(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-00374R000100330003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 120
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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IP DIPARTIUNT OP WOW
?rims or SPIAL ?MATIONS (050f0
OSD DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
Auth......2razA Rea toruhet
The responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for intelligence
aotivities of the military services is not specifically defined in
legislation Or executive order, but is implioit in the following pro-
vision of the National Security Act of 1947t
*The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal
assistant to the President in all matters relating to
the Department of Defense. Under the direction of the
President, and subject to the provisions of this Act,
he shall have direction, authority, and control over
the Department of Defense.*
The means whereby the Secretary of Defense intends to fulfill his re-
sponsibility with respect to intelligence are indicated in the following
paragraphs of his Directive No. 5105.7, dated June 29, 195ht
"Each of the Military Departments and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff organization has under its control
and direction an intelligence organisation with the
primary responsibility of satisfying the requirements
of the agency of which it is a part. The intelligence
organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the normal
channel for the production of intelligence for the
Seoretary of Defense, and nothing herein is to be con-
strued as restricting or altering the normal channels
or organization.
"In implementation of his responsibilities as head
of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense
has, however, a requirement for staff participation and
representation in policy matters relating to intelligence.
A staff channel is required in order that he shall have
direction, authority, and control in these matters as
provided by law. There is no requirement for nor does this
dircctivc authorise the establishment. of an intelligence
operating or producing'organisation within the Mies of
the Secretary of Defense."
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The Assistant to that MeePlOgOnf DefiltfeeiejarOperatione), whe
-
14 elm? sometimes referred to as the Dirmctor, Office Of Sfneoisl Operations
(OW), Vats designated to fulfill that requirement 6e1 ateff participation
and representation, Hill authority and reeponeibilitiee are set forth in
various direetivee and memoranda of the Secretary of Defense.
Principal among these in Directive 5105,7, mentioned above, which
outlines the responsibilities and functione which should be undertaken in
the intelligence area. This directive specifically reftte in the AssiAtant
to the Secretary (co) the following responsibilities;
Adelse and waist the Secretary of Defense on intelligence
matters; affecting affair of the Department of Defense;
Through staff collaboration, maintain. evereel .1-?ogn.l.zilvice of
intelligence activities within the Department to ameure the eentinueue
develepment of effective and integrated Department of I:*ferv,e ietalli-
gence policy;
Serer, ae the principal ate'f asaietant and policy adeizer to
th Secretary of Defense in all matters pertainine to the reetYensl-
bilitiee of the Department in the national intelligence effore;
Provide, in addition to the Servicee and Joine zte'.'f (JCS)
representation, the principal staf7f repreeentat ion for the :.,ecretary of
Defenne eith other departmente and agenciem of the (level-el-Tient in all
intelligence matters, either through his on office or by arrangement
with the flhatrmmn of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 6ecretaries of
the milltary departments for vie assignment of repreeentativea of the
,Joene staff or one or more of the military departments or other agencire,
as appropelate;,aed
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Exeroise the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense
the direction and control of the operations of the tistira.,
Security Agency.
In addition to the foregoing, by memorandum dated July 15? 195,, the
030 was made responsible for all payJlo.:i.ogical operations activities in
with..n the Department G f Defense participates, and other operations cr a
similar nature which are within the cognizance of the Psyaiologcal
Strategy Botrd, or its successor agtuicies.
The OSO is tilsc charged, pursuant to Directive 5105 6, Cated 201.::;.-astry
19541 with providing staff snprcrt to the Deputy Setretary of Dertneo
in the performance of his resnoneihillt'oms as a rmsber the
Coordinatinr L.VarJ t001), AmoLg 1A,her dp.rtra
Derartmant cf Defemes views &omerrfng pi :s and oIams
bei: .0:Aered oy tha 008 and furaisnes, as nez:aseary, departntr?,a
reprms&r:tstion cn ad or p.,-rraanent wsmittess estabilehed by
The is small and is nelthfq? intended nor rrerareci to 6xer:!..si
sidalinistw?ative zontml over day-to day intelAgeece activities of the
song...zee. It has and does from time tc time fos attention n probastA
of vaziy.tal.:G.1;..ern to the intelligence organi:tations and assists in b:Angir4
yerpent views into agreement. In this matter, it does have int%nence
determining poL.7.0y, at does not presently attempt to ID/.
f'e is'::ortpx!ried et a tErectcr, a deputy direct,;:,r, and eight ass' staAst
whose nt tasks are liaison to spelific cfrices and other altivitiee
in the intSI1Lgsnoe area.
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0 &Mt tio With Other Activities
514re1.cy of Defense directive, the departmentel secretaris
have been required to designate under or assistant Secretaries cr other
appropriate officials of their respective departments as having functional
responsibility for all intelligence matters. These officials serve as
liaison with the Director, (BO. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
has ft.Iso been required to designate an officer of general or flag rank.
Serving within the jCS for liaison with the Director, CEO, in integenct
mat'4.ere, In addition to liaison with correeponding aviheltns in the nil,..tary
? intellIpemce organizations, OSC is alec a point of ma34r tortalt ln thr
Department of Defense for the Department of State and CIA Joccernicg
tiltelltgente matters.
BudettLAELas and Materiet
Wth the exception of those rotating to the Nat_onal So.:unity Aoncy,
the USC) dces not control or make decisions with respect to bt6gets,
manpower, or materiel. Where NSA is concerned, the office does assist
and erisis with respect to presenting the budget of NSA to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Bureau of the audgeL It mey
also make recommendations regarding personnel strengths which affect the
NSA or the service intelligence organizations.
q15.111IA9I.L.I.U12
Much of the work of the OSO is directed toward assembling data or.
making stud.les of .common prailems in the intelligence field. The following
c;7.11nploo thi typo f stud t4e? c:it;.t.12 p..epares:
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deordinition of certain electronis aetivitiae;
A study of the attaehe spots's; and
A study of the types and numbers of intilligenee publications.
The functions of the office in the foregoing are directed toward
assembling pertinent facts and achieving agreement of the agencies ocumerned
toward a oommon tl.n, rather than directing the solution to various problems.
Conclusion
Although the language in Directive 5105.7 is very broad with respect
to the pavers vested in the Director, 050, the directive also indicates
clearly that it is not intended that these powers be so interpreted as to
alter or restrict the intelligence organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as the normal channel for intelligence production for the Secretary of
Defense. The directive also indicates that it should not be construed so
as to affect the responsibilities of the military intelligence organisations
for departmental inteliigence. No serious abuse of power or uaurpation of
prerogatives and responsibilities by the Office of Special Operations was
disclosed. Nevertheless, destits the restrictive language of the baste
directive, it is possible that with the pessage of time a change in the
basic concept of the functions of the Director, OSA, and his staff might
gradually evolve wherein that office actually would become a super
intelligence met.haniem and achieve inordinate control over policies,
pr.!srans, tnd ztItara.t .tia whi4h are the responsibilities of the Job&
Chiefs of Staff and the military departments (pp. 89, 90, 92).
It might become possible, furthermore, for the Office of Special
Operations to present policy matters to the Secretary of Defense for his
decision based oniy on the recommendations of individuals in the OSO,
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without consideration at the Nitglie4ad temaiatien,er the Ileimt
Chiefs of Staff or the heads of the military departmls. Assumption
of suoh power by an office which is without responsibility for operations
presents obvious dangers (p. 91).
...4.411111,10.01.2a.
That Directive 5105.7 be examined ()irefully, particularly with
respect to Section Ill, "Responsibilities,* with a view to clarifying it
and eliminating any aMbiguities which could lead to a misinterpretation
of the functions and misapplication of authority or the Office of Special
Operations. It is also recommended that the relationships of the OSO with
the intelligence almanisation of the JCS and the military departments be
more specifically spelled out so as to reduce the possibilities of friction
and misunderstanding with respect to the responsibilities assigned under
the National Security Act of 1947, amended.
JOINT CRISPS OP STAFF
Only those elements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerned with
intelligence or intelligence activities viii be discussed.
As an adjunct of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is a Joint Intelli-
gence Committee composed of the intelligence Chiefs of the umbers of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; i.e., Chairman, the Deputy Director for Intelligence
of the Joint Staff; Army member, the 0-2 of the Army; Navy member, the
Director of Naval Intelligence; and the Air Poo member, the Director
of Intelligence, Air Pores. Meetings of the committee are held in
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marmites or when sebetentiVeagreenenvisvtair be readied at lamer
levels or by the ssehfige of pailedia telephone or as paper.
t,
There have been 25 listings in the peat 18 months, and only two unresolved
papers have been forwarded to the nest higher echelon after those asetimge.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Stiff heads another
adjunct, the Joint Intelligence Group, and has 30 officers, including
himself, to perform the intelligent* functions and duties assigned to him
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Director of the Joint Staff. As
aides, he in turn has an executive officer and three assistant deputies;
one assistant is concerned with estimates; one with plans and policies;
and one with current intelligence. /n addition, there are two subelements
of the Joint Intelligence Committee appended to his group which are joint
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) in composition and misoion, but whiah are not
part of the Joint star as such. These latter elements, the Joint
Technical Intelligence Subcommittee and the Joint Intelligence Objectives
Agency, will be distuseed later.
The Assistant Deputy for Estimates supervises the preparation of all
intelligence estimates required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint
Staff. The relationship of this group to the JIC and the JCS in the field
of intelligence estimates is comparable but not quite the same as the
relationship of the CIA Board of Estimates in that field to the IAC and
the Director of Central Intelligence. The major difference in relationship
is that this estimates group is not subordinate to one of the producers ot
intelligence (the Deputy for Intelligence has no intelligence production
functior!! emparable to that of the Deputy Director fcr Litelligece cf CIA
as is the OIL Board of National Estimates. Estimates in this context are
distinguished from tentative evaluations and assessments on natters of
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currant interest, and are based on thelOetion, eorreletion,
and interpretation of the best and most Wrong Wormation available.
Ostalli, these estimates are on a long-range ties basis. However, pro-
vision has been made to provide estimates on a current or "crash" basis
as occasion arises. Service views are constantly sought in the preparation
of the 'stilettos. On occasion, help and assistance are sought from other
than service sources (CIA, for instance, for scientific matters for whloh
it has peculiar competence, or PS/ on matters of internal security), when
the subject impinges on special fields. However, the ultimate estimates
are strictly limited to lithe military aspects." In nsequence, Joint
Intelligence Committee estimates may differ materially from national
estimates, in the preparation of which some of the same men have assisted.
National estimates are subjected to a heavier impact from the political,
sooiological, and economic aspects of the situation than are estimates
prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee Which lay greeter emphasis
on the military aspects.
The Assistant Deputy for Estimates also is resnonsible for knowing
what the Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee is doing and keeping
the deputy current on those matters.
The Assistant Deputy for Plans and Policy supervises the ;reparation
and review of studies on policy matters, security, release of classified
material, the Air Objectives Polder Program, and on all military plans
and programs in the aerial photography and mapping or (shafting Made.
The Assistant Depfty for Currant Intelligence is responsible for
keeping the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Seorstary of
of Defense apprised of intelligence events and their meaning for the
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fUture on a dey-to-day basis if sebeeeary. lb is also reepoesible for
providing the current intelligence needed by the estimator* in the
prepeotion and defense of their estimate*, and for monitoring the
activities of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency.
JelatinnshiPs
thesmaoh as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are
established within the Depertsmnt of Defense, the Joint Ictellipence
Group supports the Secretary of Defense in intelligence matters either
through the Deputy Director for Intelligence to the Chairmae of the Joint
Chiefs at Staff or through the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Joint
Chiefs of star and thence to the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy
Director for Intelligenos is the point of oontact in the etaff channel
for intelligence matters between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office
of Special Operations, the staff ageney for such matters for the Secretary
of Defense. Thus, approaches to or from the National Security Council and
all ether external agencies are through the Seoretery of Defense, am$
for working liaison, or in matters pertaining to the Intelligence AdIrisollf
0stte44 of which the Deputy for Intelligence is a ember. The orgenii.
"atonal relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency is not cls*.
Newever, as the Deputy Director for Intelligence is i member of the
Intelligence Advisor/ Committee, there is a oleos working relationship
at chat level with the Central /stallions* Agency. $y participation of
the JOint Intelligence Group in some of the Intelligenoe Advisory Committee'1
subeommiteees4 a aloes working reletienehle is enintelned mt thst level.
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Personnel limitations in the Joint Intelligence Orono preolude direct
participation in the working groups. The Joint intelligence Group
participates in the deliberation. and end products of the Watch Committee,
the Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic allergy intelligence
Committee, and the Zoonomic Intelligence Committee, and site as an observer
at aeetings of the interagency Defector Cottee. Because the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have no operating functions, the Joint intelligence Oroup
does not participate in the deliberations of the other five suboosmoittees
of the intelligence Advisory Committee.
