HELPING HAND
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
44
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 12, 2000
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 28, 1982
Content Type:
NSPR
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STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 250008-1
WILMINGTON EVENING NEWS JOURNAL (DE)
28 MAY 1982
Helping Hand
Old friend surfaces as famous
I wonder if you could tell me if Hobby Ray Inman.
the CIA officer that has been in the news lately, ever
served aboard the U.S.S. Mullinix?
I was on that destroyer in the summer of 1961 and
the CIC officer aboard was LCDR Robert Inman. He
was intelligent (a Fulbright scholar), personable and
from the South. I would like to know if this is the same
man.
? DAL, Wilmington
One and the same.
Admiral Inman, who just recently resigned his num-
ber two post at the Central Intelligence Agency, served
aboard the Mullinix from April 1960 to September
1961. He was made Lieutenant Cnnunander in July
1961.
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ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASH LNGTON POST STATINTL
ONAlpi1OEwpg3For Releask24A1IpX97 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1
'Deputy Director of CIA:'
-
; ? By IVlic.tiael et1eri
WaahIngton Post Start '
ft,.: ? ? -
- The, Senate -Intelligence Committee
unanimously welcomed and approved the
;nomination of John ,N -McMahon
;uty director
4,
ne nspd I
?"'
riniikeii still ?11'-cOnfide--
; 4..4;
.in CIA Director; William J. :Casey :.ein4
;thud were relying especially on the
.deputy "to be straight with us.',.,
At the same time,--McMahon sought to
iiissUre the committee that new'presiden;7,
orders governing CIA operations did ,e-
triOt Mean that the agency would be ii
!---Volied in so-calle4 9ntrilsi.veVaiii4160/;,?
in this country involving US c'
't?
, Asked by Sen. Waiter 4.HuddlestOn
'.(D-Ky.) whether the panel would be .
formed whenever such techniques 'Ere -
,being used against Americans at home;":,
McMahon said: '
"I don't think the CIA will ever be 'in- ? 1J0112i N. McMAIION
volved in intrusive techniques against
mm
1kMeliCallS- here s the United Statei.' ,
m44..1.4144 immit4,44?1?
. ? .? ."
Should there be such a requirementftlie';';,?-best intelligence bfficerl have known;" a fields.. McMahon also is area
;FBI viould do thatIand'ProbablY compliment echoed by inanniriabeiri.; ; CIA insiders' Si being th-E.mt
"-r
court svarrant4t--A -- But &den carried the point much fur- to any form of outside, man.
-McMahon's and-Wei:'s'eenied7lo4 Ainong-,---hum' -other:SEW;he`."". intelligence.7' ? - -
yond a prepared -opening- statement to pointed out, the admiral "had .a heck of a In his alinement McMah
the committee in which he said:- relationship with this icommittee.' - allegiance to the benefits of 6-
"I would like to emphasize for the',? But ".... . Some of Us at least," Biden oversight of secret ,CIA act
. . .
record that the activities of the intern- - continued, '"don't always leap to embrace under questioning; promisec
:gence community. involving Americans '; the utterances of Mr. Casey as being th4. the committee. if he learned
are, and must.' continue to be, limited,- whole story, That my be a little unfair, - tant information had been w
'subject to strict standards . of raccounta- and let's assume it mi.." But the fact re-.... the , panel had been ,rnisler
bthty and far removed from any abridge:: mains, Biden added, that We s&ne- forme&;1;1.1
ricient of cherished Constitutional rights;" times wonder'vliether were getting the He 'also said the CIA inJtt
Huddleston and others have charged whole truth" from Casey 'or whether it's- plete anew study, ordered It
; that the language Of the 'executive order ? - .7 House, to assess US. counte
:signed by President Reagan last Decent,. - Biden said that he 'ana .others capabilities' -for sleeting %vitt
"-ber does widen CIA -authority to operate always count on Inman for the full story; '...,.posed by foreign 'agents.
;In the -United States rather than strictly: and he and Goldwater' joked that McMa In a related development,
'..+53-ierseas. The intrusive techniques re 'hon ought to learn how to pull -up hs tee's former chairman, Dem
.ferred -to usually mean' such things as Socks or slide back his chair at the wit: ? Church of Idaho, warned ye?
wiretapping, mail' Opening and searched ness.. table, as Inman 'reportedly did on "there is every evidence:" the'
without a warrant. ? ? hearing other witnesses say .things that States is losing sight (4 earlit
McMahon, 52, was praised by all corn- troubled him. ? ' ? ? and the general proposition
mittee members for? expertise and pro- Allegations about Casey's "politicizing" ? operations "should be a rare
; fessionalism during a 31-year CIA career.. of intelligence arenot new. Yet, paradox--- "If we are not careful,' he
But several senators eipressed the view, ically, Inman iS known' to be :one of :conference Sponsored here t
diet McMahon faced an especially- Casey's strongest defenders in terms of paign for Political Rights, 'w
"heavy burden," as 'Joseph R. Bide n Jr. the director's rejection of any attempts to ? to past practice in which c
(D-Del.) put it, -as successor to retiring manipulate intelligenm -information. ' tions become a routine progr,
Adm. Bobby R.. Inman. ? ; .? ? Unlike Inman, widely regarded as an literally hundreds of projects
Inman's surprise decision to resign, "idea man" with a good grasp of global dozens of countries.
revealed last pitptAggegoalt.asAtqlow4 boltoi% poLittiga rticcbn.,,,, ft-iriniraircogmait?
Committee irnUffi"Thr Nt.fo VriftlAVIWKI!fihon 4,4 fr% AMY vilr5360MKPae
(R-Ariz.) yesterday called Inman "the - mainly in management and technical powerful and adverse ,--,:mseq
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IINIL
NEW YORK NEWS?WORLD
26 May 1982
Inman's warning should be heeded
Adm- . Bobby Inman, the retiring deputy
dire6tor of thecii4,vo lliwas a well-deserved
reputation on Ca Hill as a shrewd
intelligence analyst and a man not given to
alarmist rhetoric.
Accordingly, we can hope that Adm.
Inman's grim warning the other day about
the threat posed by the Soviet Union's
relentless military build-up will be
heeded, most especially by those in Con-
gress who imagine that tens of billions of
dollars can be slashed from the defense
budget without further eroding the
nation's security.
Adm. Inman was plain spoken: "I
believe the Soviet build-up over the last 17
years? has brought us, to a perilous state."
Perilous is an unambiguous word. Its use
by the nation's second-ranking intelli-
gence official means that, in his carefully
measured judgment, the United States is
in danger.
? Those in Congress who tend to dep-
xsorwthat danger and to seek excuses for _
cutting deeply into the Reagan admin-
istration's rearmament program cannot
easily dismiss Bobby Inman's expertise,
or his access to the most highly classified
and sensitive intelligence.
Nor can they make light of his observa-
tion that" future Soviet leaders may be
"less cautious" than the septuagenarians
who now hold power in Moscow. Given the
Soviet Union's recent adventures in places
like Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and
Southeast Asia, any informed judgment
that the next generation of leaders may be
bolder is chilling stuff.
The combination of Soviet military
power that can even now reach anywhere
in the world plus a more aggressive post-
Brezhnev leadership would present the
United States with unprecedented threats
to its security and vital interests. The
logical inference from Adm. Inman's wise
counsel is that the best way to buy trouble
tomorrow is to cut the defense budget
_ today _ _
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STATI NTL
AltoptoyedifteduRdileale260111Tht/br: CkgRD P91-00901R000500250008-1
ON PAGE_Al__ 20 May 1982
dmiralinman to Inspect Sea Cade
By Henry E. MO0bCTry
EDITOR
More than 400 U.S. Naval Sea Cadets from 11 east
.coast divisions will participate in the Second Annual
Mid-Atlantic Naval Sea Cadet Personnel Inspection
and Pass in Review at the historic Washington Navy
Yard on Saturday, 29 May 1982.
Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be the
Senior? Inspecting Officer. The U.S. Navy
Ceremonial Marching Band and the 'U.S. Navy
Ceremonial Guard Drill Team will highlight the
ceremonies which will begin at 1 p.m. at Admiral
Leutze Park at the Navy Yard.
DAHLGREN Division, USNSCC, which is head-
quartered at the Navy Yard, is once again host for
the ceremony along with its sponsor, the District of
Columbia Council of the Navy League of the United
States.
A native of Rhonesboro, TX, ADM Inman became
Deputy Director a the CIA on 12 February 1982. In
this position he is principal deputy to the Director of
the CIA.
ADM Inman graduated from the University of
-Texas at Austin (B.A., 1950). He entered the Nava/
Reserve the following year and was commissioned
as an Ensign in March 1952. His initial assignment
was to the aircraft carrier USS VALLEY FORGE
(CVA-45), which participated in operations during
the Korean hostilities. His subsequent early career
included a variety of assignments in Naval in-
telligence, including tours as the Chief of Naval
Operation's Intelligence Briefer, and Assistant
Naval Attache, Stockholm, Sweden, as well ? as
operational assignments afloat.
