INTELLIGENCE REPORT: THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600150002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

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Intelligence Report
The Soviet Military Preece in Egypt
NSA, DIA reviews completed
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OPR-107
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February 1975
THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT
NOTE
This report was prepared by the Office of Political Research at
the direction of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, in response to
a request by the Secretary of Defense for an examination of the back-
ground, current status, and prospects of the Soviet military presence
in Egypt. The findings of the report emphasize the close dependence
of the Soviet military presence upon the changing fortunes of the
Soviet-Egyptian political relationship.
In the preparation of this paper, OPR received major assistance
from the Office of Strategic Research, and valuable comments and
suggestions from the Office of Current Intelligence. The Defense
Intelligence Agency has reviewed the draft, and has no major differ-
ences of view; however, the responsibility for the judgments of the
report remains that of CIA. Further comments will be welcomed by
the principal OPR officer involved,
or by the principal OSR contributor,
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CONTENTS
Page
NOTE ............................................................. i
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS ..................... ........ 1
DISCUSSION .................. .... . .............................. 5
I. POLITICAL PREREQUISITES AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES .. 5
A. Laying the Groundwork ........................................ 5
13. The Dividends Extracted in 1967 ......... ...... ....... ....... 5
C. The 1970 Intervention: Risks, Rewards, and Later Costs ... ....... 6
D. The Contraction of the Soviet Position ................... ....... 9
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE ... .. 9
A. Growth of Soviet Naval Use of Egyptian Facilities (1967-1972) 9
1. Soviet Use of Egyptian Ports and Anchorages ............ ..... 9
Soviet Naval Air Onerations in E * rt .......................... 10
4. Operational Significance ..................................... 13
B. Soviet Support to the Egyptian Military ................... ...... 13
1. Soviet Air Defense Forces ............................ ....... 13
2. Other Soviet Support and Advisory Assistance .............. ... 10
C. The Decline in the Soviet Presence Since 1972 ......... ... ....... 18
1. Impact of the Egyptian Withdrawal Order ............ ....... 18
2. Current Status of the Soviet Military Presence ... ........ ..... 19
III. PROSPECTS ..................................... .............. 20
A. The Range of Soviet Military Concerns and Desires .. 20
1. The Question of Present Soviet Port Rights .................... 20
2. The Conditions of Soviet Canal Passage ............... ....... 20
3. The Naval Air Unit ......................................... 21
4. The Question of "Permanent" Soviet Port Facilities ............. 21
5. The Question of a Red Sea Base ....................... ..... 22
6. The Question of Returning Soviet Advisers ......... 22
B. Factors Affecting Sadat's Alternative Choices ...... .. .... ...... 22
FIGURES
Page
Estimated Soviet Military Personnel in Egypt, 1967-1972 (chart) 7
Aircraft Assigned to the Soviet Naval Aviation Unit in Egypt rior to
mid-1972 (table) ................................................... 12
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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
The Soviet military presence in Egypt has always been closely
dependent upon the Soviet political base. That presence has fluctuated
considerably over the years with the Egyptian government's rapidly
changing view of its needs and degree of satisfy ction with Soviet
military services to Egypt. The prospects for the Soviet presence remain
hostage to this highly volatile. political relationship.
Past and Present Soviet Military Advantages
The primary militai y advantage Moscow now enjoys in Egypt
is the use of the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Mersa Matruh
to support Soviet naval forces in the aiatern Mediterranean. The
Soviet Union has in the past enjoyed two other major benefits for
operations against the Sixth Fleet:
- Between 1968 and 1972, the Soviets maintained a naval air unit
in Egypt which gave the USSR its first land-based air capability
in the Mediter... wean.
- Between 1970 end 1972, the Soviets were developing an exten-
sive deep water facility at Mersa Matruh controlled by the
Soviet Navy and for its exclusive use.
All three benefits were granted by Egypt to the USSR as recom-
pense for Soviet services-first in reequipping and retaining the Egyp-
tian armed forces after the 1967 defeat, and then in responding to
Nasser's 1970 appeal for installation of a Soviet-manned air defense
system in Egypt to halt Israeli raids against Egyptian cities.
Despite these past services, Soviet-Egyptian frictions after Nasser 's
death produced an abrupt reduction in the Soviet presence.
- On Sadat's orders in July 1972, the 6,600 Soviet air defense
combat personnel in Egypt were entirely wW-f1rawn, the 5,500
Soviets providing support and advisory service,; were reduced
to about 200, and the total of all Soviet mii:tar personnel in
Egypt dropped from a peak of nearly 15,000 in 197 :' to less than
a thousand. This spectacular change was humiliating to the
Soviet Union and politic, lly harmful to the Soviet position in
the Middle East.
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-- More important for Soviet military capabilities against the
Sixth Fleet, Sadat simultaneously ordered the Soviet naval air
unit out of the country and deprived the USSR of its exclusive
facility at Mersa Matruh, while allowing Soviet naval vessels to
continue to use the services of Egyptian ports.
The Soviet-Egyptian political tensions which produced these
changes have not disappeared.
The Egyptians have chafed at what they have seen as Soviet
overbearing ways and aspirations for extraterritorial rights.
Sadat has above all resented repeated Soviet delays or reneging
on commitments to deliver certain weapon systems, and in
1972 and 1973 he was angered by the conviction that Soviet
dealings with the US were inhibiting Soviet willingness to sup-
port Egypt.
The Soviets in turn have resented Egyptian ingratitude for
past services and have been alarmed at the post-Nasser trend
toward the right in Egyptian political and economic life. In
1974, Moscow was particularly chagrined over Sadat's turn
away from the USSR in favor of dealings with the US and closer
reliance upon the conservative Arab states, as he sought both
US aid in obtaining Israeli concessions and sources of economic
and military aid alternative to the Soviei Union.
Soviet Military Concerns and Desires
The Soviets today have both specific concerns and particular
ambitions regarding their military presence in Egypt.
The most important concern is over the preservation of the
current Soviet naval right to use Egyptian ports. While the
Soviets have a contractual agreement with Egypt for use of these
facilities, Sadat has nevertheless several times raised direct or
indirect threats to the port rights as a means of pressuring the
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USSR to fulfill arms supply agreements.
-- The Soviets would probably regard loss of the use of Egyptian
ports as a considerable inconvenience to their Mediterranean
operations. The Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus, also used
by the Soviet Navy, would offer a partial substitute, but would
not serve Soviet needs as adequately, particularly over the near
term.