Other Entities
There are two subcommittees, the Joint Technical intelligence Sub-
oommittee end the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, which are staffed
by personnel from the offices of the members of the Joint Intelligence
Committee. Although they operate in the physical area of the Joint Staff
and are monitored by the Deputy for intelligence, they are not part of
the Joint Staff.
The Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee plans for and, in time
of mar or active military operations, coordinatee the collection by forces
in the field of all technical matter which is desired by the intelligence
agencies of the nation. CIA does not participate in the planning or
development of collecting teams, but is interested in the resultant product.
Arch beneficial information has been derived frost this program in time of
war by the exploitation of captured enemy equipeent. This collection
program is still going on. Further, tho us o of technical or scientific
anaZysts near the sources of the equipment or material has aided Intelligente
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*Moire in directing solleetion requiremente arifbettering the eolleetien
results.
The Joint Intelligent* ObjectivesAgenoy was set up toward the and
of World War IT to supervise the operation.or project *Paper Clip.* This
project was concerned with the evacuation from Europe of top-grads German
and Austrian scientists for the purpose of augmenting the scientific and
technological potential of the United States. Since its inception, some
900 of these persons of 2? different nationalities have been brought to
the United States, the use of whose abilities and knowledge has saved the
Government millions of dollars in research funds and much development time
in various programs. The Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency is now
oonoerned with five projects, all of a similar nature but each having
different objectives.
The relationships on the working level between the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the C/A concerning intelligence matters arpear to be adequate
and effective within the areas of responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
DI:PARTNER OF TRE ARMY
Assistant Chiaf of Staff, 0-.2 IYateujgsnc. (AC/S1 0-2)
The AC/S, 02, is a member of the general staff of the Department
of the Army, which is the principal element of the staff of the Secretary
of the Army. Each Assistant Chief of Staff is reeponeible for the develop-
ment, execution, review, and analysis of primary programs for which he has
been designated as the program director, the AC/S, 0-2, being reseonsiblos
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for Army Program No. 5, titled "VaSeetiom, and Review and Analysis of
the Intelligence Program."
The organisational structure of the;.general staff in the Department
of the Army is indicated on Chart NO. 1. It is to be noted on this ehart
that the office of the former Assistant Chief of Staff, 04, Ingistice,
has been abolished, ell functions of this staff member having been taken
over at the Deputy Chief of Staff level which places this element on an
echelon above the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence,
and Operations.
Rean.p_mag_.itiesofl.A",leAC0-2
The AC/S, 0-2, under the supervision of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff
and of the Comptroller of the Army within his ccope of responsibility,
plans, coordinates, and supervises for the Army the galection, evaluation,
and dissemination of intelligence inforestion pertaining to the war
potential topography, military forces, and military activities of foreign
countries, and the strategic vulnerability of the United States and its
possessions, in addition thereto, he
Advises on counterintelligence matters,
Supervises counterintelligence activities,
Supervises military mapping,
Performs the Army cryptologic functions,
Provides the official channel of liaison between the Army and
foreign military personnel in the United States,
Operates the Army Attache System, and
Mbnitors the procurement, training, and assignment of military
intelligence personnel.
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To fulfill tbs shore U0Spomeibilities, tbit &Nisi of AOC 0-1,
Chart No. 2, is subdivided into fOur *viral and one administrative
divisions. The operational EINEsions ttIfelon undlr the supervision of
two deputise, a Deputy for Foreign Operations (i1,0) and a Deputy for Zone
of Interior (Domestic) Operations (DUO), who are accountable to AC/S, 0-2.
There is also a Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2 (DAC/8, 0-2) assigned
directly to the Office of AC/8 0-2, and an Nxecutive.
The DAC/8, 0-2, functions primarily as the alter 212 of the AC/8, 0-2,
and as such must keep himself informed at all times of the problems
confronting 0-20 so as to be able to function effectively in an emergency
or in the absence of the AC/8, 0-2. He is NOT in the dhain of command as
an additional echelon through which actions going to the AC/80 0-2, from
ether deputies or the executives must be cleared. Re has supervisory
responsibility fort
The management policy and budgetary activities within 0-2, and
The Nilitary Intelligence Reserve Program and the Army Security
Reserve.
The Deputy for Foreign Operations (DFO) supervises the Collection and
Operations Division, the Production Division, and the Dissemination Office,
which are the major segments of the positive intelligence element of 0-2.
He specifically has supervisory responsibility fort
The collection of intelligence information pertaining to war
potential, topography, military forces, materiel, and related activities
of foreign countries by continental any and overseas commanders, heads
of administrative and technical services, and other Army agencies;
The exchange of intelligence information among all intelligence
agencies of the Government and the Army;
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Tbs prodnotion and asintaboseetwjetelligamoe to meet the
requirements of the Chief of 5tt, major soemmads,?seds of adedmistretive
and teehnleal services, and other government agenoies, and the Army;
The dissemination of intelligence to aithorised Army and
national agencies overseas and wobbled amends and foreign governments;
The coordination of intelligence responsibilities and activities
of the various teohnical services;
The timely notifioation of the Army eetablishnent and other
agencies of any event or condition isamediately affecting the security of
the United States, its possessions, or its forces;
The Army oomponent, Air Force Office of Intelligence (AFO/N); and
The Army eryptologic activities.
The Deputy for the Zone of the Interior Operations (DZIO) supervises
the functions of the Security Division and the Training Division, which
are ooncerned with security and training of personnel for intelligence
assignments. Se specifically has supervisory responsibility fors
The formulation and interpretation of Army policy pertaining
to disclosure and safeguarding of classified military information;
The formulation and interpretation of oounterintelligence policy
and supervision over the Army oounterietelligence system;
The formulation of policy with respect to the Department of the
Army seeping effort, prodtiction? and reproduction of still and ;Nation
pictures, for intelligence, purpose.;
The preparation and defense of the Army steeping budget;
Vis development and soordisatiss of the Intent/mos support
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tubsillosmar solhools and training within,the purview et AO,
.1.:3?Ar?
The dovelepmint and coordination of polieliss relative to
Intelligence specialist personnel.
The Itutoutive coordinates all getters pertaining to the operation
of the Office of the WS, 0-2, bone the deputies informed of all actions,
and insures that instructions and orders are executed in accordance with
the plans and policies of the AC/S. 0-2. Ha has supervisory responsi-
bility fort
Liaison activities between the Department of the Army and foreign
kilitary representatives on duty or visiting in the United States;
The administration of the Army Attache System;
-The adninistrative activities within 0-2; and
The SSO System (covered in another section of this report).
Positive Intelligence Slesent
The positive intelligent:* element is that segment of 0-2 which
eollects, produces, and disseminates intelligence, its component parte
being indicated on Chart No. 3 and their organisational structure described
below;
Collection and Operations Division
This division is responsible for the screening and control of all
roquests for information stemming from any source within or without the
intelligence community. It directs these requests to the appropriate
collection activity, maintains a follett-Isystemt and generally oontrols
and administers the collection effort. / is to be noted that the Document
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Library is included in this division, since it is the physical recipient
Of all ram intelligence material.
Production Division
This division operates on a geograPhical or area of interest basis.
Each area is assigned a number of research analysts, either nilitary or
civilian, who receive the refs intelligence material and produce finished
intelligence in the form of contributions to the National Intelligence
Survey (NIS), Intelligence Estimates, replies to specific requests such
as capabilitiee of foreign military forces, statements of courses of
action, estimates of the effects of (bourses of action, reoommended action
on various committee agenda items, consideration of various studies and .
reports of Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, and Departnont
of the Army, and reviews of any. form of publication which has intelligence
implications.
Dissemination Office
This office WAS established recently as a separate entity in order
to provide a more positive control over the dissemination process, and is
Charged with the direction and supervision of the dissemination of intelli-
gence, including operational intelligence as required, and the taking of
appropriate action to fulfill the dissemination responsibilities of the
AC/S, 0-2, to indludet
The maintenance of a continual survey of the intelligence
dissemination requirements of the AC/S, 0-2;
The preparation and maintenanoe of lists for distribution of
intelligence produced by 0-2s
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The foresamtion of policy for the maintenance of statement?of-
interests lists for the distribution of intelligence received from outside
sources) and
Direction of dissemination.
Attache System
The major Army effort in the foreign intelligence collection field
is carried out by its Attache System which malmtaine stations in 65 ?
countries throughout the **ad. Attaohes are engaged principally in the
overt collection of information oomerning the military forces of the host
country and their capability, both current and potential, to wage war or
otherwise threaten the security of the United States through individual or
concerted military action. Attaches do not normally engage in olandestine
collection activities. It is estimated that the Attache System collects
BO percent of the raw information received in G2.
Officers are assigned in the Attache System on a highly selective
basis in conformance with rigid requirements and standards established
for oandidates for this type of duty. Their performance is closely
observed and can be measured quite accurately by the quality and quantity
of material which is submitted to and reviewed by the collection branch
of 0-2. Any inadequacies in meeting the required standards can be
immediately determined and remedial action taken involving the relief of
the attache if indicated.
There are roughly 700 people (military and civilian) in the Attache
System, the major proportion being on ovyrsoan assignnant. The largest
attaohe group is assigned in Prance, where there are nine officers, one
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warrant officer, seven enlisted men, eight U, S. and seven alien civilian*.
The smallest group is typified by the office in /reland, where there are
one officer and one enlisted man assigned. The sits, in personnel numbers,
of each station is determined by the extent of the collection effort
required. Since the oollection division in 0-2 both places the requests
and reviews the responses, the load on any attache and the effort required
can be very accurately determined and oontrolled.
After selection, officers are assigned to language and intelligence
schools to prepare them for their assignment. These preparatory COUPS'S
are arproximately one year in length, depending on the language facility
of the officer involved.
There is indication of a need for expanding rather than restricting
the number of personnel assigned to attache duties, espeoially when tiss
effectiveness of their collection effort is considered. For instance, on
the Australian station, there is only one officer attache assigned, yet
his area of responsibility includes Australia, Indonemia, and Borneo.
Because of the distances involved, it is impracticable for him to adequately
cover his territory, which at the present time contains much Communist
activity. There undoubtedly ars many valuable sources of information in
these areas which are not being exploited because of the shortage of nercon-
nel assigned to this station.
Fiscal operations of the attaches are reviewed and directed by 0 2,6
Comptroller. In addition, each station is inspected at least biannually
by the 0-2 Inspector General, and ale; by the AO/S, 0 i himself,
There is a total of 283 motor vehicles accountable for by the Attache
Systami a70 for use of the attaches, and the remainder for other agencies
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but assigned to, the Army for mainteninoe and scam:tab:atty. MOW
pools are operated for the use of all service attaches in London and
Rome. At other stations, the use of vehicles is coordinated by the
attaches, although not pooled.
At each it commioation facilities and services are provided
by one military service for the use of all other agencies. The service
providing this facility is determined by mutual agreement and assignments
are equalised on a worldwide basis.
Where both Air Force and Army have attaches at a station, they are
served by a single fiscal agent. Because of the difference in accounting
systems, it has not been found prectioable to includm the Naval attache in
this arrangement.
It general, each servioe attache maintains his awn translators. It
has not been found feasible to pool this service because of the difficulty
of assigning work priorities and the special technical knowledge require-
ments of the different services. Some translating is done under private
contract locally. This arrangement is not more generally used because of
security reasons.
Army Security Agency
This agency will be discussed later in Appendix I.
Army Component AMIN
This is the Army element of a three-service group which has been
established under the aegis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose
of determining certain military capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign
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eountries, designating targetstherein, end estimating weapon and
material requirements for effecting specified degrees of damage. The
Angel:raiment has the specific functions of providing integrated
participation with the Directorate of Intelligmece, USAF, and giving
technical assistance to the AC/8, 0.2, with respect to his Army and
joint resnonsibilities.
As this joint group provides intelligence support for the Strategic
Air Command, it has bean placed under the direction of the Director of
Intellieence, USAF. There is inherent in suoh unilateral action the danger
of slanting the intelligence product to oonform to the thinking of the
controlling service.
There is a specific instance in this connection in which an Army
analyst was requested to evaluate an intelligence paper prepared by this
group. Re found, after much persistence, that the original number of cities
targeted for destruction by the group had been increased at the direction
of higher authority outside the group. Such an increase was not in keeping
with the basic intelligence, but evidently was injected to show a greater
need for weapons. The added targets were found to be small and unimportant
communities and indicated a plan for complete devastation of an area, which
was beyond the original intent of the group.
The Navy le coaponent in 00/11 is in agreement with the Army comnoneft
that estimates produced under this program do not always accurately confore
with the facts and that guidance is required at a higher level which will
enforce a policy for developing true estimates for use as a basis for
planning.
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e
A study has been initiated within the Army for presentation to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, rsoommseding the estatdishmese of an integrated
Intelligence unit with equal representation by the three services. Thia
unit would produce intelligenee on capability and vulnerability and develop
estimates of required weapons for all, three services on a justifiable basis.
Under such an arrangement, overall plans and policy oould be decided by the
three servioe meMbers of the unit, or, felling an agreement at that level,
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, if neoessary, by the National Security
Council.
