STAFF STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000300080058-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: May 29, 1958
• Content Type: STUDY

D- RAF, : RTIC,/gns
Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP33 2 &300080058-6
1. PROBLEM: To ascertain the most advantageous operational base for the
25X1 A29 -unit .
2. ASSUMPTIONS:
25X1A2g a. That for political reasons will be unable to operate from
25X1A6a -
25X1 C8a b. That the will organize a complete unit and will. operate from
25X1 C8a permanent base in Western Europe or the
c. That CHALICE will provide the technical support personnel and equip-
ment to man the unit.
d. That cost of establishing a base will be borne by CHALICE.
25X1A2g e. That will be required to conduct prolonged staging operations
at whatever base is selected.
3. DISCUSSION:
25X1A6a
Available Bases or Areas:
ADVANTAGES
(1)
Base facilities now available, in place, and ready for use.
(2) U-2 already exposed in that area and operational procedures have
been established and tested.
25X1A6a (3) Best terminal weather in on year round basis.
DISADVANTAGES
(1) The US Government would probably take the blame for any overflights
from this base due to our previous activity there. (This
could be helped by
25X1C8a advertising fact of M acquisition and operation of U-2 aircraft).
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Logistics system established and functioning.
 (2) Aircraft would be operating within the Russian radar net.
25X1A6a (3)
25X1X7
ADVANTAGES
(1) US Government would likely escape blame for any overflights orig-
25X1X7 inating from
25X1X7 (2) A base in .would not be within the Russian radar net.
DISADVANTAGES
(1) Any base selected would require major construction and modification
25X1 C8a prior to use by the M unit. ($100,000 to $200,000) and would require
approximately 4 months from start of construction.
(2) Would require special logistic handling and procedures to support
the unit which would pinpoint US interest in the unit.
(3) would require new operational procedures to be laid on with local
and area operations officials and with filter centers for radar suppression
25X1A2g which, in turn, would considerably widen knowledge of the U-2
25X1A6a (4) A base in would be within Russian radar net.
CONCLUSIONS :
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USAF`E which would necessitate their coordination on all activities. It is
felt that with this type unit and activities CHALICE should avoid involvement
of USAF authority as much as possible.
and is controlled by
. That the only advantage that would accrue to the project as a result
25X1X7
of the unit being located in either
would be the
ability to deny responsibility or knowledge of the flight if a protest is made.
b. That some disadvantage would accrue in the nature of financial out-
lay of some $200,000, revamp of supply and operational procedures and some
loss in security in that a greater number of people would become more
25X1A2g , pprovec ore easel -RDP33-02415A000300080058-6
 25X1A6a
25X1 C8a
25X1A2g
25X1 C8a
25X1 C8a
25X1X7
25X1A2g
25X1A6a
-3-
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c. That could be used as a temporary training base and
staging base, pending completion of a permanent base.
d. That in order to take maximum advantage of the main object in
inclusion of the - in the U-2 program i.e. US denial of overflight respon-
sibility, the= unit must conduct operations from the ^ or other non US
controlled areas.
5. RECOMMENDATION:
,. That the unit be permanently based at
for training
25X1X7 purposes and operate from M or other bases that are not under US control.
Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP33-02415A000300080058-6