CHINA AND THE LESSER DRAGONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100140013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 24, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 July 1972
013-7
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
China and the Lesser Dragons
Summary
Following the excesses of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, one of China's first foreign policy efforts
was to repair badly frayed relations with its Asian
Communist allies, North Vietnam and North Korea.
Both Hanoi and Pyongyang responded positively to
Peking's overtures, and China's relations with
both improved steadily. Over the past year, how-
ever, the once-parallel tracks of Sino-Vietnamese
and Sino-Korean relations began to diverge. Fol-
lowing the announcement of President Nixon's
planned trip to China in 1971, Sino - North Viet-
namese relations moved toward a period of tension,
while Sino - North Korean relations became more
cooperative and harmonious.
The contrast is not hard to explain. North
Vietnam sees its vital interests threatened by
warming Sino-US relations. North Korea appar-
ently believes that, by welcoming these events,
it will further many of its own objectives.
Hanoi suspects that the nascent Sino-US rapproche-
ment foreshadows reduced Chinese material support
for North Vietnam as well as reduced backing for its
war aims. Pyongyang, on the other hand, is not
actively engaged in a military attempt to reshape
its position on the peninsula. It has lived un-
happily with the status quo for almost 20 years;
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the
Office of National Estimates.
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now it sees in the Sino-US thaw an opportunity
to gain increased international recognition and
to move toward Korean reunification through a
diplomacy of moderation.
While Peking is acutely aware of the needs
of its two allies, its policy toward them has
been shaped by broader Asian and worldwide inter-
ests. Harmony in bilateral relations has been
important, but not paramount In the mid-19.60s
for example, the Chinese not only allowed, but
furthered, a deterioration of relations with its
Asian Communist neighbors. Much of Peking's be-
havior during this period can be attributed to
the internal stresses of the Cultural Revolution,
but this is by no means the whole story.. Even
at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Chou
En-lai intervened decisively to prevent a sharp
decline in Sino-Cambodian relations; presumably
similar measures could have been taken with
respect to Hanoi and Pyongyang had the Chinese
wanted to do so.
Nevertheless, China and the other Asian Com-
munist states had much in common in addition to
their Marxist-Leninist background. The Chinese
have viewed US troops in South Korea, and more
recently in South Vietnam, as a threat not only
to their Communist neighbors but ultimately to
themselves. The opening of the Sino-Soviet rift
notwithstanding, the US "menace" could not be
ignored. Peking's views on this matter began to
change following the Soviet build-up_ on its
northern border, the shock of the Soviet-led in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Sino-
Soviet border clashes of 1969. As the level of
American military involvement in the Vietnam war
steadily declined and as Peking's rivalry with
the Soviet Union intensified, Moscow began to
loom as the greater threat to Chinese security.
The changes that have occurred in Peking's rela-
tions with its Asian allies in the past year
have largely grown out of this changed perspec-
tive. In embarking on its current path of cau-
tiously bettering relations with Washington,
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Peking obviously ran the risk of incurring Hanoi's
wrath and of making its relations with Pyongyang
more difficult.
In these circumstances, Peking has been re-
markably successful in eliciting praise and even
policy coordination from the North Koreans; Pyong-
yang at present is a smiling dragon. Things have
not gone as well with Hanoi, but Pelting has none-
theless succeeded in avoiding a drastic deteriora-
tion in relations. To some exl:ent, this has been
possible because Peking has not found it necessary
to make the hard choices that might endanger its
relationship with either Washington or Hanoi. Pe-
king has been tacitly aided in this by Moscow's
reluctance to place competition for Hanoi's favor
ahead of its own efforts to better relations with
the US, suggesting that the old Hanoi-Moscow-Peking
triangle is now overshadowed by the larger Washing-
ton-Moscow-Peking triangle. This makes North Viet-
nam's balancing act that much harder and leaves
Hanoi a most unhappy and frustrated lesser dragon.
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Background
Peking's relations with Korea and Vietnam are
strongly influenced by history. In addition to
their proximity, both northern Korea and northern
Vietnam are parts of the Chinese culture zone; both
at times were parts of the Chinese empire, and both
were tributary states of China until well into the
19th century. This legacy has contributed tension
and a fear of Chinese domination as well as strong
cultural ties that militate against any irrevocable
break.