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- A second and less urgent concern exists regarding the conditions
of Soviet naval use of a reopened Suez Canal, The Soviets prob-
ably do not believe that even in a new major Soviet-Egyptian
political crisis Sadat would dare to deny them use of the canal.
But Moscow is aware that there are various delays and diffi-
culties which Cairo could create, short of outright blocking
of Soviet passage. The Soviets would probably welcome some
formal assurances from Egypt on this score. Beyond this, they
would of course hope for preferential treatment for their vess'ls
over those of the US and NATO, but they would not expect this
unless present political conditions chang: greatly.
In addition, there are undoubtedly military benefits in Egypt
which the Soviets would like to regain or acquire if their political re-
lationship with Cairo ever permitted this.
- Near the top of the list would be restoration of the Egypt-based
naval air unit. Since its departure, the important gap represented
by the lack of adequate air support for Soviet naval units
deployed opposite the Sixth Fleet has not been filled.
- There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviets also continue
to long for restoration of the facility they were at one time
developing at Mersa Matruh for the exclusive use of the
Soviet Navy.
Contingencies Affecting the Future Soviet Presence
Tensions in the Egyptian-Soviet relationship are such that the
chance of Egyptian acceptance of any proposals for an expanded
Soviet presence are presently quite small. The Soviets are well aware of
this. These odds would improve for the USSR in the event of Egyptian
involvement in a new war with Israel, particularly if it led to an
Egyptian defeat. In the latter case, circumstances could emerge in
which the Egyptian need for Soviet help would become so grave as to
induce Sadat to accept, or even to request, additional Soviet forces
and facilities in Egypt.
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that Sadat's ability
to fend off any future Soviet pressures for an increased presence would
be further strengthened if a significant additional Israeli Sinai with-
drawal could be arranged, and the Suez Canal meanwhile reopened.
This would satisfy the most essential Egyptian war aims and increase
Egyptian incentives to try to remain out of any future Middle East
fighting, while reducing Egyptian dependence on prospective Soviet
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help. There is strong evidence that Sadat's preference is to minimize
such dependence on the USSR so far as his political needs permit,
In the absence of a new war, there is some chance that another
crisis in Soviet-Egyptian relations, possibly induced by further Soviet
reneging on promised arms shipments, could lead Sadat to take sudden
action to deny Soviet naval units use of Egyptian ports. Recently
Sadat has pe;,ionally alluded in public to the possibility of abrogation
of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty, an act which would probably
presage action against Soviet port rights. We estimate the chance of
such drastic Sadat action over the next twelve months to be on the
order of one in three, which is somewhat greater than the chance of
his giving the USSR an increased presence.
On balance, over the next year the chances seem some=shat better
than even that there will be neither an improvement nor a further
reduction in the Soviet military presence in Egypt. This is largely
because both leaderships still have important reasons to try to keep
their ongoing disagreements from escalating to the breaking point.
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DISCUSSION
1. POLITICAL PREREQUISITES AND MILITARY
CONSEQUENCES
The Soviet military presence in Egypt has always
been closely dependent upon the evolving Soviet
political relationship with Caairo, and over the years
has reflected the changing fortunes of a marriage
of convenience. l3oth Soviet military help to the
Egyptians and Soviet military rights in Egypt have
fluctuated over time in response to each side's
current view of its interests.
- For its part, Moscow has always measured
Egyptian demands-for Soviet arms, Soviet services,
and Soviet risk-taking-against an expected payoff
for Soviet political influence and policies in the
Middle East and for the local Soviet military posi-
tion vis-a-vis the US and NATO.
- On the other hand, Cairo has always weighed
the military and political conee::sions Moscow has
sought against the concrete benefits the Soviets
have been willing to deliver and the gravity of
current Egyptian needs.
A. Laying the Groundwork
Thus far, this relationship has passed through
three phases:
Between 1955 and 1967, the groundwo.'k was
laid for the specific military advantages the USSR
later received. Soviet and East European weapons
shipments, economic assistance, and political en-
couragement were highly useful to Nasser in his
efforts to oust `Western influence from the Arab
world and to assert leadership over radical Arab
forces in their struggle against Arab conservatives
and Israel. In return, despite occasional important
policy differences between Cairo and Moscow, the
USSR cemented its position as the principal sup-
porter of Egypt and the Arab cause and the in-
dispensable source of the weaponry.Nasser needed
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to confront Israel. Meanwhile, the military aid
technicians sent to the UAR to instruct Egyptians
in the t,se of Soviet weapon: and equipment estab-
lished a precedent for the much greated Soviet
presence to follow.
B. The Dividends Extracted in 1967
13etuveen 1967 and 1970, the USSR chew major
strategic dividends from this earlier investment,
and there was a rapid expansion of the Soviet
military presence in Egypt. As a result of the UAIi's
humiliation in the June 1967 war, Egypt was linked
to the USSR by new bonds of necessity. Only the
Soviets could furnish esseutal diplomatic stapport,
could reequip and retrain the Egyptian armed
forces, and could furnish effective help of their
own when Nasser's renewed confrontation with
Israel got hint into new difficulties.
The trend toward more direct Soviet participa-
tion in the Egyptian struggle with Israel in turn
furnished a pretext for the Soviets to use part of
their military presence for purposes which had
much more to do with Soviet military interests,
both nuclear-strategic and regional, than with Egyp-
tian security interests. Premier Kosygin alluded to
this fact in conversation with a foreign statesman
in June 1968, asserting that the real victors in the
1967 Arab-Israeli war had been the Soviets, because
the conflict had enabled them to transfer more
naval units to the Mediterranean and to build up
a presence there in such circumstances that no
Arab could object.
The growing Soviet squadron in the eastern Med-
iterranean may thus have been portrayed to the
Arabs as deterring US naval forces from attack on
the Arab states, 'Gut the Soviets in fact were
primarily concerned with creating a capability to
neutralize those forces in the event of a Soviet war
with the US. The presence of Soviet naval units
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in three Egyptian ports after 1967 may possibly
have been initially envisaged by Egypt its a deter-
ri nt against Israeli attacks on those ports, but
much more important for the USSR was the use
of the ports to support the Soviets' own interest
i;, challenging the strategic mission of the Sixth
Fleet. Similarly, the USSR's use of Egyptian ter-
ritory after 1968 to create a land-based reconnais-
sance and air strike capability against the Sixth
Fleet was another Soviet military benefit obtained
in payment for the services being rendered to
Egypt,
C. The 1970 Intervention: Risks, Rewards,
and Later Costs
On the other hand. to keep these advantages
Moscow was henceforth under continual pressure
to satisfy Egyptian growing demands for military
assistance. At the outset, this involved the rapid
and large-scale rcequipment of the Egyptian armed
forces after the 1967 war and the dispatch of in-
creasing numbers of Soviet advisers to oversee
the rebuilding of the Egyptian military capability.