Counterintelligence Oorps
The mission of this activity does not include any responsibility for
the oollection of intelligence information. Rol/ever, incidental to its
normal functions (which will be described in a later section) it does
acquire some such date which are fed into the intelligence system.
222EELT
The organisation established within 0-2 to handle security and related
matters is titled the Security Division,
Physical
The regulations and necessary implementing procedures for omplianol,
with Executive Order NO. 105010 titled "Safeguarding Official Information
in the Interests of the Defense of the United States," have been promulgated
and implemented. Those measures are adequate to meet the requirements of
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this order and are properly serried amt. Perseamel attached to 0-2 are
security conscious to a high degree. The poesibility of "familiatiry
breeding conteigk*is recognised and an active campaign by poster and
lecture programs is conducted to meintain the necessary standards'.
Industrial
"The Armed Poroes industrial Security Regulations" (AMR), dated
January 15, 1953 and issued by the Department of Defense, is the ourrent
directive concerning security in this area. Instructions to contractors
regarding the handling of classified material are eat forth in a Department
of Defense publication titled "Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding
Classified information"(ZSMSCI).
AFIER effectively worditates the industrial security activities of.
all military agencies engaged in proourement activities. Prior to its
issuance, agencies operated individually under their own departmental
directives and supervision. APISR establishes responsibility for plant
supervision, designates procedures for providing clearance for both
facilities and individuals, and eliminates duplication of effort and
uncertainty as to *nuisance for security matters.
Once a plant receives an agency clearance, it may accept classified
material from any agency. The agency having work performed, however, is
responsible for insuring conformance by the contractor with security
instroctions.
All management, supervisory, and the actual work-performing personnel
must have individual clearance fOr access to all matter of work alaasitldd
"seoret" and above.
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For work classified "confidential," management and key personnel
are c.keared for "secret." Management itself is then permitted to -.jeer
its own working personnel for "confidential." This is a recognised
weakness. %waver, sille0 thereat. an estimated three to six million
oontractoray employees engaged in defense work of a "confidential" nature,
the enormity of the problem involved in giving even a National Agency
Check on each individual is readily couoeivable. A study is being made
to determine first as accurately as possible the total number of employees
in this category, and then to attempt to devise some form of agency *hook
which would be feasible, Contractors, methods for oonducting their own
clearance checks have been spot checked and in most oases found adequate.
CIO units attached to Continental Army Commando conduct investigations
on personnel employed by contractors assigned the Army for clearance checks.
If material of a subversive nature is developed, the case ie turned over
immiediately to the FB/ for further disposition. It a plant is refused
clearance, there is a reviws procedure established for management to follow
in order to obtain clearance.
Pereonnel Clearance and Prooedures
Two types of clearance cheeks are prescribed: a National Agency
Check and a background or full field Check. The circuestancee under whioh
eaoh will be conducted are prescribed, and they apply to all activities
uithin ths Aruw handling olaselfied matter.
Officer candidates must have a National Agency Check and clearance
before their appointment can be effected. U.S. -born enlisted personnel
are subjeoted either to a National Agency Check or background check,
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4
depemding am Loath of service and elksmnifioation for vhieh alearease
is sought, prior to. being given atom to claseitied material. All
alien-born enlisted personnel are subjected to background cheek prier
to ace's* to such meterial. All personnel, including officers, enlistees,
reenliotees, and draftees, met complete and sign Department or Defense
'Ora 98 (DD Perm 98) loyalty certification prior to entry in the service.
This applies to all conponente of the Army such as the National Guard
and reserve organisations.
There is no established policy or system in the Ar wy for conducting
pericdie personnel security rechecks. Military personnel are checked
prior to assignment to sensitive areas, as described above, and also
when they are reassigned to one& duties or transferred from one intelli-
gence activity to another. There is no recheck made of civilian personnel.
At the present time, the backlog on weeurity ohecke on military
personnel is such that it requires from six to ten veeks to complete a
National Agency Cheek and from six to nine month* for a baekgrumnd or
tall field inveetigation.
Security is a command function and each command or echelon initiates
the request for the type of clearance necessary. CIO personnel condamt
the dhecke on military pereonnel, and the Civil Service Commission, on
any civilian employees involved.
If derogatory material with a loyalty implication is developed, the
came (if a civilian employee) is turned over to the ?SI, if in the
domestic area. In the ease of military personnel, the investigation
is completed by CIO.
When information of a derogatory neture in any form, loyalty or
criminal, is developed concerning military personnel, The Adjutant Goma
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(TAO) it informed by telecommunication and the individual's reoord is
immediately "flagged." If the information has an intelligence impll
cation, 0-2 is also informed by wire. The unit developing the data
follows up with amplifying report. The "flagging" process consists of
filing an over-sised top sheet or form in the individual's record. When
this sheet is placed in the file, all favorable personnel action, such
as promotion, change in duty assignment, decoration awards, etc., is
suspended. All staff Sections having cognizance of such aotion receive
copy of this form as a check.
0-2 itself is prinoipally ooncerned only with those Oases having a
loyalty connotation. Criminal oases are handled by The Judge Advocate
General. 02 maintains a *lard index file on the military cases in vhiJ
it has concern and follows the progress and final disposition of ege:h case.
Upon the discharge or separation of an individual fr,w3 Arre, service
as a security risk or when his term of enlistment expires while under
inveetigationt the FBI, Civil Service Commissice, and Selective Service
are immediately notified and the discharge or separa4ion certificate is
so annotated. Before reenlistment in the same or any other service can be
effected. clearance .from the discharging service and authorization from
the Secretary of the enlisting service at be obtained,
In spite of the aggressive prevention measures of screening. *hocking,
and observation, there always is the possibility of the infiltration of
a defected person. This danger is recognised.
Responsibility for Security
With the admitted ineffectiveness of the intelligence effort is the
arta of trans*endelt importance, the Soviet bloc, it would appear lcgicak
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and oonetructive to disamsoolate the.. responsible for this effort from
any diversionary responsibility or activity.
The survey developed that there is an inordinate amount of time and
effort devoted in G-2.st the policy level to the processing of individual
? security cases. It is believed that 0-2 would be better able to carry
out its primary functions of intelligence if it were responsible only
for policy matters in the area of security clearance.
Traininq
The Training Division of 0-2 is organised in three branches, only
two of which - the Combat Intelligence and Reserve Component Branches -
are directly associated with training. The third, Map and Photo Branch,
has no relation to training and is placed in this division solely for
administrative purposes.
There is included under Combat Intelligence Branch & research and
development section which likewise has no direct connection with training,
except to perform a liaison function between training and research and
development in order to insure that applicable methods and devices produced
in the latter program are introduced into the former, Its major function,
however, is to observe and review research and development projects for
intelligence interest and to act as liaison for G-2 with such agencies
as have research and development projects in progress. Ourther elabo-
raticr. f tho intelligftwe aaceute of reeeardh and development projects
will be discussed in a later section.
0-2's training interest is principally confined to the areas of
policy guidance and planning. It establishes the polities under which
intelligence and language schools operate and monitors their programme
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Its only training activity is in comneOtion With those aspects of the
reenrve prugram which select and train reservists for assignment
within 0-2 in the event of mobil/mation.
Elements of the division monitor training programs in the intelli-
gence field which are conducted by the various field commands and aroma**
to insure conformance with 0-2 *s guidance.
NLfSt..._LaFieldenoiesttnderStafiaionoftheACSG,2_
In accordance with his assignment of reeponsibilitia, AC/5, 0-2,
exercises supervision over oertain agenaies whizh operate outside his
regular staff organization. They are organized ard do function az
separate ocmmande and are related to 0 2 only for staf: guidance and
coorditatton. These agenzies are the Counter. L,teaigence Corps (CIC:,
the Army Security Agency (fA's, the Army Inte:lligence tenter 'JAC), and
the Central Renard* Facility.
Counter Intelligence Corps
This Cerra cperates under the oommand of a majcr general, who is
also, in effect, a deputy to AC/S, 0-2, for CIC matters. However, while
the Corps commander is responsible for certain administrative and
security functtons, he does not exercise a true command control over
the personnel of the Corps. Based on the principle that security is a
function of command, elements of the Corps are generally assivned to field
unite and operate directly under the command of the unft to which assigned.
the miss;Lon of the CIO is to contribute to the auccesuful operations
of the Army Establishment through the detection of treason, sedition,
subversion activity, and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of
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enemy espionage and *Octavo mithin the Army Establishment and such areas
over whilh it May have jurisdiction.
The Corps is organized into approximately 50 (the number varies,
depending on service requirements) detachments, which range in size from
16 to 1O0 men. The unite to Whieh *aligned may be from battalion to
theater level.
In the course of carrying out its Security responsibilities, the CIC,
incidentally, collects intelligence infOrnetion, especially iu occupied
areas, which material is transmitted through normal command nhannels, where
it inters the inte/ligence procese.
Central Reords Fiiiy
This facillty is also iccated at Ft. Holabird, but has no direr.
connection with the CIC, It is an adjunct of the Office of AC/S, Or.2?
and contains reccrds and files Which were maintained originally in the
Pentagon, 0,2 area, by the Seourity Division. It also holds the investi-
gative files of most of the overseen commands, and when shortly the similar
files of the U. S. Army, Alaska, U.S. Army, Pacific, and "(VS. Army F071;03,
Far East - EigtAt Army, are received, all Army files of this nature will
be in one central 1:cation.
The prinnipal value of this facility lies in the maintenance in one
place of all investigative data developed on any nartitmlar indlv,dusa,
Prior to its eatabliehment, each Army command and 0-2 maintained their
awn fiIes, and it was namable for a depngstory Of unfavrable record Lo
exist in one command without its existence being known to other commands,
With all reoorde maintained in one l'r.ation and by the preparation and
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distribution of seeing record cards, it is now possible to determine
expeditiously the results of prior investigations or the fact that no
previous investigations have been conducted.
Ar ey intelligenoe Center
This center includes the CIC headquarters, the Cie School, the Photo
Intelligence Center, the Central Records Facility, the Army Intelligence
Board, the Strategic Intelligence Sohool, located in Washington, D.C.,
and eventually the Combat Intelligence Schools now located at Ft. Riley,
Kansas.
Army Security Ageney
The organization and functions of this activity will be covered in
Appendix I.
Relationshi of AC 8 0-2 to the Office of the Secret of Defense
The establishment of an intelligence responsibility within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense has not as yet had any major impact
on the functioning of 0-2. The Army already had a Channel via the JCS
for the transmission of intelligence intonation to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, ehioh syetem is still effective.
The present arrangement for contact with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense is from 0-2 to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil
Fiiitery Afflire), thistle to the Office of Special Operations, the element
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for intelligence matters.
This method of contact works in both directions.
Thus, 0,2 has two means of contact to end from the Secretary of
Defensei via JCS and via an Assistant Seoretary of the Army.
torig4410
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Relationship of 40/S4 0-2, to Other IstAilliiienoe Agencies
0-2 operates generally in a healthy atmosphere of cooperation and
understanding in its relationship with the other agencies in the intelli-
gence oryammity. The only areas of disagreement which currently exist
stem from the proscriptions contained in certain directives of the
National Security Council. These areas will be discussed in detail
elsewhere in this report.
Interohange of material, practices, and methods enployed, and other
pertinent intelligence information is acoomplished through committee, sub-
committee, and working group =tact*. While this system has become so
oomnlex as to become aa4wet incomprehensible, it does appear to work and
produce results. 0-2 has representation on close to one hundrdd such
groups. Ruch of the effectiveness of this system is achieved through
the media of personal contacts which are naturally generated by such a
system. Material of an urgent nature is usually first disseminated , ?
throughout the community via these contacts so that exchange of such
? data is not delayed until scheduled oommittee meetings. There is positive
evidence of an aggressive willingness and desire among those engaged at
the working level to promote the overall intelligence effort.
,? There are certain attitudes taken by some agencies which have a
tendenoy to interfere with this overall effort, however, and these are
evidenoed in an overextension of the Aneed-to-know" criteria. if this
criteria could be given a "need-to-know-all" connotation, a fuller degree
of mutual understanding would result. It is, for instance, readily
reoognisable that there is an abeaute necessity to protect the specific
identity of an intelligence source. Sommer, the fact that an agency does
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?
hove a mcorosehioh has certain capabilities should be a Netter of
oommon knowledge within the oommunity. This would greatly assist the
collection effort, as then an agency with a requirement in that field
would not have to divert its effort to developing a source of its own.
Also, the ability or the willingness or one agency to protect another 'a
sources should not be questioned. There should to a more positive evidence
of mutual understanding among the agencies than presently prevails.
Army Intelligence Deficiencies
6.
The following items in the overall field of intelligence are of
specific oonoern to the Army.
The lack of positive means to provide early warning is par-
ticularly *outs, espeoially with U. S. forces located on the borders
of the Soviet bloc.
