CIA S CARLUCCI: THE AGENCY S MORALE IS HIGH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For aiiiiCaik0266.1k4/02\1:10:51446141-00901R000100170001-1
12 December 1979
IA's Carlucci: The agency's
is "big
L.)
This is the fast part of a
three-part interview with
Prank Car/I./eel, ? who be-
came deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency
in early 1978.
By MICHAEL SHAW
Q. In light of what has happened in Iran)
do You believe the other Mideast oil-producing
countries represent an ongoirig, stable supply
of oil?
A. It would not be appropriate for me to
comment on individual countries, but the line.
between production and demand is now so thin
that any disruption such as has occurred in
Iran is bound to have an immediate impact ,on
consumers. Obviously, there are sources of
instability in the oil-producing areas of the
world, and these are things that we have to
monitor very closely.
Q. Has the Central Intelligence Agency pro.
vided the president with a worse-case scenario
In the event that there are further disruptions
of the oil supply from the Mid East?
A. We supply the president with a continu-
ing analysis including both optimistic and
worse-case assumptions.
Q. How pessimistic is your worse-case as.
surnption?
A. It is the kind of assumption that would
entail some hardship on the part of Americans.
Q. One book written about the beginning of
World War II Suggested that Japan's timing
of its attack on Pearl Harbor was related .to
an approximately 90-day-or-so supply of oil.
Does history repeat itself? ?
A. I don't know about history repeating it-
self, but we can certainly learn lessons from
-history and one of the great lessons of Pearl
Harbor was- that our nation needs effective
intelligence. It was precisely as a 'result of
Pearl Harbor that, the predecessor agency of
' the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services
the OSS ? was created. ??
orate
Q. Many assertions have appeared in the
press to the effect that the American people
have lost the will to assert themselves in world
affairs. In analyzing world developments, and
in sketching scenarios for different questions
that present themselves, is the willingness
of the American people to react to particular
situations plugged into the equation?
A. We deal with foreign intelligence only,
and do not analyze domestic reaction to foreign
events. Our job is simply to tell the policy-
maker what those foreign events are and what
the likely intentions of foreign leaders might
be. It is :then up to the policymaker to assess
the domestic ramification i of their decisions.
Q. Is it fair to say that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency will gather the facts, analyze
them, sketch the scenarios, and pose the alter-
natives, but it is the ultimate responsibility
of the president to -decide what the country
'shnll do and he is he one who must make that
decision in light of American public opinion?
A. That is a fair assessment.
Q. There has been considerable discussion
that the morale of personnel in the Central In-
telligence Agency has fallen off in recent years.
Would you attribute that development to the
environment and attitudes within the United'`
States toward the intelligence business gener-
ally, or would you say that there have been
some organizational probleins within the agen-
cy that are being met at the current time?-
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Approved For Release 2003/04/02: CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
A. Morale is .a nebulous thing. Obviously
there are a number of factors that impact on
morale. The barrage of criticism to which the
agency has been subjected has had its impact
on our employees. This is particularly true be-
cause of the facts have been distorted or in-
accurate and, given the nature of our business,
we arc unable to put them in perspective. Like
any organization, we have our internal prob-
lems, We like to think that we are dealing with '
them effectively.
From my own expdfienceT?in-a? number of
government agencies, I would characterize the
morale of the CIA as high. Certainly we have
some of the most competent and dedicated peo-
ple in government wdrking in the CIA. Many
of them work extremely long hours and cannot
even tell their families- What they are doing.
Perhaps a measure of the state of our health
is the fact that we have no trouble. recruiting
people. In fact, the number of applications ,
for employment with the agency has been go-
ing up and the quality of people that are com-
ing into the agency today is as good as, if not
better' than, -it ever has been. ?
Q. Which is more important, the ?quatity of
the people, that you bring into the, Central In-
telligence Agency, or the development of the
new technologies that are making the spy busi-
ness very different than it used to be?
A. Both are important. Without quality peo-
,nle, you do not develop quality' technology. If
the question is what is more important, techni-
cal collection or human collection, the answer
once again is that both are important. The tech-
nical systems can accomplish a great deal but
.they have their limitations. They can only tell
You what is happening right now or what hap-
pen ed yesterday. It really takes human intelli-
gence to know what people's intentions are.
-Q. You are privy to probably the most stark
view of the world of just about anybody. Are
YOU optimistic or pessimistic about the future
of the United States?
A. Basically, I am an optimist. I think our
country has the resources, both human and na-
tural, and the will to deal with the problems
it faces.
Q.. Do yint place your guarded optimism
'Within a Certain'tinie fra'ni6-in-Whieli-Vve must
do certain things?
A. Certainly. And some of those things have
already been discusied in this interview. We
need to deal with the question of our defense ca-
pability, vis-a-vis the growing defense capa-
bility of the Soviets. We need to deal with prob-
lems such as nuclear proliferation and we need
to deal with the problems of energy and the
Third World.
Q. Is time running out on any of these is-
sues?
A. In foreign affairs, time does not usually
run out. The problems become more difficult
to deal with if you do not face up' to them., In
most of the areas I have mentioned, I believe
our country is moving to face up to the prob-
lems, .
Copyright 1975, MIchael S. Shaw
Approved For Release 2003/04/02: CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
_
Approved For RelearsiiI20611021/02Y CJA4REIF191-10901R000100170001-1
11 December 1979
45/14
s Fro' lc
arluccio Covert ciaion
iS a polie OO
??(1,1-1-1
t? w"'
"
This is the second part of d
three-part interview with
Frank ? Carlucci, who be-
came deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency
in early 1978.
f By MICHAEL SHAW
Q. If you had a free hand to write not only
the charter by the operations book for the
agency in the 1980s, how would you structure
things and what would you do?
A. Well, I think the first concept that has to
be understood, and understood fully, is that con-
fidentiality is the heart of an intelligence opera-
tion. There are certain things that we can make
available to the public. We try to tie that by
declassifying up to .150 finished intelligence
products per year on a wide variety of subjects.
But we have to restore an environment where
we can distinguish between that information
which okn be made public and information
which must be kept confidential in the interest
of the nation. It is very difficult to establish a
set of written proscriptions in statute. Some
proscriptions on intelligence activities already
exist. But if you try to make a comprehensive
list, you inevitably imply' that something no-
body thought to put on the list is therefore
authorized.
I think that you need to establish a surrogate
process' through congressional oversight and
something like the present Intelligence Over-
sight Board, which would see that 'intelligence !
activities. are within the acceptable limits of
U.S. public opinion. These oversight mechan-
isms exist in one form or another today and are ,
still evolving. All and all, I think we are mov-
ing in a healthy direction and,, aside from cor-
recting some of the problems I mentioned ear-
lier, I do not think I would try to reverse
course in any way at this point.
Q. What would you do to sharpen the intelli?
gence community's ability to discern and prior.
ilize signals from different parts of the world?
. A. We have given a lot of thoUght to this'
problem and have taken certain steps to deal
with it. The .most important was to establish
a focal point in the intelligence community for
?
"warning." We have put one of our most senior
and able Officers in charge of that function. He
'In turn reports to an _intelligence committee
which I chair. This has worked very well and
I think will continue to serve us in excellent
fashion. ?
Q. Convert operations, particularly during the
Vietnam/Watergate period, took on some nega-
tive connotations that may not necessarily fit
in their historical perspective, Can you give our
readership a view of covert operations within 1
its long-term historical perspective that can I
enlighten us on what a nation must do or be 1
able to do in the world in order to meet the
challenges that we face today?
A. First of all, both the president and the
Congress have recognized that covert action
'Is a legitimate foreign policy tool. That is
exactly what it should be, a foreign policy tool,
and not an independent capability. Covert, ac-
tion is attempting to influence events in other
parts of the world without the source of that .1
influence becoming known. Most people do not
have any problem with trying to influence ,
events in other parts of the world. Indeed, that
is what much of our foreign policy is about.
Most people, also recognize that most things
that an intelligence organization does have to
be done clandestinely.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
Somehow, it is just when you put the two to-
gether that people have problems with it. Yet
one can conceive of many circurnsances where
a friendly, democratic government needs help.
It cannot accept that help overtly without in-
curring 'political difficulties. Let us say, for
example, that they have to deal with a terror-
ist problem and ask the United States for that
helP. If the statemen are politically vulnerable,
they may well ask that that help be given clan-
destinely.