ADM Inman has served in a number of positions
of high responsibility. He was Fleet Intelligence Of-
ficer for the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific,
1969-71, during the Vietnam conflict. He graduated
from the National War College in 1972. He was Ex-
ecutive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, 1972-72. lie served as Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1973-74; as Director of
Naval Intelligence, 1974-76; and as Vice Director,
Plans, Operations and Support of the Defense In-
telligence Agency, 1976-77. He was appointed Direc-
tor of the National Security Agency in July 1977,
where he served until March 1981. Coincident e ith
his assignment as the Deputy Director of the ( IA,
he was promoted to the rank of Admiral, the I rst
Naval Intelligence Specialist to attain that rani.
ADM Inman's many service decorations incl tde
the National Security Medal, the Navy Distingu sh-
ed Service Medal, the Defense Superior Ser. ice
Medal, and the Legion of Merit in addition to.
several awards for service during the Korean ,,nct
Vietnam conflicts.
ADM Inman's permanent residence is Anahe n.
CA. He and his wife Nancy (nee Russo, of
Washington,. DC) have two sons, Thomas ;
William.
Sea Cadet Divisions participating in this ye s
ceremonies are: ANNAPOLIS Division, Annape.is,
MD; BICENTENNIAL Division, Cumberland, IV );
COMPTON Division, Perth Amboy, ;
DAHLGREN Division, Washington, D.
FRANKLIN/HOLLAT Division, Huntington,
LEHIGH VALLEY Division, Lehigh Valley, I sn
MAINE Division, Reading, PA; NEW JERSi :Y
Division, Bridgewater, NJ; WILLIAM E. TAYLi
Division, Wilmington, DE; TECUMSEH Divisi n.
Baltimore, MD, and TOP HATTERS Squadr n, '
NAS Norfolk, VA,
The Naval Sea Cadet Corps consists of nearly :)0
Divisions and comprises nearly 7,500 young n en]
and women and 800 officers. Naval Sea Cadets L re
ages 14 through 17 and Navy League Cadets
ages 11 to 14. All personnel are volunteers. Tae
Naval Sea Cadet Corps is the youth program of
Navy League of the United States. It is aimed at
educating and training American youth in citizt
ship and Naval/maritime matters, Naval hist( .y
and tradition, the importance of our maritime ad
Naval forces to our nation and world freedom, t le
opportunities available in Naval/maritime servi e
careers, and at guiding young men and women
toward being more patriotic, knowledgeable and
responsible citizens. Participation is voluntary a; 'd
there is no obligation on the part of the young rm ii
and women to join the a:Tned forces.
The ceremonies are f:ee, for information c;
202-678-2870. The Navy Yard is located at 8th and 4
Streets, Southeast.
CONTINUED
Approved For Release 2001/03/07.: CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1
More than 400 U.S. Naval Sea Cadets from 11 east
coast divons will participate on Saturday, 29 May in the
Second Annual Mid-Atlantic Naval Sea Cadet Personnel In-
spection and Pass in Review at Admiral Leutze Park at the
historic Washington Navy Yard. Pictured am some of the
300 Cadets who participated in the 1981 Inspection. Ad-
WO, r?Ndeablf* re?meaffm.4
mire! Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director of the Centr
Intelligence Agency, will be the Senior Inspecting Office
DAHLGREN Division, which is headquartered at th
Washington Navy Yard, and is host Division, is seen fro+
and left, with components of eight other Divisions. (Phot
by PH2 R.G. Ambroseno, USN)
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2
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NEWS RELEASE
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301
PLEASE NOTE DATE
May 18, 1982
STATI NTL
No. 213-82
OXford 75131 (Info'
OXford 73189 (Copies)
FLAG OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger announced today that the President
has nominated Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, U.S. Navy, to be placed on the retired
list in his current grade. Admiral Inman is scheduled to retire on July 1,
1982, after completion of more than thirty years of active service. He has
served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence since February 12, 1981.
Admiral Inman was born on April 4, 1931, in Rhonesboro, Texas.
-END-
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Approved For Release 200#150111?AW-IREINTW111100
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
'Disservice' to 4!i Ifaig
On Friday, April 30, The. Post pub-
lished a front-page story by Loren Jen-
kins that claimed that stories told by
, Miskito Indian refugees. provide "the
basis of Secretary of State Alexander M.
Haig's charges . . . that .Nicaragua was
pursuing. a 'genocidal' policy. against its
unfortunate Miskito Indian minority."
' That statement is misleading. The
_ government', has providaL., abundant
photographic evidence of thENYSternatic -
destruction of the, Miskit6lindian vil- ?
!ages by the Sandinista reginvi. This was
done in in extraordinary public presen-
tation by CIA Deputy Director Adm..
Bobby Inman, and the--.photographs
-have siriee been released to ell interested,
parties. An- account of AdM. Inman's
briefing was carried by The Post. It does
. the secretary of state a disservice to Sug-
gest he based his charges only on the
inevitably- conflicting accounts of Mis-
kito refugees in Hondures..;,?1.-':
MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
Special Adviser to the Secretary-of State
Washington --- ? ;10 ?
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2001/0311X7 LkalAERDP91-00901R0
ON PAGE 7) part,IE 13 tea.y 1982
ovie s in the Pa
STAT I NTL
Falklands Crisis Gives Them a Solid Foothold in Argentina,
- By ROBERT & LEMEN
. .
- ?
The Falklands caitsis has turned into a bo- t to become the Soviet Union's leading trad-. nomic relationship into a strategic-nailitary
nanza for Moscow by allowing it to further a e . tog partner in the developing world. Mos-t, one. A new fishing; agreement now lets,
longstanding sate objective: a anititary ; : C.OW and Havana consistently block discus- ; ? Soviet "scientific" vessels operate out of
relatior.iship with Argentina. - nett; tette.: att ea, sion of Argentina's human-rights violations strategic Ushuaia. off the Beagle :Channel.
. Until recently.: the 'main- Soviet leverage ' in international forums, even as they orche- '7.: The Soviet Union has been hawking militae:'
with the Argentine temta was-RS 'growing .. strate ostracism of Chile, Argentina's rival ry equipment to the itrgentine generals for I
dependence on ti Russian grain and meat , for jurisdiction over the -Beagle Channel. years. Last fall, the jpnta contemplated, the ,
naarket. Now the Soviet Union,...viith..,the ".:-f,When the two countries mobiliz' ed for war ?.. : purchase of Soviet 4tvarplanes. Inside the i
help of the affluent 65,000-member Argeneee over the channel in 1978, the Ruseians pub- 't: anti-communist Argentine. officer corps are 1
tine Com-monist PartYithe largest in Latin. ? licly sided with Argentina. The Argentine;: those who listen to !Sweet. blandishments '
America after Cuba's), is utilizing the Falk:, e :. junta tolerates the -local. slavishly pre-, with sympathy. Sorne have studied at the
land Island crisis to-supply a hitherto miss.; Soviet, Communist Party while brinally re-- , Leningrad military c011ege and participated!
tog link in its Argentine strategy: mass serpee ...pressing, other leftist organizations. The ...in now-- commonplace military exchange]
port for closer relation.e with Moscow. .. ? ' et party' reciprocates with "critical support" missions with their Sbviet counterparts. To
- Since its abstention from the U.N. Securie . and inventive apologias for the "progres- reinforce these ties. !the Soviets carefully
from the Falkiands., Moscow has lined up , -. ?.- .The SOuthern Cane of South America has era, exporters and fin4nciets. - - . - -:--
ty Council's call for Argentina to withdraw - sive" and "democratic" military regime. . - cultivated relations With Argentine grow,./
behind Buenos Aires. The Soviet press to- appreciated in strategic value as aircraft - Th Argentine? elite has so far resisted !
cuses attention ? on 1Britain's Pright wi ' .
Soviet efforts to forge a militarer link. They]
stressed their loyalty to what a senicr U.S.;
? official called our "hared values," ? when
testifying on behalf pf reeumption. of U.S.;
military sales to Argentina last May. British i
and US, reaction to the invasion of the I
Falklands may allow the Soviets- to hurdle'
t
-tar tbs
. carriers and supertankers have outg,rown
government, which. it accuses Of violating . the Panama and Suez canals, and maiitirne
international law, while remaining silent on .. traffic in the South Atlantic has multiplied
the character of Argentina's and its rupture ? Mounting interest in offshore petroleum, in
of international law. Communist Party ban- the seabed, in fishing and in Antarctica,
ners and slogans have been conspicuous h) .together with the appearance of Soviet na-
rallies around Argentina. The Soviet World* val deployments in West Africa, have
-ate soccer teara touring Argentina has also -1 further enhanced the region's strategic sit. -
been pressed into service. Russian I
e, ey alte now reportedly aupiun--:i
rush to embrace Argentine goal-scorers, , More than one-third of all Argentine ex- . monitoring equipmeat from their base in I
. . eneen ... i ? . . . : ete , ? r.. ...? plying surveillance 'data and submarine,
and . when - the/Russian players are an-e'. . pnrts are sold to the Soviet Union. The same :? Cuba.
notmg-itd. they receive prolonged Standing 1. proportion used to go to Great Britain a . driettenin d?outv direel
. ovations fro ra therArgen tine specta GM'S. : . half-century ago?before Argentina a t..21.eriate subcemmittee eart_lier 1
e
-..' Moscow has been wooingthe countries Of worked free of its hated colonial depen- . igneettetee___L_ei _et the growiree relationip bear
South Arnerica'S:- stiategic. Southern Cone ? .!, deuce. For the five decades before the junta ;_., tween Ar enteegno ._(.tOtt_r_t,
for more than a clequie.. The main recipient came fo power:Argentina sought to build up . -"mwor cause for neeteuen Sld Argentina
of Soviet attentions ha's been Argentina . its industrial sector and to diversify its mar- he humiliated, its Sbviet sympathizers; now...
