RESOURCES OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00612R000100090007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 19, 1971
• Content Type: PAPER

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19 April 1971
SUBJECT: Resources of Major Intelligence Programs
1. In 1960, a Presidentially-approved ad hoc Joint Study Croup prepa.-.>d
a Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Goverrnr;~._J
The Principals, to whom the report was addressed and who were represented :.n
the work of the Study Group were the Director of Central Intelligence, t.-I,
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, ani a,za
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The ga-(!r,11
purpose of this undertaking was "to promote the more effective and effic_,r.t
use of intelligence resources and to assist the DCI in carrying out ais
ponsibilities for coordinating the foreign intelligence activities of the
Government."~!/
2. The Joint Study Group found that manpower resources provided a m;l;
.satisfactory measure by which to characterize the efforts of the "inr.el t3nr,e
community"1 than did dollars. With respect to the latter, the repo--t nt>
the difficulty of presenting the costs of the foreign intelligence e-:'for-. Lue
to such considerations as: -- the different accounting systems emplo,,ed Ir-i
the various agencies and departments which were not designed to sepan?ate:!
identify and measure the total intelligence costs; the varying inter)retEt__,ns
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Report dated 15 December 1960 and classified TC:1
SECRET NOFORN.
Joint Study Group, wort on Foreign Intelligence Activities of tre Un1 !r LEGIB
Stat
G
t
T
es
overnmen
, para. 1 of
erms of Reference, no page number.
J The "intelligence community" includes CIA, the intelligence components
the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force and of the
NSA; the FBI; and the AEC. In addition other elements of government on
ad hoc basis: Report, p. 7.
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within the departments and agencies as to what should be included or e.s_1uaed
from any foreign intelligence costing effort; certain activities were co
mixed nature which made it difficult to distinguish intelligence om
I.LLEGIB
0
intelligence elements; and indirect support benefits received by intel:_f =-r:ce
operators for which they might not be charged. With respect to c-olle.i
resources, the Study Group concluded that (it) "can do no better a- this. Lime
than to suggest an annual range of between
3. Manpower was found to be a more nearly homogeneous yardstick fcr
resources than dollars, since the identification of manpower prima2ily ei-
gaged in the foreign intelligence effort could be accomplished witiout a
concern for various cost and appropriation categories and accounting prc~-
dares that forced somewhat complicated distinctions to be made with resT_ot
to the dollars available to intelligence program managers. The report s-z:-
marized intelligence community manpower in a table from which the foll_iriav
is a summary extract:
i"ntelli ence Community Man ower
(As of the End of FY 1960)
Department or Agency
Total Manpower
(rounded to hundreds)
CIA
State
Defense
y Id., p. 117.
J Id., p. 119.
J Id., p. 9.
I
1.8
87.6
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In presenting the foregoing; tabulation, the report noted that over
intelligence personnel were related to Department of Defense activities.
Of the total of 1,800 persons accounted for by the State Department, some
1,100 were said to be loca-::ed overseas and 700 in Washington; the former
were identified as involved in the Collection function, and the lattr
(presumably although not specified by the Report) were attributable prin-
cipally to the analysis and the Production of intelligence end products 5
to Washington headquarters support activities.
4. The subject of intelligence Collection stenmiing from human sourer:
activities (i.e. HUMINT) was discussed specifically in various sections t):
the 1960 report, of which the following are the highlights:
The Department of State contributes a fund of expertise in the
understanding of foreign affairs. Its information gathering is en-
hanced by the fact that its collection goes hand in hand with du-c-
lomatic negotiation and representation. This same fact, however,
complicates the situation in that embassy political and economic
activity, being in part policy operation, cannot be brought wholly
within the, cover of intelligence coordination, nor can it easily be
separated into the two categories of intelligence and policy. the
Foreign Service still shows an indifference to intellii,,ence, in part.
because the Service thinks of ,t~telligence in old-fashioned terns as
a limited esoteric operation. J
Id., p. 10.
Id., p. 17. -S-
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The principal collectors of overt intelligence inforcnatioe_ arty
the diplomatic and consular officers of the United States and -h he
military and civilian attaches. Their reporting is largely based
upon official and nor-official contacts, general observations tnd
research. Other overt sources include the monitoring of open radio
broadcasts, the exploitation of foreign publications, any the 'n ter-
rogation of defectors d refugees, all of which provide consi(.erat
valuable information.
The Study Group wishes to emphasize that the information (:oils-t- d JCL
through overt--mean's :_s?-the foundation of all intelligence and :~ftou:ma(
not be neglected through over-concentration on less conventional rrof. .~
of collection. We anticipate no change in this in the future.
