INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM CUBA'S US POLICY: READY FOR A CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060023-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 23, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
No Foreign Diraem
MICii~O~IL~~
Intelligence Memora.ndu.n~
Cuba's tIS Policy: Ready f?r a Change
Secret
~~
July 23, 1975
Ivo. 0748/75
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Nu Diss~ m A Grvud
I~uckgrounci Usc Only/Curitr~ gilled Dissc~rrr
Warning iVot4cs
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
Additional Warning
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
g 56 (11, (21, and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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July 23, 1975
Cuba's US Policy: Ready for a Change
Precis
Fidel Castro wants to negotiate an improvement in relations
with the US. He has said tl~is publicly; some of his top advisers are
urging liim to do so; and Moscow has pressed him in this direction.
He has made it clear, however, that:
? lze is in no hurry to restore full ties;
? h~ ~.~i!1 accept no loss of prestige ir: negotiating an improve-
ment;
? his demands will be stiff,?
? Ize expects the US to make the first formal move.
Castro resisted Soviet urgings in favor of detente until early last year. Brezh-
nev's visit to Cuba in January and February seemed to be the turning point. Since
then, the Cuban leader has biven signals through a variety ~f channels that he is
ready to talk. He has even attempted to plant the idea th~7t he expected talks to
begin after the Cuba-US anti?hijacking agreement in Febru~:~ry 1973, although the
evidence does not bear this out. In finally opting for detr.:nte, Castro is clearly in
agreement with the pro-Soviet faction in the Cuban leadership, and i:l so doing is
continuing his long-standing role of final ~:~rbiter of differing viewpoints within the
regime.
Havana, however, wants to avoid the impression that it is anxious for recon-
ciliation. Eagerness would imply the existence of an exploitable weakness. It would
also undercut Cuba's policy of maintaining an aura of confrontation between the US
and Latin America, and would z?un counter to Cuban domestic propaganda. More-
over, it might alarm the more nationalistic Cuban leaders who have feared a
recrudescence of US influence in Cuba. Castro will therefore do nothing publicly to
suggest that he is preparing for talks without a clear signal from Washington that a
timetable for discussions could be drawn tip. He maintains that the US initi^ red the
break in 1961 and must therefore take the initiative for talks to end ic`... This
face-saving gesture is extremely important to him.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publicatiun are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office of Current Intellige-zce, code 143, extension 6228.
iVo Foreign Dissem
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C! ~gAN LEADERSHIP
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
COUNCIL NATIONAL
OF MINISTERS ASSEMBLY
Fidel CASTRO (Fist Secretary) . a Fidel CASTRO (Chairman) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Fidel CASTRO (Prime hlinrster) ~ ~ a a Fidel CASTRO (fdmister-P+esrdent of
Nabonal Agrana ~ Reform Institute)
Raul CASTRO (Second Secretary).. Raul CASTRO (Deputy Charman) ..... Raul CASTRO (First Deputy Pnme ... Rout CASTRO (Munster of
Mrmster) Revolutionary Araied Forces)
Osvaldo DORTICOS a a a a Osvaldo DORTICOS a a a ~ ~ ~ a a Osvaldo DORTICOS (President of ihea a a Osvaldo DORTICOS(htmaier?PresiderK
Republic) of Central Planning Board)
Sergio DEL VALLE aaaaaaaaaaaaaa~a~aoaaaaaa~aaaaa~ry~ Sergio D0. VALLE(Interrar Minister)
Ramiro VAlDES a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a~ a~ a a Ramiro VALDES (Deputy Pnme Minster
for Construction)
ELECTED IN
197b
Juan ALMHDA (Delegate m Drente Province)
^7 t~
Armando HART (Party first secretary in Drrente Province)
~_
Guillermo GARCIA ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ Guillermo GARCIA (Deputy Pnme Minister
for Transportation aril Commun?atron)
~ M
Bless ROCA (law, elections,
Pedro MIRET(heavy industry)
Faure CHOMON~~
Isidoro MALMIERCA
Ancona PEREZ (ideology)
Jorge RISOUET (agncutture,
livestock)
Raul GARCIA PELAEZ
'Popular Sadal Party ("Old" Communist)
"Student Retmlotionary Dirttderate
(Unmarked names belong to the praaM"goerritla elite".-
RODRIGUEZ (Deputy Prrn: ~ Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ
Minister for Foreign Affairs) (htmrster-President d Nabonal
Cemm~ssron far Economic and
Saentrfic-Technn:al Cooperation)
There are 25 additional
posts an the Cound of
Ministers mrrying ifie
rank of Minister.
