BROAD GOALS OF THE TOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00612R000100050077-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 77
• Publication Date: September 10, 1968
• Content Type: PAPER

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BROAD GOAL, OF TIIr fTOD
The original purpose of the TOD was to "aid in a more precise
analysis of the allocation of resources to intelligence target,:."
Three kinds of resource allocation decisions need to be provided f,--)r.
First are decisions to obtain efficient mixes of intelligence systems
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to accomplish a given intelligence mission; se ond, are d.ccis_ ens
about right mixes of intelligence forces and:other forces, pr:nari y
military; and third
rare decisions about the level of intell:i_r;enee
effort to be accomplished. All three of these need to be dev_l_t wi1,h
simultaneously since we cannot make rational statements about the
costs of performing intelligence missions without reasonably well
optimized intelligence and military forces, and we cannot decide hs~w
much effort to expend without some insight into the returns from s3:ch
effort.
As discussed in Part IT, the TOD falls short of what car; be a(-iie- ---l
by improved data structuring to support these three classes of decisior
SPECIFIC CHANGES REQUIRED
To make the TOD much more useful, changes need to be made in t}he
content and structuring of the data there.
(1) We need to identify the intelligence systems in our
nr ogre s.
Such systems would include the equipment, people, data and fac.lities
required to produce specified intelligence outputs. This fic3,tiol
would have to include specification of units of the syster.;.
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(2) Costs of these intelligence systems must. be estimatel.
costs for each system need to be broken down two ways: first, by
RDT&E, Investment and Expenses; and second, by collecL:ion. pro?ess
and-production.
(3) Missions must then be defined and systems a_Lloeated 11.n
missions. These allocations need to be made two ways. I''irst, sysi E,~
should be allocated on the basis of their justification, and sceonc;
for the- current and budget years, on the basis of the:i'r actual use.
This allocation will result in force tables and, through the crts c?
the systems, in financial tables.
SCOPE CI3ANGES TO THE TOD
Part II pointed. out that the TOD exclude:: tactical. intel_li;en<
some R&D resources, and Department of State's resources ex,
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Part II also poi_?ted -,ut
only two years of costs were included in the first TOP an6 that the:~t
are inadequate to establish useful trends.
a. ' TOD TIME HORIZON
The time horizon of the TOD should be moved out by extf ndit
the financial, and force=. tables into the future a reasonable per-`nd.
The Five Year Defense flan (FYDP) now has forces projected for ri.~;hi
years and costs for five. Since the intelligence programs are Cart c
the FYDP, data should be available to extend intelligence program ne
in a consistent manner. More important, we currently must make
which affect our prop:remns and are affected by existing pro:;--nms Lhat t.<
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into the future. Co sequently, an horizon at last five yea; : ahc f i s
important to these decisions.
b. INCLUSION 0i-~' ADD'I'TIONAL DATA
The inclusion of programs now omitted from the TOD i; moir
difficult to deal with. The State Department's effort is sma:f 1 bit
important and it contributes to national intelligence objectives.
inclusion can be recommended easily.
Tactical intelligence programs and the R&D fo'? i+rt:ell ;aenc
in Program VI, mainly in support of tactical intelligence forces, aa,
harder to judge. These programs interact primarily with the t'zctie~
forces they support and not so much with each other. For exaii 1e. ...y
missions for RF-)ICs, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, are int imat ,
tied to the effectiveness of tactical air forces and not. to the
achievement of national intelligence objectives. Even though -rer.y
large amounts of money are expended on tactical intelligence, the
Committee believes such resources should not be included in thf, TOs;
It may be desirable, however, to carry out a separate effort to an,'-:
tactical. intelligence needs in the Department of Defense. A DraD d,1
call for tactical intelligence may consequently be required..
DATA CALL S1MPLJTICAT1:ONS
Study of the data submitted in the present TOD shows that about
85% of intelligence resources are contained in about P0.% of - th( rer c .
entities of the CIP, C:CP, CLAP and ---. This suggests that thF:;e
relatively few large reporting entities, 45 to be exact, should be
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analyzed in greatest detail and that the remaining. small entities,
about 185, should be analyzed in a more general fashion.
ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS
Several problems can be anticipated in implementing the changes
out-lined above. Among the most important of these are the following:
(1) It will be relatively easy to identify collection system,
but much more difficult to associate with some of these their pro~'essi
and especially their production subsystems.
(2) Many intelligence systems are multipurpose. This genera_
purpose nature of these system:, will result in their contributing '.o
more than one mission; therefore, cost benefit analyses of such sy,,tem;;.
must use multiple criteria.
(3) Missions may 'be difficult to define so that quantit,u..ti.ve
criteria of their achievement can be developed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
These difficulties n.ot withstanding, we recommend that the
following specific actions be taken to develop the' TOD furth(er :
1. A definition cf an "intelligence system" be establic>}red.
2. A set of program elements be defined, each of which is stu':h az
intelligence system. The units of these intelligence systems must als=)
be defined.
3. The costs for each of the intelligence systems should be
estimated as a function of time for a period of five years. This cequ't' es
that the numbers of unit., of each system be projected into t11,,:,, future
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about eight years. The cost estimates need to be further broken town
by RDT&E, Investment and Expense and by collection, processing and
production.
Missions for these intelligence forces be defined.
5. The intelligence forces be assigned to missions based first c-
the primary justification used for the intelligence system, and second,
for the current and budget year, on the way the systems are actually
being used.' These assignments will result in mission or.Tented ir,t=lla-
Bence force tables.
6. By assigning intelligence system costs to the missions, missi.f-
oriented financial tables will result.
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