? I find that when most people take issue with [
covert action they are really quarreling with
the policy and not the instrument. Just be-
cause I disagree with giving economic aid to
country X, that does not [mean that I believe
economic aid should not continue to be a for- 1
eign policy tool. Covert action has become as-
sociated ,with one or two highly controversial.
foreign policies.
Once again, the successes cannot be men-
tioned because. the credit for those successes ?
must go to the foreign government, not to us.
. The important point is to ensure that a mech-
anism for policy control is set up and that we
hot do away with the policy instrument itself.
-.Such a control mechanism has now .been es-
tablished, although, 'as I mentioned earlier, it
would be appropriate to cut down on the num-
ber of congressional Committees which have
to be informed when a covert action operation
is undertaken.
Q. Following the definition of a successful
covert action: as being in fact covert, would
assume that one reason we do not read too
much in the press About the activity of KGB
or covert operations of terrorist groups or Of
pehrhaps Cuba and other countries, is that by
that definition, if they are not discovered, they
have been successful. Can you outline, for ex-
ample, in the Mideast, what are the operative
forces beneath the surface there? To what ex-
tent is Ahere. the unreported and unseen chat.
lenge of the opposition, If one wants to put it
that way?
A. Well, I cannot go into any detail without
revealing sources of information, Incidentally,
most people do not appreciate how easy it
is for another country's counterintelligence
operation to trace a seemingly harmless fac-
tual 'Statement about a situation back to a par-
ticular agent or a particular method. So, we
can't be too careful.
One thing that is important to recognize is
that, in most cases where our adversaries have
been successful, they have been willing to
undertake either covert actions or overt mill-
?tary actions. We now see a substantial Cuban
military presence in Africa, for example. There .
are various parts of the world where you see
a substantial Soviet -presence, They do not
really operate under the same set of constraints
that we, as a society, do. In most cases you
'find them exploiting existing unrest.
%That is why it is so important for our country
to work to resolve problems which create un-
rest and conflicts between and within nations. ;
It is also why it is important for our country to
help countries friendly to us to resolve their
.underlying economic and social problems. Cer-
tainly the KGB is at work and they put sub-
stantial resources into their operations. But,
our country, despite the constraints our intelli-
gence organizations face,' has superior intelli-
gence service. ?
Q. At the risk of doing some crystal-ball
gazing, do you believe that the world energy
crisis can be dealt with in the next few years?
. A. I think it can be dealt with Wit not with-
out the exercise' of a great deal of willpower
by Americans and by the people of other coun-
tries in the free world The problem is essen-
, tially one Of restraining increasing consump-
tion while stimulating sources of production.
Unfortunately the rate of consumption has so
far outstripped the rate of increase of sources
of production that over the next few years only
consumption restraint will solve the problem.
nut, given the will, I think we can; solve it. -
Next: Oil and the Middle East
Copyright 1.079, Michael S. Shaw
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
Approved For ReleassC2466164/?1i4 VIALA4541--logiM R000100170001-1
10 December 1979
( International Scene
1 's Frank aduccie.-'D
y
,o.
ur
successes
?
By MICHAEL SHAW .
Q. Mr. Carlucci, what are the challages the
United States will encounter in worikaffaIrs lii
the 1980s?
A. That's a rather broad question. Let me
divide my answer Into a number of 'categories.
First there would be the national security
challenges: our defense posture VIS41-Vi3 the
Soviets and a whole series of treaties that are
under negotiation, like disarmament and mu-
tual and balanced ? force reduetions. .What
posture will the United States and the Soviet
Union take in these negotiations? Certainly we
will continue to face the problem of nuclear
proliferation. The energy probleni will remain
with us and, Indeed, it could become even more
critical in the '80s. If consumption continues to
go up as it has and production, remains 'cons-
tant as predicted, additional measures will
have to be taken on the energy front.
-There is also the question of relationships
with the Third World; the issue of equitable
distribution of wealth between the have and
have-not. nations. Connected with this are the
difficult issues posed by Soviet and Cuban ex-
pansion activity, particularly in Africa. There
will also be questions of how the United States
can strengthen her relationships with her
&t talk
This is the first part of a three-part
interview with Frank Carlucci, who be.
came deputy director of the Central In-
telligence Agency In early 1978. After
serving In the Navy and graduating from
Harvard Graduate .School of Business
Administration, he served with the For-
eign Service' in South Africa; Kinshasa,
Congo; Zanzibar 'and Brazil. He also has
been director of the' Office of Economic
Opportunity;. deputy director of the Of'
flee of Management and Budget; tinder.
secretary of. the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare; and ambassador
to Portugal. .
allies; how our relationship with the People's
Republic. of China will evolve; and what role
the Continuing problem of. Vietnam and Cam-
bodia may play in that relationship.
Q, What is the Central Intelligence Agency's
role, as you view it, in meeting these
challenges? ". ?
A. Fundamentally, our role is to provide the
policymaker with the best possible information
on which he can base policy decisions. This
means efficient and good collection, high-
quality analysis, and links with the poll-
cymaker that permit us to respond to his high-
priority needs.
Q. What effect, if any, have recent revela-
tions and books about the agency had on its
ability to perform these functions, particularly
with respect to its relations with foreign in-
telligence agencies and sources of inforrna-
tion?
A. ObvtousW, no Intelligence organization
can function at peak efficiency in the constant
. glare of the public spotlight. But, we accept
some of this as a fact of lite. Books always
cause a problem, Particularly damaging .are
the ones that reveal our sources and methods.
Consequently, we have established a procedure
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Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0001001700?1-1
to try to deal with this problem. Employees promise our sources an our met tads. Usual.
sign a contract when they COMO to work for us
authprizing tis to review their manuscripts for
sensitive intelligence information. We have
had generally good results with this practice,
with one or two notable exceptions. In the
case of Frank Suepp, we took the issue to court
and so far the position of the agency has been
,upheld. -There is also a group in Washington,
D.C., that publishes a bulletin entitled "Covert
Action," whose purpose is to expose the names
of CIA personnel and agents overseas, This is
particularly harmful, and so we are consulting
3:Stith the Congress and the attorney general on
measures that might be taken to curtail it. It
is very difficult in an intelligence organization
to ever 'know how- much information you might
have received if these kinds of activities were
not going on.. People who co-operate with us
express concern about these books, ? and the
activities of people like Philip Agee. We have
reason to believe that this has impacted ad-
versely on the flow of information to us.
Nonetheless, we continue to be an effective
organization.
Q. Recently, there have been articles in the
press which have criticized the agency with
respect to develoPments in Iran and other ar-
ticles which suggest that the limitations :that
have been placed on the agency and critielsin
of the agency have bobbled its effectiveness.
Would you care to comment of these state-
ments? . .
A: It is hard to generalize on these matters.
Generally, when people talk about intelligence
failures, they tend to think in absolute terms.
But, intelligence does not operate in absolute
terms. It is always possible to have more in-
formation about a given situation. How much
infor,mation is enough? In cases such as Iran,
the press accounts prior to the deParture of the
shah were generally. exaggerated. , This is' not
to say that our predictions were perfect. But it
is certainly inaccurate to say that the in-
telligence commueity did not forecast the dif-
ficulties in Iran. We have tried recently to
sharpen our reporting and .analysis on broad
social movements. .
? One of the problems in the intelligence
business is that you can never talk about your
isuceessei. Generally., a successful operation is
only successful as long as 'it can be kept se-
Itrn 4-nlit hnnt our successes, we coin-
(As Received)
,iy, it is only the so-called failures that come to
light. That's just one of the facts of life Oita
we have to live with in tho ?Intelligence
business., I assure you there have been
successes and that they have been important
successes,
As far as ,constraints are concerned, this IS
essentially a matter of 'establishing the proper
checks and balances without impeding in-
telligence effectiveness. We think that Ex-
ecutive Order 12036, issued by President Carter
at the outset of his administration, Is an im-
portant step in this direction. We also think it
is possible to develop charter legislation which
will set, out broad guidelines for intelligence
activities which will reassure the Congress and
the American people that intelligence
organizations are under control, yet will not-
impede their effectiveness.
In connection with the charter legislation,
there, are some areas of concern to us. For
example, we are required to report'plans to
carry out covert actions to seven committees
of Congress. That obviously imposes Con-
straints on the president's ability to carry on
covert action activities, Mind you, we think we
ought to report to Congress, but to a
reasonable number of committees, not seven.