Diodes TORRALBA (Deputy Prime Munster for Sugar Industry)
Belarmira CASTRLA (Deputy Pnme Munster far Education, Saence, C~Iture)
Flavio BRAVO (Deputy Pnme Minister for Consumption and Servrcesl#
Joel DOMENECH (Deputy Pnme Minister for Basic Industry)*
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H~ wpparently believes that US flexibility on the Cuh~ r~rau wrli be
reduced in 1976 because of the presidential electicns. He therefore would
like to get talks tinder way this year so Cuba could be taking advantage of
the easing of trade restrictions while prolonged negotiations on total normal-
ization are taking plane. He probably believes that once some economic
sanctions are lifted, US firms will exert enough pressure on the administra-
tion to force removal of the rest. He would thus achieve a key goal, access t~
US trade and technology, without cost to himself.
Once negotiations started, Castro would expect def;.nitive settlement of
such problems as the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay and US r~connais-
sance flights over Cuban territory before he would consider a resumption of
the relations broken in January 1961. He fully expects the US to bring un
Havana's Soviet ti~;s, compensation for nationalized US properties, and
Cuban subversion in Latin America, and probably has suspicions that the
issue of Cuban support for Puerto Rico's independence will be raised.
Whatever the result of the negotiations, Cuba and the US will remain on the
opposite sides of many important issues. Havana is committed to a long-term
policy of promoting the unity of Latin America vis-a-vis the US and wil; not
sacrifice its revolutionary bona fides for the sake of detente.
The Leadership Debates Detente
Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez appears to head the
pro-detente forces in Cuba. The third - orfourth-ranking official in the Castro
regime, he is brilliant, both as a theoretician and administrator, and is
responsible for much of the considerable administrative and economic
progress Cuba has achieved over the past three years. His ties with the Soviet
leadership appear to be excellent; he established his bona fides with Moscow
during two decades of service as a high official of the pre-Castro Cuban
Cormunist party. Now Cuba's highest foreign relations official, he has
assumed a central role in Havana's maneuverings toward detente with the
In pressing for detente, Rodriguez is reflecting not only Moscow's
interests but his own pragmatic political and economic views as well. He is
supportea by the remnants of Cuba's pre-Castro Communist party-the
"old" Communists-and apparently by some of those technocrats whose
burdens would be lessened somewhat if they had access to US markets and
trade. Although this group is small in number, its members occupy some
significant posts in both the government and the party. The group's main
strength, however, lies in its affiliation with Moscow, whose goals and
policies it espouses. The group has been in ascendancy in the field of policy
since 1970, when Castro reluctantly acceded to a greater Soviet voice in
No Foreign Dissem
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determining Cuban domestic matters. Selecting from among the group's
members, Rodriguez has reportedly established a small staff to assist him in
engineering a normalization of relations.
Others in the Cuban leadership, however, fear the ideological impact a
restoration of ties with the US-or even the initiation of talks-would have
on the Cuban population. A broad campaign to counteract US influence,
especially among Cuban youth, has been in progress since 1972. Moreover,
many in the leadership, particularly those who fought under Castro as
guerrillas, remain bitterly anti-US and want no part of a reconciliation. Their
memories of past TJS actio~is aimed at undermining the revolution are vivid;
they are suspicious of US intentions, and fear that "materialist and cap-
italist" influences could subvert many in the populace.
Many of these nationalistic officials recognize the advantages of
detente, however. Unlike the "old" Communists, they are uncomfortable
with Havana's close ties to Moscow, and probably believe that li;nited
rapprochement with the US would increase Cuba's freedom of action. They
also would like access to US products, technology, and markets (primarily
for sugar, nickel, tobacco, shellfish, and rum). They may believe that access
to US markets and technolog~~ outweighs the advantages of continued use of
the US embargo as a scapegoat for Cuba's limited economic progress. They
therefore accept compelling reasons for submitting to the urgings of Moscow
and its Cuban supporters to move toward gradual detente with Washington.
They can be expected, however, to keep a close eye on the development of
US-Cuban ties and to seek to limit US influence in Cuba.
