A PROGRAM FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B01090R002600080050-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: November 21, 1962
• Content Type: REQ

Approved For Relay 2001/011d:2B01090ROOp'0080050-7
Attachment to
USIB-D-41.5/39, Final
(COMOR-D-24/31)
USIB -Approved
21 November 1962
A Program for Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba
1. With the dismantling of the MRBM/IRBM sites in Cuba and the
removal of most of the missile equipment from Cuba,. the intelligence
needs.. of the community can no longer be expressed, in terms of "offensive
weapons" alone. During the course of the past week this change in intel-
ligence needs. has been reflected. in modifications. of the emphasis given
various aspects of our reconnaissance program. It is therefore appro--
priate at this time.to review the present program of reconnaissance, to
determine the immediate and continuing. intelligence needs, and to deter-
mine the reconnaissance program appropriate to their. satisfaction.
2. The current intelligence requirements susceptible of satis-
faction by reconnaissance are continuous: knowledge of the deployment
and operational status of significant weapons systems already known to
be in Cuba, and detection of any new weapons systems as. they are brought
in.to Cuban ports and deployed throughout the island. This information is
required to provide our. policy makers with a continuous picture of the
Soviet/Cuban posture, and to provide our planners with the detailed
information they need to plan for and, if necessary, conduct operations
in Cuba.
3. .Fxpressed.in terms. of reconnaissance collection means, we
can divide the requirement into four. categories:
a. Periodic surveillance of known installations
b. Periodic and special reconnaissance of Soviet shipping
c. Special coverage of sp ific, selected objectives
d. General search
4. Surveillance. There are several weapons systems known to
exist in Cuba which require regular and.frequent coverage to maintain
a current estimate of their capabilities, and the extent of Soviet plans
to use. them. These include primarily the IL-28 bomber forces, the
MIG-15, 17, 19 and 21 jet fighters and fighter bombers, the suspect
Soviet Army infantry and armored installations and vehicle parks, the
coastal ci?2iSe.missiles, and the KOMAR PGMGs, These installations
TS #188171
Approved For Release 2001/ 4 pi 92B01090R002600080050-7
 Approved For Relde 2001/09/po)Cr1..B01090ROOd0080050-7
Attachment to
USIB-D,-41. 5./39, Final
(COMOR-D-24/31)
USIB-Appx,oved
21 November 1962
and weapons demand frequent cover at the present time, although changes
in the situation may modify the frequency required. There are other
weapons systems and military installations. which require surveillance,
although not so frequent as those systems just mentioned. In this category
can be placed the SA-2 sites, the secondary naval forces, the exclusively
Cuban army encampments, the secondary airfields. Finally the status of
Cuban/Soviet defenses in the vicinity of certain specific areas, such as
Drop Zones and Landing Beaches, must be ascertained at regular. intervals.
All of these requirements can only be satisfied in the main by overhead
25X1 D reconnaissance. In large measure, the SAC U-2 program, BRASS. KNOB,
can provide the bulk of the cover, supplemented at intervals, partic.ularl
in the case of ground force e ui ment, by a program like the
25X1D Specific objectives, with proposed
requencies and type cover recommended are listed in TAB A.
5. Shipping Reconnaissance. There remains in Cuba, at Mariel
and Casilda, equipment associated with'the MRBM/IRBM sites. It will
be necessary to continue reconnaissance of i:hese ports until this equipment
has been removed. There are also ships enroute to Cuba at the present
time, as well as ships already in Cuban waters, which are known to have
participated in the arms lift earlier this. year. In order to determine
expeditiously what new military equipment is being brought into Cuba, it
will be necessary to maintain relatively frequent surveillance of the
primary ports with on call high resolution reconnaissance to identify the
types of equipment in each case. Much of the general information will be
available from other sources, especially C I111CLANTts Fleet Air
Reconnaissance program. However, the greater part of our `knowledge
will require overhead reconnaissance of the ports, while the ships are in,
with both high and low altitude aircraft. See TAB B for specific objectives.
6. Special Coverage. From time to time intelligence will be
received, from a variety of sources, which will indicate the presence
of various military installations and weaponsa In order for policy makers
to act upon this intelligence, confirmation will be desirable. This con-
firmation can best be provided by overhead photographic reconnaissance.
