN-TEMPELHOF. The FORSCHUNGSANSTALT (Research Institute:)of the RPM was
first in BERLIN-KLEIN MACHOW, later in STADT STEINACH, Thuringia.
29. In the last five years, has the RP operated with a profit or loss? Do
you remember the approximate figures?
The RP operated at a profit. The gross income was about four thousand
million marks. In 1944 this figure 'decreased to three thousand million.
6% of the gross income was given to the Ministry of finance, which was in
control of spending.
30. Explain liaison and coordination with other ministries, such as Navy
and Transport, for communications with ships. Did RP personnel or RP
approved personnel do the work? Who installed, maintained and developed
the equipment?
Liaison with other ministries was done by writing alone. MINISTERIAL?
DIRIGENT HORNOLD kept up coordination with the Army. Part of the postal
network was taken over by the Army. Exchanges of the Army network wererun
by Army personnel. Postal employees were used to repair cables. Army in
stalled and developed equipment.
31, . Give a detailed description of the branches and sub-branches of the
Central Office (RP ZENTRALAMT).
i) Telephone Transmission Technique.
ii) Telephone Exchange Construction,
iii) Operation of Long Distance Network.
iv) Acoustics, Microphones, Telephones, Calibration of Instruments.
v) Telegraphy, AC Telegraphy, Multiplex Telegraphy, Telegraphic device4
vi) Mechanized Operation (parcel transport, pneumatic post).
vii) Furniture Standardization.
viii) Testing of Materials.
ix) Workshops.
x) Checking of costs of all DRP installations.
32. Explain organization of RPF (Reich Research Institute). Who was head
of it? Where is it .located? W'iat subjects were being recently pursued?
To what organization was the research information supplied and how was
it gotteninto practical use by the Armed Forces?
President_ GERWICH of the RPF was in charge. He is believed to be in
AACH, Baden. The former president was a Mr ?GLADENBECK who is with the ALL-
GEMEINE ELEKTRIZITAETS GESELLSCHAFT. The RPF was located for a time in
STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. Subjects recently pursued were television and
development of infra-red research. In peace time yearly publications were
issued. During the war the HEEESWAFFENAMT (Army Procurement Office) re-
ceived the information. - Source states that the Army made too little use of
postal research results.
33. Give evacuation addresses of all services, offices, archives, etc, not
already supplied.
Division' I: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUEHN. Left BERLIN for Northern Germany
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Division II: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN. Believed
HACHING, together with some documents.
Division III: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN.
Division IV: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR KOERNER. Believed to be in NEHLHEIM/
DANUBE, with documents.
Division V: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR RACKOW. Believed to have been last in
BAMBERG.
Division VI: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH. Left BERLIN for Northern
Germany.
Division VII: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE. Left BERLIN for Northern
Germany.
Foreign Division: Dr RISCH was last in BERLIN.
"OST" (EAST) Division: General Consul KOEHN is believed to be near STADT
STEINACH, Thuringia, possibly with some records.
STAATS SEKRETAER NAGEL left BERLIN in order to join Admiral DOENITZ!
RP Pre6idint. FRAHM and a Dr KLEINSTICK were last in BAD TOELZ. Source
states that both men have extensive knowledge of postal affairs.
There are approximately 100 postal employees in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE. Among
them are experts belonging to all divisions. Some records might also be
there. There are 20 telephone and radio officials in UNTER HACHING, near
MUNICH. A Dr SCHNITTGER, expert on radio tubes, is in GEHLBERG, about 50
km from STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. The last office of the Post Ministry
was in BAD GASTEIN. Certain records should still be there. STAAM _
SEKRETAER NAGEL was supposed to open an office in BARGTE HEIDE, near HAMBURG.
The Central Telegraph and Telephone Office was in UNTER HACHING, near MUN-
ICH. Situation plans for cables and lines might be found there.
RP ZENTRALAMT: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE.
Postal Savings Institute VIENNA (5000 employees): MINISTERIALDIREKTOR
NIRSCHEL is believed to be in a home for postal em-
ployees near the MONDSEE in Austria.
Central Administration of charities: OBERPOSTRAT GIERKE.
REICHS Printing Works: DIREKTOR MOELLER, BERLIN.
STAATSDRUCKEREI (Govt Printing Office) VIENNA: HOFRAT FISCHER, VIENNA.
REICH Television Corporation does not exist anymore.
34. In addition to regular civilian telecommunications, what other tele-
communication services did the RP supply? Were the Other serVices men-
tioned operated by the same operators who performed the civilian tele-
communications service? Were the same facilities used for more than
one type of service -- if so, a general description of how this was
controlled.
to be in UNTER
Networks of the Army, Navy and Air Force belonged
tal was paid for them. The networks were operated by
had its own network and had to pay rent to the Posts.
operated by the Party. Industrial firms like SIEMENS
own nets which were privately operated. The European
Society) was in VIENNA.
to the Posts and ren-
the Army. The Party
This network was
, AEG, etc, had their
1DOSTVEREIN (Post
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35. Was the SCHULUNGSLAGER of the DRP abolished?
Yes.
36. When was it operated last?
One year ago. When the Ministry in BERLIN was bombed, the camp became
the seat of the RP Ministry..
37. Where is OHNESORGE's wife?
In ELLBACH, near BAD TOELZ.
38. How long was she connected with the DRP?
Six years.
39. What was her official position.?
Source states that she had no official position. Since her marriage to
the Minister she was only interested in the postal employees' vacation
homes.
40. When you last heard of it, was the Field Post Office still in FRANKFURT/
ODER?
The Field Post Office was last in ST JOHANN, in the Tyrol.
41. Where is MINISTERIALDIRIGENT Dr FRITZ SCHUSTER of the Field Post?
He went to Admiral DOENITZ together with STAATSSEKRETAER NAGEL.
42. How were the Postal Funds administered?
Short term loans were given to Govt Banks (REICHSBANK, SEEHANDLUNG)
which took over the administration.
43. Who was the final policy authority for paying out the funds?
Minister OHNESORGE.
44. Is the POSTSCHUTZ still under a MINISTERIALRAT in the Min. Z.?
The POSTSCHUTZ was last in "OST" Division.
45. Who was the last known MINISTERTALDIREKTOR of the POSTSCHUTZ?
General Consul KOEHN.
46. Where is he now?
Believed to be in LOBENSTEIN, Thuringia.
47. Did HIMMLER have complete authority over the DRP personnel?
Source states that HIMMLER had no authority whatever over DPP personnel.
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48. Where is the main POSTSCHUTZ Camp?
In ZEESEN next to "SCHULUNGSLAGER".
49. What was the total number of POSTSCHUT4 employees?
Formerly the "TRANSPORT ABTEILUNG" had 4,000 men with 1,600 vehicles.
In the last few months only a few hundred men were left.
50. Did the POSTSCHUTZ personnel receive training in sabotage functions?
No.
51. Who was responsible for the forarding of Red Cross PW packages to
Allied PW's in Germany?
Source believes it was Division I. Possibly POSTDIREKTION STETTIN (from
Sweden) and POSTDIREKTIONEN KARLSRUHE and STUTTGART (both from Switzerland).
52. Why were so many packages undelivered?
Because of the breakdown in communications lines.
53. Who was responsibile for this breach of faith?
The President of the REICHSPOSTAM STETTIN.
54. Where is the largest cache of these packages at this time?
Possibly in STETTIN.
55. What was your policy in disposing of undelivered packages?
Source states that he ordered them sent back to the Red Cross. It be-
came known that great quantities of parcels were given to bombed out per-
sons in STETTIN. Persons responsible for this were imprisoned.
56. How many vehicles were owned and operated by the IMP?
Six thousand busses. Source did not know how many -trucks or cars.
57, Does Division I deal with the administrative as well as the operational
matters such as the DRP Bus service?
Administrative matters only. Operational matters were in the hands of
REICHSPOSTDIREKTIONEN.
58. Does Division I control the operational and administrative side of the
DRP Savings Bank?
Yes.
59: Did Division I keep records of all stocks of stamps?
The different "DIREKTIONEN" kept these records.
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60. Are stocks of stamps still intact or have they been destroyed?
Some stamps may have been destroyed by air attacks, etc, but not in-
tentionally by postal employees.
61. Where are the stocks located principally at this time?
There should be stocks of stamps in every Post Office.
62. Describe how the R.P.O. functioned in handling the WEHMACHT postal
system.
Field Post officials were members of the Army. Postal officials were in
charge of transportation until mail reached a certain secret point where the
field post employees took over. The Army paid 20 pfennigs per man per day
in order to take care of the free mailing privilege for soldiers. .
63. If regular postal rates are required of all discharged WEHRLACHT per-
sonnel, will the revenues be sufficient to hire the personnel required
in the DRP?
Yes.
64. How long would it take for the State Printing Plant to replace all
printed stocks of stamps necessary for six months of operations?
Replacement would be very fast as long as auxiliary printing plants
could be put back in operation.
65. Assuming that war damage has already destroyed all postage stamps and
the time to provide temporary new issues is 30 days hence, what is your
recommendation or plan to re-establish first class postal service in
Germany?
Find printing plants that are still operative. Auxiliary printing
plants have the necessary material. Try to find President ROST (formerly
in BRESLAU) now in the American occupation sector. Contact Presidents of
REICHSPOSTDIREKTIONEN in the American sector as to personnel questions.
Contact all personnel in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH.
Great numbers of trucks of all kinds would be necessary. Former German
Army vehicles could be used. Long stretches in rural districts could be
serviced by female mail carriers. Wooden barracks could be used as post
offices. Former postal employees who are now PW should be selected for
help in order to re-establish mail service. German signal troops and com-
munication troops should not be dismissed, but should be used for repairs.
24 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
TaAL ea*,
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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tAttch: 0G 7th Arm
SEVENTH ARMY-INTERROGATIOW.OENTER :Initi
APO 78US ARMY :Date: 2
REICH MINISTRY OF FINANCE:I:LOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND DOOUMENTS
(This Report is being published in answer to-SpecIal Questionnaire .
provided by US Group 000 G42, T-Seciicht 6th Army Group., 14 May 1945)
II PREAMBLE
The following information was obtained from Permanent:Under Secretary REINHARDT
and Under Secretaries WOOTHKE and KALLENBACH. They are very'cooperative and state
that they are willing and able to help in the reorganization of the Ministry and its
departments. In connection with the records and documents, it was pointed out that
many had been destroyed in air attacks. Furthermore,- all nonessential documents
were destroyed because of the difficulty of transporting-them arid because Of their
constituting a fire hazard during air raids. Many of the records of all departments
were evacuated to WUERZBURG and left there with two employees as custodians.
Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: G.P.V?
IX. MINISTRY OP FINANOE
A. DEPARTMENT I
Most of the personnel and records were last located in BERLIN/OHARLOTTENBURG,
B/SMAROKSTRASSE 48-52. The records of ./B were in BEELITZ.near BERLIN. About twelve
officials, under'Ministerialdirigent AUGUSTINE, together with some records, were
last in BAD-TOELZ. Some officials, notably Ministeralrats KALLENBAOH, GERTH,.and
SCHMIDT-SCHWARZENBERG, were in GARMISCH.,PARTENICIROHEN, but were taken into custody
by OTO around May 4. The chief officials still looated in BERLIN are Directere
KLUGE and MEYER.
S. DEPARTMENTIII
- This department came directly under the control of,REINHARDT. Most of. the
records and personnel are in MENAI!, Thuringia. A few: under Director Dr SIEGERT
and Ministerialrat SCHERER, are still in BERLIN. '
C. DEPARTMENT III
This department was also under the, Control of RE/NHARDT.' Most of the records
arid personnel are in /LMENAV, Thuringia. In addition to these, there' is a Regis-
rungsrat SCHADT and one other official in WEILHEIMi Oberregierungarat'TeLENSK/ in
BAD-TOELZ, and Steueramtmann PAUL/din BERLIN.
D. DEPARTMENT /V-
MinisteiialAirigent WOOTHKE (AUCSBURG) was one of the men in charge of this
'department. Most of the-personnel and,doCuments remained in BERLIN and POTSDAM, .
under Ministerialdirektor WEVER. Ministerialrat VOGELS was last in OBERLA/NDERN,
hear MUNICH. In addition, there were three officiale in BADTOELZI,MOLTER,
and HORN. '?
E. -DEPARTMENT V ?
Most of the personnel and, documents remained in BERLIN, under Ministerial-
direktor Dr BERGER, although this man may now be in HAMBURG. It is believed that
one official, Dr BREYNAN, went to BAD-TOELZ. Some officials and documents were in
QUERPDRTH, in the Harz, under Ministerialrat DAMPER. Ministerialrat SCHMIDT was
in GARMISCH, but was taken into custody by CIO on 4 may, 45.
P, DEPARTMENT VI
This department is divided into four sections as follows:
VI-A Documents and personnel were last in BODENBACH, in the Sudetengau, under
Ministerialdirigent Dr BROHTZ, who is either in BODENBACH or in WALDSASSEN,
in the Oberpfalz'.
VI-B Last located in ILMENAU, Thuringia, under Ministerialrat ROSENBAUER.
Some personnel and records were in MALLERSDORF, Lower Bavaria, under Minis-
terialdirigent VON DIETZ. '
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V1-0 /n ILMENAD, under Ministerialrat ENGELBRECHT.
VI-D Partly in /LMENAU, under Ministerialrat.ENGELBRECHT, and partly in
MALLERSDORF, under Regierungsdirektor WUNSCHEL.
G. DEPARTMENT VII
This department remained in BERLIN, under Ministerialdirektor Dr RECK. Address:
BERLIN/CHARLOTTENBURG, BISMARCKSTRASSE 48-52.
H. DEPARTMENT VIII
This department was formerly the Prussian Finance Ministry. It remained in
BERLIN, under Ministerialdirektor Dr SCHECHE. Some of the personnel and records
were sent to NEU-RUPIN, Brandenburg.
I. CHIEF REGIONAL FINANCE OFFICES
These departments were directly under the control of Under Secretary REINHARDT,
who states that there are eractically no records left, most of them having been
destroyed in the last few years, and that it will be necessary to start from
scratch. He states that he would be able to reorganize and reestablish these
departments.
DEPARTMENT FOR TRAINING AND EXAMINING
This function was carried out by Under Secretary REINHARDT, who states that
there will be no difficulty in reestablishing it.
K. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS POLICE
This function was transferred to the Ss Police under HIMMLER.
L. MAIN OFFICE FOR GENERAL FINAN:)E AND CREDIT QUESTIONS
This office remained in BERLIN in the REICHSBANK, under Ministerialdirigent
BAYERHOFFER. His office was in the OBERFINANZPRAESIDIUM on the KURFURSTENDAMM.
SOME) of the officials and documents were sent to BAD-TOELZ, under Ministerialrat
BUSSMAN.
M. STATISTICAL OFFICE
Records were last in ARNSTADT, Thuringia. The head of the office, Ministerial-
dirigent FIEDLER, was last in GARMISOH.
N. OFFICE OF MAIN TRUSTEE FOR CONFISCATED PROPERTY - EAST
This office no longer exists as such. Its functions were taken over by Depart-
ment VII/ (Par F; above).
O. OFFICES IN THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF THE MINISTRY
These offices were, for the most part, still in BERLIN, with the exception of
the Direction of the Austrian Salt Mines, which was last in VIENNA, and the Sup-
reme Financial Court, which was last in MUN/CH/BOGENHAUSEN, MONTGELASSTRASSE. The
Directorate of REICH Building was last located in BERLIN, at KURFURSTENDAMM 193.
The REICH Debt Administration,. under Dr FISCHBACH was completely burned out. Dr
FISCHBACH's home is in BERLIN/DAHLEM.
P. RE/CHSHAUPTKASSE (TREASURY)
The Treasury was still located in BERLIN on 13 April 45, in the REIM-MBANK
Building on the JAEGERSTRASSE. Plans had been made to.evacuate'a portion of it to
Southern Germany, but they had not yet been carried out.
24 May 1945 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
,2
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGLTION CENTER :Init:
APO 758 US AMY :Date: 24 May 1945
HOFER, THE EXPONENT OF PEACE
?
1. SOURCE'
HOPER,Fran, OGRUF (Lt Gen) NSKK, GAULEITER and REICHSSTATTHALTER of
Tyrol - liortnEsibets. HOFER's career is a typical example of Success under
the Nazi,Regime He rose from modest beginnings to heights of power attain..
able only in .a totalitarian state. Clearly seeing where his advantages lay
he joined the Austrian branch of the Nazi Party in 1931, and when the organ.
izitIOn waS-ouflaWed, sought refuge in Germany, where he joined in plotting-
the future ANSCHLUSS Having been placed in charge of elections for Aus-
trians residing in Germany, his Wor': may be considered one of the contribu-
ting factors of the Nazi "success" in 1938. He Was rewarded with the
appointment as GAULEITER of Tyrol.
Rating: C-3 Date of Information; See Text Interrogator: E.H.
2. ADMINISTRATION OF ITALIAN TYROL
HOFER held the office of REICHSSTATTHALTER (Gbvernor) of Tyrol - Vorarl.!,
berg (Italian Tyrol) since Sep 41. After MUSSOLINI's fall he was the head,
of a stringent military government and had absolute authority in this area.
The only duties left to the DUCE were to collect taxes, pay his officials,
and contribute 10,000,000,000 LIRE to the German war effort monthly. ApproX-
imately 40,000,000 LIRE of this sum was appropriated by HOFER, suPposedly
for the purpose of road improvement, billetting of troops, construction of
air raid shelter, payments of bomb damages, etc.
Source claims that Se suppressed both the Nazi and Fascist parties in
BOZEN and TRIENT under the pretext that this was foreign territory. He
installed DE BERTOLINI, an 80-year-old anti-fascist lawyer, who had pre-
viously arrested MUSSOLINI, as prefect of TRIENT
3, HOFER'S EFFORTS FOR EARLY SURRENDER
HOFER got in touch with SS OGRUF (SS Lt Gen) WOLF, Chief of the SS and
Police in Italy, who had had talks in early March with a certain Mr.. DULLES
who claimed to be a representative of President Roosevelt, in Switzerland.
The purpose of these talks was to arrange for the withdrawal of German
troops to a predetermined line in front of the Alps, and cessation of hos--
tilities until the defeat of the Nazis in BERLIN.
In March and April HOFER visited the FUEHRERHAUPTQUARTIER (Supreme Head-
quarters of the FUEHRER) where, according to his claims, he advocated the
retreat in Northern Italy during an interview with Genls JODL, BORMANN,
and WINTERDEER (?). Upon his return from HITLER's Headquarters, HOFER con-
tacted GENOBSTMSan)WITTINGHOF, Commander of Army Group "C", the German
ambassador to Italy RAHN, and JOLF, and told them Of the curt rebuff and
harsh treatment he received from HITLER. The General was noncommittal.
Later he contacted OGRUF (SS Lt Gen) KALTENBRUNNER, Chief of the SICHER-
HEITSPOLIZEI (Security Police) for the SOUTH German area, a direct repre-
sentative of HITLER and successor to HEYDRICH, for the purpose of reaching
a definite line of action to avoid further bloodshed and destruction in. his
(HOFER's) area. No impression was made in this quarter.
On 24 Apr the STEIRMARK, OBERDONAU, KAERNTEN,and SALZBURG regions were:
added to HOFER's jurisdiction. On 26 Apr he had a conference with Field:
Marshall KESSELRING and GENOBST (Col Gen) WITTINGHOF, and claimed that he
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implored them to and ,a hopeless fight. KESSELRING declined to accept his
appeal and a few days later sent him a message ordering him to keep his nose
out of military affairs.
As'a result Of talks with an American officer who Came to discuss surr-
ender terms, HOFER ordered the removal of the numerous AA guns surrounding
INNSBRUCK, and that all the bridges, in INNSBRUCK and vic be left intact.
I. THE FUEHRER MISINFORMED
According to HOFER, HITLER was completely misinformed on production fig-
ures. HITLER received his miSinformation frOm a Certain HERR SAUER; pro-
duction expert from Dr SPEER's office. ,Although all figures were prac-
tically bare-faced lies, HITLER claimed SAUER to be his best source of in-
formation and trusted him completely. HOFER cited the following examples:
HITLER was convinced' that he received 2500 cars monthly from Italian
factoriaP, while actually only 500 were produced. In one of SAUERs
reports for a certain period ending 1 Dec 44, he stated thata certain,
factory in FOICCHI, Italy was producing 4,000,000 rounds of. machine,pis-
tol ammunition. However, this factory had not been completed by that.
date, and did not begin production until 20 Feb 45. Another instance
cited by HOFER was a report issued by SAUER in which production. of 81 mm
mortars in a factory in VIPITENO, Italy was claimed to be 8000 per 'month.
During a conversation with HITLER, HOFER was told that this plant prp-
duced at least 1000 mortars per month. The truth, however, was that the
factory had just been completed, and production had not started. The
Monthly quota was set at 200 mortars.
5. WEHRWOLF
'HObIlt claims that he refused to organize a aHRWOEF in his district, but
despite his opposition that it was organized through other Channel's. .Hw-
ever, in order'to keep "order" and to "avoid unnecessary trouble which could
only lead to disaster for the people" he appointed a certain TOEFPER, man-
ager of a factory in INNSBRUCK as liaison man between him and the WEHRWOLF
organization. Source claims he does not know.the name of the leader but
that TOEPPER has all the needed information to disrupt this organization.
He claims, however, that he knows the No 2 man (but not by name) and offers
his services to assist the Allies in rounding up the gang and locating their
stores of weapons.
6. ART TREASURES
a) Czech or Hungarian State Property: Source claims that these objects
were stored in a railway car neat LANDECK, and were supposed to move in
the direction of Switzerland.
b) Italian Gold Treasure: Cached in a bunker in the castle FESTE FRAN.MS-
.FESTEI.vic VIPITENO and BRESSANONE
c) Property of Florentine Art Galleries: Stored with. the knowledge of
the Italian government in the ST LEONHARD courthouSe. Source claims that
persons who may have more information on the subject are Dr RINGLER, who
can be reached through the LANDESMUSEUM, INNSBRUCK and GRAF (Count) TRAPP
INNSBRUCK.