After a decade of steadily expanding corn- -, kets by selling light ma.nufactured goods to-with popular backing, will argue that the
.rnerceeArgentina_thie year empatesed.Indiat Latin...America. and Western Europe. The - United States has proved its unreliability,
:junta reversed this policy, favoring the agritertel that only Soviet military assistance will .1
. ctilturat. cseports of the oligarchy and prosett protect Argentina from its enemies and ena-:1
..'tratingthe industrial sector Argentine crit-te ;.ble it to regain its national honor:: te-.14.-enetetrI
Z.ICS. 7.of ...thi: junta claim .that- its policy': has.. ,tee' An Moseeei.-we'ted;
,'turned back the development clockncreat-. e. make an ironic footnote to the Reagan Ad:4
king ;:itikictuial .dependente?ontthe Soviet,te ministratiOn'S-Policy of "drawing the line',"
traarket and facilitating Soifeepenetrationttnet; in Central America. Thenthe Administrae)
linThird World countries like India, liare':-.:1ion 'enlisted the junta in its Central Arneri-:v
and tt Cuban: Moscow, - has ?i 'used : economicte: can e anti- communist -crusade; it tasewneni
f? blieliniaitnto- ',Wrest' "further,' concessienit 7 .. that.. the generals' indispentability , in entre
, ..? I
Even before the.: Falklands'', Crisise., the backyard would be proof tigainst fallout;
Soviets Were slowing dawn 'their payments ,-. ' from. an adventure in the FalklandseNavr!
...for: Argentine goads and Urging Argentina this bastion of Western value; is the hottest!
I.
to reduce the huge imbalance in Soviet- ' new candiate for Soviet military assistance:l
tArgeetine trade by buying Rtessian. Moscow . The Argentine expel-tence clenionstra tes;
:' now -supplies Argentina with turbines and ', again that anti-communism does not neces-
generators -for several critical power ' sarity Make for anti-SavietiSin. - .- . --t ? ? ttt
;? clear
: prn)ecte, and ie providing the Argentine nu- ? - ' .- ....? , ? e ? ': .- it -; e'.? ',-, :-.-:. ...14:31
. -44
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fr'desire to build this Pert-,7? r.0..-......?--- -* .,- --
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'-titMoscove clearlyratede.ami
ARTICLE AP
ON P
NEW YORK TIMES
'Release 20011033W :263A-RDP9J -0_090_1 ROO
STAIINIL
Crisis Called Likely to Spur Soviet-Argentine
By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
SpecialtoTheNewYorkThow .
t WASHINGTON, May 1.2 Adm.
Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, says that one out-
come of the Falkland crisis may be to
turn-the Soviet Union into an arms sup-
plier
of Argentina in return for Argen-
tine wheat and beef. .
He described the possibiity as a
"major cause for worry" in the United
-States, adding that "I think you Will find
the Soviets eager. to- sell at bargain
prices.?-The obstacle to such a develop-
. ment in the past. he said?was Amend-
ra e
na's lack of interest. .
Until its seizure of the Falklands
April 2,, Argentina had depended on
Western Europe, Israel and the United
States for arms supplies, but these
sources have now been cut off.
Admi;a1 Inman, making one a his
rare. .Congressional appearances.. in
open session; testified Tuesdaybefore a
Senate investigations subcommittee on
the implications for Soviet military
power of the acquisition by Moscow of
Western and Japanese technology. Ad-
-miral Innian announced his resignation
last month, but he is not expected to
leave hie post until around July 1.
?
He said the failure to stop theoutflow
of this technology had placed the United
States in a ."perilous'!-position in deal-
ing with expected Soviet challenges in
the 1980's. .
?4' ?-".f
American officials have -already re-
sported.that .Argentina was looking for
alternative sources for .suchi arms as
the French-built air-to-surface missile
that wrecked the British destroyer
t. Sheffield.
Admiral Inman was the first official
to suggest openly that Moscow's need
for hard currency to, buy food could be
. .. . .
linked to Argentina's need for arms.
, Admiral Inman said that rather than.
,
r. embark on any new research and devel-
opment programs, the Soviet Union had
undertaken a "very thorough vacuum-
cleaning" of Western ., and Japanese
technology ? to improve-its fighting
...power at greater speed and lower cost.., -
"' ' 1.-:i c.: ? 'Very Substantial Efforts' . .
....., ... ...
?
Be disclosed that; a.. recent defector
."documented very substantial efforts"
by the Soviet Union in Japan. Admiral
Inman described Soviet intelligence ac--
tivities in the United States and West-
ern Europe as "intense" and called for
substantially better;.ceordination be-
tween.intelligence - and:Other _Federal
agencies to deal with the problem in the
United States.? ..---.?-....... - . .. ,.. - ....:
... He,said he would_give a' "very high-
priority" to stopping the. .export
export of high-'..
..
teclmology products from the United
States that specifically help Moscow.
_build2ophisticated.weapens.. ...? ,, .
?The C.I.A.: has reported that 70 Per-
cent - of the acquisitions of. militariV.
., useful technology, beim . been accom-
i plished by the Soviet and Eastern Euro-,
' pean intelligence services, using clan.;
. destine, technical and overt collection
' means. The remaining 20.to 30 percent
.; camel. through: legal , purchases and'.
open-source publications or from other
Soviet organizations, such as the Minis-.
. try of Trade. Only .a small portion came
from direct technical exchanges , con,
: ducted by scientists and students.... -:-
' _Admiral Inman told the hearing tha
[the new generation. of.-Soviet. leaders
"may not be as cautious as the old gen-
erationoli3Olsheviks:"" 441'...`-' '..` - - -
i
Asked by Senator Saiii'Nunn; Demo-
-era of Georgia, about iinplications of'
financial pressure on.MoScow, Admira
Inman . predicted that:try-10 years the
Russians would still have economic and
agricultural probleniklitit.that..!`they
will continue .to:protect their. invesv,.
meat in the military sector,Therefore;
we :must pay more: attention to ever.
more sophisticated weapons systems:" -
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SUBJECT
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
The Today Show
May 12, 1982 7:30 A.M.
STMKN WRC-TV
NBC Network
Washington, D.
Admiral Inman Comments on the Falkland Crisis
CHRIS WALLACE: Here in Washington, CIA Deputy Director
Bobby Inman told a Senate subcommittee there is concern that the
Falklands crisis may push Argentina toward the Soviet camp.
ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN: You have fingered a very major
worry I have, that the outcome of this crisis will be a decisiol
on the part of an Argentine government to embark on a substantill
program of acquiring new military hardware in a broad way from
the Soviet Union.
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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Media'aisbelief rapped.
., outgoing CIA biggie
:an intelligence briefing last March on
the Soviet and Cuban-backed military
.,.ts..ttitti buildup in Nicaragua.
_ ?Washington New Bureau)?Adm. ' , John Hughes of the Defense Intellk
Bobby, R. Inman,. re-' - ' -,!;:tzsil - ' - gence Agency conducted the briefing,
tiring: deputy 17.41re- -showing reporters photographs taken
- cror of the CIA, said from spy satellites of Soviet-type mint-
' yesterday that it .is ary garrison arrangements, lengthened.
difficult to'convince ,A,:i . airport runways to _ accommodate
the- r public of . the .?iil _Soviet-made Mig fighter-bombers, and
peril:: of ? a-- , Soviet. :deployed Soviet T-55 tanks.,. -,4 4-)
military buildup be- :,--- Inman, who said he regards Hughes
cause the press will as the best photo interpreter around,
not believe United said he was surprised to see the news-
States intelligence paper accounts of the briefing next day
reports, even when '- , ? use a word like "alleged" in discussing
they Include spy t.,, Adm. Bobby f,. the intelligence findings. ? \ -'
satellite pictures. . , - Inman- : ''' Inman, testifying before the Senate
"If one doesn't ? , "L, , Permanent Investigations Subcommit-
want to believe there Is a Soviet build- tee, said the public will not be con-
up, then one can find other kinds of vinced of an increase in Soviet
questions to divert attention," said In- ' strength "if there is no willingness (by
man, who added that he had been reporters) to accept the honesty of the
particularly irked at press coverage of professional." is
, ., ,
By JOSEPH VOLZ
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fipproy4erFor Release gap? fiSRE51%.9(1ACRAffIR
mrei
ay 2
? 'ADM. BOBBY R. INMAN
sees cause for worry" about weapons
;
4,10 dist .2no.., ? ., ?