Information is required concerning Soviet ground force and
logistics targets involving the layout of transloading facilities;
stookpiles or materials, quantities, and locations; refinery capahiiities
and mod products; oompoiition, quantitiee? and destinations of shipments;
and security of installations.
The nature of Soviet ground force weapons is unknown, especially
the models and quantities of post World War II weapons and equipment now on
hand or under development.
Detail8 of the order of battle of Soviot and satellite ground
forces are exceedingly rare, their condition of readiness uncertain, and
data on their airborne capability is infirm.
While certain information is known on Soviet conventional doctrine
and training of unite, knowledge of their methods of employment of &timid?
weapons is incomplete.
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Little is know regarding Chinese Commemist forces, par-
tioularly their order of battle, weapons, and-combat readiness.
Very little has been ltiarned regarding USSR mass destryotion
weapons and means of delivery.
There are large areas of doubt concerning Soviet economic
preparation and potential for war in the arms, munitions, and automotive
industries, and the extort of their imports, exports, and storage
Data are not available on Soviet transportation and tele-
oommunication systems, particularly their locations, statistics, and new
*obstruction projects,
Because of Soviet security measures, it is bel'oming increasingly
difficult to oonduct clandestine operations,
Adoptability to Wartime Operation.
Through its reserve componenta, 0-2 is well equirped to expand to
meet therequirehtens of wartime operation. These units are very active
and maintain a capability for making a positive oontribution when called
to active service.
There is a group of approximately .400 reservists who have spectific
mobilisation assignments in he Office of AC/S, 0-2, When placed on
active duty for training purposes, they are assigned to the same duties
they will have in the event of an emergency. In addition, they are kert
current with intelligence problems by working on projects which are
direotly associated with their duty assignments.
Because of the rapid turnover in the Counter-Intelligence Corps,
there is a large pool of ressrveslithish can bdoSilled upon to expand
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that activity. %cases of the type of seemrity'filee maintained by
this Corp., its reservists oan be cheekditmeickly for clearance when
brought on active duty.
A major difficulty, which is recognised by the Army, will be
experienced in expanding intelligence activities in the field of in-
terpreters and interrogators, and, in fact, in the entire "intelligence
specialist" area. A prolect was started to list and classify all U. S.
?Wien, with linguistic capabilities. The cost and extent of the effort
caused its abandonment. In this report, the linguist problem la covered
in the section on personnel.
Sudget
Under the present accounting system, 0-2's Comptroller has cognisance
only of those fundi which aro identified in the Army appropriation for
intelligence purposes. He has no control ot supervision, for instance,
of the fund* disbursed by oertain technical services for intelligence
purpose..
Because of the oomplesity of sources from which financial support
is received, and because intelligence gathering is an overall function
of the Army, it is not feasible to develop a cost for the intelligence
effort without placing a costly and time-coneuming requirement on its
accounting system. The Army is setting up an accounting system based on
the performance budget which, it is anticipated, will produce costs in
this 'area, and which should be in effect by PY 1958.
There are, however, certain figures available which indicate the
order of magnitude of the overall cost. A survey made in 1954, based
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ascertainable oasts, including pay of both military and civilian
personnel,
shows the following costs in the areas indicated,
Collection
$110.6 million
Production
21.2 Pb
Dissemination
Collateral Activities
3.5
Total
S1$5:7
Army Component, Aron
()rand Total
.3,
$137.0
National Intell;gence Surtty
Intelligence which goes into the Army's contribution to this summary
is obtained from all available oollection facilities. It is not possible
to identify any item of information as having been collected solely for
the NIS program, as it may be used also an departmental intelligence
Consequently, there is no accurate record available showing the Army's
tontribution in manpower and fande in any fiscal year to the preparation
of National Intelligence Surveys.
The Production Division (0-2), 'charged with the preparation of NIS
data for the Army, however, haa prepared an analysis which indicates total
manhours, expended and estimated, in the Nis effort, as follows*
Production
Control Section
(Administration)
?ethnical Services
Fiscal Year 1954
?laical Year 1955
butions
Sections
Total
9,109
4,000
890,764
90347,
memaame
tontri-
buttons
Sections
70000
752,748
? Total
1,17h
491,218
5,935
3990546
1,392
567,21,)
110392
6,000
2411/An!
.1,340,183
ammimmilt
Effect of National Security Council Directives
Authority to conduct intelligence activities by the Army at from
the National Security Act of 1947, as emended. Purther amplification of
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this Act and assignment of responsibilities to specific agencies to
avoid duplication of effort are provided through the media of National
Security Council Intelligence Directives (MID) and Director of Central
Intelligence Directives (DCID). To date (December 3, 1954), 16 NSCID's
and 13 DCID'a have been issued, the latter being related to epecifiA
NSCID's and providing details of operation.
These directives range, in date of issue, from 2947 to 1954. They
are issued by the National Security Council and the Director of Central
Intellipence after elonsiderationrby the Intelligence Advisori Coanittes
The Department of the Army issues regulations to direct and...antral
tte intelligence activities based on the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, NSCIM,e, DOIND's, and Presidential and Deportment of Defense
(DOD) directives.
4 ?There does not appear to be any divergence between the Army's intelli
gene* activities and statutory authorisation. There is, however, a
profound disagreemeht between the Army and the CIA over limitations placed
.N11
upon its; the Annyle, intelligence operations under the provisions of two
of the NSCID,s; specifically, map Nos. 5 and U. There is no difficulty\
connected with other NSCIWe or DCID's.
NSCID No. 5 which originally was promulgated on December 12"? 1947,
is currently effective in revised form, with data of issue August 28,-
1951. This directive m!24111.?? the Army from conducting clandestine
operations, giving the responsibility for the collection of all foreign
inteltigenca information to the CIA. When this directive was originally
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limed, the Army almost entirely disoontinued its operatiore in the
foreign intelligence field and relied upon C/A to provide this essential
information. This situation oontinusd until the entrance of the Chinese
Communists into the Noreen conflict. The Army claims that lack of prior
information on Chinese intentions in this regard seriously hampered its
operations mod resulted in the dispatch of the "Ridgway Message" to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, which delineated the military ?amender's problems
and intelligence inadequacies in this area. To provide the necessary
essential information, the Commander-in-Chief, Far Rest (CINCFE) was
compelled, with much difficulty, to establish an intelligence organisation;
setting up schools and facilities to train personnel. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, recognising the disastmus potentialities associated with the
provisions of NSCID No. 5, initiated negotiations between the Joint
Intelligence Committee (the chiefs of the military intelligence services)
and the Director of Central Intelligmoe for the purpose of arriving at a
definitive agreement under the terms of the "agreed /activities" clause of
ISM No. 5, which would establish the conditions, type, and extent to
which the military services might engage in espionage operations.
After considerable effort, an agreement has been reached among the
agencies concerned, which defines and enumerates the extent of the
operations in which the military services may engage under this "agreed
activities" clause. The Army is definitely not satisfied with this
agreement, only the term as the best obtainable solution at
this time. It does "legalise" the Army's activity already in existence
in this area uader the autbority granted by JCS as a result of the
Rragmay message.
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Weever, &j7'?rift position is INA gra.ahm.S.414.0.14...bs ;10-
written to include the authority to. conduct clandestine operations granted
to the Army under Seo. 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, and that acceptance of ISCID NO. 5 in its present fora was
rerntti*tio f the responsibilities placed upon the Army by that Act
and further promulgated in NS= Na. 1.
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Personnel
All military assignments to 0-2 are made by rne Adjutant General
(TAG, in a similar manner as other assignments. There are, however,
within 0-2 lertain key spaces 38 in number - in which 0-2 ha a special
Interest. In these instances, nominations are made by TAG for seect!on
because of apelifi:: indtvid.,e1 requirements.
The qualUy of personnel, with few minor exceptions, is considered
of an exceptionally high order. Based on personal observation of all
officers contaated, they are alert and fully conversant with their jobs.
The personnel assigned in the Attache System is more highly selected, in
a sense, since there are certain specific qualifications which must be met.
The breakdown of the officer personnel assigned in 0-2 indicates a
rank distribution, as of December 16, 1954, as follows:
Authorised
Actual
General Officers
.7?
3
Colonels
34
34
Lieutenant Colonels
109
120
Majors
137
125
Captains
78
64
Lieutenants
0
13
The large cumber in the ranks above captain is due to the deeirebility
of assigning officers to 0-2 who have had field experience. It is
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considered that offioers in the junior grades do not have sufficient
experience to be of real value in such an assignment. Actually, whi.,e
the count shows thirteen lieutenants, the table of organisation does
not include any billets in this rank in 0-2. Those currently assigned
are filling existing vacancies for captains and majors, and are used
primarily in adminiatrative jobs. 0-2 itself is not a training activity
for intelligence officuers, since 0-2's functions are ,zonfined principally
to policy and planning. Officers assigned to 4-2 do undergo a period of
training which is directed to preparing them for 0-2 assignment rather
than for performing operationally.
There does not appear to be any general resentment toward assignment
to intelligence duties. This may be true only in 0-2 itself, but there
is no indication of any servloewida feeling of antipathy. Such feeling
at does exist is considered to be a hangoler from wartime operations when
many assignmenta were wade to intelligence duties solely on the basis of
1...nguage capabilities. The majority so assigned had no other qualificatIons,
yet the demand for translators and interrogators superseded other consider-
ations.
The question of adequate housing facilities does not enter this
picture, except in some isolated oases in the Attache System.
Once personnel have bean engaged in intelligence activities, their
personnel records are marked tc indicate suoh service. They can be
readily identified by TAO td on be made available When necessary so
that they are not lost to tee system. Moist saolor officers do not dsairw
to lose attaahment to their basic branones, but do feel that at intz.14geeve
assignment in beneficial to their career. It is the current poliv to
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rotate officers in and out of intelligence duties, as it is felt the
field experience in their in branch so acquired makes them better
qualified for such duty.
There is a general dearth in the intelligence community of civilian
employees qualified to perform the vital functions of intelligence
analysts. Necessary qualifications for these jobs require extensive
background experience in related subjects. The usual source for this
type of personnel is the teaching profeasion, and only certain areas here
provide the essential background in research and basic knowledge. While
0-2 currently employs a oonsiderabls number of civi;iams in this category
(approximately 150 as analysts or in related functiona), there is a
3onstant demand for more, as all the inLelligence agencies within the
oommunity have a continuing need for their services. This condition of
short supply and heavy demand has led to considerable shifting about by
this class of employee, as higher paying grades for which they can qualify
become avaiable in other swamies. There is no evidence of the presen:te
of proselyting in these cases. The opening un of better jobs is a matter
of common knowledge, and the analysts initiate the Change themselves. If
there was possibility of improving the grade structure, 0-2 eould more
readily aJt*leve a greater permanency of personnel.
The establishment of a milaary intelligence,-....orpe for aareer prArposs.
downol appear to meet with any degree of approval. The general feeling IJ
that, as mention.d above, assignment outside of intellirence is higiily
desirable in order to provide experience in the practical use of intelli-
gence and to imnrase .he individual with the importance of adequate and
timely information. There is an implied fear of such a carve developing i
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into an ni,ory tower? group Ukiah would net generate urea or realistic
intelligence and thus completely fail to meet the Army's requirements.
Lenguage Training Program
Language training for the Attaohe Syetem and the Voreign Area
Specialist Training (PAST) program is condboted at the Army Language
School at Monterey, California. Use is also made of the Naval Language
School in Washington, D. C. Also, the Army conducts language courses for
CIC personnel at AIC, Port Rolabird, Maryland. The following languages
are currently being taUght covering all Army programs, i.e., attache,
PAST, ASA:
Albanian Korean
Arabi. l (Egyptian and Middle Eeat) Norweg1a2
Bulgarian Pzrelan
Chinese (Cantonese and Mandarin) Polish
Czechoslovakian Portugeae
Danish Rumanian
trench Ruesiva
German Yugoslavian
Greek Spanish
Hungarian Swedish
Italian Thai
Japanese Turkish
In addition, there are 82 other languages for which a requirement
may be developed. In these languages, courses, including texts and
nomination of tealhers, are developed so that the traihing can be started
as soon as the need is developed. This procedure only ahortens the
preparation of a linguist by a ?owls of months. It still will require
almost a year to carry out the necessary training.
Language ileums given at Monterey are from one year to forty-six,
montns in length. This is satisfactory for the attache and FAST programat
but unsatisfactory for lAtelligance specialists as it includes too oomprs.
henaive a coverage.
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Current discussions in the Army oancerning lagasse training are
along the following lines;
Eliminate training in writing and reading for oertain categories
of personnel, as the only facility they need is in translating orally into
English. This ;wild permit shortening the oourse or giving more time for
the conversational phase.
Oive complete responsibility for language training to 0-2. This
would place all language interests in one command echelon.
Place a requirement on all MAAO and mission personnel to take
Language courses prior to assignment and continue on-the-job training.
Establish an eighteen month course in Russian which will (since
shortened from forty-six months) put more people through the course.
