TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010038-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: October 28, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIIII~~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIII
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
28 OCTOEER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 43)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
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[.eluded here euleet If
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention i
PRC IN UNITED NATIONS
Peking Sees Vote as Victory Over U.S. "Two-Chinas Scheme" . . .
1
SING-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Says Nixon Visit Arrangements "Are Proceeding Well". . .
5
INDOCHINA
North Korean Party-Government Delegation Welcomed-in Hanoi . .
9
Brezhnev in France Warns of Intrigues Against the Vietnamese .
12
DRV Deprecates President's Radio Talk, Hails Antiwar Forces . .
13
Paris Talks: Communist Media Continue Cursory Attention . . .
14
DRV Spokesman, Comment Rap U.S. Raids ii DMZ, North Vietnam . .
14
Moscow Registers Concern Over Indo-Pakistani Situation . . . .
16
Media Report on Refugees, Heightened Border Tensions . . . . .
18
KOSYGIN IN CANADA
Increased Soviet-Canadian Economic Cooperation Stressed . . . .
20
KOSYGIN IN CUBA
Warm Havana Welcome for Premier Reflects Cordial Relations . .
24
SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS
Anniversary of CPV Entry into Korean War Marked in DPRK, PRC .
27
EASTERN EUROPE
Soviet Bloc-Yugoslav Contacts Multiply Since Brezhnev Visit . .
30
Moscow, Prague Show Sensitivity on Yugoslav Maneuvers . . . . .
31
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
28 OCTOBER 1971
Moscow (3048 items)
Peking (1545 items)
Kosygin in Canada
(0.2%)
13%
Domestic Issues
(33%)
40%
October Revolution
(1%)
6%
Indochina
(20%)
7%
Anniversary
South Korean Student
(0.3%)
6%
Slogans
Soviet Students Rally
(--)
6%
Movement
2d Anniversary Somali
(--)
5%
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
4%]
Revolution
In"ochina
(5%)
3%
7th Summit Conference
(--)
4%
U.S. Zionists' Anti-
(--)
3%
of East & Central
Soviet Campaign
China
(3%)
2%
African Countries
Kekkonen in USSR
(--)
2%
Middle East
(1%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Mop?"cw and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda conten' may be routine or of minor significance.
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PRC IN UNITED NATIONS
Peking's initial reaction to the 25 October UN vote on the seating
of the PRC came on the 26th in a speech by Acting Foreign Minister
Chi Peng-fei, who on the same day had seen off Henry Kissinger at
the conclusion of the latter's six-day visit. That the Chinese
were willing to keep the UN representation issue separate from the
plans for President Nixon's visit seemed indicated by the timing
of the second Kissinger visit and by Peking's failure to link the
U.S. position on the UN question with Sino-U.S. relations generally.
Initial PRC comment has viewed the UN vote as a "significant
victory" in foiling U.S. efforts to bring about dual Chinese
representation in Lne world body. Peking has not taken the
occasion to assess Washington's China policy in a broader context.
In the only reference to President Nixon, a 26 October NCNA report
cited the Western press as saying that the President personally
wrote to many heads of state in behalf of "the 'two-Chinas' scheme."
Peking's ' action to the vote was foreshadowed in earlier authori-
tative comment stressing firm opposition to any dual representation
formula. A foreign ministry statement on 20 August and a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article on 25 September, declaring categorically
that the PRC would have nothing to do with the United Nations
unless Chiang Kai-shek's representatives were expelled, were
confined to the narrow issue of UN representation. The Commentator
article claimed that the U.S. resolutions aimed at dual representa-
tion reflected persisting U.S. hostility toward the Chinese, but
no implications were drawn for Sino-U.S. relations. Similarly,
comment on the vote has avoided broader issues involving the two
countries and has pulled its polemical punches directed at the
Nixon Administration. In contrast, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on the vote lashed Japan's "reactiu.L.3ry Sato government" for
baring "its ugly features in remaining stubbornly hostile
towards the Chinese people."