Other links have been forged in the more recent
past. The Chinese Communists gave substantial aid
to Ho Chi Minh's liberation forces well before the
1954 Geneva conference brought North Vietnam into
being. And while Soviet arms were used extensively
in the Korean War, it was-Chinese troops who fought
alongside the North Koreans. The lesser Communist
powers are also China's only allies in Asia, both
having signed mutual defense treaties with Peking
in 1961.
China's relations with the two states never-
theless have been stormy at times, especially
since the Sino-Soviet rift widened in the early
1960s. Thereafter, whenever possible, Pyongyang
has tried to balance Moscow against Peking. And,
following the overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964 and
the Soviet decision to assume an active role in
supplying North Vietnam militarily, a triangle of
power relationship emerged involving Hanoi, Mos-
cow and Peking. The North Koreans and the North
Vietnamese accepted aid, assistance, and advice
from both Communist giants, but by playing one
off against the other, they retained considerable
policy independence.
China's relations with Hanoi and Pyongyang
declined following the onset of the Cul-'%.ural Rev-
olution in 1966. Within a year, North Korean
Premier Kim Il-song was being viciously attacked
as a "revisionist," and "Red Guard diplomacy" was
attempting to export the Cultural Revolution to
the ethnic Chinese communities in both Asian
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Chou Eri-lai meets with Kini 11-song in North Korea
Le Duan (left) and Pham Van Dons (2nd from
right) welcome Chou En-lai at Hanoi, March 1971
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Communist states. Following a Red Guard attack on
the North Korean Embassy in Peking in 1967, Pyong-
yang recalled its ambassador, and Peking responded
in kind.
Sino-Vietnamese relations reached a low point
in the spring of 1968, when Hanoi agreed to par-
ticipate in peace talks with the US in Paris. At
the time, Peking's approach to the war wa to couple
cautious practice with strident propaganda; while
carefully avoiding direct military intervention,
Peking encouraged Hanoi to continue its protracted
struggle against the US. To demonstrate its dis-
pleasure over the opening of the Paris talks,
king virtually ceased its propaganda support,
negotiations as a US hoax.
In August 1968, Sino-Soviet relations took on
an added dimension after the Soviet-led military
intervention in Czechoslovakia and the enunciation
of the Brezhnev doctrine. These developments had
a sobering impact in Peking and contributed to the
policy shift toward moderation that was to become
far more evident in 1969 and 1970.
Following the Ninth Party Congress in April
1969, the trend toward an "open door" diplomacy
accelerated, and Peking placed a high priority
on restoring good relations with both Hanoi and
Pyongyang. A high-ranking North Korean delega-
tion attended China's National Day celebration
in October 1969, and by February 1970, ambassa-
dors were again exchanged. Chou En-lai's visit
to Pyongyang in the spring of 1970 was his first
trip outside China since mid-1966 and was highly
successful. Sino - North Korean relations were re-
gaining the warmth of the period before tie Cul-
tural Revolution. Relations with North Vietnam
also steadily improved as Peking began to acknowl-
edge the existence of the Paris talks and muted
its previous insistence on uncompromising, pro-
tracted struggle. In March 1971. Chou En-lai
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refused even to acknowledge a exis elf e
talks, and continued to denounce the concept of the
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went to Hanoi, repeating the success of his 1970
visit to Pyongyang, and capping his post - Cul-
tural Revolution efforts to restore close rela-
tions with North Vietnam.
Between late 1968 and early 1971, the re-
sponse of Hanoi and Pyongyang was similar: both
welcomed the changes in Peking's policy as suiting
their interests in maintaining friendships with
both the Soviets and the Chinese and enabling them
to retain their freedom of action. But, in the
spring and summer of 1971, China's foreign policy
entered a new phase to which its Communist neigh-
bors reacted differently.
NORTH VIETNAM: Renewed Strains
The first sign of apprehension appeared in
Hanoi immediately following Peking's invitation
to the American ping pong team in April 1971.