Obtain more spaces or billets in intelligence activities so that
more people can be placed in language schools. This is a pipeline propo-
sition as the personnel are lost to the system while in school.
Determine, prior to enrollment, whether or not a man selected
for language training is capable of learning a language; i.e., &termini,.
by testing if the training and time will be wasted or fruitful.
There are numerous problems encountered in planning and conducting an
extensive language training program, whi:h should be recognized:
Two-year draftees are difficult to use for language training as
term of service is about up when training is completed.
Draftees are only interested in studying languages for which
there is some market after service. Currently, there is no market for
Russian.
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Due to the reqeiremente of career management, it is difficult
to keen trained personnel in assignments where they can continue to use
the language and so retain facility.
To fully qualify a man in a language, he should live in the
*country in Which the language is spoken. This is impracticable with Russian.
FAST program personnel are sent into %Iasi& at least once as couriers. This
does not provide much help. To really be qualified, personnel must be
intimately acquainted with the language, slang, and idioms. A language
mourns in itself will not provide full qualification in these respects.
There are 106 languages which could be covered. Right now, the
ones to select, besides Russian, as of major importance and on which to
concentrate are questionable.
There is oonsiderable resistance to taking a bil1et away from
combat elements and give it to language training.
A committee was formed amongst intelligence agencies to work out
a plan for listing civilians on a national basis who have a language
capability. This project was dropped because of oomplications that would
be involved in rating capability, the oost of the program, and security
angles College personnel of this type are well known and many already
are miners of the Reserve forces.
ConcltOnnit
From the quantity and quality of the material collected, it is evident
that the Attache System is of vttal importance to the intelligence effort.
There is evidence thst recent enforced reduct."-ote in the nuiher of personrel
assigned thereto have resulted in limiting the effectiveness of this
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important phase of intelligent* collection. The functions and acoomplish-
manta of the Attache System require fuller understanding and appresiatioo
in order to remove external pressures whioh effect reatriationa on its
performances (pp. 105-107).
The caliber of personnel assigned in the Army Attache System and
the standards prescribed for such assignment are satiefactory. The apt=
itself is well administered and controlled. There is pcsitive evidence of
an appreciation of the need for economy ard coordination in operational
functions (pp. 105, 106).
The effort expended in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, on processing individual personnel security oases ts
dileIrcionary in effect and is detrimental to the major objective of that
office; ie., .ollectingt producing, and di3sNaiating intelligence infor
nation (pp. 113? 114).
The Intelligence effort of the Army haa become most comnlex in nat%re
and widespread in interest, requiring the constant attention of those in
authority in order to provide adequate 000rdination within the military
services and the intelligence oommunitY as a whole. These increased re-
sponsibilities and the need for universal TOOOgni-14011 Of the importance
of intelligence indicate a necessity for the elevation of the intelligence
(pp. 100, 119).
element of the Army to a higher echelon in its organisational structure!
The Army has the responsibility under Sec. 102(d)(3), of the National
Security Act off 19447, as amended, and also under the provisions of NSCID
No. 1 to engage in clandestine operations. NSCID 5, tterefore, is,
in e;fect, a tt.al of the Army's capaolliq and statuicry aathcrity
this respect. , The *Agreed Activities" paper is only a partiai recogniticA
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of this responsibility and does not fully permit the Army to meet the
(pp. 122-125).
requirements of this responsibility or the exigencies of the situation /
The Army has a very extensive capability for further exploiting the
defector progremc. but is prevented from doing so by the ieplementation of
the provisions of NSCID No. 13 whioh relate especially to the inducement
aspects of that program, (pp. 125-129).
The collection and. production of intelligence in the Army are
seriously hampered by its inability to attract and retain qualified
personnel primarily in the oivilian analyst category. There is consider,
able movement within the intelligence communityobetween agencies of
personnel in this category, which is a direct result of the provisio-,4a
of civil estrAce regulations regarding clessifioation and the inabWty
of the military services to offer adequate monetary ivducements, 15.. 131).
The major diffioulties in the development of a group of adequately
qualified linguists are time and personnel. Until a long-range program
is developed and accepted by the military, the effort will be small, with
unsatisfactory results and a complete lack of lompetence in this field.
The other a"Aternative is to rely solely on desperation methcds of acquiring
linguiets, in which non-U.S. rationale must be used, with acceptance of
the ettendant risks. It does appear that the Army is CCs7S4:10110 of
language problem, but is not attacking the problem with saffleiett
eer.eseiverees. scOlittrn involres a lcng-r=e prA:grzm fro= whiz:.
immediate results cannot be experJted. (pp. 106, 121, 132-134).
There is no eetablished policy or procedure, per se, in the Army for
the periodi security recheck of personnel assigned in sensitive areas.
(p. 112).
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Recommetdations
? That the Army Attache System be manned to permit full exploitation
of the collection potestial of this mortice. Present ceilings on person-
nel imposed by a Department of Defense directive should be lifted in order
to achieve greater flexibility and permit more extensive prior training
of assigned personnel.
That the Assistant Chief of Staff, Itelligenoeibe elevated to the
level of Deputy Chief of Staff.
4
That the National Security Council revise NSCID No. 5 to provide for
clandeatine intelligence activity on the part of the military services
coneistent with their capabilities and statutory responsibilities undvr
the National Security Act of 1947.
25X1C
That serious consideration be given to more extensive use of Schedule
in the employment of civilian analysts and other intel4igerne speoiaaate,
LI order to prwvIde the ne4essary flexibility in the recr.altment of quali-
fied civilian personnel by the military services, and to fa:All-tate the
itAterhanrm cf such personnel between the Zone of Litericr competAtive
service and the ()renew excepted service.
VS7.1. tbc Arw aggreasireily vit,tack Lbw 11hguist prii,blets by developing
ahd using outeide sources for training in colleges and universities througt.
':J145 medium of, for example, its comprehensive ROTC and Reserve programs.
That a polity be established and measures instituted for the periodic
eecurity rechecking of personnel assigned in sensitive areas at in*ftrireis
nc.t to exceed five years. 137
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ISPARTMENT OF THE at
9litisa_saritnlintalUmugLiMi
The Office of Naval Intelligence is a part of the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. The Director of Naval Intelligence is
designated an Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. Na reports to the
nce Chief of Naval Operations. He also has a direct responsibility to
the Secretary of the Navy.
Under the authority and direction of the Chief of Naval Operations,
the Director of Naval Intelligence is required to administer, operate,
and naintain an intelligence service to fulfill the intelligence and
counterintelligence requirements of the Department of the Navy in order
to:
Inform the Naval Establishsent of the var-making capabilities
and intentions of foreign nations;
Provide the Naval Establishment vith the intelligence needed
for plans and operations;
Warn Naval authority of threats to the security of the Naval
Establishment;
Provide the Naval coutributiome to joint, national, and inter-
nctional intelligence;
Promote the MAXIMO intelligenoe readimoss of the operating
forcos and other oomponents of the Naval Establishment;
Coordinate the intelligence effort of the Naval Establishment;
Develop and promulgate, subject to approval of the iocretary
of the Navy, policies for the protection of classified setter, isoludiag
such policies applicable to industrial security;
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Advise the Chief of Naval Operations concerning all matters
relating to naval intelligence and security policies for the protection
of classified matter
ONI is organized into three divisional namely, Security, Intelligence
Production, and Administration. In addition, there are two staff sections:
a Policy and Plans Coordination Section and a Foreign Liaison Section.
In the field there are three organisations which assist in carrying
out the misaion of the Nave the Naval District Intelligence Offiers,
who are under ONI,s management 'control and who are located in the conti-
nental United States and in certain outlying areas such an Exrtc
Panama. Hawaii, and Alatitt; the Naval Attache System, whi-A: is
OLL juriadiltAcn; and the intelligence orgarilzaclos W-hin ir.103 tcr
afloat, wt1.91, anhnogh directly under their respec.tirt ,7c1nruarers,
under ON/'s tethica't super-visicn.
The primary ftaotions cf the District InteLigance Officers are the
conduct of counteriLtalligence aotivities avd the imn:,cmo:Aation or
security policies. The pAstrict Intelligence Officer nerves oil the staff
of his respective Naval District Qommandatt. and Ln certain designe,ed
diatricts he has additional duty on the staff of the oomma7.4der of the set
fzontier in Which the district is located.
Naval attik:hes and their staffs are offic.Ally a part of ONI, trot
they also have a respolisihiltty to the ambassador or mizister who :Li th4i
of the diplcmatic mission to which they are emir:led, Normal y.
attaches are stationed only in those countries which are of primary naval
interest to ONI. They provtde the major source of overt collection of
intelligencm,
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In the fortis afloat, ea:th area, fleet, type, and task force
commandee, and all flag officers exercising oommand have a staff inte7,A1.
genes aection, This is headed by an intelligence officer who is reepc:Asible
for the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence for the
command and for its couaterintelligence measures; ONI supports their
intelligence requirements and assigns collection missions within their
capabilities to execute.
Policy and Plans Coordination Staff
Working direotly under the Director of Naval Intelligenoe, this mall
staff is concerned with policy matters and the preparation of iLtelligence
plane. It oonsists of three officers and two civilians and is the focal
point for all intelligence matters coming from or going to the Joint
Intelligence Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee. or the National Security Council.
Foreign Liaison Staff
Also working directly under the Director of Naval Ixtelligence, the
Foreign Liaieon Staff consists of five officers, two enlisted men, and
three civilians.
It is the point of oontact for all foreign naval attaches
and members of naval missions for the purpose of keeping those people happy
and away from the intelligence produoers. It is supposed to kncw at all
times the whereabouts of all foreign naval personnsi el,..redited to the.
United States Government. In most oases, this is no problem. However,
the large number of British, Canadian, and Australian naval personnel in
the United States and the very close working relationships that have been
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.114.1?????????/.104?01.0.....
built up through the years of cooperative effort have resulted in a lapse
in Oda knowledge so far as those three countries are oonoercad. This aa
be a serious gap and efforts should be made by the Navy to correct it.
Production Division
The entire problem of the production of intelligence required to
fulfill the mission set forth above is that of the Intelligent,* *mduction
Division, whose organisation is as follomst
INTELLIGENS PRODUCT/ON D/V/SION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OP NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE PMCDUCTION
Executive Assistant,
Production Coordination Stat!
FOREIGN BRANCH
Bead, Foreign Branch
Geographic Section
Technical Section
Medical Section
Amphibious Section
COLLECTION 4 DISSEMINATION BRANCA
Bead, Collection an. Dissemination Branch
Photo and Graphic Section
Collection Section
Dissemination Section
Support Section
ESTIMATSS MANOR
Need, Estimates Brant*
Naval and Joint Estimates and Studies Seotiod
National Intelligence Eitinates Section
NATO Intelligence Section
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ol productioe
in reIatienehip to worldwide staff requirements. The staffing of foreign
pc.7;ts ined pe..sonnel is no.c. only tumconornical. cut.
can also result in the loss of opportunity to collect intelligemea:,
169
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In addition to the service schools, use is made of college
fw;iAt'ios for Iangvage training and specialized Area study requ:..r
m&nte, Training courses are also available for Air Fr.v.:o reeerve
personnel, and considerable effort is made to encourage their partili-
pationo The Air Force intelligence training program (except for language
training) is generally adequate for existing requirements, even in soma
technical areas where a critical need exists and where the attrition im
high. The training program is also susceptible of considerable Expansion
for wartime conditions. It must be noted, however, that the increased
emphasis on slientific applications in the data handling aspect of
intelligence may create a special requirement for qualified personnel
in this field,
Research
The tethological intelligence research program of the Air Force is
a very active one in which every effort IS being made to utilize new
ideas. When a new idea appears feasible of application, it is eXploited
en a crash basis in order to obtain results in as shart,a period as
possible. Through the device of oontraot, the best qualified personnel
available in the country are **played, not only in the examination of
technical problems and the developient of solutions but also in the
analysis of intelligence. This approach has brought about an increased
interest on the part of industry in the application of scientific
developments to the intelligence field.
Recognition of the inadequacy of ourreet collection, filing and
production methods has impelled the Air Force to undertake rommareb
mosimer
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it a matter of common concervi to tt,e
intelligence community. Ultimate solution of these problems may inTolve
the application of such
auUmatic evaluation of
intricate processes as digital computation and
electronic intercepts. The importance of such
solutions to the total intelligence program warrants the establishment of
a central technological intelligence research activity.
Relationship with Othpr Intelligence Agencies
Air Force participation in the intelligence activities of the joint
Chiefs of Staff is accomplished through the Joint Intelligence Committee
and the Joint Intelligence Group. By means cf the Etiiities, the Air
Force cont.ribstee to the production of the Jcjn IAellige,lce Estimates,
There is close relationship between the personnel of the Directorate of
Intelligence and the Joint Intelligence Group. Full utilization is being
made of air irtelligence estimates and studies in the trtegration of
departmental intelligence into Joint Intelligence Estimates. The Director
of intelligence of the Air Force represents the Air Force on the Intelli
gave Advisory Committee of the National Security Council. Through its
participation on this committee, the Air Force actively engages in the
prodection of National Intelligence intimated.