The Soviets assumed a more direct role and
greater risks, however, after Nasser began a war
of attrition against Israel in 1969 and Israel re-
sponded with deep-penetration air strikes against
Egyptian cities.
Fez nev did endorse the sending of Soviet
combat units to defend Egyptian air space, includ-
ing SAM brigades and MIC-21 squadrons, accom-
panied by large numbers of Soviet advisers and
technicians to handle an increased flow of air
defense equipment. This Soviet intervention suc-
ceeded in neutralizing the Israeli air campaign.
In view of the growing risks of escalation, however,
the Soviet leaders welcomed the August 1970 ceas-
fire which interrupted a trend of increasing Soviet
direct combat with the Israelis.
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As it result of Soviet acceptance of this new role
in defense of Egypt in 1970, Soviet military person-
nel in Egypt rosy from an estimated 4,000 troops
in early 1970 to an all-time perk of nearly 15,000
by the middle of 19711 This multipli-
cation of the Soviet military presence increased
both the Soviet stake in Egyptian military fortunes
and the Egyptian sense of dependence on the
USSR. At the same time, the Egyptians granted
the USSR some additional advantages for operations
against the Sixth Fleet which may conceivably have
been Nasser's quid pro quo for the Soviet assunnp-
tion of additional responsibilities and risks. Thus,
it was in mid-1970, shortly after the Soviet air
defense forces had arrived, that the Soviet Union
began to move beyond its existing use of Egyptian
ports, and was allowed to start development of
facilities at Mersa Matruh for the exclusive use of
the Soviet Navy. It will be seen in Part II that
during 1970 and 1971 the Soviets also considerably
expanded and diversified their Egypt-based naval
air operations against the Sixth Fleet, which had not
changed since 1968. One may speculate that this
may similarly have represented new Egyptian rec-
ompense for the new Soviet air defense services
to Cairo.
On the other hand, subsequent events demon-
strated that the great enlargement of the Soviet
presence and facilities in Egypt after early 1970
carried with, it an equally great political handicap.
The new Soviet presence created growing resent-
ment of what many Egg) ptians saw as Soviet over-
bearing ways and intolerable extraterritorial rights.
The growth of nationalist sentiment in the Egyptian
army and government, impatient with Soviet tute-
lage, took on new impetus after Nasser's death in
September 1970 brought more conservative forces
to power in Cairo, and was further reinforced by
the subsequent Soviet frictions with Sadat discussed
below. Al? of these factors fed Cairo's desire to
reduce Egyptian dependence on the USSR by
cutting back the Soviet military presence as soon
as Egypt's most pressing needs in the confrontation
with Israel permitted-in practice, as soon as the
Egyptians had sufficiently learned to man an air
defense network. Since the Soviets at no point
had political control of the Egyptian government,
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they could not prevcr.t this change front being
curried out.
D. The Contraction of the Soviet Position
't'hroughout the most recent stage, /roan 1971 fo
the prescnf, there lilts been it lout;-tern- trend, with
,Soule ups and clowns, toward Si cooling of relations
between Cairo and Moscow. In July 1972, this
erosion of the Soviet political base in Egypt re-
sulted in it large-scale forced cutback in the Soviet
military presence. This involved not only the ex-
pulsion of most Soviet advisers, but the elintina-
lion of two specific Soviet military advantages--
the land-based naval air unit, and (lie excinsive
Sovict facilities under construction at Mersa Matruh.
As noted in Part III, since 1972 there have been
further sporadic direct and indirect Egyptian po-
liticai threats to the primary remaining Soviet
military advantage, the continuing naval use of
Egyptian ports..
After Nasser's dearth, the Soviets had feared such
aua evolution of Egyptian policy, and sought to
prevent it by concluding a Sovict-Egyptian Friend-
ship Treaty with his successor Sadat in ?1971. This
treaty, however, has not prevented the persistent
growth of tension and recurrent crises between the
two states. Since his advent to power, Sadat has
above all resented repeated Soviet delays or reneg-
ing on commitments to deliver certain weapon
systems, and in 1972 and 1973 he was angered by
the conviction that Soviet dealings with the United
States were inhibiting Soviet willingness to sup-
port Egypt.
The Soviets, for their part, have become increas-
ingly concerned over what they have r.een as a
rightist trend, hostile to their interests, unfolding
in Egyptian domestic political and economic life
since 1971. The Soviets have also greatly resented
Egyptian ingratitude for the various risks the Soviet
Union had accepted, the essential military hardware
actually sent to Egypt in the past, and the many
vital Soviet services to Egypt rendered during the
October 1973 war. Finally, in the wake of the
October war, the Soviets were particularly cha-
grined over Sadat's turn away from the USSR in
favor of dealings with the US and closer reliance
upon the conservative Arab states, seeking both
US aid in obtaining Israeli cunee:;Stuns an-d sources
of ecouuntic and military air alternative to the
Soviet Union,
One result thus far of this interaction from 1971
to date has liven to confirm ;Jos'.-ow in Its Policy
of doling out tlic wcsapons most coveted by Saalat
sparingly and with great delays and oinissions-
pending an improvement in Sa.lat's behavior toward
the Soviet Union.
In turn, Sachat's resentment of the Soviet attitude
has served to reinforce his resistance to Soviet
pressures. Arriong other filings, he has thus far
remained determined to reject any pressures to
enlarge again the Soviet military presence in Egypt,
whether through it return of Soviet advisers or in
other ways.
After a more detailed examination of the rise
and decline of the Soviet military presence i'i
Part 11, the fact6rs affecting the prospects for ex-
pansion or further contraction of that presence
will be weighed in Part III.
If. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET
MILITARY PRESENCE
A. Growth of Soviet Naval Use of Egyptian
Facilities ('1967-1972)
Prior to nerd-1967, the Soviets had limited access
to facilities in .Egypt, although Soviet ships con-
ducted frequent port calls there. The Soviet naval
force in the Mediterranean was small, and ships
normally deployed for less than two months, spend-
ing about half of this time at anchor. Thus, there
was little need for routine access to Egyptian
facilities.
