WASHINGTON WHISPERS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 26, 1982
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

- STATINTL
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AP:3: Er-FEARED
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
ON PA 26 July 1982
Washington 'MDtg,-,,DigT@?
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's
ability to keep tabs on foreign intelli-
gence agents in the U.S. has been hit
hard by budget cuts and a surge of
suspects. A decade ago, the FBI aimed
to have 1 agent for each suspected
spy?but now the ratio is 1 FBI hand
for every 4 foreign agents.
* *- *
Advice from Adm. Bobby Inman, re-
cently retired deputy chief of the
Central Intelligence Agency, on deal-
ing with Congress: "If you've raised
teenagers, you've got a head start "
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LRT I Lao;
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ON PAGE/AA ____ 25 JULY 1982
IA's genius' recalls
life near the top
pome and I -almost exPecteesiiine-
i.oneto .come up to me and say, `I'm 1
sorry, none of this ever happened
to you. You were only dreaming,'"
Inman said in a recent interyiew.
While visiting Dallas. =
'Inman, SI, became depnty dime?
tor of the CIA in 1981, at which time
fthe?U.S..Senate approved,hispromo-.-
::tiOn'from vice adMiraltb,adiairal:
Be had: been director Of 'the Na.
tional Security Agency four, years
before that.
As deputy director. Inman ran
the day-to-day operations of the
CIA. With his toothy smile and re-
strained, military manner, Inman
was a welcome contrast to Director
= William Casey the gruff Republi-
can appointee who angered easily.
Inman became the peacemaker
to anxious congressmen -irked by
,44,4 past discrepancies of the CIA. His
Bobby Ray lumen t mandate from- President Reagan,.
"guiding genius" Of the CIA.7.! he said, was to rebuild-U.S. intent- ,
gence gathering agencies ? a task
By Bill Deener - he believes he accomplished..: ?
' Staff Writc.r.of The News. ; - ? :-BeoatiSi ?of XliaTaPtilailtY with
r4, Congress 'and ;President Reagan,
I.obby. Ray :amen, gangly and. ,
come tile next CIA director. When
re-
that students love to harass. . . this
? many believed Inman would be-
-tieSpectacled, looks like one of
,
those high schoci science teachers ruSeY.':WaiiibeitiglireSsureti. to re::
?':',- ? ? ? ? Sign earlier year because of a i
Then he speaks. and the thin, ak controversi. over some of his linen-
:.most frail man has casthis riveting cial dealings, Inman was touted by
spell. The man, who once taught Some, congressmen: as his replace-
history at a Longview junior high ment.
school, has lived most of his life "That was one of the Most diffi-
the shawdowy world of the Central 'cult times I've ever gone through '
? Intelligence , Agency, spy satellites in my life," Inman said. "There
and Capitol Hill intrigue. Until his were all kinds of innuendos that
retirement-in April, Inman, a us- somehow I was orchestrating the
tive Texan who hasn't decided
where he will relocate, was consid-
ered the guiding genius of the CIA.
"At my retirement ceremony. I
was reflecting on how far I hack
STA I IN I L
publicity and the congressional at
in order to get him (Casey)
out kid take his job.lio one who
knew rue ever harbored any
thought of that for any length of
time at all. ? -
'Back in 1980, I' said there was
not likely to be another military
DCladirector_ of_theiCIA) JOT_ 20
years4So even- though -there was a
fair amount of press speculation
that I would likely have-been the
successor if Casey would have left,
it was my firm convictionAat just
flat would not be the case."
Inman was born in the small
East Texas town of Rhonesboro in
Upshizr County. He graduated from
Mineola High School and received
a degree in history. and .governmitit
from. the University of ?Texail:But ht.>
grew tired of teaching histarrt,OXougi:
view teen4gers 'and joined theStivY
1951. .