The Freedom of Inforniation 'Act has caused us
a number of problems. We find that the prac-
tice of using the disclosure process in trials to
push for the revelation of more classified
Material than the Intelligence Community can
conscionably accept, and thereby stymie the
prosecution?a practice referred to as "gray
mail"?has impeded our effort to deal with
serious security breaches. We also think that
the antiquated 1917 Espionage Act is not a good
instrument for solving the kinds of problems
suph as the "Covert Action" bulletin problem
that I described earlier.
Copyr1ght 1979, Michael S. Shaw,
Next: Covert operations.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02: CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
Approved For Releaienta004M-YCIAAID01911?116031R000100170001-1
11 December 1979
frac avkic
is poilic
I By MICHAEL SHAW ,
'Covert actkn
tool'
? ? :10-9.r.Z
- ? ?
71?' ,tf6L1.?4'.LiZ
?yr
?
?
This is the second part of a
three-part interview with
Frank ? Cartucci, who be-
came deputy director of the
Centrat Intelligence Agency
in early 1978,
Q. If you had a free hand to write not only
the charter by the operations book for the
agency in the 1980s, how would you structure
things and what would you do? ?
A. Well, I think the first concept that has to
be understood, and understood fully, is that con-
fidentiality is the heart of an intelligence opera-
Pon. There are certain things that we can make
available to the public. We try to tlo that by
declassifying up to .150 finished intelligence
products per year on a wide variety of subjects.
But we have to restore an environment where
we can distinguish between that information
which can be made public and information
which must be kept confidential in the interest
of the nation. It is very difficult to establish a
set of written proscriptions in statute. Some
proscriptions on intelligence activities already
exist. But if you try to make a comprehensive
list, you inevitably imply' that something no-
body thought to put on the list is therefore
authorized.
I think that you need to establish a surrogate
process' through congressional oversight and
something like the present Intelligence Over-
sight Board, which would see that 'intelligence
activities, are within the acceptable limits of
U.S. public opinion. These oversight mechan-
isms exist in one form or another today and are
still evolving. All and all, I think we are mov-
ing in a healthy direction and,, aside from cor-
recting some of the problems I mentioned ear-
lier, I do not think I would try to reverse
course in any way at this point.
.1,
Q. What would you do to sharpen the intelli-
gence community's ability to discern and prior-
itize signals from different parts of the world?
. A. We have given a lot of thought to this'
problem and have taken certain steps to deal
with it. The .most important was to establish
a focal point .in the intelligence community for
? "Warning." We have put one of our most senior
and able Officers in charge of that function. He
in turn reports to an .intelligence committee
which I chair. This has worked very well and
I think will continue to serve us in excellent
fashion. ?
Q. Convert operations, particularly during the
Vietnam/Watergate period, took on some nega-
tive connotations that may not necessarily fit
in their historical perspective, Can you give our
readership a view of: covert operations within
its long-term hIsterical perspective that can
enlighten us on what a nation must do or be
able to do in the world in order to meet the
challenges that we face today?
A. First of all, both the president and the
. Congress have ? recognized that covert action
'Is a legitimate foreign policy tool. That is
exactly what it should be, a foreign policy tool,
and not an independent capability. Covert, ac-
tion is attempting to influence events in other
parts of the world without the source of that
influence becoming known. Most people do not
have any problem with trying to influence
events in other parts of the world. Indeed, that
is what much of our foreign policy is about.
Most people, also recognize that most things
that an intelligence organization does have to I
be done clandestinely.
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/02: CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
Somehow, it is just when you put the two to-
gether that people have problems with it. Yet
one can conceive of many cIrcumsances where
a friendly, democratic government needs help.
It cannot accept that help overtly without in-
curring 'political difficulties. Let us say, for
example, that they have to deal with a terror-
ist problem and ask the United States for that
helP. If the statemen are politically vulnerable,
they may well ask that that help be given clan-
destinely.
I find that when most people take issue with
covert action they are really quarreling with
the policy and not the instrument. Just be-
cause I disagree with giving economic aid to
country X, that does not ;nem that I believe
economic aid should not continue to be a for-
eign policy tool. Covert action has become as-
sociated .with one or two highly controversial.
foreign policies.
Once again, the successes cannot be men-
tioned because. the credit for those successes ?
must go to the foreign government, not to us.
. The important point is to ensure that a mech-
anism for policy control is set up and that we
not do away with the policy instrument itself.
-Such a control meel-kinisin has now ?been es-
tablished, although, as I mentioned earlier, it
would be appropriate to cut down on the num-
ber of congressional Committees which have
to be informed when a covert action operation
is undertaken.
Q. Following the definition of a successful
covert action as being in fact covert, ,I would
assume that one reason we do not read too
much in the press about the activity of KGII
or covert operations of terrorist groups or Of
pehrhaps Cuba and other countries, is that by
that definition, if they are not discovered, they
have been successful. Can you outline, for ex-.
ample, in the Mideast, what are the operative
forces beneath the surface there? To what ex-
tent is .there the unreported and unseen chat-
' lenge or the opposition, if. one wants to put it
that way?
A. Welt, I cannot go into any detail without
revealing sources of information. Incidentally,
most people do not appreciate how easy it
Is for another country's counterintelligence
operation to trace ?a seemingly harmless fac-
tual Statement about a situation back to a par-
ticular agent or a particular method. So, we
can't be too careful.
One thing that is important to recognize is
that, in most cases where our adversaries have
been successful, they have been willing to
undertake either covert actions or overt mill-
? tary actions. We now see a substantial Cuban
military presence in Africa, for example. There.
are various parts of the world ,where you see
a substantial Soviet -presence. They do not
really operate under the same set of constraints
that we, as a society, do. In most cases you
find them exploiting existing unrest.
'That is why it is so important for our country
to work to resolve problems which create un-
rest and conflicts between and within nations.
It is also why it is important for our country to
help countries friendly to us to resolve their'
? underlying economic and social problems. Cer-
tainly the KGB is at work and they put sub-
stantial resources into their operations, But,
out country, despite the constraints our intelli-
gence organizations face,' has superior intelli-
? gence service. ?
Q. At the risk of doing some crystal-ball
gazing, do you believe that the world energy
crisis can be dealt with in the next few years?
? A. I think it can be dealt with but not with-
out the exercise'of a great deal of willpower
by Americans and by the people of other coun-
tries in the free world The problem is essen-
tially one of restraining increasing consump-
tion while stimulating sources of production.
Unfortunately the rate of consumption has so
far outstripped the rate of increase of sources
of production that over the next few years only
consumption restraint will solve? the problem.
rut, given the will, I think we can solve it.
Next: Oil and the Middle East
Copyright 1579, Michael S. Shaw
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000100170001-1
err,
Approved For 146.16640 Sititt14/1092V1: iN.LIF3141-00901R000100170001-1
12 December 1979
CIA's Carlucci: The agency's
is 'high'
? 04,s:
This is the last part of a
three-part interview with
Frank Cariucci, ' who be- !.ireQ..,,,;;,?
came deputy director of the. ?p,7.11,1\.:-.,.,,vv
Central intelligence Agency 3*
, e
in early 1978.
;ulit
By MICHAEL SHAW
Q. In light of what has happened in Irtim
do You believe the other Mideast oil-producing
countries represent an ongoing, stable supPly
of oil?
A. It would not be appropriate for me to
comment on individual countries, but the line
between production and demand is now so thin
that any disruption such as has occurred in
Iran is bound to have an immediate impact on
consumers. Obviously, there are sources of
instability in the oil-producing areas of the
world, and these are things that we have to
monitor very closely.
Q. Has the Central Intelligence Agency pro.
vided the president with a worse.case scenario
In the event that there are further disruptions
of the oil supply from the Mid East?
A. We supply the president with a continu.
ing analysis including both optimistic and
worse-case assumptions.
Q. How pessimistic is your worse-case as-
sumption?
A. It is the kind of assumption that would
entail some hardship on the part of Americans.
Q. One book written about the beginning of
World War 'suggested that Japan's timing
of its attack on Pearl Harbor was related.to
an approximately 90-day-or-so supply of oil.
Does history repeat itself?
A. I don't know about history repeating it-
self, but we can certainly learn lessons from.
