LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCIES REVISITED*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000150001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 17, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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BOARD or
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUlyI No, ~-67
IIRRARY f Il.E COPY 1~7F bruary 1907
DU NOT DESTROY ,_ ~,
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CENTRA L ~N'I'ELLIGENCE AGENCY
17 February 1967
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM N0. 1-67
SUBJECT: Latin American Insurgencies Revisi~ced*
Generally speaking, i~asurgencies in Latin America have
retrogressed over the past, year and their prospects for the
coming year are not bright. Fidel Castro continues his efforts
to stimulate revolution, 'but the Soviets, as well as most Com-
mttnist leaders in the area, seem increasingly skeptical about
the efficacy of this apr~roacb. and increasingly inclined to
peaceful, united-Front tactics. Nonetheless, there is con,
tinning potential for unrest and political d~.sturbances in a
ntunber of Latin American countries which clo not now have active
insurgencies; such conditions are particularly apparent in
Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti and Panama.
+~ This memorandum was produced solely by CZA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Clandestine Services.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C -R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
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1. In the year since we published NIE 80~~0-66: Incur en.-
in Latin ?.merica, t~~ insurgent movements which we discussed
therein have not prospered. In general they have taken one step
backwards anZt seem undecided about what to do with the other foot.
In part this reflects a lack of popular response; in part the in-
creased effectiveness of government security x'orces.
2. Although Fidel Castro has been continuing his verbal
efforts to stimulate revolutions and has provided some additional
aid and trainingr this has neither given mayor new impetus to
elx?eady active insurgencies, nor caused any new one to take the
field. Fidel has quite candid]~y explained the why of this:
simply that Latin Amerman Communists presently include too few
bold revolutionaries and too many pseudorevolutionists, defeat-
ists and theoreticians. His approach is direct and simple; atop
talking, get out there and fights and this action will sooner or
later create the conditions for success.
3? To this, most other Latin American Communist leaders
wearily reply that you can't start a successful revolut2on at
the drop of a "barbudo." The m+sin Sob, the orthodox Communists
say, is to develop revolutionary consciousness in people who are
still unready for revoluticn; taking to the hills without this
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extenoive groundwork is futile c~nd likely to end in ignominious
defeat, as it did i~ Peru. Re~ectiag the universality of Ficlel's
theory, these Communist leaders cite the vast differences among
countrieo and conditio~~s for revolution. Lven one advocate oY
armed struggle, a Guatemalan Communist writing in the October
issue of Problems of Peace and Sorialiem, said "we believe that
the people and their vanguard, the Marxist-Leninist party must
find their own path of revolution. The specific national
conditions, historical, traditions, and concrete s:ttuations in
tLe different countries lay their imprint on each national revo-
lutionary process."
4. C~oviet policy in Latin America appears to reflect
increasing doubts about the efficacy o~? armed struggle as a
revolutionary tgctie in most Latia countries. To Castro's dis-
may, the USSR has sought to expand its commercial and diplomatic
relations with Latin countries, iacluding the target of Fidel'8
more virulent propaganda, the Frei government of Chile. Moreover,
Soviet propaganda emphasizes the political approach. In a review
of the world Communist situations for example, a January Pravda
article appraised the p~spects for Communism in Latin America
without mentioning Cuba or Fidel. emitting mention of any
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insurgent groups or even countries is which there are going
insurgencies, it praised the growing membership of Latin
American Communist parties and cited Communist representation
in Panamanian, Uraguayan~ and Chilean parliaments. Under the
general headings Asia, Afr9.ca, and Latin America -- Resistance
to Neocolonialism, armed struggle was referred to as a mes.ns
for achieving political iadependence~ but no specific refererrp
was made to it in the Latin American context. The stress in the
case of Latin America was placed instead on the necessity to
work for the unity of the workers class and the "broadest
possible social forces."
5. In late 1965-early 1966 there were four farrly active
("limited operational" in the language of NIE 8090) insurgencies
in Latin America -- in 'Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombian and Peru.
'rhe one in Peru was quickly defeated and its organization largely
destroyed. The one in Colombia we described at that time as
having "barely emerged from the incipient stage;" since then it
seems to have receded slightly. Endemic banditry continues to
pose more of a problem in the Colombian countryside than do
Communist guerrillas.