During the Koreati`fWar;
served aboard the aircraft carrier Val;
leytOrge. His incisive mind, near-pho.:::
togrisilltieniaiirdifklinatgoV631t,diclitz
tion to work obviously served him
well. His rise to admiral at,me,g1, );Lps
beStistieSeribed as meteoric:
Robert Anson, an author and an ex-
-.
pert on U.S. intelligence agencies,
wrote of Inman recently: "He is ... one
oLthe_very rare non-Annapolis, non-',
blue7;Witter:Inll four-star admirals in
U.S. naval history, and undoubtedly the
only one anywhere , who ,can discuss
the rhythms of Thackeray and Swin-
burne as knowledgeably as he can the
exact dispositon of the Soviet Baltic
fleet. His brain is an intimidating
rnaobrleehtooticstei cro.m_tn, ed With every imagE.
CONTENUM
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- - - - STATINTL
ARTICLE Amman
QZ PAGE 7
Analysis/Leslie H. Gelb
Political Shift Illustrated by Moderates'
NEW YORK TIKES
J'ULY 1982
? Spacial to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 23?In recent
weeks, the three officials generally re-
garded as the most moderate voices in
the National Security Council have
left Government, each a man with im-
pressive military credentials.
Their departure is a stark example
of just how lar the political center of
gravity has shifted since the Carter
Administration. It is also a reminder
of just how steady and deep institu-
? tional roots run in Washington, be-
neath shifting political fashions. -
? The three officials, Secretary of
State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Gen.
,David C. Jones, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adm. Bobby
? Ray Inman, the. deputy director of the
Central Intehgence Agency, were
classified as conservatives in the Car-
ter Administration. In the Reagan Ad-
ministration they were classified as
moderates, a shift that eventually be-
came an element in the departures of
Mr. Haig and Admiral Inman. ?
?
s Assoc:wed Prems
? ? . Adm. Bobby Ray Inman
What actually changed was not the
three men's views, but the political
climate in Washington.
In the inner councils of the Reagan
Administration, the three men were
the main advocates of arms control
talks with the Soviet Union, of a less
devilish theory of Soviet behavior, of
more tolerance in dealing with the
world as it is. As a result, they and the
institutions they represented were
often out of step with the hard-line ap-
proach of the White House.
thilthd Prow Interratimal
Alexander M. Haig Jr.
? -
It was not unusual in the last year
and a half to hear White House offi-
cials or political appointees in the De-
fense Department express a certain
mistrust of them. They were often
viewed as having divided loyalties, to
their institutions rather than to the
President. The political men of the
Administration were never quite com-
fortable with them despite their mili-
tary backgrounds, traditionally a
good conservative credential. ?
There was trouble from the outset.
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Wein-
berger wanted to cut short General
Jones's second two-year term as
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
because the general bad recom-
mended Senate approval of the second
strategic arms limitation treaty. The
general had also supported the
Panama Canal treaty, much to the
dismay of the Republican right wing.
Mr. Weinberger, however, was per-
suaded to keep General Jones on the
job because of the uproar caused by
rumors of his impending dismissal;
the Secretary and White House offi-
cials reportedly did not want to put
themselves in a position of being ac-
cused of politicizing the military.
In any event, General Jones stayed
on for a full second term and for regu-
lar,retirement, and he became an ad-
vocate of beginning talks with the
Soviet Union on medium-range mis-
siles in Europe at a time when the
political appointees in the Pentagon
were against such negotiations._
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Departure
The Joint Chiefs of Stan naa been an
intimate party to past discussions
with the ? United States's European
allies on that subject- Like the offi-
,
dais in the State Department who
'participated in the discussions, ? the
chiefs knew that the Europeans would
not agree to the deployment of new
American medium-range missiles in
Europe unless arms control talks with
Moscow were under way. It was a
matter of European politics that the
American military understood, even
though the point had not quite sunk in
with the new Reagan officials.