1. Soviet Use of Egyptian Ports and
Anchorages
After the June 1967 war, as the Soviet MMeditcr-
raneav Squadron grew and the duration of the
deployments of its ships increased in length, Egyp-
tain anchorages and shore facilities began to play
a greater role in the operations of the Squadron.
Two anchorages in Egyptian waters-Solluin and
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Mersa Matruh--were established to support S-iviet
subs:;urines and surface ships. The Soviets built
"floating !lases" composed of groupings of mer-
chnnt tankers and naval auxiliaric-s in these areas,
which became it pi:-,;ivy source of support for the
Mcdit.irculcan Squadron.* Solluin was frequently
used by submarines for mid-patrol support and
replenishment, and the Mersa Matruh anchorage
was used periodically by surface combatants. In
March 19(18, Moscow supplemented these floating
bases by concluding agreements with Egypt to
permit routine access to some Egyptian ports by
Soviet naval forces. In 1970 the Soviets also began
to develop a new port at Mersa Matruh with
facilities ex(,' isively for their own use.
Alexandria. The facilities at Alexandria provided
the Mediterranean Sgeadron with support services
similar to those of it Soviet base. This was not it
"Soviet naval base' in the conventional sense,
however, because the Egyptians still retained over-
all control of the facilities.
The agreement with Egypt nevertheless gave the
Soviets manager,al control of the El Cabbari Ship-
yard at Alexandria. All key personnel in the ship-
yard-an estimated 350 to 400 persons-were
Soviet nationals and were under the supervision
of r Soviet admiral. The facilities at El Cabbari
were capable of performing repairs of conven-
tional submarines and surface ships up to destroyer
size. The Soviets used this facility to perform
overhauls of some of their F class diesel sub-
marines and routine maintenance on smaller com-
batants.
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Spare parts, ammunition, POL, and food stores
were also maintained in Alexandria, and Soviet
auxiliaries moored in the harbor were used to pro-
vide logistic support as well as to provide some
routine maintenance and repair. Alcr-andria was the
main port providing mid-patrol support to diesel
submarines in the Mediterranean. Except for one
instance in 1969, nuclear submarines did not use
the port but were supported at the Sollum an-
chorage by auxiliaries operating out of Alexandria.
The Soviets also continued to make regular use of an-
chorages in international waters elsewhere in the eastern
Mediterranean.
Pat Said. The Soviets use(] fort Said its an ilu-
chorag(, for 1'01, storage, 011(1 for billeting of
personnel atl0ched to the anlphibiotls group that
was aloulst always present. This group usually Con-
sisted of it destroyer, it tank binding ship, and
two nnxliuin lilt dilip, ships. The group was believed
to have about 250 troops embarked.
Afersci Afutrult. By mid?1970 there was it continu-
ous Soviet naval presence-usually two or three
auxiliaries and it minesweeper-at Mesa Matruh,
and at about this time the Soviets began to develop
there it deep water facility for the exclusive use of
the Soviet Navy, Port development activities in-
cluded dredging operations and the installation of
quays mnel floating piers. Other construction in the
immediate vicinity included barracks, several sup-
port buildings, and it recreation area. Soviet F and
W class submarines and associated support ships
began to be observed at Matruh's floating piers in
1970 all(] 1971, suggesting that the Soviets may
have intended to shift their support of diesel sub-
marines from Alexandria to the more secluded
facilities at Matruh, less vulncroble to Israel: at-
tack.
2. Soviet Naval Air Operations in Egypt
Soviet naval air operations based in Egypt began'
By 1972, a total of 36 aircraft were assigned to
the Soviet naval air unit in Eg~vnt.
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were lidded to the unit, mud
opertited Boni lbree 1111l'lelcls-Cah?o West, Ma(ruh,
mill Aswan (see table).
licconnal.mancc Aircraft. In early I1)(38, six TU-1(3
Ilttdget' reconuaissunce aircraft were deployed io
Cairo West Airfield. lit .1970, six AN-12 (,'ill) trans-
u-rtx
sit -se(pienl y cep Dyed to Matsui Airfield. '1'liese
'1'U-16 and AN-12 reconnaissance aircraft were
used to monitor US till(] NATO naval forces in
the NIediterramNan Sell. TIto ",nb transports also
played it role ill the training of Egyptian surfacc-
to-air missile crews t:nl provitied Some logistic
support for the Soviet air tiilit.
ASV Aircraft. In late 1968, the Soviet stir emit
in Egypt gained its first ASW capability when three
BE-]2 Mail amphibious aircraft were flown to
Matruh Airfield. A fourth Mail was added in iiiid-
1970. By mid-1971, t1' Mn,l amphibians had hecii
replaced by longer-ranged IL-38 May laud-lased
aircraft. Like the TU-10s at Cairo West, these air-
craft were used to reconnoiter US and NATO
naval forces in the Mediterranean. They also par-
ticipated in ASW exercises with ships of the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron.
ASM Strike Support Aircraft.
four TU-l6 Badger aircraft
Cairo West Airfield
Aswan Airfield
Matruh Airfield
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were de-
ployed to Aswmn Airfield fu sontl-ern l gyps. Il
scents likely, although it cannot he Droved, that the
Soviets originally envisaged this deploymieul its
the first slay) in the develolimte-a t,f till Egypt-based
mir-to-surfaco missile si;lke capability t-gaiust (lit!
Sixth FIect. 11' NO, these DImns for some r(USmt dill
not mittore, mid no Egypt-based ASM patrols were
ever coudneted by the Soviets over the Meditc'- 25X1
roilentt.'"
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO '1'111: SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION
UNIT IN EGYPT PRIOR TO ACID-1972
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transfer to Egyptian control, are listed here l).cause they remained part of the Soviet capa-
bility in Egypt until they were transferred.
In early 1979,
TU-16 E
TU-16 K
TU-16 G
TU-16 E, K, or j
IL-38
AN-12
AN-12
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The Aswan-based TU-1R Cs, although apparently brought to Egypt in 1971 for eventua
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 4. Operational Significance
By mid-1972, the Soviet naval presence in
Egypt was well established. The, Soviets had or
were in the process oI' building up several major
facilities to support their naval forces in the Medi-
terranean. Naval air assets basal ill Egypt gave the
Soviets the capability to atone easily keep track
of US and NATO naval forces ill the Mediterra-iecui
Sea. The Soviets also appeared to be building up au
airborne nii,r:ile strike capability to support the
anticarrier? mission of the Soviet Navy.