The signs were greatly multiplied after the July
announcement of the President's intention to
visit China. Hanoi's language in a Nhan Dan
editorial on 19 April and a Foreign Ministry state-
ment on 21 April was even more blunt than during
the worst period of the Cultural Revolution..
Hanoi warned Peking not to be deceived by the "so-
called Nixon doctrine," a "counterrevolutionary
global strategy" that resorts to "insidious tricks
to sow division among the socialist countries" in
an attempt to pressure the Vietnamese people into
accepting US conditions. Indeed, the general
thrust of the North Vietnamese rhetoric was that
big powers could not pressure small powers--a re--
flection of Hanoi's latent but continuing fear that
its interests would again be sacrificed to great-
power politics, as they were at Geneva in 1954.
This fear was not just the paranoia of a
small country long at war. The Chinese response
to American actions in Vietnam had been restrained
from the becrinnincr.
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the fact that Mao Tse-tung felt it possible to
launch the divisive and debilitating Cultural
Revolution the following year reflected this esti-
mate. Throughout the war, Washington and Peking
had signaled each other that each hoped to avoid
direct confrontation, and by the autumn of 1970
Mao told that he believed Washington
was indeed getting out of Indochina. This was
certainly not what Hanoi believed at the time,
and the implications for North Vietnamese war
aims were obvious.
Indeed, it seems a moot point whether Pe-
king has ever been greatly interested in Hanoi's
ultimate war aims. When Prince Sihanouk was in
power, Chou En-lai carefully played on the
Prince's sense of a "special relationship" with
China that somehow was meant to offset pressures
from Hanoi. While Peking has deliberately taken
a supporting and secondary role to North Vietnam
in Laos, it has never allowed Hanoi to eclipse
the Chinese entirely. Even when Peking's propa-
ganda on Laos was most bellicose, the Chinese
maintained a diplomatic mission in Vientiane.
All of this suggests that China views the pos-
sibility of ultimate North Vietnamese hegemony
over all of Indochina with something less than
equanimity. Moreover, as the possibility of at
least a limited rapprochement with Washington--
for reasons and on issues not directly related
to Vietnam--became brighter, Peking's view of
Hanoi's aims probably also changed. Moscow was
calling fur an Asian collective security pact,
which obviously was in very large measure aimed
against China. If the US were to leave South-
east Asia, the Soviets would attempt to fill the
resultant vacuum, and China would be left to face
Moscow alone. In such circumstances, a military
defeat or political humiliation for Washington
in Vietnam probably seemed undesirable to Peking.
At the same time, Peking obviously saw no
utility in forcing a political humiliation on its
North Vietnamese ally. Humiliation was neither
necessary nor probable since the Chinese appar-
ently accepted the view that the United States
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Li Hsien-nien arrives in Hanoi, September 1971
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was in any event prepared to withdraw militarily
from Indochina. There was no sign that China was
prepared to pay such a price for US friendship,
and Peking was well aware that its ability to in-
fluence Hanoi was limited. The abortive and counter-
productive effort to turn the screws on North Viet-
nam in the spring of 1968 was proof--if any were
needed--that even brutal Chinese pressure did not
achieve the desired end in Hanoi. Moreover, the
North Vietnamese remained balanced between Moscow
and Peking. Heavy-handed pressure would simply
shift Hanoi in Moscow's direction, to China's
detriment.
In these circumstances China was obliged to
tread cautiously. The war was an obvious irri-
tant in Sino-US relations, and ending it would be
in Peking's interest, although not necessarily in
North Vietnam's so long as Hanoi's maximum terms
were unrealized. But China could only advise,
not coerce. Above all, Peking could not afford
to give Hanoi cause to believe that China and the
US had come to a hard and fast understanding on
a war settlement behind Hanoi's back. In the
months following the announcement of the Presi-
dent's trip, the Chinese clearly were intent on
limiting the immediate damage to their position
and influence in Hanoi.