Soviet- rgentme Ties
Called a Possibility
,.. ,
' The United States is concerned that' in the:
wake of the Falklands crisis, Argentina may ern?
bark on a "subatantial program" of obtaining new
weapons from the Soviet Union, the CIA's deputy.
director-said yesterday. ' "';' ' - ,.,'';,.' 1, \*; \ ''
Adm. Bobby R. fnman told a Senate Subcom-
mittee thai such a possibility "is a major cause for
worry in the Months ahead."
, Irunan's remarks appeared to go further than
Reagan administration officials have previously in ,
public statements,: in pointing specifically to the
'prospect Of,Soviet-Argentine military ties growing ?
out of Argentina's confrontation with Britain.
,Inman said that if such an arms supply rela- .
tionship,develoPV along with it would come in- '
, creasing, Argentine dependence on Soviet military
.
advisers and spare parts; ' ','::?c",1$ '31.' '''' t
'Inman, Who Will; retire' froM the CIA July '1.-,''
; appeared .before the Senate governmental affairs..
investigations 'subcommittee primarily to testify''
about .problemsi. in :controlling leaks of, sensitive:
U.S. technology to the Soviet bloc.
A governinent study now being carried out on
' the technology ?transfer problem, Inman said, is
:
likely, to lead to recommendatio9s for a "very sub-..,
1
stantial., input?. of Manpower" to ,help bolster the
FBI's. counterintelligence force '''''' ' ''''' '''' ' ? - ''
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PROGRAM Morning Edition
DATE
STATION WAMU-FM
NPR Network
May 12, 1982 6:15 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Inman Comments on the Falkland Crisis
BOB EDWARDS: Yesterday the Deputy Director of the CIA,
Admiral Bobby Inman, told a Senate subcommittee that Argentina
may turn to the Soviet Union for weapons as a result of the
Falklands conflict. Argentina's previous suppliers, the United
States, Europe and Israel, have refused to sign new contracts
since the invasion of the Falklands. And Inman said, "I think
you will find the Soviets anxious to sell at a bargain price."
With news that Soviet reconnaissance planes have spotted
part of the task force, we have a report on Argentine-Soviet
relations from Chris Hedges in Buenos Aires.
CHRIS HEDGES: Since the invasion, one of the strongest
defenders of the move to retake the Falklands outside of this
country has been the Soviet Union. The Soviet news agency Tass
has issued a stream of reports that brands the British as
colonial aggressors; and during Secretary of State Alexander
Haig's negotiations portrayed the American diplomat as
manipulating the situation in favor of Britain.
It is suspected by many observers here that the
Argentines are receiving practical help from the Soviets during
the crisis and can turn to the Soviets if they need to buy arms.
While this regime claims to be anti-communist and killed
20,000 of its own people in an avowed war on Marxism, Argentina
sells most of its grain to the Soviets. And when this crisis
began, there were 20 Soviet ships in the port loading grain and
another 20 off the coast waiting to receive shipment.
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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2
Soon after the islands were taken, the Soviet Union and
Argentina signed an aureement to exoloid the protein-rich krill
around the Falklands.
The Argentirs have used their relationship to the
Soviets as a threat, always painting the picture of an abandoned
Argentina forced hy their cruel friend, the United States, into
the arms of the Russims. Many government officials here are
quite Fond of quoting Winston Churchill's line about making
alliances with the devil if need he to save their country.
Inc ties with the Soviets have been growing and will
continue to grow afte,- this crisis. During a recent soccer match
between the Soviets and Argentina, the Russian team was given an
enthuisastic standing ovation.
Anti-communim in Latin America is always a rhetorical
convenience used to justify the silencing of any opposition,
rather than an ideoloflical stance. And the Argentines are one of
the prime examples.
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ART
024
OLE API' ,'ABED PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
) r Release 2001t0M71:9(ZIA-RDP91-00
ov
CIA official fears Argentines STATINT
will try to buy Soviet weapons
, i Inman said if such an arms rela-
From illqUiref Vitro Service) " Thatcher, said Monday that the "ma;,,'
WASHINGTON ?The United States tionship develops between Moscow chismo of women" is playing a rolefi
is concerned that. Argentina_ will 1 and Buenos Aires, Argentina would 1! in the "silly war" over the Falklands
respond to the Falkland Islands crisis I experience increasing dependence i ? Prince Philip the outspoken
. by moving .to buy new weapons from on Soviet military advisers and spare '; husband of Queen Elizabeth II and a
the Soviet Union, the cIA's deputy parts. .. l:. *4 keen conservationist; Said yesterday
(
director said yesterday: ' 1:-?,1,-4,-,, ,.. = . ?.-,Press accounts of Soviet Argentine ; that the British fleet off the Falkland
Adm. Bobby R. Inman, told a"Senate '?. military cooperation. have included i Islands may be mistaking whale
subcommittee that such a possibility : reports that the Soviets are sharing echoes for Argentine r submarine
is a, major' cause for worry- in the; ' intelligence data ? gathered by sat- signals and, as a resultonany whales
months ahead." Inman, who will re:, ellites, ,reconnaissance aircraft and , may have been killed
tire July I, made the comments be- electronic eavesdropping ships ? on ? Three British journalists jailed
fore the Senate governmental affairs- the movements of the British fleet, ,..1./ .. by the 'Argentine -government on
investigations subcommittee': '''.- !I .4..7 In other developments yesterday: j...; spying charges completed a month
Inman 's remarks appeared to ' gci_e.,. ' ? The Pentagon refused to discuss behind bars yesterday with little
further than Reagan administration details of possible materiel aid to ,. hope for immediate release. Simon
officials previously have in pointing. , Britain ..c. in - the crisis. Pentagon Winchester, a reporter for the Sun
specifically to the prospect of Soviet- ?. spokesman Henry Catto said he could day Times; Anthony Prime, photogra-4
Argentine military ties growing out neither confirm nor deny whether pher for the Observer, and Ian Mathl
of the confrontation with Britain, decisions have been made to provide: er, a reporter for the Observer, have
over the South Atlantic islands. . the materiel support for British =. been kept virtually incommunicado
"I think they will find the Soviets 'forces ' that Haig had announcedin
,. _
l.recent days.
very eager to sell ? and at a bargain , would be forthcoming.
price ? particularly if that can lower. ' 'In Paris, Deputy Secretary of
the amount of hard currency they State Walter Stoessel said the United
have to spend to get access to Argen- States would assist Britain short 4of.
tine wheat and beef," Inman said '.; _sending American troops. 1-1e, saict.
After the United States announced -Arierica-bicking of Britain "in this
on April 30 that it was backing Brit- ? difficult and deplorable problem"
am n in the Falklands crisis, Secretary. , had hurt ALS. relations with Latin
of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. noted , America, but Washington believed
that "communist adversaries seek there would be understanding ,
positions of influence on the main- among Latin American countries of
land of the Americas." ,!',,,' , ,: ,, lz:, the principles involved ? especially
Inman, in response to questioning' the principle "not to recognize ag- ?
by Sen. Lawton Chiles (D., Fla.), not. gression." . - , ,
? -
ed that the Argentines have bought ? Pope-John Paul II will cancel his
most of their modern weapons from planned visit to Britain if hostilities
Western Europe and "have not previ-' with Argentina have not ceased by
ously indicated any interest in pro- the middle of next week; Cardinal
curingSoviet hardware, even though ' Basil Hume said yesterday. Hume,
Peru was acquiring a great deal of ..Roman Catholic primate of England
it ''-.) ...-a '-.$114A', '14 i':i4, , . ''', t ! t , ? ,,?4, tand Wales said the visit?scheduled '
But you, have fingered a very: to last' six days, beginning May 28 ? ,
major worry I have ? that the out-, .;"would be difficult for the Holy See
, come of this crisis will be the deci- '... in sad circumstances." '
sion on the part of an Argentine :, ? U.S. ambassador-at-large Vernon
government to embark on a substan-, 'Walters, in an indirect reference to
tial program ol acquiring new mill-. British Prime Minister- Margaret
tary hardware, in a broad way, from'
. the Soviet Union," Inman told Chiles, ,. I
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I.P140101...rolk9sesem????
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PROGRAM Eyewitness News
DATE
SUBJECT
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1110.101,11.1.1901f.01.6.16..4.114.1.0..lorsmno.--.......04*.0?11
STATION WDVM TV
May 11, 1982 6:00 PM aw Washington, DC
Admiral Inman Comments
MAUREEN BUNYAN: The outgoing Deputy Director of the CIA
today warned the Senate that the United States is in a perilous
position because of a massive buildup of Soviet military power.
Admiral Bobby Inman's comments came before a hearing on the flow
of advanced military technology to the Soviet Union.
Inman said future Soviet leaders may be less cautious
than current officials in challenging the U.S. He warned that
such a lack of caution could lead the Soviets to underestimate
the strength of the U.S., causing a crisis in the years ahead.
OFFICES IN. WASHINGTON DC G NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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shadowy genius (V. cia? a spook so shrewd that no
one's sure if.- he's sinister or sincere
article
017 ROBERT SAM ANS
ILLUSTRATION BY GARY RUDDELL
ARLY ONE MORNING not long
ago, a group of the nation's
defense and in lead-
ers rose from their beds, kissed
their wives and families and,
jaws set, went out to fight
World War Three. In simulation, that is.