-history
-history and one of, the great lessons of Pearl I
Harbor was that our nation needs effective
intelligence. It was precisely as a 'result of '
Pearl Harbor that, the predecessor agency of
' the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services
the OSS ? was created. .?
Q. Many assertions have appeared in the
press to the effect that the American people
have lost the will to assert themselves in world
affairs. In analyzing world developments, and
in sketching scenarios for different questions
that' present themselves, is the willingness
of the American people to react to particular
situations plugged into the equation?
A. We deal with foreign intelligence only,
and do not analyze domestic reaction to foreign
events. Our job is simply to tell the policy-
maker what those foreign events are and what .
the likely intentions of foreign leaders might
be. It is :then up to the policymaker to' assess
the domestic ramification i of their decisions.1
Q. Is it fair to say that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency will gather the, facts, analyze
them, sketch the scenarios, and pose the alter-
natives, but it is the ultimate responsibility
of the president to -decide what the country
'shall do and he is he one who must make that
decision in light of American public opinion?
A. That is a fair assessment.
Q. There has been considerable discussion
that the morale of personnel in the Central In-
telligence Agency has fallen off in recent years.
Would you attribute that development to the
environment and attitudes within the United
States toward the intelligence business gener-
ally, or would you say that there have been
some organizational probleins within the agen-
cy that are being met at the current time?
'02
0?'
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A. Morale is a nebulous thing. Obviously
there are a number of factors that impact on
morale. The barrage of criticism to which the
agency has been subjected has had its impact
on our employees. This is particularly true be-
cause of-the facts have been distorted or in-
accurate and, given the nature of our business,
we are unable to put them in perspective, Like
any organization, we have our internal prob-
lems..We like to think that we are dealing with
them effectively.
From my own expeHencer-in-A number of
government agencies, I would characterize the
morale of the CIA as high. Certainly we have
some of the most competent and dedicated peo-
ple in government working in the CIA. Many
of them work extremely long hours and cannot
even tell their families that they are doing.
Perhaps a measure of the state of our health
is the fact that we.have no trouble recruiting.
people. In fact, the number of applications
for employment with the agency has been go-
ing up and the quality of people that are com-
ing into the agency today is as good as, if not
better' thrar,?it ever has been.
Q. Which is more important, the ?quality of
the people, that you bring into the. Central In-
telligence Agency, or the development of the
new technologies that are making the-spy busi-
ness very different than it used to be? ?
'A. Both are important. Without quality peo-
'pie, you do not develop quality' technology. If
the question is what is more important, techni-
cal collection or human collection, the answer
once again is that both are important. The tech-
nical systems can accomplish a great deal but
.they have their limitations. They can only tell
you what is happening right now or what hap-
pen ed yesterday. It really takes human intelli-
gence to know what people's intentions are.
.Q. You are privy to probably the most stark
view of the world of just about anybody. Are
you optimistic or pessimistic about the future
of the United States?
A. Basically, I am an optimist, I think our
country has the resources, both human and na-
tural, and the will to deal with the problems
It faces.
Q.. Do yOu place your guarded optimism
-Within a Certaidtiiiie ffaiiiin-Whidli'i've must
? do certain things?
A. Certainly. And some of those things have
already been discusied in this interview. We
need to deal with the question of our defense ca-
pability, vis-a-vis the growing defense capa-
bility of the Soviets. We need to deal-with prob-
lems such as nuclear proliferation and we need
to deal with the problems of energy and the
Third World. ?
Q. Is time running out on any of these is-
sues?
A. In foreign affairs, time does not usually
.run out. The problems become more difficult
to deal with if you do not face up' to them? In
most of the areas I have mentioned, I believe
our country is moving to face up to the prob-
lems, .
CopyriBlat 157, Aftchael S. Shave
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STATI NTL
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
An Interview with Deputy Di rector Frank Carlucci
1197/
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k.;.1
C. .A. Aide Says News Leaks in U.S. Worry Allies!
By DAVID BINDER
Syrxial to The New Yort Times
WASHINGTON, June 17 ? The prob-
lem of leaks of sensitive information to
the press is inherent in the American
political system, but Frank C. Carlucci,
the Deputy Director of Central
,ecce, says he believes leaks now are the
worst he has seen in 23 years of Govern-
ment service.
In an interview last week, he said a
spate of leeks during the last year by for-
mer C.I.A. officers, current Pentagon of-
ficials and current members of the Na-
tional Security Council and Congress had
prompted "friendly foreign intelligence
services" to be more cautious in sharing .
secrets with the United States.
Recent leaks disclosed classified infor-
mation about American relations with
South Korea and. Japan, new weapons
systems and the identities of covert ?
operatives of the C.LA., he said, adding
that some of the revelations had come ?
about inadvertently through accidental
releases under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.
But Mr. Carlucci, a career Foreign
Service officer who was appointed to his
C.I.A. post in 1977, said he was much
more concerned about the "erosion of the
environment" for protecting national-se-
curity information. He said the erosion
was caused by "leaks for policy_reasone7
by officials wishing to influence a course
of action.. ?
He said he was firmly opposed to "run-
ning one investigation after another" to
try to find the source of the disclosures,
which has usually been futile. Instead, he
said, the solution was to reinstitute "a
sense of values on the part of employees
about what is proper and what isn't, em-
phasizing that while- whistle-blowers
have their place; legitimate grievance
mechanisms and mechanisms for-dissent
exist." ? ? .
Mr. Carlucci said the ? combination of
deliberate leaks and accidental disclo-
sures had prompted virtually every-intel-
ligence service that maintains felations
with the C.I.A. to voice concern-during
the last eight months "about our ability to
protect the information they give us."
"It isn't all one-sided," he said of the
foreigncomplaints, explaining that Brit-
ain, West Germany and Australia. were
developing -freedom-of-Information laws
and were "trying to profit by our experi-
ence," '! 7 ?
But he went on toy that the gravity of
the disclosure problem; underlined by
C.I.A. compliance with-about 4,000- re-
quests a year under the information law,.
could be illustrated by a foreign intelli-
gence chief "who toldenne- he -couldn't
cooperate as much- as he'd like, because
of the disclosure practice.":7,;.-.0teeeee -
Covert Operative Mead:fled'
A visiting British intelligence delega-
tion recently told Ametican?authorities
they needed new assurances that their se-
crets would not be compromised by the :
r information law. ;
i
There was also a disturbing incident, ?
Administration officials said, in which a .
covert operative of an American intern- .
gence service was identified through
Freedom of Information disclosures. "He
got a knock on the door and his cover was
blown," an official said.
Mr. Carlucci noted that some foreign
intelligence services were so jumpy
about the American disclosure practices
that they had sharply curbed secret-shar-
ing, even on matters where the C.I.A.
knew they had certain valuable informs-
tion. - ? .-
"They don't say, 'We aren't going to
give you X, Y, Z.' " he said. "That is not
the way intelligence services work. But
we do know of information in the posses-
sion of friendly services that was not 1
gven to us."
Mr. Carlucci said he and his aides, as
[well as officials of the Federal Bureau cif
'Investigation, were working closely with
iSenate and House committees td. draft
new legislation increasing the Goveteee
.ment's power to protect vital secrets. He
said a draft bill might be ready by late
next month. ? e ? - ? -
' "I"abi mildly optimistic that we can do
something about the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act problem and reasonably sure
we can protect secrets," he said.. . .. ? -
He said that he approved of the princi-
ples embodied in the 19/4 law making It
. possible to obtain Government docu-
!meats not protected by the- security ex-
emptions. But he said the C.I.A. had to
j
i commit SO th
to 90 employees to e process-
ling of such requests and received no .
lextra funds for the nurnose.-
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ON PAGE /
ir
rest!
on
Frank Carlucci, a Scranton na-
tive named deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency in
1978, is interviewed by staff writer
Don Sarvey.
Q: When you work for an organ-,
ization such as the CIA it must make
your outlook on the world a little
different than the ordinary citizen.
How does it differ?
A: Well, it's an enormous educa-
tion. You get a perspective of the
world that you can't get anywhere
else in government. I've been a fora _
. .
eign service officer for some 22
years. serving in different parts of
the world, but never have! gotten
quite the overview that I have now.
Not only do you see what the poli-
cies are, but you get an insight into
all the inside information. From that
aspect, it'a a fascinating experience..