The Air Force has good working relations with the Central Intelligence
Agenoy (CIA). As an example, the CIA provided prompt aid to the Air Porno
in a recent sabotage alert. The CIA also assisted in the production of
oertain publications pampered to meet As specified need. The Air Force
works closely withCIA in the produotion of the National Istaligence
Survey and has attempted to insure the smiling of its ammdtadets throe*
the establishment if an NIS proftetive control stiles.
in
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SLIM
The Office of Special beestigatione represents the Air Pores on
the Interdepartmental Intelligence Waimea. (XIC), which has been
described previously.
The Directorate of Intelligence represents the Department of the
Air Force on the State Defense Military imfermatien Committee (SDNIC).
This committee develops plans and policies with respect to the release
of classified information, including intelligence to foreign oountries.
Personnel
Personnel figures for the Directorate of Intelligence represent the
military and civilian personnel under the immediate oraftrol of the Direotor
of Intellifence. Figures for the Office of Special Investigations represent
personnel in the continental United States.
usslooraworlowitionce
P. 1953 rt 1954 n.12g1
Military Personnel
1151
1132
1111
Civilian Personnel
131.9
123k.
Total
,
2470
2366
2345
Ofttee of AnOOIAVIWOOleatione
ion, of Interior
Military Personnel
Civilian Parsonnel
Tot al
91 A953
1559
639
2198
Fr 1954
rr . 190
1683
1769
7,-6
_ 120
2389
2489
irom an exmaloation of tha various activities and offices cf both
the Directorate of Intelligence and the Office of Special Livestigations,
1.72
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it SAM fouud that personnel were being geed efficiently. No offices
were found to have a noticeable surplus of personnel, either military
or civilian. The distribution of grades appeared to ref Lect the relative
impertance of the activities to which assigned.. Turnover of personnel
was mainly in the lower grades arld is not regarded as excessive. he
:oiler professional A411821 grades there arpeared to be a gocd cor..C.sticn
st.7iery Leinals, position responsibility, educational beckg-ou- and
tape! ier.;ce. the upper it was fouT.d that most axterie,e-J 'haa
been rdved in Government suctrtze, with 81;arp
ane7 er;z,r7 ci tztelligence vork. Con fiLdi.nge it,dllatod a
pl-cm,cf.rz fci ikhla to hIgher 10-eide rattv,x u5ing 'he3e
gr,z,Ine; talent from ouLsick the Gc-foinmant 4 -
A..
zotne relvAacce or; the part of careen- ,e,riice ilarsohnel a, -apt
woe aosignsteits bat:sumo of whai, are regarded ad litaiced
opportui:ic:!_e.1 to the grade of geteral officer in this field,, If greater
latitude were given the Director of Intelligence to Cf loot nerscnnel,
improvement in the attitude toward intelligeme dAy would result, stylus
many of the highly qualified off4...,:ers he would Eleiett c,ould be expt
rea,..h the grade of general of).7.1zer.
The Air Po.,..ce has experienced d.t.fficifty iu pr rome of
qIntlified personnel fcr Latolliptice dutice twcatze
or rice regullons ? Certain lit1i pence ere1-.stri,
ne-7:d great: thystca.1 long experience? are gerally Lshort 6111,1)4,
ELIZ e cfte. reluntaet to be in civil service. An exemption from 6011113civil
r,tquiretarts ahould be provided for limited number,., of such peretor.:th).
173
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/ ?
It is believed thst a bard Or esmassism AMA seisib41601 ie IMO
tediable aMaftlettlatad fleatiea s bitaitigenee agenetes
of seck wooded"' spaces, however, the Li?. Por is not allowimg re.
structive influences in civil-service procurement of top-flight selentifie
personal to *uteri advanced development projects. Utilisation of special
personnel, moored sucossefUlly by oontract with manegement
organisations, is proving effective.
' All potential intelligence officers should be given epportumities
to am in the intelligence field.
MOdgal
110 attempt has been ads to determine the overall oost of intelli.
geode for any of the services because the costing of combat intelligence
add have been a task beyond the oopooity of this task force. Accord-
iegly, action we. taken to obtain budget and expenditure isformation
for those intelligence activities mhicih are the direct reeponsfbility
of the Director of Intelligence and the Director of the Offios of Special
Investigations. Indirect expenses are 'minded. Separate figures mere
Obtained far the Directorate of Intelligence and the mum of Speoial
Investigations, based on direct cost operations for the fiscal years
1953 and 1954 and estimated for fiscal year 19551
.
cod Costs
Direlarrou
pititaLlizenne
x of Palms
PI 1912 U-1214 11-2,911
Military Personnel
$ 7,425
$ 7,306
$ 7,191
Civilian Personnel
Other
5,514
?LIM
5,390
-.0.411..
5.467
_Lim
Total
$21,46.0
$20,821
$21,475
1.74
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0 0%)
8,115
4Tiett sontr61* eaglet 111 the Air Pores in the uses of funds made
available for intelligent* ptrposes, particularly with respect to the
contingency funds of both the Directorate of Intelligence and the Office
of Special Investigation*. txpenditures are reviewed by either the
Director of intelligenoe or by the Deputy Inspector General before they
are finally submitted to the Socretery Of the Air Aired for anfiroval.
The :Letelligence activities of the Air ram, ate taped on directives
of the National Security Council and inotimeentiog directives of the Director
of the Central intelligens* Alency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
intelligence goals, proenlgated by the Director of Intelligence, provide
the current guidance for the Air Pore in meeting both departmental and
national intelligence requirements. The Air Force is satisfied with the
national intelligence objectives now in effect and guides its ?et
operations accordingly. Malefaction is also expressed with the contents
of DC/D 5/1, Coordination of Foreign Clandestine Collection Activities,
which will allow the Air Force to take greater advantage of the inherent
oollection nottntial of Air Pores overseas commands.
Music Observation* ConsernIng Air tore. Imtelligence
The irtaillivi.nce 0-ffort of the Air Forco 1: ctaractorlzod by creohial-
asa and frankness. There is realisation of the extreme importance of the
elk
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time eldrOMMi to iho Ait /mei thsto it it will in P.M* iodheitaal
methods or collection and prodnetion of ihtellifinedi Bignifieentlt
deficient is the supplI of intelligemoe regarding the Soviet Air tarsi
sad air technological areas. NUch additional information is needed on
the auselan air order of battle and air methodology. Little is Mame
About air aottviky an the airfields in the interior of Russia. The
defector prOgrim teem sasnesesstul in siourlog defectors poesessing
high-level knowledge of the Russian air effort.
ii00121,1gOli
Due to the fact that many &weer personnel consider that there ard
limited promotional opportunities in intelligence, a reluctance to estef
this field is apparent among such officers (p. 173).
In order to obtain the services of topw.flight civilien intellig4240
specialists Who cosmos great technical skill and long experift00, theri
is a need for exenptias from some of the civil-servioe requiremente
(p. 173).
lased on the difficulty experiemoed by the Air Force in the proOdrio
meet and retention of certain intelligence specialists, an allocation it
personnel spaces exempt from some civil-worries requirements aordes thd
intelligence oommmnity should prove helpful (pp. 173, 174).
The increasing isportanee of Intelligence to the encoessful
eccomplishment of all air operations demands that the prestige of VOA
function and the personnel involved be raised to a level vhioh will
encourage full cooperation, opportunity., and develorment (pp. 157* 154.
BUM
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The oolleetion potentisl of ettembi eteliaitiebeeld be enploited
to the utmost. The collection potential of many attache posts cannot
be fully realised unleee tho posts are manned by adequately trained
pereenmel, especially lingplets. lisonmaies have been demanded in terms
St fade, personnel, net.. vebioles, and aircraft, which will probably
have a detrimental offset on the sellaction potential of the Air Attache
System (pp. 162, 163, 169).
The Air Toros has become involved in technical research projects of
an intelligence nature which could well be the responsibility of a central
agency, as some of the devices or ideas being developed have AA overall
application to the intelligence community. (pp. 170, 171).
Present methods of declassifying technical information are permitting
too mueh information of intelligence lulus to appear in public print. The
control. of declassification of material or technical information should be
strong enough to retain for our country the full value of our teohnical
advancement. Control of such declassification when vested in one man is
undeeirehle. (pp. 166, 10).
There are many Air Force intelligence publications which contain
some sensitive material. In view of the worldwide distribution made
of some of these, a significant security risk is involved. (p. 163).
Because of the great volume of raw information flowing into our
intelligenca 44aciss, wawa, riling systems do not give reedy souses
to ihformstion previously filed. The imoressingly critical nature of
the time element makes it imperative that processing of intelligence be
dome in 4 minima period of time. The application of automatic demised
?
in
Pr. wok
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de:
to moceplidh Tig66 jr00.066MgelmOOMPlIA Offer greet peeibilitiee
(P. 160).
Due to somaterleaftres, it is hemming imosasingly difficult to
collect raw intelligence in the Soviet-bloc area using traditional -
methods. This .he. it lamdatory that all possible resources be utilised
to exploit filly them techmolagieal mans for intelligeme oolleotimn
.
lid& are nee available or uhleh ean be developed. (pp. 160, 163).
On momat of the difficulty encountered in the oollection of raw
intelligence fres the Soviet area, it appears that calculated risks Should
be taken when the information *ought is so vital that the cost in risk is
aot exoessive. The nes_of "ovorflighta" to secure Bubb information
_deserves constant consideration. (p. 160).
- The standards of proemial Mentity achieved through oceplienca with
Inecotive Order 104,0 should be preserved (p. 165).
AmmosmisSimma
That the organisational position of the Director of Intelligente
of the Air Force be raised free its present position to that of a Deputy
Chief of Staff.
That a linited miher of civilian personnel spaces for Air Force
intelligence be emempt from some civil-oerrice requirements.
That a board or conniesion be mtablished to maks an equitable and
coordinated allocation among the intelligence agencies of porsonrel
spaces exempt from some oivil-eervice requirements.
That the Air Attache System be maintained at a level whiCh will
insure an adequate collection capability and that air attache qualifi-
cations, so& as baokgroend, interest, and language training be
vs
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ommerirrat.;.: with the collection potential of the statr,
That an Intelligence demure/1 Center be eatabliiihed under the CIA
4
to guide the total intelligence research progran.
That a board be established for the supervision of security de-
classification of material or information. .
That a periodic enamination be made of Air /force intelligence
publications to assure justification for both the pObliostion and distri
? button thereof.
That mechanical and electronic devices to analyse, classify, file,
and pro4duce intelligence information be put into use at the earliest
possible moment.
That all possible resources be used to exploit technologieal means
for intelliyence collection.
That the use ofnoverflights" to secure vital Information receive
constant consideration.
That the Department of the Air Force develop adequate procedures
for the periodic security review of personnel occupying sensitive positions.
rf?
007212 ?MATIONS
ONPASTNINT ov MIMS
In 1948 the National Security Council issued ISCID Md. 5. It
assigned to the Central Ietellipence Agency the exelesive responsibility
for all espionage and eoustarespionsge activities outside the gpegraphleal
limits of the United'Otates and its poseeesione, essept for sash elfudber."
letollAgftmoe aetivities of the servieee as isre assessarip to admirals the
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security of their (440404e eatehliehmants.'t. *WO* eleasee were included
in the charge given the Central Intelligemce Agency Which would permit
the military services to perform certain agreed activities. During the
negotiations prior to the approval of this directive, there was consider-
able discussion as to the meaning of the terms "oounterintelligence" and
counterespionage."
It soon became apparent to the services, especially to theater
*amender., that the CIA concept of its espionage targets would not
bring in the information needed by those commanders to accomplish their
missions. In addition, theater commanders were not satisfied with the
provisions of this directive because it gave an organizatioa, over which
they had no control, authority to operate in their areas of oommand
without their control, knowledge, or direction. They were required to
give logistic support to the Central Intelligenoe Agency, but could not
serve their intelligence requirements on the local representative of the
Central Intelligence Agency and expect a response if those requirements
differed from those assigned by the parent organisation. Also, infor,
mstien colApeted by the Central Intelligence Agency did not come directly
to the commander from the local representative. The raw information
collected in his area was sent to the Washington headquarters of the Ott,
where it was evaluated and then sent out to the theaters, a process
sometimes reqyirirg emilch as a month or six tme,c.s.
In 1550 action was initiated to spell out the agreed activities
which the services could perform in these fields. In 1951 the Director
of Central Intelligence by direct negotiation with the Secretary of
TOT $10411ff
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Def.,,Lse. and without the participation of the Intelligente Advisory
Conmitec, received approval and effected the promallation of additiona
paragraphs in 'a revised =CID No. 5. These paragraphs spelled out and
in some measure corrected the relationships between the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the field and the theater comnanders,but did not spell
out the *agreed activities', which had been the conoern of the service
intelligence 'shiers for some time. Under the authority granted in
paragraph 10 of this directive, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, took
? command of and directed that part of the CIA collection operation which
was intended to support his military mission in the Far East Command.
