SECRETS, SPIES AND CITIZENS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R001000140012-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 1, 1978
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRETS , SPIES
AND CITIZENS
- What spies want
- How they get it
- What you can do
MAY , 1978
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On the eve of World War II, the President called on all
citizens to report to the FBI information relating to possible
espionage and sabotage. Since that time) increasing responsibilities
have been placed on the FBI to safeguard the Nation's security. The
FBI is responsible for the detection and prevention of espionage,
sabotage, and other clandestine intelligence activities within the
United States, by or on behalf of foreign powers, through such lawful
foreign counterintelligence operations as are necessary. Today, just
as in the perilous period of wartime, the relatively small contingent
of FBI counterintelligence professionals is heavily dependent on an
enlightened and supportive citizenry. It is hoped that this pamphlet
serves to heighten awareness of the dangers and what citizens can do,
especially among those Americans who have access to classified and
unclassified strategic information of value to a hostile power.
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SCENES FROM A NOVEL?
An Armenian immigrant named Kogian had achieved a
level of success and security which exemplified the "American
dream." He lived in a comfortable suburban neighborhood, was well
established and held a challenging and well-paying job with a firm
which did classified research for the Pentagon.
Into this setting walked a gregarious, appealing gentleman
named Sayadian who said he was a distant relative from Armenia and
worked for the Armenian Benevolent Association. Enthused to meet
someone who reminded him of roots in his far-off, native land, Kogian
became fast friends with his newly arrived "cousin." Kogian admired
the work Sayadian was doing for the Armenian Association, and
Sayadian in turn expressed great admiration for the important work
Kogian was doing for the United States.
Kogian was a dedicated employee who often extended his
workday by bringing home current work projects. The projects dealt
with sensitive, defense-related topics and required the use of
classified documents. One night Kogian was surprised to discover
that Sayadian was surreptitiously photographing the sensitive docu-
ments. He was appalled when his "cousin" informed him that he was,
in reality, a Soviet agent, and that the photographs were intended for
the use of the Soviet Intelligence Service, the KGB.
Kogian expressed dismay with Sayadian's treachery, and
attempted to extricate himself from the potentially disastrous
situation. Sayadian appealed to Kogian's sense of Armenian patriot-
ism. Even though Armenia was part of the USSR, Sayadian argued, it
was still Armenia. Finally, a close of mild intimidation and an appeal
to Kogian's greed--$1,000 in cash--silenced his protest.
Unfortunately for the "cousin" and his dupe, their venture
into espionage was short-lived. They were arrested soon thereafter
and both were sentenced to prison terms. The end result for the
pathetic Kogian was more than a mere prison term. It also meant an
aborted career, humiliation, a stained record, and a life in ruins.
About the same time, across the Atlantic, another story
was unfolding. Harry Benton, a young U. S. Government employee
traveling in Eastern Europe, stopped for a drink in a stylish bar. He
was bored, lonely, and, being 6,000 miles from his wife, longed for
female companionship. To his surprise and delight, he was joined by a
dark-haired, sensuous Russian beauty named Natasha.
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The exchange of idle banter and the flow of vodka created
a spirit of mutual empathy which led the young man to venture the
proposition, "I suppose it's quite obvious that this American would like
to make love to you." She replied quickly, perhaps too quickly,
"Alright, then we shall."
The sultry Russian proceeded to escort the U. S. Govern-
ment employee to her apartment, where the American was treated to
an evening of pleasure.
Little did naive Harry suspect that the lovely Natasha was
a KGB agent. Little did he know that his dalliance with Natasha was
being filmed and recorded by agents of the KGB. Little did the young
man realize that he had foolishly gotten involved in a classic,
compromising situation which left him vulnerable to a blackmail
attempt by the KGB.
Luckily, Harry Benton blunted the threat of any KGB
coercion by revealing the full details of his foolish escapade to the
appropriate Federal authorities upon his return to Washington, D. C.