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7. FACTORIES
BOZEN:
SINNICH:
VIPITENO:
KIRCHBICHL (vic
WOERGL-KUPSTEIN):
8. PERSONALITIES
GAULEITER HABICHT:
WEISSENBORN
Dr BILGERI
SS OGRUF (SS Lt
Gen) GREIFELD
Underground munitions factory, was to have started
production 10 May with a monthly capacity of 20,000,
000 rounds.
Underground ball-bearing factory.
Steal and Aluminum factory.
Truck factory With monthly capacity of 250 trucks
per month.
Saltpeter and nitrogen plants.
A completed factory for mortars; had neVer started
production timated capacity, 200 per month.
A 40,000 sq m light machine gun factory, located in
a lignite mine. It is also equipped to build aircraft
engines.
SS OGRUF PRUETZMANN:
SS OGRUF GLUECKS
sa OGRUF POHL
24 May 1945
First leader of Austrian Nazis in exile in Germany; ?
killed on Russian front.
Chief of weapons section in production office headed
by SAUER. Last seen in Tyrol, supposed to be hiding
in a tunnel in vie REITH.
Former president of INNSBRUCK Chamber of Commerce;
later GAUWIRTSCHAFTSBERATER (District Economic Ad?
visor). Expert on food, public utilities. Lives
in BRIXLEGG, Austria.
Chief of REICHSKOMMISSARIAT (REICH Commission) for
the security of the German people (DEUTCHES VOLK-
STUM); in charge of repatriation and relocation.
WEHRWOLF leader for Germany, second to HIMMLER.
Inspector General of Concentration Camps.
In charge of finances and business exploitation of
Concentration Camps.
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
PAUL K DALAI
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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:Auth: CG, 7th Army:
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:Init:
APO 758 US ARM!: Date: 24 May 1945 :
? ?
HITLER'S LAST SESSION IN THE REICHSOHANCELLORY, 24 FEL 112
Note: No authentic reports of this session have been published in the
Press or announced over the Radio. Reports Which-have been
released did not contain the true facts.
SOURCES
i) WAHL, Karl, GAULEITER oflAUGSBURG ) Both these men were present at
ii) AMANN, Mix,,Nazi Party member No 3.) the, meeting described below.
Rating: c,3 ,Date of. Information: 24 Feb 45 Interrogator; W.K.
The meeting was called on very short notice. It was to take place
at 1300 hrst. and the leaders were told to come by Oar and to return the
Same day.' There were some 60 or 70 people, all told, REICHSLEITERS,
GAULEITERSt-SA and SS leaders, but no generals or leaders of the, WAFFEN
SS. The members were lined up on three sides of A large and still un-
damaged room of the REICHS'Chancellbry. In a few:Minutes HITLER entered,
followed by BORMANN. Both Men shook hands with all present, and there-
after HITLER Spoke briefly to REICHS Labor Leader HIERL. He spoke in a
low voice, and only. parts of the conversation could be understood, but at
the,end HITLER presented HIERL with a case containing the 'highest German
'decoration The reception was followed by a simple luncheen, consisting
of stew and real coffee. HITLER left the room at 1530, and an hour and
one-half later the leaders reassembled to hear his speech.
When he returned to make his speech, HITLER sat at a small table, on
which were his notes and a glass of water. Everyone noticed his stooped
position and the fact that his left hand - not the, right one which was
wounded on 20 July was shaking so badly that at times his entire body
was trembling. It seemed to be causing the FUHRER great discomfort.
At first his voite was low, but it gained strength and later reached its
customary climax. No change in his voice was noticeable.
HITLER'S speech lasted approximately one hour and one-half. For the
first time the impression upon -is-listeners was not convincing. HITLER
seemed to be struggling to convey a feeling of inner hope to the assem-.,
bled Party leaders, but the sensational news which all anticipated was
not fortheoming. The substance of his address follows:
He stated that the RusSian onslaught was of paramount concern to
the people, because it was accompanied by serious misdeeds against
them. . However, it was expected that the attack could be stopped.
A large-scale counter-attack was planned, but hod been delayed
chiefly because of great losses of heavy weapons. HITLER praised
the brave deeds of certain generals, and expressed the wish that
others were also "carved of the same wood". Many lacked the abil
ity to improvise, which was a necessity. He singled out as es-
pecially brave Gen HUE, who had been killed.
In the.main message of his speech, however, he called upon them not
to become faint-hearted but to develop supreme strength, and then
the war could still be won. The leaders would have to guide the
people personally, and bring out a "Teutonic Fury" in them. He
declared that this was the time to find out the true quality of the
German people, Should the German people give up, then it would be
demonstrated that they had no moral worth, and in that case they
would deserVe destruction. That would be the rightful judgement
of history and Providence.
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Concerning military affairs he brought out four points:
i) Germany must remain on the defensive in the WEST. (HITLER had
great faith in the Westwall and the RHINE).
ii) In the EA8T a powerful counter-offensive would be prepared.
(He did not indicate the sector).
iii) The new U-boats were outstanding; they represented a rev.4
olution in the technical field. DOENITZ was a phenomenally
outstanding leader.
iv) The new MESSERSCHMITT fighter plane, LE-262, was without equal
anywhere in the world. It could not be damaged in combat, the
only losses occurred as a result of accidents in take-offs or
landings, and these were insignificant. Production was on a tre-
mendous scale, and the results would soon be noticeable in the
air. HITLER then spoke ( = the mistakes of the German Air Force,
declaring that the greatest fault had been the choosing of the
wrong models.
Towards the end of his address HITLER spoke of politicalevents. He
stated that England would hold out to the end; she was firmly allied
to Russia and would not give in. On the other hand, he predicted
that, if Germany held firm during the crisis, a day would come when
serious conflicts would arise between Russia and the US.
Concluding his speech, HITLER thanked the assembled leaders for thet
cooperation and loyalty, and then spoke a few words concerning his
health. This he had never done before, so it was especially note-
worthy and had a depressing effect upon his listeners. He said that
Frederick the Great had returned from the wars an ill and broken
man. Now he, himself, felt the burdens of War, which had become
evident in symptoms of ill health. Previously, owing to great worry
he had suffered from a trembling leg. Now, however, the infirmity
was in his lett arm. He hoped it would not move to his head, for a
shaky head would be unpleasant. But even if that occurred he could
only say, "MY heart will never quake; that remains ice-cold". He
went on to say that after the attempt of 20 July the doctor read his
pulse and found that it had remained at its customary 72 beats. He
also mentioned trouble with his vocal chords and admitted that he
had undergone an operation not long before.
In closing he stated that he would in the future be forced to take
some harsh measures. The leaders should not misjudge him if he
should take steps which they did not understand,
When HITLER had finished, BORLANN spoke a few words about loyalty and
courage and readiness to follow HITTER unto death. Before leaving,
HITLER conversed briefly with a Zew people - Dr GOEJBELS, Dr LEY, GAUm
LEITER HIRTZ, and BACKE. Then he said he must leave, as others were
already awaiting him in another room.
24 May 1945
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
K(Atitic,/
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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Ref No SAIC/.16
23 May 4,
GOERING DISCUSSES HITLER, ROMMEL, SCIENCE, AND - GOERING
2511A
1. PREAMBLE
The cause for which GOERING stood is lost - but the canny Hermann, even now,
thinks only of what he can do to salvage some of his personal fortune, and to
create an advantageous position for himself. He condemns the once beloved'
FUEHRER without hesitation. Up to now he has not made a plea .1'1 favor of any of
his former henchmen, alive or dead. Yet, behind his spirited and often witty
conversation, is a constant watchfulness for the opportunity to place himself in
a favorable light.
Rating: 0-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K.
2. THE FUEHRER
a) HITLER AS STRATEGIST
According to source, HITLER concerned himself almost exclusively with military
operations from the beginning of the war up to the end. At times he made decisions
down to division operations. The FUEHRER believed that fate had selected himto
be the military leader of Germany - a belief which was strengthened by the success
of his operations in France. Here HITLER decided to break through at SEDAN and
drive for ABBEVILLE. against the advice of the OKH, where it was believed that the
attack was possible only from the right flank. When operations atarted the OKH
openly expressed doubt of the suecess of the plan. Then, When the attack went
off better than expected, and resulted in a complete victory, HITLER. became very
proud of his military abilities?as did the generals themselves. -
PW went on to describe the situation meetings at the FUEBREWs hq. HITLER
was always present at these meetings, which took up 6 to 7 hours of his day. The
following officers usually attended these meetings:
KEITEL, GEFFELDMARSCHALL (Fld Marshal)
WINTER, GENLT (Maj Gen) OKW
BUHLE, GEN d? INF (Lt Gon) OKH
. ZANDER, STAF (SS Col) Party Chancellory
BURGDORF, GEN d. INF (Lt Gen) )
VON PUTTKAMMER, Admiral
VON BELOW, OBST (Col) FUElgtER's Adjutants .
HAENSCHE, STUBAF (SS Maj)
KERSTEN, HPTSTUF (SS Capt)
FEGELEIN, GRUF (Maj Gen) Liaison Off to HIMMLER
VOSS, Admiral II " " DOENITZ
SCHERFF, GENMAJ (Brig Gen) War diary writer'
JODL, GENOBST (Col Gen), or his Reported on the
representative situation in tha
WEST ?
GUDERIAN, GENOBST (Col Gen) Chief-of'Staff of the Army;
reported on the situation in
the EAST?
JUNGE, KAP z. SEE' (Navy Capt) Reported on the naval
situatiot .
BUMS, MAJ Reported on the air -situation
GOERING himself and GROSSADMIRAL (Crand Admiral)DOENITZ were frequently
present at these meetings..
At the meetings, maps wore spread out.on a huge table.- The officers waited
near the entrance for the -appearance of HITLER. When the FUEHRER,arrived he
shook handswith all present and then lead the group into the room.
The officers then gave their talks on the situation. During these speeches
HITLER frequently interrupted and gave his views in energetic tones. Opinions in
opposition to his own wore- soft-pedaled and never reached -a point of serious
discussion.
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During poriods when the ?situation was unfavorable, HITLER took it out on tho
different branches of tho armed forcos and blamed their heads for all mistakes.
Source was singled out quito often, and had to take robukos in front of all tho
officers present. This load to the point whore the officers bog= to lose thoir
respect for GOERING'a military ability.
At tho mootings HITLER always presented tho latest dispatohos of the foreign
press, which ho than discussed in his well-known mannor.
During tho last few months tho situation meetings wore hold in the Winter
Garden of the Chancellory and then to the very last in HITLER's bunker undornoath
tho Chancellory. This bunker had a dimonsion of on1y5x3 in. Alltho officers
had to Crowd into this all spaco and many of them faintod daring the meetings.
Tho night meeting which usually started between 2400 and 0100 hours was not
attondod by?all the officors, but HITLER was always present. After thO mooting
HITLER's famous tea would take place. Horo a nall circle of trusted frionds
would?makedecisions of primo political importanco. Hero, too, BORMANN used his
strong influonco to overrule HITLER, who was usually tired after tho previous
mooting. GOERING maintains that all things not directly connected with tho
conduct of tho war bocmno tho responsibility of BORMANN.
The FUEHRER's tea guests Usually included the following persons:
BORMANN,
FEGELEIN, GRUF (SS Maj Gon),
BURGDORF, GEN d. INF (Lt Gon),
All or some of tho adjutants, arid
Mrs JUNGE
Mrs SCHROEDER
Mrs CHRISTIAN
b) HITLER'S PLANS FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONV2ZTI0N
i) Prisoners of War
PW claims that it was HITLER'S intention to donounco tho GENEVA
Convontion if the war would have lasted another throe months. All Allied PW
except the so valuable to tho Gorman war economy wore to be oxterminatod.
According to source, this plan bocamo known to tho generals and tho
Nazi Party loadors, all of wham took a stand squarely against it, with the
oxcoption of GOEBBELS.
It was pointed out to HITLER that German PU in Allied hands would havo
to expect the samo fate. To this tho FUEHRER replied that those millions of
Germans wore of no more use to tho war effort aayway, but that after his
proposed action there would be no more deserters from tho Gorman Army. Tho
Gorman people, said ho, would then fight to tho last man.
ii) Chomical Warfaro
_c
PW states that HITLER was restrained from the USO of CU during tho
last period of tho war only by his fear of Allied retaliation. He often
admitted that he had missed the chanco to use OW at the right time (i.e.,
during the oarlior stages of tho war). .At that time ho had believed Gorman
victory certain with tho uso of normal weapons.
c) HITLER'S DEATH
Whon tho situation in BERLIN had dotorioratod beyond hope, HITLER allowed
his personal physician, Dr MORELL, to escape to tho SOUTH of Germany. MORELL had
boon administoring c. very largo daily doso of hormones to tho FUEHRER- Source
boliovos that it was the sudden absence of thoso hormones which caused HITLER's
general breakdown and subsequent death.
Following 20 July 44 tho FUEHRER's health had boon declining. His right log
and arm trembled spasmodioally, and the enallost contradiction irritatod him to a
high degree. Only BORI/UX GOEBBELS and FEGELEIN still had any influonoe op him.
PW says tho atmosphere of HITLER's shelter was horrible. His socrotary and his
mistress could stand it only by being drunk all day long.
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3. ROMMEL'S DEATH
PW claims that ROMMEL had plotted against HITLER in the 20 July Putsch. On
tho following day tho FUEHRER sent a high 85 officer to ROMMEL with the order
either to accept arrost and trial or, as a special privilogo bocauso of his
meritorious service, to shoot himself with tho pistol which was handed to him
at the sano time. Ho was allowod five minutos in which to make up his mind.
ROMMEL choso the second alternative.
4. GOERING ON SCIENCE JND INDUSTRY
-
a) ATOM SMASHING
PW claims that Gorman sciontists have made tromondoUs prOgress in gnashing tho
atom. Ho boliovcs that this will bo the rovolutionary Sourco of onergy-in the
future.
Although ho was chairman of the Gorman Sciontists' Loaguo, source does not
havo an approciablo amount of knowlodgo of the field.
Basing his statement on a booklet ho onco saw dealing with the subjoct, PW
claims that Amorican research in tho field of tho atom is far below that of other
nations.
b) NEW GERMAN U-BOAT
Source is very proud of tho success which he claims for a now Gorman turbino-
driven sUbmarino which "doos not need to surfaco for air". Only a few of thoso
subs wore ready in spring 45; In largo numbers they would bavo inflicted serious
damage on Allied shipPing. Their undof-wator speed is claimed to be almost as
high as the speed of tho fastest surface vassals.
5. GOTRINGS ECONOMIC STATUS
h) REGULAR INCOME
In tho light of one of tho Party's foremost early aims - namely, that no one
earn more than RM 1,000 per month - GOERING's economic status is grotosquo.
In answer to questions concerning the source of his income, PW replied that
ho received "very docent" wages as President of tho Prussian Ministry, and that
"largo checks" woro pincod at his "disposal" (ZUR VERFUEGUNG) by the mombor firms
of tho Supervisory Council of Manufacturers (AUFSICHTSRAT VON FABRIKUNTERNEHMUNGEN),
although ho did not rocoivo a regular salary as head of this agency.. Ho would not
make any prociso statements as to the total of his income; which would bo difficult
to establish, his resources being in the hands of a number of different .banking-
institutions.
Examination of a bankbook, however, revealed tho following information:
Income as Minister of Aviation approx RM 3500 per mo
ft P member of "REICHSTAG" 1700 " "
Special oxponso account .from REICHS Ohanoollory 20000 "
Adding to this his estimated salary of RM 25,000 per month as President of tho
Prussian Ministry, his total monthly income from tho above sources was over
RM 600,000 per yoar.
In addition, there wore regular chocks from tho EH ER Party Publishing House
amounting to RM 120,000 por year, for his writings on tho Four-Year-Plan. Allowing
for salaries accruing from othor public positions, a yearly income of RM 1,000,000
may be considered a fair estimate.
b) ADDITIONAL INCOME
Tho abovommontionod bankbook also shows occasional chocks and 'credits from
large firms - for example, semi-yearly amounts of RM 300,000, RM 250,000, etc.
from tho RETS MA Firm (Cigarettes), HAMBURG.. (Note: Minister of Finance FUNK
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oxnlaina thee? amounts, stating that REENTEMA, was involved in a trial for ovasion
of taxes amounting to several millions, from which it was able to extricate
it solf with, GOERING' s aid.)
As chief of the Four-Year-Plan, sourco was able to have any Oinount of money
put at his disposal, more or loss "voluntarily" Thus it may be said that for
all practical purposes, money waa not a matter of concern in PW' s life.
Questioned about a possible fortune in foreign countrios, source replied,
"T can await any revelations of your agents concerning my 'foroign fortunosl
with an untroubled mind."
(Note: It was possiblo, however, to learn from REICHSHINISTat FUNK that
GOERI.11-6 had probably smuggled money abroad through MEDEL, a partner in the WITZIG
banking concern. MEDEL, a native of Germany and rt naturalizod Dutchman, married
to a Swiss woman, worked for GOING in some sort of illogitimato doald in foroigr
currency. About three to four months ago ho flow to Spain, probably with a large
share of GOERING' s fortune, which was in all likelihood to be deposited in ,
Portugal or South America?
It may be noted that GOING asked the interrogating officer ropoatodly
whether living conditions wore bettor in Argontina, or in Ohilo?
Dr FUNK explained that GOERING, ^s director, of tho Four-Year Plan, could
disppeo of foreign currencies indopontly, and that ho usod thom,unhositatingly
for his own purposes, such as the purchaso of art treasures.)
c) PRIVATE FORTUNE
PW' 8 fortune consists mainly in objects of.!,,rt, which ho robbed from foreign
countries, bought, or accepted as "voluntary" gifts. ,Sordo Of this fortune cams,
from towns such as NUREMBMG, which prosontod 'him with objocts of art - jeweled
daggers, swords, boxos wrought of gold, and the like - at ovary possible
occasion ? Other works of art cemo from foreign nations, statosmon, industrialist;
craftemon, musoumo, and from the FUEHRM . They combined to form a collection
worth many millions, which, judging by his motion in discussing it, ho wanted
to build up into the largest treasure in the world, somothing like the two
fabulous hoards of German folklore, the NIEBELUNGENSCHATZ or the WELFENSOHATZ ?
6. VANITY OUTRAGED,.
P11 complained about his troatmont as a prisoner, saying that it is usual for
a marshal to have a tiouso of his own to live in. Considering his position as a
Nazi, however, ho thought ho would have to be satisfiod to live in the some
manner as the other officer PW.
He says ho asked the 4^poribans for safe conduct when ho gavo.himsolf up,
and now bo finds himself a prisoner of war. He is worried about his private
possessions. Judging by the way the Allies have boon dealing with thorn, ho says,
ho foars that one day "they will take tho pants off me" ?
23 May 45
PAUL KUBALA,
Commanding
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:Init: :
APO 758 US ARMY:Date: 24 May 1945
........ ......
OBSERVATIONS ON ARMOR EMPLOYMENT
(This Report is in answer to Questionnaire, Hq Seventh Army,
Office of the Armored Officer-, dated 18 May 1945)
SOURCES
i) GUDERIAN, Heinz, GENOBST (Col Gen), Officers Repl Pool, OKH, former-
ly C of S, German Ground Forces, and Inspector Of Am-bred Units.
Apparently wantingtO appear anti-Nazi, the General answered all ques-
tions freely; .he stated emphatically, however, that he did so only
because HITTRR's death freed him from his oath of allegiance.
Rating: B-2 Interrogator: RW.
-ii) VON GEYR, Leo, GEN D PZTR (IA Gen), Inspector of Armored Units.
Proud of his profession, of the old Prussian general type, source gave
information grudgingly; his personal pride borders upon the ridiculous.
Having been Military Attach 'e in LONDON for several years, source claims
to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs, ,
Rating: B-2 Interrogator: R.W.
iii) DIETRICH, "SEPP", OBSTGRUF o2,61 Gen of..WAFFEN SS), CG 6 SS Pz,Army.
Impressed by his own position and deeds, blaming everybody for lack
of courage, the notorious SS General appeared to criticize Allied
equipment and tactics because he thought it was "expected of him" rather
than as a result of actual experiences. He emphasized his 35-year-long
Army affiliations.
Rating: 0-3 ' Interrogator: R.W.
iv) HAUSSER, Paul, OSSTGRUF (Col Gen of WAFFEN SS), ex-CG, Army Group
"G". Source is a ?Tim believer in HITLER's theories, and attempted to
justify most of the FUEHRER's deeds, but.he talked freely on military
matters. Formerly a Prussian general in the Army, source stressed the
fact that he was primarily a military leader and not a politician.
Rating: B-2 Interrogator: R.W.
ANSWERS TO SPECIAL QUESTIONNAIRE
1, What do you think of the offensive fire power of the American tank and
tank destroyers?
While,Gen GUDERIAN and Gen Von GEYR felt that they were not sufficiently
experienced to answer the question, the former because he did not command
troops opposing American armor, the latter. due to the limited employment
of armor during the part of the Normandy campaign when he was in command,
the two SS generals praised American tanks and tank employment. "SEPP"
DIETRICH stated that in his opinion,the SHERMAN engine was ver good, but
that a larger cal gun could be mouated on the SHERMAN tank. The new
American heavy tank, he said, was even more satisfactory and could be
favorably compared with the best German tank, the Royal Tiger. Gen HAUSSER
called the fire-power of American tanks "immensely strong".