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',Phe Venexue~.an Case
5. After five years the Armed Forces of National Libera-
tion (FALN) in VEnezt~.el~:, a,~e stii.l. function:ing, but; are stilt.
badly split and have been hurt?by the arrest of many leadere.
Two hard line factions, one called the Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left and the other led by FALN dissident Douglas Bravo,
between them number around 300 men. They aro trying separately
to stean pressure from the soft line in the Venezuelan Communist
Party to forsake armed struggle and return to political action,
and to this end, are both supported by Fidel Castro, though it
is clear that Bravo is his favorite revolutionary. Last July
the Bravo g~'oup was aided by a morale-boosting infusion from
Cuba of 20-30 additional Venezuelan insurgents. In. November
and early December it rekindled revolutionary embers by launch
ing a series of attacks on property and on key officers of the
armed forces. Its evident aim with the latter tactic was to
widen the breach betweer.:'~rezuelan military ?.eaders and the
Leona government, and perhaps to provoke the military to seize
power.
7. A _olpe was probably averted by the Leona government's
willingness to accede to military demands for a crackdown on
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insurgency. Its amnesty cam;~aign (which had sought to lure the
half-hearted out of the hills) was cancelled, constitutie~~nal
guarantees were suspended and the CJatral University at Caracas
was raiQed. Yet even this show of force did not fully placate
the mi:Litary forcNs. They sti.l7, charge that the government is
not giving them adequate support in the anti-guerrilla efrort
and they demand that sterner measures be taken. Other factors
such as antipathy to poLi.ticians and to the goverrnnent's pol.9.cy
of favoring officers sympathetic to the ruling Democratic Action
Pcrty~ have added to military discontent.
S. The Soviet Union, in an ap~.__~ent reversal oP its pa at
policy of support for the armed struggle in Venezuela, now seems
to be favoring the soft line. From 1962 to early 1966 it had
supported the FALN with funds and propaganda rearing perhaps
that to igpore this movemen~ would be to risk increased Chinese
influence in L~~tin America. There was less reason for such
Pear after Fidel~s relations w~.th the Chinese had so markedly
cooled. The Soviet decision to stop their e.id also came at a
time of deep internal dissidence within the FALN~ which seemed
tc dim its prospects. Although the Soviet radio and press have
not officially condemned armed struggle in Venezuels~ tb~eir once
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extensive propaganda in its fcvor has eased, and e~a:ri;ain party
publicationu have featured articles by ndvocvtes of the soft
line. At the time of Bravo's renewal of violence 3.t~. Late 166,
tnc USSR was negotiating with Venezuela for diplomatic relations,
appaz~antly in hopas of exporting finished goods rather than revo-
lution.
The Guatemalan Case
g. In Guatemala neither the Castro backed Armed Rebel
Fc,r~ea (FAR) nor Yon Soaa's Revoltationary Movement of 13
November (M4t13N) ha3 been able significantly to improve its
position in the last year. The military did not prevent the
Mendez Montenegro ~xovernraent from taking office; two top FAR
leaders have been killed; and, in spite of some efforts at
unification, the two insurgency movemeni,e remain estranged
from each other. The FAR's leaders have complained about
shortages of arms, food, and other supplies, and have cr~.ticize3
some of their patrons in the Guatemalan Workers' Party (pro-
Moscow Communist; for lacking militancy. The ma,~or change in
the ins~,srgency situation, however, has resulted from the Guate-
malan Army taking to the field in a sustained effort which, for
the first time, has managed to put the guerrillas on the defensive.
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As a result of military operations the insurgent forces, whose
strength had risen in the early part of 1966, have been depleted
somewhat -- to about 250 activists in the FAR and 100 in fine M~t13N.
10. To a far greater extent than in Venezuela, however, the
Guatemalan insurgency has raised the political temperature and
caught the mildly reformist Mendez government in a squeeze play
between guerrilla and "gorilla." Left wing terror and the oli-
garchy's antipathy to the Mendez government has begotten right
wing terror. Elements from Castillo Arm~ss' old party, the
National Liberation Movement (MLN) have undertaken their own
counte.-guerrilla operations and have tried to win the army over
to their side. For the moment Mendez has been able to survive
coup plots and kee,Q the right from being a current threat.
