THE DANISH STRAITS AND LAW OF THE SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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INPOLOO
No Foreign Dissent
The Danish Straits
and Law of the Sea
GCR/ RP-75-21
May 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Claislfied by 019641
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11632 exemption category:
? 3I1(1(2), and (3)
Automatically declass fled on:
date Impossible to determine
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I\'o 1 rn'('l,.,n Uis.ti('m
Page
Summary .............................................. 1
History ............................................. 2
The Straits -- A Vital Part of Denmark .............. 3
Soviet Regional Interests ............................ 4
Naval Transit ...................................... 5
Military Overflight ................................. 8
Commercial Traffic .................................. 8
Navigational Hazards ................................ 9
The Pollution Threat ................................ 11
Outlook ............................................. 12
Maps
The Baltic Sea .......................... Follows Text
The Danish Straits ...................... Follows Text
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No Foo-i;.;n I)iss('111
THE DANISH STRAITS AND LAW OF THE SEA
Summary (C)
The Danish Straits, for centuries a vital link in the major
maritime trade routes between the Baltic Sea and the North
Atlantic (see maps), figure prominently in Law of the Sea
(LOS) negotiations concerning the issue of vessel passage
through and air flight over -international straits. A regime
of innocent passage* has traditionally governed vessel transit
in passages, such as the Danish Straits, that are overlapped by
the conventional 3-mile** territorial sea. Since a projected
expansion of the territorial seas to 12 miles will overlap more
than 100 straits around the world, including such critical
passages as Gibraltar and Malacca, the United States and the
Soviet Union are gravely concerned about maintaining their right
to transit these straits unhindered by any bordering state
regulations or toll charges. American and Soviet strategic
interests further require submerged submarine transit and
military overflight through international straits.
The major naval powers hope to obtain the right of free
transit*** through and over all international straits, regardless
of width, at the Third United Nations LOS Conference. This
has met with firm opposition from Denmark and other states that
seek exclusion from a regime of unimpeded transit for those
straits less than 6 miles in width. Denmark's influence among
the Nordic nations and within NATO and Common Market councils
makes it a formidable opponent of the straits objectives of
the United States and the Soviet Union.
* Innocent passage is the principle that allows only those
vessels considered not prejudicial to the peace, good order,
or security of the coastal state to pass freely through the
territorial sea of a foreign state.
** Distances throughout this report are in nautical miles
unless specified otherwise.
***Free transit is defined as unimpeded transit by ships and
aircraft through and over straits used for international
navigation.
NOTE -- This paper was produced by the Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research. Comments or questions may be directed
to Code 143, Extension 2404.
25X1A9a
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Denmark appears determined to avoid any loss of sovereignty
over the Danish Straits and probably can he expected to reject
any LOS treaty that would require straits states to permit
unimpeded transit through all straits in all circumstances.
Copenhagen believes that the necessity to guard against pollution
threats from -increasing tanker traffic; the need to maintain
Danish control over cross-straits ferry traffic; the national
commitment to resist Soviet pressure to increase its influence
in the Danish Straits; and the fear of submerged transit by
Soviet submarines all combine to require Denmark to oppose any
proposed change, however subtle, in the degree of control it
presently exercises over the Danish Straits.
History (U)
From the 14th to the mid-19th century Denmark controlled the
entrances to the Daltic and claimed virtually complete sovereignty
over the Danish Straits. Foreign ships passing through the Straits
(the majority via the Sound) were required to "strike the top sail"
to the King and to pay "Sound Dues." Even after the eastern coast
of the Sound was ceded to Sweden in 1658, Denmark claimed that
the Sound was still Danish territory. The 1857 Treaty of Copenhagen
signed by the leading maritime powers eliminated payment of passage
dues and decreed that:
-- no duties were to be charged,
-- pilotage was not to be compulsory, and
-- the lights and buoy system in the Straits
were to be maintained by Denmark.
The Treaty also established the right of unimpeded navigation through
the Straits, as Denmark agreed "not to subject any ship, on any
pretext, to detention or hindrance in the passage of the Sound or
Belts."