Responding to both schools of thought, Castro desires, but would not
make major concessions to achieve, the economic benefits of a reconcilia-
tion. As he and Rodriguez have said, Cuba's five-year plan running through
No Foreign Dissem
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19130 was drawn up on the presump-
tion that the "blockade" would not
be terminated. As for diplomatic
ties, Rodriguez has suggested pub-
licly that relations might be resumed
in 1976, but Castro may be thinking
in even longer terms, and probably
dies not expect much progress until
after the US elections next year. In
his view, the benefits are not so
great as to necessitate a vigorous
effort to negotiate under the pres-
s u r e o f time. Neither are the
economic advantages so tempting
that lle would be willing to go
decisively against the advice of those
in the leadership who are counseling
him to proceed slowly.
Castro's View of the Issues
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
Compensation: Tn recognition of the importance of the compensation
issue, Castro appears ready to counter any demand for indemnification for
nationalized properties with his own dem4~l~d that the US make restitution
for the damage its economic denial program has done to the Cuban
economy. Although this subterfuge would enable him to manufacture a
figure for damages far in excess of any US Maims, he seems to believe this
gambit would be too transparent to withstand reasoned argument. _ 25X1X6
Castro, without the pressure of the blockade,
would be willing to adopt afall-back position that would permit a negotiated
settlement of outstanding US claims. Castro himself has apparently implied
much the same thing to visitors from the US. For obvious reasons, Havana
would expect to settle for considerably less than the $1.8 billion now given
as the total figure for valid claims.
Special I,A STAMPA correspondent Ennio Caretto asked Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez if the resumption of diplomatic relations with Washington was possible and
quoted Rodriguez as replying: "Yes, if nothing happens to prevent it. In fact, the process of
international detente grows stronger. I even have a date in mind-1976. We no longer feel
threatened by the United States. We are ready to negotiate, and we do not even make it a
condition that the United States close down Guantanamo (naval base) or free Latin America-
those are things we can discuss....I will tell you furthermore that, so it seems to me, 70 percent of
the US people, the Congress, and the State Depaztment accept us. Burying our hostility will be to
the advantage of everyone-us and them."
(Dispatch from Ennio Caretto, LA STAMPA, Turin, March 23, 1975, p. 9)
-5 -
No Foreign Dissem
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THE CUBAN CGMMUNIST PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Fldel CASTRO- Fust Secralary
Raul CASTRO- Second Secretary
Osvaldo Dorticos Sergio del Valle
Juan Ahncida Guillermo Garcia
Fidel CASTRO-Chairman
Raul CASTRO- Deputy Chairman
Osvaldo DORTIC06 Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ*
Antonio PEREZ Isidoro MALMIERCA~
Jorge RISOUET Roul GARCIA
Joel GOMENECH*
Osvaldo DORTICOS
Vigor E. DREKE**
Velma ESPIN
Manuel E. hAJARDO
Marcelo FE~NANDEZ
Oscar FERNANDEZ
Harold FERRER
Caliato GARCIA
Guillermo GARCIA
Julio A. GARCtA~
Pedro M. GARCIA
Rcul GARCIA
E!~na GILD
Fabio GROBART*
Orestes GUERRA
Raul GUERRA
lose ABRANTES
Rogel(o ACEVEDO
Armando ACOSTA*
Severn AGUIRRE*
Juan ALMEIDA
lose M. ALVAREZ
Emilio ARAGONES
Jose AitTEAGA
Flavin BRAVO
Julio E. CAMACHO
lino CARRERAS
Ernesto CASILLAS
Bclarmino CASTILLA
Fidel CASTRO
Raul CASTRO
Angel Joel CHAVECO
Faure CHOMON#
Osmani CIENFUEGOS* Secundino GUERRA*
Leopoldo CINTRAS Armando HART
Abelardo COLOME Joel IGLESIAS
Raul CURBELO Omar H. ISER
Sergio DEL VALLE Rienerio 11MENEZ
Manuel DIAZ Rolando KINDELAN
PINAR DEL RIO-Julio E. CAMACHO LAS VILLAS-Arnaldo MILIAN`
HAVANA-Jose R. MACHADO CAMAGUEY-Raul CURBELO
MATANZAS-Julian RIZO ORIENTE-Armando HART
'Popui~r Social Pury ("Old" Communip)
"Student Rnrolutfon~ry Oinctanu
No Foreign Dissem
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Ramiro Valdes
Armando Hart
Military Department
American Department
Man Organizations Department