To this end, Peking.simply ignored Hanoi's
invective, while offering general propaganda sup-
port, although not as much as North Vietnam de-
sired or expected. Peking also dispatched to
-Hanoi an economic delegation headed by politburo
member Li Hsi'n-nien, the first high-ranking Chi-
nese leader to make a publicized visit to North
Vietnam since Chou En-lai's trip. Li reiterated
in strong terms Peking's support for the Vietnam-
ese seven-point peace plan and signed an economic
aid agreement, a politically significant gesture
since in previous years the North Vietnamese had
always come hat in hand to Peking to conclude the
annual aid deal.
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Mao meets North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong
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Two months later, North Vietnamese Premier
Pham Van Dong was given red-carpet treatment during
a five-day visit to Peking. When he left, the com-
munique noted that Sino-North Vietnamese relations
were developing "on the basis of Marxism, Leninism,
and proletarian internationalism"--a Communist catch-
phrase denoting close solidarity and one that Hanoi
had avoided using in this context for several months.
Mao personally greeted Pham Van Dong, and Chou En-
lai gave explicit assurances to the North Vintna
These and other
gestures seemed to mollify Hanoi, and public criti-
cism of the Chinese subsided.
It was inevitable that the President's trip
itself would rekindle and reinforce Hanoi's ap-
prehensions. Moreover, the announcement in the
fall of 1971 that the President would also visit
Moscow gave the North Vietnamese new cause for
worry. On the eve of the President's Peking trip,
when the Hanoi press began to give heavy play once
again to its distaste for big-power summitry, Pe-
king. followed its earlier pattern, overlooking
Hanoi's rhetoric and taking steps aimed at shoring
up the confidence of its ally. In early March,
Chou En-lai flew secretly to Hanoi and conferred
with Premier Pham Van Dong and Cambodian Prince
Sihanouk, who was there for talks with the North
Vietnamese. According to Sihanouk, who later
described the visit to newsmen, Chou assured
Pham Van Dong that Peking would not act, even
secretly, as an intermediary between Hanoi and
Washington in resolving the Indochina war.
Though this, as far as it went, was exactly
what the North Vietnamese wanted to hear, Hanoi's
publicly stated concern continued unabated. The
communique issued by Sihanouk and the North Viet-
namese after Chou's visit contained adverse com-
ments on the communique issued in Shanghai at the
conclusion of the President's visit, and Hanoi's
media continued to comment adversely on the visit
by quoting liberally and sarcastically from the
Shanghai document. Indeed, the North Vietnamese
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undoubtedly felt they had reason to complain. Al-
though the Chinese portion of the Shanghai com-
muniqu6 did not directly contravene established
North Vietnamese positions, its language was far
too vague and pacific to satisfy Hanoi, and the
Chinese evidently did not. even attempt to con-
tradict the view of the war set forth in the US
portion or the communique'.
The April Offensive
Despite Soviet and Chinese assurances of con-
tinued support, the North Vietnamese apparently
had come to the conclusion by the early spring of
1972 that things were moving too quickly toward
some degree of understanding between all the great
powers with a stake in the Vietnam conflict. And
though many factors undoubtedly contributed to the
decision to launch the April offensive, the goal
of shattering--or at least cracking--the detente-
in-the-making between the US and each of the Commu-
nist great powers must have loomed large in Hanoi's
calculations. Through this action, Hanoi, also
apparently hoped to refuel the lagging competition
between Peking and Moscow for Hanoi's favor.
Ironically, the offensive, although certainly
a production of considerable drama, has had the
effect of making Hanoi a less important cockpit
for the Sino-Soviet diplomatic struggle. Moscow
had strengthened its position vis-a-vis Peking
at least marginally the previous autumn and winter
as the Chinese took their first tentative steps
toward Washington. But the timing of the North
Vietnamese offensive was an obvious embarrassment
to Moscow. So was the subsequent US mining of
NorL. Vietnamese harbors, which also had the ef-
fect of drawing the Soviets more directly into
the diplomatic maneuverings connected with the
war. Like the Chinese, the Soviets now had good
reason to want an end to the conflict; they also
had much less hope of exploiting the situation.
By going ahead with the Moscow summit, they
dissipated whatever advantage they had gained in
Hanoi over the preceding several months.