Out over the treacherous terrain of
U.S. 95 they trekked, until at last, some
distance from NVashington, they attained
their objective: the U. S. Naval War Gil-
lege. While the sun peeked over the trees
and security. men watched net VOUsly,
they manned their computer consoles
and braced for action.
On the Blue Team, representing the
United States, were arra; cd some of -the
best brains in the strategic business.
There were generals and admirals, CIA
men and a Secretary of Defense, ascii-
table Who's Who of the military estab-
lishment. Their Red Team opponents,
representing the nuclear might of the
Soviet Union, were a less prepossessing
lot. Especially their leader.
He was a tall, slender man, almost
gawky. Ile wore horn-rinuned glasses
and had a large, high forehead of the
kind that freckles in summer. He did
not appear dangerous. Indeed, were it
not for the admiral's uniform he was
wearing?an ill-fitting garb from which
it seemed the hanger had not been re-
moved--he might have been taken for
a schoolteacher (which, in fact, he had
been before he joined the Navy). Com-
pared with the company around him,
glittery in its gold braid and determi-
nation, he was an improbable figure, and
his smile, which flashed frequently, was
most imp ?balite of all. It was big and
toothy and there was a gap between the
leading incisors. Altogether, it made him
look not so much like a schoolteacher
and even less than an admiral; stand-
ing there, amidst all that brass, he seemed
like nothing so much as Huckleberry
Finn. Ills muse w;is Bobby Ray Inman.
The game commenced. Back and
forth the simulated superpowers battled,
sending their computerized scenarios
this way and that. Missiles flew, bombers
bombed, ships sailed, armies marched,
whole countries disappeared. The ten-
sion in the .room was electric. Hunched
Li
over one console, a member of the Joint
Chiefs turned suddenly ashen. Out of
nowhere, the nukes were on their way.
On it went, hour after harrowing
hour, and when it was over, when the
world lay in pseudo cinders, there was
egg of the most highly classified nature
on the face of the United States. Said
one awed participant, a former Secre-
tary of Defense, of the man who had put
it there, the admiral with the Huck Finn
grin: "I'm just glad that guy's on our
side."
You hear that a lot, in Washington
about Bobby Inman. "The right mats
in the right job at the right time,"
Barry Goldwater, the chairman of the
Senate intelligence committee, calls
him. James Schlesinger, the former Sec-
retary of Defense, terms him "a national
asset." To Senator Joe Biden, the liberal
Democrat from Delaware, he is "the
most quality guy in the Federal Govern-
ment." Former CIA director Richard
Helms commends him for his "bril-
liance"; a Helms successor, William
Colby, for his "integrity." Major General
George J. Keegan, Jr., the fire-breathing
former chief of Air Force Intelligence,
likes him for his "guts"; BirchBayls, for
Isis "brains"; Walter Mondale, for Isis
"wisdom." And then there are those, like
a former deputy director of the National
Security Council, who say, quite simply,
"Bobby Inman is the smartest man in
uniform." And who, after a thoughtful
pause, add, "laybe out of uniform, too."
All this about an improbable man few
people outside Washington have ever
heard of. In Inman's profession, the ano-
nymity is welcome. Bobby Ray Inman,
you see, is a spy.
?
His official title is deputy director,
Central Intelligence. What he does is
everything. It is Inman who runs the
agency's day-to-day operations; Inman
who coordinates the activities of the "in-
telligence community"; Inman who pre-
pares the critical "national intelligence
estimates"; Inman who evaluates the
data flowing in from spy satellites; In-
man who protects CIA from flak on
Capitol Hill; Inman who has the next-to-
last word on every GIA undertaking,
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t
P1,-Apprbvdd Istir Retkisq1001 /03f07e:?011ft=1REIP91160901iM0051)02500aijilm" made
of a Ilkolgy a a %kei e:
nniter shippIng titter strugg over C 's new execti- his ce ings deviously plain. According ,? ?
alms to the Alghan rebels. Ile is, in the
%try deepest sense, the man who keeps
the sect et:.
One Of those secrets is who Inman is.
[lie places he has worked?CIA, NSA,
DIA, ONE the whole alphabet soup that
is American intelligence?will say noth-
ing. and none with more eloquence than
CIA. ''The admiral is keeping a low pro-
file,' an agency spokesman says. "We
;11ent going to help y-on with anything.-
CIA, however, does provide an official
biography. It consists of exactly one un-
revealing paragraph. It states that he was
born, 50 -years ago, in Rhonesboro,
Texas?a town that, according to South-
western Bell, does not exist. The
biography also says he attended the
University of Texas, graduating in 1950
with a liberal-arts degree. A check with
the university's alumni computer reveals
no such person. Nor, unsurprisingly, is
there any listing in any Washington,
D.C., area telephone book for a Bobby
Ray, or B., or B. R., or, for that matter.
any Inman. James Jesus Angleton. the
fabled former head of CIA counterin-
telligence. id listed. Yes? Angleton whis-
pers, he knows Bobby in Then the
line goes dead.
Inman has no hobbies or outside in-
terests. He does not go to baseball games
or cocktail parties. Ile rarely, in fact,
goes anywhere, except to the office. The
principal exception is when he is called
to Capitol Hill to testily before one or
another of the intelligence-oversight
committees, .whose hearings arc con-
ducted in secret. Around Washington,
he has few close associates CIE someone
as lowly as a three-star admiral wants to
see him," says one, himself a loin-star,
"it had better be damned important")
and even fewer friends, "Bobby," as one
spook puts it, "is not the kind. of guy
you talk over your bowling scores with."
Of the handful ol people who claim to
know him well, most could not say
whether he smykes, or drinks (negative,
in both instances), even whether he is
married (he is, happily) or has children
(he has, two: .both boys). indeed, out
of 50 interviews with people who has
worked with him over the years, rang-
ing from former CIA directors to his
superiors in the Navy, only one knew
the name of his wile. It is Nancy, and,
like her -husband, she is said to be very
quiet-
It has been anything but quiet., how-
ever, since Inman came to CIA. There
have been behind-the-secnes battles,
exposi's in the press, questions about the
agency's links to Libyan-backed assassins,
continued conflicts with Congress and
calls for director William Casey'sresigna-
iion. One way or another, they haye all
involved Bobby Ray Inman. A prime?
ti?e order, an engagement that, before
it was through, would shake the agency,
threaten the Bill of Rights and nearly
cost Inman his job.
It Al began in early 1981, a few weeks
a I tet Inman's eolith mat ion hearings. The
hearings themselves had been a love
leas:, With one Senator after another con-
ml dating Inman on his extraordinary
fitvess for his new job. The only note-
wi.rthy moment came toward the end
of the session, when,Inman was asked to
Ionunent about reports dna CIA and the
White House- would soon seek to undo
restrictions the; Carter Administration
had placed on the agency with regard
to domestic 'spying. Inman's answer was
direct; he was against the Administration
move. As 'Inman put it: "I would not
elect to carelessly walk away from the
safeguards we have so carefully crafted
together. These rules arc to protect U. S.
cif iiens, tant anyone else, and I believe
that we need to continue to protect
them."
But even as Inman WaS speaking, plans
Were a root to undo those safeguards.
They surfaced, finally, in March, with
die leak of the draft of a proposed ex-
ecutive order, which, once Ronald
Reagan signed it, would allow -CIA not
only to engage in domestic spying but
to infiltrate domestic dissident organiza-
tions, carry out dlandestine wire taps
and conduct "Warrantless searches"
("black bag jobs," in agency parlanc.)?
in sum, all the Operation Chaos ca-
pers that had gotten CIA into trouble
with Congress in the first place. Inman,
who'd had a hand in drawing up the
Carter protections before going to CIA,
was livid. Almost immediately, he was
back bei ((ICCongress, denouncing the
new plan as a "third-level working staff
paper" and pledging anew that?CIA's
job is abroad." Lest anyone miss Isis point,
lie then invited reporters to CIA's
headquarters and, in a rare, on-the-rec-
ord briefing, vowed. to resign if altera-
tions were made to CIA's charter that
he found "personally repugnant." The
dralt was withdrawn and, shortly there-
alter. its author, CIA general counsel
Daniel Silver, kit the agency.
But that wasn't the cud of it. Three
months later, another proposal, this one
in more protective of civil liberties, was
floated and just as quickly shot down,
apparently because it was too protective.
1 hen. last fall, a third and final draft
made its appearance. Less Draconian
than the first, more hard-line than
the second, it still offered possi-
bilities for domestic spying. Civil liber-
tarians and not a few Senators were
alarmed, and Inman shared their con-
cern. At one point, during a secret Sen-
ate briefing with CIA counsel Stanley
to a Senator who was present, when
Sporkin discussed provisions_ of lie, order . ?
that would allow domestic sp ing,
Iii-
man flashed a "thumhs-down" sign;
when the Sena tors bored in on Spork in,
Imnan winked and beckoned with his
hand, -More, more."
"Bobby is the conscience of the
agency," one Senator said al terward.
"Without him, the deluge."
General Keegan, was blunte.: Bobby
Inman, he said, with admiring relish,
"knows how to keep the whores at bay."
?