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the Nation's capital, another
American was about to become ensnared by the maneuverings of a
hostile intelligence service. Jack Wilson, an earnest young college
student had achieved his fondest ambition. He had received an
appointment to work as a staff member on Capitol Hill. This gave
him the opportunity to serve his country--he had strong patriotic
feelings--and to learn a great deal about government. It also gave
him the opportunity to meet and converse with interesting people.
One such interesting person was a "reporter" from a
Warsaw Pact country. Upon their meeting at a reception held at the
Soviet Embassy, the reporter regaled the impressionable young man
with attention. He told Jack that, as a reporter, he was very much
interested in the student's impressions of American political affairs.
The reporter continued to foster the budding friendship in future
meetings. The aide was flattered that an important figure from a
great European state would find a lowly staff member, such as
himself, worthy of companionship. Jack's ego was further boosted
when the reporter requested him to prepare articles for his
"newspaper." The articles consisted of profiles of Congressmen,
analyses of political trends in the United States, and other such
topics. Eventually, the reporter also began to request official reports
and documents for use by his newspaper, explaining that his editors
liked documentation. Eager to please his impressive acquaintance,
the young man was only too willing to comply.
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Alas, the "reporter" was not a reporter. He was a
resourceful and wily KGB agent. The aide's "newspaper articles"
were not meant for any Moscow Gazette. They were meant for the
eyes of Soviet intelligence officers. Thus, ironically, far from helping
his own country, the young American became an unknowing tool of a
hostile intelligence service.
Are these passages from a John LeCarre' or Ian Fleming
novel? Are they scenes from a spy movie or TV thriller? No, the
situations described actually occurred in the very recent past,
although the names of the individuals involved have been fictional-
ized. They illustrate some tactics used by hostile intelligence
services to entrap people who have access, or even possible access, to
classified and unclassified strategic information. They exemplify the
unceasing efforts of hostile nations to acquire, through whatever
means necessary, America's vital knowledge.
The decade of the 1970's has witnessed a distinct decrease
in international tensions. But, although world tensions have dimin-
ished, this does not mean that America can now neglect its national
defenses. For many reasons, the international scene remains a
dangerous place for the United States. Numerous countries through-
out the world, due to ideology, economic interests and other
considerations, have foreign policy objectives which run counter to or
pose a threat to the interests of the United States.
Stark evidence that the international environment is still
threatening to American interests is afforded by the fact that,
despite a lessening of international tensions, espionage activities
directed against the United States have not declined in the past
decade. In fact, since the number of known or suspected hostile
intelligence personnel operating in the United States has, in compari-
son to the 1950's and the 1960's, increased in the 1970's, one could
conclude that espionage has actually increased in the last decade.
Espionage is the illegal gathering, through clandestine
means, of information or material affecting national security. As
described in Federal law, espionage is the gathering of information or
material relating to the national defense and/or delivering, transmit-
ting or communicating it to any person not entitled to receive it or to
any foreign government with the intent or reason to believe that it is
to be used towards the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation. Such activities are proscribed by the United
States Code, Title 18, Chapter 37.
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Ironically, the relaxed international scene has actually
helped to create conditions which make espionage all the easier. For,
with these relaxed tensions came a dramatic increase in trade,
scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges and commercial
visitors from the Soviet Union and other communist countries. In the
past five years, the number of communist country officials assigned
in the United States has increased by over 300, a total of 15%, and
the number of commercial exchange and business visitors from
communist countries has more than doubled since 1972. Experience
has shown that a substantial number of these individuals are working
for their respective intelligence services, thus greatly increasing the
potential for espionage operations.
The intelligence data that may be the target of espionage
activities can take many forms. To the inexpert eye the targeted
data can be of obvious importance or may be, just as readily,
seemingly innocuous. It can be technological, political, scientific,
economic, sociological, geographical, and even personal information
on individuals, particularly those with current or potential access to
information of intelligence value. Of particular importance to a
foreign intelligence service is the identification of what constitutes
our vital political, economic, and military intentions, and the theft of
America's military and scientific secrets. The principal repositories
of such data are the United States Government and industries holding
Government contracts relating to national defense.