PEKING SEES VOTE AS VICTORY OVER U.S. 'n'.0-CHINAS SCHEME"
The first monitored PRC reaction to the 25 October General Assembly
vote appeared in an NCNA dispatch on the 26th singling out comment
on the vote made by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at an
Iranian embassy reception. Chi hailed the favorable vote as a
"victory of the people of the whole world" and a demonstration of
the "bankruptcy" of the policy long pursued by "U.S. imperialism."
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According to the NCNA account. Chi said the Chinese government
and people were grateful to Al:lania, Algeria, and the other 21
nations which had sponsored the resolution restoring the PRC's
rights in the United Nationb, to those countries which have
diplomatic relations with the PRC, and to "other friendly
countries" which have "upheld justice." The NCNA account of
the reception did not include Chi's remarks to correspondents--
reported in the Western press on the 27th--that the PRC was
giving consideration to the question of when it would take its
seat in the United Nations.
Following NCNA's brief report of Chi's remarks, the first
substantial comment came in a lengthy, heavily editorialized
NCNA dispatch dated the 26th and carried in both domestic and
international services. On the 28th a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
discussed the Assembly vote,* echoing Chi and the NCNA dispatch
in calling the outcome a victory for the people of the world
and a demonstration of the bankruptcy of U.S. policy.
Both the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and NCNA were critical of the
United States and the "Sato government" for engaging in "tricks"
to gain support in the Assembly for a two-Chinas "scheme," with
NCNA derisively observing that U.S. and Japanese representatives
during the week-long debate "were running hither and thither,
just like ants on a hot pan, to exert pressure and to deceive
and woo" other delegations. The NCNA dispatch cited Western
press reports as saying that President Nixon personally wrote
to the heads of many states, that Secretary Rogers and Ambassador
Bush "rustled" around with promises of U.S. favors or hints of
withdrawal of U.S. aid, and that U.S. senators had threatened
that Washington would reduce its funds to the world body if the
Albanian resolution were adopted. Japan also dispatched "important
personages to join its UN delegation and coordinated with the
United States in its vote-seeking effort," according to NCNA,
The NCNA dispatch--which noted that the final vote was welcomed
with "cheers" and "prolonged warm applause"--drew on U.S. news
reports for the statements that the Administration was "caught
* In the three previous years, Peking's comment on the voting
on the representation issue had been conveyed in heavily
editorialized NCNA dispatches. The 1967 vote occasioned a
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, and the votes in 1965 and
1966 were discussed In PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials.
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by surprise" and "expressed strong disappointment." And like
the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, NCNA said that the U.S. press has
called the vote the "worst U.S. defeat in UN history." NCNA
added that Ambassador Bush, in a statement after the vote, said
"despondently that this is a 'moment of infamy,"' at the same
time admitting that the votes which have been cast "represent
the views of the majority of UN members."
On the 27th NCNA transmitted the text of the Albanian resolution,
listing the 76 nations which voted for it while singling out only
the United States and Japan among the 35 that voted against it.
The same NCNA transmission listed the 59 states voting against
the "important question" resolution "concocted by the United
States in collusion with the Sato government of Japan."
OTHER COMMUNIST Moscow has welcomed the outcome of the
COMMENT 25 October vote in a moderate volume of
comment calling it a step toward realism, at
the same time assailing Washington's "arm-twisting" methods and
pointing to consistent Soviet support over the years for seating
the PRC in the United Nations. The most authoritative commentary
to date is a PRAVDA article on the 28th by Viktor Sokolov, which
said tat the seating of the PRC and expulsion of the Chiang
Kai-shek representatives aie "linked with the hope that the
United Nations will be more effectively carrying into life the
principles of its charter." The article replayed the pervasive
theme that the USSR has consistently pressed for restoration of
the PRC's rights in the organ.'zation, "whatever the state of
relations with the Chinese leadership." A foreign-language radio
commentary by Yuriy Soltan on the 26th had paraphrased, without
attribution, Soviet Ambassador Malik's remarks during the debate
to the effect that the Soviet Union supported the seating of
the PRC even though Soviet relations with the Chinese leadership
have at times assumed "a sharply ideological and political character."