11)
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2. In general, what is our greatest weakness in armor and armored tac-
tics? ,
Gen GUDERIAN is of the opinion that the tracks on our tanks are too
narrow, causing them to get stuck when operating in snow or mud. Thus
the American tanks are "Good We.. Tanka" (SCHoNWETTERTANK). Gen von
GYP thinks American armored tactics 'were good, given American air
superiority; when difficulties were encountered, air support was called
for and the matter taken care of. If called to fight an enemy with
equal or stronger air power, however., American tank tactics would have
tp be more daring to be successful. Attacks were not carried through to
the last. Flexibility of leadership (WENDIGKEIT DER F,OHRUNG) was some-
times lacking when large tank concentrations were employed. Gen
DIETRICH' points out errors in armor employment, -notably the fact that
armor was not always employed in sufficient Masses. This, he says, is
a tactical error which results in lack of offensive power. In the case
of large armor concentrations, the Germans were always. aware of them due
to lack of proper security. Gen HAUSSER thought that a lower-echelon
commander' would be better acquainted with these problems. He stated,
however, that the idea of tank concentrations ihstead of individual tank
employment was correctly recognized by the. Americans and carried out in
the best POssible way. The tendency to avoid frontal attacks has proven
successful.
3. What are your views on effectively combatting infantry A/T measures
in the, use of the PANZERFAUST?
Gen GUDERIAN.thinks the PANZERFAUST an excellent weapon, easy to
transport-, cheap and easy to manufacture on a mass production basis,
and easy to handle in a fpxhole. Its disadvantages, as seen by Gen
GUDERIAN, are Its short range and the jet flame..
Both DIETRICH and HAUSSER think that although invented as a result
of the. A/T gun shortage, the PANZERFAUST has proven itself to a.point
where it can no longer be regar..Thd as a pure "emergency weapon". As
Gen DIETRICH puts it, even if he could 'obtain as many A/T 'guns as he
wanted, he would not like to omit the PANZERFAUST'in organizing A/T
defenses.
Gen von GEYR regards the PANZERFAUST as an emergency weapon par
excellence. His answer, in full:'"Faute de mieux, on se coucha avec
sg femme..." ?
4, Have you found that the bridging problems for Pz Kw V and Pz Kw 'VI
greatly limit their tactical mobility?
All sources answer this question in the affirmative, but all point
out at the same time that, in general, the root of the problem lies in
the specific types of German bridging equipment, and in supply difficult-
ies. In this connection Gen von GEYR states flatly that, with the
technical quality of American equipment, no difficulties whatsoever
should be encountered, Gen GUDERIAN and Gen HAUSER point to supply
problems as the main difficulty. Gen-DIETRICH thinks the K-type bridginE
equipment insufficient, but the I-bridges very good, except in the case
of large rivers, like the RHINEi
5, To what do you attribute German tank losses, by percentages? Air, A/T,
Arty and mechanical? Which was most feared by. tank crews?
2
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Gen GUDERIAN: 60-.70% through ,mechanical failures (Eastern front); 15%
A/T; 5% Arty; 5% mines; 5% othera. (Note: figures are
only a very rough approximation; source was very hes-
itant about answering thi6 question)
Gen von GEYR: Source could not give kny approximate figures. He
thinks air-tank cooperation the most deadly combination.
Air attacks are very effective and most feared by tank
crews.
Gen DIETRICH: 30% methanical failures;' 10% air; 15% A/T; 45% tanks and"
PDs. Losses due to arty are negligible. Most feared
by crews: Allied tanks and TDe.
,Gen HAUSSER: During long movements to the zone of action, 20-30% of,
all tanks en route fall out due to mechanical failures.
Considering the remainder as 100%, 15% are lost.through
? mechanical failures; 20% through air attacks-; 50% '
through A/T defense; and 15% are knocked out by arty.
Tanks and IDs are feared most by German tank crews.
6. What'developments have been made in the use of Infra-Ray or similar
ray devices for night operations by tanks? Where can technical data
be found on the subject? Who were the manufacturers? What men de-
veloped this device?
? All sources agree that these uevelopments have not yet passed the
early experimental stages. Gen DIETRICH knows about experiments carried
out at the TRUPPENUBUNGSPLATZ (Training Area) PADERBORN; Gen GGDERIAN
thinks the GAF was developing similar devices, and heard about tests with
PKWs (passenger cars).
Gen GUDERIAN thinks the ENTtaCKLUNGSSTELLE DES LUFTFAHRTMINISTERIUMS
(Research Center of the Air Ministry) shotld know details; Gen DIETRICH
refers to the HEERESWAFFENALIT (Army Weapons Dept), BERLIN, as the place
where details might be found. 'Gen von GEYR is of the opinion that the
British lead in the field of Infra-Ray research, and mentions specific-
ally Prof LINDELANN, of OXFORD. He does not know any details'as to
German Infra-Ray developments, and also refers to the GAF for details. .
7. What de you think of American reconnaissande tactics?
Gen GUDERIAN thinks that AMerican tactics are generally the same as
those employed by German units. Advanced (VORGESCHOBENE) motorized
ton with air support is very effective, he statese Gen von GEYR thinks
that the organization of American ten units is superior to the German,
particularly in the number of vehioles, where the proportion is 15:1.
The most dangerous moment fortheopponent is mass rdn after a pene-
tration; he,pointe.oqt. Gen DIETRICH praises American air ten ("excell-
ent"); but'ithinks but ground tactics lack aggressiveness. Movements
have to be executed in shorter time, he thinks. Gen HPIISSER particularly
likes American cav groups; he thinks they are "very effective" because
they are used to close dangerous gaps in addition to their ten missions.
The German Army Leeks a similar unit; he points mit; and in units which
Could perform similarly to oUr cav groups, equipment is inferior.
8, What do you think of American r n equipment? What are its weaknesses?
With the exceptien of von GEYR, who claims no knowledge of the subject;
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all other sources describe the light roil-tank as "excellent". Gen
HAISSEP also'thinks the radio communication system and equipment is
efficient; Gen DIETRICH thinks the rcn car is not heavy enough. Gen
GUDERIAN enviously adMitsathat'Germari equipment is inferior.
9. Has much German technical data on armor been given to the Japanese?
All sources except Geri GUDERIAN had no knowledge of the subject. Gen
GUDERIAN thought that according to a statement by the FUEHRER, the.Jap-
anese automatically received information on all German new developments.
He could, however, furnish no details,
10. Do you know of any important developments in Japanese armor?
All sources claimed no knowledge of any such developments.
11. Approximately
Western front
how many tanks did Germany have operative on the
on I Mar 45?
Gen GUDERIAN: Rough estimate: 400-500. At the time of the beginning
of the invasion a total of,1,200 tanks were operative,
and losses could usually be .replaced in time, After
Jan 45, the transportation breakdown caused failure
of delivery to units. The most acute shortage was in
assault guns, and other SP guns.
Gen von GEYR: Rough estimate: 200-300,
Gen DIETRICH: 300 was the maximum,: aCcording to his estimate.
Gen HAUSSER : Army Group "G" had approx 100 tanks and assault guns
available. Estimate of the total, which he believes
probably incorrect:- 1,000.
12. What is the total number of each of the following types, Mk V, Mk VI
and JAGDTIGER w/128 mm?
Gen GUDERIAN was the only one
He did not know any total figures
he stated to be not more than 100
approx 300, On the average; Mk VI
100-120 per month; JAGDPANTHER, C
24 May 1945.
who could answer the question at all,
except in the case of JAGDTIGER, which
. The monthly production of Mk V was
were produced at the average rate of
mm: 50-70 on the average,
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
(2 X.?4A.A.LA..
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, LI,
Commanding.
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STV7,7TH :RMY IOTTEOGTION Olrz1f]R
APO 758 VS
0030002-7
4
s .6E0113 I
:Auth: OG, th IrmN:
:Dates 22 Aay 1945 :
HVIG POTTHAST, MIO7BrY3HAn MISTS3
SOUROt
Hedwig POTTHL:;T is an attractive woman in her early thirties, who might be
termed the prototype of the Nazi "DrISOM ?RAUH'. She gave the improssion of
being an unaseu:Ang woman rather than a forceful or palovlating type.
Ratings 0-) Date of Informations See Text Interroqator.
IZ. HISTCRY
Source was born '6 Feb 15124 iA OCI07,3,'the daughter of a Llerchant of middle
class family. She att3nded school in I 1, and later studied at the Zconomic
Inetitue for Interpreters in 1/077HTI.g, earnin7, her degreo in 1953. ?rom, 55-34
she worked as. a clerk in a govt office in 003117Z. ,
In the autumn of )5 she applied for transfer to a post'whoro she could
utilizo her knowlodso of taglishi and she was subsocivaltly 4von a position in
the.nwepapor net of the --2STAPC Office in B3RLIF. Howev:ir, she still had no
-opportunity to ;:tate, use of her lng/ish, she as'.oae for a transfer or for
permission to. resign. She was not permitted to loavo the G1STAPO 6orvico, but
was givon a. now position as private soorotary to Hoinrioh a post which
sho::ocoUpiod from 'Jan 36 until tho'boginning of 41.
Source statos that sho supervised 922,1111's "PRIVA2 (Private
Chancellory) -aAd that. her work was in no way concerned with his 56 activities.
III. AFFAlaHITR F;L:ILI.TR
1n to OOV1'90 of so,.i.rooln work with. HLII,DA an attacl:mont developed which
ovontually 13d to a serious love affair. Sourco loft her job in 1941 to load
the lifo.of a loyal, dovoted mistress, and she bore two ohildron to HL.IILIR. iri
the years which followod. The alliance was not legalized by marriago only
boCauso HI:yZalIa felt that a divoroo miht result in his wife's death, as the
latter had boon very ill ever sinco the birth of hor on17 child. In the autumn
of 42 source moved to 8ZROH.Tr.A.ZZ:,?whoro she ro.lained until just before the
Allied occupation...
- Iv. 2TaIg7k )CUTT8 ? .1-M MILL 32
4
?
Source states that the last time she saw Hii.:2.311 was during the week onding
22 Aaroh 45. At that time Mii.11,12 was confined to bed in a hospital at HOH3F-
LUTOHO near sufforiig from an attaok of srippo. :Inc visiting him
there souroo onoountorod Dr Folix rilli$TEX of LIIMS04,Ttio 6, 6TOOKHOL14, a zaaSage
spocialist who had b364 troating HILL 3:?, for yoars. Dr :2;a$TtN told her to call
upOn him if over she noodod any help. (A wire from source to Dr :::TRST.IN was
intorcopted by Allied authoritios, disclosing source's loetion and loading
to this interrogation).
Thiloelo lived in WIROHTZSGADIT, she used to receive daily tolophono calls
from unsaab., bi:?L presumes that the calls oamo from 3IY, but she is not
oortain. ,The last call from him MAIO on 19 April 45. 114 usual ha, discussed
only personal mattors over the phono, although ho montioned the fact that
tho situation was gotting moro difficult ever y day* Boforo oaying-goodbyo ho
promised to call again the following day, but source states that she never spoke
to him amain. A letter from him arrived the same day, howovor, dolivorod by
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SvOR
? ? .--
ono or. HrytzTals staff officers. It containod the usual personal messages, but
ended with another phrase about difficulties and tho hope that God would protect
her, the children, and Germany. The letter gave no hint as to 1-IL:MIA's plans,
and no directions for source. Source states positively that this was the last
word, direct or indirect, which she has received from hin.
Pravious to the interrogator's arrival, source had been shown a copy of
"Stars and Stripos?0 announcing 7.71L.LILM's capture. She apparently believed this
to be true, bepauso she Was obviously deeply concerned and shocked when it was
suggested that the story mi.2:ht not be true. She could offer no opinion at to
his whereabouts, but by a question revealed that sho thought he might be in
hiding samewhere, "trying to save somothing for Germany?. She does not believe
that ho has floe, to another country, and she clatas that he never gave any
indication of havin7 any plans in case of a Gorman collapse.
V ? HLIML!-3-.R S TA7 F
Source nontioned the followirm personalities on s privato staff:
STAF (SS Col) 3AUATZT ,:s.cted as private courier b etwo on HIlLiL
and source
?'3T5.F (SS Col) Dr 31-0:7DT
Lt Ool of Police SUCHAITTJC
.0S,2TJF (1st Lt) GT.TIGTaMq
VI,AFTT3ECIAT
When the Allied advance threatened 3IICHT.:35GADT.T, source a7:-.-;i3. with .her
children first to .A.OH-37S117,3, Tyrol, and su.bsequently to another address whore
this interrogation toolk. place
-After repeatedly. protesting that she had burned all her letters from HII?iML?L
- source finally admitted th-t "she had burned only a s-eall -portion of them, as
, she couldn't boar to destroy anythinz so precious her. A.ppropriate author-
ities have been notified regarding the disposition of thee e letters.
VII. HIi
Source Ste:loot that HI1--11131i nevr discussed politics or SS activities with
her, . and that she has boon completely uninformed on these matters . since leaving
her job. She considers an idealist with troMendous faith in Germany
and in, the
She believes that everything ho did was for the sake of e..,-many. Ho never
enriched himself ? -nd never kept valuable presents but gave them to the -SS. His
only property is his house in M.Y/TD/T.-.3GENSEE. which he bought on- a mortgago and
paid off over a period of years.
HI1111;7311 was-privately opposed to -a continuation of the war against the
.';Teste.rn Allies. Ho attributes the fact thatland and the US fought a :_'..ratny
to my a 7.37.3727.110131s ineptitude, and believes that ano - Foreign 1.:inister might
have avoided such a disaster.
22 May 1945 -IT TTH 17.75.2..;'C:3:.TION 0Ii'72.71.3a
PAU L ,
Maj , MI ?
Oommanding.
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19 may 1945
F
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 ? ?US Army
HERMANN QOPING,TALKING
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:Auth: CG th Arm :
anit:
aato: 19 May 1 5:
/. SOURCE
GOERING, Hermann, REICHSMARSOHALL. Sourco is by no moans the oomical figuro ho
has boon depicted so many times in newspaper reports. Ho is neither stupid or a fool
in the Shakospoarean sense, but gonorally cool and calculating. Ho is able to grasp
the fundamontel issues under discussion immodiotoly. Ho is certainly not amen to be
underrated. Although ho tried to soft-podal many of the most outrageous crimes Com-
mitted by Germany, ho said enough to show that ho is as much responsible for the
policios within Gormony and for tho war itaolf, as anyone in Germany. GOERING took
groat pride in claiming that it was ho who was responsible or tho planning and suc-
cossful execution of tho paratroop landing in Grote, that it was ho who had drawn up
tho plans for a capture of Gibraltar, a plan which was never carriod out bocauso
HITLER was opposed to it at tho last minute, that it was ho who was rosponsiblo for
tho development of the Luftwaffe. On tho other hand ho denied having had anything
to do with the racial laws and with tho coocontration camps, with the $S- and tho
atrocitios committod both in Germany and outsido. GO2RI:G is at all times an actor
who doos not disappoint his audionco. His vanity extends into the field of tho path-
ologiCal, as ip oxemplifiod by tho poarl-groy uniform, the heavy, solid gold opaulw
ottos and an enormous diamond ring on his right hand, oven though his medals wore
limited to two, including the Grand Croas of the Knight's Cross with Swords and
Diamonds. Just as muoh a pert of GOERING aro two of his aides, OBIT (Col) VON
BRAUCHITSOR, son of tho Fiold Marshal, end HPTM (Coot) KLAAS. GOERING was only too
ploanod to be able to discuss tho history of the past 12 years, and ho gavo all
information more than willingly to a group of interrogators.
II. !THE WA
Outbroak And The Polish Campaign
COMING claims that ho tried to prevent HITLER from launching the Polish campaign,
and when ho did, and Franco and Britain did not declare war immediately, ho attamptod
onco more to bring about a peaceful solution to the problom. From 1- 3 Sept 1939
tho Germ= forces wore advancing into Poland without a declaration of war. GOERING
ropoivod a massage through his personal courier in SWEDEN at noon on 3 Sept from
Viscount HALIFAX, in whioh the latter aakod him once more, end for the last time, to
halt the operations before it was too late. GOERING bogged HITLER to stop the Gor-
man forces and to make an offer to Britain and Franco to the offoot that they would
be willing to solve the problem peacefully, if they would be allowed to keep tho
territory already oocupiod in the first throe cloys of Soot. This would have meant
the elimination of tho Polish corridor--all this territory had been overrun in tho
first throo days?and would have given Germany an area, which for a long timo was
being jealously watched and vary much covotod by Gormany. GOERING fools that tho
offer might have boon acceptable to Britain and Franco, on the grounds that it would
have loft Poland a buffer state botwoon Germany and Russia. Howovor, before thoso
propoaals oould be aubmittod to Britain and France, the declaration of war arrived
from both those countrioa.
Tho Invasion Of Franco AO. Tho Lowlands
GOERING crodits HITLER for tho plan of the invasion of France and tho Lowlands.
Originally it was intended to invade France at a much oarlior date, somotimo during
the winter of 1939-40. HITLER askod GOERING to inform him as soon as a period of
fine weather Was in sight, so that tho Luftwaffe could be committed for at loast five
days in a row, a period which was considered suMciont to disorganizo the French
linos and to launch a powerful offensive, tho main effort of which was to come
around NAMUR. GOERING claimed that at that time ho was very much opposed to tho in-
vasion of France, and suggostod repeatedly that it be postponod until Spring. Ho
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was in constant fear all through the wintor that a poriod. of fino weather might pro-
cinitate the offonsivo against Francon
It was during tho winter of 1939-40 thata certain mishan occurred which almost
-resulted in GOERING-Is end, at least as a political figure, and might. have moant
Gormanyis end, if tho accident. would have boon exploited properly by the Alli. A
Gorman courier was given tho complete plans for tho invasion of France and tho Low-
Lands, which wore to be dolivorod at a Gonoral Staff ConfOronco at Cologno. .Tho
pilot, Recording to GOERING, got lost and landed in BELGIUM by mistako. The papers
wore promptly capturod, but everybody refused to believe that they wore anything
but a fake. When the courier discovonocL tho mistake and found that the piano had
landed, pot on the destined airfield ell the right bank of the RHINE, but in BELGIUM,
ho made an attempt to burn the papors, but ho succeeded only partially, and most
of thorn wore capturod either intact, or at loast, in such largo fragmonts, that tho
main gist of tho documents could not be mistaken When tho 'news broke of what had
happened, HITLER raVod at GOERING and told him that the Luftwaffe was rosponaiblo
for this faux pap. GOERING told his audionno how ho sat at home byhtho fireside with
:papers trying to. rononstruct what had happonod, and ho oven burnt his fingers trying
to, find out whether or not the courier had had time to burn most of the papers. At
the -instigation of his wife, ho called in several diviners and fortuno tollors who
finally roachod tho conclusion that tho detailed part of the plan for the invasion
must have boon destroyed.
The result of all this was that a new plan wasndranno up, which was bettor than tho
first, and which was finally oxocutod, i.e. the breakthrough at SEDAN.
GOERING was very onthubiastic.about tho way in which HOLLAND was conouerod, prid-
ing himself again and again for his own ingenuity in this connection. Ho tolls the
story of a: Dutch first lieutenant who told about this incidont Gon WINKELMANN,
Commander of the Dutoh Armed Forcos,was Galled up on the telephone by this Lt who
was holding a certain bridge near tho Albert Canal. The latter asked him for por-
mission to blow up tho bridge bocauso there wore paraohutists dropping down in tho
immodiato Vicinity. Gon WINICELYIANN rofusod to bolievo tho story, and told him to
refrain from blowing up tho bridge. A few minutes later the Lt called again, and
again Gon WINKILMANN refused to believe it, and adding that ho rofused to have two
divisions cut off from retroat,--thoso divisions wore being hounded by tho Germans
from the front--and that it nas absolutely impossible that any paratroopers would
daro to drop behind tho linos. A few minutes later tho Lt called for the last timo,
saying "General, I an about to be arrested", and at that moment tho German para-
troopers captured the Lt and tho bridge intact.
Tho BombinA-Of.F2a1M1
GOERINGto story of tho bombing of ROTTERDAM was vory much in divergence with tho
publishod stories and the known facts. GOERING claims that only ono wavo of 36
nlanos carrying incendiary bombs, none of. which oxcooded 50 kg, dropped its bombs.
GOER/NG bocamO very- oxoitod when he was asked for his oxplanation for the largo num-
bar of dead and woundod. "What largo numbers of woundod?" ho cried. nI toil you
what happened, the fire brigade was so soared to death (HAT SO EINEN SOHISS GEHABT)
that it refused to move out and do anything about tho fire. That's-why such a largo
part of the city burntndown Tho destruction could have been restricted to a very
mall area, if the firo brigade would have taken any action on it. You can ask the
BUERGERMEISTER of ROTTERDAM about that, and ho will toll you. the soma thing. All
thoso stones of hundrods or thousands of dead and wounded are just inventions and
fairy tabs (ERFINDUNGEN UND MAERCHEN), At the most some twenty or thirty people
could havcodiod from fames, whilo they wore hiding in the collar. When the s000nd
wave camp over, Gon STUDENT ordored'a rod flareto. bo fired to prevent the dropping
of moro bob, and this was dono, and no further bombs wore dropood.n
GOERING'os an For-OZU Moditorranoan
In 1941 GOERING had made plans for a massive offensive in tho Moditorrancat. Tho
plan was about as follows;- Throo Army Groups wore to take part in what wr?s intended. to
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be a vast onvolopmont operation. One Amy Group was to go through Spain, capture
Gibraltar, move into Morocco, and roll up tbo front aa far as TUNIS, a ocord Army
Group was to go through Italy and move into Tripolitania, and a third Army Group was
to go through tho Balkans and Grooso and capture the Dardanellos, ANKARApand out
through to the SUEZ Oanal. Upon the completion of thin move, it was planned to
offer the following proposal to Groat Britain: to present them with the fait
aocompli that the Mediterranean is no longer theirs, but that they could use it
again, if they would ally thomsolvos with Gormany and fight against Russia. GOERING
fort that this offor would havo had to be accepted by Groat Britain, since they
could ill afford to lose the Moditorranonn as a passage to the Far East.