Trantportollon and Communication
Jose LLANUSA
lose RAMIREZ*
Department
Antonio E. LUSSON
Jorge RISOUET
,Manuel LUZARDO*
Raul ROA
General Foreign Relations Department ~-
Josc R. MACHADU
Blas ROCA'R
Isidoro MAIMIERCA*
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ*
Education, Science, Culture Department-)F
Juan MARINELLO*
Orlando RODRIGUEZ
Miguel MA~TIN*
Basllio RODRIGUEZ
Juridical and State Organ(sms Department
lonquin MENDEZ
Ursin(o ROJAS*
Raul MENDENDEZ
Celia SANCHEZ
Arnoldo MILIAN*
Aldo SANTAMARIA
Organization Department
Carlos MIR
Haydee SANTAMARIA
Pedro MIRET
Rene de Jos SANTOS
*
Agriculture and Livestock Department
Jesus MONTANE
Clamontino SERRA
Jose NARANJO*
lose R SILVA
Arnaldo OCHOA
Lionel 50T0*
Heavy Industries Department
Morin OLIVA
Julio TARRAU*
Filiberto OLIVERA
Diocles TORRALBA
Sugar Department
Ramon PARDO
Fel(pe TORRES*
Antonio PEREZ
Ramiro VAIDES
Faustino PEREZ
An(bal VELAZ
Economy Department
Wolfredo PLREZ
Roberto VIERA
Manuel PINEIRO
Luls A. ZAYAS
Consumption and Services Department
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Guantanamo: Castro would be
less conciliatory in other areas. He
would expect to get a definite com-
mitment by the US to abandon the
naval base at Guantanamo Bay. His
public statements, however, suggest
that he would be content to estab-
lish atimetable for US withdrawal
rather than press uncompromisingly
for immediate and total evacuation.
He is keeping in close touch with
the Panamanians on their canal
negotiations with the US and will
use these as an indicator of US
flexibility. He sees Guantanamo as a
much less important issue in US
eyes than the Panama Canal, and he
would therefore expect to negotiate
a much more rapid withdrawal from
the former.
Acutely aware of strong resistance in the US to a new Panama canal
treaty, Castro may try to profit from the Panamanian experience by doing
some discreet politicking with Senators and their staff members to smooth
the way for a base evacuation agreement, and coincidentally to bring
domestic pressure on the Executive Branch to reach a solution satisfactory
to Cuba. He seems convinced that there is considerable sentiment in both
public and official circles in the US for the return of the base to Cuban
control, and he apparently does not see the subject as a major threat to the
success of negotiations. He would probably be primed to quote chapter and
Mexico City, 14 February-Regarding the possibility of a rapprochement between Cuba and the
United States, Fidel Castro said: "We are in no hurry. We can wait ten or twenty years.
Condemnation of the blockade of Cuba is growing, and the North Americans are increasingly
isolated. The blockade is harming us, but we can wait. Argentina's US companies are willing to sell
us automobiles. The United States, as well as US businesses, are facing a dilemma. They have to
choose between US and Argentine law."
(Buenos Aires IPS press item, February 14, 1974)
Asked about Cuban relations with the US, Prime Minister Castro demonstrated a relaxed and
generally favorable attitude toward the US but apparently did not envisage the early resumption of
formal US~Cuban ties. (SECRET)
No Foreign Dissem
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verse from statements by a multitude of US political and military leaders as
expert testimony to the very limited usefulness of the base to the US. He
may also be prepared to give some guarantee that the base would not be
turned over to the Soviet navy, despite the fact that such a pledge would
theoretically impinge on Cuban sovereignty.
The Soviet Connection: Castro would reject any attempt by the US to
tamper with Cuba's military, political, or economic relationship with the
USSR. This point would probably pose the most difficult negotiating
problem in that it is an area where Castro has little maneuvering room to
accommodate US demands. Castro believes that a small nation trying to exist
in a superpower environment stands less chance of being smothered if it casts
its lot with the more distant superpower. If Cuba cannot achieve the
ideal-to be as independent of Moscow as of Washington- dependence on
Moscow at least gives it more independence in Castro's eyes than the heavy
dependence of previous Cuban governments on the US.