During the Crimean, Franco-Prussian, and Russo-Japanese Wars,
Denmark allowed passage of warships through the Straits. During
World War I, however, Denmark was forced by Germany to mine all
three straits. Warships were prohibited, and merchant vessels were
only permitted by day under pilotage. The Straits were again
subjected to intensive mine laying operations while under German
control during World War II.
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The Straits -- A Vital Part of Denmark (U)
At the Third LOS Conference the United States, USSR, and
other maritime nations are seeking the right of unimpeded transit
through international straits, regardless of their width. Both
Denmark and Sweden, however, support retention of the existing
innocent passage regime for the Danish Straits and other straits
6 miles wide or narrower. The Danes have indicated they will
support an unimpeded transit regime for international straits
only if the Danish Straits are excepted. While it primarily
seeks an exclusion on the basis of the Danish Straits being
narrower than 6 miles, Copenhagen also feels that the passages
qualify for exemption as a "regime strait" subject to treaties
now in force.*
The Danes claim that a right of passage comparable to the free-
dom of navigation that exists on the high seas has never been in
effect in the Danish Straits, where a special regime, based on
treaties, customs, and the national legislation of Denmark and
Sweden, hus been developed over the years. Denmark and Sweden feel
that this current regime, having served the interests of both the
coastal states and the international community for many years,
should continue in force. Copenhagen views the special 6-mile
exception for the Straits as a necessity to protect "a vital
part" of its territory.
Danish spokesmen indicate that the primary difficulties in
reaching a solution for the Straits issue are political and
psychological -- the Danes are unwilling to relinquish control
over all vessels transiting the Straits and to accept high seas
corridors that would separate principal Danish islands.
Compelling historical, geographical, and cultural factors
combine to provide the emotional foundation for a determined
insistence on the preservation of the present regime in the
Danish Straits. The Danish coastal archipelago, comprising 500
islands, of which more than a hundred are inhabited, has always
been considered to be the heart and core of the nation. For
centuries Danish unity has rested on maritime communications that
existed through the Sound and within the inland waters of the
Great and Little Belts. The heavy ferry traffic across the
straits is vital to the Danish economy. Denmark has been defined
as a "sea state based upon the political and technical mastery
of the Baltic Straits." The sea has deeply influenced the
* The Dardanelles and Bosporus, governed by the Montreux Convention,
are an example of a "regime strait."
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attitudes of the Danish people. No Dane lives more than 30 miles
from the nearest coast. The Danes regard the sea as a friend,
a source of food, a place for recreation, the "only way to travel,"
and a source of inspiration.
Soviet Regional Interests
The USSR has long had a vital interest in the Baltic and its
approaches and has repeatedly attempted to gain participation in
the management of the Straits. Denmark's decision to Join NATO
in 1949 brought violent Soviet protests, and NATO naval maneuvers
in the western Baltic have periodically triggered Soviet attacks
on the "imperialist aggressive plans of NATO." The USSR has
claimed that the Baltic is not an open sea but is a regional
water body in which warships of non-Baltic countries should be
prohibited. Soviet scholars have maintained that the Baltic states
have the right to blockade the Straits to all foreign warships
and the exclusive right to establish a navigational regime in
the Straits that would insure its proper maintenance and pro-
tection. The Soviets were especially provoked by the 1951
Royal Danish Decree that imposed navigational restrictions on
non-NATO warships transiting the Straits. (U)
The Baltic Sea area is also important to the Soviets because
of its extensive shipbuilding, petroleum storage, and marine repair
facilities. It has additional value as a relatively remote
exercise area for naval forces and is an ideal site for military
training and equipment testing. Baltic naval ports (see Figure 1),
such as Leningrad, Baltiysk, Gdansk, and Rostock, have highly
developed logistical capabilities to support amphibious operations
intended to secure the Straits. (U)
The USSR has had a longstanding interest in protecting its
northern flank from an attack by NATO and in protecting its
supply lines in the Baltic, which could become critically
important during wartime operations. The growing naval strength
of West Germany and the possible introduction of nuclear forces
into Denmark and the Baltic approaches are major Soviet concerns.
