FINAL REPORT, OSD VIETNAM TASK FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R000900090004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 15, 1969
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 200Oe10IORDP931301194R000900.090004-0
Completed
v_.y 99
. Paul C. .Tar retie' ASD/ISA
n.-:su y
olicy ~'_.---;j --.sr, or s Co,.t_olf1S:~
Final Rep or;., OSD V_etr_a.:: Task Force
On June 17, 1907, S'scre~a r Robert S. i~,C12 ara. directed ~'.^.at a '.,ask Forge
SS _or med to study the history of Uni~ed S,.,-;.,.es involvement in VieTlna:",
70
ly to
f=o... A'Dr..d, ri-- IT to tresent. Mr. Mci\amaras guidance was si
ac .~ c eS --"-at were 7iefCyCiODeC .c and ocjeCvlVe. With Six full-tine
,. ; SSlo. ais assigned to the, Tas'_i Force, we were to- co-=.7 ete our work
- tree :no moths. r- year and a half aver, a .Wiu:: the 1:_VOlve :en of s `x
=~ s S3 `Jrofessio a1s, we are ., ly done to the tune oam' ~L: 'v~f-seven
and _- -ice collet io. S of documents conta'i. e..:i.s for cy-once volumes.
i. a Mr. ara gave e Task Force fuall access to OdD files,
--e Task Force received access to CIA naterials~ 2 C. Some use of hate
a= amen cables and i;e oran a. We read no access to ouse ~iles.
(`i `" 31Cy ~Ce Dro ].b1 tea. personal intue:Views witvh any of t e p.:inc_pa1 _Ja oiC=
e resu was ; of so much a documentary history, as a history based. solely
o" documents -- c ec--ed and rechecked w] ant-like diligence. Pieces of
fomida'ale and surges Live by, v'.^.e~ selves could have .. ? :v :uch or : othi_. .
P:;_ Fars this document was never sent any here, a d ,per a S ~. au o , though
co=t .led -a-7o:, was irrelevant. Without t e memories of people to tell us,
W were certain to make mistakes. Yet, uSirg those memories ^ig v Iave teen
mis.ea ing as well. This approach to research was bound to lead to disto~1onS,
::~. cisto yions we are sure aoo uma. in these studies.
To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just to see what he
"o`~.ms_de world" was thir'ciro, we turned to nensp tiers, periodicals, a -,a vooks.
T:e never used these sources to supplant he classified documeni:s, Cut o^.ly to
.. eve
;i.. ...J_.........,.. _l1. .em. A dl because these doc:.me ts, so :44'_: es 4T_^1~ -en by very
som much and desired to say only a pa-?`t and some'. Imes written very
a' 50 can t_'adic or ily, are not immediate self-= evea! i y or self-
i. tier of r[ searchers _oo at them
we to have a
- - _ S a e a ? u r YSreo'/e_ , When we :. e : we C3. A c.:
..._a
v/v. .Mv -v.Y Gomez_ ong V4'v of co:_ve.'Lu, we i .c-uiec. the j`': ole ra a r
- rye 2iv;'- Sc Cam' G'._ Gw c' _c:.S'.= Force s, .~_F_~ i L c '7;~ S V
__ sec..- vo fend -off yitab1e is....-__es in on r. ....:..~ ....-:G_..ti :c.. us .,,. tints were reviewed ^and. _._...._.:.c..ei-. SC:re .r_- I .. ove
_ `.. i n s?JJY...`_ce, tit seg.,,,=.=...?L, stud .es. x.. 47 -".. wr v~_.V~. ..._.._ C_' ~.vvv _~_ tiLJ
Approved For Relea&e-200210&12' `-;6rA-!*o093BOrTI% t~f0'W6b90004-0 --_._
 Apps- eeF Ear Relea ' Y0~1/'6~f2~I~ Cdr RDP9 61 Y94F~(~9( 6090004"0= -
.~ v_ ~,.~.` ? vv. .I~v.._ " iv_ v~n....v ... .'..~, .J... .1.: __., .: ~. uv ~:7. it ~, .,. V~ ~. v.-... .i.;,
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v..,_::1. '.,j l,.op1e came --cm Lrc- _ces, c_-~..;,
OSD, and. ao ~? ~i:i _.% a .. ~1s. ? o e Ca n'e -oJr a mo ., nor three months, w_
J'.lr.V.. L,
were 7Ia. the unh ~J~J.:.. .~:/.~ G~ v .1:~_ SU,
~J e____/-. S SvOS 'y 7_.. J .OSV all the St dies S UCrc 4 1 :Jr S,
L .v J_^O ~^
CeSS0_ #~J
u_y~' LO J;C_`. ~?7 v .a Z 4^ ~JCO :i
nal ~ tl V.;.,., es Y1
Y .:. G... v_?__ uV-5_.{ 0. G_25Sr.G $ l7rl:'.a.%.~j on these s4 .., K~l.aa an average of
-s man.
v, style and. -__-se rest of sac studies varies cons ierably. e
parts and 1V.A, concerning the years ~j rJ to ~c0; end.
t oe raw "ally r;G ,-J tar v, i+'~J--"411 u ough va~ere are many interesting : idbi s.?