TS #188171
Approved For Release 2001/09/04:.CIA-RQP92B01090R002600080050-7
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Rehmie 2001 /09!D4FC ZB01090R0 00080050-7
Attachment to
USIB-D-41.5/ 39, Final
(COMOR-D-24/ 31)
USIB -Approved
.21 November .1962
The existence of reported installations can generally be confirmed, and
their location precisely determined,. by high altitude U-2 photography.
In some cases. this will also be' sufficient to ascertain. the nature of the
installation. In other cases, however, only low level, high resolution
cover can provide the photo quality necessary to an accurate determination
of function. There will also be installations detected by high 'altitude search
cover which will require low level confirmation and identification. In view
of the extensive use of cover and concealment by the Soviets, this. low level
coverage will need to be frequent. In addition there may be need for. photo-
graphic evidence of military installations which. policy makers can use in
the various forums where they deal. All of these needs will require
overhead reconnaissance, using both high and low level aircraft, of
selected installations on. a. one-time cover basis. Some examples of ob-
jectives in. this category,. which are 'awaiting verification at the time of
this writing, will be found in TAB C.
7. Search. The nature of our. intelligence activities in regard to
Cuba. is such. that new installations could be built undetected. or new
equipment brought in and deployed without our knowledge. To protect
against this potentiality, there is a need for frequent search cover of
the entire island to detect new installations (including any suspect nuclear
storage sites) and new deployments of weapons, There will also be a'need
for determining, by aerial search of relatively large areas, the exact loca-
tion of weapons or installations reported to be present. Under. current
conditions, BRASS KNOB` on a periodic basis appears to offer the most
potential for accomplishing such a task. Weather permitting, weekly
coverage of the entire island is required.
8. Conclusions. Our current program of reconnaissance using
a mix of high and low level photo reconnaissance is essentially what we
must continue for the foreseeable future if we are to satisfy our outstanding
intelligence requirements.
TS #188171
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002600080050-7
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Rel 2001 /09/ j IA ? 0l090R00 0080050-7
Attachment to
USIB-D-41.5/39, Final
(COMDR-D-24/31)
USIB-Approved
21 November 1962
9. Recommendation. It is recommended that the program` be
approved as defined in the attachments hereto, TABS A? B, and C. The
tabs will be updated on a continuing basis.
/s/
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance
nests that it be kept advised of the availability, readiness
,
and performance capabilities of such special recce capabilities in
order that it may adjust its requirements accordingly.
TS #188171
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92B01090R002600080050-7
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Reld#Aw'e 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92BO1090R00QV0080050-7
Tqb A.
USIB-D-41.5/39, Final
(COMDR-D-24/31)
USIB-Approved
21 November 1962
Periodic Surveillance Objectives
Objectives: COMOR Number Frequency Desired
High Altitude Low Altitude
A. Airfields
Daily Weekly/On-Call
Daily high altitude coverage of airfields listed is required to
determine:
1. Location, type, and number of aircraft,
2. Unusual concentration or dispersal of A./C
4.
25X1 B
Operational status of airfield.
San Julian A/F
Holguin A/F
Camilo Cienfuegos
San Antonio de losBanos
.Camaguey A/F
B. Major Military Encampments Daily Semi-weekly/On=Call
Although daily high-altitude coverage will detect a major change,
low-level coverage is needed on a semi-weekly bads if we are to maintain
current our estimates of Soviet ground force equipment and personnel, or
to make a determination of the capabilities, groupings, and possible
missions of these forces.
Artemise.
25X1A Remedios
Santiago de las Vegas
Holguin
- - TS L188171
Approved For Release 200-I7OB/04 SlAA B01090R002600080050-7
 Approved For Rel a 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92B01090R00Q00080050-7
Objectives COMOR Number
Cruise Missile Sites
USIB-D-41.5/39, Final
(COMOB-D-2)+/31)
Tab A. (cont . )
Frequency Desired
High Altitude T,Ow Altitude
Weekly On-Call
Cruise missile sites will require high altitude coverage on the
order of once a week in order to detect any changes to the sites. Any
indications of change will require immediate low-level coverage.
Siguanea
Banes
Santa Cruz del Norte
La Sierra
Campo Florida
Guerra
D. KOMAR PGMG
Weekly Weekly/On-Call
Mariel Naval Base
Banes Naval Base
E. SA-2. Sites
Based on experience to date, we consider that on-ca1,l high-altitude
.coverage will be adequate to keep track of any changes in the general SA-2
picture. Low-altitude photography has provided some good technical detail
and on-call coverage by low-altitude aircraft can still add
TS # 188171
Approved For Release 2QQ JO!/04 sg6CF3p aB01090R002600080050-7
 T-O-P S-E-C-R -'T -T
Approved For Rel a 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92B01090R0 QMQA5f-739 Final
(COMDR-D-24/315
Tab A (cont.)