A substantial body of comment by Moscow's East European allies has
also stressed the bloc's long-standing support of Peking's seating
and assails the U.S. maneuvers on the representation issue. Some
of the comment has gone beyond Moscow's in pointing up the new
responsibility now resting on Peking. Thus an article in Warsaw's
TRYBUNA LUDU on the 27th expressed hope that the PRC representatives
will join with the socialist and other peace-loving states in
solving complicated international problems. It should be expected
that Chinese diplomacy will bring a constructive cor"r.ibution to
the world body, the article sa-td, adding that it is further hoped
that Peking will cooperate in the checking of the arms race, in the
discontinuation of nuclear tests, and in the nonproliferation of
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Similar East German comment has also predictably taken the
occasion to call for admission to the United Nations of those
states which are being kept out due to the policy of "discrimina--
tion" pursued by the United States.
Bucharest's press and radio have hailed the vote as an expression
of justice and political r?al:.sm, and a congratulatory message
on the 26th from Ceausescu and Maurer to Mao Tse-tung and
Chou En-lai cites the vote as supporting the Romanian line that
a lasting solution of major international problems cannot be
conceived without the participation of the PRC. In addition
to the Romanians, the Albanian a.td North Korean leaderships,
Yugoslav Premier Bijedic, and Polish Premier Jaroszewicz have
sent congratulatory messages to their Chinese counterparts.
Lin Piao was not an addressee of any of these messages.
The DRV's first reactiL_L came in a Hanoi domestic sexgice
broadcast on the 28th which said public opinion in many
countries regards the vote as a victory for the PRC and the
peace-loving peoples of the world and "a disastrous setback
for the U.S. imperialists." Citing AFP, the broadcast noted
that Secretary Rogers in his 26 October press conference had
declared that the expulsion of the RCC from the world body
would not affect U.S. relations with the Chiang Kai-shek
regime. No DRV congratulatory message has been monitored as
of this writing.
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SING-U, S. RELATIONS
PEKING SAYS NIXON VISIT ARRANGEMENTS "ARE PROCEEDING WELL"
Conveying a sense of momentum in Sino-U.S. developments in
the wake of the second Kissinger mission from 20 to 26 October,
Peking announced on 28 October (afternoon of the 27th Washington
time) that arrangements for President Nixon's visit "are proceed-
ing well" and that another announcement is expected "in the near
future." Unlike reports on the Kissinger delegation's arrival
on the 20th, which were carried in the middle of Peking newcasts,
the 28 October announcement was broadcast as the 1c=.ad item by
the domestic radio.
While predictably avoiding direct comment on the President's
projected visit, Peking reported the second Kissinger mission
in such a way as to signal that ongoing Sino-U.S. developments
are not affected by the current internal anomalies in China.
NCNA dispatches on 20 October, disseminated in both domestic
and international services, reported Kissinger's arrival that
day--to make "concrete arrangements" for the President's visit--
and his talks with Chou En-lai followed by a banquet on the same
day "to entertain Dr. Kissinger and his party." To bring the
point even further home to the Chinese people, and perhaps to
recalc:'.trant elements in the leadership, PEOPLE'S DAILY on the
21st carried two photographs of the U.S. delegation with Chou
and other Chinese leaders.
In addition to the premier, the Chinese officials at the
announced talks on the 20th included Politburo member Yeh Chien-
ying, vice chairman of the party's Military Affairs Committee,
and Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. Yeh, the ranking
military leader currently appearing in public, and CH'_ met
the Americans at the airport on their arrival and saw them off
on the '?6th.
In addition to the 28 October announcement, there were three
Peking reports on the visit, covering the arrival, the talks
and banquet on the 2Uth, and the departure. Apart from noting
that the delegation came to the PRC to make arrangements for
President Nixon's visit, there was no characterization of the
atmosphere or the substance of the talks. Though there were no
other specifications of when talks were held, the departure
announcement noted th..t during "intervals between the talks"
CONFIDENTIAL
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28 OCTOBER 1971
the delegation "visited various pla.-.es" and attended a theatrical
performance in Peking. Chou was not reported as making any other
appearanrpa during the period of the delegation's stay.*
SINO-SOVIET-U.S. The Chinese may have been pleased with the
TRIANGLE timing of the Kissinger delegation's arrival
coincident with the second anniversary--
unmarked by either Peking or Moscow--of the opening of the Sino-
Soviet border t ks. In the course of the movement toward Sino-
American negotiations, Peking has exhibited an awareness of the
uses of this development for its position in the triangular
relationship. This was reflected, for example, two months after
the Sino-Soviet talks had opened at a time when both sides were
leaking reports of difficulties in Vie border negotiations.
