SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400030007-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 30, 1964
• Content Type: IM

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30 December 1964.
OCI No. 2858/64.
Copy No. ty
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SITUATION IN THE SUDAN
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
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SE CRE T
MORI/CDF Pages
1-
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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OCI Noe 2858/64
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
30 December 1964
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Situation in the Sudan
1. The transitional government which emerged
in the Sudan from the political eruption of late
October and early November is still highly unstable.
The cabinet is an uneasy coalition of representa-
tives from the various political groupings, in-
cluding four communists. It has been ham-
strung by frictions and by the general unwillingness
of its members to take controversial or unpopular
decisions. The various party leaders are maneuver-
ing to increase their popular strength before
parliamentary elections now scheduled for this
spring. The divergent interests of these leaders,
and of the groups behind them, make the chances
for evolution of a stable government extremely
poor, even if elections can be conducted. There
is thus a continuing possiblity of a sudden break-
down of public security which could well endanger
US lives and property.
2. The most disturbing feature of the political
situation since the military regime was ousted has
been the rapid increase in the influence of the Su-
danese Communist Party (SCP). The SCP is now
manipulating and exploiting the "Professional Front"
--a grouping of leftist-influenced organizations of
lawyers, doctors, etc.--to widen its power base for
the elections. Still numerically weak, the Commu-
nists probably hope to run in the elections both
party sympathizers and apolitical professional
people whose parliamentary votes they could control.
They are also reportedly making overtures to leaders
of the National Unionist Party, whose strength is
largely among urban workers, in hopes of forming
a coalition.
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3. Meanwhile, leaders of the Ansar politico-
religious brotherhood, the most influential of the
non-Communist groups, are working through a "Na-
tional Front of Political Parties," which they
organized and control. They fear the expansion of
Communist influence, and have threatened to call
massive demonstrations to press their demand that
the government reduce Communist representation in
the cabinet. The Ansar command an extensive fol-
lowing, primarily in rural areas, and hope to win
a major victory in the elections. Any Ansar move
against the Communists before the elections, how-
ever, would meet strong opposition, could provoke
new violence, and would probably play into Commu-
nist hands.
4. The army has accepted its subordination to
the civilians with hardly a murmur. Along with
the police, the army has been seriously weakened
by purges and will probably be unable to play any
positive political role in the near future. Many
army personnel, however, are strongly anti-Communist,
and their intervention could still be decisive in
any open conflict among the political parties.
5. In foreign affairs, the new government has
enthusiastically adopted radical Arab and African
nationalist causes in place of the generally pro-
Western policies of the former regime. Although
the Communists in the government have certainly
played a major role in making this shift, the non-
Communist parties and the public as a whole seem
equally anxious to get in step with the more strident
African and Asian nationalists. This attitude is
reflected in the Sudan's wholehearted support for
the Congolese rebels.
6. A major and apparently insoluble problem
confronting this regime, as it did the previous one,
is the long-standing "southern question." The re-
gime came into office pledging immediate measures
towards alleviating the problems of the three
southern negroid provinces, where separatists had
been waging a terrorist campaign against the gov-
ernment for more than a year. Some conciliatory
moves were made, but violent racial rioting in
Khartoum in early December brought them to an
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abrupt halt. Official statements continue to deny
the existence of any rebel activity in the South and.
to assert that fruitful discussions are taking place
between Arab and Negro leaders. Other evidence
makes it clear, however, that the breach between
North and South is almost complete, and the govern-
ment leaders are now openly declaring that the Sudan
is and will remain a unitary state. Anti-Arab
terrorist activity is almost certain to increase
again in the South.
7. Parliamentary elections have been scheduled
to take place in March or April. Recurrence of
violence in Khartoum, however, as well as the in-
evitable difficulties involved in setting up the
election machinery will make it difficult to hold
the elections on schedule.
8. Tensions therefore seem likely to increase
rather than diminish, and there is no sign of the
emergence of effective authority to keep them in
bounds. The danger of violence is particularly acute
in the capital, where mob action has taken place
frequently in the past two and a half months with
little interference from the security forces. Anti-
Western and anti-Christian sentiment is now strong.
The danger to American lives and property is thus
a continuing one.
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