It was an extraordinary performance,.
but then, nothing about Bobby Inman
Juts ever been ordinary. He is an ad. -4
mit-al who grew up on die plains of
East Texas. He is a regular career officer
who did not attend Annapolis He is a
technician who never studied engineer-
ing. He is an intelligence specialist in a --
Service where, by regulation. ()illy "blue
water admirals" can hold the mist senior
commands. He is, in fact, one 01 the very
rare non-Annapolis, non-blue-water, full,
four-star admirals in U. S. naval history,
and undoubtedly the only one any-where
who can discuss the rhythms of Thack-
cray and Swinbtnne as knowleegeably as
he can the exact disposition of the Soviet
Baltic fleet.
The only thing about him dist is
ordinary is his name. It is not Robert
but, in the manner of tailback,. for East
Central Oklahoma State, plain Bobby,
simple and folksy, He lives like a Bobby:
strictly no ft-ills. According to he finan-
cial statement filed with Congress at
the time of his CIA appoint lent, his
only income, apart from his N.ovy salary
and interest from a credit union and a
handful of U. S. Savings Bonds, derives
from the rental of a modest four-bed-
room house, on which the bank holds a
mortgage of less than 5100,000. Inman
himself resides in typical military ac-
commodations in suliurban
The only thing that separates dni from
his middle-class neighbors is tht presence
of Navy-supplied stewards. The stewards,
who are a perquisite of his 1-.111c, assist
in the preparation of Inman's sole
known passion: the ritual of elaborate,
multicourse breakfasts.
He barely- has time to eat them. Most
mornings he is up at four to begin por-
ing through the remains of tin work he
has lugged home the night before. By
seven, he is at his functionall,- Spartan
office at CIA's McLean, Virginia, head-
quarters, having read the overnight cable
traffic during the chauffeured ride to
work. Unless there is a cal ti the Hill
(where he is liked) or-the White House
(where he is not), he will remain there,
without interruption, until well ? after
dark. At which point he returns home
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to begin the process all over again. beat. "Mr. P-R-E-M-A-D-A-S-A is the of Henry Kissinger's, worked within the
Fiin?? laughs an old hrend. "Bobby prime minister," he shot back, allowing White Ilouse and, without Presidential !
Inman has no fun." himself a small, self-satisfied smile, "and knowledge, spied on die Gosernment
Upon first meeting, Inman can seem Mr. J-A-Y-E-W-A-R-D-E-N-E is the presi- itself. Just who they were spyina for w.? .
aloof, dmost cold. Ile is much warmer dent." always difficult to say. For v, nite- Lea
with friends?likable. engaging, con. 1 he Navy. fortunately, values such task force was a Navy operatimi, it was
siderate of sensibilities?but even then, recall. and Inman's climb up the career heavily infiltrated by CIA. -1 lie Navy ?
there is a distance, a sort of enforced ladder was in-c-t-e-o-r-i-c. After a war- yeoman, for instance, was a CIA. man;
remoteness. aS it he's constantly calcu- tune tour of sea duty aboard the air-? like the other members of Tgsk Force
kiting who around him can be told what. craft carrier Valley Forge, Inman held 157, he officially did not exist. So se-
It can be unsettling. A man who has a series of increasingly important assign- cret was the task force, so sensitive was
known him lor years and, like so many assistant naval attach?U.S. Ern- its mission, that, until a group of its
others, still claims not to know him bassy, Stockholm; executive. assistant, former agents brought suit against the ,
well, admits: You know as much about Vice-Chief . of Naval Operations; chief Government demanding pension rights,'
Bobby Inman as Bobby Inman wants intelligence briefer, C1NG-PAC; director, the Navy refused to acknowledge that -
you to know, and that is damned little." Naval Intelligence; vice-director, De- there had ever been such a thing
Intelligence accounts for some of. the tense Intelligence; director, National The task force was real enough, ?-
isolation. Inman has spent most of his Security Agiency. His superiors groomed though, and so was the now ,nfamous
;Rink lifetime keeping people from and fussed ?over him like a prize pupil CIA man Wilson, who was then running ?
knowing things. But it is the other in- who, because of his oddity, threatened one of the task force's fronts, an equally
telligence, the one spelled with a small none of their careers. And so, almost real civilian corporation called Around
I, that keeps him truly separate. his invisibly, he continued to rise. World Shipping and Forwarding. Around ?
brain is an intimidating. storehouse, The turning point came in 1973,_ dur- 'World's legal business was freight han-
crammed with every imaginable' fact, ing the Yom Kippur war. The outbreak dling, and among the items it shipped.;
and, according to every recollection, it of the war, which initially sent the quite illegally, were 20 tons of ida?stique
always has been. Back in Texas, they 1sraelis reeling back from the Suez Canal, explosive to Libya. But dan. wasn't
still remember that Bobby Inman was one caught U. S. intelligence flat-footed, and, Wilson's only enterprise; he boasted of
of the renowned radio "Quiz Kids." di- as the battling continued, there was a holding controlling interest ?,n more
zling adults every week with intellectual mad scramble to come up with hard than 100 corporations. The companies
pyrotechnics. Give him an impossible information. At issue was not only the laundered spy money for the Navy,
equation and, whir, he'd solve it. Ask disposition. of the Arab armies but also secured sophisticated electrontcs gear,
after a fact and, zingo. he'd give it to the intentions of the Soviet Union. In- entertained Congressmen, monitored
yon. The capital of Mongolia? The man, then intelligence briefer to the Soviet nuclearlionth shipments and,'
date of the Council of Trent? The Vice-Chief of Nasal Operations, sup- according. to published reports. _helped ?
coefficient of the square root of nine plied the critical piece of the puzzle. destabilize the left-wing government of
over pi? Bobby knew them all? What the piece was remains, even now, Australian prime minister Gough Whit-
and a lot more besides. He seemed to secret, but a good guess is that it in- lam. There was very little, in rim that -
read everything in sight, which was not volved Soviet plans to dispatch, two Task Force 157 did not do. Ai cording
unusual for a bright boy in a small town combat divisions to Syria at the height to subservient investigations by The
where. after feeding the hop after sup- of the conflict. "Everyone else in the Washington Post and the Winnington
per, there IV:IS not much else to do. What community was calling it one way," re- News Journal,. Task Force 157 was in-
was unusual was that he never seemed calls one admiral. "Bobby was the only volved in almost every majm intelli-
to forget any of it. Ile could repeat, one calling it the other. Bobby was the gence operation from 19G8 until 1975,
--serbatim, whole passages of obscure one who was right.- from overthrowing Salvador Allende in
tomes he had digested years before. It The Soviets, after threats by Richard Chile to helping Kissinger fiy secretly
was as if his mind were an IBM 360 on Nixon, abandoned their plans, and the to Peking in 1971.
which the terminals never closed, and correctness of Inman's analysis eventual- Inman put an end to it. 'Lie chain
watching it work, all clickety-clack, like ly helped win him appointment as three- of events began in 1975, *shortly after
some giant parlor trick run amuck, got tor of Naval Intelligence. It was there finnan's appointment as director of.
I') be a little frightening. that he encountered. the redoubtable Naval Intelligence. Early thit year,
He must have had few playmates. Edwin Wilson, CIA man, shipper of Inman appeared before Sen at John
While visions of playing football for arms, recruiter of assassins. McClellan's Defense Apprcyriations
1tK7A1 danced in the other boys' heads, ? Subcommittee and, afterward, a senior
young Bobby was off at the library'. He Military intelligence, and Naval. Intel- committee staffer invited him to lunch.,
iv as skinny and four-eyed and awkward ligence in particular, is a formidable Inman accepted and at the restaurant
and along the way, a lot of sand proba- undertaking, involving the tracking not they were joined by Wilson. who
bly got kicked in his fare. But it paid off. only of potential enemies but of actual announced, "I work for you, Admiral."
Because when he got to he an ;1(11111, allies as well. In the Navy, much of the Inman was surprised. but not nearly so
the 1)1hcr boys weren't frightened, they latter task fell to a shadowy operation much as when 'Wilson went oti to tell,
were awed. "I'd tell you he has a photo- dubbed Task Force 157. hint that he would have an easier time
a ph ie memory." says one of them. a Created in the late Sixties, at the securing money on the Hill if 1n7steered.
senior \Vhite noose aide, -but it's better height of the antiwar movement, Task contracts to Wilson's companies.
than that. A photograph takes time to Force 157 was perhaps the most clandes- There were never any contracts. When -
develop. Inman's like a Polaroid. In tine of all military intelligence's opera- he went back to his office that afternoon,
smut." They still wanted to test him, Lions. Its members wore no uniforms and Inman ordered an investigation of Wile,
though, just as they' had on the radio were outside the regular Navy chain of son instead. it took a year to untangle
every week: Spell the name of the command. Their cover took various all of Wilson's Various connections and,.:
prime minister of Sri Lanka, Daniel forms. Some operators ran dummy civil- even then, whom he was working for
Patrick Moynihan challenged during a ian companies. Others, such as a yeoman and _precisely what he was doing were
Senate heApprtoverd ROI Releaset200,11/103107NDtC4A-ROP914Q901R00050025EUMvuEry
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Ear _from c ear. What was obvious was ce argei. t san that of CIA?? train of impedimenta trailec behind
that Wilson was, in hunan's words. "a
petty grafter . . . a 'five percenter.' "
With that pronouncement, Inman fired
him. Inman disbanded Task Force 157
ahogether when he discovered a lew
months later that. Wikon had been
- using it to recruit assassins on behalf
of Libya. "I closed it down.". bonan
said of the task force, "because it was
out of control and because its continued
operation was a di'ahl, on Navy
resources." .