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Significantly, the Chinese have chosen not to
try to extract immediate advantage from this situa-
tion. Indeed, rather than offering fervid support
for Hanoi in obvious contrast to the reluctant
Soviets, Peking has been about as restrained as
Moscow in responding to the stepped-up war. As
ou and other leaders have frequently avoided com-
ment on the Vietnamese situation, even on occasions--
such as banquet toasts for visiting dignitaries--
when normal usage called for it.
Chinese restraint did not vanish when the
President announced his decision to mine North
Vietnamese harbors and resume full-scale bombing
of the north. Characteristically, Peking waited
three days to respond, and when an official govern-
ment statement was issued on 11 May, it was re-
strained and moderate. Although it condemned the
US military measures as a "grave step," it did not
characterize them as a threat, challenge, or
provocation to the Chinese people or government.
China raised that issue only on 12 June, just 48
hours before the public announcement that Dr.
Kissinger would again visit Peking. The Chinese
statement on this occasion was clearly designed
to preserve Peking's credibility in Hanoi, and
the question of a threat to China has not been
aired since.
This lack of vigorous propaganda support for
Hanoi even when Peking could have been expected to
attempt to score points against Moscow, speaks elo-
quently of Chinese distaste for many aspects of cur-
rent North Vietnamese policy and attitudes. Chinese
officials, at home and abroad, have criticized the
North Vietnamese offensive, implying that Hanoi's
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tactics were a mistake and not likely to succeed.
Peking has given no indication that it believes the
vigorous US reaction to be a turnabout in Washing-
ton's desire to withdraw militarily from Indochina;
the Chinese obviously believe Hanoi's tactics have
done little to speed the process.
The general Chinese point of view on Indochina
has been fairly consistent both before and after
Hanoi's offensive began. Their propaganda line
has emphasized the importance and necessity of an
early and rapid US military withdrawal from the
peninsula; it has treated political questions much
more summarily and with much less precision. The
Chinese have not totally ignored North Vietnam's
seven-point proposal for ending the war, with its
emphasis on political change in South Vietnam, but
they have treated this aspect far more cavalierly
than Hanoi would have wished. Moreover, Peking has
carefully avoided attributing duplicity and evil
motives to the US--above all to President Nixon him-
self. Remarks of this nature have invariably been
edited out of Hanoi's propaganda before it is re-
played in China. Still more striking, Peking has
at no point condemned the President's proposal of
8 May for an internationally supervised cease-fire,
US troop withdrawals within four months, and an end
to US acts of force in Indochina in exchange for a
return of US prisoners; Peking has rerun North Viet-
namese comments rejecting these ideas. It is quite
possible that the Chinese have indicated to North
Vietnam that they believe these terms will give
Hanoi an opportunity ultimately to achieve its ob-
jectives. In fact, the Chinese could at present
consider Hanoi's intransigence on political issues
a greater obstacle to the realizations of Chinese
aims in Indochina than US military actions.
If the Chinese have been offering Hanoi advice,
they can be fairly sure that the North Vietnamese
will at least have been listening closely. The
mining of North Vietnamese harbors has made China
Hanoi's remaining lifeline for supplies. For the
first time in the war China is in a position to
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strangle North Vietnam's war effort--and much of
Hanoi's civilian economy as well. All Soviet and
East European aid, as well as Chinese supplies,
must now pass through logistic channels controlled
by Peking.
There is, of course, no evidence that the Chi-
nese contemplate a naked assertion of their advan-
tage in order to force their will on Hanoi. From
their point of view, little would be gained by such
a brutal demonstration, which would amount to an
obvious abandonment of a Communist ally. But Hanoi
surely recognizes that much now depends on Chinese
good will. Indeed, the drawn-out argument between
Peking and Moscow over whether Soviet ships origi-
nally destined for Vietnam could call at Chinese
ports may be intended for North Vietnamesc consump-
tion in more ways than one: both r'hina and the USSR
seem to be protesting that Hanoi's supply difficul-
ties are the other's fault; at the same time they
are demonstrating that a resolution of these diffi-
culties is not their highest priority. Hanoi has
almost certainly gotten this message, lictle as they
like it.