The Soviet development of a rtuniier of ports
and anchorages in Egypt made is easier to sup-
port and maintain the growing Soviet presence in
the Mediterranean, 'Phase facilities allowed the
Soviets to keep their naval forces on station longer
and to build up the size of the force without put-
t':ng undue strain on the Soviet logistic system.
The use of floating bases in Egyptian anchorages
and shore-based facilities in Alexandria, Port Said,
and Mersa Matruh allowed the Soviets to provide
mid-patrol resupply and replenishment to deployed
units. The shore facilities also were used to provide
maintenance and repair for deployed unit,. Most
of this work appeared to be of a routine nature,
however, and ships requiring major repairs still
returned to the Soviet Union with the exception
of the few F class submarines overhauled in Alex-
andria.
The gradual buildup of the Soviet naval air unit
in Egypt gave the Soviets their first land-based
air capability in the Mediterranean. One of the
continuing shortcomings of the Soviet Navy has
been its lack of adquate a.r support fer its ships
operating in distant areas. The Egypt-based aircraft
provicletl valuable and unique support to the Nledi?
terranein- Stluuclrou by eecuunoiterhig US i-ud
NATO ro-viil mills.
Ill addition to (Ills r?ecmriaissanc(' f-niction, the
Soviets also were building up all Egypt-based naval
aviation antistibnuu?ine capability, and at one time
appear to have planned to add to this it missile strike
unit that could have been used to counter Western
aircraft carriers and other high value targets in (he
Nlediterrt-nean. 'T'hese capabilities, when t-Sed in
conjunction with missile-egriipped ships and sub-
nutriaes ill the Niediterranvan Squadron, would have
become a significant threat to Western naval forces
il' their development had continued.
B. Soviet Support to the Egyptian Military
Except for Soviet naval and naval air units, most
of the Soviet military personnel in Egypt were ac]-
visers engaged ill long term training programs until
1970. 'I'h(! massive increase in the Soviet military
presence after early 1970 can mostly be broken down
into two groups: Soviet combat units directly coin-
mittcd to Egypt's air defense and Soviet support
and advisory assistance to the Egyptian air defense,
air, naval, and ground forces.
1. Soviet Air Defense Forces
The initial deployment of Soviet combat units to
Egypt in early 1970 consisted largely of SA-3 regi-
ments and Nil(:-21 squadrons, and numbered some
7,4,)0 personnel. This figure rose to some 8,300 hyHK1
mid-1971 when Soviet SA-6 units were sent to Egypt,
and then declined to about mid-1979,
F
Soviet SAINT units apparently were drawn from both
PVO Strany-the Soviet strategic defense organiza-
tion-and from PVO Voysk-the air defense organ-
ization of theater forces. The NIIC-21 squadrons
were drawn from Soviet Frontal Aviation units.
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Soviet SAA/ FurWN. Soviet SAM forces
I I included fora' SA-3
reg nteii its 11117-11-1177-0 brigade. Each SA-3 regiment
was composed of it headgntu'ters and from four to
seven firing battalions phis organic AAA elements.
Soviet SA-3 battalions initially were deployed near
Alexandria, Matruh, Cairo, and Aswan to defend
key port facilities, industrial areas, and airfields
used by the Soviets, 'These SAM units, along with
Soviet fighter aircraft, helped to deter deep pene-
tration raids by Israeli aircraft after March 1970.
The Israelis had by then shifted to attacking
Egyptian niilitarv installations along she Suez
Canal, as the Egyptians were developing an air
c efcnse harrier west of the waterway. Included in
this barrier were new Soviet SA-3 and Egyptian
SA-2 units as well as Soviet and Egyptian fighter
aircraft. After it ceasefire agreement with the
Israelis was reached on 7 August 1970, the Egyp-
tians began replacing Soviet SA-3 crews along the
canal. By March 1971, all Soviet units had departed
the canal zone, and many began returning to the
USSII. Nevertheless, about half of the estimated
45 SA-3 firing battalions in Egypt were still manned
by Soviet personnel as of mid-1972.
The Soviet SA-6 unit, which
arrived in Egypt in early 1971 deployed to Aswan
Airfield. This was the location of a Soviet naval
TU-10 ASM unit then being formed, X1 25X1
DfIC-21 Units. The Soviet MIC-21 units which
deployed to Egypt in earl 1970 consisted of two
regimental size elements
The units were deployed to protect against Israeli
incursions over the interior of Egypt and to defend
Alexandria, Cairo, and industrial areas around I-Iul-
wan? three squadrons
with a rout 35 MIC-21s was based at Bani Suw,:yf
and Al Fayyum, and two squad-
rons with about 25 aircraft was based at Jiyanklis.
On several occasions, Soviet detachments deployed
to airfields nearer the canal.
Significance of the Soviet Combat Support. The
deployment and operations of the Soviet combat
forces in Egypt suggested a two-fold mission: to
provide an effective air defense for Egypt while
25X1
Lhe Egyptians Slrcngtlu'ii d and expanded their own
air defense organization, and to safeguard the air-
fields and port facilities from which the Soviets
supported the operations of their Mediterranean
fleet, In this they Succeeded, first by halting, the
Israeli deep penetration raids over the interior, of
1,gYlrt and then by achieving it ceasefire along the
Suez Canal,
Soviet pilots and SAM crews apparently operated
under guidelines designed to minimize confronta-
tions with the Israelis while still functioning as an
effective deterrent force, The Soviets gradually
became more aggressive, however, as the air defense
umbrella near the canal was strengthened. '1'lie So-
viets and Israelis clashed in the air only once-at
the end of July 1970-and that resulted in the loss
of four Soviet MIC-21s with no losses for the Israelis.
The Israelis did lose six F-4s and suffered damage
to several others during the summer of 1970 as the
result of Soviet/Egyptian SAM and AAA defenses.
2. Other Soviet Support and Advisory
Assistance
Whereas some 6,600 Soviet combat personnel
were committed to a direct role in Egypt's air de-
ft?nse by mid-1972, about 5,500 were providing sup-
port and advisory assistance to the Egyptian air
defense, air, naval, and ground forces. Included
in the support and advisory categories were the So-
viet MIC-25 Foxhat reconnaissance unit, Soviet
maintenance personnel, mid advisers assigned to all
levels of the Egyptian armed forces.