Actually tho original plan for the move through Spain was GOERING8s brainchild.
Ho claims that ovorythiug was proparod for this move, which was substantially as
follows: fifteen divisions, including two parachute dive and three flak corps,
wore linod up for this purpose. Approx 600-88mm (sic) AA guns, and a numbor of
specially constructed 80om pi000s, plus a number of "smallorn 60cm arty piocos wore
to bombard GIBRALTAlluntil it was pulverized. It was colt that no living soul could
have ramainod in tho galleries undo- such a bombardment. The now 80cm guns wore
alroady mounted on rniloars and yore ready to roll through Spain. The guns, when
in firing position, occupiod four railroad tracks. The two parachute dive, which
wore part of to fifteen diva, wore hold in roadiners to jump on the plateaus which
surround the rook of GIBRALTAR. GOERING bolievos that theso two dive would never
have boon necessary, sine? tho bombardomont by all the gunny which was to be an in-
cossant pr000duro, would have brought the garrison to its kneos,
, At the last minute HITLER rofused to carry out the plan, which ultimatcly included
the entry into Portugal for the purposo of scouring the ports and establishing now
U-boat bases to substitute or supplcmont thoso on the French Atlantic Coast. GOERING
fat that HITLFRIs refusal to carry out the piano was a big, mistako.
Tho ya, With Rl.1010,
GOERING says that ono of his groatost ?hocks was experienced when HITLER decided
to wage war against Russia. GOERING told him that what ho was doing 110.0 agatnst his
oisfn bollofs and contrary to what ho had written nnd promised the people in "MEIN
KAMPF". HITLZR told him that it was unavoidable, that the Russians wore becoming
a groator monaoo ovary day, and that ho would smash the Russian Army before winter.
GOERING pointed out to him that oven if he mashed the Russian Army, Gormany would
still not be able to make peace with the Russians, but HITLER refused to listen.
, /t was in the vintor 1941 that GOERING had his first disappointment in HITLER.
Forced to rotroat SOW distanoo in Russia, HITLER boon= incronsingly more ill-taw-
(xi and unroasonablo. ,GOERING then roalizod that HITLEH was not able to with-
stand setbacks. This was in ovidonco oven more during the days (:): the battro of
STALINGR:X. ? HITLER refused-to lot the Army of 200,000 mon undar VON PAULUS cut its
way out, despite the fact that ho was implorOd to do 9D by GOERING and a groat majo-
rity of the military, HITLER callod GOERING one day and asked him for a statanont
on the total numbor of transport pianos available and their total loading capacity.
GOERING told him but mddod that thonumbor of olsnos would bo inadequate for the task
ahead. HITLER thou askod GOERING whothor it was possible to carry in supplies by
bomber, and GOERING told him that it could be dono, but that it Was not advisable,
sine? many bomb os woro being usod in the battle against Britain. HITLER oalculatod
that by the uso of all availablo transport pianos and bombers, including the use of
a brand now wing of Ho 1771s, which was just in the pro coos of training for a spring
offensive, and for which GOERING had a particularly soft spot in hia heart and which
ho was desperately trying to keep intact during tho training period--ho (HITLZR)
could supply the Army of 200,000 with o,J-o. GOERING protested bittorlyi stressing
the impossibility of the job duo to a number of factors, including the weather;
GOERING told HITLER that ho could not expect to have constant flying woathor, and
that some days it would be impossible to fly at all, and in that case, the quantity
of supplies roquirod the following day would bo doubled. HITLER porsistod and GOER-
ING tried to oomplyWiththoordors? The attempts to aupply the surrounded Army soon
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broke doun for just tho roasons indioated by GOERING. Tho woathor was atrocious
and most of tho pianos wore either wrecked on tho ground or lost in tho air through
aooidonts. Tho result of this venture was that after a short time, most of tho
transport pianos, many bombers and tho entire Ho 177 wing weroimmobilizod, and
that tho battlo of STALINGRAD was lost anyway.
GOERING stator; that from that time on, the rolationehip botwoen himself and
HITLER steadily deteriorated. HITLER would give and countermand orders so often,
that GOERING was complotoly unable to keep abreast of tho situation. Ho would
have a conforonco with him in tho afternoon, and return to his quartors in tho
evening to find 'a oortain order waiting there for him which the FUEHRER had not
mentioned to. him during the conference. Many of thoso orders wore quite iMpos-
siblo to carry out. Ac an oxamplo of one of thoso controvorsios, GOERING citos an
order from HITLER which ordered the ontiro Luftwaffe to make an all-out attack on
LENINGRAD in an attempt to knock Out the city. non GOERING told him that ho could
not possibly transfer the entire airpowor against one objootive, and loavo all'
other objoctivos, ospocially LONDON, untouched, HITLER accused tho Luftwaffe of
cowardice, claiming that it was afraid of tho AA guns in LENINGRAD. It was usoloso
to toll him that the AA protoction of LONDON was considerably stronger than that of
LENINGRAD, and that the Gorman Mora had not 6hibd away from the task of bombing
LONDON.
GOERINGte attitude with rogardo to tho Ruosinn war was as follows during wintor
1941: It would be tho boot thing to hold ori to what we havo got--tho Ukraine--
and not attompt to ponotrato any further. Lot us build an East Wall with all tho
millions of workers which wo havo at our disposal, and no Russian /XIV will over
break through, booauno we have a superior Luftwaffe, and they can never break
through tho dofonoos without an effective Air Foroo". However, the following spring
the offonsivo was renewed with tho well known results.
GOERING claimed that during tho first few days of tho Russian campaign, tho
Luftwaffo had terrific sucoomsos. On one day they knocked out 2,700 Russian pianos,
almost all of them on tho ground. The Russians, ho claims, did not have any idoa
of what was happening in the first few hours of this devastating attack. GOERING,
supported by VON BRADCHITSCH, then wont on to say that they thomselvoo did not be -
hove the phenomenal success at first, and only announced tho loss of 1,900 Russian
piano.
20 Lay. Putooh
GOERING said that ho was supposed to have boon prosont at the mooting which was
scheduled to tako place botwoon HITLER and MUSSOLINI at the FUEHRERHAUFTWARTIER,
in East Prussia, but that duo to his dislike of MUSSOLINI, ho docidod not to attond
tho mooting. It was only duo to this fact, that ho avoidod either being killed or
woundod.
GOERING says that it was impoosiblo to organigo an effective anti-HITLER movo-
mont at the timo. To do away with HITLER would have probobly meant coming to an
agreement with tho SS on that matter, and the SS oould not be trustod, GOERING
felt. When askod why ho did not protoo':, to HITLER, and why ho did not give up his
position as Chief of tho Luftwaffe, GOERING replied that ho was afraid that ho
would consequontly lose his plaoo as ouc000nor to HITLER, and that he would be ro-
placod by ROMANY, for whom ho claimod to havo a special dislike.
Tho Racial Polioios Of pommy
GOERINGto explanation for tho racial pelidy in Germany waa as follows: Tho per-
secution was not intended to take on the aspects which it did later on. It was
originally intended to squeeze only those Jews who were in leading positions, since
they "represented a serious danger for the German nation". "After all, those Jews
who fought in the World War and received the Iron Cross 1st class, were allowed to
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remain. We even encouraged their emigration to Palestine, and helped them to leave
Germany." GOERING made no attempt to hide the fact that he was very much in favor
the "arysnization" of Germany, it was just the "methods" with which he was not quite
in accord. "Anyway, during the first few years of National Socialism we did not per-
secute the Jews." He admitted that the rogroms of 1938 Were "pretty bad" (RECHT
SOHL/MM), but claimed that this was the first instance of persecution of the Jews in
Germany. "It was never intended that the "Aryanization" of Germany should take on
such forme" (ES WAR NI E VORGESEHEN DASS DIE SACHE SOLCHE FORMEN ANNEHMEN SOLLTE).
Although GOERING openly admitted that he knew of the "existence" of concentration
bamps, he claimed that he never realized that they were particulary bad institutions.
"I always thought that they were places where people were, employed for some useful
woric." After seeing some of the pictures taken at DACHAU Concentration Comp,
GOERING said "all this must have happened in the last few weeks". He said that he
could not "Understand" that there are some people in Germany' who could Commit such
atrocities.
Atrocities In FrapAp
.101. ??????????????
GOERING said that he did not believe in the atrocities which the Allies claim the
Germans had mtmitted in FrInce. "You should have soon some of the bodies of German
soldiers who were killed in Frando. It Was simp/y ghastly, indescribable the way
these people looked." He Aismissod the Mutilation of French patriots as "propaganda"
and compared the stories with those of the last war where people were supposed to
have been fund with some limbs cut off. With this answer, he dismissed the matter.
GENOBST(Ool Gen), BECK Gon GAMELIN
aosmo considered Gone BECK and GAMELIN, both one-time Chiefs of Staff of the
Gorman And French Armies respectively, to be in the category of "drawing-room!' gen-
erals (SALONGENERALE). GOERING felt that both generals knew only the theory and not
the practice. Both of them would spend most of their time weighing the different
possibilities, all of which sounded ver nice on paper.
1,:t417 k.c1. MUSSOLINI,
GOERING did not have one good word for Italy and MUSSOLINI. He felt that Italy
was a millstone around Gormanyte neck, and that Germany would have been much bettor
off if they had never bothered about Italy. GOERING seams to have a personal dis-
like for MUSSOLINI. He imitated MUSSOLINI during his meeting at the BRENNER Pass,
when HITLER had hurriodly arrived from Germany after hearing that Italy planned to
march into Gr000e, HITLER apparontly tried to persuade MUSSOLINI to refrain from
such a venture.
GOER/NG said that he had full "sympathy" for the French if they despise Italy.
Ho felt that Italyts entry into the war one week bofore the ond of the French COPV"
paign was a "treacherous" move. "If I wore a Frenchman, I would spit on the ground
every time I saw an Italian". The most ridiculous thing of all, according to
GOERING) was MUSSOLINIts speech at the conclusion of tho French campaign, when he
said that Italyts soldiers had accomplished the very difficult task of overcoming
"tremendous fortified positions", and worst of all had triumphantly announced the
capture of a certain mountain peak, which had always boon Italian.
19 May 1945 SVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
fex,k
PAUL KUBALA4 s.
Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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SEuRET_
Ref No SAIO/12
111
17 May 45
SEVENTH AR2JIY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US AR:1Y
2
2
2
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Auth: 0G,7th Army ;
Init: ,
Date; 17 MAy 45 ,
NOTES ON PERSONALITIES AND-ESTABLISHI:iENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH DIVELOPI,IENT OF V-WEAPONS
I. SOURCE
LARSSON, Nils, a Swedish engineer who has worked for two years in Germany on,
rocket research. Ho appears to have a well-rounded picture of German rocket prodUC-
tion and plans, and although ho admits that he is only a "small man" in this field,
he knows the more important, men and where they can be found. Ho volunteered tho
information published below, which is given in souroets own words*
Ratings Date of Information: 101&y. 45 Interrogators E.T.H.L.
II. OHIEF FOR DEVELOPivENT OF V-WEAPONS
"Tho Chief for Dovelopment of V-woapone, Gen DORMERGER, is staying in HINDELANG,
near OBERSTDORP, Allgaou, according to soUrco's latest information. The Gonoral
has a complete sot of documents on the V-2 in his possession, To avoid destruction
of these documents, tho General should bo approached with the utmost caution. He
is believed to be carrying false identification papors. Thoroforo it would be
advisable to have someone who knows him personally mako the first contact
1114 ROCKET BOMB MATHEMATIOIAN
"Dr Franz KALSCBEUER, who is one of the outstanding mathematicians in the field
of ballistics for rocket bombs (AUBSENBALLISTIK DER R WAFF21, is reported to be .
At prosont in TRAUNSTEIN, Upper Bavaria. Ho has with him all tho supporting 14i4t
for a nowly developed slide rule for rocket bombs, and also tho Handbook of :Rocke
Science of the VA (Exporimontal Station ? ). Furthermore, he guards all secret
designations (code dosignations) for -oekot scioncop-as well as the key for thormo- -
dynamic computations'.
For the further deVolopmont of the rocket bomb by the US Army the apprehension
of this man is absOlutely essential, and itshould be undortakon with extra= ea,-
tion, as noted in II above. Dr KALSCHEUERis residing with a family named WW1., ?
evacuated from DANZIG, and is engaged to be married to a daughter of tho fami4".
IV* VIVAPAS
l'Tho firm WAOKERCHEMIE, MUNICH, has a stock of VINAPAS in the storeroom of i,tk
factory building at BURGHAPEN On the SALZAOH River, Upper Bavaria* This is a rpm_
material: of groat importance in the deVelopMent of tho rockot bomb, and tho entire
Stock should bo ocured
W. MEASURING INSTRUMENT FOR ROOKEV.M4LOPMENT
"One of tho most important instrumonts connectod With rocket development ie a
measuring devico designated GM 0 E. This instrUmont is loCated in the GASTkAUS
BAECKERALM, in EAYRISOH ZELL, Upper .Varia, and is in tho care of Engr Waldemar
TROAS1 who is the only min in Germany Who is fully quallifiod to service tha
it-let/lament. tio has orders to bloW it up if ho can no.longor safeguard
it
VI. ORIGINAL DATA FOR ROCKET BOMBS
,
"Engr Karl Heinz SCHLESIGER4 from tho oxpertmental laboratory of tho WAFFEN4' .
UNION (loapons Union) in PIANS, Czechoslovakia, is in possession of the original
exact data, for to rocket botbs. SCHLESIGER was in VEILNBAOH, noar ROSENHEni on
10 May 45, in a hotel now,rovipitionod by the Rod Cross.' This mountain resort
(BERGHOTEL) was used until recently as a transit camp for Slovonose FEILNBACH is
situated approx 5 km SOUTH Of the detour to BAD AIBLING on the SALZBURG-MUNICH
AUTOBAHN."
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VII. AMMONIUM PER0HLORAT3
"The DEUTSOHE SPRENGSTOFFOREMIE MK, at KRAIBURG on the INN, Bavaria, lac.s, ia
stook 600 kE of ammonium porchlorato, a substance which forms the basis for now
dovolopmonts in oxplosivosi It is stored approx 500 m NV of thO main entrance, in
oxplosivos bunker No 3.58, which is partly dostroyod."
VII/. RAY.7ANSMITTER AND INTEGRAL OAL0tUS MACHINE
'Tho original and only existing ray transmitter for the remote control Of rocket
trombe is located at PRIBRANS, OzochoslOvakia, 60 km SV of PRAGUE, and 3 km WEST
of the ,main PRAGUE-6IRANONITZ highway. The instrument is in the former physics
'building of the oxporimontal laboratory of the WPFEN UNION, SF:ODA, BRUENN. This
building is known as DREIECKGZBATUDE and is situated on the slope of HEILIGEN
BERG (Holy Mtn)."
"In the assembly dept of the se-called work shop building, adjoining the DREI-.
EGKOMBADIUDE is the only oxistingmodol of an integral calculus machine."
? Sourco boliovos that both instruments described above are of groat impOrtanoe.
,17 May 1.94,
SEUNTH ARIE INTLIROGATION =MR
("WC 16/akot4
PAUL MALL, Haj; MI,
Oommanding.
4
39.113/
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Ref No SAIC/9
20 Apr 45
THIS IS AN ENCIrvilF
o!}'
SECRET
:Auth: OG, 7th Army:?
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init: r2(4.
APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 20 Apr115
PROPOSED PLAN FOR OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN GERMANY
_
SOURCE
GRAF VON ORIOLA, GMT (Maj Gen), comes from an old Silesian aristocratic fmm-
ily. He is cooperative, expressed a pronounced non-Nazi attitude, and has an
intense interest in the reconstruction of Germany. (Of Pd Int Buls Nos 5/750
and 5/751)
Ratinc: B-2
Interrua.tor: W.M.B.
Note: The following is presented substantially in source's own words.
. OCCUPATION OF 73CUTHERN GERMANY (See Appendix)
Source considers three corps fully sufficient for the occupation of Southern
Germany EAST of the RHINE and bounded in the NORTH by the approximate line: Mouth
of the LAHN - BAD NAUHEIR NEUSTADT/SAALE - COBURG -ABOH. The distribution of
the occupationforces would thus correspond to the distribution of the German
military forces in the pre-war years. Source believes that it would be of ad-
vantage to have the oectors occupied by the three occupation corps correspond
to the German WEHRXREISE sectors, as. this would facilitate cooperation with. the
existing military and civilian offices. For the sane reason, and also to make
the best use of the local tranoportation and communication facilities, source
suggests that the corps CPIs be located either in the cities where the wEHRKREISE
Hq were formerly located, or in their immediate neighborhood.
The proposed areas allocated for the occupation forces, within the boundaries
considered above, and excluding all tel -itory WEST of the RHINE as well as the
SUDETENLAND, are as follows:
Army Staff
?
First Corps
Second 'Corps
Third Corps
The DCNAUWOERTH area, because of its central location,
OF: MUNICH; comprises WITHRXREIS VII.
OF: NUERNBERG; Comprises WEERKEIS XIII and Southern cor-
ner of WEERKREIS IX.
OF: STUTTGART; comprises WEHRKREIS V and Eastern part of
WEHRKRSIS XII.
The following locations are suggested by source for div h :
First Corps: First Div - ROSENHEIM
Second Div - AUGSBURG
Third Div - GARMISCH
Second Corps: Fourth Div - WUERZBURG
Fifth Div - REGENSBURG
Sixth Div - BAYREUTH
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Third Corps! Seventh Div - DONAUESCIIINGEN
Eighth Div KARLSRUHE
Ninth Div - WIESBADEN
The div boundaries proposed by the General correspond to the probable occupa-
tional capacity of each. district. The boundaries are lines that may be easily
plotted, viz, AUTOBAHNEF (super-highways), highways, rivers, etc.
Source thinks it neither practical nor necessary to quarter the occupation
troops in dispersed and broken-up groups; he believes central grouping more ad-
visable, This would facilitate the operation and maintenance of the unite. Such
an arrangement Would,. furthermore, permit the use of existing and, for the most
Part, recently constructed barracks. The dense net of good roads would permit
quick shifting of troops, should the, need arise.
The following training grounds are in the army sector:
i) GRAFENIMEHR - Second Corps, but also within easy access of First
Corps;
ii) HAKAEL3URG
MUENSINUN
iv) WILDFLECKEN
v) SONTHOFEN
- Second Corps;
Third Corps;
Second Corps;
- First Corpe; primarily for mountain training.
If the use of arnored dive for occupation troops is intended, source thinks
it advisable to locate them in the immediate proximity of these training: areas,
in order to decrease the damage to the crops caused by the maneuvering tanks.
20 April 1945. SEVENTH AMY INTERROGATION JENTER
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, "-
Commanding.
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Appendix
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
SECRET
Ref No SAI0/9
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I.- THIS IS AN ENC1.PSI:
- : :TT
SEORE.T-
,Ref No SAIO/10
22 April 45
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY
EVENTS LEADING UP TO 20 JULY PUTSOH
(df Report Ref No SAId/2, l0 !pr 45)
"A. EARLY UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS
7
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030002-7
: sgoRsT s,
cp,uths 0
:Init:
:Date: 22 Apr 5
61,410?611 *********** .W11
I. SOURCE
HEM, Emil,'HEIDELBERG, KAISERSTRASSE 33, a 51-year-old Socialist, who
appears to have considerable knowledge of anti-Nazi movements. He paid for his
political- convictions by being imprisoned for almost two years (between 1934 and
1936), after trying to. create an underground organitation in SV Germany.
RatinA: 0-3' Date of Information: See Text Interrogator:
II. ANTINAZI GROUPS
It should be understood that only the so-called intelligentsia were engaged in
the Underground movements mentioned ia this report, and that the various groups so
engaged were to hays formed a smal1 cadre for organizations to be created after a
sucoesiful Putsch.
LEUSOFLNER, former Minister of the Interior .of Hessen, who io mentioned several
times in this report, had by 1941 become the loader of a group of anti-Nazi intel-
lectuals and former trade union chief. GOERDELER, former Mayor of LEIPZIG, :
seems to have first taken an active part in those ventures.in 1941. He became the
principal liaison man between the generals and the other factions, but he had no
underground. movement to give him a perSonal backing. LEUSOHNER and GDERDELERcoI
laborated withthp generals, who had been plotting. HITLER!s doWnfaIl since1939.
In addition to the clique led by LEUSCHNER, GOERDELER4 and .the generals,
other small:greup,had been formed which met at Count MOLTKE's castle at KREISA,.
Silesia. Acoording to source, the leading personalities werei.
Count,MOLTEZ'
?bunt York VON URTENBURG
Dr.:MTVITNDORFP
Dr-HAUB40a,
Prof REIOMINI HALLS
LE,133P,
Father D3LL, S.J., MUNICH
OBEANONSISTORIALRAT
(iquiv Archbishop)
Dr plAmmmExER
%mil HINK
(Former Social Democratic Party.Aopreeontative)
ft
ft
Pt SP
PP. PP
lO lf PP " P$
(Representing the German: Catholics)
(Spiritual loader of the German. Protestants
since' NIT02113111$ iMprisonmont)
(Source)
III. WV ATTWTP
The firpt preparations for an insurrection against HITLER were made during
the winter of 1939, when.GENERALFELDAARSCHALL VON BRAUCHITSOH'had concentrated
a number of armored divisions in the SERLIN area. However, Gen GUIDER/AN lost
his nerveat the last momentvand,the whole:Undertaking had-to be called off.
(This ,story lp,tas- told to source by LEUSCHNER). .
Tho next try.Lso fax as is known to source, Was made in Deo 41. Then again
VON BIAUCHITSOH.was ready to liquidate HITLER, and the preparations had reached
such an advanced stage that the Field Marshal asked LEUSOHNER to name those
SEOE,3 T
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prominent Nazis whom it was essential to kill at all costa..The coup Was planned for
Christmas 41, but VON BRAUCHITSCH was relieved of his Command 12 Dee, and the scheme
collapsed.
