MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 23, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R0004~~1~ ~'1~18~
No Furci~gn Di.r,iem
~4G1~~ a04[~
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Cenfidenti~l
27
No. 0415/75
January 23, 1975
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
No I'oreic~n Disoem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E, 0.11652, Pxemption category :
5 5B (1-, (2), and 13)
Automatically declassified
on: Data Irnpossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/~QT4 ~,~CTQ=RQP86T00608R000400010016-1
MIDDLE EAST -AFRICA -SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared .or regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - /~frica Division, Cffice of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other uffices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
EC-Iran: Support Grows in EC Council for
Preferential Trade Agreement 1
Malagasy Republic: Internal Rumblings 3
Angola: Returning Refugees May Cause Problems 4
India: Kashmir Agreement May be Imminent 6
Jan 23, 1975
Approved For Release 20001Fi -~P~8~~0608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/09/~Aidl~l~-~IQPPL6T00608R000400010016-1
EC~Iran
Suppar~ GY'UZJt1 in L'C Cotcnr.iZ for
P;~eferentiaZ Trccdr; ~lrr.rerrnent
The EC Council. has moved closer to a decision
on a preferential trade agreerent with Iran. Signs
of support for such a preferential agreement con-
tinue to grow.
pact;
25X6
}"rance_and Denmark support a broad preferential
The US and Italy would probably prefer not to
see a preferential arra.nyement signed, but do
T.reland opposes preferential treatment for
Iran, as does the EC Commission. Vice President
Soames has argued that such an agreement would lead
to a proliferation of demands for similar treatment
and would undermine assurances given to the tJS.
Preferentia~ treatment by the EC is a major goal
of the Shah and. he has shown a willingness to push
the issue despite the well known objections of_ the
US. In an ~',nterview this week with the German
magazine Der Spiegel, the Shah said that growing
economic ties between Iran and Europe gave leis
country the "absolute right to ask for preferential
treatment," and he vowed to push his case even harder
in the future. The Shah cited a French promise to
support Iran's dema:~d in the EC, and offered the
opinion that German support would ensure a successful
outcome.
(Contir:~:ed)
Jan 23, 1975
COPJFIDEPJTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/09~b~dF~~.N I ~IPL86T00608R000400010016-1
The Council has referred the matter back to the
permanent representatives ~~f the Nine in Brussels
with orders to move rapidly ~.n reaching a deci~~ion.
The Commission recommendations under study fal~.
short of a preferential arrangement, but call for
3.ndustrial cooperation with Iran and Tehran's
participation in the community's scheme of general-
ized preferences for developing countries. The
foreign ministers will reconsider the issue at their
next Council meetings on February 10 and ll.
(CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
25X1A
Jan 23, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/09~C'~VFd~~(~II~~#.$6T00608R000400010016-1
25X1X
Malagasy 1'tepublic
.Zn?Ger>uZ Pzcrn~ZingF
Armed forces were placed on a].crt on Januaz:y 2.3
and troog~s tools up posit.ioz-~::~ around government
buildings in 'Tananarive. These precautions may
presage an announcement of changes in the three-
ycar old military-civilian government headed by
General Ramazzantsoa.
Signs of serious divisions in tr,e military
have surfaced in recent weeks. According to the
Malagasy press, there was an attempted coup o~,
January 1; eleven junior of:icers and about 20
noncomzn~.ssioncd officers repor?t~d1y were sabse-
cluently arrested.
the dissension prob-
ably centers on a struggle far power between
Colonel Ratsimandrava, interior minister and head
of the c~enclarmerie, and army. Colonel Rabetafika,
the director general of the government and Rama-
nantsoa's right--hand man. Z'hoy have boon rivals
for influence since the government carne to power.
Their conflict l~artly reflects traditional ani-
mosity between the ger~darmeri~ and the army.
Ratsimandrava also probably resents Rabetafika's
access to Rarnanantsoa. Differences over recent
government economic measures may have sharpened
their rivalry. ~t'hey reportedly have exchanged
bitter words, with Ratsimandrava accusing Rabeta-
fika of taltiing bribes.