3oc use generally
of the documents in this -period were lose or not keot. (except
oen v . Conference era) we had to rely more on outside resources.
`_ J.~v,961 G :'.;ar s (Pa v5 I 'V.3 and. C and V1-C), the records were `ountiful,
es C=_' ~ y o : the first Kennedy year-in of ice, the Diem coup, a d on o he
e,s v_ the .a.,eDloy: e .t of ground forces, the decisions s',zrrou d ng the
d.u 4CW~i,S at
, U..-GLi ~ rClc..u.l?OrS and
J at
2?"2'?~?:s Worth Vie"na m t
egos at_r~ a settlement Of the cor__lic;..
a, ost all the studies contain both a Sunary and. Analysis and a Chron_olo r.
o- ca e, de , docume n ary source. The S,..=a =y and.
aat;..GS ai:.-
SCi.u.'`G:18, which WrGvc"', 2.4ue:-`":vl.l to Ca:Ju'w? the main un ^
_a^ s o- he :: o""ographs--'an LL VO -L-4:e some j ua~pe us and speculations which
m.-y Gr a_ay not a the2 vex. itself. 1'^_2 ,7G; ograp S themselves stick,
2'J_ 2cr in by and, la ^ge?, to the documents and do not tend. to be 'analytical. .? _swoR,l es ecialiy w ere _V blends into cl.rrent events, es ec_a_ly
w .-ere -U-at current event is Vietnam, is c, treacherous exercise. We could
not 30 into the minds of the decision--m. V:erS, we were not -resent at ---a
eec sio S, and we O en could not tell whether So--ething hap_ enec. because
so ': G e a -'duel :i-' decided against it, Or most 'likely beta se it unfolded
_ro w the s' ,^ti n~ History., to me, has been expressed by a passage from
,
?~ *~-'',Ville t S "`'`GbV Di C!{ where r2 -he wiit2S : u1'.^_i5 i5 c^. wOrlG Of, Chan e,
-2-,....'c
.
w a si y all. i t,?.? eavinvly working to'-'et. er as ones
Ca::c _y i.I_es eiz' e:. and has the last feat=in 0 slow c.4 eve nvs. t~
VIVi- -, nc-,r tab y in
+1 ? , ? ?~ . CJ .ve .-~?I%. 4 V r2-, 2C 4 Vaal s
? \.J jv .:-_ yr and. n Y r _-~ ocess, they ar_pea to assign more nless to . en a =i=
-zr
wi Was Brae 'case.
of,
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 I. 8 May 1969 NLF 10-Points
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A;-I) II. 9 may 69 L 3 SOUTH VIETNAM
Proceeding from a desire to reach a political solution with a view to ending the U.S.
Imperialists' war of aggression in South Vietnam and helping restore peace in Vietnam;
on the basis of the guarantee of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese
people; proceeding from the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements on
Vietnam and the actual situation in Vietnam; on the basis of the political programme
and the 5-point position of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, which
keep with the 4-point stand of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;
the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation sets forth the principles and main
content of an overall solution to the South Vietnam problem to help restore peace
in Vietnam as follows:
1. To respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, L. e". indpendence,
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements
on Vietnam-
2. The.U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military persorna
arms and war aateriel, and all troops, military personnel, arms and war materiel of the
other foreign countries of the U.S. camp without posing any condition whatsoever;
liquidate all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam; renounce all encroachments on the
sovereignty, territory and security of South.Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam.
3. The Vietnamese people's right to fight for the defence of their fatherland is
the sacred, inalienable right to self-defence of all peoples. The question of the
Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties
among themselves,
4. The people of South Vietnam settle themselves. their own affairs without foreign
interference. They decide themselves the political regime of South Vietnam through
free and democratic general elections. Through free and democratic general elections,
a constituent assembly will be set up, a constitution worked out, and a coalition
government of South Vietnam installed, reflecting national concord and the broad union
of all social strata.
50 'During the'period.intertrering'between the'-restoration of peace and the-holding of
general. elections, neither.party shall impose its political regime on the people of
South Vietnam. The political forces representing the various social strata and
political tendencies in South Vietnam that stand for peace, independence and neutrality,
including those persons who, for political reasons, have to live abroad, will enter
into talks to set up a provisional coalition government based on the principle of
equality, democracy and mutual respect with a view to achieving a peaceful;.independent,
democratic and neutral South Vietnam. The provisional coalition government is to have
the following tasks:
a) To implement the agreements to be concluded on the withdrawal of-the troops of
the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp, etc.
b) To achieve national concord, and a broad union of all social strata, political forces,
nationalities, religious communities, and all persons, no matter what their political
belief and their past may be, provided they stand for peace, independence and neutrality.
c) To achieve broad democratic freedoms--freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom
of gathering, freedom of belief, freedom to form political parties and organizations,
freedom to demonstrate, etc.; to set free those persons jailed on political grounds;
to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal and discrimination.