. General Jones and the other chiefs
also joined forces with Mr. Haig and
- the State Department in arguing that
the terms of the arms limitation
treaty should , be observed, even
though Mr. Reagan and those close to
? him had pronounced the treaty sorely
? deficient.
In all of these cases, General Jones
? and Secretary Haig had greater com-
mand of the facts and the diplomatic
histories. They carried the day each
time with President Reagan. ,
They were less successful ..thother
matters. For example, while both
men and their institutions worried
about the growth of Soviet military
power, neither was prepared to argue
;
that the United States was in a posi-
I Iroa. of military inferiority. Soviet
military superiority was an article of
faith with the Reagan team.
General Jones and Mr. Haig essen-
tially restricted themselves to ar-
guing that in some respects the Sovi-
ets had the advantage but that in other
respects the United States and the
Western powers were still better off.
They emphasized "adverse trends" in
the military balance rather than cur-
rent inferiority. They were often
joined in this view by Admiral Inman
and the professionals of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Admiral Inman also proved a thorn
in the side of the Reagan Administra-
tion with his repeated opposition to ef-
forts by Reagan political appointees
to expand the role of the C.I.A. to in-
clude certain kinds of domestic
spying. Like most senior C.I.A. offi-
cials over the years, he had respect
for covert operations only under care-
fully controlled conditions, and he had
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,CO,NTINCET1
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THE SAN DIEGO UNION
19 JULY 1982
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE______A *-
Even His Critics Acknow e ge
STATI NTL
Casey Has Strengthened CIA
By L. EDGAR PRINA
Coley News Service
WASHINGTON ? A year has
passed since the Senate Intelligence
Committee reported it could find no
basis for concluding that William Jo-
seph Casey Jr. was unfit to serve as
director of Central Intelligence:
If that wasn't damning with faint
praise it indicated that the commit-
tee had, as the Capitol Hill expres-
sion goes, only "a minimum of high
regard" for him.
But if the committee were to make
?
a judgment on Casey's job perform-
ance today, it almost certainly would
be phrased in positive, favorable
terms.
Even Some of his severestsritics,
who personally don't like the gruff,
sometimes abrasive New Yorker, ac-
knowledge he has strengthened the
CIA in his first 18 monthsas Lord of
Langley.
"Despite the distrust of Casey, he
is generally credited with doing a
good job in beefing up the agency,"
an aide to one of the most critical
senators said.
A strapping six-footer, the 69-year-
old veteran of the Office of Strategic
Services (055) in World War II, is on
a roll. He is eihibiting the cairn as-
surance of e man who loves his lob
?,. ?
and. feels he's on top of it.
,.
Such was not the ease when he was
baled before the Senate committee to
explain why he appointed the contro-
versial and inexperienced Max C.
Hugel as his deputy for clandestine
operations and failed to provide all
the information required of. him on
committee questionnaires. ?
- Casey eventually conceded it was
"a mistake" for which "I take full
responsibility" to have appointed
Hugel, who had by then resigned.
And the director wound up telling the
senators more about his own past
business and government activities
than they probably wanted to know.
Casey seems to be able to admit a
mistake and learn from it. He agrees
that he failed to devote sufficient at-
tention to congressional relations
after his confirmation sailed through
the Senate 95 to 0 in January 1981.
? He came across as a rather reluc-
tant sharer of intelligence informa-
tion with the oversight committees.
Members of the Senate panel were
particularly irked. Eventually, after
Huge! Thuslness erupted,
several committee mem-
ber& Including then Chair-
dap, Barry Goldwater,
Ariz., suggested Casey:
should resign.
,Ii recent months, howev-
er, 'Casey has made an ef-
fort to keep in closer touch.
He now invites small
,groups of Senate and House
committee members to dis-
cuss matters of mutual in-
terest over breakfast.
Adm. Bobby R. Inman,
_
who retired as (AA deputy
director Jest month, called
.,..esey a "good director,"
adding:
re?The only critical note
that I would make, and I've
made it to Bill, is that he
-needs to work harder on his
congressional relations.
