STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010025-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: February 5, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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ecret
No Foreign Diaaer,i
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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
'27
No. 0423/75
February 5. 1975
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No orelgn 2asem ,on ro a Zasem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemptimi category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication Is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Officc of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Jordan: Army Morale Up, But Problems
Still Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Kuwait: Long-Term Changes in Socio-
Political Structure Anticipated . . . . . . . 2
Angola: Jonas Savimbi and UNITA . . . . . . . 3
Tanzania: Party Role Strengthened . . . . . . 6
Feb 5, 1975
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Jordan
Army Morale Up, But Problems StiZZ Exist
Morale in Jordan's armed forces reportedly has
improved significantly over the past few months,
chiefly as the result of pay raises and improved
officers' housing. Nevertheless, senior officers,
are distressed over
affect the forces' combat efficiency.
These officers are concerned that the army,
because of the minimal role it played in the October
1973 war, has become a less aggressive force tb an
it was formerly. This decline in esprit, together
with Jordan's lack of an effective air defensee
system, they believe, places the armed forces in a
highly vulnerable position in the event of hostilities-.
The officers also continue to be bothered by
what they regard as the poor quality of leadership
in the army, particularly with regard to tactical
and strategic planning. The absence of broad
planning, they say, will mean that the armed forces
will play only a reactive role in a new war. Exercises
held for King Husayn are said to be set pieces con-
ducted with advance knowledge that the King would be
visiting the units concerned. In addition, the
officers claim that training has been seriously cur-
tailed because of shortages of fuel and anvaunition
and that staff officers offer little supervision
over such training activities as are undertaken
unless they know that senior officers wi], be present.
The critical officers reportedly be:i.eve, finally,
that the good effect on morale of the recent pay in-
crease was diluted because it was insufficient to
meet the rising cost of living and because it turned
out to be less than rumors had led the military to
expect. While armed forces personnel are supposed
to be able to buy basic commodities through the com-
missary system, in reality enlisted men often find
that officers have bought all available supplies of
such items. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
(143-6119)
Feb 5, 1975
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Kuwait
Long-Term Changes in Soeio-Political
Structure Anticipated
The US embassy in Kuwait believes that Kuwaiti
society will undergo a dramatic reshaping during
the next decade. The embassy judges that the exist-
ing pattern, characterized by an emphasis on tribal
and family 'iembership as a determinant of one's
place in life, will be replaced by a "social demo-
cratic" system in which the Sabahs--the ruling
family--will lose much of their power.
The results of the recent parliamentary election
are seen by the embassy as a harbinger of future
changes. Although the Sabahs and their traditional
tribal allies captured a majority of the 50 assembly
seats, many young liberals were elected. The embassy
sees these newcomers as a powerful social force,
anxious to introduce basic changes in Kuwaiti life
such as the legalization of political parties, giving
trade unions the right to strike and bargain, grant-
ing equal rights to women, any generally relaxing
restrictions imposed by Islam or the Sabaiis.
Another catalyst for change will be the military,
according to the embassy. Thus far, the officer
corps has been content to play its professional mili-
tary role, but this will almost certainly change.
The embassy sees the military eventually wanting
more of a "piece of the action," higher pay and
benefits, and a greater voice in the setting of
national policy.
Kuwait's large expatriate community---estimated
to make up 60 percent of the country's 900,000
inhabitants--may also become a pressure group inter-
ested in bettering its lot and acquiring a bigger
share of the country's affluence. These expatriates,
which include about 200,000 Palestinians, hold key
posts in government and commerce, but the regime
considers them outsiders and has denied them many
of the benefits accorded citizens. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(143-7895)
Feb 5, 1975 2
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Angola
Jonas Savimbi and UNITA
During the past several months, Jonas Savimbi,
leader of the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola, has emerged as the most active
and politically skillful of Angola's three national-
ist leaders. This new role is especially surprising
in view of Savimbi's position throughout the Angolan
insurgency as the little-known head of the terri-
tory's smallest and seemingly least effective
nationalist group.