F. Beaches, Drop Zones Twice Weekly On-Call
CINCLANT contingency plans require accurate up-to-date infor-
mation on the condition of landing beaches and drop and landing zones,
if they are to be kept current. In addition to the condition of the
objectives themselves, access routes, obstacles, and the location of
enemy anti-aircraft weapons and counter landing forces must be
determined in detail if operations are to be enabled to proceed with
minimum casualties, and maximum opportunity of success. Twice-weekly
high-altitude reconnaissance must be. supplemented by low-level coverage
on call in order to provide the required detail concerning ground
forces materiel, disposition, and the nature and extent of obstacles.
G. Guantanamo Base Area Twice Weekly On-Call
To maintain an updated ground order of battle, i.e., concentration
of personnel and equipment, it is necessary to cover the Guantanamo area
twice weekly by high-altitude photography. Due to the small scale of
this photography it will at times be necessary to launch low level
aircraft to provide large-scale photography, so as to ascertain the
true functions and capabilities of specific areas which indicate intent
to attack or signs of extreme buildup.
H. Secondary Airfields Weekly On-Call
Weekly high-altitude coverage of secondary airfields is required
to determine:
1. Operational status of the airfield,
2. Unusual concentrations or dispersal of A/C,
3. Location, type, and number of A/C
Low-altitude coverage required as specific items are identified
and large-scale photography is required for detailed technical infor-
mation..
I. Secondary Military Ground Forces Weekly On-Call
Encampments and Vehicle Equipment Parks
Current contingency plans and national estimates require detailed
knowledge of ground order of battle and the state of readiness of the
ground forces in Cuba. Inventories of arms., artillery, vehicles, and
heavy equipment, the state of readiness, organization, disposition, and
the preparation of positions and field fortifications occupied or to be
occupied, all contribute to this knowledge. Weekly high-altitude sur-
veillance, supplemented by low-level reconnaissance of questionable
targets deemed sufficiently critical can, when subjected to detailed photo
interpretation, contribute in a major way to the satisfaction of this
requirement.
- 7-
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92BO109GROO200@O8SQ50-7
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved For Rele S'e 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92BO1090R00 0080050-7
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T Tab B
USIB-D-)+1.5/39 Final
(COMDR-D-2+/315
USIB-Approved.
21 November 1962
Shipping Surveillance
A. It is imperative that daily surveillance by means of high
altitude aircraft be obtained of certain key ports in Cuba. This
requirement is necessary in order to first ascertain which ships
are in port and whether they have any potential for loading or
unloading military cargo. Once this information is obtained by
photographic means (or any other available means) low level cover-
age will be necessary in order to ascertain the exact nature of the
cargo being off loaded. Equally important will be the determination
of what military equipment is being loaded for shipment out.
Havana
Mariel
Santiago de Cuba
La Isabela
C as ilda
Matanzas
Cardenas
Cienfuegos
Punta Gerardo
Caibarien
B. Secondary ports requiring weekly high altitude
Bahia Honda
Nuevitas
Punta Alegre
La Coloma
Nueva Gerona
Moa Bay
Cabanas
C. Addition of secondary or other ports to any days lists should
be made a matter of decision based upon information that ships are
enroute or expected.
- 8 - T.S.# 188171
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002600080050-7
 25X1 B
L Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002600080050-7
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92BO109OR002600080050-7
 Approved For Rele a 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP92B01090R0O2 0080050-7
TS #188171
Attachment to
USIB-D-41. 5/39, Final
(COMOR-D-24/ 31)
USIB-Approved
21 November 1962
Internal Distribution
Copy 22 . . . .
23. . . . .
24.
25. . . . .
26. . . .
27 . . .
28 . . .
~9...
30 . . .
32 . . .
34 . . . .
35.49. .
DD/ I TCO
DD/P TCO
DD/R
Director, NPIC
C / DMD/NPIC
C / CIA/ PAD/ NPIC
OCI TCO
OSI TCO
ORR TCO
AD/ OSA/DDR
Intel/ OSA/ DDR
SO/ OSA/D]R
TSO/CIA
C/SRS/DDR
DCI TCO (for USIB/S)
Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CTh-RDP92B01090R002600080050-7