?`rhat .process also could be
-helped if some members of
Congress went a little easi-
er in their public rhetoric
toward him."
? Casey gave himself a I.
handicap with the news
media when he decided that
the CIA once again would
be "not a low-profile, but a
no-profile agency."
No longer can a reporter
simply call the agency's
public affairs office and ar-
range a briefing by one of
the hundreds, of specialists
at the CIA complex in near-
by Langley, Va., as was the
case during the Carter ad-
ministration. -
Such briefings are now
relatively rare and are of-
fered on .a _quid pro quo
basis: "if the 'reporter is
going to travel abroad and
agrees to share his insights
and information upon his
return,. tie will probably find
that a specialist is avail-
able. ? ? ? -
? e. 4
Unclassified CIA zre-I
search reports on such
things as Soviet oil produc- ?
tion or U.S.S.R. arms trans-
fers to Third World coun-
tries no longer are brought
to the attention of interest-.
ed reporters, nor mailed to
them upon request..
In an address to agency.
employees, Casey said he
believes the CIA will be
more effective and more re-'
spected "if we cut down on
hawking our wares" and
concentrate of excellence in
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::L?; APPEARED
ON PAGZ If
THE NEWSDAY MAGAZINE (N.Y.
11 July 1982
yr t
uietiy in Co
By David Wise
Photo by Ken Spencer
- Some weeks ago, an interesting
piece of information began circulat-
ing in the intelligence community -
the closed, spooky world of the
tral Intelligence Agency, Defense
? Intelligence Agency, National Secu-
rity Agency, Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the other spy
agencies in and around Washington.
. The word went out that William J.
Casey, the director of central intelli-
gence, had bought an expensive
i
house n the exclusive Foxhall Road
section of Washington. 1
To men and women accustomed to
working with fragments, piecing to-
gether minute bits of intelligence to
form a larger mosaic, the report was
immediately seen for its true si
cance. Better than any official- an-
nouncement, it meant that Bill
Casey, a Long Islander who has a
i
home n Roslyn Harbor was plan-
ning to stick around as CIA director. '
There have been times in the past
stormy year and a half when it was
not at all clear that Casey would sur-
vive as the DCI, as the spies refer to
their chief. There was a series of di-
sasters. First, Casey named his for-
mer political aide, Max C. Hugel, as
head of the CIA's cloak-and-dagger '
directorate. Hugel was soon forced
to resign as the result of disclo-
sures in the Washington Post
about his questionable business
dealings. Then the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, responding to a
barrage of publicity, began probing
Casey's own financial put. And
sen. AsspravieGar (*dew
chairman of the intelligence com-
mittee, once a Repuhlicanprysidep7
point-blank for Casey to resign.
All of that took place last year
Casey's first year on the -job. The
storm subsided. The Senate panel,
in a backhanded way, found Casey
not ."unfit" to serve. And through it
' all, the CIA director ? Ronald Rea-
gan's campaign manager in 1980
managed to preserve his close per-
sonal relationship with the Presi-
dent. ("I still call him Ronnie,"
Casey has said.) .
Among those who must surely
have beard the report ? about the
house off Foxhall Road was Casey's
deputy, Adm. Bobby Ray Tnrna
..who Sen. Goldwater and a lot of oth-
-er members of Congress had openly
hoped would be Reagan's original
choice for CIA director. Blocked
from the top job, wooed by private
industry with job offers in six fig.
urea, Inman in April announced thal
he was quitting.
In Moscow, the KGB has no doubt
already heard about Casey's new
house. Very likely, Vitali V. Fedor
chuk, the recently appointed chair
man of the Committee for Stat.(
Security, better known as the KGB,
has already informed President Leo-
nid Brezhnev in the Kremlin
And the report is true. J. William
Doswell, director of the CIA's Of-
fice of External Affairs, a smooth,
Richmond, Va., lobbyist and former
newsman whom Casey brought in as
his top public relations man, con-
firms it. Doswell said that Casey
and his wife, Sophia, moved last
month from their apartment some-
where in Washington to their new
home off Foxhall Road.