Moreover, Castro cannot lightly dismiss the political and economic ties
that bind him so tightly to Moscow. By his own choice, he has allied himself
with the communist countries and adopted socialism as his creed and as an
intermediate goal on the road to communism. He has destroyed Cuba's
pre-revolutionary institutions and replaced them with socialist ones. He has
accumulated such a monumental debt to the USSR that, even in the most
favorable circumstances, Cuba will be tied to Moscow until well into the
next century. Even with the economy's upturn in the past year, there is no
end in sight to the Castro regime's dependence on Soviet assistance. Castro's
political path, therefore, will continue to parallel that of the USSR no
matter what develops in Cuban-US relations.
Neither does he have much maneuverability with regard to his military
ties to Moscow. Virtually all of the weapons and military equipment now in
use in Cuba originated in the USSR. The Cuban military establishment,
therefore, must look to the Soviets for compatible spare parts and replace-
ment equipment. Given these facts, a termination of Cuba's military relation-
ship with the USSR would have such far-reaching implications for Havana's
defense capabilities that Castro would be obliged to opt for whatever course
would guarantee continued Soviet supplies. Furthermore, Havana allegedly
pays nothing for Soviet weapons and would be unlikely to look with favor
on a policy shift that would require an expensive outlay for arms formerly
obtained free of charge.
Another aspect of the military relationship that Castro is also ill
inclined to terminate concerns Soviet naval visits. The presence of Soviet
warships in Cuban ports is the only tangible evidence of Moscow's willing-
ness to involve its armed forces in Cuba's defense. Castro has no illusions
about the steadfastness of Moscow's resolve on Havana's behalf in the face of
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a threat of a nuclear holocaust, but short of such a threat he probably looks
upon his visitors as a modest yet useful and welcome deterrent, and about
the most that can realistically be expected from a reluctant protector. Even
if he were disposed to discourage the visits, Moscow's wishes would most
likely prevail-an indication that this is more aSoviet-US than aCuba-US
problem.
Overflights: Castro would also assume an adamant stance on U-2 and
SR-71 missions. He would demand, and expect to get, a pledge to respect
Cuba's airspace and end reconnaissance overflights. He would argue that the
flights are an intolerable affront to Cuban sovereignty and can even be
considered unnecessary, given the ability of the US to achieve the same ends
through more advanced technical means. His strong legal position would
probably make him impervious to compromise on this point. He might even
try to make an issue of US peripheral reconnaissance flights, but this would
be more a harassment tactic than a bona fide item for negotiation.
Puerto Rico: Castro has publicly belittled the benefits to Cuba of a
reconciliation while claiming that the principal advantages would accrue to
the US. This line is basically a tactic designed to bolster his negotiating
position and to support the impression that he is under no pressure to
change the status quo. He is much more realistic in his private assessment,
however, and may even believe that Cuba has so much more to gain from
detente that he needs to manufacture throwaway issues to be discarded
during the negotiating process.
This may be the principal reason for Havana's aggressive effort in recent
months to focus world attention on the status of Puerto Rico. The Castro
regime has:
? improved its ties with the Puerto Rico Communist Party;
? permitted the Puerto Rico Socialist Party (formerly the Puerto
Rico Pro-Independence Movement) to maintain a permanent office in
Havana;
Normalization of relations with the US is a goal shared by Cuban authorities, but
one comes away with the
feeling that Cuba's asking price will be high. "Since Cuba's claims for compensation against the
United States exceed American claims against Cuba, in effect, Cuba is asking the US government
to compensate Americans who lost their properties in Cuba."
No Foreign Dissem
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'
~~
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NwN~~ _.,r
L._.-`...._Smllyu -.~__~~~- -- -
_U$fi NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY
,v;,~?,,,,rrr?' i
~~,` CUBA
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? pressed the independence issue in the United Nations and other
international forums;
? promoted international symposia as part of its continuing propa-
ganda campaign demanding Puerto Rico's independence;
? organized a domestic propaganda campaign to keep the issue before
the Cuban people.
Castro may briieve that he can agree to barter a more moderate Cuban
stand on Puerto Rico in exchange for US concessions during neg ~tiations. He
therefore would keep up a high level of publicity until negotiations start. He
proved his flexibility on the issue in late 1972 and early 1973 when the
Cuban representative at the United Nations kept an unusually low profile on
the subject of Puerto Rico in order to avoid upsetting Cuban-US talks on
aerial hijackings.