Up till now, IZamanantsoa has refrained from
taking sides in his subordinates' dispute. He may
;zow have desisted to make :ome changes before the
military unrest becomes more serious. (CONL'TD>NTTAL)
25X1A
Jan 23, 1975
COiJFIDEiJTIAL ?
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/09/'~0~11~1~~6T00608R000400010016-1
Angola
Neturning Refuges Ma;/ Cause ProbZemc
Included in the recent accord establishing a
transitional government for Angola are provisions
for the return to the territory of a large number of
Angolan refugees living in Zaire. If the refugees
decide ?to return,they will carry with them the
potential for serious political and economic disrup-
tion in the territory.
Although the exact number of refugees is unknown,
a Portuguese estimate of 750,000 appears reasonable.
The refugees fled to Zaire in the early 196Us follow-
ing a violent white reaction to the outbreak of insur-
gency by the Nationa~. Front for. the Liberation of
Angola. The front has since recruited heavily among
these refugees and has received financial support
from those who learned skills and established them-
selves in the Zairian economy.
The accord calls for the transitional government
to set up facilities for the return of these refugees,
preferably in time for them to vote in the constituent
assembly elections that are to be bald. They will
represent a powerful bloc of political support for
the National Front, as well as a source of military
recruits.
Having learned skills in Zaire, many of the
.refugees are likely to go to Luanda and other urban:
areas rather than return to the countryside. This
will put them in direct competition for jobs with
local blacks and whites. The whites, who already
feel their. jobs may be jeopardized, will not welcome
this additional. influx of labor. Moreove~?, most
black and white urban workers appear to favor the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, an-
other liberation group long in competition with the
National Front .
(Continued)
Jan 23, 1975 4
COiJF I DEfJTI/~L
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/09/'~4i~~1~~1~~6T00608R000400010016-1
After a decade of exile, many refugees speak
French as a firsr language and have been absorbed
into Zairian society. Some of them may decide to
remain in Zaire. The Zairian government, however,
beset by high unemployment and anxious to limit
foreign involvement in the economy, may well
encourage them to leave. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
Jan 23, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/O~f~~r ~~T~~86T00608R000400010016-1
India
ICashmir llgrecment May be Imminent
The New Delhi government and Sheilch 1lbdullah,
the I:ashmiri nationalist leader, appear close to an
agreement that will return the Sheikh to power in
Kashmir, but not dilute India's control over two
thirds of the disputed state.
During the past two years, emissaries of Prime
Minister'Gandhi and the autonomy-minded Sheilch have
held secret talks aimed at reaching an accord that
would make ICashmir's incorporation into the Indian
Union in 1947 more palatable to the predominantly
Muslim Kashmiris. ~t the same time, P1ew Delhi has
?tried to destroy any lingering notions amoncr the
I:ashmiris that India might. honor its pledge of 1947
to hold a plebiscite to determine whether they
would prefer accession to Pakistan.
following a round of talks in New Delhi last
week with Mrs. Gandhi, the Sheilch said an agreement
was "probable, " and he left for ICashmir to sound
out his followers. I-Ie is d~:e to return to Now
Delhi in a few days.
If i;he 68-year old iCashmiri leader signs an
agreement, he will reportedly be reinstated as :~ashmir's
prime minister. Ita was deposed and arrested in
1953 when he came out in favor of Kashmir's emer-
gence as a fully autonomous state 3uaranteed by
both India and Pakistan. In the last several years
he has made amends with Mrs. Gandhi and has acknow-
ledged the finality of ICashmir's accession to '
India. As part of the new settlement he reportedly
is willing to merge his political party, the
I~lc;biscite front, with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party
which controls the Y.ashmir government.
The conclusion of an agreement seems to hinge
on the Sheikh's acceptance of several key points
(Continued)
6
Jan 23, 1975
COiJFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010016-1
 Approved For Release 2000/09/'~j~~1~~6T00608R000400010016-1
including the right of the central government to
declare an emergency and talce control of the state
government and Mlle jurisdiction of the Indian
Supreme Court anc~ the national election commission
over Kashmiri territory.
Mrs. G