Moscow also realizes that the Soviet Baltic Fleet could be
quickly immobilized in the event of war by the mining of the
Straits. (U)
The primary mission of the Soviet Baltic fleet is to
counter the threat of NATO naval forces (Soviet military
writings continue to indicate concern over the possibility
of NATO naval forays in the Baltic). Its secondary responsi-
bilities includc the surveillance of the Baltic exits and the
support of amphibious landing operations in adjacent coastal
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areas, such as the Danish coastal archipelago. Its probable
wartime mission would be to gain control of the Danish Straits
and then reinforce Soviet naval strength in the North Atlantic. (U)
The USSR feels that its Danish Straits position of unimpeded
passage does not in any way contradict its longstanding Baltic
"closed sea" policy. The Soviets have attempted to effect this
policy by urging all riparian states to join in agreements to
make the Baltic a "sea of peace." The Soviets view such an
agreement as the legal foundation for a regime in which they
would probably be foremost among equals. They have also
attempted to further Baltic unity with proposals for jointly
cooperatinu in marine research, rescue at sea, fishery studies,
and marine pollution abatement projects. There has been some
Scandinavian apprehension that the USSR might use regional
pollution agreements and restrictive clauses requiring intensive
"pollution checks" for NATO and other non-Baltic vessels as a
device to exclude non-Baltic warships and military support
vessels (possibly including tankers) from the Baltic Sea and
Danish Straits. (U)
The USSR has also attempted to enlist the assistance of its
Warsaw pact allies in an effort to further its Baltic policies.,
Poland hosted a 1973 convention in Gdansk on fisheries and the
protection of the living resources of the Baltic Sea. The
official program stated that "apart from the area of the Baltic
Sea, the convention encompasses also the Great and the Little
Belts." Poland stated that it was also ready to "embark upon
broadly conceived international cooperation in all fields
concerning the region." In addition to a need for cooperative
efforts by Baltic states, Poland felt that a "joint preventive
policy in relation to other users of the Baltic" should be
developed. The Soviets and their allies have always been very
careful to include the "Baltic" or "Danish" Straits together
on every policy move that involves regional cooperation. (OUO)
Naval Transit
Military and strategic considerations have triggered much
of the controversy involving the Danish Straits during recent
LOS discussions. The strategic significance of the waterways
to the USSR and NATO have given them an importance befitting
the title of "Gibraltar of the North." (U)
The Danish Straits are a link between Scandinavia and
continental Europe that could conceivably become a barrier
across access routes of the Soviet Union's Baltic fleet. The
Kiel Canal is the major alternate route for entry to and exit
from the Baltic Sea. (U)
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Both the United States the and USSR feel that the right of
innocent passage will not necessarily assure "free transit" for
military traffic through international passages, such as the
Straits. Under present rules of innocent passage, agreed to in
1958, submerged passage of submarines and uncontrolled overflight
of aircraft may be prohibited by the coastal state.* A number of
straits states also insist that under the innocent passage
doctrine, they have the right to require notification from
foreign warships prior to transit. (U)
The United States and the USSR insist that the LOS Convention
guarantee free transit through international straits', qualified
by necessary safety and navigational procedures. Underlying
their LOS policies is a fundamental concern for the security
of strategic waterways, such as the Danish Straits. Both
countries cautiously view any LOS straits proposal that would
alter the present Danish Straits regime. (OUO)
The Danes have stated that it is vital to their national
interest to prohibit unrestricted passage of Soviet warships
through the Danish Straits. The 1951 Royal Decree prohibits
passage of more than three foreign warships simultaneously
through Danish waters and requires that transit be made during
daylight hours. The Danes are concerned about the possibilities
of submerged Soviet transits through the Straits, and have stated
that it was possible for small and medium size submarines to effect
such transits without being identified. The military potential
of the Straits for underwater passage has not gone unnoticed by the
USSR. Soviet LOS writings have pointed out the suitability of the
Great Belt for submarine transits. The Danes have also expressed
concern about the potential for Soviet clandestine underwater
activities. Most military experts have tended to discount this
threat since the narrow and relatively shallow channels in the
Straits make clandestine submerged transits impractical. (C)
The Danes have indicated growing concern over the Soviet
bloc Baltic Sea maneuvers which have been drawing ever closer
to the Straits. In previous years, Warsaw Pact maneuvers were
held off the coasts of Poland or the Soviet Baltic Republics.