Aerial Reconnaissance. The role of the four Soviet
MIC-25 Foxbat aircraft which deployed to Cairo
West Airfield in March 1971 was to provide periph-
eral and overhead reconnaissance of Israeli-field ter-
ritory. The aircraft operated both along the Suez
Canal and over key Israeli military installations in
the western Sinai. The intelligence gained from
these missions was passed to the Egyptians for their
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Soviet presence that was virtually unaffected by the
order was the Soviet nav:d access to Egyptian port
fa.-ilities, although almost all Soviet shore installa-
tions were removed.
Soviet Advisers. Soviet military advisers played
an extremely important role in the Egyptian armed
forces between 1970 and mid-1972.
In Y7.ay case,
however, the Soviets lacked sufficient influence over
the Egyptian armed forces to prevent the Egyptian
government from removing the advisers, and there
is no evidence that the USSR sought to do so.
C. The Decline in the Soviet Presence
Since 1972
The Soviet military position in Egypt thus suf-
fered a dramatic setback on July 17, 1972 when
President Sadat ordered the withdrawal of the bulk
of the Soviet personnel. Within months, the Soviet
combat presence was eliminated, and by late 1972
only about 200 of the Soviet advisers, who were
associated primarily with new equipment deliveries,
remained in Egypt.* The principal clement of the
1. Impact of the Egyptian Withdrawul
Order
In issuing his expulsion order, Sadat specifically
stated that the mission of Soviet military experts
and advisers was terminated, and that all Soviet
military equipment and installations which re-
mained in Egypt would become the property of the
Egyptians, The resulting Soviet exodus was rapid
and complete, and went off with little incident. So-
viet equipment was either withdrawn or taken over
by the Egyptians, and installations were either dis-
mantled or abandoned.
Effect on the Soviet Naval Presence. The major
operational impact of the Soviet expulsion from
Egypt was the loss of the naval aviation unit, par-
ticularly the ASW clement, which had been provid-
ing support for the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.
This was a valuable but not vital strategic asset to
the Soviets. The airfields used by the aviation unit
came under full Egyptian contro, and the unit itself
was disbanded. All of the unit's aircraft returned
to the USSR, except for ten ASM-equipped Badger
Cs which already had been turned over to the
Egyptians in February 1972.
In addition, the Soviet-controlled port facility
at Mersa Matruh reverted to full Egyptian control,
and Soviet shore installations there and at other
Egyptian ports were removed or abandoned. Thus,
the USSR's apparent attempt to develop a naval
base of its own at Mersa Matruh was halted. Such
a base would have allowed the Soviets to support
their Mediterranean operations on a more direct
*The number of these advisers in Egypt associated with
new deliveries has apparently fluctuated somewhat since
1972. It evidently increased shortly before and during the
October 1973 war, primarily in connection with the Soviet
resupply effort and the arrival of the Scud, a weapon
system unfamiliar to the Egyptians. The adviser total ap-
pears to have again decreased thereafter. Besides the re-
nmining advisers, a fluctuating total of some 600-800 other
Soviet military personnel have remained in Egypt since the
1972 ouster, in various capacities discussed below.
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basis without having to rely on joint use (if Egyptian
naval facilities.
Otherwise, however, the oi,istcr of the Soviets (lid
not result in major changes in the Soviet use of
Egypt to support their naval operations in the Medi-
terranean. Egypt reasserted its full contrgl over the
port facilities, but Soviet warships in the aftermath
of the ouster continued to replenish at Port Said
and Alexandria on a regular basis, and the Soviets
increased their use of Alexandria for overhauling
diesel submarines.
Soviet Combat and Advisary Support. Soviet coin-
bat support to the Egyptian military was almost
totally ended by the expulsion order. The Soviet
MIG-21 squadrons and SAM units, including both
;,A-3s and SA-6s,* were turned over to the Egyp-
tians. The Foxbat reconnaissance unit temporarily
returned to the Soviet Union, and the great majority
of maintenance and advisory personnel were with-
drawn.
2. Current Status of the Soviet Military
Presence
The current size of the Soviet military presence
in Egypt is estimated to be about 800 to 1,000 per-
sonnel. The bulk of this force, some 400 to 500 men,
is associated with the continued use of Egyptian
port facilities by the Soviet Mediterranean Squad-
ron. Another 100 or so are again maintaining the
Soviet r oxbat reconnaissance unit, which returned
1 Cairo West Airfield in October 1973. The re-
.aainder primarily are associated with the head-
quarters of the Soviet military mission in Cairo or
are technical advisers maintaining Soviet military
equipment still under warranty.**
Soviet Use of Port Fac-Ilities. In a speech in early
1974, President Sadat revealed that Soviet access to
oration; in these estimates. It is not definitely known, for
example, whether most of the Soviet personnel brought to
Egypt in 1973 to train Egyptians in the use of the Scud
have since departed, although various indications make this
a plausible conjecture. Despite fluctuations in the subcate-
gories, the overall total of 800-1,000 Soviet military per-
sonnel in Egypt has probably not greatly changed since 1972.
Egyptian port facilities is bused on a five-year agree-
ment initially concluded in March 1968. Sad at stated
that be had renewed the agreement prior to its
expiration in 1973, but (lid not state whethei the re,
newal period also extended for live years.* At the
same time, Sadat said that the Soviets have had no
actual military bases in Egypt since July 1972.
The Soviet Navy continues to make regular use of
Egyptian ports, primarily Alexandria. Surface com-
batants and amphibious ships periodically stop at
Alexandria for replenishment and minor repairs.
Diesel attack submarines continue to be overhauled
in El Gabbari Shipyard and have been observed in
drydock there. A repair ship, a barracks ship, and
some yard craft are stationed in Alexandria where
the bulk of the Soviet support personnel are accom-
modated. Soviet auxiliaries routinely operate out of
Alexandria while providing water, provisions, and
ammunition to surface combatants in Soviet anchor-
ages off Egypt.
The Soviets continue to use other Egyptian ports
to varying degrees. Soviet amphibious ships and a
destroyer were moored routinely in Port Said up
until the October war, but did not appear to make
use of any of the port facilities there, not even the
oil storage site ]eased earlier by the Soviet Navy.
Since the October war and the resultant damage to
Port Said by Israeli air raids, these ships have
shifted to the Matruh anchorage and may periodi-
cally use the port itself. The Soviets also continue
to use the Sollum anchorage.