In 42, LEUSCHNER, MASS, another Socialist union loader, and KAISER, the former
chief of the Catholic unions, reached complete agreement as to the action to be
taken. With GOERDELER acting as intermediary, LEUSCHNER established contact with the
generals, who were represented by Gon VON BECK. Other generals known to have takon
part in the talks woo Gen FALKENHAUSEN and Gon KUECHLER. Gen MANSTEIN refused to
take part, stating that ho was a soldier, not a politician.
The third attempt was planned for April 43, but during a meeting between source
and ars MITRENDORFF and HAUBACH, at source's house in OBERSTDORF, Allgaou, it was
docidod that aTutsch in 1943 would be untimely. Tho Russians wore still far away,
and their political intentions wore unknown, while tho Americans and tho British had
not yet had any important military or eolitital succoss. 4 now govornmont would havo
had to face tremondous problems. The iirrection was therofore postponed, after Gen
VOX BECK had been notified through CoUnt MOLTKE.
In the same year, GOERDELER, LEUSCHN2R, and tho former Ambassador to MOSCOV,Ovunt
VON DER SCHULENBURG, drew up a plan to ostablish contatt, first with STALIN, and
later with tho British and American govornmonts. Count SCHULENBURG was to have crossed
the jRussian ?linos in Gon KUECHLER's Army sector, but in tho end pontiOsion was
refused by the Gents Ia, bocauso the fact could not have boon kept secret. ,(This was
told to source by LEUSCHNER and MIERENDORIFF, who had also Shown him a memorandum
from SCHULINBURG to HITLER, written in May 41, in which the Count pleadod with tho
FUEHRER not to go to war against Russia since tho vast spaces and tho severe climate
prosentod insurmountable difficultiosY.
In the. summer of 43, the gonorals declared that a revolt on their part waS impos-
sible, but that they would wolcomo a rovolution and would give it their immediate:
support. The Jesuits, who had encouraged the underground movomont from the start,
wore assigned the task of conducting a poll of popular sontimont. When this poll
disclosed a negative reaction everywhere except in MUNICH and VIENNA, it was:con
cludod that a popular rebellion was out of tho question, and that HITLER would have
to bo ovortbrown by mon with political and military power. Spurt? statoe that H1MO
attempted to establish an ontento with LEUSOHNER during the course of the sumo.
mor, and it is sourcore opinion that ho was succossful in this and that he maintainved
contact with LEUSCHNER ftain4 that time onward.
Count MOLTKE's clique and the group formed by GOERDELER, LEUSCHNER, and the gen-
orals had oortain political difforencos, but by early summer 44 they had reached an
understanding coneerning the proposed personnel of a now government. GOTRDELER was
to have boon Primo Minister at first, but LEUSCHNER was to succeed him after a short
time - at least so LEUSCHNER was led to believe. Source, who was a mombor of Count
MOLTKEls circlo4 claims to have boon offered tho governorship of Southern Germany,
which ho refused because ho did not want to hold publit office. To this refusal ho
attributes the fact that ho is still alive.
Austria was to remain a province of Germany, but a soparato government was planned,
Whickincluded SOBUSCHNIGG, SEITZ, :the former Mayor of VIENNA, and Dr GLEISS-
NER, .a, SOcial Democrat. SEITZ had reluctantly agreed to participate in tho spring
of 43.
IT. THE 20? JULY PUTSCH
Early in July 44, LEBER got in touch with the throe-man Contra]. Committde of the
Communist Party. Source believes that ono of those mon was a Nazi agent. kt any rate
LEBER and REICHWEIN, together with tho members of the Central Committee, wore arres-
ted shortly thereafter. At one of those meetings tho namo of Col VON STAUFFENBIRG was
mentionod, and source thinks that tho possibility that ho had become known to the
GESTAPO may have influonced VON STAUFFENBERG to advanco the date for the putsch.
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PERSONALITIES
Source believes that the following pOrsonalities connected with the underground
activities describcd above may still bo alive:
Dr GLEISSNER
Mrs SOMANB
'CONSUL MOVVRNT
FALTER1EG 11, BERLIN. (Mentioned abovo):
BURGFELD-24,, or c/o WEBER, MITRASSTRASSE.9, FRANKFURT/
MAIN. Her husband was one of LEUSCHNER's collaborators,
and source bolioyes that she may know a nutabor of per-
sonalities who Might be useful:
I. SOURCE .
LINDEMANN, Reinhold Moritz, 0/GFR (0111), 659 SCHW FLAK ABT (Hy A/A BO, a 44-
year-old native of RODACE, nor COBURG. His records show that h9 joined the Nazi
Party in 1952, and that he hold the rank of TRUPPITUEHRER (S/Sgt) in the BA He
was cooperative during intorrogation, but it is apparent that ho is an opportunist
11110 is anxious to ingratiate himself with the winning side* Although his cousin,
GENLT (MajGon) Fritz LINDEMANN, was implicatod in the 20 July putsch; source donipb
having had any connection with the affair himself.
Rating 0-75 - Data of Information: See Text Interrogator61R4E.T. and E.Wi
II. THE 'MOVEMENT
-
Source believes that the attempt on HITLER of 20 JUly 44 had its incoption in
the CONSUL Mevomont, which was founded during 1940-41; and which was named aftor
an ant-Communist organization of the oarly 20's. Tho group was madeup_of lawyers,
economists, and high-Tanking Army officers, and its ideals; according to source,
wore demOcratic: Its purpose was to overthrow HITLER, and to end the war, by bring-
ing about an insurrection.
P1 received his information from his brother, Dr Kurt LLATM/1/27N,who Was killod
bye. bomb .a few weeks ago; and from Maj Dr REUSSE, an old family friend. Source
states that neither of those on wore involved in tho movement, but both had
iii-
direct connections with it. Maj RIUSSE was at tho LUFT1AFFENFACHSCHULE (GAF Trado
School), WUERZBURG; where ho directed tho training program.
III.. PROMINENT PERSONALITIES
? ?
?
?
GRAF HELLDORF
GENMAJ (Brig son) HASSE
Dr GOERDELER
GENLT (Maj Gori) Dr Fritz
LINDEMANN
GENOBST (Col Gon) HIPPER (?)
OBSTLT (Lt Col) BENARDIS
OBST (Col) GRAF VON STAuFFENBERG
Former STADTKOMMANDANT, -BERLIN.
OBERBUERGERMEISTER (MAyor), LEIPZIG. ,
Sourco's cousin.
General Staff Officer.
? GENOBST Fritz FROM His murder Of a Gonoral Staff Officer fol-
lowing 20 Julyvand his subsequent disap-
poarancotwere reportod in the press,
Fiold Marshal VON 1ITZLEBEN Tried by a people's court after 20 July:The
Judge in the case was killed, and further
news- was suppressed, source states.
The leading members after tho founding of the Movement wore Field Marshal VON
S EORE T
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4 ,
WITtlAttrytt and 0,1iliF VON ST141.7FENBERG.. The ?X-iLinilor of memllor,s, in the movement is gen-
erally estimated at 500, according to source, of whom :approx,400 are 'thought to have
boon executed following the 20 July putsch, including all thejLbove-namod person-
iitte
eXc'Opting'poSSibly Gen FROM, whose connection with the,p1pt was never provon.
,
-? ?
22 4pril 1945'
SEVENTH- /ARM' INTE'RROGATION.CENTOR
re/.4.0t. 11(4.4.-12J-et-e-et.
PAUL KUBAL.A., Maj I MI,
Oemmanding?
!-:
???
? ?
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5 Aay. 45
030002-7
25X1A
TTh AR, A I'srT1:1101AIION 011-1T7.?.
APO 758 US
T.r1D-TRC+.,Icu:m i40V1:17,7T ?TD saLigATA8
SOUR0,7
ACM, Siegfried, civilian, pharmacist, 51/11, 11. YLT:rMr;,45.11, ilIPT.O.H; anti-
Nazi and cooperative during interrogation.
Rating: 0-3 Date of Information: Beg lay 45 Interrogator: W.F.V.
A"TI-NAZI U7D7RGROUND ACTIVITI75
Source claims to be a member of an underground organization which, he claims,
was at least partly responsible for the limited. resistance. offered to the Allies
in AUIICH. Source joined the uovoment about four Woes ago, after having desert-
ed from the Army. The organization, was very secret, and source came to know only
one of its sector leaders (A3SCH4ITTS47,IT]..i), Hans ?17371.1, ln HIliSOK3TRG3TJA6S1.
AUTIL7R, source suuests,- would be able to supply a long list of .'azi and anti-
flazi in =I0H.
In SCYLIT1577, 57 of .1U-I07, a Dr lustav ZTITIJI-t was the leader of the anti-
vazi underground org?mization. He told source about a week ago that a coup was
planned for the time when the Americans would be on their way toSCHLIIIIRS77. It
was delided to do away with, the layor, the ir, and an unidentified high
.95 leader (F07fin'in SS PU'IHRTR). The underground movement was camouflaged as the
local W1HRW0LF, because that was the only way of obtaining arms. or this purpose
Josef "SUP' 'I.A.LDH7111 served as liaison man with the $S. The 6OHLT7571.: organiza-
tion was 30 men strong; another estimatA 40 man were scattered about the country-
side and in the surrovAding uountains.
Source ws sant by Dr ZTITL1R to etablish contact with the Allies in order
to help the underground organization i.. their attempts to prevent organized
resistance on the part of the b and to capture the loading SS personalities in
the area. Dr rI1,1-11 could be reached at either of the following places:
K7AYABI1E07, SCHIJIIi57]; or at his brother's house, iA JOS]F.,THAL. Josef '0i.ALDH-TAR
could be found in J0S2,7ST1-11,.
A number of unidentified 7azi Party and leaders passed through 6OHLI7RS.77
about two weeks ago on 'their way to 3A1fliS-2H ?AIL and the mountains beyond, source
States.
5 't:lay 1945. $777JTH AR.2.
tn
'7
1'1 'PH /
PAUL E1T3ALA.,
Commanding.
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:Auth; 00, 7th Army:
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER :Init:
APO 758 ? US ARMY :Date: 18 Apr 45 :
ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR V-2 RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE
(This report should be read in conjunction with Report Ref No sAIV6).
SOURCE
WAGNER, Karl, Prof Dr, a 43-year old scientist, prof at. the DARMSTADT Technical
Institute. Source is a close-mouthed, lonely individual who is interested solely in
his research work. He talked rather reluctantly at first, but once on the subject
of his scientific developments he did not hesitate anymore. Source claims to be at.
the Allies' disposal, but his sincerity is open to some doubt.
Source was assigned the task of compiling evaluation tables of rocket fuels by
the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center. Eight days before the Allied occupation of
DARMSTADT, howover, he was ordered to destroy them.
OtinA: B-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 InterrogEle921: A.Z.
ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR V-2 RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE
. Source dovolopod the electrolytic condenser for Prof Dr BUCHOLDIs V-2 automatic
range-control device (of Report Ref "Zo 8AIC/6). Ho used a sodium chloride solution
(see below) as oloctrolyto, and silver for ono electrode; the other oloctrodo, also
of silver, was covered by a thin layer of silver chloride. .
While loading the condenser, the current is sent through it in such a way that
tho silver chloride layor is moved from one silver electrode to the othorl
Ail' 017.4. e- A6-0 1-
The amount of silver chloride used for tho layer is predetermined by tho chargo
with which the condenser is to be loaded. By rovorsing tho polarity of tho condo/seer
(during the flight of tho V-2 missilo), tho silver chloride layer is moved bank to
the first electrode. As soon as the silver chloride has boon completely moved to the
other electrode, a sudden incroaso of voltage from .1 v to 1.0 v is produced, duo
to tho hydrogen layer formed around the silver. This voltage is impressed upon the
grid of an amplifier tube which activates a relay (Rolay J, Report Ref No SAIC/6);
the relay, in turn, operates tho mechanical device which stops tho fuel combustion
in the projoctilo.
The exact composition of tho solution is imol of sodium chloride, 1 mol of ?
acotic acid, and 1 mol of sodium acetate. Source emphasized that most of tho diffi-
culties were encountered in obtaining a pure solution.
The actual condenser was built in a container 2 cm in diameter and 6 cm high. The
accuracy of the final signal was .0015 undor laboratory conditions, but loss in
actual oporation.
18 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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Ref No SAIC/7
13 Apr 45
THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE T
DO NOT DE.B1
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 - US ARMY
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:Auth:CG,7th Army :25X1A
:Init: PK:
:Date: 13 Apr 45 :
ofeesaverneyeeaveee
? - GENERALARZT (GEN OF MEDICAL CORPS) PROF DR ERNST RODENWALD
I. SOURCE
Dr RODENWALD is a 66-year old HEIDELBERG University professor who is acquainted
with leading medical scientists throughout the world. He appears to have an open,
honest character, and to abhor falsehood. Although ho admires HITLER's social pol-
icy, he dieagreos with most of the National Socialist principles becaUse of his
religious beliefs (Roman Catholic) and his humanitarian sentiments, and ho cannot
understand why the Gorman leaders do not stop the war, since it is obviously lost
for Germany. Nevertheless he still considers himself bound to the present govern-
ment by his military oath of allegiance to HITLER.
The Professor boom() a Party member in 1932, while living in BATAVIA, Java,
but when he discovered that the Party was trying to force a political policy on
the "BUND DER AUSLANDSDEUTSCHEN", he quit the Party, never to enter it again.
This attitude was held against him, and-he encountered difficulties when he returnorl
to Germany, although ho was permitted to continuo his scientific research without
molestation,
Dr RODENIIALD is prepared to contribute his services as a hygiene scientist to
assist the Allied authorities, and is also willing to place his laboratory and
research center completely at their disposal. It is possible that ho has boon in-
fluenced in making this decision by his anxiety to reinstate himself:in the good
-graces-of thoNotherlands'Gevt, which was paying him a pension before the war.
Rating: B-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrokator: A.Z.
II. HISTORY AND MOVEMENTS
1897 Student at the Military Medical Academy, BERLIN.
1907 Student at the Institue for Marine and Tropical Diseases, HAMBURG.
10 Official govt doctor in Togoland, Africa.
15 Medical advisor on hygiene to the Fifth Turkish Army, with Turkish rank
Of Major.
19 Left the Army to finish his doctorate at HEIDELBERG University.
21 Medical advisor on hygiene in Netherlands East Indies.
26 Medical Inspector, East Java.
34 Returned to Germany as Prof of Hygiene at HEIDELBERG.
39 Called to XII Army Corps.
40- CO of the Institute for Tropical Medicine,, BERLIN,
45 but continued as.professor at HEIDELBERG.
41 With an anti-malaria mobile laboratory train in Italy and the Balkans.
43 Promoted to GENERALARZT.
III. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Source claims that he never hoard of any experiments in this field. He empha-
sizes that he was strictly a specialist in hygiene and tropical diseases. He statee
that when the question of 8W was raised at an official dinner for Army doctors in
1943, all present agreed that this type of warfare Was impracticable owing to the
danger of contaminating friendly troops. In this connection he cites the case
of Australian troops who brought dysentery to the Allied units attacking the DAR-
DANELLES in 1917.,, The resulting epidemic forced the Allies to withdraw, but the
German troops were also contaminated, and they lost half their numerical strength.
Source states that none of his fellow university professor with whom he is ac-
quainted would be willing to lend assistance in the field of BW.
1.
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IV. POSSIBLE BW EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS
In BERLIN/MALCHOW souree directed a station where anopheles mosquitoes were
bred at the rate of 8,000 per month. In 1944 a girl was sent there from an SS
zoological research institute in Bavaria, in order to study the breeding opera-
tions. Source states that there are several institutes of this nature, known
as "SS ARNENERBE INSTITUT", but he does not know where they are located. He sug-
gests that these SS research institutes would be the most likely centers for any
experimental work in BW.
V. PARA TYPHUS "0"
Source states that the bacillus of para typhua "0" can be carried by human
beings for months without harm to the carrier. But should the carrier contract
malaria, the bacillus becomes virulent and is then fatal.
VI. ATOM SMASHING
At HEIDELBERG. University source knew a Chinese girl who had been making suc-
cessful experiments in this field. After the commencement of the Allied offen-
sive, most of her laboratory equipment was moved to TAUBERBISCHOFSHEIM (now in
friendly hands). Source cannot recall the girl's name, except that she belongs
to the GO family.
)
VII. ORGANIZATION OF WEHRMACHT SANITAETSINSP (GERMAN ARMY MEDIOAL INSPECTORATE)
CO of the Inspectorate is GENERAL 0/STABSARZT Dr HANDLOSER.
There are four sub-inspectoratee:
A. Ground Forces Inspectorate, CO Dr WALTER.
1. Personnel Department.
2. Science Department (Statistics and dissemination of sanitary regulations).
3. Organization Department (Tb b and T/E for medical and sanitary units). -
4. Administration and Finance Department.
B. Air Forces Inspectorate CO Dr SCHROEDER.
O. Navy Inspectorate, CO Dr GREUL.
D. WAFFEN SS Inspectorate, 00 not known to source.
vrm GERMAN MILITARY MEDICAL ACADEMY
00 of the Academy is GENERALARZT Dr ASALT a Nazi.
The Academy is composed as follows:
A. Teaching-Section, also called "PEPINIERE", where military doctors receive
instruction.
B. Research Section (00 GENERALARZT Prof Dr SCHREIBER) made up of the following
LEHRGRUPPEN (Institutes):
1. Hygiene, OP Prof Dr ZEISS.
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2. Tropical Diseases, CO Prof Dr RODENWALD (Sept 43 part of this Institute was
moved to the WILLIAM KERKHOFF INSTITUT in BAD YAUHEIM).
3. Toxicology, CO Prof Dr WIRTH, who is also a OW specialist.
4. Pharmacology, CO .Col GEMEINHARD.
5. Physiology: .
a) Bio-climatic Section: Prof RANKE.
b) Alimentation Section: Prof LANG.
6. Pathology and Anatomy: Prof A7DERNATH.
7. Photography and Training Films: (?)
8. Air Technics: Prof STRUCHHOLD. (This is no longer a part of the Research
Section.)
IX. GERMAN GENERALARZTE
The only German medical officers of general rank (all university professors)
are:
Prof Dr SAUERBRUCH
II " HABERER.
? H LAEVEN
H KREUZ
ROSTOCK
ZEISS
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13 Apr,45
SOURCE
SECRET
: SECRET:
:Auth: 00,7th Army:
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER In it:
APO 758 US ARMY :Date: 13 Apr 45 :
V-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PENEMUENDE
T-2 AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE
6 ???e?eueve?s o?????
BUOHOLD, Prof Dr, Technical Institute of DARMSTADT, a 45-year old DARMSTADT
scientist employed by the BROWN-BOVERI Works, MANNHEIM, from 1923 to 1934, when
he accepted a professorship at the TEOHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE, DARMSTADT. Reluctant
to give any information when first interrogated (not at this Center), source now
claims to have been authorized by the rector of the school to disclose the details
of his research work to the Allies. He was cooperative during interrogation and
is ready to collaborate with the Allies. .
Rating: 5-2 Date of Information: Spring 45 Interrogator: A.Z.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sept 39 the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center ordered several scientists of
the' Technical Institute of DARMSTADT to meet at PEENEMUENDE. During the meet-
ing these scientists were informed of the intended large-scale experiments with
rocket-propelled missiles. Each was given specific assignments for developing
various parts of the experimental projectiles.
Source was assigned the following:
a). A device maintaining a constant frequency of 500. cycles
of secondary importance to the V-2, according to source.
b) The automatic V-2 range-control unit (See III, below),
c) Later, source had the task of developing measuring instruments for the HEIDEL-
BERG cyclotrons:
II. V-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PEENEMUEDEZ
The father of V-2, source states, was Prof VON BRAUN, an engineer of little
importance before the war who had carried out some rocket experiments in the post
World War years together with OPEL Jr. When he proposed his V-2 ideas to the
German General Staff in 1939, he was put in charge of the PEENEMUENDE laboratories
Dr STEINHOFF, only recently given the title of professor, and described by source-
as being exceptionally able, was assigned to work on the experiments :as a' special-
ist in electrical matters.
. The research on V-2 proceeded very slowly at first. In spring 43, however,
orders. to speed up the experiments arrived. Most of the component parts of V-2
were built and tried at PEENEMUENDE; only .a few devices were given to scientists
for development outside the Experimental Center. These wore given to the DARM-
STADT Technical School professors for the most part, because Prof Dr STEINHOF
was a former student at that School.
Source successfully completed the automatic range-control devices for the V-2
by the end of 43," but ho was still trying to improve it, as well as finding er-
satz materials for some of its parts.
Gen DORNBERGER, Knights' Cross holder, was OG of the PEENEMUENDE Experimental
Center.
in a 27-volt current
11. AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE FOR V-2
Since the explosions giving the V-2 missile its forward thrust are irregular,
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itis impossible to predetermine the time at which the combustion should, be stop-
ped.forany given.range. The only way to increase the range accuracy of the mis-
sile is, therefore, to out off the fuel combustion NOT at a time set in advance,
but only after the missile attains a definite velocity, calculatedin advance.
This, in turn, can be deduced through the well-known integration formula by con-
sidering the acceleration at the moment of each explosion, i.e., at the instant
of each forward thrust of the missile.
a) Itiagiples'Involved
In Source's device, the thruat of the missile at the instant of the explosion
is transformed into a direct current which is 'proportional to this forward thrust
This current is directed through an electrolytic condenser previously charged
with a capacity calculated to correspond to the velocity of the missile at which
the fuel combustion is to be stopped. During the flight of the missile, the gen-
orated current builds up a charge equalizing that of the condenser. As soon as
the charge thus built up reaches the proportion of the condenser charge the re-
sulting rupture of voltage operate a mechanical device Which stops the fuel cot-
bustion.'
b) Operation (See Schematic Diagram, Appendix)
A rotating coil B is placed in the magnetic field A. In front of the coil,
and placed eccentrically with it, is a copper plate 0, which, in turn, is placed
in the center of the field originated by two coils, DI and D'', through which
passes an induction current of 500 cycles.