In 1974 communist fleets maneuvered in East German waters
only 55 miles from Denmark. The head of Denmark's military
intelligence said in a recent Danish radio broadcast that
* According to Danish naval regulations, foreign submarines
shall remain surfaced with their colors shown and foreign
aircraft must comply with Danish air traffic control directives
when passing over the Sound and Great Belt. The Little Belt
is designated as part of Danish inland waters.
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increasing numbers of Warsaw Pact naval patrols had been
identified even closer to Denmark and that for the first time
Soviet bloc forces had begun to conduct maneuvers in the
Kattegat north of Sjaelland (Zealand). (U)
The official position of the Soviets in 1974 was that the
Danish Straits legal regime "is regulated by international
agreements specifically relating to such straits." The Soviets
believe that the concept of innocent passage has never been nor
can it ever be applied to such straits. They contend that
the Copenhagen Treaty of 1857 specifically stipulated provisions
establishing freedom of passage in the Straits. While the Soviets
interpret the current status as being a regime of unimpeded
transit, they strictly adhere to Denmark's three-ship and daylight
hour transit rules for naval vessels. They maintain that their
insistence on unimpeded straits passage does in no way indicate any
intention to use the Danish passages in any manner prejudicial to
the interests of Denmark and Sweden. (OUO)
The Soviet argument against an innocent passage regime in
strategic straits is that it gives the "last word" on enforcement
and control procedures to the coastal state. The USSR feels
that Denmark, a member of NATO, may tend toward the adoption
of an "innocent passage" regime that would discriminate against
Soviet transit rights. The Soviets were unwilling at Caracas to
provide explicit assurances that an "innocent passage" regime
prevails in the Danish Straits, but they appeared amenable to a
private understanding that the LOS Convention would not alter
the status quo in those passages. (C)
Despite their strongly expressed differences in defining
and interpreting the nature of the Danish Straits regime, all
interested parties -- Denmark, Sweden, the USSR, U.S., etc. --
basically agree on the desirability of continuing present
policies for maritime traffic transiting the Straits. (U)
The projected bridge and tunnel projects to connect the major
islands in the Straits area have been mentioned by the Danes as
undertakings that must not be interfered with by the provisions
of a new LOS treaty. A transportation project package introduced
by Premier Anker Jorgensen in 1973, but not yet approved by the
Danish Parliament, provides for the realization of the following
projects by 1985: (a) a bridge over the Great Belt between
Zealand and Fyn, (b) a railroad tunnel between Helsingor and
Halsingborg, (c) a bridge and tunnel across the Sound between
Copenhagen and Malmo, and (d) an international airport on the
island of Saltholm east of Copenhagen. Due to economic con-
straints and environmental considerations in Denmark, these
projects have encountered growing opposition. (U)
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The Danish transportation project proposals have also met with
negative reactions ire the USSR. In 1973, Soviet Chairman Aleksey
Kosygin stated that Denmark's plans for the construction of
bridges and tunnels in the Danish Straits were an international
question and that the Dares should consult the USSR and other
interested countries before proceeding further. The following
year, the Russians submitted draft articles on straits at the
Caracas session of the LOS Conference which contain a passage
stating, "the coastal state shall not place in the straits
any installations which could interfere with or hinder the
transit of ships." Although the Danes have provided assurances
that international proprieties would be fully satisfied, Kosygin's
comments are another example of Soviet efforts to interfere with
Copenhagen's authority over the Danish Straits. (S)
Military Overflight (S)
Overflights of strategic areas, such as the Danish Straits,
have also been a thorny LOS problem. Both the United States
and the Soviet Union support LOS Conference proposals that call
for all aircraft to have the same freedom of overflight over
such straits as aircraft have on the high seas. Both Denmark and
Sweden, however, feel that the problem of overflight should not
be dealt with at all at a LOS Conference. According to Danish
sources many commercial air routes pass over the Straits.
