1964 NESC REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000300180007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 7, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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3e?II r *S4 70: Vii, Zarle G. Whneler,
.
ftauums Joint Chiefs of Staff
SttaJlD( P 19a finc Report
~1Mf:8 s R for Ur. N Cone from Mudxmmp J C6# dated
al Sept 640, S Roject (CM-1 >6 )
I concur in prj.iple with your pr posed letter to Mr. may.
fir, I would suwwt that a refersase to briefini the P ?ssident
be inserted in the letter. We would servo to rsex$d Mr. ?km y
that this has beam the noxmi n of presentation of I833C
reports in past years.
JOB A. McCONN
DDiroater
O/DDI : DRH: eh (7 Oct 64)
Distribution:
Orig & I - Addressee
1 - Signer
1 - ER w /Basic (TS 0038352)
I -
I-oDDI
JCS review(s)
completed.
O/DDI
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
CM-142-64
21 September 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR; Mr. John A. McCone
SUBJECT; 1964 NESC Report
In forwarding this year's NESC Report to the White House, I
would like to include an explanation of its scope and limitations.
A draft letter which is intended to accomplish this is inclosed for
your consideration. If the members of the sub-committee agree, I
will forward this letter and the report to Mr. Bundy.
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
TOP SECRET
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
Dear Mr. Bundy:
The 1964 report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) of the
National Security Council has been completed and is forwarded herewith.
This year's analysis differs in major respects from the reports of previous
years, which were devoted primarily to assessing the effects on the US and
USSR of massive nuclear exchanges between the two countries. The
objective of the 1964 task was, in effect, an assessment of US "crisis
management" capabilities in the event of hostilities at various scales of
intensity between the US and the USSR. Specifically, the NESC was
asked to consider: (1) the manner in which a war between the US and
USSR might be initiated, (2) the factors -- political, military and
economic -- affecting decisions at critical points in the war, particularly
during the early phases of hostilities, and (3) the effects on the US, its
allies, and the USSR of actions resulting from such decisions. The
report's over-all purpose was to evaluate the validity and feasibility of
this type of analysis as a basis for providing guidance for political-
military planning and to assist in identifying and evaluating the risks
inherent in various alternative courses of action in presently approved
operational war plans.
The NESC staff, to complete the report within the time allotted,
chose to narrow the scope of analysis. It discussed methods of assuring
more complete guidance to the military planner; however, it concentrated
on an appraisal of the suitability and adequacy of existing NATO war
plans, command/control processes, and military capabilities to respond
to USSR-initiated conventional and limited nuclear attacks against the
Alliance; and it explored the military aspects of such situations more
fully than the diplomatic ones. Finally, it focused on the identification
and examination of elements influencing military decisions rather than
on the timing and possible consequences of critical decisions. Even so
circumscribed, the NESC task nonetheless addressed one of the most
complex -- if not the most complex -- of all the areas of Free World
political -military planning. Military technology, geography, population
distribution,. and alliance politics have all combined to make the decisions
on going to war, and on the early type and scale of combat, the most
difficult and fundamental ones the NATO member governments must take.
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The evaluation brought out clearly that because of the complexity
and the changing nature of the NATO defense posture some significant
problems remain unresolved. Specifically, the report underscores the
risks and dilemmas to the Alliance due, in part, to the restricted
flexibility of SACEUR's forces, 'resulting from peacetime maldeployments,
uncertain reinforcement capacity, the requirement to maintain a general
war posture, and logistics limitations. Current ability, to hold the conflict
to a relatively low level of intensity, without the sacrifice of a major portion
of the homelands of our allies, for a period sufficient to permit diplomacy
even minimal opportunity to forestall irreversible escalation, must be
assessed as limited and uncertain.
That the problems not yet solved are formidable and vital is well
recognized by this Administration. As the report suggests, this is in
fact an area which is being subjected to the most intensive military
planning; in a number of major current projects, the requirements for
effective and flexible military action of limited scope, responsive to
direction from the highest levels of government, are being closely
studied in the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
impediments and limitations that have been identified, both in the NESC
report. and in other studies; result principally from unresolved
divergencies on the current NATO Strategic Concept, difficulties
inherent in the military situation, in alliance operations, and in military
technology.