On the other hand, focusing Cuban domestic attention on Puerto Rico
suggests that Castro has more in mind than just developing a "throwaway"
negotiating point. He would hardly risk raising the public's hopes on a
matter linked so closely to Cuba's ow;n history if he did not intend to pursue
it. Although he is usually well informed, he may be misreading the situation
in Puerto Rico to the extent that he believes popular sentiment in favor of
independence has increased significantly. It is most likely that elements of
both perspectives are present in Castro's reasoning.
US as "Gendarme": Castro would also use as a bargaining point his
long-standing demand that the US cease its alleged role as "gendarme of the
hemisphere." This is a broad term derived from the history of US interven-
tion in Latin America, and intended by Havana as a counterpoint to the US
insistence that Cuba cease "exporting the revolution." It has been used for
so long to reinforce Cuba's revolutionary credentials among Latin American
leftists that it could hardly be abandoned when Havana comes face-to-face
with the US. But it will be one of the easiest "issues" for Castro to drop,
should the US elect to soft-pedal the issue of Cuban subversion in the
hemisphere.
So far, every sign indicates that the Castro regime will refuse to make
any public commitment to abjure the support or espousal of violent revolu-
tion in Latin America. In fact, the draft of a new constitution released in
Havana in early April specifically acknowledges the "right of peoples to
reject imperialist violence with revolutionary violence" and "recognizes the
legitimacy of wars of national liberation as well as armed resistance to
aggression and conquest, and considers its right and its internationalist duty
P/o Fai'r!e~ig~n D~isTsem
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Portions of an interview with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez by Kenize Mourad of Nouvel Obscrvateur as
published in Mexico City's LT Dia on January 30, 1975.
QUESTION: At a moment when US-USSR relations seem to be clouded, do you think that an
improvement in relations between Cuba and Washington is possible?
ANSWER: We do not have an apocalyptic view of what has happened. The detente policy is a
permanent one; it is not based on circumstances or events of the moment; the world offers no
other choice. However, should the ultrareactionary forces prevail in the US, it could not but
reflect on Cuban-US relations.
QUESTION: Last November's OAS meeting in Quito declined to lift the sanctions against Cuba.
Another OAS meeting, slated for April in Washington, will reconsider the question. Are you
optimistic?
ANSWER: I have just be;,: ?riformed that Kissinger has conceded that the vote should be by
simple majority, not by atwo-thirds majority. This will allow some countries that still have
scruples about establishing relations with Cuba to have them. Kissinger's decision would also pave
the way for a future agreement with the US once it decides to end the blockade. Because, as a
matter of fact, it cannot be ignored that a favorable OAS decision in April does not, of necessity,
mean the end of the blockade. This is a matter of domestic policy to North Americans -there is
significant right wing strength in the Senate.
QUESTION: It would seem that the USSR would be delighted with the resumption of relations
between Cuba and the US. Is Cuba in favor of such relations, above all, to lighten the burden
carried by the Soviet Union?
Ai`ISWER: Absolutely. The improvement of our relations with the US would be written into the
detente process. The continuation of a source of tension such as Cuba is not encompassed in USSR
policy. Insofar as the question of the economic burden is concerned, they have never brought it
up.
QUESTION: After establishing relations with Washington, could Cuba make the voice of com-
munism bebetter heard in Latin America?
ANSWER: We do not pose the question in those terms. The final objective of communism, of
course, is the establishment of communism throughout the world. It is essential at the current
juncture, however, to safeguard the peace, because the alternative is nuclear war. I will not refer to
the positions of the USSR with regard to Latin America. However, the Cuban position is as
follows: Socialism cannot be built in Latin America overnight. Objective conditions for socialism
do indeed exist in certain countries, but there are no immediate possibilities at hand. In our view,
the development of the revolutionary process must first entail the defense of national interests.
The Cuban model is not the only one. The Peruvian and Panamanian revolutions are led by
military ~*oups who have grasped what their country's interests are and are carrying out a
nationalist revolution. It is this which leads us to cooperate with the Peruvian government, as well
as with Venezuela, which is also undertaking a policy of independence.
QUESTION: The US has spoken about reestablishing relations with Cuba, if Cuba renounces the
"export of the Revolution" to Latin America. Last February, when Brezhnev visited Cuba, did he
voice his opposition to the "export of the revolution?"