Unrestricted "slights over the area could interfere with normal
traffic in established international air corridors. The Danes
feel that uncontrolled overflights of the Straits could poten-
tially force Denmark to close down its entire air defense system.
Commercial Traffic (U)
More than 100,000 ships pass through some part of the Danish
Straits each year and more than 76,000 vessels make complete
transits (see following Table). The bulk of the traffic passes
through the Sound and often stops at the major Scandinavian ports
of Copenhagen, Malmo, and Halsingborg. The Sound is the most
direct route between the Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea,
being 120 to 160 miles shorter than the other two straits.
Larger ships, una,~ble to manage the Sound's shallow depths, pass
through the deeper channels of the Great Belt, which has become
the major passage for tankers and other deep-draft ships. The
Little Pelt is used mainly for intra-Danish trade, and Aarhus
and Fredericia are gaining in importance as transit points
betwean Jutland and Fyn. The Little Belt is also used as an
alternate to the Great Belt in stormy weather.
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Danish Straits Mari time Traffic
Number of Vesse'Is*
(Complete Transit)
Sound Great: Be 1t l.itt:le 8e1 t
'rran si
t From
Trans i
t from
Transit From
North
Sou th
North
South
TOTAI
29,151
15,531
12,106
12,186
3,819
3,605
76,398
26,210
15,841
10,891
10,379
4,685
3,877
71,883
26,614
15,438
12,155
11,496
4,962
3,911
74,576
24,061
17,156
15 , 263
15,079
3,857
3,563
78,979
23,921
17,688
1 5,876
15,181
4,267
3 , 924
80,857
1972
23,725
15,727
14,514
13,880
4,307
3,935
76,088
* A1.1 vessels ? rc over 50 gross registered ton:;.
Source: .1974 banish Stdtisticd11 Yearbook, Copenhagen.
The major alternate commercial shipping route to the Danish
Straits is the Kiel Canal, which is situated entirely within
West German territory. Ships using this canal must pay a toll,
but successive improvements have made it a more competitive
route. For a ship bound from Leningrad to London, the Kiel
route is about 220 miles shorter than passage via the Sound.
Major drawbacks of the Kiel Canal are its increasing traffic
congestion, slowness of passage, and least depth of 31 feet.
Other less important shipping alternatives include (a) the
White Sea-Baltic Canal, which cannot accommodate vessels larger
than 3,000 tons and has a restricted navigational season of
mid-May to early November due to ice; and (b) the Gota Canal
in Central Sweden, which is used mainly for tourist excursions.
Navigational Hazards (U)
The Danish Straits are the only natu,al ^xits from the Baltic
Sea to the North Atlantic. The gateways to the Baltic -- the
Sound (Oresund), Great Belt (Store Baelt including Langeland
Belt), and Little Belt (Lille Baelt) -- are shallow, relatively
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narrow, and have constricted navigation channel"; I:hroughouI
much of their length (see Table, Figure 2). The Stra i t; are
generally open for navigaLion throughout. the year; ice condi-
tions, although highly variable, are not. normally an obstacle
to shipping operations. I n especially severe winters, however,
ice may bc: it hindrance during January and February, particularly
on the b.anish side of t:he Sound and ill certain harbors within
the Great 13e1t. Poor visibility and 'ow ceilings can be a
problem from November to March, and sea mists known as hav(lusen
are occasiona11y troublesome during the summer months. ]heavy
fog (visibility less than 5/13 oi", it mile) occurs some '18 days
per year at Copenhagen, mostly from October to March.
Highly variable currents are prevalent and unpredictable
rip and tidal currents are active in many parts of the Straits.