The continued Soviet access to Egyptian naval
facilities remains a valuable asset to the Soviet Med-
iterranean Squadron. The Syrian ports of Latakia
and Tartus, also used by the Soviet Navy, would
offer a partial substitute, but would not serve So-
viet needs as adequately, particularly over the near
term. Without access to Egyptian ports, it would be
difficult to support the current level of naval opera-
tions and a heavy sti''in would be put on the',)viet
logistical system. The Soviet submarine force un-
doubtedly would have to reduce its on-station time
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in the Mediterranean, and it considerably greater
level of support would be needed to maintain or
increase the surface force. Moscow would have to
readjust its naval priorities relative to other areas, or
else be satisfied with it reduced naval presence in
the Mediterranean.
I%oxbat Reconnaissance Unit. The Sir FoxbO
unit which again is operating from Cairo vest Air-
field consists of four aircraft. They presumably re-
turned in order to provide intelligence support to
the Egyptians,
Advisory Support. Soviet advisers no longer have
a significant role in support of the Egyptian armed
forces, and with the great reduction in Soviet equip-
ment deliveries since late 1973, their numbers may
have further diminished.
Ill. PROSPECTS
A. The Range of Soviet Military Concerns and
Desires 25X1
In addressing the future, there are certain aspects
of the current Soviet military rights and presence in
Egypt which the Soviet leadership would clearly
like to sategnard against existing or potential politi-
cal threats, and others which it would almost surely
like o extend and improve. The degree of impor-
tance which the Soviets may attach to these worries
and ambitions probably varies from case to case.
I-Iard information is scant, and in no case has it been
confirmed that the USSR has recently voiced de-
mands about any of these matters to Egypt. The
logic of the Soviet position, however, strongly im-
plies several areas of concern. The most important
two are defensive, regarding military rights which
the USSR now still enjoys or might be expected to
enjoy in Egypt which could be placed in question
by a further growth of Soviet-Egyptian tension. The
others r late to specific Soviet unsatisfied desires,
none of which seems likely to be granted without
a fundamental change in the present relationship
and a mnior increase in the Egyptian sense of de-
pendence upon tlu' Soviet 1Jniau.
1. The Question of Present Soviet Port
Rights
On the defensive side, a real Soviet concern exists
regarding the present Soviet naval use of Egyptian
port facilities. While tuc USSR, as noted, apparently
has it contractual i1grcement with Egypt for the use
of these port facilities, the validity of this agreement,
and the continuation of Soviet port rights, have
nevertheless frequently been brought into grave
question by Sadat as a means of pressuring the
USSR to fulfill arms supply agreements. There is
strong evidence of the anxiety of Gromyko and other
Soviet leaders over the implications of Egyptian
threats made in the s~.immer of 1973 and the spring
of 1974 to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship
Treaty. In January. 1975, Sadat himself publicly
voiced such a threat for the first time. These threats
are intended by the Egyptians to convey, among
other things, a menace to Soviet port rights, and are
undoubtedly so interpreted by the Soviets.
The Soviet
Navy is thus acutely aware that despite its con-
tract, its use of Egyptian ports remains extremely
vulnerable, conditional upon the continued viability
of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty and the general
health of the Soviet-Egyptian political relationship,
including the degree of Egyptian satisfaction with
Soviet arms supply. Soviet naval planners undoubt-
edly long for an improvement in the relationship
with Cairo which would renpove this uncertainty.
2. The Conditions of Soviet Canal
Passage
There is also some reason to suspect that the So-
viets do not take for, granted the conditions tinder
which they will exercise future rights of naval pas-
sage through the Suez Canal, and that they may
have at least some concern over this matter as the
opening of the canal draws closer. Such concern
would be founded in the first place upon the recur-
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rent grave strains in Soviet-Egyptian political reiu-
tious and the demonstrated unpredictability of Sa-
dat:s behavior toward the USSR. Sovirr at
It is likely that the Soviets will wish
eventually to test the Egyptian attitude. In Deccm-
ber 1974, Admiral Ivlicv, Soviet defense attache in
Cairo, pointedly queried to
ascertain whether the cone i ion or the cane would
now permit passage of cruisers and destroyers.
The Soviets almost certainly believe that the
Egyptian-Soviet relationship would have to deterio-
rate much further than it has already before Cairo
would take the extremely grave step of impeding
their passage through a reopened canal. While the
USSR may have no reason to expect a further change
of this magnitude, the Soviets are aware that there
is a whole spectrum of delays and difficulties which
Cairo could create, short of outright blocking of So-
viet passage. Moscow would therefore probably wel-
come some explicit Egyptian commitment, prefer-
ably in writing. It may be assumed that the Soviets
would like prior documentary assurance that Soviet
naval units will be permitted to pass readily be-
tween the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, that
Egyptian arrangements and regulations regarding
such passage will be fixed and predetermined and
not arbitrary or subject to fluctuation, like other
Egyptian behavior, with political whim and circum-
stance, and that these controlling regulations be as
little cumbersome and restrictive as possible. Finally
the Soviets would of course prefer, but have no rea-
son to expect, Egyptian agreement that Soviet war-
ships will get preferential treatment over those of
the United States and NATO.
3. The Naval Air Unit
Beyond this primary concern to secure their pres-
ent military rights, it is probable that the Soviets
25X1
would very much like restoration of the naval air
Unit which operated out of Egypt against NATO
Mediterranean forces between 1968 and 1972. As
state(] earlier, this unit had given the Soviets their
first land-based air capability in the Mediterranean,
and thus had helped fill an important gap repre-
sented by the lack of adequate air support for So-
viet naval units daploycd opposite the Sixth Fleet.
Since Sadat's expulsion of the naval air component
in the summer of 1972, this gap in land-based sup-
port has reappeared and has not been filled. While
there is no present evidence that the Soviets have
again raised this issue with Cairo, the question of
the naval air unit is likely to be near the top of the
Soviet list if changing circumstances should ever
make Sadat more vulnerable to Soviet demands.
4. The Question of "Permanent" Soviet
Port Facilities 25X1 25X1
Dt,pite the evidence suggesting that present So-
vict use of Egyptian port facilities is adequate for
Soviet purposes, it is likely that the Soviet Navy
would prefer to regain the more extensive rights in
Egyptian ports which it enjoyed prior to Sadat's
1972 crackdown, particularly the Soviet program
to develop Mersa Matruh as a deep water port con-
trolled by the Soviet Navy and for its exclusive use.
klaimed
a about on the same time that the Soviets had recently
asked Egypt to grant the USSR "permanent" naval25X1
facilities at either Mersa Matruh or Alexandria,
offering a partial moratorium on the Egyptian debt
to the Soviet Union in return.