ANSWER: We have always talked about aiding revolution, never about exporting it. Cuba shall
never renounce its right and its duty to cooperate with those who wish to change society,
whenever such change is impossible by democratic means and above all whenever such change is
deterred by the intervention of the US and the CIA. In Paraguay's case, for example, we can give
aid to the revolutionaries without sending armed forces. In Chile's case, naturally, we shall aid the
revolutionaries with all out strength to overthrow Pinochet's government.
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Statements of Fidel Castro on March 19, 1975, at a press conference att the occasion of Canadian
Minister of Trade, Commerce, and Industry Gillespie's visit to Cuba.
QUESTION: Does Cuba want to recognize the United States and what would be the negative
effects of that?
A?dSWER: The United States is recognized, gener311y speaking, and the question is not of us
recognizing them but of them recognizing us. It is not we that broke relations with the United
States. Neither did we establish an economic blockade against the US. It was the US that broke
diplomatic relations with us and established the economic blockade of Cuba. This was not a Cuban
initiative; it was theirs. We have suffered no inconvenience from having no commerce with the US.
QUESTION: Would you like to have the United States recognize Cuba?
ANSWER: VVe are not impatient for that nur are we very anxious for it. We feel it will happen
sooner or later. When it does happen, we will consider it a positive event.
QUESTION: You have said that the first step to resumed relations with the US is the lifting of the
embargo.
ANSWER: Yes. We maintain a certain position regarding this point and it is that the economic
embargo should cease before we can go into negotiations to solve the differences between Cuba
and the US because the embargo was a coercive measure, a unilateral measure on the part of the
US toward Cuba. One should not negotiate under conditions of pressure and coercion; that is why
it is our position that the embargo, the economic blockade, should cease. We have not established
any blockade against the US. For example, they need sugar. They have to go out to the different
markets to find it and we have sugar. We have no law which forbids selling sugar to the US. If at
any time they should need sugar and want to buy it in Cuba, we are ready to supply it. Therefore,
there is not a situation of equal conditions. That is why the blockade must cease before any
negotiations take place between the US and Cuba.
QUESTION: Do you interpret the visits by American Senators and others as signs that the
blockade might be lifted in the near future?
ANSWER: We cannot establish a direct relationship between one thing and another. The visits to
Cuba have been the result of the Congress' Foreign Relations Committee and the interests of US
political personalities, and not part of the policy of the US government. In any case, we regard
these visits as positive and believe they can contribute to the improvement of. relations between
the US and Cuba. They are also the expression of r political trend, a trend of public opinion
favorable to the lifting of the blockade and the improve~~tent of relations.
Paris, 24 October-Fidel Castro reiterated that with regard to bilateral relations, there can be no
dialog or negotiation with the United States so long as that country does not unconditionally lift
the blockade. Once that requirement is met, there would be many other problems to discuss,
among them the Caimanera (Guantanamo) naval base. "Later, we must see whether the United
States tries to impose anything-for instance, anything that might limit even in the slightest way
our country's sovereignty. We will not admit any condition. For a negotiation to get anywhere, for
our relations with the United States to improve, it is essential for them to start by comprehending
that present-day Cuba is not the Cuba of the past; that today, Cuba is a country that is absolutely
free, a country that does not and will not accept any condition that might infringe on its dignity
and political sovereignty even in the slightest way:'
(Havana radio broadcast of October 24, 1974, discussing an interview of the same date
granted by Castro to L'Humanite. J
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to aid the besieged and the peoples who fight for their liberation." The draft
also codifies the "gendarme" issue by condemning "imperialist intervention,
direct or indirect, in the internal or external affairs of any state" by any
r-~eans.
Rather than signifying Cuban intransigence, however, this type of
policy definition suggests that Havana is leaving room for compromise.
Recognizing that its past policy of "exporting the revolution" with violence
is still a major hurdle, the right of "peoples to self-determination and
self-defense" is postulated rather than any Cuban right to sponsor revolution
abroad. As a confirmed revolutionary, Castro will not unequivocally
renounce revolutionary violence; to do so would compromise his revolution-
ary ethics and brand him as a pure opportunist. In this light, his "gendarme"
demand appears as little more than rhetorical capital generated to counter
one "unreasonable" demand with another, with the expectation that a
compromise can be reached.
As a pragmatic politician, Castro understands that the US could not
renounce the Monroe Doctrine or any of its subsequent corollaries, and he
does not expect this. In reiterating his "gendarme" demand, he does not
intend to create an ideological impasse. Instead, he sees both sides, through
negotiations, subscribing to a statement that would appear to address both
demands satisfactorily without requiring either party to abjure publicly the
practice of overt or covert intervention in other countries' internal affairs.