Serious navigational hazards include shoals, reefs, projecting
rocks, mines, shipwrecks, submarine cables, fishing nets, and a
.bevy of World War II ammunition and chemical dumping grounds
often situated da,;,rerously close to major shipping lanes.
Little Belt, situated between Jutland (Jylland) and Fyn
Island, is the westernmost and the longest (68 miles) of the
Baltic exits. It varies considerably in depth and width, and
much of the adjoining coastline is indented by many shallow
fiords and bays. The northern part of the passage is narrow, and
the central section is encumbered by numerous shoals and offshore
rocks. Near Fredericia, the northern part contains a tortuous
segment known as Snaevringen (the Narrows), which is rendered even
more hazardous by tricky currents that often set obliquely to the
channel direction. The most dangerous stretch of the central part
of the Little Belt is an extremely narrow channel southeast of
Bago Island that often requires local pilotage. The southern
part of the strait is the safest for navigation, although many
channels southwest of Fyn are only suitable for smaller vessels.
The Little Belt is said to be "preferable to the Great Belt in
bad weather" because tides, waves, and storm actions have a
relatively low intensity' compared to that of the Great Belt.
The Great Belt, the centrally positioned strait, is bordered
by Sjaelland (Zealand) and Lolland Islands on the east, and by
Fyn and Langeland on the west. The Great Belt is overall the
widest and deepest of the three straits, but it also has the
most convoluted navigation channels and the most extensive series
of navigational hazards. The passage is notable for the numerous
coastal shoals and reefs that extend for considerable distances
offshore. Strong variable currents are prevalent, often attaining
their greatest speeds near the many sandbars and rocky projectioaes
bordering the winding navigation lanes. Wrecks of sailing vessels
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pose a .Oec: i a l pro:) l cm near Langeland. Kor'sor, Ka l undborg , iin(I
(.)thee' Gr'i!aI 13{?11: ports pass(?ss narrow resIricted 0 pproi)rhP!, which
have required much dredging and tra i (.1h tens ng . the mo-) L reliable
channel for deep-draft vessels is Dybe Itende (t.he Deep Channel),
which has depth; exceeding 90 feat throuqhout. much of its length
and is almost o mandatory route for transit of the Great: Belt
in stormy wc!lther.
The Sound, the easternmost strait, lies between Denmark
and Sweden and is the shortest, most direct: rout(; into the Baltic.
Described as the "least confused of the three entrances to the
Baltic," this r Lrai t has traditionally been the major transporta-
tion artery between the North Sea and the 11,0 tic. I ts major
navigational restriction is a shallow limestone sill in the
southern part of the channel near Copenhagen. Drogden, the
primary channel on the Danish side, has been dredged to a least
depth of only 26 feet while iiintr?annan Channel in Swedish waters
has a least depth of only 23 feet. A veritable maze of shoals and
sand flats extend southward from Middclgrund, east of Copenhagen,
for a distance of nearly 20 miles. I n severe winter, drifting ice
has caused problems near Helsingor and between Zealand and the
Swedish island of Ven. Other navigational restrictions include a
large number of shipwrecks in the southeastern part of the passage
upwelling currents near Helsingor and Landskrona, and severe
silting problems at Koge and other sections along the Zealand
coastline.
The Pollution Threat (C)
The Danes feel that one of the basic objectives of the LOS
Conference is to organize cooperative efforts to combat marine
pollution while simultaneously avoiding unnecessary shipping
restrictions. They are worried about the growing probability
of maritime accidents and oilspills in the Straits because of
the increasing use of larger tankers in the already congested
shipping lanes. Denmark has stated that it will oppose any
LOS proposals that would tend to prevent enforcement of inter-
national vessel-source pollution standards by the Danes in the
Straits. The Danes believe that their pollution abatement goals
could be met if a special Danish Straits pollution regime were
to be set by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO). As a major commercial maritime state,
Denmark opposes any plan that would allow coastal states to set
vessel-source pollution standards pending establishment and
implementation of internationally agreed measures. Such a
program, it feels, could result in a maze of differing
pollution regimes based on the national legislation of the
coastal states.