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career who has mana to stay one
jump ahead of trouble, barely av 'd-
ing entanglement with the bit of 1
Robert Vesco during Watergate.
For example,. Sen. Joe Bideri? of
Delaware, a Democrat on the Se
Intelligence Committee and y'
most vocal critic, refused to end rse
the panel's findings on the C14 di-
? rector, declaring: "Mr. Casey has
displayed a consistent patter4. of '
omissions, misstatements, and n-
tradictions." And Casey's critics also
charge he is not really qusiifleI to
t e CIA since his Intel nce
arom World Var
II, when he worked for the Oe of
Strategic Services (the OSS wa4 the
STATINTL
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ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
11 July 1982
A Few Closing Remarks
In April., when Adm. Bobby. R. human
announced that he was going to step down as
the ;number two man in the Central
Intelligence Agency, both liberalsid
conservatives mourned his retirement. as a
loss of a brilliant intelligence officer.
In a retirement interview with The New
York Times,- Adm. Inman, in his
traditionally reserved manner, raised
several important points about intelligence
operations. One was a clear warning. "I
believe historians -would' agree that every
administration ultimately turns to the use of
covert operations when (it) becomes
? frustrated" in its diplomatic efforts, Adm.
Inman said. He also warned that these covert
operations can "impact adversely on the
more important job of foreign intelligence
collection and analysis."
On the issue of the politicalization or
1/4bending of intelligence data to justify an
administration's policies, Adm. Inman was
tactful but clear in his response. While it was
"very rare" for an administration to
"deliberately twist the intelligence to
support policy," Adm. Inman noted, "there
have been efforts over the years to say more
than the intelligence professionals believe
safe in terms of protecting sources and
methods."
However, Adm. Inman also went on to say
that "the backbiting and bureaucratic
maneuvering by ideologically committed"
congressional and executive branch staffers
was his greatest frustration. ?
It, is impossible for the U.S. to function on
the international stage without a first-rate
intelligence service. But as Adm. Inman
carefully warns, keeping its analysis free of
selfish policy interests and the poisoning ?
effects of covert operations is difficult and,
apparently, a full-time job.
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ARSICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE :
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
6 July 1982
BRIEFLY / Capital
U.S. intelligence weakness cited
The U.S. intelligence community is only "margin-
ally" able to do its job during the rest of this century
and was slow in seeing the size of Cuban involvement
in Central America, the former CIA deputy director
said yesterday.
"The United States intelligence community, as cur-
rently structured and manned, is marginally capable to
deal with the world of the late 19808 and 90s," said
retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman in an interview in The
New York Times.
"That judgment is shaped by my view that this coun-
try's primary problems in that period will be found in
the competition for raw materials, natural resources,
and markets in an unstable world with the potential for
minor conflicts that could escalate in areas where we
have little or no intelligence effort:'
"Our major weaknesses include a minimal effort
both in collection and analysis about many of the non-
communist countries. We lack the encyclopedic effort
that will let ds understand trends before we get to the
level of a-crisis," he said.
STATI NTL
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STATI NTL
ARTicLEApprgyetFor Release 2001/OMPBocalA-RDIR91-009050'0250006-3
ON PAGE A.3 6 JULY 1982
Ex-CIA aide says agency
4
marginally' able to do job
United Press International
WASHINGTON ? The US intelligence com-
munity is only "marginally" able to do its job
during the rest of this century and was slow in
seeing the size of Cuban involvement in Central
America, the former CIA deputy director said
yesterday.
"The United States intelligence community,
as currently structured and manned, is margin-
ally capable to deal with the world of the late
1980s and '90s," said retired Adm. Bobby R. In-
man in an interview with the New York Times.