Q: It sometimes seems through '
American eyes that the world is an
ever more hostile place. Is that real-
ly true? Do we have genuine friends?
A: Let's put it this way, I think
the world's a - more complicated
place. Twenty_ years ago when ,,I??,
came into the foreign service, things -
were fairly straightforward. I can
recall at that time we were worried
about Korea. Korea was allied with
China. China was allied with the So-,1
viet Union. We've now seen a proxy
struggle between the Soviet Union.
and China, and who knows wherej
Korea stands? We've seen the Third-
World emerge as ....an ideological ,
battleground. We've seen the non-
aligned movement. We've seen the
growth of strategic weapons and an
effort to reach a SALT agreement.
We've seen national revolutions ...
most recently in Iran. It's become a
lot more complicated..! don't think
this means that we don't have
friends, that people don't listen to us
and respect us. The fact that our
president is in Israel trying to bring
the two sides of that dispute togeth-
er is evidence, of the continuing
prestige of the United States.
Q: -With detente seemingly los-
ing ground, is there any chance
there's a new Cold War era ahead of
usa.
A:! don't know that I'd accept
your characterization that we're
losing ground. If you put yourself in
. the shoes of the Soviets, if you are
Ivan Ivanovich looking at your gov-
ernment, we find that that govern-I
ment has problems. It's got a succes-
sion problem, it's got a leadership
problem ? aging leadership. It's got
an oil problem. Their oil is topping
out, rising demand. It's got an agri-
cultural problem. It's got a problem
? of rising consumer expectations and-
declining growth rates. And, they
haven't done all that well. Obvious-
ly.they've got problems with China. ,
And their relations with Japan are
not all that good. They don't have-
much to show after massive support
for Castro all these years in Latin
America. In Africa they've got some
targets of opportunity, but they
were kicked out of Ghana and Guin-
ea, Zaire, Sudan, Egypt, Somalia.
They've made some progress, obvi-
ously, in places like Afghanistan
and the People's Democratic Repub-
lic of Yemen, (but) it's by no mewls
certain that they've done all that
well in the Middle East ? not even
in Iran, because the foreign policy
orientation of Iran has yet, to be
decided.
So, I don't accept the character-
ization that we are losing. I would
accept the characterization that the
Soviet Union has become much
more adventuristic In its foreign
policy. It has shown a greater pro-
pensity or greeter willingness to use
its own military personnel oversees
and to exercise its influence tbrouglr'
Cuban and other proxies. And that is
a significant new development that
we have to take into account. -
Q: Did China give any advance
weaning to the US. of its intent to
invade Vietnam?
A: Well, the vice prime minister
of China really didn't hide his inten-
tions from anybody at any time,
whether he was in the United States
or in China. He made it clear that
the People's Republic of China took
a hostile view toward the Vietnam
invasion of Cambodia and indicated
China would be obliged to take
'action. It came as no great surprise
to me. - 7
Q: There haa.heen some Criti-,
,
cairn that the US. government
didn't have adequate intelligence, or,
perhaps adequate analysis of tlia ina
formation we did havei to anticipate-
events in Iran. Is that true? . .1
?
co-ivav'
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A: Well, that's a complicated!
question. The answer is, yes, we
were able to follow the decline in
the shah's authority and were able
to predict, at least over the short
term, that the populace was turning
against him and that Iran was in for I
serious problems. It is fair to say
that neither we nor anybody else
that I know of predicted the dimen-
sions of the national revolution that
occurred ? that one man would re-
turn on a crest of popular emotion
the way that Khomeini returned, or
that the country ... would start to
splinter and we would see leftist
factions and rightist factions and re.
Iigious factions and modernization
factions and now ... women's
groups. That sort of thing, we didn't
predict that. -
Q: Had there been changes lathe
shah's regime, liberalizations, say a
year ago, is it possible he could .have
survived? - -
A: Well, don't foiget that one of
the reasons the shah got in trouble
was his liberalization program. He
was the one who tried to modernize
Iran. He was the one who gave the
rights to women. And it's Khomeini
Who has taken the position that
those rights are not appropriate un-
der Islamic. law. So, I don't know
that more progressive policies
would have helped him.' You
? always, in a situation likethis, have
the question of when do you pass-
the point of no return? At what
point could he have altered his poll-
cies, tried to put together n_ coati!.
tion, tried to work with the relig-
ious opposition? I couldn't even haz-t
ard a guess on when that might have
been appropriate. Certainly, in
retrospect. one can say had some
action been taken a year ago it
might have been helpful. But the di-i
mensions ? of the upheaval in Irato
suggest that it was very.neep-root-i
'?
Q: What are the prospects for
stability in that country in the com-
ing months?
A: We're all hopeful, of course,1
but there's no question (that) there
are factions. There are leftist fac-
tions ... and then there are more
conservative groups. Prime Minister'
Bazargan is trying to get his govern-
ment under way. The military is
without a command structure. The
populace is divided and the economy
is in bad shape. There are various
nationalist groups, the Kurds for
? example, that are demanding more
autonomy. The country is, in effect,
riddled with problems.. My own
view is that, despite the best efforts,
of well-intentioned leaders, it will
take some time to sort out these
problems
Q: Does what happened in Iran
hold any lesson for other Middle
East countries, such as Saudi Ara.
bia? Is there a danger of revolution
spreading ? something with Islam-
ic overtones?
, A: I think Iran does demonstrate
that Moslem fundamentalism can be J.
a potent political force. You have
powerful Moslem groups in places
like Egypt. You may have noticed
that President Seder made a speech
about two weeks ago in which he
criticized the Moslem Beetherhood
for opposing his policies. The
Moslem Brotherhood is a fundamen-
talist group. Saudi Arabia is a little
bit different, in the sense that it is
much less secularized that some of
the other countries are. And, of
course, the shah had almost. com-
pletely secularized his country. ,
Also, you've got to take into ar-
count the fact that the rest of the
Arab worki is, by and large, (com- ?
posed of) Sunnite Moslems, as op- -
posed ?to the Shiite in Iran. That's
significant, both in religious- terms
and in political terms, in the sense
that the Shiite tend to have a more
hierarchical religious structure,
which can give rise to a single, para-
mount leader, whereas the Sunnites
do not. The Sunnites are much more
inclined to work with a secular gov-
ernment, whereas the Shiites tradi-
tionally have been a sect of opposi-
tion. It is by no means automatic
that this would spread to other
countries. But certainly, the fact
that Moslem fundamentalism can be
a potent political force will not be
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and there are about /O0 million
, Moslems in this world.
Q: How keenly felt is the loss of,
the CIA stations in Iran that, I
understand, monitored Soviet mis-
sile sites?
? A: Well, I'm not able to talk
about that. We don't talk about any
of our intelligence operations.
Q: It has been suggested that
perhaps the loss of these would af-
fect our ability to monitor a new ,
SALT agreement.
A: Well, I think it's premature.,
for me to comment on that. The-
SALT agreement hasn't been
signed, so we really don't know all
of its provisions. And there will be
quite an extensive debate la the Seco
ate on ratification. There, one of the
central issues will be verification.
Until the administration knows the
provisions of the agreement and has
prepared its presentation, I think it
would be inappropriate for me to
comment
? Q: With oil playing an increasing
role in world politics, how closely ,
does the CIA monitor the flow of oil ,
and keep tabs on reserves in various
parts of the world? 1
I
A: Very closely. It's one of our1
principal concerns. We make rep-
lar reports on it to the presidenttOi
the Department of Energy, to the
secretary of state and secretary of
defense. We've also put out one un.i
classified report on the world's -OW
reserves \ and we've had some I
? updates. We, monitor that.-. veryl
closely.
Q: We hear a lot about spy satele
lites and sophisticated gadgets at all
? sorts. Have these things replaced the I
man in the trenchcoat?
? A: By no means. In fact, ihey're.
corm:Pit-mental-F. Tecrinical collec-
tion can general!!! only tell you
what happened yesterday or, if
you're lucky, what's happening ,
today. It can't tell you anybody's
intentions. And the traditional hu-
man collection is extremely valu-
able in knowing people's intentions.
Our effort is trying to get the two to
work together. One will never sups
plant the other.