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sI (.ur I
Denmark has already trblished navigation rtaies for ve,;sels
trans I 1 1 1 1 ( 1 the Grea I. Bel I. Thos e ru I es requ f re the use of it
pi lot and radiol.0ophone contact, wi Lh Danish cont.rol poIIIL!;,
and Iimn a vessel's (Ira f1. to 15 meters (49 feel.). Claiming
that these rules arc often ignored, Denmark has it ttemp Led to
strengthen I Ls traffic control proc
a edures by+ek I ng pa ;sage of
n IMCO resolution on the safe navigaLion of' the Great Belt.
Denmark also feels that this vital route is riot, currently
safe for use by ship.; larger than 100,000 dead V;^ight tons (dwt)
and drawing more Lhan 15 meters draft. However, transits by
oil and liquefied natural gas tankers between 100,000 and
125,000 dwt are increasing, grid a petroleum transshiixnent port
at Gdansk, Poland, scheduled to become operational in mid-1975,
has been designed to accommodate 150,000 dwt tankers. The Danes
fear that accidents involving such large tankers could cause
immensc damage to the marine environment. This increasing
threat is it major reason why Denmark and Sweden are pressing for
stricter controls over navigational procedures and traffic move-
ments in thc. Straits. Tankers now using the Straits are straining
the limited capacities of the narrow, shallow waterways.
The Danish Hydrographic Office is currently conducting surveys
in order tc provide more accurate charts for the Straits. Survey
work in the Great Belt was completed in 1974 a'id work is currently
underway in the Sound. The Office is conducting research on
water movement prediction in the Straits, which it feels is
essential for a better understanding of currents, salinity,
chemistry, and pollution affecting the marine environment.
Denmark plans to deepen the Great Belt and possibly the Sound
and Little Belt to a minimum channel depth of 17 meters (56 feet).
Proposed plans for further deepening of the shipping channels
to 30 meters (98 feet) remain undecided, pending the outcome of
present studies and funding proposals. The Danes have stated
that they may turn to other Baltic countries for a cooperative
effort to deepen the waterways and to share the economic burden.
This would appear to present an excellent opportunity for the
Soviets to float yet another Baltic "togetherness" proposal and
possibly gain some degree of control over Straits operations.
Outlook (C)
1. Denmark will continue to insist that the special regime
governing transit through the Danish Straits be retained. They
will support unimpeded passage through international straits
overlapped by territorial seas only if the Danish Straits are
granted a special exemption.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140006-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : Cl % pP86T00608R000600140006-6
?. the Uni ted States and the USSR must decide whether
Denmark's support Is necessary to achieve their major !trait-,
objectives in the LOS negotiations. The United States may
agree to a 6-mile exception For the Danish strait;, hat Soviet
intentions to acc:onanodate the Danes remain uncertain, me,
yuesCion of military overflight of straits may remain unresolved
at. the Geneva session of the I.OS Conference.
3. International and local maritime trade will continue to
increase throughout the Danish Straits. Greater traffic densities
and larger petroleum tankers will become increasingly serious
problems in the Great (felt channels. To help minimize the risk
of maritime accidents and large of lspi l is in the Straits, Denmark
will continue to support more comprehensive navigational regula-
tions and improvement programs.
- 13 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140006-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140006-6
TS-11E C,/,LT'C
"l'11r
11(IJ1/.:h . 1?(!lr:r rvrr
lhr ?11/ r,nlrrrrr! n il.: Jrtur!
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Figure 1
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140006-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600140006-6
Main nhippilq chnnnnl
A Nnvicintlon hrznro ishonla, nhipwrocks, etc.)
In the vicinity of mnl:i chnnnnl
-?- t)ammark-Swvdon territorinl
son boundary
Lint hymotry
n n1 ,n
metern
1 711
U"du nl MJnn
.f1 ;'ll
'dntnln hldne
lit %f1 111
K dn1TY.1
(Jylland)
Jutland
1ernln9 I?'