Thus, the NESC's report this year serves both as an evaluation of
existing NATO capabilities to conduct a defense against limited aggression
in Europe and as a useful reminder of some unfinished tasks and current
realities.. Continued improvement is called for to see that the processes
for the higher control of possible military action in Europe are quick-acting,
flexible, and survivable, particularly during the early phases of any
hostilities. This period will be marked by obscurity of enemy intentions
and actions and great peril to our forces, yet it will be a time when an
inadvertent signal to the enemy, or an unwanted escalation, could
frustrate diplomatic negotiations for an acceptable settlement. It must
be remembered, too, that the type of enemy attack in Europe -- its
location, intensity, and objectives -- will be essential determinants
of the NATO military response, and hence of the amount of time
diplomacy may have to operate before hostilities intensify. Under
certain circumstances, NATO could respond to a limited Soviet thrust
with conventional means alone, and the better the preparations made,
the more effective the defense would be. In other circumstances,
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limited nuclear operations could be required. For both of these modes of
warfare, much preparatory work remains to be done. As a third
possibility, governed strongly by the nature of the enemy attack, NATO
could quickly be faced with the necessity of going at once to general war
or failing to defend the territory of one or more of its members --
drastically foreshortening the time available for diplomatic negotiations.
The decisions as to scale and tempo will not be made by NATO uni-
laterally; the.Soviet Union, as noted will also be vitally involved. But
NATO, by maintaining and strengthening its arms and its manifest
readiness and determination to meet attack of any scale, can take major
strides toward assuring that the Alliance can make an effective response
to aggression, and can thereby strengthen the deterrent it poses to
Soviet aggression. The NESC report reaffirms that such deterrence
remains the capstone of NATO viability.
In summary, the 1964 NESC report provides a useful evaluation
of our current capabilities to meet various forms of limited aggression
in Europe, together with a contribution toward further identification of
some specific areas for additional study and analysis. It would seem
appropriate that you furnish the report to the Secretary of Defense for
use by his Department as he deems appropriate. In this way the study
results may be considered expeditiously in connection with related
actions now under. way within the. Department of Defense.
For the Net Evaluation Subcommittee:
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
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TOP SECRET --- 6.'
30 September 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : General Wheeler's Letter Regarding the 1964 NESC Report
1. The attached suggested reply to Gen. Wheeler recommends that
the draft letter to Mr. Bundy should not be sent. This recommendation
is based on the view that the report of the NESC is intended specifically
for the President, yet the letter does not indicatethat the report will
go to him. Rather, the final paragraph of the letter suggests that it is
passed by Mr. Bundy to the Secretary of Defense. Also, the length of
Gen. Wheeler's letter suggests perhaps that it can be read in place of
the report. What his letter attempts to do is to minimize the impact of
the problems discussed in the report. These problems have been recognized
for some time but little constructive action has been taken to resolve
them. The bringing of these problems directly to the President is in
consonance with the charter of the NESC.
2. In establishing the NESC, President Eisenhower was seeking to
gain an independent evaluation of US strategic capabilities vs. those of
the Soviet Union. It was intended that this independent view would assist
him in taking decisions with respect to security policy and budget pro-
posals of the Department of Defense. The 1964 report, while not evalu-
ating an intercontinental nuclear exchange, is nevertheless in a real
sense a net evaluation of US policy, strategic concepts, and forces as
they relate to several potential levels of war in the NATO area.
3. If the Chairman of the NESC believes that he, in his Joint Chiefs
of Staff role, must comment on this and subsequent reports before they
go the President, such comments could be attached. But if the reports
are not to be given to the President, then the NESC is no longer per-
forming its assigned mission. Either the NESC should be dissolved or its
responsibilities and organization reconsidered.
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 " I agree with the recommendation made
who is continuing to work
by
informa y with General Johnson on this
matter, and suggest that the DCI not
endorse General Wheeler's proposal. STA
The Director, at his convenience, may
want to discuss this matter with II
Vand myself.
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ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
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CONCURRENCE
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Remarks :
To 2: For preparation of reply.
Suspense: 30 September 1964
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
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:FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
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4 Sept 6
FORM 237 Use previous editions (40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 0-587282