The explanation was vintage Inman,
a hit_ of idealisin--''out of control"?
laden with a heaping helping of pragma-
tism: "drain on Navy resources." It was
? the same combination he used to rational-
ize his opposition to CIA's domestic spy-
ing. 1-fe feared for civil liberties?"rules ,
?
to protect Americans"?yes, and he was
worried about efficiency, too. Keeping
track of protesters was expensive. It took
one's eye off the Worst of all, the
press invafiably fotind out, and that, as
Inman ruefullyi put it, "keeps us from
doing the job we were meant to do."
You had to trim like that if you were
a spook, or you wouldn't stay a spook
for very long. It was all right to come j
off like an A.C.L.U. member in private, 1 an unseen third party to all the phone
to silently signal Senators that, what they calls made by Jane Fonda, Dr. Spock and H
were hearing from Reagan's boys was 1678 other Americans nn the agenc'y.,
crazy. The important thing was not be-1' "watch list." NSA also read all overseas
ing too out-front publicly. You had telegrams and thoughtfully distributed
be a member of "the team," as ['lei copies of the most interesting to other
faceless men of the agency called them- honesty he d recruit
GOvernment agencies -flat
selves, and, there were rules by whichl
the team played. It was a dicey business
sometimes, sorting out who you were.
from what you believed, and for Bobby
Inman, going to NSA was the diciest!
business of all.
?ii
The National Security Agency is onei
of those agencies your Government:'
would prefer that you not know about.'
The joke in Washington is that its
initials stand for Never Say Anything,
and, in practice, NSA doesn't say much.
It is listed in no Government handbook.
It is uniquely exempt from the provi-
sions Of the Freedom of Information
Act. What it does, how many people it
employs, the amount of dollars it spends
are all classified. Even the executivel (7.
order Harry Truman signed 30 years I
ago bringing it into existence rernains
an official secret. ll won it; by accepted standards, he
?
modern, three-story building lb' miles The average military officer who went
outside Washington on the grounds of' up to the Hill, you see, was a practiced
Fort Meade, Maryland. To discourage, imlitician. Ile played the angles. Helc
the casually curious, two chain-link, TV-4 backslapped. He drank bourbon ancr'
monitored fences, each topped by six branch water with the bulls in their
strands of electrified barbed wire, sur-1' bideawa-y offices. 'When he testified,
round it. 'The people who pass through which was something to be avoided, a:
its portals (some 20,000 men and worn-1
backed by another 100,000 military per-; him. There were squadrons junior
sonnet at 2000 "listening posts" through. colonels whispering off mike in his ear; .
out die world) are, a tight-lipped group. briefcases bulging with every possible
They are forbidden to discuss their work, contingency; set-piece formulas for Just.'
even with their spouses. To ensure that the Right Answer. To get it, a Congress- ,
they don't, they are subject to regular man had to ask Just the Rieht Ques-',
poly,graph examinations that ask them to don, and even then, of course. lie didn't
list the names and addresses of people get ""irfi' Wfi'le careers were made no
with whom they have had sex, as weld the fine art of evasion. That was the :
as whether or not they are acquainted' established norm.
with the meaning of the word fellatio. But Inman WA.,,n't normal, lie didn't "
What NSA does is snoop. "They've' drink and he didn't backslap. He did t
got a huge vacuum cleaner turned on," go into the hideaway offices, hut it wasn't,
to chat about what the Redskins had
says one authority on the agency, "suck.'
jug in information around the world.:
Whatever goes out over the airwaves?
rub the bridge of his nose in weariness'.
from a Soviet radar pulse over Novo-.
and talk geopolitics. He'd discuss where
sibirsk, to an AI ab diplomat calling
the world was going the next '!0 years, ;
home to Riyadh about the price of oil,
and where it ought to be going. He'd
to a Panamanian infantry captain radio-
talk about the Russians, dispassionately,
ing his company to switch position?
gets sucked up in, the vacuum cleaner." alialYticjillY, trying to put hiluself in
their shoes. And he'd talk abont ?
And that, as it turned out, was the
gence?NSA's and that of the other ,
trouble. For among the billions of bits.'
agencies. There wouldn't be Janes Bond
of information NSA routinely \ collected;
were the .private conversations of ordi-' stories, but the nuts and bolts of the
nary Americans?and Some not so ordi- craft: how. more linguistics experts;
needed to be recruited: how CIA's :
Tlary ones, as well. For years, NSA was
'generation gap,' as he called it needed
to be closed; how the "data product" !
could be improved. He could be star-'.
tlingly honest?"That's pretty dumb,"
he said of one operation, "but 'we're
going to do it anyway".:7-and, i hk
n
converts tohis side.
program, code-named Operation Sham-
particular
11 he had a political ideology, it was a
. .,
rock, went on for 18 years. mystery to the men who questioned him.:
It all came to an end (hiring the ?Goldwater liked him, and so did John
Watergate investigations. When the Nix-. f ower, which was to be expected Inman
was, after all, a man of arms. 11:fiar was i
on tapes were played. three initials' kept
clone the previous weekend. Instead,
he'd stretch out his long legs, h an back,?
sopping up: NSA. From the way Nixon
Ind hi; friends talked about it?twice
. i
not expected, what was truly astoLinding,
was how the liberals, the -Senatirs hke :
as much, by one count, as CIA?NSA Joe Buten and Daniel K: Inoi.ye and :
seemed capable of almost anything. The Birch Bayli, who munched ' on CIA di- '
more the Congressmen listened, the rectors like cornflakes, not only liked '
closer that seemed to the truth. Around him but adored him. Their regard for
Capitol Hill and in the press, there' him was almost embarrassing. and in '
was growing pressure to bring NSA. certain quarters in Washington. it was
to heel. Enter the fixer, Bobby Inman, said that all the adulation actua;ly hurt
Inman's touch with Congress was al-. Inman. When, Biden heard that be of.
ready well known. The Navy thought so fere(' to call Inman "a no-good, son-of-a-
mich of his skills it had already given bitch horse's ass" if it would help his
ins a medal?the Distinguished Service. career, but Inman didn't seem worried,
rectal, its highest noncombatant deeorto About Congress there was no reason to
on---simply for tlse quality of his Con-
. ,
' worry during those years he was minning
,, .ssiona testimony. It was odd about '
. that medal, and odd about the way In-
ma '
The agency is headquartered in ? al, did almost everything wrong.
NSA, because Inman had a scs.ret. A
friend, a former CIA director, told what
it was: "Bobby," he said, "undei stands
information. He knows it is power. He
knows how to use it."
It was hypnotic to. watch. There he
would be on a hearing day, utter]) alone.
No aides whispering conversations, no
briefing books at his side, the greeo baize
of the witness table stretching out before
him s like an empty ocean. Thi t gavel
would bang and the distinguished Sen.!
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ator from somewhere would ask a ques-
tion. And then it would happen: A
smile would conic over Inman's face as
if, cartoonlike, a light bulb had been
turned on in his head. "Well, yes, sir,"
he would begin, and two tight para-
,graphs later, the Senator would have
what he had been after, with maybe a
lesson in Russian history or English
literature in the bargain. If the question
had been less than wise, as questions in
Congress tended to be, the Senator would
never know it. This was not Scans
Turner, who belittled them, or Dick
Helms, who condescended to them; this
was goodol' Bobby Inman, who simply
informed them. It seemed so effortless,
no one ever guessed at the pressure; only
his left leg, crossed casually over the
right, gave him away. When he was
bored, it had a habit of swinging from
side to side.
The press was entranced. It was hard
not to be when, as was his wont at NSA.
he was lunching with them in their
offices, taking them home to breakfast
and, ever so nicely, asking them not to
write this story or that. NSA directors
had never done that 'before; no spook
ever had. And they had suffered for
it. Inman was different. When Inman
talked, reporters listened. There lsre r c
certain rules, of course; You never
named him; you never attributed the
tidbits he gave you; you never, in fact,
did anything he didn't want you, to do.
OE the invitations to breakfast stopped
coming. That was a capital game, and
Innian pla),ed it with consummate skill.
During his time at NSA, exposes of the
agency all but disappeared.
Inman's ability to play the pi ess ?vas on
display?along with his slashing wit--
at the 1977 Gridiron Dinner. The annu-
al black-tie, off-the-record soiree is an
important event on the Washington
social calendar, a once-a-year opportuni-
ty for pols and press to put aside the "
adversary re:1w flinch ip that supposedly
exists between them. -the topic of the I
1977 dinner was intelligence, and Inman,
then director of NSA, was in top form.
Cazing out over the Washington Hilton
balfronm,.where were collected sonle of
the senior powers of America o jour-
nalism. he noted that, according to recent
press reports, sonic of those in attendance
had been picking up pin poney as
operatives for the CIA. -That was a
shame. Inman said. SI IICC (IA was
such a ham-handed, stingy employer.