Denmark
No /?th
Velle
ij~ e
Approved-For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T006( 0/01.4006-6
Mph
 Approved For Rerlease 1999/09/26 :,CIA-RDP8ST00608R000600140006-6 - ----
1,11c Sound
(Or "slln(I)
Flip Shaw (Shagene Odd")
tilnlulo rMp"
V __ Jn
Kdonw~trnr,
TUNNEL
Helsingor
Kattegat
Koge
Liugt
Koge
"INcscribed ( 1 ' thr `h'rt,SL c?oll-
(7(s((/ of lhr /hrvc ('1 Ircrttc'cs to
thf' Baltic', Thee Soror(1 bas lra-
(Iifiotr((l11/ 1)cCn the major tr(rtts-
7)(Irt (it ion arter!) I)-,t 1l?C('n III(,.
,Yorih ,S'ca and the Baltic,"
?Kalundborg
Ros~ildo
Approved For Release 199/0
Helsingor. , ~Halsingbo' lrg
Sjaelland
\ landsk
Th Sdund
(Or sued)
COPENHAGN\
(KOBENHAVN)
Q $alfholm
I~ 1
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Swe
ao@ao1
Bnthymotry
Q 4 10
motors
Built-up urban area
den
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 Sea.
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H~ ruing ty
",
l unll~~iih~n
1.
I
~ II
L!~~e
H,A
I.,Holsinhro
Den
Veilo
Sn rP v r I nnnn
Rnndcre.
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The 'umlhel-l", purl of litc Lilllc 13(')t
is n.arrorll, u.tr(1 liie cc,1111-vl ;,cclitIi is
(rn.C'un2OCred h7/ rz.~trrzl~~rou ,'1r. MI,; urrd
of fslaorc roc)c1I. Near Yrcdc,"icia, llrc pogo
segmrr.ent icrzorour. as ~Srzierrirrrre~r O.he
Narrow) .... '
Oat l'spl(?l n '
kro
Physical Dimensions and Yearly Traffic of the
Danish Straits
Length'
Maximum width'
Minimum width'
Minimum channel width'
Maximum channel depth
(approximate)
Minimum channel depth
Maritime traffic, 1972
(number of vessels
making complete transit)
Little Belt Great Belt The Sound Federal Republic
CO 65
5tl
14.9 15.2 25.3
.3 5.8 2.2
.2 .1 1.0
265 ft. 190 ft. 125 ft.
36 ft. 42 ft. 23 ft. "Husum
8,242 28,394 39,452
?~ Mitt- ,nil Auni/ary r,.Un s, : falinn
~.-.. n,r nnl h,?~csa.r,IJ aun,nnvr
(Jylland)
./utland
mark
502393 475
of
Schleswig
Germany
Frederic
Lange!
Uurlgar? :Irtr(t
Eckernfdide..
n
 Koge
999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608
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(Ordrund)
`
Mons
,(lint
Langeland
den
Trclleborq
largemen!~
Itic
German Democratic
Republic
i I.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T0060 Figure:?
Kerterninde
0
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Helsingor.' \~lHf Isingbo
l
rill
COPENHAGEN~:
(KOBENHAVN)'
(*) Solthohn
Kaye
tiuyt
?Koge
Area of Erb
fkivns~
KKnt ') LP_
Ba
Mon
"Tile Great Bell. has be(x1)11c Ii'e
/11(11or passage for I a)11,'crs (111(1 r 1/1('1 , "?"'
deep-dr-aJ/ ships. Dennim-A, feels IN
this nilal route is not c1(rreu/111 for
ships larger Mail 1/)O.000 dtv1. (Cud
dra~oiug lrwre Mau l5 ulc~lers."
rg Swe
1 t Landskl
~{ t' 1~f~. !1 I/l; r,' t'11/ruut'(':; to
0006 9P 49,04 ;;t,lrutl 11 n;; 11(1~~
dilirll!(!l/!/ ix-1'11 Ili(' lirtljllI. 11-film.
porl(ll i(lu (11101/1 i)4'/ 11 t'TT! /he
Nor/h Scu (1'11(1 /he Ifullio."