"That judgment is shaped by my view that
this country's primary problems in that period
will be found in the competition for raw materi-
als, natural resources, and markets in an un-
stable world with the potential for minor con-
flicts that could escalate in areas where we have
little or no intelligence effort."
Inman said there were areas, "specifically in-
telligence on economic and political develop-
ments in the Soviet Union" where "the effort
isn't as good as it should be."
"Our major weaknesses include a minimal
effort both in collection and analysis about
many of the noncommunist countries. We lack
the encyclopedic effort that will let us under-
stand trends before we get to the level of a cri-
sis," he said.
Inman said although the CIA is working4o
Improve. "there are many areas of the wotid
where we have the potential to be surprised try
events."
One area, where that occurred, he said wds
Central America where the CIA for years "hacta
minimal effort" and "did not detect in a timeLly
way the commencement of the training of
spective guerrillas in Cuba."
"We were slow to recognize the breadth -6f
insurgencies we were going to face," he said.
Inman, the former head of the National Se0-
rity Agency, said CIA director William Casey,
his boss at the CIA, is a "good director.
Inman gave Casey good grades for workinglo
improve the national security estimates and te-
building the infrastructure of the intelligence
agencies. He said Casey could do more in tge
way of congressional relations. ???
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I. ? ' 1
ARTICLE APPLUM.
ON PAGE 4)
Q&A! Bobby R. Inman
Assessing Government's Approac
NEW YORK TIS
5 JULY 1982
to IntelAgence
Special to The New York Mime
WASHINGTON, July 4 ? Adm.
Bobby R Inman startled Washington
in April when he announced his inten-
tion. to resign as the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence. Be said he
wanted to go into private business, but
associates asserted that the real rea-
sons for his departure were policy dif-
ferences with the Reagan Administra-
tion and mounting frustration over
dealing with the White House National
Security Council staff. His retirement ?
from the Government and the Navy
complete, Mr. Inman sat down last
week to discuss intelligence issues.
Q. Is the Reagan Administration
using intelligence information as a
neutral basis for foreign policy formu-
lation, or, as some critics have
charged, is it twisting intelligence
data to lustily policies?
A. It's been very rare in my experi- ?
ence when an Administration makes
an effort to deliberately twist the in-
telligence to support policy, but there
have been efforts over the years to
force us to say more than the intelli-
gence professionals believe is safe in
terms of protecting sources and meth-
ods. I believed we found the proper
balance earlier this year on the issue
of Cuban and Soviet involvement in
Central America. The debate was not
with the intelligence but with the poli-
cy. I don't believe that the Cuban and
Soviet threats were being exaggerat-
ed. For years we had a minimal effort
dedicated to Central America and did
not detect in a timely way the com-
mencement of the training of prospec-
tive guerrillas in Cuba. We were slow
to recognize the breadth of insurgen-
,cies that we were going to face. When
we finally acicuraulated a large body
of raw'datii; 'and tuidirstood the scope
of-Cuban activity/Clearly undertaken
with full Soviet support, there was a
tendency- to. react with shock. That
rtivlyell have come acme's as overre-
action. The language used to describe
-Cuban activity may have been a little
more shrill than it would have been
had we detected the activity from the
outset.
?
Q. How has the Reagan Administra-
tion changed priorities in intelligence
collection and analysis?
A. Early in the Reagan Administra-
tion, increased emphasis was placed
on gaining a Imowledge of events in
Central America and the Caribbean,
the causes of terrorism and the prob-
? lem of the transfer of American tech-
nology to the Soviets and Communist
? bloc. Over a longer period of time, '
there's been a focus on improving
lakowledge across the third world. .
Q. Has the Reagan Adminiiiratiou
placed a greater reliance on the use of
covert operations than recent admin-
istrations?