It was largely because of Savimbi's service as
an intermediary that Angola's two other nationalist
leaders, Holden Roberto and Agostinho Neto, agreed
to a meeting of the three leaders in Mombasa, Kenya,
in early January. There, the three worked out a
common position to present to the Portuguese several
days later in negotiations that led to the independence
accord.
Savimbi was the most
articulate and best intormea or the insurgent leaders.
Since those negotiations, Savimbi has been
politically active in the territory while his rivals
remained outside Angola. Prior to his arrival in
Luanda for the installation of the transitional gov-
ernment on January 31, Savimbi made a whistle-stop
tour through several important towns in central
Angola. Officials from the US consulate were impressed
by the "size, good humor, and organization" of the
reception Savimbi received at two of the stops and by
the notable participation of whites. According to the
US observers, Savimbi made an effective presentation,
calling for increased production, racial cooperation,
and better educational opportunities, without sounding
ideological or controversial. Savimbi reportedly is
now beginning to receive sizable financial assistance
from well-to-do whites in central Angola.
(Continued)
Feb 5, 1975 3
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Savimbi apparently believes that his organiza-
tion can attract enough support to give it a major
policy-making voice in a coalition government. The
campaign for that support will not be easy, despite
Savimbi's wide popularity in central and southern
Angola. In the north, particularly around Luanda,
the National Union will run into strong rural support
for Holden Roberto's National Front for the Libera-
tion of Angola and equally intense urban support for
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
Savimbi's organization may be on a collision course
with the Popular Movement because of its assumption
of the labor portfolio in the transitional govern-
ment in an attempt to counter the Popular Movement's
strong influence over organized labor in the territory.
Although it is not clear whether Savimbi's newly-
displayed political skills can win him a leading role
in an independent Angola, hfs will not be easily, if
at all, overshadowed by hi:more powerful and better-
known rivals. He is off to a fast start and has
avoided controversy and ideological commitments, a
tactic that may work to his political advantage over
the long run:
Several other factors are likely to contribute
heavily to Savimbi's political success. His popular-
ity is based on tribal ties with the Ovimbundu, the
large,it single ethnic group in Angola. They inhabit
the densely populated and prosperous central high-
lands, where Savimbi established the National Union
in 1966. These tribal ties give him a potential
political base out of proportion to the size of his
organization's military forces, which numbers
approximately 3,000 trained troops.
The central highlands also is an important
agricultural center and a main marshalling point on
the Benguela Railroad, Angola's major transportation
network. The railroad provides an important source
of revenue for Angola as a carrier of copper from
Zaire and Zambia.
(Continued)
Feb 5, 1975 4
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In addition, Savimbi maintained his headquarters
inside Angola during the insurgency and operated
without significant foreign support. This has
nabled him to claim he is not obligated to or under
the influence of foreign powers.
Savimbi's ability to survive inside Angola has
prompted his rivals to charge that he made a deal
with the Portuguese. This accusation has not hurt
him so far, however, and seems unlikely to do so in
the future, even though there was an informal cease-
ire between his forces and the Portuguese during
the later years of the insurgency. This arrangement
existed largely because the Portuguese found it
convenient to leave the National Union as a buffer
between them and Popular Movement forces in eastern
Angola. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(143-4380)
Feb 5, 1975 5
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Tanzania
Party Rote Strengthened
President Julius Nyerere has decided to
formalize the political supremacy of his party,
the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU),
over the government.
TANU's central committee--the party's top
policy making body--met in late January under
Nyerere's chairmanship and took a number of steps
intended to strengthen both its own and the party's
position. The government was directed to prepare
two constitutional amendments, ore institution-
alizing TANU as the top policy making organ in the
country, the other formalizing Tanzania's status
as a "socialist state." The central committee,
moreover, asserted its power to direct government
ministers to-appear before it and TANU subcommittees
to give an accounting of their ministries' opera-
tions.
The changes will make little difference
politically because TANU is already the sole legal
party and has long formulated official policy.
The US embassy in Dar es Salaam comments, however,
that the changes do represent another step in the
country's evolution toward a socialist political
system that closely regulates the daily life and
activities of all citizens. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(143-7228)
Feb 5, 1975
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