Peking's announcement on 14 Decembe_ 1969 of the chief Soviet
negotiator's departure for home--an announcement contrived to
put pressure on Moscow to return the negotiator soon--was
pointedly juxtaposed in the same NCNA international service
transmission with a belated report (three days after the fact)
of a meeting in Warsaw between the U.S. and PRC diplomatic
representatives. That meeting led to the resumption, after a
lengthy hiatus, of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks running
parallel with the protracted Sino-Soviet border talks.
The Warsaw talks were suspended after the U.S. incursion into
Cambodia in the spring of 1970, but there was new movement
in Sino-U.S. relations following the Lam Son 719 operation
in southern Laos in February-March this year and the emergence
of what Peking began. calling an "unprecedentedly fine situation"
in Indochina. After a series of developments ranging from the
visit of American table tennis players to the PRC in April to
the July announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming trip,
Peking presented an analysis of its strategy as requiring maximum
flexibility in distinguishing among its adversaries in order to
isolate "the main enemy." By implication, Peking identified
the Soviet Union as its principal antagonist and Justified its
dealings with the United States on the basis of changes in U.S.
* Chou appeared at an Iranian embassy reception on the evening
of the 26th at which Chi Peng-fei offered Peking's initial comment
on the UN vote. NCNA reported on the 27th that Chou had "a
friendly talk w~'.th American friendly personage John S. Service"
that day.
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policy that offered a counterbalance to the Soviets.* Thus
Peking may have hoped that Moscow read the American delegation's
arrival date as a reminder of the triangular facts of interna-
tional life.
SOVIET BLOC Moscow followed the Kissinger visit with brief
COMMENT reports of the announced activities, but there
has been no comment in the central media. A
Radio Most w broadcast to China on 26 October, discussing the
previous day's UN vote on seating the PRC, took note of Sino-
U.S. developments in accusing Washington of hypocrisy in its
China policy as evidenced by its efforts to develop contacts
with Peking while maintaining its relationship with the Nation-
alist Chinese regime. The day before Kissinger arrived in
Peking, a broadcast to the Chinese contrasted what it portrayed
as significant Soviet support for the PRC and Washington's
hostility from the time that the PRC was founded. The broad-
cast contained a rare reference to the moribund Sino-Soviet
treaty of alliance, noting that economic and other support
provided by the Soviets in line with the treaty enabled the
PRC to overcome the Western economic blockade.
In a notable allusion by a top Soviet leader to Sino-U.S.
developments, Brezhnev took the occasion of a speech in Paris
on the 27th to warn against attempts to impose a Vietnam settle-
ment "by way of secret combinations behind the Vietnamese
people's back."** Current Soviet comment has not spelled out
implications of Sino-U.S. relations for third parties, but some
East European comment has expressed misgivings over the effects
of these developments. A 25 October commentary in Prague's
RUDE PRAVO on the second Kissinger missicn explained that the
"anti-imperialist forces" view these developments with disquiet
because Washington undertook normalization of relations with the
PRC out of consideration of the "schismatic and anti-Soviet
orientation" of Peking policy. Nothing has changed in that
respect, "as Kissinger has seen for himself with satisfaction,"
the commentary concluded.
* Peking's analysis is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August,
pages 19-22.
** Brezhnev's remark is discussed in the Indochina section of
the TRENDS.
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An article on 20 October in a minor Polish paper, DZIENNIK
LUDOWY, a peasant organ, linked the anniversary of the opening
of the Sino-Soviet border talks, the Kissinger mission, and
Indochina in musing over the past two years' developments in
Sino-Soviet re.ations. After discussing Sino-Soviet develop-
ments, the article took note of Kissinger's arrival in Peking
that day, an event "which gives one food for thought."