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TI. 9 May 69 L 4 SOUTH VIETNAM
d) To heal the war rounds, to restore and develop the econony, to restore thF
normal life of the people, and to improve the living conditions of the labcuri
people.
e) To hold free and democratic general elections in the whole of South Vietnam with
a view to achieving the South Vietnam peoples right to self-determination, in
accordance with the content of point 4 mentioned above.
To carry out a policy of good neighbourly relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia on
the basis of respect for her independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial
integrity within her present borders; to carry out a pot ic.- of good neibhbourly
relations with the Kingdom of Laos on the basis of respect for the 1962 Geneva
agreements on Laos. To establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with
all countries, irrespective of political and social regime, including the United
States, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence: "mutual
respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression,
non-interference in the internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful
coexistence;. to accept economic and technical aid with no political conditions
attached from any country.
7--The reunification of Vietnam will be ac:.ieved step by step, by peaceful means,
through discussions and agreement between th two zones, without foreign interference.
Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, the two zones reestablish normal
relations in all fields on the basis of mutual respect. -
The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th _.arallel, as provided
for by the 1954 Geneva agreements, is only of a provisional character and does not
constitute in any way a political or territorial boundary.
The two zones reach agreement on the statute of the demilitarized zone, and work
out modalities for movements across the provisional military demarcation line.
8--As provided for in the 1954 Geneva agreem-^nts -~.n Vietnam; pending the peaceful
reunification of Vietnam, the two zones -ior and south of Vietnam undertake to
refrain from joining any military all'.:ice .'th foreign countries, not to allow any
foreign-country to maintain military bases, troops and military personnel on their
respective soil, and not to recognize the protection of any country or military
alliance or bloc.
9--To resolve the aftermath of the war;
a) The parties will negotiate the release of the armymen captured in war.
b) The U.S. Government must bear full responsiblity for the losses and devastations
it has caused to the Vietnamese people in both zones.
10--The parties shall reach agreement on an international supervision about the
withdrawal from South Vietnam of the troops, military personnel, arms and war materiel
of the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp.
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 I.I. 9 Nay 69 L 5 SOUTH VIETN,'~
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The principles and content of the overall solution expounded above form an integrated
trhole. On the bads of these principles and content, the parties shall reach
understanding to the effect of concluding agreements on the above-mentioned questions
with a view to ending the war in South Vietnam, and contributing to restore peace
in Vietnam.
The overall solution put forward by the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation
fully meets the national rights of-the Vietnamese people and the interests of world
peace.
The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, which has, organized and led the
South Vietnamese people' in their struggle against U.S. aggression, is the authentic
representative of the South Vietnam people, fully competent to settle all problems
relating to South Vietnam. The aforesaid overall solution to the South Vietnam
problem proposed by the NFLSV once again demonstrated our correct position, and our
consistent goodwill and serious intent.
This overall solution ensures the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese
people and the right to self-determination of the South Vietnam people. It ensures
a lasting peace in Vietnam. It embodies the spirit of broad national concord of
the South Vietnam people and the national front in Indo-China and Southeast Asia,
responds 'to the aspirations for peace of'Aneri.can people as well as the world's
people'. .This solution creates conditions for the United States to put an honourable
end to its war, a war which is costly in human life and property, unpopular and
prejudicial to the U.S. prestige.
The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation is firmly confident that the
people of both South and North Vietnam, standing shoulder to shoulder in their.
common struggle for independence, freedom and peace, will no doubt wholeheartedly
support this overall solution.
The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, which is closely united with the
Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces,.. believes that because of
its policy of broad national union and concord, all religious, political, social
a:ad cultural organizations in South Vietnam, all political forces and Vietnamese
residents abroad will warmly hail this solution; and the national-minded members
of the Saigon army and administration will sympathize with it.
The people and governments of the socialist countries.and of the peace- and justice-
loving countries, the peace and democratic organizations in this world, which have
always given glorious support to the South Vietnam people's resistance war against
U.S-. aggression for. national salvation, will surely support the overall solution
to the South Vietnam problem put forward by the National Front for Liberation.-
Together with the progressive people in the United States, those American personalities,
intellectuals and clergymen who have voiced their opposition to the U.S. unjust
war in Vietnam, and those American servicemen who are fed up with the war of aggression
and who desire to be rapidly brought home, will no doubt sympathize with this solution
too.
The overall solution to the South Vietnam problem we have expounded. above is very
l.~gieol and reasonable, The United States Government must adopt a serious attitude.
It :oust pub an end to its ;,ar of aggression, abandon. Its manoeuvre of maintaining
neo-colonialism in South Vietnam, and respect the right of the Vietnamese people
to settle themselves their internal affairs, without. foreign interference.
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