Is did not have authority to direct, nor did he attempt to do so, other
3entra1 Intelligence Agency's operations from his area, since some of
the operations were in supcort of the national intellirence mission of
the agency; he was informed of these operations to the extent believed
neceseary by the CIA representative.
because of the ;soit, of information being furnished to the theater
eomaanders by the CIA, and because of the delays inherent in the system
of delivery of the information to thus, the commanders, both in Europe
and the Far last, felt it neoessery to conduct clandestine oollectioe
operations of their gem. These operations were in contravention of the
Security Council directive. Local represeee.atives of the CIA were aware
of the existence of these programs, as myths Director of Central
Istelligemoe sad the servioe intelligence chiefs. Also, daring this
? period, megotistiems were going am in ma effort to melt agreement on
ghat slam imbemded by the ?agreed eetisitiese *Leh the eertimet rem
embhirlied to porter* in this MIL
?
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It was net until November 22, 195k, that agreement was reached on
this document. It was finally promulgated as DCID 5/1 on January 11,
1955. The wording of the directive is not fully that desired by the
Army and Navy intolligenoo Shies, inasmuch as it can be interpreted to
give the Director of Central Intelligence a veto power over any and all
actions in this field if be wishes to use it. There is also a question
of whether this paper spells out the emoeptions in the field of counter-
espionage as it does in the field of espionage. Time has not been
available to allow exploration fully into the needs for such a directive
in the counterespionage field; and it may be that an agreed definitim in
the glossary of terms recommended elsewhere in this report :uipm define the
terms ",Jounterintelligence" and "counterespionage" so as to make sLch
directive unne(Assary; for, in flot, it seems that the dirficul:py huro
lies in a difference of opinion as to the meaning of the twc terms.
Other ?overt activities concern participation in "hot" and "cold"
War. MC 10/2 was ism's& in 1948 and superseded by MC 5412 in March
1954. In this paper, the IOC recognised the authority of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff over "hot" war operations and made the Director of Central
Intelligence responsible for "cold" war operations and preparatory covert
measures in peace to support military operations in time of war.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
alum the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no operational authority or
function, they have been concerned only negotiations on directives
in the 1le1d of intelligence irtormation by ?overt means.
in ether areas, although not specifically contained within the
definition of eistalligoacis ae used by the task force, throe fields
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emerge which most be considered in mg diseussion of covert intelligence
activitiSs. These are unconventional warfare, evasion and escape, and
resistance.
Responsibility for unconventional activities was assigned to Central
Intelligenoa Agency by SSC 10/2 in 1940 and redefined by SSC 5412 in
March 1954. Al a result of SSC 5412, Annex 8 (Guerrilla Warfare) to the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (the basic war plan of the United States)
was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1954. NO consultation
or referral to the Central Intelligance Agency was effected until after
it was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time that the
annex was dispatched to the theater commanders, as a basis fr.,r them
contrasts their war plans, two copies were sent to the Cearal Istel:iganca
Agency for information in order that this Agency would know what planning
was to be expected from their representatives at the theater level.
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff actions, worked out in consonance with
the Central Intelligence Agency, defined the command relationships in
wartime at theater levels on the principle of a "Fourth Force," so that
theater commanders would have under their command .Army, Navy, and Air
Force assets assigned to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Central
Intelligence Agway force assigned by that agency. Definitions of the
terms ueed in NBC 5412 were pOblithed. The Air Force was rade the
ft:et-Aire agent of tho Joint Chiefs of Staff ca awasion ard &deep*.
The Army was designated as the department with primary interest in
unconventional warfare. Resistance remained the responsibility of the
Central Istelligence Agency in war, as well as in peace.
183
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Under the declaim contained in NIC 5412, it became the responsj.
bility of the Central Imtelligenoe Aaency to prepare a base on which
evasion and escape and unconventional warfare can be expanded in time
of var. So far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff know, this is not being ,
done in areas now under Soviet or satellite oontrol. Since the planning
responsibility for actual operations has been delegated to theater .
commandere, it follows that the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not *need to knew*
actual assets or the minutiae of plains but should know whether or not
action is being taken to fill theater oommandere2 requirements. The
theater ocumenders, however, and certain members of their staff, mast
ky,cw what and where the assets are, when they can be tasd and their
capability so as to plan their effective use. In addition, certain
mmabers of the planning staffs in the Army and the Air Force must he
aware of the current statue of these assets in order that they may plan
and provide for wartime operations when military commanders aasume
' military staffs in Washington.
At the request of the Army member, the Joint Chiefs of Staff direvted
the theater commanders to report a realistic estimate of the guerrilla
potential behind the Iron Curtain and in the peripheral states to be
expected on D-Dey and for each six months un to D -,- 24 months. For eaah
of one Iron Curtain countries, the D-Day potential reported was 0, whi3h
indi.catee a lack either of information on the ort of the comnandera cr
of action on the part of CIA. Thie is of eir.e4.we !borr7y. to t!.!-., Arn7 :.7ttff,
irosm;Ach
as Annex B to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan states as
one of its basic principles, "Guerrilla warfare will be uzeu to the maxim
from D-O onward.*
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S4-1.112.10ht 0....AbLeg
In the Aron staff supervision over (overt operations is divided
between 0-2, 0-3, and the Psyohologioal Warfare Division. 0-2 is
responsible for staff control over intelligence collection, natters
perteining to cover for CIA, and Army intelligence interest in evasion
and escape. 0-3 is responsible for general staff supervision over the
activities of the Psysholegical Warfare Division of the Special Staff.
The Psychological Warfare Division is responsible for staff control over
guerrilla warfare.
Intelligence Collection
On July 30, 1951, the Intelligence Adviscry Committee by Directive
28/1 established a subcommittee to be known as the Interagoncy Priorities
Coamdttee. The membership is the sans as that of the Intellivnce
Advisory Committee, except that there is no representative of the Joit
Staff. It appears that this omission is proper, in that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have no operating functions and this committee has operational
authority contained in its charter.
The mission of this oommdttee is to determine the information requiime-
mints to be colleoted by clandestine means; to prepare and maintair a
listing of those clandestine collection targets deemed to have a priority
status, reflecting each agency** interest; and to divert capabilities to
higher priority targets fron those of lower priority when such diversion
is indicated. Prior to the saweasion of this mission, the general terms
in which the national intelligence objectives were written did not provide
the moose:try guidance to the intellifence coessusity. Through the
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plhli,',,nr,Tet of this committee, hoverer, and see a result of itr
? deliberations end programs, more specific objective, have been determined
and publithed.
In spite of the accomplishments of the Interagency Priorities
Committee, the Army is concerned over the lack of infornation from the
C/A as compared to its mon oollactien achievements in certain area*.
The Army feslalthatlf it *ere not restrainedby existing directives
it would be able to 0011;4 more of the information that it needs from
Europe. This confidence appears to be based upon the fact that the type
of informetion the Aimy is trying to collect is much more easily obtainable
than is the type of information that CIA is attempting to collect.
In the Tar East the situation is different, largely due to the
characteristics of the people who must be used to do the collecting, and
the fact that this was an area where U. S. troops were in action.
The Army is conoerned with two other clandestine collection efforts.
The one in Thailand is purely a Thai effort. Personnel assigned to the
0-2 section of the MAW are assisting in trai4ing Thai staff and operational
military personnel in military intelligence practices and teohniques. Some
et the.. trainees in turn operate en intelligence collection apparatus for
the Thai Ariy, furnishing the United States Army with copies of the entire
Ash*. The emtift operation, with the efteption,of the instruction and
:advice furmiebed by the Mita, is supported by th? Thsi Army - men, sow,
and risk.
A plan sounersing elendmotine operations in iron las weed to oa
Jim* 26, 19,5, Ana ditaasailma.' *di 10101, 1044m0a4r.
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!ft)P MAN,
selieted lentimieffieere mill be sent to the limited States for training
in clandestine intelligence practioes and techniques at the Army's
Intelligence Center at Fort Mblahird, Maryland. At the completion of
this training, they Mill return to Iran and operate Irviitn agents, .
using U. S. Army menstary support, into the adjoining areas of the USSR,
starting About November 1, i955, for the benefit of both the U. S. and
Iran. U. B. knowledge of activities in these areas is very limited; these
areas are, in fact, a primartarget fres the intelligence point of view and
are easily aoceesible.
The Army has been operating nlandestine collection efforts it darmanyo
Austria, and the ler East for a nueber of years. The coafidential funis
end the Manpower expended and programmed in all of these rfforte for
fiscal years 3.953, 1954, 1955, and 1956 total $6,203,1.12 and an arerage
of 931 manyears.
25X1C .
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ror now
guidon and teespe
The Army has three interests in evasion and escape prooedurest
traiAlag, debriefing, and a special CIA program.
Training in evasion smd escape is serried on as part of 411 'ahoy
training wider the oomtimsmtal Army oommsod, sad coasIsts IA WAWA, 0
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tha will of the soldier to evade if eat off x_nd eellape if i-aptured;
survival. training i.e a norm' part of the field training of the soldier.
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Cover and Deception
Ccoer and derA.ption measures for military operrnAone were exclude:
from the :ipossures char.ged to the Central Intelligence Agency ty Octii
MSC 10!,, and MSC 5412. They are strictly military measures whl'h will
be p4nried qnd put into operation by the military commandet4 as part of
their mi)..1xy plans. If any theater commander shr,uld include in him
mfer and de::eption plans the use of any "double .i..gent" under the direetien
of an element of the Central Imte6ligence Agenely,not i.der 1711,!,,stt.Ir
these al14:ic.4,b mast be worked cut between the fcL Chlefe of Staff
the Director of Central Intelligence at the Washington lovel.
Guerrilla Warfare
The Any is assigned "primary interest's ese.Ag the services in matters
oiLIA samperilla warfare. The stafi function in this field is
assigned to the Psycholegical Warfare Division of the Army Sposial Staff)
under tha general staff guidance of the Assistant Chief of Staff. 0.1.
:t is, thsrefore, the reeponeitdlity of the Chief of the PaychoUsgical
Warfare Divisicso to prepare the military plans for the Army in this field
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train, and disrot(.h t.O the th,E:1rs in 4(40-1,1.4e-
!
the reil wno ars to perforM thie fthc-,-.1on in time Qf war.
Reepor:nibllities assigned to the CIA i:lolude the developme:it
reAstance mcvemente behind the Iron Cueoala and the preparation for
rewistame movemerts in nelgrAbort.:g zouiltriea which are under threat of
invesion,, These will be used to support guerrilla operations ih timo
of war.
There ib -grave concern expressed in the Psychological Warfaro Diion
that theater ?mmmanders are not beiag fully informed by CIA repre6er!,e-
tisPes_of their unconventional warfare assets and planned operations:
This
concern is based upon the followingi
Meagerness of asset* set fOrth in plans ailomad by the i,he4Ater
oemmanders in accordance with JCS instructions,
Complmte lack of information on the part of theaff at the
ilkehi4ton cliarged by JCS with staff supervirio,.
far this type cf opsrationa in war.
"""wassimull",*
At tha present there are some 53 traiaed U.S? officers and me:. in
MOM who are available for warUme implementeion of theater plan,' ff
guerrilla warfare. These men are mposed to perform deep ponetratioa
missions, with mid in support of assets developed by C/A and the
"retardatioa" mission Of the coemander in Burope, The Army does not know
terio'a.ar the :circa is largo otio4h1 properly equipped, or accompiftened in
the appropriate language. There arc an additl.onal 1700 officer and
at Fort Bragg undergoing training preparatory to dispatch to the theaters.
The Army believed that there is,eome fault on both sides in the
development of programs and plans in this field. Thi 4 is particularly
193
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tree it ildtalmbere there his been Sae. dragging of military feet in
providimg the CIA With t4rgets to be covered. In Addition, the initlai
requirement called for the preparation of a tremendous number of targets
for sabotage, a number fir beyond any reasonable expectation of accomplish-
_sent.
1JLtbS
Staff respenetbility for eovert operations of the Navy is issigne4
to the Office of Havel /utelligence for intelligence collection, intern-
genes support in evveios and escape matters, and cover; Fleet Operations:.
deadlines Division for evasion and escspe equipmano; and Aviation Trait-ng
Division for training in evasion and escape.
Intelligence Oollectiou
The Nary has only one clandestine collection effort in operation,
which is in Germany and is monitored by the interdepartmental Collection
Committee (Germany) (IMO), under the chairmanehip of the senior CIA
representative. The operations are limited to naval targets in the .