At the very least, the acquisition of such data or material
by a communist country may benefit the economy or security of that
nation. Of concern, however, is the fact that the acquisition of
certain types of information by a hostile intelligence service will not
only assist that service's country, but will also damage the United
States' national security by giving the other nation a military,
political or economic advantage over the United States. National
security amounts to, essentially, the maintenance of United States
territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international freedom of action.
Hence, in the broadest sense, the protection of "national security"
can be viewed as the preservation of the United States as an
independent and viable nation-state.
DEFENDING AMERICA'S SECRETS
To protect the national security from damage caused by
the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive, strategic information, the
Executive Branch of the United States Government has established a
system whereby such vital information is "classified." There are
three levels of classifications, and the basis for each level of
classification is the degree to which the unauthorized disclosure of
information would damage the national defense or foreign relations,
that is the national security of the United States.
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Based upon this system, the material which is granted the
highest degree of protection is classified "Top Secret." The
unauthorized disclosure of such material could cause "exceptionally
gravel' damage to the national security. Exceptional damage would
entail disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national
security, the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex
cryptographic and communications intelligence systems, or the
disclosure of scientific or technical developments vital to the
national security. "Top Secret" material warrants maximum protec-
tion.
Material which, if disclosed, would cause "serious" damage
to national security is classified "Secret." Examples of serious
damage are the disruption of foreign relations significantly damaging
to the national security, disclosure of significant scientific or
technological developments relating to national security, or the
exposure of significant military plans or intelligence operations.
"Secret" material also requires a substantial degree of protection.
The lowest level of classification is "Confidential." If
disclosed, "Confidential" material could cause damage to the national
security. "Confidential" is applied to material which requires some
protection. Classified data of all levels must be maintained and
protected in a special manner. Only Government employees and
persons in the private sector who have "clearances" may view this
material on a need-to-know basis. Controls are placed upon its
accessibility, transmittal and storage.
The classification system is by no means a random or
frivolous tool. Its purpose is the well-being and safety of the United
States of America--the national security. It is judiciously and
carefully applied. Within the United States Government there are
only a limited number of specifically designated officials of the
Executive Branch, in offices concerned with national security, who
have the authority to classify documents. Material is carefully
reviewed before being classified and, if there are any doubts about
the particular level of classification a document warrants, the lowest
possible classification level is applied. Indeed, if a document is
unnecessarily classified or overclassified, the official responsible for
the faulty classification may be subject to administrative sanctions.
If a document carries the label "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confiden-
tial," one can be certain that it contains material vital to the national
security. Such material should be handled and guarded with the
greatest care.
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The protection of national secrets--preventing the disclo-
sure of certain information-may seem to have lost importance in this
age of "leaks" and exposes in the press. Indeed, in some cases,
individuals have actually achieved a degree of fame and glamor as a
result of their disclosures of classified information. They are viewed
as heroes by many people for their wholesale unveiling of classified
information. And barely a week goes by without a book being
published, a newspaper appearing, or a TV program broadcast which
includes, or appears to include, some leaked, classified information.
Perhaps more so than at any time in our history, we have
entered an age of "open government"--an age in which a flood of
information flows freely from sources which were at one time tightly
bound. In this atmosphere of openness, a person can readily come to
believe that there is no need for security, no need for secrecy. This
is simply not true. The classification system was created for the
most compelling of reasons--the preservation of national security.
The system is designed so that information not requiring protection
may be disclosed. On the other hand, it is designed to assure that
information vital to America's security is not scattered about the
countryside. As an individual who has access to sensitive informa-
tion, it is your responsibility to comply with and respect this system
and do your share in guarding America's Top Secret, Secret, and
Confidential data.
Intelligence collection--the world of espionage and coun-
terespionage, spies and spy catchers--is a popular subject of fiction.
It has been topic of countless books, short stories, TV serials, and
movies. The role of the spy, the "Secret Agent," has become so
sensationalized and exaggerated that it is very easy to think that
spies exist only in the minds of fiction writers, that spying belongs in
the same category as science fiction and westerns. Do not believe it.