? Q: HOW much information is out
there for the taking, without any
special effort? ? -
A: An awful lot of our informa-
tion comes from unclassified sourc-
es. We- only gather information
clandestinely when we can't get it
overtly. I can't remember the fig-
ures, but I think some 30 or 40 per-
Oifi?bobtfli information used by our
analysts does come from unclassie
tied sources. "'"
' I
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
Interviewed by Lynne Joiner on KPIX-TV
November 15, 1978
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LYNNE JOINER: Mr. Carlucci, what is the proper
role of the CIA in a free and democratic society? I mean,
how can the public really trust "honorable men," as former
Director Colby called himself, after the revelations of
Watergate, the secret Angolan war, the Pike and Church Com-
mittee revelations?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Well, Lynne,
you've really asked the $64 question. Certainly any free
society, such as our society, needs to have good information
so that our policy-makers can make the proper decisions to
maintain our security. Unfortunately, we don't live in a
perfect world. And it's necessary to try and obtain informa-
tion that in many cases the countries don't want us to have;
to just cite examples, certain countries that are engaged in
the development of nuclear weapons. Obviously they don't want
that to be found out, but it's in our vital interests to know
it. And there are terrorist groups that we have to penetrate.
The Soviet Union, as everyone knows, has devoted very
substantial resources to armament. And it's important for us
to have adequate warning should anything untoward happen.
So the role of an intelligence organization is to
gather information from all sources, open sources, clandestine
sources -- and by the way, most of our information comes from
open sources -- and to analyze it and to present it to the
policy-makers in the form that they can best use it to make
their decisions.
Our philosophy is that we ought to make as much of
our finished information public as possible. Last year we put
out some 150 publications, including some quite meaningful ones
on subjects such as economic developments in the Soviet Union
and China; publications on energy. But obviously we have to
maintain certain secrets in order to protect our sources.
Somebody in a denied area is not going to give us information
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if he suspects that he's going to see his name in a congressional
hearing or in a newspaper article somewhere.
As far as maintaining controls, we think that a lot of
progress has been made in that area in the past several years.
The President has set up an Intelligence Oversight Board, where
anybody can bring a complaint. The board reports directly to
him. We have oversight committees in Congress, with which we
are working very closely. And I think we can be assured that
adequate safeguards and procedures have been established to
prevent the kind of abuses that have come out in the past.
JOINER: Back in 1954, though, the Hoover Commission
investigated intelligence in this country. And they said at
that time "There are no rules in such a game, that if the U. S.
is to survive, longstanding American concepts of fair play must
be reconsidered. We must destroy enemies by more clever, sophis-
ticated and effective methods than those used against us."
And I think that the concern of a lot of Americans
is over the secret part of activities by Central Intelligence.
John Stockwell, a former CIA agent, in his book In Search of
Enemies, said "Covert operations are incompatible with our
system of government, and we do them badly." What's your
answer to that?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't agree with
that. I think in many cases, we may want to be in a position
of helping our friends, but our friends, for very sound politi-
cal reasons, are not able to take our help openly. They may have
a powerful Communist Party within their country. They may have
certain political constraints within their country. And yet it
may be important to the survival of a democratic form of govern-
ment to receive some assistance from us. And I believe the
President of the United States ought to have some capability
to do things. He ought to have some means that fall short of
sending in the Marines and are somewhat stronger than simply
diplomatic notes.
The real issue is maintaining the proper controls on
this kind of action that's used very sparingly, that should be
used only when it is necessary to carry out the foreign policy
of the United States, and it should and does indeed have the ap-
proval of the President of the United States. And when it occurs,
various committees of Congress are briefed so that they can take
positions if they believe the action is unwarranted.
JOINER: I believe that those briefings are not always
candid. We've had a former CIA Director, Richard Helms, who was
censured and pleaded nolo contendere to the fact that the lied
to those committees about U. S. involvement in Chile.
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I'm not in a position
to speak for the former Director. But I can assure you that both
Director Turner and I testified at our confirmation hearings that
we intend to be totally forthcoming with the committees of Con-
gress and....
JOINER: You're saying is the past is past....
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, as I say, I'm not
really in a position to pass judgment on previous Directors.
JOINER: You're in the CIA. How can you not be in
a position -- you're in a better position than anyone on the
outside is.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, when this occurred,
as I recall, I happened to have been Ambassador to Portugal and
was not following domestic events that closely. And it's really
a matter for the courts to make these kinds of judgments, and
let the courts speak for themselves. All I can speak for is
the present management of CIA and the present administration.
And we have been very open and very candid with Congress. And
I think if one were to check with the chairmen of our committees,
he would find that they would endorse that statement.
JOINER: How much can you really change the CIA? There
have been five CIA Directors in the past five or six years. How
much inertia do you find? I mean you just came to the CIA in
February. Do you find it frustrating? A lot of people have
said that you meshed your office to create change. I know that
Admiral Turner has forced the resignations of many people to
try and cut back on covert operations, and so forth. But there
is in any kind of bureaucracy that self-interest to just self-
perpetuate.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, certainly the CIA
is no different than any other government agency. I myself have
had the opportunity to serve in four or five different agencies.
And one of the ones I served in was Health, Education and Welfare,
and that kind of a question was a constant question when I got
on HEW: "How can you possibly manage such a large place, and
how can you make change?" The answer is that you proceed to
institute the management tools and techniques that have been
proven in both the government and private sectors. You try to
exercise as much leadership as you can to determine just how
your employees....
JOINER: It's a little different ball game.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: It's a little different
ball game in the sense that we are dealing with a secret agency,
and we have faced a lot of criticism, some just, a very lot of
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it unjust, and that unfortunately affects morale. But its
important to point out that the Pike Committee itself, which
investigated the CIA, and in many instances was highly critical,
pointed out that in virtually every instance where the CIA had
been accused of wrongdoing, the particular act originated as
the result of a decision by political powers, be they Presidents,
or Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs;
that CIA was simply carrying out policy. To blame the CIA for
that is a little bit like blaming the army for the invasion of
the Dominican Republic and the Marines for landing in Lebanon.
Let me make this point, and, as I said, I've served in
a lot of government agencies the past twenty-five or twenty-six
years. And I have never served with a more dedicated or competent
group of people, a group of people who want to do the right thing
and respond to leadership. I think they now have that leadership.
And I'm quite encouraged about the kinds of things we can do in
the intelligence world.
JOINER: On Monday in the New York Times, Sy Hersh
had a story about an CIA analyst named David Sullivan, who
resigned under pressure after leaking the information on the
SALT talks and sources of -- and methods of obtaining informa-
tion on the Soviet Union to Senator Jackson. Admiral Turner
was noticeably and understandably very upset about that. And
yet Mr. Hersh, in his article, went on to talk about this kind
of political decision that is made that you were referring to;
and that is that President Carter puts a high priority on a new
SALT agreement.
Is that the kind of thing that might lead us into some
problems with the Soviets over SALT, that there is a political
decision made on how the President wants that to turn out? David
Sullivan claims that it was important for Senator Jackson and
senators, who then have to vote on and ratify the treaty, to know
what his analysis was, which was that the Soviet Union has in-
deed gained ground strategically over the U. S. since 1963 and
that they are really not serious about detente, which runs counter
to a political policy in Washington.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, that may be an overly
simplistic description of a particular document. There are several
parts to your question. One is that we are not a policy-making
organization. And in order to be effective as an intelligence
agency, we have to call the shots as we see them. So we do not
try to tailor our intelligence estimates to suit policy. Indeed,
on many occasions we are the ones who have to deliver the bad
news to the President.
I might point out that in this particular case, the
document in question was made available to Senator Jackson by
Admiral Turner himself. So there was no effort to withhold
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the information from Senator Jackson. It's just a question of
whether any employee of the agency can take it upon himself to
leak classified information. There was no effort whatsoever
to suppress any information that Mr. Sullivan had. But there
are certain regulations on how classified documents shall be
handled. And obviously if people can't follow those regula-
tions, we cannot have an effective intelligence organization.
JOINER: This does bring up the whole question of
internal security in the CIA and the question of critics. A
number of former agents in the past few years have been writing
books about the agency and getting criticisms and also court
rulings about that. John Stockwell, in his book, says "The
CIA's oath of secrecy has been desecrated in recent years, not
by authors like Agee, Marchetti and Snepp, but by CIA Directors
who led the CIA into scandals, absurd operations. At best, the
oath was used to protect those directors from exposure from their
underlings, although the directors themselves freely leaked in-
formation that approved their operational or political judgment.