'outs/ areas of East Germany, Mimi', and, to a small extent, in Poland.
financial outlaw is of the nature of $20,00c
the lary has 'er' recently sent to its commanders in the field the
content of the *Agreed Activities* paper. The Implementing instructions
iseiside a requirement that eonection effort be limited strizt17 to
asexcre cor navailesestel) interest. Any ?vomiting plans in this field
be SOL to the Chief at Naval Operations for approval before
hdp4ocentlaie setion is Wm* le saltine to the intelligeneo eolleative
thelMNOOdene direst egger4e to the development of swielits
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121.11MMI
sot ssespe information sod the pralines tat sssiftenas in aosetil
&Mae where ersdere or escapers may seek refuge. This latter activity
cannot be construed to be within the meaning or intent of the "Agreed
Activities," a fact which is recognized by the working level of naval
intelligence. However, since all plans at be arproved by the Chief
of Naval Cperationa before any action is taken, satisfactory negotiations
with CIAm,..4y resolve any problem when or if they arise. The Navy issued
the st4 imatruutions because of a 1a4 of any information that suf,h assets
haTe been or will be deueloped by CIA, and, therefore, re)t it nr,at go
/Lead oo its own.
The L.,srageny Prtoritiem (,:omml_ttme is Na0.1.4faer.!"4
a of it oiss)oa. Statistics deverped by the NC.7V iiiliCate, that
reoeliod from CIA in rr-Jsoouse to 1PG reque3:,s ,tomas irom three
T-AtscAlts: "official" - mexliAg :Arrangement with friendly go-rem-
souro4m; "escapees and &Sectors"! and "others" ? weaning,
thielgs,
(runny
ALBANA
' BUIGARIA
aZIMUSLWAILEA
HUNOARY
POLAND
RUMANIA
OUR
ti. S, cLandestine aollectitw.
SOURCE INFORMATION
These
stateticm arc:
: NAVAL MEREST
TOTAL : OFFICIAL
and
DIFECTORS OTHERS
17
12:'
19
..,
' '4
7:57
1!0
49
45%
49%
)2%
59%
54%
14%
47%
17
84
57
41
f..,
' ;3
34
45%
35%
37%
32f
;,3%
4.7/
3$(
_ 4././.01e..-
' i
.?
/I
??????????????
4
a
-,-
70%
25X1C
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"..1.11,931t
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?OP MAW
With the Approfti st the piper on agreed aetivities, implementing
*Aim os a direetive on the sehjest of sourcecontrol, papereills, and
fabricators, issued by the Intelligence Advisory Committee in the summer
of 1952, becomes more necessary than ever. At that time, agreement was
reaohed and a directive issued (IAC-0-54 dated July 24, 1952), recognising
the need for some means of control by listing the people who were being
used as clandestine agents. Satisfactory arrangements have been worked
out for a community listing of "papermills and fabricators" who have been
exposed As such, but no source controls. have been established. In the
meantime, the services in Europe have developed a cooperative system of
control of sources. In the Far East all oollectora in Korea, except CIA,
are cooperating, and the services have a control system for all of their
operations. CIA contends that because of the requirements of the National
Security Act of 1947 and Ptiblic Law 110 of 1949 it cannot cooperate.
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Ifteion and 1114ape
Navy iatereste and protlsis. in this field parallni those of the
Air Force. There is some overlap -in training and intelligence production.
The first is acceptable; the other seems unnecessary. CINCHUR assigned
certain oountries to CINCNELM for the production of E & E intelligence
briefs and an order of priority on then. CINCH= did not have the
production eapability and, therefore, forWarded the ilogndreieet to ONI.
Thus far, an has produced briefs on Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey,
and is now working on Greece, with Albania, Hungary, and two others still
to go. The U., S. Army and Air Force in Europe have Also been assigned
areas to aoser- for the same purpose. It is expected that CINCPAC Vil
assign areas to his subordinate eohelons in the same faehion as was done
in Europe, 1r doing so, he should oonsider studies alread7 available on
Korea, Marto-S-0-U, part of Siberia, and Indo-China, and the fact '..hat At
Force is producing similar studies at the Air Uiliversity.
CIA claims that it t, nnecessazy for anyone outside of its own agency
to know of its assets in the fields or escape and evasion at this time.
.Not tOo long ago the Cdmmender4.Sixth Fleet, was given a set of sealed
laUiinotions to be opened only. in the event of war, which would provide
materiel to be usedNin'pilot briefings. CIA has refuaed to provide the
Nav*.with_inforeation !Cr briefing pilot. 46 are to maks "overflights,"
baiing.ti,3 refusal ?lithe ground, that to sacriZi;e: the cots for the sake
, I -
Of the one or two men making such overflights is not justified when those
nets night ultimately save-many. more pilots in of war. Mid is the
.only fine indication available to the Navy at t level of the
possible salttenoe of any CIA. assets in this field.
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11111kor
Defertment of the Air Fore*
Staff responsibility is assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence
for intelligence collection to the Directorate' of 12Ano
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for evasion and *soaps measures and the Air Force interest in guerrilla
warfare and resistance movements, and to the Office of Special Investigations
for any required investigations. The relationship of the Air Ferce with
the CIA in the field of covert operations is by far the best of the three
military services.
Intelligence Collection
The Directorate of Intellipence is new in the clandestine collection
field, having been given this responsibility in August 19514. Prior to
198
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that time, clandestine collection has been handled, by the Office of
3peoia1 Investigations. The Change was made because the director of
this latter office found that he had insufficient investigators both
to Wiled intelligence and carry out his investigative mission. Also
the lack of definitive *Merit)* or directive to collect intelligence
made it difficult for him to support demands for men and m6ney to do so.
Two major collection operations are in progress: one in support of
the Air Force commander in Europe, and one iA support of the Air Force
ow:wonder in the Far East. In bath areas, the operations are targeted
at obtaining information to support the mission of the =mender concerned.
When,served on the commanders, ocllection requirements of the Departmer
ot the Air Force receive a lower priority than the requirements of the
command.
Funds have been programmed for fiscal years 1955 and 1956 in the
total amount of $1,242,000.
The Air Force considers that the plans and programs of the Inter-
agency Priorities Committee (IPC) are satisfactory, except that the results
received therefrom are inadequate.
Defeotore
The Air Force considers the direotIvec under which defector operation:
are conducted to be adequate. Performance under the directives leaves
much to. be desired, becauee of the extreme secrecy restrictions under
which these operations are conducted.
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ftesile sod Snaps
The evasion. and escape problem is divided into six areas of major
concern in the IAP. These are training, equipment, briefing material,
S organisations, requirements for clandestine facilities, and actions
es exesetive spot for JOS on joint lervibe matters, which are discussed
Training
The Air Force is running a Survival School boated it Stead Air
Fon* BOB& in Nevada. All pilots and crew webers will eventually go
through one of these courses, each of which is of two weeks duratit3u.
The emphasis of the school is ou survival, which is considered an essential
part of evasion and escape. The program contemplates whole crews will
take this course together to teach them to work as a group. Est:abates
indicate that about 70 percent of the SAC orews have been trained, with
a oonsiderably smaller percentaae of completion in other uommands,
Survival training also appears in the training schedules of all Air
Force combat units and theater commands to include, where time is available,
field agonises.
Since the Korean incident, there is a very active training program
toward resistance to interrogation. The program has been developed,
giving maximum consideration to the Communist techniques and methods
learned from returned prisoners of war, as well as to the proitaions 11"
of the Geneva Convention.
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laristimitilsberWle
In addition to the regular mission material for bristles pilots,
oertain other information forE&Ibrisfings is obtained from intelli-
gence activities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Form,
Department of State, and CIA. The collection requirements for this
program have been issued and some material has been collected.
The Air University is now in the'prooess of developing, country by
country, I & I manuals which are being distributed to commands concerned.
When asked if the MIS would do the job, it was stated that there was some
information of value contained therein, but Essentially it was not detailed
enough to fill the need. Although there is some overlap, the Air
University manual program was not a complete duplication of the NIS.
Collection requirements for information on security measures within
areas to be overflown originate in the theaters, and the production of
the required identification cards or papers is the responsibility of the
theater concerned. It is not known whether the oredentials can be
produced in the desired quantity.
Evasion and Escape Organisations
In ecoordance with JCS 1969/26, the Air Force is limiting its plans
and crograme in this field to strictly overt operations.
ue
The Ai!4agSsJce, a function of MATS, is the principal organi-
zation working lLe.ld. Plans are being carried out for the
designation of areas behind the Iron Curtain from which downed aviators
can be retrieved.
In addition, authority has just been received for the organisation,
training, end preparation of military E & IS teams which will be drocped
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aim
1m4o Nage email as they are developed for use ea target areas for
damaged aircraft. These teams are also intended to provide assistance
to any escaper or evader who makes his way into the area concerned.
This program is much the same as the Army plan for the use of
penial forces. Each may well be used in oonjunction with the other.
Requirements for Clandestine Facilities
Again, in accordance with JCS 1969/26 and in support of SAC war plans,
certain requirements for clandestine E & E facilities were placed on CIA
by USAF through the agency of Joint Strategic Plana Division (JSPD) in the
fall of 1953. The CIA has been reporting periodically as to progrseg
made in filling these requirements. In addition, theater air commanders
have placed and are placing requirements on the local CIA senior repre-
sentative.
As !Monti,. Agent for the JCS on E & E Matters
The Air Force has been designated as the executive agent for the JCS
on E Ii I natters. As such, the USAF is developing joint doctrine, training,
tactics, and equipment. At present a manual is in the coordination stage
among the three services, which is basically acceptable to all, and when
published will be the first in its field.
In only one area, Alaska, is the Air Force in actual operation-in
25X1X4
the E 4 E field.
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WINK
Guerrilla Warfare
The Air force's interest in this program is twofoldt
The furnishing of targets at theater level which, if destroyed
by guerrilla means, mill help the Air Force in the accomplishment of its
assigmed missions; and
The provision of air transportation, through the facilities of
the Air Resupply Groups, to deliver and resupply Army ftmoial Forces
teams and Air Force Military I & I teams.
OonaluOions
The approval and promulgation of the "Agreed Activities" paper,
authorising service commanders to conduct approved clandestine collectin
operations essential to the execution of their missions, permits the
exploitation of service capabilities in the clandestine collection field.
(p0.179-182, 185-181, 19k, 195)
Tha services, particularly the Navy and Air Toros, are not taking
full advantage of their clandestine collection capabilities. Targeted
operations under the program of the Interagency Priorities Committee
have not produced results sufficient to the needs. (pp. 186, 187, 194, 199)
? There is a need for the establishment of a central registry of
alandostine agents in accordance with IAC Directive No. 54 in order to
prevent dtplication of pant and false confirnation of information.
Action in this respect is being delayed due to agency reluctance to
disclose sources. (p. 196)
The directives and operating procedures concerning the defector
pregrastre adequate and appropriate. *Waver, cooperation in the field
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MUM
and the implamentetion of the propel allb be inorgiest, partiesiarly
concerning the inducements which can be offered overt defectors (walk-
ins). (pp. 188, 189, 196, 199)
Zither C/A has been unable to develop andalainteiniguslWcesets
in the evasion? &ad 'save and guerrilla' wart . or is furnishing
inadequate information to the services oonoerni ts use ueh a
coalition can only result in duplication of effort, inadequate planning,
and failure in operation. (pp. 183, 184, 189, 192-194, 197, 201, 202)
Recommendations
That under the terms of the "Agreed Activities" paper, the services
expand their clandestine oollection efforts with primary emphasis focused
on targets in the Soviet Union and Communiart China. Personnel and funds
to accomplish this objective should be made available to the military
intelligence services.
That the intelligence community establish adequate and positive'
measures for the identification and listing of all clandestine operators,
as provided in the IAC Directive No. 54 approved July 24, 1952. Mutual
trust regarding the divulgence of intelligence sources should b. cultivated
within the community.
That the defector program, including inducement policies, early
access to the defector and prompt &Lamination of the use to which he
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=Mit
Is to he yeti he Improved, with the ob3eotives of making defection more
sktOsetive and et derivingivester benefit for the entire intelligence
sommomity.
?hat the military serviced be permitted greater latitude in offer-
ing indessemets to potential defeeters.
110 the National Security Council review present assets and direct
the peeeseery action to assure adequate preparation for evasion and
end support of guerrilla warfare.
205
. To? samar
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TOP SECRET
4-. --* .
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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
CIA CONTROL NO..
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?..4... ?
COPY NO. LLA, .
LOGGED BY
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ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until st,ch time as it
is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control
personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive
and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand
columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
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REFERRED TO
r 2
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SEEN BY
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NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate
spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
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FORM NO. 2a
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TOP SECRET
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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
CIA CONTROL NO. ,
C 5 36-
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
i
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LOGGED BY
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ATTEJi/TION: This form will be top
placed on Ef and attached to each ret document received by the Central Intel
ligence Agency or class, lied Top Secret within the CIA and will remain to the document until sI,ch time as it
is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secre r is limited to Top Secret Control
personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to thematter. Top -. Control Officers who receive
and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate . custody in the left-hand
columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate - of handling in theright-hand columns.
.
REFERRED TO .
RELEASED
SEEN BYOFFICE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SI GNATURE AND OFFICE
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244
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NOT! F DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate
spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
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