Specifically, the article suggested the thought--which "must
be uppermost in the minds of the Indochinese people"--of how
more advantageous would be the position of the communist states
vis-a-vis the imperialists if the Sino-Soviet talks :.ad pro-
duced real progress.
OTHER CONWIUNIST The second Kissinger visit has not been
REACTION mentioned by Hanoi, which has never explicit-
ly acknowledged Peking's invitation to the
President while indirectly ca&tigating it, or by Pyongyang, which
has endorsed Peking's invitation. Peking's Albanian ally briefly
reported he Kissinger mission. In the wake of the original
announcement on the President's visit, Tirana had taken the
occasion of the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements on
20 Tuly to warn that the Nixon Administration cannot be trusted
and that the United States is "the main, the most perfidious, and
* -= most ferocious enemy of the peoples."
Havana has reported the Kissinger visit without comment. Some
Cuban reports have noted that President Nixon plans to visit
both Peking and Moscow.
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INDOCHINA
In the wake of the 24-28 September visit of Li Hsien-nien's
Chinese economic delegation and the 3-8 October visit of
Soviet President Podgornyy. DRV leaders are currently playing
host to a North Korean party-government delegation led by
Politburo member and Vice Premier Pak Song-chol. References
to DRV-DPRK solidarity and friendship pervade the propaganda,
with no overt manifestation of their diametrically opposed
reactions to Peking's invitation to President Nixcn--welcomed
by Kim Il-song on 6 August as a "great victory" for the Chinese
people and world revolutionary forces, at the time Hanoi in its
vitriolic polemic was implying that the PRC had departed from
a proletarian internationalist path.
Soviet party chief Brezhnev at a Paris dinner for President
Pompidou on 27 October made a thinly veiled allusion to possible
Sino-U.S. collusion on Indochina when he warned that the problem
cannot be solved "either by attempts to impose an alien will on
Vietnam by means of force or by way of secret combinations behind
the backs of the Vietnamese people." Brezhnev again pledged
Soviet support so long as the Indochinese struggle continues.
And Moscow broadcasts continue to cir.e President Podgornyy's
visit to Hanoi, during which the annual Soviet-DRV aid
agreements were signed, as testimony of the UOSR's unabated
loyalty to the DRV and the national liberation movement.
U.S. failure to respond positively to the PRG's 1 July proposal
and to totally withdraw from South Vietnam continues to be
scored by the Vietnamese comiunist delegates at Paris as well
as in routine propaganda And a Hanoi radio talk characterizes
the President's remarks on ending the war, in his 24 October
radio talk marking Veterans Day, as "flowery words" aimed at
deceiving American and world opinion.
NORTH KOREAN PARTY-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION WELCOMED IN HANOI
Pyongyang media gave no advance notice concerning the visit to
the DRV of a party-government delegation. On 24 October, the
day of the delegation's departure, KCNA reported that in response
to the invitation of the C+-ntral Committee of the VWP and the DRV
Government, a six-man party-government delegation headed by Pak
Song-chol, Politburo member and second vice premier, departed
Pyongyang for a "friendship visit to the DRV."
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NCNA reported the dame day that the delegation briefly stopped
at the Peking airport, where they were met by Politburo member
Li Hsien-nien who hosted lunch. Later on the 24th the delegation
was welcomed at the Hanoi airport by a Vietnamese delegation
headed by Nguyen Duy Trinh, Politburo member and Foreign Affairs
Minister. An evening banquet featured speeches by Trinh and Pak
with Premier Pham Van Dong in attendance.