I F
the Egyptians refused. 25X1 25X1
While these allegations are completely uncon-
firmed, it seems possible that the Soviets are less
content with their present port rights, and more
anxious to obtain a return to their old rights, than
an outsider might think appropriate to their needs.
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5. The Question of a Red Sea Base 25X1
It is conceivable but on balance considerably less
likely that the Soviets may also still yearn for a
naval base on the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea,
ssertec in the spring of 1972 that the So-
viets lad broached this subject to Egypt, and had
specified the small port of has Willis, which they
wished to develop into such it '''tse. This request, of
course, presumably died a natural death shortly
thereafter when Sadat put an end to the Soviet ex-
clusive rights to control Mersa Matruh. It is not
impossible that if the political relationship with
Egypt were to improve sufficiently, the USSR might
revive the issue of has Banas, although the Soviet
felt need for such a port is likely to diminish with
the opening of the Suez Canal and in view of the
possibility of obtaining or improving Indian Ocean
facilities elsewhere.
6. The Question of Returning Soviet
Advisers
Finally, a return of many Soviet advisers and ex-
perts to Egypt would in itself be a less significant
change than those listed above, from the standpoint
of Soviet military capabilities against US and NATO
forces. It is not certain that the Soviets desire such
a return, in view of the problems this aspect of the
Soviet presence has created for the USSR in the
past. If, as is possible, the Soviets do have such a
desire, it is presumably largely for political reasons.
Such an influx of Soviet personnel to Egypt might
serve to symbolize to the Arab world a partial
undoing of the humiliating expulsion of July 1972,
which had inflicted major damage to the Soviet
political position in the Middle East. At the same
time, the Soviets might hope that an enlarged ad-
visory presence in Egypt would improve their lever-
age on Egyptian policy. For these reasons, Sadat
has thus far been adamant in warning the Soviets
that he would not accept such additional advisers.
Since the postponement of Brezhnev's scheduled
January 1975 visit to Cairo, there have been press
and diplomatic rumors apparently begun by the
Egyptians-and one private statement alleged to
have been made by Sadat-to the effect that one
of the Coll trihnting reasons for the postponement
was . isagrecnlent over Soviet insistence on return-
ing experts and advisers to Egypt. It is conceivable
that the Soviets did raise this issue in the limited
contract of the experts that might be needed to train
Egyptians in the use of certain additional weapons
Cairo was seeking from Moscow. This has not been
confirmed, however. Sadat has recently acted io
quiet speculation on this subject by publicly deny-
ing the rumors he had originally set in motion.
B. Factors Affecting Sadat's Alternative
Choices
There is no good evidence at )land to suggest that
either an improvement or a further reduction in the
Soviet military presence in Egypt is probable in the
near future, Sadat is acutely aware of his continued
dependence upon Soviet spare parts and other mili-
tary hardware, and of his need for Soviet support
if, despite his wish to the contrary, he should be-
come involved in another conflict with Israel, Sadat
also knows that once having played the card of de-
priving the USSfi of its Egyptian port rights, he
would lose most of whatever leverage he now has
over Soviet policy. Moscow is equally aware of the
central inlportan+' of Egypt, the largest and strong-
est Arab state, for the Soviet struggle to retain and
expand its influence in the Middle East. The Soviets
are also sensitive to the considerable inconvenience
that would be imposed on their Mediterranean op-
erations if they were to be deprived of Egyptian
port facilities. Both leaderships would therefore ap-
pear to have good reason to try to keep their on-
going disagreements from escalating to a point
which would endanger the current Soviet military
presence. 25X1
Nevertheless, that presence continues
upon a highly unstable political base.
25X1
25X1
to rest
tensions in the
Egyptian-Soviet relationship have grown front year
to year since 1971, that file two leaderships today
privately regard each other with pi ofound distrust,
and that the oscillations visible in the Egyptian
public posture toward the USSR during 1974 could
well continue. It is therefore conceivable if some-
what improbable that in the event of another crisis
in Soviet-Egyptian relations, possibly induced by
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further Soviet reiiegiig of promised arms ship-
It-fits, Sa(lat could take sudden action to (jelly
Soviet naval units use of Egyptian) ports, despite
the Soviet coatracl,ual right to Such use,
Also possible but presently even more )mlikely
Is the opposite alternative-the emergence of cir-
cull)stances Under which Sadat would agree to an
expansion of the Soviet military presence in Egypt.
'I'herc is strong evidence that Sad at would be most
reluctant to (1o this, and that his preference Is in
fact to miiimize his dependence upon and military
association with the Soviet UUiou insL.fan? as his
political needs permit.'"
!n this connection, the most in-portai)t coisider-
ation for Sadat is the attitude of the Egyptian mili-
tary, which is the key factor in Sadat's hold on
power. At present, many Egyptian military leaders
are most anxious to receive Soviet spare ports and
additional weaponry, and would like Sadat to main-
tain sufficiently good relations with Moscow to
25X1
25X1
assure such deliveries, I Iowcv(-r, tile (wh1vilce is
antl>iguous as to how high it ))rlcc most Egyptla ii
military figtu?cs would be willing to pay to Moscow.
Sadat's ouster of the Soviet experts in 1972 was
generaily popular In the Egyptian artily, and there
is no present evidence of it telidcncy to insist that
Sadat grant an increased Soviet presence if this
should prove essential to secure Soviet hardware.
'I'I)c trend of future events_pulling Egypt toward
or away front it new round of fighting with Israel-
is likely to affect the evolution of Egyptian opinion
on how fain it will be necessary to propitiate the
USSR. There is reason to believe that Sadat's ability
to fend off' any future Soviet pressures for an in-
creased presence would be further strengthened if
a significant additional Israeli Sinai withdrawal
could be arranged, and tlle Suez Canal uuaaiwhile
reopened, thus satisfying the most essential Egyp-
tian war alms and increasi )g Egyptian incentives
to attempt to remain out of any future Middle East
fighting. On the ollicr hand, Egyptian involvement
in a new will. world for the time being greatly in-
crease Cairo's dependence on the USSR, particu-
larly if it led to an Egyptian def( it. In the latter
event, the Egyptian need for Sodct help could
become sufficiently grave to induce Sadat to ac-
cept. or indeed, request additiu;ual Soviet facilities
and forces in Egypt.
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