Having conveyed this message, together with
their presumed advice regarding Hanoi's best course
of action, the Chinese are also protecting them-
selves in the event their advice is rejected. To
accomplish this, they need only allude to the im-
port-ant role China must play in keeping North Viet-
nam militarily and economically afloat; in practice,
they are also demonstrating that this does not mean
that Hanoi need expect to be completely abandoned.
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In short, while the Chinese are probably giving
North Vietnam unpalatable advice, they are simulta-
neously demonstrating their importance as an ally.
And, as in the period following the initial announce-
ment that President Nixon had been invited to China,
they are attempting to limit the damage to their
prestige and influence in Hanoi. Peking and Hanoi
no longer have parallel policies on Indochina, but
there appears to be a point beyond which Peking--
not surprisingly--is unwilling to press the argument.
NORTH KOREA: Kind Words
In marked contrast to the sharp deterioration
in Sino - North Vietnamese relations that followed
the announcement of the President's China trip,
Sino - North Korean relations--which were already
on the upswing--continued to improve. North Korean
Premier Kim Il-song delayed until 6 August, but he
then weighed in very heavily in favor of the trip,
the first, and still the only, foreign Communist
leader to do so. Kim characterized the trip as a
great victory for Peking and as a great defeat for
the US policy of trying to isolate China. Just as
important, Kim chose the occasion to strike a new
note of flexibility in Pyongyang's policy toward
South Korea.
It is quite possible that Kim's new note was
coordinated in advance with Peking. His formula-
tion on the President's trip paralleled the line
of those being used in briefing cadres in China on
the President's visit. Moreover, when on 5 August
Chou restated Peking's views on the Korean question,
iris formulation almost certainly had been discussed
earlier with Pyongyang. In an interview with James
Reston, Chou said, "'To solve the Korean question, a
way should be found to bring about a rapprochement
between the two sides in. Korea to move toward a
peaceful unification of Korea. That, of course,
takes time, but this demand is reasonable." Chou
suggested that a peace treaty to replace the armi-
stice was in order.
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This attempt to focus on Korean issues was not
isolated. In the summer of 19 71, Peking took a
number of steps to indicate that it believed the
time for movement on the Korean question was at
hand. In June, for the first time in five years,
Peking had appointed a Chinese representative to
the Military Armistice Commission. Moreover, the
Chinese issued a strong and immediate endorsement
of the North Korean eight-point unification plan
and the seven demands put forward at the August meet-
ing of the armistice commission. Peking also en-
dorsed and gave wide publicity to the mid-August
opening of the Red Cross talks between Pyongyang
and Seoul on the question of divided families.
A new and expanded economic aid agreement was
signed on 15 August, and three days later a hich-
level delegation, headed by North Korea's chief of
staff and including the commanders of the air force,
army, and navy, arrived in Peking. When the delega-
tion departed on 7 September, a new arms deal had
been concluded which provided for a significant in-
crease in both the quantity and variety of military
goods to be supplied by Peking.
Coming at a time when ere
was little tension on the Korean peninsula, the
arms deal appeared to be a gesture by Peking to
consolidate Pyongyang's support for China's opening
to the US.
For its part, Pyongyang probably saw definite
advantages in reaffirming a close relationship with
Peking and in adopting its own "open door" policy.
For 20 years the North Koreans have tried sporadic
border attacks, subversion, and dramatic gestures
like seizing the Pueblo to undermine South Korea,
encourage a withdrawal of US troops, and bring all
Korea under their rule. This approach yielded few
successes, and with the lessening of tensions sig-
naled by the reduction of US forces in Vietnam and
the thaw in Sino-US relations, Pyongyang must have
reasoned that more could- be gained by exploiting
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the drift of events than by opposing them. By fol-
lowing in China's footsteps, Pyongyang would gain ex-
panded international, recognition and eventual accept-
ance into the United Nations. This more moderate
policy line, Pyongyang may have reasoned, would
hasten the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea
already under way. Domestic considerations, such as
reductions in North Korea's defense budget, may have
also played a part in the decision. in addition,
the North Koreans probably judged that Peking would
lend no support to the "adventuristic" policies of
the past.