Ordering the troops to the field was instrumental in easing
tensions, but the chances fora owl a from the right will in-
crecF;e if the insurgency drags on.
].l. Neither of the two insurgency groups seems to be
getting much aid Prom outside the country. Though Yon Sosa
may be receiving trifling amounts of aid from Trotskyites in
Mexico; Castro no longer provides it and the Soviets never did.
Evidence of outside support for the FAR is also sketchy; it
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has apparently relied on ransoms from kidnappings fog much of
its financing. The most recent clear indication of Cuban
material. support came last September, when the Mexican police
broke up a ring connected with the Cuban embassy in Mexico
which had been smuggling US-made rifles into Guatemala since
early February of 196. Tne Soviets, as far as we know, have
not been prairiding jaterial assistance; however, since the
Moscow-oriented Guatemalan Workers' Party' continues to back
the FAR insurgency efforts, the USSR seems tacitly to be sup-
porting them too.
Insurgency Prospects
12. Of the four insurgencies which were relatively active
a year ago, there seems little chance during the coming year of
resurgence of the one in Peru, and the one in Colombia is un-
likely to reach serious proportions. During this time period,
neither the insurgency in Venezuela nor that in Guatemala will
become strong enough to seize power itself, but one or the
other might p,,ovoke a military seizure of power.
13. Castro and Che Guevara have contended that a military
coup inevitably and nearly automatically produces a Fituation
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favorable to the ultimate seccess of insurgency. Actually,
the room for slippage between. cup and lip in the process is
very large. For Castro's approach is based on what transpired
in Cuba, where his revolution was without a Communist label
and had extensive middle class support. .Ironically, what
happened in Cuba i~w~ had something ox" the effect of an inocu-
lation against revolution elsewhere 3n the area; indeed, Che
himself hss made the point that, because one Cuba )'zappened,
the chances of a second Cuba have become ama].ler 'ra+;her than
greater.
14. One problem that could face insurgents after they had
provoked a military ~ would b~, an increased military effort
against them -- possibly one of such scope and effectiveness
that it wiped them out. Under these conditions, replacement
insurgents would be hard to find;
15? It does not necessarily follow, however, that a mili?
tart' takeover would mean an extended period of harsh a~ci re-
pre~oive role which would sor~i alienate the population. Oa~].y
certain of the military governments of Latin f~merica have be~
paved like that; others have been constructive in var;ous ways,
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and the dedicatian of Latin Americans to rel,~?raentative insti-
tutions is not so strong that they are immediately and auto-
matically alienated by a military leadership. Perhaps the most
important weakness for the insurgents after a og lpe is that
they, and Communist movements as a whole, havE so ::ar built up
very 1?lttle backing and sympathy among the masses in Latin
America -- they particularly lack support among the rural
peasantry. They axe now increasing their efforts to gain ouch
support in a number of countries, but a?;; beat this wi11 be a
long run process.
16. The kind and e~ttent of popular reaction to a o~ 1pe
would, of course, vary from country to country. Where the right
is entrenched and political institutions are still. relatively
weak, as in Guatemala, a of a proba?~ly woul& not -~enefit the
insurgents to the extent +.hat it might in Venezuela where there
is broader support for present political institutions and where
a military regime would be likely from the reginning to encounter
active opposition from a number of groups in the population.
17. In sum, prospects in the short ruu axe not bright
for aqy of the iniaurgenr..ie s presently active . The potential for
violence and unrest -- which could conceivably develop into
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insurgency -~- is probably greater in somo chronically unstable
countries such as Dolivia or Haiti, which are not now plagued
by active insurgencies. There is, of tour?e, variation over
timo as to which countries may be particularly vt~~;z~~.erable.~
Tt~r the coming year we would list, along with Bolivia and Haiti,
the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Panama.
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
25X1A
* A year ago in NIE 8090 the countries we listed in this
category were Bolivia, Dominican Repub:ic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, and Panama. The governments in Ecuador and
Honduras now seem slightly more stable and the potential in-
surgents there less effectual. Guyana, on the other hand, has
become cause for greater concern; it became independent in
May 1966 and the British security force was wlthdrawn.
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