Other critics have said that the problem is that if
you are an individual with concerns over the CIA operations, or
whatever, that it's very difficult to get your voice heard. So
that perhaps this is the reason so many people have decided they've
got to publish this information.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, my answer to that, in
a word, Lynne, is nonsense. The Director's door is open. My
door is open. We have an inspection corps in CIA that hears
grievances. We have processing to make complaints heard. If
people are not happy with us, they can go to the Intelligence
Oversight Board, which is independent. It consists of three
prominent Americans, Tom Farmer, former Governor Scranton, and
former Senator Gore. It reports directly to the President and
is charged with the responsibility of looking into wrongdoing
that may come from any person whatsoever within the agency or
without. We have no say over it. People can go directly to
them.
They can also go to the congressional oversight com-
mittees. The interesting thing about some of our erstwhile
publishers who say they are, in fact, whistleblowers -- and
indeed, we need whistleblowers in government -- is that they
did not seek to avail themselves of the internal procedures to
express their dissent before they went public.
JOINER: Some of the books that I've read claim that
they tried over a number of years. These are officers who had
been in the Company for ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen years.
What do you think prompted them to do that? Personally, why
do you think they did it?
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I'm not in the very
best position to attribute motives to them. But I'd simply point
out that some of them have made substantial financial gain out
of this.
In the case of Mr. Snepp, he was seen personally by
the Director and assured the Director that the CIA would be
allowed to review his book before it was published. And he did
not do that. He, in effect, lied to the Director. Now, we can-
not have an intelligence organization, as I mentioned before, if
any employee can come in, work for a few years for the agency
and decide to go out and write whatever he wants in a book. No-
body anywhere in the world is going to talk to us if they think
that their names are going to appear in a book, and we're just
not going to have information.
So unless we can control this problem, there is no way
that I think we can have an effective intelligence organization.
JOINER: Some people, some critics say that there is
a double standard, though, that in Snepp's book, he did not dis-
close any secrets or confidential information. As a matter of
fact, one of his lawyers is going before the 4th District Court
of Appeals today, saying that there was no classified information
in the book, and that he should be absolved of any wrongdoing in
that case; but that at the other end of the scale, former direc-
tors, such as Mr. Helms, who admitted to lying before the Senate
committee, is given a suspended sentence and no fine, that there
is, indeed, a double standard between those who are on a working
level and those who are on a policy level.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, in the cases of for-
mer directors who have written books, I'm not aware of any book
written by Mr. Helms. Mr. Colby wrote a book, and one of my
predecessors, General Walters, wrote a book. They both sub-
mitted their books to the agency for review. Now, we made
suggestions on things that were sensitive that could be taken
out of the books, and they followed those suggestions.
I might mention, by the way, that we don't have the
right to censor. If someone submits a book to us for review
and we suggest that there's classified that ought to be taken
out and they refuse, then we have to avail ourselves of judicial
means to try and get the information reviewed. So there is no
double standard. Former directors have submitted their books.
The question is whether employees....
JOINER: ...It's not so much the books. Sometimes it's
just the idea of people speaking out about the CIA as opposed to
Senate testimony, in a Senate committee. And even John Stockwell
admits that he stonewalled, that he did not disclose a lot of
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information about the Angola matter.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Okay, well, you're back
on Mr. Stockwell....
Q: No, I'm saying it's the contrast, critics have
pointed out, between a former director who can get away, quote,
unquote, with lying to a Senate committee as opposed to someone
who has been an agent on a lower level, who then feels the need
to talk about some of the abuses he's seen in the agency, but
doesn't feel he can get any change....
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, let me make it clear
that the agency isn't seeking to immunize itself from charges
of abuses. Our purpose in asking that books be reviewed is
to remove national security information. And if people want
to write about agency policy, they are perfectly free to do
so. We would not attempt to prevent that.
The problem that arose in the case of Mr. Snepp was
that he chose to, in our judgment, breach his contract by not
submitting the book. The issue is not whether there was classi-
fied information or not. The issue is who should decide whether
there is classified information or not. Should it be Mr. Snepp,
or should it be the agency review board? And....
Q: He claims at the time he was inducted into the
CIA, no one told him about the, quote, unquote, dirty work of
covert actions.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know what
he means by dirty work of covert actions. The intelligence
business obviously has some difficult moral issues to face.
I can cite you one, what happens when you try to penetrate a
terrorist group.
The best way to stop terrorism is to have penetration
of a terrorist group. What if your agent is ordered to go on a
hit? If you don't do it, then maybe he is killed. Well, if you
can't participate in an assassination, how about a bank robbery?
Well, if you say no, you lose your agent. If you lose your agent,
maybe you don't get a warning that some Ambassador's going to be
assassinated.
These are difficult calls. It isn't always pleasant
work. You cannot set up absolute moral standards. When in
effect, in the espionage business, you are trying to encourage
someone whose society is hostile to us to commit treason against
his country, it isn't always pleasant. We try to exercise our
best judgment. We try to be as consistent as we can with the
moral values of our country. But we're also conscious that we
have national security responsibilities. If Mr. Stockwell was
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unhappy with some of the things that he saw, there were plenty
of internal channels available to him to make his dissent known.
JOINER: Some friends said he tried. But let's move
on to something else. And that is the whole issue of whether
or not covert actions are as necessary now that we have very
technically competent, sophisticated systems of gathering in-
formation; for example, some secret spy satellites. Right now
in Indiana there's a trial going on with a man named Kampiles,
who got ahold of a secret page, or, rather, manual on these.
What effect does that trial have on national security?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, Lynne, it would be
very inappropriate for me to comment on a case under litigation,
because it might prejudice the case one way or another. But let
me try to answer your basic question, which is, if I understand
it correctly, the use....
JOINER: Are covert actions as necessary now that we
have spy satellites that can see where agents can't see?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, let me make a dis-
tinction, by the way, because the term covert actions is a term
of art, which generally means some kind of special activity de-
signed to influence a given situation. But those are very few
and far between.
Clandestine collection where we try to obtain agents
who will give us information on what is going on that is simply
normally being denied to us is, I think, what you're referring
to. Is that kind of collection necessary now that we have tech-
nical systems? A lot has been made of our technical systems, and
certainly they are very impressive, particularly for monitoring
such things as a SALT agreement. On the other hand, a technical
system can only tell you what has happened. It can't tell you
what people's intentions are. And in a world where you have
strategic parity, it is very important to know what people's
intentions are. And for the foreseeable future, we will still
need that human intelligence in order to know what people intend
to do rather than what they have done.
JOINER: You have been on both sides. You have been
in foreign policy-making as a diplomatic with the State Depart-
ment, and now you're with the CIA. How do you see that division?
Is there too much rivalry between different agencies of our go-
vernment that are involved in foreign affairs? Is it effective
cooperation? As a former diplomat, don't you get a little un-
comfortable?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, no, I'm not at all uncom-
fortable in my job. I was asked this question at my confirmation
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hearing: did I ever have any problems with the CIA? And I said,
no, indeed I did not. I always had a very good working relation-
ship. This is not to say that every Ambassador would make the
same response. But I think it is fair to say that relationships
between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency
are excellent. We confer on a daily basis with them. Frequently
we work out our problems together. We, as a mechanism, try to
be supportive, pursuant to the congressional and other constraints
on us, of U. S. foreign policy. I think the coordination, by
and large, is very effective. And certainly in the field, I
receive almost every ambassador who comes to town and talk to
him about his relationship with our people overseas. And I
receive very few complaints.
There are always bureaucratic problems in the govern-
ment. But I think we seem to be overcoming the more difficult
problems.
JOINER: Recently there's been a lot of headlines in
the news about what's going on in Iran. How far will the CIA
go to protect the Shah?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, you're asking the
wrong person, because you yourself a few minutes ago made the
distinction between policy and intelligence. And the question
you are asking....
JOINER: Isn't that distinction kind of blurred some-
times?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We try not to blur it. No,
ma'am. Well, no, in fact it is not blurred. We do not vote,
for example, at National Security Council meetings on policy
decisions. We provide information.
JOINER: But you were talking about how important the
discovery of intentions are. And that is part of the CIA's job.
If indeed the CIA perceives those intentions in such a way that
prove to be incorrect, doesn't that affect the policy?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, yes.