If this was indeed the North Koreans' reason-
ing, they were almost certainly correct. Even in
1969-1970, when Peking first made a concerted ef-
fort to repair relations with Pyongyang, Chinese
statements and propaganda on Korean issues were
notable for their lack of belligerency, and they
almost invariably omitted Pyongyang's fieriest re-
marks when replaying them for China's audience.
This public position almost certainly corresponded
closely to Peking's private views on the matter:
China clearly did not want to improve relations with
North Korea if that only increased the chances of
being dragged into new and dangerous disputes re-
sulting from Pyongyang's belligerence. In fact,
as Chou En-tai's remarks to Reston suggest, Peking
is now anxious to liquidate the remaining vestiges
of the Korean war. This would enhance China's
image as a reasonable actor on the international
scene and would remove another obstacle--albeit less
important than the Vietnam war--to better relations
with Washington.
The Chinese are aware that, in addition to the
two Korean governments, four powers have interests
in the Korean peninsula--China, the USSR, the US,
and Japan. Peking's moves on this complicated
chessboard suggest that they realize a resolution
of the long-standing Korean stalemate will have to
take the interests of all these powers into account,
but it is also clear that the Chinese hope to maxi-
mize their own advantages in the process. Thus,
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Peking appears to recognize that Pyongyang will con-
tinue to strike a balance between China and the So-
viet Union, and that too hard a push for North Korean
support in the dispute with Moscow is likely to be
counterproductive. The Chinese expreE. ed neither
public nor private concern when the North Korean
foreign minister traveled to Moscow at the very mo-
ment they were entertaining President Nixon. In-
stead, they appear to be making the more subtle argu-
ment that they can offer Pyongyang more than the
Soviets in disposing of the remnants of the Korean
war. This argument presumably claims that US forces
remain in South Korea largely to "contain" Chine
and that the current rather flexible Chinese foreign
policy--specifically the dialogue with Washington--
is likely to win Pyongyang benefits the Soviets
simply cannot deliver. In reality, Peking is far
less concerned about the rapid withdrawal of US
forces than its North Korean ally. Although their
public position calls for rapid and total US with-
drawal, the Chinese may well feel that--as in the
case of Vietnam--the Nixon doctrine, US budgeting
problems, and the reduction of troops so far point
to an eventual eradication of the US military pres-
ence on the peninsula anyway. The Chinese probably
believe that too rapid a US disengagement from Korea
would merely impel Seoul to turn to Japan for addi-
tional diplomatic and economic support. And while
Peking probably understands that it would be ex-
tremely difficult to exclude Tokyo from the penin-
sula entirely, it certainly wishes to minimize the
Japanese influence there as much as possible.
In this respect, Peking's present approach to
the'Korean problem serves the Chinese well. Peking
probably reasons that if it can keep the level of
tension down in Korea, Tokyo will be far less in-
clined to see its security in jeopardy and therefore
will be less likely to undertake a major rearmament.
Pyongyang has followed Peking's lead on Japan.
Rather than continue to portray Tokyo as being
forced by its social and economic structure to move
inexorably toward "militarism," first Peking and
then Pyongyang began to take the line in the fall of
1971 that Japan was capable of avoiding this path
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 and of choosing peaceful coexistence with its Asian
neighbors. Moreover, when Peking began in mid-1971
to move toward normal relations with Japan, North
Korea agreed in December to allow a semi-official
Japanese group to set up a trade office along the
lines of the one handling a part of Sino-Japanese
trade. The efforts of both Peking and Pyongyang
clearly are aimed in considerable part at heading
off any possible Japanese move to fill the vacuum
as the US presence in South Korea declines.
Given the convergence of Chinese and North Ko-
rean interests, it is not surprising that on the eve
of the President's visit to China, Peking strongly
endorsed Kim Il-song's proposal for peaceful unifi-
cation of the Koreas, and that following the visit,
Pyongyang issued a lengthy statement commenting
favorably on the Shanghai communique. Using the
visit to further its own interests, Pyongyang sought
to score points by expressing its willingness to
enter into its own dialogue with Washington. The
North Koreans also urged Seoul to enter into nego-
tiations that would "break down barriers" and lead
ultimately to reunification. The two governments
announced on 4 July that such talks had in fact
been undertaken.