' A. I know of no way that I can talk
sensibily in public about specific coy.
ert operations. By their nature, there
Is nothing unclassified about them. I
believe historians would agree that
every administration ultimately turns
to the use of covert operations when
they become frustrated about the lack
of success with diplomatic initiatives 1
and are unwilling to use military
farce. Some may begin by being more
eager than others. I wouldn't care to
characterize any of the administra-
tions I've watched. In the long years
of drawing down intelligence capabil-
ities, we almost completely disman-
tled the nation's capacity to conduct
covert operations. The impression
that we're running around the world
conducting covert operations is plain
false. I would add that concern about
the extent of covert operations is not
just found in Congress. It's also found
In substantial depth among intelli-
gence professionals. They are over-
whelmingly concerned about the qual-
ity of this country's foreign intelli-
gence, and they worry that covert
operations, especially when they are
exposed and criticized, impact ad-
versely on the more important job of
foreign intelligence collection and
analysis. si
?
.1
. Q. When the Carter AdrnInistrIttli
negotiated the second strategic arms
limitation treaty with the Soviet ;
Union, opponents said the United ;
States lacked the ability to verify such ,
agreements. Is that true?
A. We have tried over the last dec-
ade to improve the nation's ability to
verify arms control treaties. There
was valid criticism in Congress that
the resulting capability was thin. The
requirements for verification with re-
Approved For Releas : 1
alpMe Etn
whelming. ? A more complex treaty
will place substantial additional bur-
dens on verification. There are sev-
eral ways to deal with that. There are,
for instance, forms of on-site inspec-
tion that would increase verification
capabilities, but if you insist on abso-
lute certainty, if you insist on the ca-
pacity to detect every violation, you'll
never have an arms control process.
You have to take some risks. The key
Is being confident that you will detect -
any serious cheating.
?
Q. What is the state of United Statis
Intelligence capabilities? ?
A. The United States intelligence
community, as currently structured
and manned, is marginally capable to
deal with the world of the late 1980's
and 90's. That judgment iashaped by
my view that this country's primary
problems in that period will be found
in the competition for raw materials,
natural resources, and markets In an
unstable world with the potential for
minor conflicts that could_escalate in
vr---vre now have little or no
Intelligence effort. I do not believe we
can do less than we are doing against
our principal adversaries, and there
are areas where that effort isn't as
good Ed it should be, specifically intel-
ligence on economic and political
developments in the Soviet Union. The
major strengths of our system involve
military matters. Our major weak-
nesses include a minimal effort both
In collection and analysis about many
of the non-Communist camtries. We
lack the encyclopedic effort that will
let us understand trends before we get
to the level of a crisis.
?
Q. Over recent decades, there has
been an increasing reliance on elec-
tronic mid other technical means of
collecting intelligence. Has the result-
ing neglect of human sources dam-
aged overall collection capabilities
and quality?
A. A myth has grown up from state-
ments of some officials that we are too
dependent on technical collection.
There was a period of time when deci-
sion makers believed that satellite
photography was going to answer all
our needs. We're all a little wiser now.
No analyst should be left dependent on
a single me,ans of acquiring intelli-
gence. Human collection runs the risk
of relying on someone who wants to
aTttlelP Pv% Mrs tfinc3.31-3
:?
? -STAT.! NI ?
: Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R
NEW YORK TIMES
ARTICtE AP2FeED 3 JULY 1982
ON PAGE
WASHINGTON TALK
Briefing
..aetting a Line to Inman
ADepuiy Director of Central In-
telligence, Adm. Bobby R.
Inman had instant access to al-
most every kind of communication
and information in the country, as
well as a corps of dedicated couriers
to speed sensitive items to his desk.
But as a civilian who recently
changed home addresses, he had to
make two personal visits to the local
post office this week?one visit begin-
ning at 6 A.M. and lasting one and a
half hours ? to retrieve his own
mulation of letters.