This has ample precedent in agreements the Castro regime has signed to
restore formal ties with other Latin American governments; each signatory
agrees to respect the political and territorial integrity of the other.
Outlook
Castro appears to gauge the prospects for improved Cuban-US relations
with a mixture of cautious optimism and realism. He understands that his
maneuvering room is limited, especially on several key issues. Nevertheless,
he appears confident that a restoration of formal ties is merely a matter of
time. He appears willing to bargain on some points and apparently expects
the US to recognize, and make allowances for, his inability to give ground on
others. His knowledge of recent US negotiations with other Latin American
countries has apparently convinced him that an accommodation is possible.
This does not mean that Cuba would readily accede where flexibility
exists in order to reach an agreement. On the contrary, Havana apparently
believes the US is universally on the defensive and prepared to give ground
on significant issues. The Cubans see the US Executive under strong domes-
tic pressure to reach a more satisfactory relationship with Havana, and they
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apparently expect this pressure to grow as next year's elections draw near.
They see no reason to soften their position and instead plan to press
aggressively to maximize the concessions they believe the US is prepared to
grant.
A restoration of diplomatic relations, however, would have little impact
on Cuba's long-range objectives. Havana would still be committed to pro-
moting iconoclastic and far~~reaching social change in Latin America and
elsewhere, probably resulting in selective endorsements of violent revolution-
ary groups. The Castro government can be expected to persist vigorously in
its efforts to unite Latin America and to reduce US influence. The Puerto
Rico independence movement will continue to receive Cuban sympathy and
propaganda support but probably at a reduced level. The Castro regime's
ties with Moscow will remain strong regardless of the extent of detente with
Washington, and Cuba's pursuit of socialism will continue unabated.
Havana hopes to resume trading with the US, but will pragmatically
look for the best possible deals with little or no regard for political or
symbolic arrangements. US businessmen hoping to turn a profit would find
the Cubans extremely hardheaded, shrewd, and capable at the bargaining
table.
At the same time, Cuban diplomats resident in the U5 would presum-
ably make the most of their presence to advertise the Cuban Revolution to
the US public through academic, cultural, and social groups and the mass
media. They would also angage in a broad intelligence collection effort,
partly in cooperation with the Soviets in response to Moscow's requirements
and partly to gather technical data keyed to Cuba's agricultural and indus-
trialdevelopment needs. Havana would continue to reproduce material in US
technical journals, manuals, and books without regard to copyright restric-
tions, and academic and scientific exchanges would be actively sought to
enable Cuban scholars to pick the brains of US experts. To avoid contamina-
tion of the Cuban population through exposure to US cultural influences,
however, the Castro regime would step up its domestic campaign against
"ideological diversionism" and adopt measures to limit the dissemination of
US news and cultural publications within Cuba.
In summing up the detente scenario as it develops, therefore, more of
the chips would appear to be winding up in Havana's corner than the United
States'. Following the termination of the US economic denial program, the
Cubans would enter into talks with the US that, after long, hard bargaining,
would probably result in the resumption of diplomatic relations. Cuba would
gain a definitive commitment for the return of the Guantanamo naval base
to Cuban control, cessation of reconnaissance overflights, termination of the
economic denial campaign, access to US markets and technology, and
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political respectability. Moreover, the Castro regime's fundamental policies
and international relationships would remain unchanged as would its
hostility toward the US.
For its part, the US would gain a nearly source of sugar, limited
compensation for US claims, a modest market for US goods, and elimination
of the expense of con~uc?ing reconnaissance overflights and the economic
denial program. In addition, a major world-wide benefit would accrue to the
US upon the elimination of the so-called Cuba question-a long-standing
source of irritation particularly within the context of the Organization of
American States. ACuban-US reconciliation would be roundly applauded by
most Latin American governments, which sce the Cuba issue as a massive
stumbling block in virtually all aspects of relations with the US. It would
also be well received in countries outside the hemisphere where the legal
requirements of the economic denial program frequently generate friction
with the US and where the prospect of a superpower engaged in fruitless
confrontation with a ministate serves to dilute US prestige. At the same
time, some countries-specifically Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Nicara-
gua-would probably react negatively, convinced that the bases for sanctions
against Cuba still stand.
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