JOINER: Hasn't that happened in the past?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I'd be the last person to
claim that we have a hundred percent batting average. It's very
difficult to predict violent upheavals. We do the best we can
with the resources at our command. We try to provide the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense with the
best intelligence that we can. We're not always right. I think
we're often right than wrong.
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JOINER: What's the worse error you've made in judgment
in the past ten years?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: In the past ten years? Well,
I haven't been in the agency in the past ten years.
JOINER: All right, since you've been there.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I was an Ambassador to a
country where a revolution took place that was not predicted,
Portugal, so I have direct experience of knowing what happens
when you do not foresee these things. I can't claim that that's
an error of judgment, because I don't know all the judgments
that have been made over these past ten years. I could have
used a little bit more information in Portugal at the time.
It's awfully easy when a coup occurs to say, well,
why didn't you know about it? But obviously the person in
power didn't know about it either. So it's not always the
easiest thing to find out, but we do our best.
JOINER: Besides trying to deal with the intentions
of foreign powers, or whatever, you also have to deal with
contingency plans, "What if something happens?" Obviously in
Portugal you wish that there had been a "what if" contingency
plan. But recently CBS News in London has interviewed a man
who claims to have been a deputy press agent to the Shah. He
resigned. And he claims that the CIA has indeed prepared a con-
tingency plan. I would assume that there probably is. I don't
expect you to tell me what it is. But he does claim that the CIA
has trained military officers from Iran in this country to take
over in case the Shah is deposed or if it becomes necessary for
him to give up the reins of power in his country.
plans.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know of such
JOINER: You know of no such contingency plans?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, obviously, when you've
got an unstable situation, an intelligence organization has to
try to look into the future and predict what might happen. But
what you were talking about once again comes in the area of covert
action. And for such a proposal to take place, you would need a
presidential finding and briefings of seven committees of Congress,
and I'm not aware of any such finding.
JOINER: You can't give me any idea of how far the United
States and the CIA is will to go to protect the Shah?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, that's a policy ques-
tion. That really is a question that ought to be addressed to
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t h e Secretary of State or the President of the United States.
I cannot really exceed my mandate.
JOINER: What advice do you give to companies, inter-
national American companies, that deal in a country as explosive
as Iran, for example, under the present circumstances? What kind
of advice is being given to them by the CIA, based on your in-
telligence gathering?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, once again, that's
the responsibility of the State Department and the Ambassador:
the protection of American citizens. All I can do there to
help you is to divorce myself from my CIA role and recall my
experience in Portugal in 1975, which I think it's fair to
say was an even more chaotic situation. And it was my respon-
sibility as the American Ambassador to try and advise Americans
whether they should stay or leave. My best judgment at the time
was that they should stay, that they should keep in full contact
with the Embassy, and, as problems arose, we'd try to work them
out with the local government. As matters turned out, that proved
to have been a wise decision.
I have no idea what Ambassador Sullivan is advising
Americans in Iran today, but that's really his principal respon-
sibility.
JOINER: Can the U. S. deal with the Moslems if they
take power in Iran? Have we contacts with the Moslems?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We have succeeded in dealing
with any number of governments around the world. It really
[End of Side I.]
JOINER: Does the CIA continue to use -- have they
ever and do they continue to use multinational American cor-
porations?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we, for obvious reasons,
have a practice of not confirming or denying what kind of covert
arrangements we use. There are people, such as Mr. Agee, who
engage full time in trying to reveal the names of CIA agents,
and indeed incite people to violence against them. And he puts
out a monthly publication in Washington called "Covert Action."
I feel a very keen responsibility, in light of some unfortunate
incidents in the past, to do everything I can to protect our
employees and our agents.
So we just do not discuss those arrangements.
JOINER: Does the CIA -- this has been claimed by some
critics -- that to get around the Freedom of Information Act,
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separate files are kept, not official files, but what are called
soft files are kept. Senator Clark went to Africa on a fact-
finding mission during the Angola conflict in '75. And according
to some books I've read, they pulled out soft files so that in
case an American citizen ever wants to know what is in their
file, these do not count. Does that go on?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I read the same book,
which I believe Mr. Stockwell wrote. And I sort of asked the
question, and nobody could find any soft files for me.
I think it is important to note that any intelligence
organization follows a policy of compartmentation, so to speak.
And that is, one part of the organization does not know what
the other part is doing. And that is done for security reasons.
The only place where it really starts to come together is at
my level and the Director's level. So there are a number of
different filings.
Under the Freedom of Information Act, we're given
requests. We may have to search up through 23 different filing
systems. In fact, we spend over 109 man years and $2 1/2 million
answering Freedom of Information requests. We get about 85 a
week, and it costs us $540 per request. And so we do have to
go through a lot of filing systems. But I know of no, quote,
"soft" or secret filing systems.
JOINER: Another thing that has come up is the role
of academics and consultant roles with the CIA. What exactly
does the consultant -- what do consultants do? How necessary
are they? Some universities, such as Harvard, have drawn up
guidelines, which Admiral Turner is very concerned about. Isn't
it true that one way the CIA can get the necessary research that
it feels it needs from academics is to set up special institutes
to study these things? The Rand Institute, for example, has been
for years working on projects for different departments of the
government. Stanford Research Institute in our own area is close
to an academic university, and its ties are separate.
Hasn't the agency side-stepped the concern by students
and faculty over involvement with the CIA?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we don't think we've
side-stepped it at all. In fact, we've been engaged in quite
lengthy and, we hope, constructive dialogues with president Bach
of Harvard on this issue, and the presidents of some other univer-
sities as well.
It is very important, if we are to have the best ana-
lytical work possible for our policy-makers, that we have some
outside input. And there's a great deal of knowledge in the
academic world. We'd like to be able to call on that academic
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knowledge. When we do undertake contracts with the universities
for research projects, we make this known to the head of the uni-
versity, ask him whether he wants to accept the contract. It's
his decision whether he wants to make it public.
The question that seems to arise more frequently is,
well, what about relationships with individual faculty members?
The Harvard guidelines, if I understand them correctly, would
oblige CIA to make those contracts be public. And frankly, we
think that abridges the civil rights of the individual faculty
member. We tell him he is perfectly free to advise the pre-
sident of the university if he wants of his relationship with
us. But that decision is really up to him. And we don't see
any reason why CIA or the U. S. government, in effect, should
be singled out for particular discriminatory treatment by a uni-
versity. There are any number of companies that have contracts
with different faculty members. Sometimes those contracts are
made known; sometimes they aren't, depending on the individual
faculty member. And we see no reason why we should be any
different.
JOINER: William Paisley was found floating in the
Chesapeake Bay a month ago, a little more than that. At first
the agency said that he had no connection any more with the CIA.
Then it was discovered that there were secret files, classified
information on his boat.
Does that concern you that he disappeared that way?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, let me make a couple
of corrections there. I don't think we issued any statement
that he had no connections with the CIA. I think we indicated
that he had retired from the CIA. He was serving in a consulta-
tive capacity. Point number one.
And point number two, there were no classified documents
on the boat. There were some press articles to that effect, but
those articles were inaccurate.
Point number three is that this was really a case for
the Maryland State Police. They conducted the investigation.
I think they called on us for help. We tried to respond. They....
JOINER: Did they call on you for help?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: They called upon us to look
at some documents that were found on the boat. We looked at them
and said these are not classified documents. I'm not aware of the
details of what other assistance we may have provided. I don't
think it was very significant. After an extensive investigation,
they announced that while one can't be absolutely certain about
these things, they assumed that it was an unfortunate suicide.
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And....
JOINER: One final question. If you were advising
someone about the CIA, after what you've told me about the
fact you can't have strong, absolute moral values with this
kind of work, what would you say to those
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, I hope I didn't
mislead you. I think certainly you can have strong moral
standards. What I said is there are some difficult judgments
that have to be made pursuant to those moral standards. But
the strongest moral imperative, as far as I'm concerned, is
that we live in the best society in the world. And I can say
this after 23, 24 years' experience in the Foreign Service.
It's a society worth protecting. We need a good intelligence
organization to preserve the values we hold dear.
JOINER: Hasn't it been tarnished, though? I mean
how do you attract the best people?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we go back once again
to the comment that a lot of the so-called abuses originated at
the political level. And we don't have any trouble continuing
to attract good people. Our applications continue at a high
level. And I'm told that the people coming in are some of the
best that we've had in the history of our agency.
JOINER: Thank you very much.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Thank you.
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