STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 31, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

CIAQ~~1 ~.
Middle Ea
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No.
0421 /75
AtrcaSouth.
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No Foreign Discern
9UITT Ka~m
Midd!e East
Africa
mouth Asia
Confidential
1';-~ 7
No. 0421/75
January 31, 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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CONFIDENTIAL
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Contents
Angola: Transitional Government Installed . . . 1
Kenya: Pragmatic Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . 3
Jan 31, 1975
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CONFIDENTIAL
Angola
Transitional Government InstdZZed
The black-dominated transitional government that
will prepare Angola for independence ne:t November
was formally installed in Luanda on January 31.
The government is based on an uneasy truce among
Angola's three rival nationalist group.; that is sure
.to be subjected to severe strains in the coming months.
The new Angolan regime is headed by a Portuguese
high commissioner and a presidential council composed
of one member from each of the groups with the chair-
manship rotated monthly. The high commissioner
represents Portugal's interests, but has no vote on
domestic issues. A cabinet of 12 ministers, with
portfolios equally divided among tht=: Portuguese and
the liberation groups, was also installed.
The leaders of the three groups have appointed
deputies to the presidential council in order to
remain free to engage in political activities. They
did not appear in Luanda for the installation
procedure.
Signs of strain have already emerged between
two of the groups. On January 25, an official of
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
destroyed some equipment at the government-run radio
station in protest against censorship of Front com-
muniques by staff members sympathetic to the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The next day,
Front members kidnapped the stati'on's deputy director
and beat him badly before releasing him. Both the
Front and the Popular Movement subsequently issued
communiques accusing the other of planning civil war.
After a decade of intense rivalry, sometimes
marked by armed clashes, cooperation among the groups
will not come easily, if at all. Indeed, antipathy
(Continued)
Jan 31, 1975 1
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between the National Front and the Popular Movement,
based on the personal ambitions and conflicting
ideologies of their : espective leaders, is so
strong that open warfare between them is a distinct
possibility. The National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola, the smallest of the three
groups, has emerged thus far as an effective inter-
mediary between the two organizations, but its
ability to continue in that role is likely to be
weakened by its own political preoccupations during
the transitional period. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Jan 31, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Kenya
Pragmatic Foreign .Policy
Nairobi's prompt approval of. Washington's pro-
posal, that the USS Enterprise visit Mombasa early
next month demonstrates the.Kenyatta government's
continued adherence to a pragmatic approach to
foreign affairs despite its growing sensitivity to
criticism from more militant African regimes. The
government's assent to the visit--with the request
that it be given minimum publicity--reflects the
Kenyans' hope of securing US equipment and training
for Kenya's armed forces.
The Kenyans know that the visit of the Enterprise
is likely to draw extensive criticism from Tanzania
and some other African states, as have earlier
appearances of US Navy ships in Mombasa. Tanzania
has berated Kenya on ideological grounds, blasting
it for alleged close association with the US and the
UK.
Over the last few months, Kenya has attempted
to associate itself more closely with other African
countries on broad issues. For example, Kenya has
gone on record in favor of making the Indian Ocean
a "zone of peace" and opposing a great power military
presence there--themes embraced ardently by Dar es
Salaam. Since taking office last October, Foreign
Minister Munyua Waiyaki has stepped up contacts with
African ambassadors in Nairobi, and made a trip to
several southern African countries. He also.arranged
for Kenya to host the meeting of Angolan nationalists
held in Nairobi in early January; Kenya's previous
involvement in southern African matters had been
minimal.
When the question of the Enter rise visit arose,
however, the government's higher interest in obtain-
ing US military items came to the fore. Nairobi has
been discussing the purchase of F-5E fighter aircraft,
A-4M attack bombers, helicopters, and training for
its officers in US military schools.
;Continued)
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Until recently Kenya accorded its military,estab-
lishment relatively low priority in allocating govern-
ment resources. As a result, its 9,000-man armed
force is much smaller and less well equipped than its
counterpart in Somalia or Uganda--Kenya's potential
adversaries. President Kenyatta's new-found concern
over defense has been spurred by the deterioration
of Kenya's relations with Ethiopia and the consequent
weakening of its military alliance with Addis Ababa.
The Kenyans have regarded the alliance as an important
constraint on possible adventurism by Somalia, which
covets part of Kenya's territory. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
Jan 31, 1975
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