' When the missile is given a forward thrust at the instant of each explosion,
the mass of the copper plate 0 tends to move. By doing so, the plato disturbs
the constant magnetic field created by the coils DI and Du. The current created
in the coils 'b' and D11 originates in'the secondary of the transformer E an al-
ternating current which is applied to the grid of tube R'. This current flows
through the transformer F into the copper oxide rectifier G, and from here, as
(pulsating) D.0, it charges special electrolytic condenser H and flows back to
tho rotating coil B. Hero it creates a rupture of voltage which nullifies the
original effect of the forward thrust of the missile on the copper plate O.
' As soon ae the currant flowing through the valve H becomes equal to the pre-
determined charge stored there, a discharge of voltage occurs, which is impressed
on the grid of tube R.
A relay J, placed in the plate circuit of tube R", is operated by this grid
reaction and, in turn, operates the mochanioal device which stops the fuel com-
bustion. .
PW states that an accuracy of .001 is obtained by this device.
In order to charge the electrolytic condenser H, source developed an instrw-
ment (KONTAXTUHR) which operated on a 50-cycle currant. This apocial current was
created by a buzzer working on 50 cycles, also developed by source.
15 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION OENTER
/.4
PAUL PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Oommanding.
2
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V-2 AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE
(SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM)
Direction of
1 Acceleration'
....... 40 v;500 c
erryln._
D I
Legend
'wry
rby.
H
.0141....????????????1110.11....,Im)
A - Magnet
3 - Rotating Coil (DREHSPULE)
C - Copper Plate
Di )- Coils
1 - Transformer (GITTERUEBERTRAGER)
P Transformer
-
G - Copper Oxide Rectifier (TROCKENGLEICHRICHTER)
H Special Electrolytic Condenser (ELEKTROLYTISCHT ZELLE)
- Relay -
R1 ) - Tubes
R")
Report Ref No SAI0/6, SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
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6 April 45_
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SEVENTH ARAY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO _758 US ARMY
, INFORMATION ON GESTAPO IN BENSHEIM
SECRET
25X1A
Auth: CO? SAIO !
mit: izAtt
Date;
SOURCES
i) METER, Francisca, 40 years old. Claiming that she now sees, the treachery of
the Nazis,she is vary cooperative and volunteered all information.
Rating: 0-2 Date of Laformetion: Mar 45 Interregator: R.I.
ii) METZGER, Eleanore, 21 years old, cooperative but unobservant; she still ap-
pears to have. some pro"Nazi sentiments.
Rating: 0-3 tate of Information: Mar 45 Inte_rrogator: R.I.
iii) GANTNER, Annelieee, 21 years old, not very observan6, but fully cooperative.
Rating: 3-2 Date of Information: Mar 45 interrcigator:
iv) LSONHaRD, Erna, a 22.-year old stenographer and typist who was very cooperative
and helpful.
Rating: 3-2 Date of Information:. Mar 45 Interrogator: W.M.B.
-v) BOE, Marie Therese. A 26-year old girl who claims to be a French citizen and
who was forced to work for the GESTAPO. Refusing to obey Orders to be transferred
to the interior of Germany upon the approach of the Americans, she went into hid-
ing and remained behind until the arrival of American troops.
Rating: B--, Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: d.M.B.
,Notel Sources, all employees in GESTAPO Hq, BEFSHETA, were -brought to the Center
for the purpose of interrogation on the shooting of American soldiers at 3ENSHEIM
(See I, below), Some general information, howevee, was also obtained during in-
terrogation.
. I. SHOOTING OF Al-IERICAN SOLDIERS
All sources with the exception of Source METZGER agree on the following story:
On 24 Mar 45, at about 2300 hours, when the arrival of advancing American troops
was imminent, two American soldiers were shot by the KRIM SEK (Criminal Secretaries). .
STADTMANN and RAAF, at GESTAPO Hq, BE7SHEIM. A Polish subject KAMINSKI, the jani-
tor .(address not known) was present at the execution. None of the sources were
.present, but all heard the story from KAAINSKI the following day. A Mrs SEITZ,
who lives in the building ofthe former GESTAPO Hq, was also present at. the shoot-
ing. The two Americans were buried in the GESAPO Hq courtyard. The order for
the execution was given by a major of the BEhSHEIM garrison.
One day after the air attack on NORAS on 15 or 20 Feb 45, an American soldier
was brought into the BENSHEIM,GESTAPO. Hq and put into a room, face to the wall.
He was interrogated, loft the building after two hours, and wae not heard of since.
Source LEONHARD heard from her landlady that this man had been shot. Source GANT-
YER, who kept the register of all men coming into and leaving Hq, was not given ,
the name of this soldier, and made out ao papers for his ehipmegt to another camp. -
As this was a most unusual procedure, she assumes that the man was shot.
II. GESTAPO FILES 3-2 (Source: LEONHARD)
(See SHAEF,. CI Brief, 1 Mar 1945)
i) General SUCH-UND SPEZIALKARTET.
This .department was known aleo as the FAHNDUINTGSKARTEI (Searching File). Pink
colored cards (FAEND7NGSKARTEN) wore designated for foreign nationals, while
S E ORET
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1
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 k
SECRE T
yellow colored cards were for German nationals,
The. information contained in these cards is at the same time to be found in
beek form in-the FAHNDUNGSB(JOH. This is a monthly. publication of the RSHA in.
whieh all :wanted parsons are listed with their personal descriptions. The in-
formation is transferred from the book to the cards.
ii) HAUTTYARTEI (Main Index File)
. The cards of ABT II -wera blue, while the files were yellow, indicating that
they contain a list of political crimes and suspects.
Thed'ardsofkBTTIiwere(9rapp, and the files were green, indicating that they
contain a list of espionage crimes 07- uspects.
The above color system pertaining to both the SUCH UND SPEZIALKARTEI and the
HAUPTKARTEI is prescribed by the RSHA in BERLIN and applies to the whole of Ger-
many.
iii) A-KARTEI (Riders)
This index file contained a list of political criminals or of those people
who hsd not adopted. the National-Socialist point of view. Mbst of the people
indexed wore in concentration camps.. On these cards grben blue, and rod riders
were used. Source believos that green referred to "Marxism " and rod to ncomMun-
ism", but ignores the moaning of the blue rider.?
The index was always kept locked and stored away in a safe. Only one person
was handling the index and nobody was supposed to see .11.0 contents of these cards
The files for the green, blue and rod -cards were only in two colors, green and
yellow.
All entries on the index cards wore Made in plain langua7,0 and not in dodo.
iv) GESTAPO Files in DARMSTADT
All records of the GESTAPO in DARMSTADT were CO.
uplotely destroyed by fire dur-
ing a bombing attack on 11 Sept 44. When this Hq Was moved to BENSHEIM, now re-
cords and files had to bo compiled. Thoy were forced to start again from scratch.
III. GESTAPO AUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Branch), DARMSTADT B-2 (Source: aNTNER)
A number of people who wore arrestod by the GESTAPO wore transferred from BENS-
HEIM to DARMSTADT for a so-callod special treatment (SONDTRBEHANDLUNG). KOMMISAR
WANGEMANN was in charge of this doparl, -It. Source was responsible for filling
out the travel papers. At one time she noticed on one ofthe rapers that the per-
son involved was rapidly dying of a disease, which, source claimed, could not havo
boon the case.
Iv. FORGED SOLDBUECHER FOR THE VAFFEN SS B-2 (Source: GANTNER) .
oscnAF MUSCH was observed by SOUTQO one evening in the process of forging SOLD-
BUTCHER for the WAFF EN SS for REG RAT GIRKE, KRIM RAT HELLTYBROICH, BAUMEISTER,
and a driver.
V. CONCENTRATION CAMPS 5-2 (Source: GANTNER)
? Persons arrested by the BENSHEIM GESTAPO Hq woro shipped to the following in-
stitutions:
i) Male political convicts and foreign workers who had sexual relations with Ger-
man women were sent to DACUMJ (major offonses),BUCHWWALD (minor offenses), and
FLOSSENBUERG (minor offenses).
2
STORE T
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/
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ii) Female political convicts and women who had soxuai. relationb with foreign
workers _wore shipped to RAVENSBRUEOK and, FLOSSENBUERG.
iii) Persons convicted of sabotage, of failing to cuppoar for work, of prohibited
sexual relations which aid not result'in pregnancy, ot al, wore sont to DARMSTADT
Reformatory (for the Saarpfalz Region); MAINZ Reformatory (RHINE Region); HEDDEN-
HEIg; and HIRZEMHTIM. The maximum punishment was 56 days,
6 April 1945,
SEVCYTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
PAUL KUSALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.
3
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Appendix
Name
GIRICE Fritz
Civilian
Title
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SECRET
GESTAPO PERSONALITIES
ALDGEREINE
SS Title
T:ELLEN3T1OICT-T
L,partment Section Age(+)
T. GESTAPO HQ BENSHEIM, ADOL F HITTER SPL 52
(Responsible for District HESSEN)
REG RAT STUBAF Ohief of Hq
ERTL-. RAT STUBAF ?
SCHWINN Peter POI RAT
STEIN, Ernst POE OB INS HSTUF
BENKWITZ, Ger- ?POE 'ENS OSTUF
hard
BATZ, Joachim POL SEX
EIDEANY, Julius
(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1
Deputy
Parser-lel
Finance
Transp to
..onc camps,
visas, pas-
ses
Preventive
detention
filing
SECRET
Height(+)
32
1.70 m
LEI= IV
39
1.75 m
LEITER I
1.75 m
"ITITER II
55
1.72.m ?
IV 6 aab
32
1.75 m
32?
1.73 in
IV 6 an
? 37?
1.74 m
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Description
Stocky build, broad
shoulders, dark hair,
scar behind right
ear (3 cm)
Speaks English, good-
looking, brown eyes,
black hair, good
teeth.
Very ETdnder, blue
eyes, dark blond hair,
nervous eye twitch. ?
Broad shouldcrs,
grey eyes, grey
hair.
Medium blond re-
ceding hair, blue
oyes, wears glasses,
thick lips.
Dark hair, brown
eyes, very nervous.
Bald, grey eyes,
right log stiff,
healthy complexion,.
111.2pcndix (Cont'd)
Civilian
Name Title
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SECRET
ALDGEMEINE
SS Ra-lk Departi_e_t
MUSCH
Isolde
VPPED, 7ilholmine
AI.:BRECHT, Hans POD SEX
r;UDI131713ERGETZ,
Fritz
AMS TUZ
GIESS, Fritz
WEISS, Gertrud
POI SEK
(+) Estlmated
Report Ref No SAIC/1
OS CHAP
Interpreter
Personnel
Typist
Mail
Finance
Section
3AST?IV
lc 2
Administration '
Admin; food
Admin
Mess Hall
SECRET
A e(+ Height(
65?
30? 1.70 m
24 1.68 in
24 1.58 m
42? 1.75 m
30? 1.69 in
Description
1.72 m Grey hair, stocky,
wears civ clothes,
Latvian dialect.
29? 1.80 in
32
1.78 in
1.65 in
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Blond, blue eyes,
stocky,. broad face.
Dark blonde,bluo-
grey eyes, protru4-
ing teeth.
Dark hair, blue eyes,
quiet disposition.
Blond hair, grey
eyes, slender, bony
face.
Dark blond, dark
complexion, unstable
disposition, indis
tinct pronunciation.
Dark blond,. zrey _
eyes, slender,
wears glasses.-
Light blond hair,
light blue eyes;
strong, energetic
disposition.
Black hair, blue
eyes, stout, ener-
getic manners.
9
Appendix (Contld)
Name
METZGER, Miss
GELBRICH; Magda
SCHM=, Maria
GI:NINE-Pt Hiss
IZITGBER
STATT=N
F;JDIXGER, Helmi
WARLICH; use
(+) Esat'ed
aolDclqRf fo SATC/1
Civilian
Title
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SECRET
ALLGEEEINE
SS Rank Department Section
Typist, Admin
_KRIM ST:X US..T2UF
7R.ILI SEX
Secretary to .C.I'IRXE
Agc(+) Height( ) Description
28
Secretary to HEBLZNBROICH 31
Tvansp to
Jews
Jews
1.65 in
1.65m.
Black hair, dark eyes,.
beautiful teeth,deli,.
oat? cemplexion,chann,
ing manners. .
Black hair, remarka-
bly..blue eyes, long
eyelashes, very slim.
IV 5 37 1.73 in Black
black
CO,
loot.
IV 5
Jews (typist) IV 5
32
22.
ri 6a b 23
SECRET'
1.75 in
1.69 in
1.70m
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hair(greying),
eyes, pointed
Swabian dia-
Greying hair, black
eyes, fine face,
Viennese_ dialect,
cordial manners.
Brunette, blue eyes,
noticeable large mole
on left forehead,
stout.
Black,hair, blue
eyes,fine appear-
ance,very intelli-
gent, GME's
girlfriend.
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7
SECRET
_,endix (Cent d)
Civilian AIDGEMEINE
Title SS Rank
Department Section
Age C -1-)
Height(+)
Description
DLHEER,Andreas.
iclam.03 SEK STUSCHAF
WESTAUSDADER IV lc 1
53
1.68 m
Almost bald, _black eyes,oue
of upper ?teeth missing,thick
pronunction.
Gc71"Z,Karl
Kaim LSST HSCHAF
rEST=SVANDER IV lc 1
29
1.76 in
Blond hair,blue cyes,fresh
complexion, artificial right
leg.
2RI3CHBIER,Karl
KRIM SEK STUSCHAF
VESTAUSIANDER IV lc 1
41
1.70 m
Dark hair,dark eyes, scar on
back of head, exceptionally
broad his.
7)1?IEGEIA,Laver
STUSCHF
WES=SLAYDER IV lc 1
42
1.69m
Bald, exceptionally black eyes,
sick appearance,Bavarian dialed-1
Miss
Interpreter IV lc 1
=OLD Erika
Interpreter IV lc 1
21
1.70m
Dark blond hair, blue-eyes,
slendor,bad complexion,two
gold teeth.
-TLLTHES,Georg
KRIM SEX STUSCHLF
ORTSLUSDANDER IV 10 2
46-
1.75 m.
Black hair, grey eyes, thick
eyebrows, healthy complexion,
strongly built.
ELLP,Kiche1
KRIM SEK
?0RTSLUSLANDER IV lc 2
.34
1.69m
Dark blond hair, grey eyes
slim appearance,pale com-
plexion.
WAGNER,' Xsrl
40
1.69 in
Dark hair,blue eyestred com-
plexion,scar on face,stout.
RETZza,Seppel -
IV 1c 2
38
?
1.75 m
Wavy black hair,grey eyes,
slim,Bavarian dialect.
(+)?Estimated
Report Ref No SAIO 1
SECRET
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1037)ondix Cont'd)
Name
GnT
EBERT
GLOOM:TER, Hans
HEUSEL?Goorg
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Civilian _ILIGEXEINE
Title SS Rank
KRIM OB SEK
BCRTHOID,Heinich
LLCKS, Heinrich
LEONIERD, Miss
BROBLCH", Martin
WEBER, Ludwig OB SEX
(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SLIO 1
oc, t(Lrmy)
Capt(Lrmy)
Tr
S T
Do artmant Section
A o Height(
DescriTstion
IV lc 2
Russian Inter-
preter
44
1.68 in
42? 1.70 m ?
Counter- IV 3a & b 56 ? 1.70 in
espionage
IV 3a & b .51 ?
1.75m
IV _;.a b 48? 1.68n
IV3p &b 26?
Typist IV 3a & b
Counterespi- IV 3c
onaga.War in-
duStries
Guard a as- IV la & b
cape; Communism,
Marxism
1.7C in
49.? 1.72 in
53? 1.70 m
T 72 T.' "
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Graying black hair,grey.eyO's,
strong,wears an exceptionally
beautiful diamond ring on
small finger of loft hand.
Black hair., dark eyes,scar on
right corner of mouth.
Grey hair,gre oyas,mustache,-
scar on back of,right,hand,
friendly disposition.
Groy hair, grey eyos,Dro-,-
flounced bollystrongly built,
plump appearance.
Dark hair, grey eyes,wears
glasses,slila,quiet disposi-
tion.
Straw-colored hair,dark oyes,
slonder,stomach ailment,hol-
low cheoks,ESSLN dialect.
Dark blond,somcwhat bald,blue
eycs,round face.
Black hair,grey eyes,heart ail-
mant,strongly built,quiet dis-
position.
5-
Appendix (Cont'd)
Civilian
Title
rano
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ALLGEMEINE
SS Rank
Do. rtnen
SECRET
Section
TETERS', Karl
BLUEEISTER,Josef
GLESS
DENGER,Elfricde
RECHEL,Eariechen
Typist
Telephone Operator
Age(+) Height(4-) Description
36? 1.70 m
32? 1.70m
50 1.70 in
23 1.68 in
Wavy black- hairldark eyes,high
check bones, quiet disposition.
Blond hair,blue eyes,Bavarian dia-
lect.
Dark blond,grey eyes,long face.
Black hair,black eyes,light com-
plexion, slim.
22 1.67 in Blond hair,blue eyes,hcalthy
complexion.
In G-ESTLPO ,AOSSENDIENSTELLE (Poreign Sarvic Post); DARMSTADT
W.LNGEMINN, Julius KRIM TOM 081U7
KoRELL, Karl KRIM 0 SEK
STENDLIJ
GERELN, Rina
naTL, Miss
RIRSCHNhit, Christi-
KRIM SEE
no
FREDIENBI.AtGER,
Erika
(4) Estimated
Report Ref No S.IIC/1
Registration
SECRET
52 1.80 in
52 1.68 in
Grey hair, grey eyes, thick grey eye-
brows, strong appearance.
Grey hair, grey eyes, stocky, tip of
right hand middle finger missing.
46? 1.70 in Dark blond hair, slender.
25 1.67 in Dark blond hair, slender, blue eyes.
37 1.67 in Dark blond hair, protruding teeth.,
36 1.70 in Brunette, grey eyes, strong appearan-
ce, energetic manners.
20 1.55 in Black hair, dark eyes pale, slendkar.
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Lppendix (Cont'd)
Civilian
Name Title.
6r.DER, Karl POI 0 SEK
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E C R .E I
LLIGEMEINE
SS Rank Department Section Lge(+) Height(+) Description
46 1. 68 in . Black hair, black eyes, small
face, high cheek bones.
III. GESTLPO LUSSENKOMILNDO.(Foreign Service EA) , GROSS UMSTLDT
UNILICHT, Karl STUSCHLF 40 _ 1.65 in Dark hair, flat nose, stout.
DISSELBECK, OSCHLF ? ri.T 1 c 1 29 1.66 in ? Bald, black eyes, slim.
Karl-Heinz
SCHRCDER, Hedwig 21 1.63 in Brunette, dark eyes, high
cheek bones, slander.
IV. GEST.LPO ,IUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Service Post), GIESSEN
7&TPDEL- HSTUF 45 -_
7TXZER mum WM 1as relieved by-SEP,- 56 1.67 in Greying heir, fat, 7cars
PEL glasses.
ICESCH KRIM SEK
1.75 m 45 Dark hair, slender.
V. GEST.LPO ;.USSENKOMIC,..NDO (Foreign Service Ha), 70RITS
7Y-x-HV7CdHLER HSTUF 45 1.58 in Dark hair, grey eyes, fat,
stocky.
VI. GEST.LPO L,USSENDIEN3T3TELT7S (Foreign Service Post), H,IYLU
=GER }IM EOM Not SS 331.68 in Dark blond hair, stocky.
fTifTTTIE, Heinrich KIM SEK 43? 1.70 in Dark blond hair, slender.
SCHMITZ, KRIM SEK 1.75 m Black hair, sl=dcr.
VII. GESTL.P0 .LUSSENDIENSTSTEILE Foreign Service Post), MLINZ
7_GEYDR KRIM KOU OSTUF 38? 1.70 in Dark blond, slender.
(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SLIC/1
SECRET
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Lppendix (Cent' a)
Civilian
? Name Title
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SECRET
LLLGEMEINE
SS Rank De artment Section
o(+)
Heizht(
.Descri tion
BP-LNER
SOMMER
ZORN, Lulu
VIII.
KRIM SEX
KRIM SEK
33?
1.80m
45? 1.70 m
Typist 23 1.60 m
Black hair, dark brown eyos.,
slender, self-assured.
Black hair, brown eyes, stout,
fresh complexion, good appear-
ance.
Red hair, blue eyes, stout,
wears glasses.
REFERLT N GEGNER IL_CHRICHIENDIENST (Enemy Signals), BENSHEIM, LM-M=ETTILTZ (1.gents recruited by Ref N
worked in M:.INZ, BINGEN, WORMS, DLRLISLIDT, and GROSS UMSTEDT)
BOHM, Bruno amd SEK 36 1.68 m
KNORZER, Erna lately in F=EFURT
.KEtISCH
SNYLIK
KEUM SEX
HEERWLGEN KRIM SEK
PETRI KRIM L.SST
31
IX. REFS= N, Sub-Sec BINGEN
43
33
X. REFE= N, Sub-Sec WORMS
1.71 m
1.73 in
1.70 in
Light blond hair, light blue
eyes, nervous, flat nose,
Saxon dialect.
Black hair, black eyes, long
pale face, arrogn.nt manners.
Dark blond hair, strong build.
Black hair, dark eyes, Polish
citizen, speaks some German.
45 1.65 m -Tey hair, slender, very intel-
iigbnt, speaks French; furni-
ture store K=STR 1, DLRMSTLDT.
29 1.76 in Dark blond hair, grey eyes, slim.