While the Group recognizes the operational responsib-j_liti;?s o::` tile
Foreign Service, it does believe that greater utilization for. LnteLi--
gence purposes can be made of all Foreign Service Officers serving
abroad. This requires, first of all, improved indoctrina- 8t )n t:LLi,-
role as overt collectors of intelligence information. ...
5. To provide some oraer of magnitude insights as to changes ii th-=
intelligence connunity that have occurred since 1960, the following tab.z t
tion compares FY 1960 as a base with FY 1966 and FY 1971.
Intelligence Community Manpower
Figures rounded to hundreds
Department or Agency FY 196o FY 1966 ' Y ?. t?71
CIA
State 1.8 not available .3 --
Defense 87.6 135.9 13f.1
These figures need, however, to be interpreted cautiously and with a rat_r
keen perception for what they may not mean as well as what they car sig-___y.
For example:
(a) It is not possible without recalling from storage in Gne
archives the original data considered by the Study Group (there re-
cords are in fact being recalled for further analysis) to knov
whether the Defense base of 87.6 included all the types of aclivit >s
that are classified as intelligence under the data for FYs 66 and 't_.
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2/ Ia., p. 43.
10 Id., p. 43-4.
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(b) The data considered by the Study Group do not provide a r,:iio
of manpower resources as between the Collection and the Production
functions, so that it is not immediately possible to know whet ier
ratio may have changea during these years.
(c) A modest part of the Defense increase can be atcribut?d t)
the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1962 and ti.:
non-withering away of the Service intelligence organizations.
(d) With respect to the State Department, the FY 19bO data in.-
cluded State manpower assigned to Collection, but the FY 1971 ata.
represent only the Office of Intelligence & Research which is con-
cerned with intelligence Production. No arrangement is now in bei =
and operating for accounting for any part of the Foreign Ser-rice oc
other State collection manpower as part of the total resources of 4t-
intelligence community. This is not a matter of orgg;anizationai c)?-
trol, but rather involves providing a functionally -oriented displa,
of resources (regardless of Department, Agency or military Service)
that go to carry out the functions of the intelligence cormuni-icy.
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6. Further comparisons utilizing the FY 1960 data from the Joint St t y
Group are not practicable due to the lack of detail in the data in tneir
final report. However, some additional insights are available frog: a,st..l,:y
of information reported. in the Consolidated Intelligence Resources inffcr1-cion
System (CIRIS) for FY 1.971. The CIRIS is the mechanism currently z.sea e?
the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB), which has custody of
CIRIS, to provide a basic set of statistics relative to the resources cI kre
major components of the intelligence community, the missions and ftnct:cn
for which these resources are employed, and the principal targets or
ligence objectives against which the intelligence functions are ai ectt(..
The inputters to CIRIS appear to be approximately those wno reported to ;,kE
Joint Study Group in 1960, but as indicated previously precise comT)arit.f..:
cannot be made until the files of the latter are recalled from the arc!. a...
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7. The inputting organizations participating in providing CF1IS d?:ta are
as follows:
Departments, ArYzencies and Military Services Reportin{? to C RIS
Organization Corunents
All CIA resources are included it ell]
cept for Covert Action. The latter wet?e ex;ded
also from the 1960 Joint Study Group report.
Only the resources of INR are includei The
CIRIS mechanism is available and suitable fc. rrore
extensive reporting by State.
Reporting covers DIA and NSA. Also t-h,i or\rnto-
logic and non-cryptologic intelligence com-m-v E,` C; of
the three Military Services. Also a group j t11r;e
resource special programs. So-called "tacti..t.l sources are not included in CIRIS; they wer- ct r-: teed,
likewise, by the Joint Study Group. So.ne 1. i.ultel-
ligence R&D is accounted for by D )R&E Tide( *_r =:;ent
DOD budgeting procedures and therefore is nt)t , ('IRIS.
The net of this is that the CIRIS synthesizes and highlights the u?:ilic7r t-._c>n of
the principal intelligence resources that are commonly considered to be 3?r?ooiated
with "national" intelligence. The principal exceptions to the forc,goi.rt- -.re
overt collection resources of the State Department and some multi-capa1i1i-ty
resources within DOD, such as some ship and aircraft platforms thai car f~-'form
intelligence missions and also are designed and used for non-intel i,gerr..
rational activities (e.g., ELINT-equipped search aircraft that can oerfv-,r
intelligence missions but are also essential to the defense of naval for-tls
and to the conduct of naval operational missions.)
8. As the tabulation on the following page will illustrate, aporox- r.t.--1v
two-thirds of the present U.S. intelligence effort accounted for by the'-