-1-hen, smile broadening, he continued:
"We in the Pentagon want to make it
Il[) to you. join us and you can be in the
hig money. We've got 120 d011ars
a year to spend. They skimped on ex-
penses. With us, you'll have um-ouch-
6
rti 'turn's. timthle-dtPPing and lots of : It was against this backdrop t at word
fringe benerds? Dnekininting triPs- PX began to circulate in late 1980 that '
privileges. (heap booze at officers clubs. Inman was being pushed as he next !
Free iJcoho1 treatment ;It VA hmsPitals? director of Central Intelligente. Doing I
..Ancl )(tut: dishonorable discharge up- the pushing was Barry Goldw;,ter. and,
gr:Ided. If your editor won't pay for the the incoming Reaganites were rot at all
assignment, well give you a free ride -with happy. They had their candidate?I
Lockheed. If you have to get there Reagan campaign director \Villiam
la-4, we have a few B-1 prototypes. Not Casey. a 68-year-old former CSS man
to mention Trident submarine rides for
the kiddies."
The reporters, who were to write while Casey suffered from cei tain
few critical stories about NS:\ thereafter, mitted defects?lapses in men.ory, in- I
lapped it up. CIA director Stansfield ability to organize and, as tirrw would I
demonstrate, a studied cavalier' ess with
other people's money?he was at least I
not Inman. Inman they despised He was ,
a Carter appointee. He was poprlar with
Congress and the press. He hat; even?
and this raised hackles most of
a11-
1110WC(l a fag to stay at NSA.
This last charge was indisputaely true.
In mid-1980. as the :\ [oral vfajority
was beginning its in cam-
paign, a routine security check IL ci found
a middle-level NSA employee to be a
homosexual. 1Vithin the int-Iligence
for the Central Intelligence Agency.
CIA had suffered at Inman's hands, community, that had alwa sben,- cause
both difYing his tenure at Naval, Intel-
ligence and later while he was at NSA, it
blackmail. That was the recommenda-
for instant dismissal, the ratiornile being
that homosexuals were \mine; able to
where he had become embroiled in a
tion in this case, but Inman overrode it.-1
bureaucratic cat fight with Turner over I
's independence. Turner, . ,t)1,1ei crantaind'sf foarm,i,l,v1-:1-,r
and,
the agency 1
whose arrogance was exceeded only -by misc., the enot.ne(t, was oiloweuIC tsta,, !
his ambition, had lvaned to bring NSA: (n) Ivith no diniiininion 01 his securitoi
directly under his command, and Inman, eiear;nue. 1-he ci A ?old O\ I) were7
after months of battling, had successfully beside themselves. ;Ind. by the lime he .
thwarted him. The incident was notable, took office. so, reportedly. was It.eagan's
if only because it WaS one of the few then national-security advisor, 1th hard
times Inman had ever been seen to lose. v Allen. Allen had hig plans for the
his temper. Whether by calculation or, agency. i word wurd Of the da, ir was
not, during his fight with Turner, he; going to be "unleashed," and du loosen-
had done so several times. Tables were ing or its bonds and the alterana
pounded, faces turned red, angry words mstics dierein would rexinire tough.
were exchanged; and, as a result, Turner, minded, hardcharging men. TI e worry
an immensely proud man, had never ens that ltiman was soft.
forgiven Inman.
? There remained, though, the ,u-ohlern
Matters were not improved when NSA
--- Goldwater, who was lobbying, iast and
intercepts later picked up word of Billy inrionsjv lot- Inman's appointme it. Also,
Carter's financial dealings with the Lib- someone had to backstop Cam y, espe-
yans. Rather than take the information daily On the Hill. The yip solw on was
to Turner, Inman, as provided by stat; to offer Inman the n umber-tv 0 post,
ute, went instead to Attorney General dcp?,), dircoor.
Benjamin Civiletti?then quietly briefed Inman was not sure he wan te,l it_ Ile
the press about what he had done. Tur-
ner was wounded again when, during the
controversy over the presence of a Soviet
combat brigade in Cuba, the Defense
Department, fearful that CIA was using
IICAVS Of the brigade as a stratagem to
undermine SALT, pointedly checked the
agency's data with Inman. Enraged, ,
Turner reportedly went to Jimmy
Carter, his .old friend and Annapolis
classmate; looking for Inman's head.
Instead, Carter awarded Inman the
National Security Medal.
?
who had headed the Securities and Ex-
change Commission under Nix n. And I
Turner, also in attendance, did not seem
as amused.
Turner was !not the only one :evil?
wasn't, happy. In a town like Washing-
ton, where there are always wheels with-
in wheels, there were those who thought
that Ininan's technique----his courting of
the Congress, his petting of the press?
AV;IS merely a ploy: there were those
who believed that, in seeming..so honest,
Inman was actually being devious. As it
happened, many of those people worked
was content at NSA. he told friemls..md,
if he (11(1 1 Ca VC, it would probabi be for
private industry, uliere, reported; v, (lifers
in the S250,000 range vver(;- her eq dan-
gled, }W..' sons were approachime college
age. 1Vith his military career al its ap-
)arent ienith, he was tempted to accept
one of-sthe lucrative offers. FrienTs. suell
as James Schlesinger. himself a former
CLA director, urged him to turn the ap-
pointment, down. Inman was on the
verge of taking their advice when Rea-
gamesummoned him Lo the 'Whitt Itouse
Alter an application of the famous Rea-
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Admiral Inman changed ltis ininc
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Since then he has not had an easy
time of it. During the controvers' over
the financial dealings of Casey's deputy
for covert operations, a California
businessman named Max Hugel, Inman
was suspected of leaking the in
that eventually brought ibout Hugel's
downfall. The stories about the source
of the leaks were untrue, but that did
not prevent. further suspicions that In-
man?"a sleeper agent." as one of his
enemies called him?was behind Gold-
water's call for Casey's resignation, when
the CIA dfrector landed in a financial
briar patch of his own. At one point,
when it appeared that Casey was on the
verge of being ousted, security advisor
Allen let it be known that if Casey
went. Inman would go with him.
The Casey flap finally passed, but not
before Inman was comiwlled to go on
national television and, looking distinct-
ly uncomfortable, commend his boss for
doing "-a great job." But that was not a
sufficient show of good faith for the po-
litical right and, during the battle over
CIA's proposed executive order, they
went at Inman again. Human Events,
the influential right-wing journal,
warned ominously of unidentified "lib-
erals" lurking within CIA's corridors,
and The Wall Street Journal, in an edi-
torial widely believed- to have been gen-
erated by 'the White House, invited
Inman to make good on his ? pledge
about "personally repugnant'', executive
orders and resign. About that time, CIA;
spokesmen started talking about,Inman's
"keeping a low profile."
He has rarely been .seen. sine, The
few times he has vcntured unt, it has not
been as the Robb) Ininawof
Casey keeping cover, he has become the
agency's point man. the a nointed.bcarer
of bad tidings. Ile was there when
Reagan finally signed the agency's ex-
ectitive order: there again - when ,the
agency decided to crack.down.on civil-
ian scientists, warning them of the legal ,
trouble that awaited them for disclosing
sensitive technology; and. he, was there
yet again to defend the widespread. ,use
of Government polvgraphing.
For his diminishing drde,of friends,
it has all been very unsettling, ,"It's
bad," a Senafor said recently? referring
to the executive order:rhat; Reagan
signed and Inman defended,,He_men-
tioned the White _House cereniony,
Inman standing there. looking-:;rather
blank, assuring everyone that.the,revised
version was really going. to, be i11 right,
that they could go to sleep at, night
not worry. because he had_kept,:,the
genie in the bottle., The Senator,:-.an
admirer of Inman's, recalled. ,how, at
that moment. those wheels ,:within
wheels spun again, and how-chis?Jime
he found himself svoudering-? whether
maybe they were right. "It's .,!d," he
repeated. "Rut without Bobby; it..-.woidd
have been a hell of a lot worse." ?
7
Was it true? Had Bobby real ,y become ;
Horatius at the bridge? Or was he some-
one elsc. entirely, someoney'darker,,and
different?
It certainly seems that Innian's role
now is to keep the ,bad thiTtgs from
getting worse, and it. is a pail ,.he per-
forms without much convictimi. At the
meeting of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science,- where he
called for voluntary censorship, his
words seemed flat, their syntax tortured
and stumbling. The gap-toothed smile
was there, as always, but, no t seemed
more forced, the man behind it. more ?-.1
fatalistic. When. he told, the .,assembled I
scientists of a storm, that-,,waN ,coming, I
how their way of life would ;he washed
away if they. did not . bend efore it,.
he seemed to some of listeners to !
be speaking as mucho1;,himself as he
was of them. His .auclience, locked back
at him.. A friend in. attentlarce,:shook
his head sadly.
No One ill Washington can, ,e certain
now what will become of: the,agency or
of Inman. People can only 1411c.iand
speculate and wonder and ?vs?irry..But
they can be sure that, whateNer, comes
to pass in the shadowy .world ;,fie ui
habits, Bobby Ininan yjJ1 e1,think-.
ing ... always di inking.
1:3
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1