Spies do exist, and literally hundreds of spies, or Intelli-
gence Officers, as they are officially known, and their agents are at
this moment plying their treacherous trade within the United States.
The principal source of these Intelligence Officers is the Soviet
Union, but the USSR's allied nations in Eastern Europe, as well as
Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and smaller Asian communist
nations such as North Korea and Vietnam, also dispatch spies to our
shores.
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Their main objective is the wholesale collection of data.
The most prized type of intelligence data is the classified Govern-
ment document, but unclassified material-even material which
appears to be trivial- can also be of inestimable value. In their task
of gathering intelligence data, the foreign intelligence services have
a large array of tools. Satellites miles above the earth's surface
gather photographic data. Aircraft and vessels gather electronic
intelligence. But a further source of data, and potentially the most
valuable to a hostile nation, is that acquired through the use of actual
spies.
Intelligence services may gather their information through
the use of several different techniques. Probably the greatest
achievement an intelligence organization can have is the placement
or recruitment of an agent directly in a sensitive position in a
national defense or intelligence element of an opposing Government.
The penetration by live or electronic sources of private institutions
involved in sensitive, national defense-related research and develop-
ment work can also be of tremendous value.
Hostile intelligence collectors ply Washington and other
locations where strategic data can be collected. They gain their
desired information wherever, whenever, and from whomever it can
be had.
Hostile intelligence officers employ various tactics in
their campaigns to enlist target employees. They may use a honeyed,
seemingly guileless approach. They befriend targets, treat them to
gifts and money, wine and dine them. Many Soviet and other
communist agents believe that Americans are hopeless materialists,
and can be easily swayed by appeals to their alleged greed.
In another maneuver, a hostile intelligence officer misrep-
resents himself as a citizen of a country friendly to the United
States. Thus, a targeted American may be duped into handing over
sensitive information by being led to believe that he is aiding an ally
of the United States. In variation of this tactic, an intelligence
officer poses as a representative of a non-communist country towards
which a targeted American is particularly sympathetic.
If a hostile agent believes that an individual has commu-
nist or similar sympathies, he may make an appeal for information
based on ideology. A "pitch" for information may also be geared to
take advantage of an American's desire for international harmony and
world peace.
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Another favored appeal exploits the American belief in
freedom of speech and the free exchange of information. A hostile
intelligence officer in the role of a scientist may, for example, tell an
American scientist that science has no political boundaries. There-
fore, in the interests of science, the American is encouraged to share
his knowledge with a fellow "member" of the international scientific
community.
But intelligence agents can also play rough in their
ceaseless quest for strategic information. To such people espionage is
a business. If they feel coercion and blacken' ,il will serve their
purpose, they will not hesitate to employ those methods. The honeyed
approach can readily turn sour if an agent determines that a targeted
employee has personal inadequacies which that employee does not wish
to have exposed.
Another tactic is the exploitation of a "hostage situation."
If, for example, a foreign intelligence service learns that a target
employee has relatives in Eastern Europe or the USSR, that employee
is in an extremely vulnerable position. First will come gentle
persuasion (an agent may produce "letters" from so-called relatives
calling for the American to "cooperate"). If that doesn't work, the
agent can suggest that harsh measures could be applied to the
relatives.
You should therefore be wary of glad-handing strangers
who make an intensive effort at forming a friendship, and then slowly
but surely begin to use that friendship to learn where you work, the
nature of your assignment, who you work with. A generous and
inquisitive stranger could very well be the proverbial wolf in sheep's
clothing.
One should also be wary of strangers who ask for
information not related to their professed area of interest or do not
seem to be particularly knowledgeable in their field. Thus, if a
"scientist" requests data not related to his field, or does not seem to
know much about his supposed area of expertise, then he could very
well be an imposter.