Lynn Rosellinil
Warren Weaver Jr.!
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250006-3
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-0090
ARTICLE AP Piti.e.Lri,E1)
ON PAGE
CORM&TARY
JULY 1982
Disinformation: Or, Why the
Verify an Arms-Control
Edward Jay Epstein
WHEN Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger revealed last April that
the Soviet Union had achieved superiority over
the United States in intercontinental missiles, he
provoked a furor in Congress over the status of
the nuclear balance. Weinberger's revelation also
pointed to an intelligence failure of unprecedented
proportions that extended back over two decades,
and that cast a .great shadow of doubt over the
capacity of the United States to keep accurate track
of the Soviet military arsenal and therefore to verify
any arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union
in the future.
In 1961, the Soviet Union, despite all its bluff
and bluster, had deployed only four cumbersome
and unreliable intercontinental missiles. U.S. intelli-
gence had confidently asserted that there was no
way the Soviet Union could ever deploy the num-
ber of missiles necessary to threaten the rapidly ex-
panding American missile force without providing
years of advance warning.
Such confidence then seemed fully warranted, as
U.S. intelligence had through its technical wizardry
found means of intercepting virtually all the Soviet
missile-testing data, or telemetry, and of determin-
ing the accuracy of the missiles. It was on the basis
of this powerful array of intelligence about Soviet
activity that American leaders made crucial deci-
sions throughout the 1960's concerning the number,
location, and defense of America's missiles.
Yet in the event, these intelligence assumptions
proved to be seriously flawed. Even though its mis-
sile testing was being relentlessly monitored by
America's electronic sentinels in space and on land,
the Soviet Union, without alerting U.S. intelli-
gence, managed to develop?and deploy?missiles
with multiple warheads accurate enough to attack
the most hardened missile silos in the United States.
EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN writes often on issues of intelligence.
Among his books in this field are Legend: The Secret
World of Lee Harva Oswald and hi viegt ?
coApprovedeffertiteileaSP 'i4MOrlittY Also
cOntri fed articles lo he New 3. mke?, NCA4'
T1771f 5 :,1e;p7:111C, and Com MEN TARV (including ?I he t Var
How could such
been detected?
At first, Lor tuts incredible intelli-
gence failure tended to focus on the errors of the
American analysts. The inability to see improved
Soviet missile accuracy was attributed either to the
prevailing disposition grossly to underestimate
Soviet technical competence, or to incorrect Assump-
tions about the method by which Soviet scientists
tested missile accuracy. The fault, in other words,
lay in self-deception.
However, when the data taken from the Soviet
missiles were studied in retrospect, with the help of
new and better methods of analysis, it appeared that
considerably more we involved in the intelligence
failure than American mistakes and self-deception.
This reanalysis suggested that the Soviet Union had
deliberately and systematically misled American in-
telligence by manipulating and "biasing," as it is
called, the missile transmissions that were being in-
tercepted. In other words, by channeling doctored
data into our most sophisticated scientific spying de-
vices, Soviet intelligence had duped the satellites
and antennas on which American intelligence had
come to depend. The Soviets had thereby effected a
decisive change in the delicate balance of strategic
missiles.
After nearly a decade of bitter debate within the
secret world of intelligence, the deception issue still
remains unresolved. Recently a plan was drawn up
by the National Security Council staff to place tech-
nical as well as human spies under the scrutiny of a
centralized counterintelligence authority. The pro-
ponents of this reorganization argue that without
such an "all-source" unit, able to piece together in-
formation from secret agents, surveillance cameras,
and the interception of coded messages and tele-
metry, the various intelligence-gathering services
could again be easily deceived. The opponents of
this plan in the American intelligence agencies
doubt that the Soviets ever in fact orchestrated a
CIALROptivoinol FRo00150o2s0ooso3 moni-
toring des:ces, and reject the proposed centraliza-
tion as unnecessary and destructive of morale. The