The initial Chinese response, carried in a Peo-
ple's Daily editorial of 8 July, leaves little doubt
that Peking generally approved of this development.
In particular, the Chinese seem pleased with the
clauses calling for reunification of the peninsula
"without outside interference." Like the North
Koreans, the Chinese will argue that this implies
a diminution of US influence in Seoul, a check
against Japan, and--perhaps above all--a fairly
rapid dismantling of the UN machinery concerned
with Korea. Peking associates the UN role in Korea
with the 195? v to in New York that all but con-
demned the Chinese Communists as an outlaw govern-
ment, and for obvious reasons it would like to see
the Korean machinery phased out.
Close coordination between Peking and Pyongyang
on the question of UN consideration of the Korean
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question this fall has become clearer since the
joint communique of 4 July. Soon after its release,
Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei told
that Peking panne
to support Pyongyang's desire for a UN debate. And
even prior to the announcement on 20 July that China
would back the draft resolution on Korea sponsored
by Algeria and other non-aligned countries, the
Chinese began to lobby in a number of capitals for
support. After testing the waters earlier this year,
the Chinese apparently have decided'to abandon
their previous caution, largely because they now
feel that the new :resolution, by avoiding the polem-
ics of past Soviet and Mongolian resolutions, stands
a much better chance of passage. Moreover, Peking
apparently sees an opportunity here to improve its
already good relations with the North Koreans and
to score points at the expense of the Soviets, who
were reluctant to offer early support for the new
resolution.
For all their current cordiality, however,
there are limits to the present relationship between
the North Koreans and the Chinese. North Korea is
not going to put all of its eggs in the Chinese
basket; the Soviet connection will be maintained.
Indeed, recent events suggest that considerable
Korean suspicion of China still exists. Peking,
in turn, views questions of concern to Pyongyang
in a larger and wider prospective; Chinese attitude
toward the US military presence in the south may be
a case in point. But both countries are interested
in a move away from attitudes on the Korean question
that have remained frozen for two decades. So long
as this is so, they will have good reason for close
cooperation.
This cooperation, from China's point of view,
is largely a product of circumstances rather than
an end in itself. There is no reason to doubt
that Peking wishes to continue working closely
with Pyongyang, primarily because such a course
coincides with larger considerations such as the
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 Approved For Release 2004/04/19 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100140013-7
declining profile of the US in Asia and the Soviet
threat to Chinese security and influence. The
Chinese must fit their relations with their two
Asian Communist allies into this larger frame of
reference. The relationship with Pyongyang fits
well; that with Hanoi is not nearly so compatible.
This broader view presupposes a multipolar
diplomatic environment in which China's interests
occasionally could coincide with those of the US
but not often with those of the USSR. It is cer-
tainly no coincidence that Chou En-lai has quoted
several times from President Nixon's speech of June
1971 in which the President referred to five major
centers of power, including China. This does not
mean that Peking will soon abandon its material,
diplomatic, or propaganda support for the "libera-
tion forces" in Indochina, its stronger verbal and
diplomatic support for Pyongyang, or its champion-
ing of small states agal.nst both "US imperialism"
and "Soviet revisionism." It does seem to mean,
however, that China will not let these suppor'-ive
activities interfere with its larger interests,
and that it will, if necessary, at least partially
curtail such support in deference to those larger
interests.
North Korea has lived with a status quo that
clearly is distasteful to it for two decades. Pe-
king's changed diplomatic posture thus fits Pyong-
yang's needs, since a relaxation of tension in the
Korean peninsula implies an eventual change in that
status quo. Hanoi, on the other hand, has been
directly and violently challenging the status quo
in Indochina for at least 13 years, and a relaxation
of tensions in that peninsula would mean an accept-
ance of a status quo abhorred by the North Vietnam-
ese. Hence, Hanoi disagrees with certain aspects
of Peking's present policies. But because rapproche-
ment with Washington has become a major element of
the continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry, neither North
Korea nor North Vietnam can play off the two Commu-
nist giants for its own ends as successfully as
before. As a result, these lesser dragons in the
long run are likely to consider--if not necessarily
accept--Chinese views more carefully than ever be-
fore.
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