Premier Dong participated in official talks with the delegation
on Lhe 25th and 26th. VNA portrayed the talks as having proceeded
"in an atmosphere of sincerity, militant solidarity, and fraternal
friendship." A "grand meeting" to welcome the DPRK delegation
was held by the "Hanoi population" on 25 Jctober at a local
meeting hall. Trinh, who headed the Vietnamese turnout,
stressed the theme that "Vietnam and Korea share the same
plight of temporary division of the country, are facing up to
the same enemy--the U.S. imperialist aggressors--and share the
same ideal of socialism and communism." Activities of the DPRK
delegation on the 26th included attendance at an art performance
hosted by the culture ministry, wreath-laying ceremonies at the
Hanoi monument to war dead, and a visit to Ho Chi Minh's home.
PROLETARIAN Foreign Minister Trinh in his banquet speech
INTERNATIONALISM on the 24th presented an optimistic picture
of relations with the DPRK and other members
of the socialist world. He referred to the fruitful development
of Vietnamese-Korean friendship on the basis of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism, suggested a toast to the
"solidarity" of the socialist countries and the international
communist and workers movement on this basis, and carefully
specified both the Soviet Union and China in referring to support
from the socialist countries. These are orthodox, standard
formulations and are ccnsistent with Hanoi propaganda during the
Podgornyy visit. They are noteworthy only against the bacLground
of Hanoi's July-August implications that Peking, in extending the
invitation to the President, was departing from a proletarian
internationalist path. Even after Hanoi ceased its anti-Chinese
polemic at the end of August, it remained reluctant to describe
Sino-U.S. relations as based on proletarian internationalism--a
reluctance dramatically demonstrated during Li Hsien-nieti's late-
September visit. While Hanoi must have been irked by Kim Il-song's
endorsement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon,* its current
propaganda now presents a DPRK-DRV relationship of "militant
solidarity" and "warm" friendship.
See the TRENDS of 11 August 1971, pages 13-15.
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Pak Song-chol in his speech at the banquet referred to Korean
"loyalty" to proletarian internationalism in a passage in which
he said that the Korean people regard the struggle of the
Vietnamese people as an encouragement to their own revolutionary
cause and "will continue doing their utmost to give moral and
material assistance to the fraternal Vietnamese people until
their final victory." Pak followed this assertion with a
repetition of the line on Asian unity promulgated by Peking
and Pyongyang which implicitly excludes the Soviet Union. He
reiterated that U.S. imperialism will be driven out of the
countries of Asia in the face of the "Joint fight of the Korean
peopl3, the Vietnamese people, the Lao people, the Cambodian
people, and the Chinese people." Speaking at the Hanoi meeting
the next day, he similarly referred to Asian unity, and in
another passage promised continued "active aid" to the
Vietnamese people.
Some seeming inconsistencies in Hanoi's line on Chinese adherence
to proletarian internationalism have come to light in recent
propaganda. After having studiously avoided references to the
concept during Li Hsien-nien's visit, DRV leaders did refero
proletarian internationalism in their congratulatory message
marking the 1 October PRC National Day.* However, they dropped
the declaration contained in the 1970 anniversary message that
mutual friendship between the two peoples had been "unceasingly
consolidated and developed" on this basis. As reported by NCNA,
a Vietnamese official of the friendship association at a
29 September meeting said that the Vietnamese "are determined
to do their utmost to nurture the fraternal friendship and
militant solidarity between our two peoples based on Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism. . . ." Hanoi media
failed to publicize this statement, but the omission seems less
significant in light of a similar pledge in an article on DRV
diplomacy by Foreign Minister Trinh in the October issue of the
party journal HOC TAP. Trinh said: "We will strive to strengthen
our militant solidarity and friendly relations with the brother
socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China, on
the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."
* See the TRENDS of 29 September 1971, pages 4-5, and of
6 October 1971, pages 2-3.
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BREZI-INEV IN FRANCE WARNS OF INTRIGUES AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE
Moscow's restrained treatment of the United States in the wake
of the announcement of the President's forthcoming visit to the
Soviet Union appeared to have been reflected in Brezhnev's speech
at a dinner given by President Pompidou on the 25th. Avoiding
criticism of U.S. foreign policy, the Soviet party chief remarked
that his visit to France was taking place "in a complex situation"
and added mildly that "the war in Indochina is continuing and
the Middle East crisis is still unsettled."