The operative of a foreign intelligence service need not be
a foreigner, nor need the occasion of your encountering him be in any
way extraordinary. The neighbor you might meet at a PTA meeting
could be a foreign diplomat who lives down the block, or he could be a
fellow American who has been recruited as an agent by a hostile
service. He could be a "spotter," who reports to an intelligence
service on persons he meets who appear to be susceptible to
recruitment and, sometimes, arranges for intelligence officers to
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meet them. Do not expect either the intelligence officer or agent to
expose his role in any dramatic and sudden fashion. Usually there is a
long period of cultivation during which your conversations could be
completely normal and innocuous. However, at any point where
someone begins to inquire into aspects of your knowledge or activity
which are classified or otherwise private, you should certainly stop to
consider whether the inquiry is normal innocent curiosity or whether
it might be the beginning of an attempt to secure intelligence
information for the benefit of another country.
It cannot be overemphasized that unclassified material
may be just as valuable to a foreign intelligence service as classified
material. In formulating their estimations of U. S. strengths and
weaknesses, and in the quest for data that will enhance their own
nation's strength, foreign intelligence services seek all types of
material. A small bit of information could represent a very
important piece in a much larger puzzle. Therefore, all data should
be protected from the probing hands of foreign agents. A stolen
industrial process can save thousands of dollars in research and
development cost. The most trivial document could be the missing
link for a hostile nation's problem.
In the effort to protect America's secrets, the role of the
Security Officer must be emphasized. Each Government agency and
private industry which deals with classified material has a specified
official in charge of security matters. This Security Officer should
be recognized as an ally and not an adversary. If you are approached
by a suspicious stranger in the manner described above, the Security
Officer should be informed immediately of your encounter. Even if a
friendship has been established, even if the individual has been able to
pry loose some information, the Security Officer should be consulted.
A major aspect of the Security Officer's job is to protect employees
from getting involved in compromising situations and, if necessary, to
extricate them from such situations. Such assistance cannot be
rendered if the employee remains silent. Of course, it is much better
for an employee to reveal a suspect relationship voluntarily, rather
than have it come to light in the course of a security investigation, or
through some other means. Then, it may be too late for anyone to
assist the indiscreet employee. Basically, it cannot be overempha-
sized that, if involved in a compromising situation, the sooner the
employee consults his Security Officer, the better. Of course, some-
times you will be in a place or situation where you cannot, or for
some reason don't want to, contact your security officer. Remember
that in the United States, the F7BI is as close as your nearest
telephone. Directions for contacting our offices appear in the front
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of all U. S. telephone books. Abroad, the nearest United States
diplomatic establishment can arrange to put you in touch with the FBI
or other appropriate U. S. Government security officials. Once again,
it must be stressed that your best course of action in any of the
questionable situations mentioned herein is to immediately relate the
facts to a counterintelligence professional who will be able to analyze
the situation and propose a course of action. Effective counterintel-
ligence is a demanding and professional discipline, and any attempts
by untrained or uninformed amateurs to handle hostile efforts on
their own could not only result in personal disaster, but also interfere
with the FBI's coordinated counterattack.
Finally, it must be stressed that the threat posed by
foreign intelligence agencies cannot be underestimated. History is
replete with situations in which a nation's security was gravely
damaged by the efforts of a hostile nation's intelligence services. In
our own history, the breaking of the Japanese Secret Code helped to
bring U. S. victory in the Pacific during World War II. On the other
hand. the theft of some of our key atomic secrets greatly abetted the
interests of the Soviet Union. The craft of spies is by no means a
game. The very fate of nations can be damaged or enhanced by their
enterprises.
A philosopher once said, "Knowledge itself is power." This
maxim most certainly applies to national power, for one gauge of
national power is the amount and quality of scientific, technological,
and military related knowledge possessed by a nation. A nation such
as the United States can be weakened by the theft of its vital
knowledge, and its enemies can be strengthened by the acquisition of
that knowledge, whether it be classified or unclassified. It is the
responsibility of each individual who has been entrusted with sensitive
data to do his or her share in protecting America's strategic
knowledge, whether it be classified "Top Secret" or seemingly
unimportant, unclassified material. For if Americans do not conduct
themselves in a responsible and patriotic manner, do not recognize
that this country's national security is based essentially upon the
loyalty and efforts of its citizens, then the tightest document
classification system, the most efficient security organizations, and
the mightiest armed forces may be utterly valueless.
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