XI. INSPECTOR FOR RS, BERLIN, PRINZ -LBRECHT STR 8-9
LOHMER-PIEYR2,DER, Dr (formerly Chief of GESTAPO Hq DLRMSTLDT
and INSPECTEUR WIESRLDEN)
(+) Estimated
Report Ref No 5LI0/1
48 1.80 m Dark blond hair, very good
appearance.
SECRET
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8
LDpendix (Contid)
Civilian
Name Title
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7
LLLGEEEINE
SS ',lank
S E C
De artmont Section
(+)
Hoi ht( Descri tion
STRLUCH
FRIEDRICHS
ISSELHORST, Erich
Dr
EHIMINGER,Erich
SCHILLING, Dr.
DLHLHEILL2,Karl
ICILLE2,1.1fred
M'ILIER,Gorhard
GEHB,Yarl , REG 0 INSP
WILRE,Lrtur
DIRIEWLNGER.
c+y Estimated
llei3ort Rof No 1,77(7/1
OSTUB712
STUBLF
OSTUBLF
XII. GESTLE0 Lig MINSK (Russia
Jan 43-Jan 44
42
33
58
1.75 m
1.78 m
1.75 m
STLF
Now in BERLIN asIL
32
1.80 m
LiITSCHEF
STUBLF
Lator chief investigate
at GESTLPO Hq, WIESBLDEN
37
1.70 m
OSTUBI.F
35
1.65 in
USTUF
46
1.60 in
-TrSTUF
35
1.65 in
HSTUF
45
1.70 m
HSTUF
SONDERXCLEJLNDO loader
against partisans
34
1.70 in
OS TUE
SD
38
1.73 in
7SECRET
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Dark blond,dark brawn ayes,scar
an left part of face,hcalthy
toeth,good appearance,very
Dark blond,slender,quiat person.
Greying hair,light blue eyos,stout,
very intelligent,hard workor,good
appearance.
Black hair,dark eyes,slonder,
goad appearnace,ambitious..
Dark blond,wears glasses,scar on
left part of faae,vory intelligent.
Light blond hair,light blue eyes,
slender, energetic.
Bald,dark complexion,wears glasses,
fat,quiot disposition.
Dark blond,stout,good looking.
Black hair,dark eyes,slenderl
quiet disposition..
Black hair ,dark eyes,tall,slendo,
heavy drinker.
*
Dark hair, slendor;snappy appeszrance.
9
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7
kppendix (Cont'd)
Civilian .LILGEMP,INE
Name Title SS Rank DeLaytment Section Lgo(+) Height(+) Description
IL.DECKER HSTUF SD 38 1.60 m Black hair,dark eyes,stout,gded-f'
looking, cordial manners.
OSWJILD OSTW SD? fomerl in KIEL 46 1.69 m Grey hair4ight blue eyes,strong
appearance, was always looking
for company.
(
a
(+) Lstimated
Report Ref No sLIVI
STUBLF
SONDERKOR=DO IV; 36 1.70 m Light blond hair,6rey-blac 19
leader Rg-inst partisans. stout, easy-going.
Later chief of :KIEL GESTLPO.
XIII. SD LUSSEYSTELIE (orcin ServiCe Post) DL2MST.LDI
HSTUF Chief of DLRMST.LDT Office
.SECLEI
_
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ic
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200
THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACR
SECRET
Ref No SAIC/5
12 Apr 45
030002-7
?
: SECRET:
:Auth:CG,7th Army:
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
:Init: :
:Date:12 Apr745
:
APO 758
US ARMY
....... ..... e 00000
INDEX
I. SOURCE ..... ................... ........
Page No
1
II. LOCATION OF OKH AND OKW .........
.
1
III. KURIERSTELLE (Courier Hq) OKH
.....
1
IV. KRIEGSAKADEMIE
V. THE GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY LINE
2
VI, NATIONAL REDOUBT .......
2
(See SHAEF, German Army Questionnaire No 24, 2 Apr 45.)
I. SOURCE
MESSEN, Hans, 0/LT, Courier Officer at Courier Hq, OKH, BERLIN. A 31-year
old bank employee from KISSINGEN. He is of Dutch descent, but had to accept Ger-
man citizenship in order to. keep his work. 'Anti-Nazi, source.gaVe hithself.up.to
Allied troops on 7 Apt.45.. Source was cooperative during interrogation.
Rating: B-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K.
I. LOCATION OF OKH AND OKW
Source knows of the following Hq locations, as of 25 Mar 45:
a) OKH (FELD) and OKW (FELD): ZOSSEN, approx 40 km SOUTH of BERLIN. All mail
for front units, for armies and lower echelons, is delivered to OKH (FELD).
b) OKH (ERSATZ) and OKW (ERSATZ), with most of its departments, moved to WEIMAR.
Chief of the General Staff, OGRUF (Lt Gen) JUETTNER, is still in BERLIN, BEND-
LER STRASSE. All preparations are made to move the entire OKH and OKW to an
undisclosed location in Southern Germany. Upon receipt of to order "OLGA 1"
the advanced party of these Hq will move to the new location When the order
"OLGA 2" will be given, the entire staffs of OKH and OKW will move.
HIMMLER and his Operations Section no longer have a permanent Hq. They oper-
ate from an armored train named "PANZERZUG STEIERMARK".
Part of the REICHSFUEHRUNG SS is still located in BERLIN, KAISERALLEE (ATRIUM),
and in GRUNEWALD. The remainder haa moved to the METTEN Monastery, near DEGGEN-
DORF/DANUBE.
KURIERSTELLE OKH (Courier Hq 110)
This Hq, at first under the ZENTRAL ABT (commanded by GENERALSTABSINTENDANT
KUEHLE), was put under the ALLGEMEINES HEERESAMT (AHA) in Oct 44. In charge of
the AHA is GENLT GREINER, a Nazi. OBERSTLT BRUCHMANN, who went through an SS
training course, is in charge of the KURIERSTELLE. By hie command all non-Nazi
officers, including source, were removed from the Post. In all, 30 officers be-
long to the KURIERSTELLE.
IV, KRIEGSAKADEMIE
? On 23 Mar 45 the KRIEGSAKADEMIE (GENERALSTABSLEHRGAENGE - General Staff Classes)
was moved from BAD.KISSINGEN to the TRUPPENUEBUNGSPLATZ GRAFENWOEHR, GSM 4416/
U-6, First Edition/P-0031. Source spoke with the CG of the School, GEN DER'INF
SPAETH, and with his adj MM VON LOCHWITZ, before the AKADEMIE had moved. He
was told that it was planned to move the KRIEGSAKADEMIE to Southern Bavaria at
a later date, and he was asked to suggest a nice, quiet place for its location.
Source suggested BAD TOE:1,Z, approx 50 km SOUTH of MUNICH.
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V. GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY LINE
A certain Lt ZIAMERWN, Weapons and Amn Officer at Seventh Army-Hq, told source
on 2 Apr 45 that Seventh Army intended to move to defensive positions in the COBURG-
LICHTENFELS-BAMBERG-FORCHHEIM area and that digging was already going on in this
general area. Lt ZIMMRMANN's task was to blow up all amn dumps between the then-
hold lines and the abovementioned positions.
VI. NATIONAL REDOUBT
Although unable to furnish definite information on the planned National Re-
doubt, source recalls talks in the Officers' Casino at the OKH to the effect that
HITLER and his elite SS troops intended to retreat into the mountains, and that
fortifications are being built there. The moving of the OKH and the KRIEGSAKA-
DEMIE into the neighborhood is also significant of these plan, source thinks.
12 April 1945. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
A.41 "KOLL
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MIf
Commanding.
2
S EORET
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Ref No SAIC/4
11 Apr 45 SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY
CHEMICAL PLANTS
0002-7
SECRTT
tAuth: CO, SAN
:Initt
:Date: 11 Apr
I. SOURCE
HENDIIION, Fred, a civilian who lived in the US for almost sixteen years,run-
ning a contracting business in 110OUTE 1, F.Y. He was very observant, and gave all
information willingly. He has been giving voluntary assistance to CIO in BUCHTN.
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Feb 45 Interrogator: F.J.S.
25X1A
11. PLANT NEAR IMENIGS-WUSTERHAUSEN
Source claims to have worked for three years as a maintenance man and "trouble
sheoter"at a large chemical plant located seven km NORTH of NITDTRLAHT, GSGS 4072/
NE 52/10, Third Edition/V-05, a suburb of KOEPIGUSTTRHAUeEN. He states that this
plant 'manufactured formaldehyde., hexa, hexalol; and a powerful high explosive (hex-
ogen 0, from methanol brought from .a nearby plant at iliJDAU, The factory employs
approx 300 French and German workers.
The buildings are placed among tall pene tzees, in an area approx 1200 x 1,000m,
(See Sketch). Each building is of brown breeL and has a sixteen-inch concrete roof
built to hold earth, and planted with small teees. 4ire trellises are affixed to
each building to support vines. However; all these efforts at camouflage are of no ?
avail, because the plant's two "smokeless" chimneys emit poisonous fumes which turn
all nearby vegetation brown. The location is also given away by a large pile of
lime waste, white against the light brown of the blighted surrounding terrain.
Chemical products are carried from building to building in overhead pipes,
supported by conspicuous concrete piers. All buildings aro connected by paths 2 m
wide, in addition to the service roads shown on sketch, which are approx 4 m wide.
The water supply, which is essential to the operation of the plant, is carried in
pipes laid approx 4 feet underground.
III. ALTERNATE PLANTS
According to source, two similar factories, intended for use as alternates in
base the NIEDERLAH,..1E plant should be destroyed, have been built at SCHROBENHAUSEN,
ga4aria, GSGS 4416/1.-5/6002, and at .P.ENFELDT/eCESER, asGs 4416/Q-4/2559. These
plants are laid out in the same manner as the one at NIEDERLAHME, and the Same
blighting of vegetation is caused by chemical fumes from the chimneys. Source
states that these sites would also be easily detected from the air due to the large
piles of lime waste.
LIST OF INSTALLATIONS AT NIEDERLAHME PLANT
(Note: Numbers refer to Sketch on following page).
1. Workmen's living quarters; not cam-
ouflaged; looks like country house.
2. Garage.
3, Undo'rground chemical storage tanks.
4. Main electric switchboard shod.
5. Filling station for methanol.
6. Office building.
7.. Officials' living quarters.
8. Workers Mess and kitchen.
9. Washrooms.
10. Steam power plant. with 55-foot
1,1smokeless" chimney.
11. Electric power house.
12. Truck repair shop.
13. Formaldehyde plant.
14. Laboratories.
15. Hexa plant, with 16-foot tower.
16. Storage room for machinery.
17. Storage for finished. products.
18. Storage building.
19. Chemical processing building.
20. Repair shop.
21. Electric power building; quarters.
22. Tlasto disposal building.
23. Concrete air raid bunker.
24. Pipe lino tool shed.
25. Wooden tower for drying hoses.
1
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:
26. Electric switchboard building.
27. Formaldehyde processing building.
28. Hexalol plant.
29. Concrete air raid bunker.
V. SKETCHs CHEMICAL PLANT AT NIEDERLAHME
cr,
F.1
0
030
015
14 0
8
ar
11 April 45
2
27
191
ci
26
15
24 f
30. Chemical processing building for
. high explosives.
31. Pump house for water system.
32. Small pond.
NOT to scale.
19
23
-1 7- ---,-
11
)9 F3 (-1,(7---i-5---
),
025 11 0
1
[1 19
16 0 .
22?
d \-0 i7
18
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; ?".
r ;
SA.
-Lime waste pile
SECRET
0
10
SEVENTH ARMY
(7.A (
PAUL KUBALA,
Commanding.
INTERROGATION CENTER
Maj, MI, c.vs"4
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In Nei VLACH
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Ref Ne SAIC/5
11 Apr 45
SE2RET
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY
HIGH-RANKING GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES
; SE
RET ;
:Auth: QQ SAN
:mit:
:Date: 11 Ap
6
SOURCE
VON PFUHLSTEIN, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired). Involved in the 20 July
incident and imprisoned by HIMMLER, source considers himself at last out of
danger and talks freely on*any subject. He is anxious to cooperate with the
Allies (See Report Ref No SAI0/2).
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Beg 45 Interrogator:
LIST OF GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES
a) Field Marshals and Generals
i) Field Marshal KEITEL, GENOBST JODL, GENLT WARLIMONT - According to PW the
three most important personalities in the WEHRMkOHT, are well known to source.
They are unscrupulous men, cowardly, lazy, unwilling to sacrifice themselves.
They worship HITLER to the last and have betrayed the Army to him.
JODL -Very narrow-minded, a typical armchair general; he never realized
that his orders were impossible to ocute; held his unit commanders respon-
sible for all setbacks and denounced chem to HITLER; his main shortcoming was
the inability to see the incompetence of HITLER as a military leader.
WARLIMONT -A good society man, knows languages fluently, a "smooth oper-
ator" (AALGLATT); if necessary he can work with people of every political be-
lief; he has no fixed line and changes his mind very easily.
ii) VON BRAUCHITSCH, Field Marshal - Opposed to HITLER but not outspokenly anti-
HITLER: He was undoubtedly euspeoted of sympathizing with the generals of the
20 July plot. However, he emphatically denounced the 20 July affair in a news-
paper article and hailed the appointment of HIMMLER as Chief of the Replacement
Army, thus saVing his life.
iii) VON MANNSTEIN, Field Marshal - Probably the most gifted military leader in
Germany; has no clear-cut political beliefb. Afraid to take part in the 20 July
events, he now pretends that he knew nothing about them.
iv) FREIHERR VON WEICHS, Field Marshal - At heart an enemy of HITLER, he clearly
recognizes the crimes which HITLER committed against the German people. Yet,
against his principles and beliefs, he was the first to sign a written oath of
loyalty to HITLER.
v) BUSCH, Field Marshal - Of little importance as a military personality; a
typical 100% Nazi general; worships HITLER completely.
vi) VON BOOK, Field Marshal - At heart against HITLER, he is too ill with sto-
mach trouble and too cautious to take an active part in the elimination of the
FUEHRER.
vii) MODEL, Field Marshal - An evil, ambitious and characterless person, whose
actions are dictated solely by his personal ambitions. He has an incredible
lack of consideration for his subordinates. Worships HITLER.
viii) KESSELRING, Field Marshal - There is considerable doubt as to his military
ability. ROMMEL and many other generals in Africa hated him or laughed at the
military measures he took. His incredible optimism did not reflect the actual
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state of affairs. He sent optImistic reports regarding the situation in Africa
to HITLER from ROME; the troops in Africa suffered considerably as a result of
his leadership.
ix) ZEITZLER, GEYOEST - Took over the post of C of S, Army High Command, full
of idealism and confidence in HITLER, but within a fow weeks he learned to re-
cognize HITLER's incompetence as a military leader and his moan character.
ZEITZLER wap particularly shockod to find that HITLER was Complotely indiffer-
ent to the death and misery of hundreds of thousands of Gorman .soldiers. He
hated and despised the FUEHRER, but could not bring hiasolf to the decision to
overthrow him.
b) General Staff Officers (Of GERMAN GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS, MIRS(b)/RL/haS/18/44)
Note:
(*) indicates promotion known to source cince publioatioil of
Seniority List of 1 May 44.
-(#) indicates that the name does NOT appear in the above
publication.
i) ALDINGER, MM
* ii) VON BENTIVEGYI, GENMAJ
iii) VON BILA, OBSTLT
* iv) BIROK, OBST
v) VON BOEHMER, OBSTLT
# vi) TREUSCH VON BUTTLAR-
ERNNDENFELD, GENMAJ .
(Believod NOT to be the
one on the list)
vii) BRENDEL, Zoadhita;,
OBSTLT
viii) BRUDERMUELLER, MAJ
* ix) BUCHER, OBST
x) SOHULZE-BUETTGER, OBST
xi) GRAF ZU OASTELL-
? CASTELL, OBSTLT
Son of Gon LADINGER who livos in FREUDENSTADT,
Black ?Forest.
Div commander. Previously he was active in the
AB'1EHR.
?
Probably Ia of a div.
Related to BLOMBERG. Ho is in the QUARTIERMEISTER
ABT of an army.
Related to FIUGENBERG; he was seriously injurod on
the Eastern Front and is probably no loner with
a combat unit. -
Since a few years in the Army Operations Sec, Joint
Operations Staff, and an important collaborator
with JODL. Very Clover and well-informed about
the MI RMAOHTSFUEHRUITG, he seas all its weak
points and those of HITLER, but is too clover and
cautious to state clearly his opinions.
Ia in-a p.n.offidor with ne fixod-political
5piniOns.
In the Army:e0perations Sec, Joint
Export on Balkan affairs. Born
known to haVo democratic ideas;
HITLER unknown.
Operations Staff.
in WUERZBURG,? is
his opinion of
Killed in 1944 on the Eastern Front whore ho was
Rogtl 00.
Hanged as a rodult of his participation in tho
20 July plot. Last assignment: Ia, Army Group
SOUTH.
Ia of a 3ICLITRUYGS Div in the EAST. Nickname:
?T0ENTIL
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xii) COSSMAN, OBST
VON GROLLMANN (Rank un-
known) (NOT the one on ,
the list)
VON HOBE, Heinz, OBSTLT
xv) KEITEL, MM
xvi) KLEIKAMP, OBST
rvii) LAHOUSEN, GENMAJ
viii) LASSEN, Ernst August,
OBST
xix) VON LINSTROM, OBST
xx) BARON FREYTAG VON
LORINGHOVEN, MM
xxi) VON LOSSBERG, OBST
xii) NIEPOLD, OBSTLT
xii10 GRAF VON NOSTITZ, OBST
xiv) OSTER, MM
xxv) PALTZO, OBST
xvi) RADKE, OBST
,SECRET
For a. time 0 of S to GEN STUELPNAGEL; now
'Crof'S Of a corps.
Ma,rried;has six children. Previously 0 of S,
Se.cond Pz.Army in the Balkans; lately 0 of 3,
_Army Group SOUTH, under VON WEICHS.
Relative of GENOBST HiLDER; probably leads the rem-
nants of a div pn the Western front.
Sen of the Field Marshal; unimportant as a military
figure; is on the General Staff Officers' list
solely because of the position of his father.
Important personality. he works in the HEERESPER-
SONALAMT (Army Personnel Office) and in concerned
with the General Staff Officers' files.
Austrian, active officer of the Austrian Army who
was.absorbed by the German Army after the occupation
of Austria. Worked in ASUEHR both for the Austrian
and German Armies. Lately sec chief in the ABWEHR,
now OG of an inf div.
Ia to GEN WEISS, CG Second Army; probably captured in
East Prussia.
Hanged because of his participation in the 20 July
plot. Successor to COSSMANN, 0 of S to the 0 in
C, France. His wife and two children are living in
MUNIOH.
Oomtitted suicide after the 20 July plot. Was AB-
WEHR see chief. His wife and three'children are
living in SALZBURG.
Son of the well-known GENOBST VON LOSSBERG of the
World War. C of S of a corps in Norway. He fell
into disgrace because of some political remarks
and his promotion was held back.
Killed on the Eastern front in 1944.
0 of S of the Division Commanders' Scheel' in HIRSOH-
BERG.
Son of GENMAJ OSTER. He is Is. of a div on the Ital-
ian front.
Was ABWEHRSTELLE71EITER in DRESDEN until 1959.
In the OKII Was HAUPTREFERENT (Chief Adviser) for
Nazi indoetrination in the Army, directed the NSFO .
School. A confirmed Nazi, he was nevertheless
suspected of having been connected with the 20 July
plot. lie was imprisoned for four weeks in the
RSHA Prison, and then released, reportedly com-
pletely 1.ohabilitated.
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Xxvii) RAE, OBST
?
S ECRET
? _ ?
Supply expert in the QUARTIERMEISTERABT of an army
group.
REINRARDT, Hellmuth, Was 'C of S to Gen.OLBRICHT, Who had him relieved
'OBST- ,becauto he was not suitable for. taking part in
the 20 July plot. GRAF STAUFFENBERG .took his
place.
xxix) SASS, OBSTLT
xxx) SAUERBRUCH, OBSTLT
Lately Ia of 58 Inf Div, he was seriously wounded
in Russia. He lost a leg and is probably no lon-
ger in the service.
Son of the famous physician; holder of Knights'
Cross. Was for some time Ic (G-2) of Second Pz
' Army. in the Balkans. Seen by source in the RSHA
Prison, BERLIN, where he remained for a few days.
Source beliew.)g, however, that SAUERBRUCH was at
the Prison aE witness rather than suspect.
xxxi) SCHOENE, OBST In General Staff position in PRAGUE.
xxxii) SCHROETTER, OBSTLT
For some time in the HEERESPERSONALAMT as adviser
(REFERFNT) for the personnel files of the General
Staff Officers list under OBST XLEIKAMP (See
xvi; above).
SCHWATLO-GESTERDING, Author of some inilitarr pamphlets. In 199 Chief
,OBST . of ABWEHRSTELLE HA.i:TOVER.
xxxiv) SE-TER, MAJ In the QUARTIEREISTERABT, 0-KH Important collab-
orator of GENMAJ STIED'.
xXxv) SNEED, OBSTLT Personal -djutant to ZEITZLER Dead (Of Report Ref
No SAL.:12).
xxxvi) ULS, OBST G.of S of a corps on the Eastern Front in 1944.
xXXvii) VON VOSS, OBSTLT Committed suicide after the 20 July plot (Cf Report
Ref No SAIC/2).
11 April 1945.
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
A..)
1(;?:
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.
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Ref No SAIC/2
10 Apr 45
SECRET THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO HOT DETACH
. SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY
THE 20 JULY PUTSCH
130002-7
25X1A
I. SOURCE-:
VON PFUHLSTEIN, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired) has been a professional sol-
dier since 1917, but he acts and talks like a buSinessman rather than a German
general. He is related by birth and mixrridge to many a family of German high
nobility. However, he is not a land owner, does not have independent sources
of income, and has been living on his eoldiersl pay. He seems to be strongly un-
der the influence of his wife. He has six children, all of whom are being
brought up not to believe in the ideas of soldiering or of National Socialism.
At the time of the interviews source was hi7;hly nervous and excited, due to
the fact, he explained, that he had gone through a great deal Of suffering and
that, at last, he ootsidered himself out of danger. He talked freely and without
hesitation or doubt on any subject, and his etory is believed to be accurate
and to the best of his knowledge.
Gen VON PFUHLSTEIN is extremely an. 'ells to be employed by the Allies in any
capacity.
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: d.M.B.
II. PERSONAL HISTORY
17 Dec 1899 Born in Danzig.
19127 1917 KADOTTENANSTALT (Military. Academy) P02S0e.ei-LI0HTERFELDE.
19 Mar 1917 Entered Army as FAEHNRICH with 4 Guard Ragt.
14 Deo 1917 Commissioned LT.
1918 In 1000000-man Army.
1 Apr 1925 Promoted to 0/LT.
1 Apr 1933 Promoted to HPIM.
1933 Secondary General Staff position to the Arty FUEHRER III, BERLIN.
1935 CO, JAEGER Co in HIRSCHBERG/Silesia.
1936- 1937 Ic,XI Corps, HANOVER.
1937 Promoted to 03STLT.
1938 Ia, 19 Div.
1939 Ia, 58 Div
1941 C0,154 lief Regt, Eastern Front.
1 Feb 1942 Promoted to OBST.
1 Feb 1943 00,BRANDEN3URG Div.
1 Jul 1943 Promoted to GENMAJ.
1 Apr 1944 Re1ieved of command because of political unreliability.
1 Jul 1944 CG,50 Div, Eastern Front.
.18 Jul 1944 Wounded.
1 Aug 1944 OG in charge of defensive fortifications, HOHENSTEIN-ORTELSBURGER-
'1ALD, East Prussia, 1:7:- order of Gen GUDERIAN.
1 Sep 1944 Arrested by SD because of participation in plot against HITLER
on 20 July 44.
14 Sep 1944 Officially dismissed from Army and imprisoned in BERLIN.
24 Nov 1944 Transferred. from BERLIN Prison to KUESTRIN Prison (Concentration
Camp for officers politically unfavorable to HITLER).
30 Jan 1945 Dismissed free prison, where he was under HIM:LERIs custody as
a political prisoner.
2 Apt 1945 Surrendered voluntarily to an American unit at WERTHEIM.-
Present address: KREUZJERTHEIM, near WERTHEIM/Main. In the castle of his
cousin 7UERST zu. LMENSTEIN-1ERTHEIM-FRE1DENBERG.
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TIT. BRANDENBURG DIV
At the time source took over the 37k1DEN3URG Div, on 1 Feb 45, its personnel
was comPosed exclusively of volunteers who knew of its special purpose. A number
of SS men were, also in the Div at that time. During 1945 HIALER took out soma
of the SS personnel and used them as political spies in foreign countries. In
bummer 44 elements of the Div, viz, 2-300 men commanded by OBSTLT IJALTHER and his
former adjutant, 0/LT CPERLACH, were transferred to the SS and placed under the
command of SEORZENY. The force behind the move to return all reliable SS men un-
der the Command of the SS was 0/LT VON FOELKIRSAM, a native from the Baltic states.
IV. 20 JULY PLOT
Not Tho following is an account of the happenings connected with the German
generals' plot culminating in the attempt tomos.z1sinate HITLER on 20 July 44,1n
source's own words. or the sake of continuity, and for the general interest it
may present, the story of the actual assassination attempt has been included, -des-
pite- source's absence from the scone or the event; ?
1. Preparations of the Plot
"On 1 Feb 43 I was relieved as rogti CO on the Eastern front and given the
command of he newly organized BRANDENBURG Div. GENAAJ OSTER, C of S, AVEHR
ABTEILUNG, disclosed to me, in numerous official conversations, substantially
the following:
a) "In the opinion of a considerablo number of enlightened officers, including
Field Marshals VON KLUGE and.VON MANIISTETV, GEN DER INF VON STUELPNAGEL, and
many others who wore well informed, the war could no lonzor be won militarily.
Every day that the war was prolonged leant unnecessary bloodshed and would
oltimately load to the complete colle?)so of Germany. The newly appointed Chief
of General Staff, GENOBST nITZLZR, was of the same opinion since the STALIN-
GRAD debacle.
b) "It was of primary importance to end tho war somehow, as quickly as possible.
Tho prerequisite for this would have to be the elimination, or at least the
exclusion of HTMER and the Party, since any negotiations between the Allies
and HITLER wore impossible, - HITLER and his close supporters would never take
such stops, in the first placo. MY opposition to HIPLTR and the Party had boon
known to Gen OSTER for years. Field Marshals VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN,
GINOB9T BECK and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN have decided to remevo HITLER, at first
from the military command only, at the earliest opportunity. Tho plan was
approx as follows: On the appointod day the FUEHRER's Hq in East Prussia was
to be seized by trustworthy anti-Nazi troops. VON KLUGE and VON AANNSTEIN,
together with other officers, then wanted to seo HITLER and confront him with
the following demands:
i) Appointment of a REICEBGENERALSTABSOHEF (REICH Chief of General, Staff)
with full powers of command for the entire -conduct of the war in all theaters; ,
ii) Subordination (UNTERSTELLUNG) of all throe qEHRAACHT branches to a single
person;
iii) lo-appointment for the vacant post of Army 0 in 0 (OBERBEFEHLSHABER DES
HETRES)i
'iv) Establishment of a single General Staff for all throo JEHRMACHT branchos.
Should HITLER not acccdo volunta:c_ly to this plan, suitable steps to apply'
2
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force were to be taken. Those measures would probably consist of placing HIT-
LER under temporary arrest. Proparetions were made to out off all communicse?
tions between tho FUEHRER's Hq and tho outside world at the designated time,
until the desired decision would be reached one way or another. BERLIN was
to bo seized by anti-Nazi troops at the same time.
The intentions wore furthorto incorporate the qAFFEN SS into the Army, with
the appointment of a REICH Chief of aoneral Staff.
. Along with this plan there were other designs, of a political and economic
nature, with tho dotails of which I EVA not familiar. It is fairly certain that
it was hoped to ostablieh'contact with America and England through the Vatican,
with the purpose of negotiating for an armistice. I think that the Vatican
was chosen as the neutral mooting place for the diplomat a concerned; I do not
know whether the cooperation of the Popo hkmself was sought.
c)"It was further made clear to me that my appointment as Com:mender of the
BRANDENBURG Div wae only a blind, that it would be my task to occupy a certain
district of BERLIN with elements of the Div which wore located in the town
of BRANDENBURG and, aboveeall, to eliminate Party officials, the SS, and tho
SD.
:d) "GEN DER INF OLBRICHT handled the technical preparations in the interior.
But he was unable immediately to make any headway with his preparations., due
to tho lack of capable and dependable officers. He finally succeeded in ob-
taining OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG as chief, and only with the arrival of this
officer did the proparationa begin to make progress. All preparations had
to be handled with the greatest oar?. Only very few ofT'icers could at first
. be let in on the secret. Spying by HIM.LER, the SD, and the Party indreased
daily. The fact that the Chief of the Army Personnel Office (PERSONALAMT), -
.GENLT SOHAUNDT, was a 100% Nazi and could not be told about the plot made the
situation especially difficult, because officers who wore urgently desired
for the accomplishment- of the prope..sd coup could not be secured.
o) "The further arrangements of tho plan called for holding the Eastern front
undor all circumstances, at least to protect the Gorman border from a Russian
invasion. It was intended that a British-American invasion in the JEST should
not be opposed; Gorman troops wore to be withdrawn to the interior of the
REICH and to reinforce tho Eastern.front. The plan was to let in the ,Americans
and British, without fighting and as fast as possible, far into Germany. The
necessary preparations in the 4E8T wore in tho hands of GEN DER INF VON STUMP-
NAGEL, Military Commander of Franco, and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN, Military Com-
mander of Belgium.
f) 'In the course of time it developed that Field Marshal VON KLUGE was some-
what undecided and had postponed the dato of tho undertaking. In spite of
all pressure he kept postponing the appointed time for tho coup. stooks and
months passed, in summer 43, during which I and many others came to tho con-
clusion that tho plan would never be carried out because of the indecision
of VON KLUG,i% .VON KLUGE was advised, and even urged by his /a, GENTAAJ VON
TRT'INOU, to go on with the plot. OBST SCHULTZE-BUETTGER, Ia to Field Marshal
VON MANNSTEIN1 was also let in on the piers.
g) "I received tho mission of determining, during a visit to tho OKH, the posi-
tion and attitude of GENOBST ZEITZLER and the Operations Sec (OPERATIONS AB-
TEILUNG).of the Army High Command. It was essential to know whether ZEITZLER -
could be let in on the plot. Through several conversations with the officers
of the Operations Sec, particularly with OBST GReF VON KIELMANNSEGG and 03STLT
SAND, I received the impression that ZZITZLER, while he had taken over the
position of Chief of the General Staff with great confidence in HITLER, real-
ized after. a few weeks that HITLER -_73,totally imcompetent as far as military
matters were concerned and was making one catastrophic decision after another.
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ZTITZLER was especially shocked by the fact that losses in men which ran into
,hundreds of,thousende, as at STALINGRAD, did not make the slightest impression
on, HITLER. ZEITZLER learned within ihose short weeks to recognize HITLER's
military incompetenee and to hate and despise him because of his personal char-
acteristies, But he was not yet thinking about the overthrowing of the FUEHRER.
He rather considered it his duty, Cothe what may, to remain at his post.
The inevitability of the Collapse wa4 painfully clear to him and to the offi-
cers of the Operations Sec. They continued to work out of a sense of duty,
and without, any hope.
I communciated this impression t6 Admiral CANARIS; the decision was reached
NOT to inform ZEITZLTA of the plans.'
h) "In the course of the year 1943, Particularly in the fall and winter, the
determination to overthrow HITLER riPened. There were various ideas as to the
methods of realizing this aim. For a long time it was hoped that an opportunit5,
would Present itself during one of HITLER's so-called "visits to the front"
,(FRONTREISEN). HITLER's visits usually carried him only as far as Army Group
Hq. At Army Group Center as well as,at Army Group SOUTH preparations for an
assassination were made. It did notcome to pass, because HITLER could no
longer be persuaded to make a visit to the front, Thus the decision was gradu-
ally reached to bring about the overthrow of HITLER, and if possible also HIM-
LR, in the FUEHRER
i) "In Jan 44 I was reported by a junior officer, 0/LT BOECKEL, as having a
suspicious political outlook. I was-classified politically unreliable and, ,
therefore, relieved on 1 Apr 44 of the BRANTENBURG Div command and. placed at
the disposal of the OKH. After I let BRLIN, I had no opportunity to witness
the further: unfolding of the plan. I was sent to a div commanders' course at
HIRSCHBERG. Having been appointed Od 50 Inf Div' on 1 July 44, I was on the
Eastern front at the time of the attempted assassination on 20 July". '
V. THE EMI'S OF 20 JULY, 1944
"In KUTSTRIN, while under detention, I had occasion to speak to the following
officers, HITLER's political prisoners like myself,: OBST VON CANNSTEIN, Comman-
dant of the Cay School, BROMBERG; MAJ VON HASSTLT, son of the diplomat; and MM
VON XLUGT, son of the Field Marshal. these three officers were apprehended just
after me, and, were able to give a detailed account of the attempted execution
of the plan. The greatest part of the story, as far as I can recall, was told
by OBST VON CANNSTEIN.
OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG, as C of'S to the Commander of the Replacement
Army, had to report to the FUTHRER Hq to give an account on the state of the
replacement forces. This report was to be deliverad as part of the so-called
situation conference (LAGEBESPREOHUNG) in which HITLER, =TEL, JODL, ZEITZLER,
WARLIMONT, and other officers took part daily. OftenTIMALER, and occasionally
GORING were also present. STAUFFENBTRG had no control over the appointment
of the date for his report. On the designated day STAUF7EFBERG flew in his pri--
vate plane to the FUTHRER Hq at LOETZEN, East Prussia. He had With him large
maps and special large graphs for his report, and also a briefcase with a strong
explosive charge. After arriving at the FUTHRER Hq,STAUFFENBERG declared that
before the cOnferenco he would have togo into the conference room to lay out
his maps and graphs. Thus STAUFFENBERG had the opportunity, immediately before .
the conference, to go alone into the cOnference room. He spread his maps out on
the table so that the view of the floor beneath the table was obstructed. Under
the map table, protected from sight, he placed the briefcase with the explosive '
charge and probably a time fuze.
Sinoe the situation conferences usually lasted several hours, and STAUFFEN-
BERG was to be the last to report, it Was not noticeable that he loft the FU2HRER
Hq at the bog of the conference. without waiting for the explosion he flew back
to BERLIN and there reported to GIN OLBRICHT that the assassination was accom-
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plishod, Based upon this belief, the program proceeded further. All the prepared
ordors were given. These concerned first of all the taking over of the most im-
portentgovernnient offices in BERLIN and the arrest of the most important Party
and SS mombors such as the higher-ranking GS police officials, GAULEITER, etc.
GENOBST BECK tried at the same time to got in touch with the army groups by tolo.,-
phone. As I understand it, the following conversation took place:
MILT KINZEL, 0 of S, Army Group NORTH, received the telephone call from BERLIN.
A voice, probably that of STAUFFENBERG, said, "I am turning over the call to
GENOBST BECK". GEYOBST BECK then said, substantially, "I am not sufficiently
informed regarding tho details of the situation in the Army Group NORTH. However,
I am giving you the following directions for the further conduct of the struggle;
Take care that Army. Group NORTH under no circumstances be cut off and lose con-
tact with. the REICH. If necessary the Army Group front must bo withdrawn towards
East Prussia". with those words the conversation ended. It can be assumed that
MIMI BECK, GST nm INF OLBRICHT, and OST VON ST=FFENBERG.gave numerous or-
ders and directives in the same vein. Thus it was (easy for the SD later to grab
a high porcentago of all officers connected with the case, sinco through the un-
happy outcomo of the attomptod assassination practically all the cards wero on
the table.
I know that many officers who woro not imeedirtoly apprehended, their nerves
strained by mental uncertainty, bought and found death on the front or through
suicide. This was the case of OST VON VOSS, 0 of S,? Army Group Oontorfand pro-
bably of RPM- VON KOEHNEN and HPTM Holmut PINKERT of BRANDENBURG Div. Some of-
ficers, such as NAJ VON HASSELT, aqeof the opinion that a high percentage of the
officers involved in the plot weroRoizod by the SD and that perhaps only one-
fifth were Olt. I personally know of only one, GENLT VON ROST, 0 of S, III Corps,
in BERLIN, who was definitely involved in the preparations for the coup. .Until
rocently ho was OG HOOH-UND DEUTSn -7 TER Div on the Eastern front, EAST of
VIENNA. At first instrumental inthe.plans for the overthrow of HITLER, he later
got "cold- foot" and stopped aside".
VI. RS RA PRISON, BERLIN
"On 1 Sept I was arrested by the SD, thrown into the RSH:). Prison, BERLIN, PRINZ
ALBRECHT STRASSE, and. shackled. The prison coils wore located along two corri-
dors in the collar. I was confined to Coll No 13 from 1 Sept to 24 Nov. 30 sin-
gle coils were occupiod. In this SD prison I saw the following persons, some of
whom I came to know personally, and others whom I knew only by sight.
i) REICESMINISIER SOT.CHT, Coll 4. Probably roloasod Jan 45.
ii) MINISTER POPITZ, Prussian Financo Minister. Probably hanged.
iii) GENORST HALER, Cell 17. Probably now out of prison and in a concentration
camp in MECKLENBURG.
iv) GENOBST FROI. Pato unknown to mo, probably not hanged, but certainly still
detained.
v) The diplomat GRAF VON DER SCHULENBURG. Certainly sontoneod to death, and
hanged.
vi) The diplomat, VOX HASSELT, certainly hanged.
vii) OBERBUERGERMEISTER GOERDELER (LEIP7IG). Sentenced to doath. Ho was bound
hand and foot, then probably hanged. Call 7 or 8. ?
ix) GENMAJ ?STEM of Sp ealEHR ABT, almost cortainly subsequently hanged.
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x) OTrAILT GRAF VON KIELMANNSEGG, 0 of S in the Operations Soo, OKH. Confined
near mo in Coll No 12 for six weeks, then released becauso of insufficient ovi?
deace. Is supposed to have comiland of an armd rogt now.
xi) (?rTILT SPEIDEL, 0 of S, OBERBEFEHLeHASER WEST, under RUNDSTEDT and KLUGE.
Detained only for a very few days. I mot him again lator in the KUESTRIN For?
tross.
xii) My personal friond,PRINZ r
releasod subsequently. Ho is
_MST AUGUST VON HANNOVal. Is supposed to have, boon
probably with his parents in BLItZ:ENBURG/HARZ. .
xiii) The two personal adjutants
whose name is unknown to me.
of GENOBST ZEITZLER, OBSTLT SMIND and the other,
SMEND was to be hanged or shot later.
There wore 32 Small single coils in all,and'during my stay at the prison most
of thorn wore continuously occupiod. s soon as one occupant was hanged another
was brought in.
About 200 to 300 persons were hold in the rison of the Criminal Court in MOA?
'BIT, BERLIN. All of those wore confined booms() of participation in the 20 July.
incident. Among those 200 persons woro numerous other officers, members of tho
Foreign Office, economists, merchants, intoliectuals. Mothor prison was located
in FUERSTENBERG. In all the larger cities, the jails woro fillod with similar
personalities. Those wore all somohow involved, or suspoctod of having boen
in?
volvod in the 20 July affair. GEFOBST Z-LITZLER was probably also approhendod.
His whereabouts are unknown to mo, BERLIN lawyer, whose name has escaped me,
was asked for advice by my wifo. This lawyer, who wg..A.s wall informed on those
matters, told my wife that in his estimation about 25,000 persons had been ar?
rested in connection with the 20 July incident".
VIII. FORTRESS OF KUESTRIN
"On 24 Nov I was transferred from ie RSFA Prison to the KUESTRIN Fortress.
Here the SCHLOSSKASERNE wae designated as a concentration camp for politically
unreliable officers. ?There were about 25 persons in KUESTRIN among wham I recall
the following:
0 GEN DER KAV VON ESEBECK; last assignments Acting OG in VIENNA;
ii) TINLT SINZIGER, Commandant of VIA;
iii) GENMAJ VON STUELPNAGIL, Siegfried, discharged. Last aesignments Oommandant
of STETTIN.
GENLT smanu, 0 of St OB WEST;
MAJ VON HASSELT;
MAJ VON KLUGE, son of the Field Marshal;
OBSTLT HOOPPNER;
HPTM VON PAULUS, son of the Field Marshal;
OBST OANNSTEIN, Commandant of the Cay School, BROMBERG.
When the Russians stood before the
fortress of KUESTRIN was evacuated in
in utter rashness. I myself was able
gates of. KUISTRIN on 30 Jan 45, the
panic, and many of the prisoners released
to go home. The fate of the other officers
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is not known to me. A new concentration camp for officers was to be set up in
Central Germany, in the neighborhood of ERFURT, but I do not know whether .these
plane have been realized".
7111. TREATMENT OF OFFICER PRISONERS
"After the 20 July Putsch GOERING approached HITLER and asked him to treat
the arrested generals humanely and in amanner befitting their position. This
request was rejected by HITLER in the roughest manner possible., and GOERING was
thrown out together with his request. SS OBERGRUPPENFUEHRER (Lt Gen ) Sepp
DIETRICH (also ROMMEL?) reportedly supported this request. All three fell sub?
sequently into disgrace."
SEPP.DIETRICH
"In CUESTRIN GENLT SPEIDEL told me the following SS OGRUF Sepp DIETRICH had
realized a long, time ago that HITLER's poliey and his methods of waging war would
lead to a catastrophe. SHIM told me that L'ITRICH saw these things as they
really were. It must be remembered that Sepp WaTRICH, as a unit eomelander, got
his impressions directly from the front and from his contacts with many Army of?
ficers, ? impressions completely different from those of HITLER, able only to
estimate the situation from behind a desk. There exists mutual mistrust between
HIMMLER and DIETRICH; HIMALER felt that DIETRICH had grown too powerful and that
he might become a dangerous rival in the future.
SPEIDEL described DIETRICH as an uneducated country yokel, but having sound
common sense. I saw a chit of paper on which DIETRICH had written to SPEIDEL
in fall of 44: "With cordial greetings, Yours, Sepp DIETRICH (and not HEIL HITLER,'
OMIT KAMERADSCHAFTLIOHEM GRUSS, IHR S"LT DIETRICH (UND NICHT HIL HITLER)).
X. PERSONALITIES,
;90NDEREGGER, KRIMINALKOMISSAR, interrogator in RSHA Prison, BERLIN. Medium
height, slim; narrow, wrinkled face. Brown hair, balding.. Slightly sloped
shoulders. Southern dialect. Brown eyes. About 40 years old.?
ii) HUPPENKOTHEN, SSSTUBAF(Coi), interrogator in RSHA Prison, BERLIN. 1.80 m
tall, Westphalian origin. Broad shoulders, slender, strongly built. Remarka?
bly round lac:mat, round smooth cheeks. Large, slightly protruding blue eyes.
Dark blond, thick hair. Swaying walk About 30 years old.
iii) KALTVBRU'INER, SS OGRUF (Lt Gen), 'Chief of the SD. Medium height, broad '
shoulders, stocky.. Large, fat hande. Daek blond, almost black hair.. Talks
quietly. Slight Austrian dialect;
10 April 1945.
SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
_0004 --1402
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Oommanding4
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