But Brezhnev showed no such restraint in a speech on the 27th
that he hosted for Pompidou. He called U.S. "aggression" in
Indochina one of the most serious obstacles to peace, and said
that the way to settle the conflict is "to end foreign
interference" in that part of the world. And, in the first
such statement by a top Soviet leader, he went on to declare:
"This problem cannot be solved either by attempts to impose
an alien will on Vietnam by means of force, or by way of
secret combinations behind the Vietnamese people's back."
As would be expected in the circumstances, he mentioned
neither the United States nor China by name. Gromyko in his
28 September UNGA speech explicitly d'scussed Sino-U.S.
relations and went on to raise the specter of "combinations"
of states directed against others in a general context without
mentioning Vietnam.* Brezhnev's remarks seem particularly
notable coming against the background of Kissinger's return
from his second trip to Peking as well as the UN vote on the
seating of the PRC--developments which dramatize the PRC's
expanding role in world affairs.
In his brief statement on the "correct" way to settle the
Indochinese question, Brezhnev said nothing about the PRG's
1 July seven-point proposal. Authoritative Moscow press
reaction in July and August to the announcement of the
President's Peking visit had charged that it eased pressure
on Washington to respond to the 1 July peace proposal.**
* This passage was included in extracts of Gromyko's speech
distributed by TASS but it was excised from the version of the
speech published in the central press. See the TRENDS of
6 October, page 41.
** Moscow had endorsed the PRG proposal in a PRAVDA editorial
on 5 July--the day after PEOPLE'S DAILY's editorial endorsement.
Both Gromyko in his UNGA speech and Podgornyy in a 3 October
speech in Hanoi criticized U.S. failure to respond to the proposal.
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DRV DEPRECATES PRESIDENTS RADIO TAU(. HAILS ANTIWAR FORCES
At this writing Vietnamese communist media have not publicized
antiwar demonstrations in Washington marking the Veterans Day
weekend. But VNA on 27 October did report what it described
as a "recent" message from Hoang Minh Giam, chairman of the
Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People,
hailing the "fall offensive."
President Nixon's 24 October radio talk marking the Veterans Day
holiday prompts a Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 26th
which ridicules the President's remarks that the United States is
ending the war and proceeding toward preventing the outbreak of
others, and that there is now a greater chance to make the present
U.S. Vietnam veterans the last war veterans. Hanoi observes that
the President "hoped that his flowery words" would deceive
American and world opinion. And it goes on to counter his
assertion that the war is ending by describing continued U.S.
bombing and other military action throughout Indochina. The
broadcast does not specify the various steps spelled out by
the President which he said moved toward peace, and it of
couzse ignores his remarks that hi3 trips to Moscow and Peking
are directed toward that end.
Hanoi also takes issue with the President's contention that the
antiwar movement opposes U.S. servicemen and veterans. It says
that he "brazenly distorted the truth about the American
people's antiwar movement" which in fact, it adds, has "gained
the sympathy of many servicemen and veterans." The radio
claims that "heedless of Nixon's boastful arguments," the
people are "actively making preparations for the fall struggle
movement" to demand an end to the war and repatriation of all
U.S. troops.
The Hoang Minh Giam message on the fall offensive--a routine
propaganda exercise at times of U.S. antiwar campaigns--says
that after the impetus of the spring antiwar activities, the
"ongoing fall offensive has destroyed the myth created by the
American warlike circles that the peace movement is dying."
The message, carried by VNA on the 27th, claims that the antiwar
struggle underlines the fact that the American people "will not
be deceived by any political lie," that they will "have the last
word to achieve their demands and will remove all those who go
counter to their tradition of peace and justice." Giam also
routinely called on the U.S. Administration to respond to the
PRG's seven-point peace proposal.
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PARIS TALKS: COMMUNIST MEDIA CONTINUE CURSORY ATTENTTON
Vietnamese communist media's attention to the Paris talks is
confined to the cryptic LPA and VNA accounts of the sessions.
Consistent with recent practice, the VNA accoun.. of the
21 October session dismisses Ambassador Porter's statement
in a single sentence, saying that he "continued to maintain
his aggressive and colonialist stand." And VNA totally
ignores the GVN statement.
PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien's statement is again replete with
criticism of Ambassador Porter, but the VNA account omits or
softens many of his remarks. Tien repeateuly criticized
Porter "for over the past five sessions rehashing the shop-
worn allegations of his predecessors, distorting facts and
making black white." VNA notes that Tieu denounced the U.S.
delegate for trying "by hook or crook to prettify" President
Thieu and the recent election. But it ignores Tien's charge
that Porter "even wants to negate the South Vietnamese
people's great resistance to U.S. aggression, led by the NFLSV
and the PRG"--an obvious reference to the Ambassador's assertions
that the NFLSV has little real influence in South Vietnam
militarily or politically. VNA also ignores DRV delegate
Nguyen Minh Vy's question to Porter asking "how he can deny
that at this conference table he has been resorting to the
arguments of a colonialist aggressor to continue to hinder
the work of the conference."
Vy's statement consisted largely of charges of "fresh U.S. war
acts" against the Indochinese countries, and he described the
upcoming trip to South Vietnam by Defense Secretary Laird,
Admiral Moorer and General Westmoreland as evidence that the
Nixon Administration "is scheming to take new military
adventures."
DRV SPOKESMAN. COMMENT RAP U.S. RAIDS IN DMZ. NORTH VIETNAM
The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 22 October issues the
most recent in its series of protests against U.S. strikes in
the DMZ and North Vietnam. The statement charges that from
16 to 20 October, U.S. planes including B-52's attacked Huong
Lap village and U.S. artillery from "south of the demilitarized
zone" and U.S. ships shelled Vinh Giang and Vinh Son villages.
The three villages, described as being "nor;:h of the 17th
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parallel" were also thu subject of the two most recent foreign
ministry spokesman protests on 9 and 16 October. The current
protest also says that on the 18th and 19th U.S. aircraft
"bombed populated areas" in Tuyen Hoa and Minh Hoa districts,
Quang Binh Province.
The charges voiced in the foreign ministry spokesman's protest
are echoed in a 23 October Hanoi radio commentary. It is unclear
why this particular protest prompted comment when none followed
the four previous similar protests in the past month. The
commentary recalls the intensive 21 September raids--which had
been protested at the higher level of a DRV Foreign Ministry
statement on the 22d--calling them a "typical case" of repeated
U.S. "crimes" against the people of Vinh Linh and Quang Binh.
It also recalls that the Administration used the "extremely
overbearing and odious allegation" of self-defense reaction
to justify those acts.
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28 OCTOBER 1971
U S S R - I N D I A
MOSCOW REGISTERS CONCERN OVER INDO-PAKISTANI SITUATION
In the month since Prime Minister Gandhi's 27-29 September state
visit to the Soviet Union,* Soviet media's treatmet of events
in the Indian subcontinent has evolved from an outpouring of
Soviet public sentiment in support of the refugees streaming
into India, underscoring sympathy with India's position, to
expressions of unconcealed concern that the Indian-Pakistani
confrontation may result in war. The propaganda sustains its
pro-Indian character, though tempered now by exhortations for
mutual restraint.
Declaring that "both sides were in full agreement in assessing
the situation," the statement issued following 22-25 October
"consultations" in New Delhi between Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minist%r Firyubin and Indian officials, including Prime Minister
Gandhi, reflected both the continuing Soviet support for he
Indian position and increased mutual concern over the explosive-
ness of the border situation. The "consultations," according to
the statement released on the 27th by TASS and INFORMATION SERVICE
of INDIA, were held "in connection with the tense situation which
has arisen on the Indian subcontinent and which endangers peace
in that part of the world."
The statement specified that the discussions were held "in
accordance with the existing practice of biannual, bilateral
consultations and with Article 9 of the Soviet-Indian treaty of
peace, friendship, and cooperation." Article 9 provides that
in the event of an attack or a threat of attack the two parties
"will immediately start mutual consultations with a view to
eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures
to ensure peace and security for their countries." INFORMATION
SERVICE of INDIA cited an official spokesman as saying it was
India which "had invoked" Article 9. A New Delhi broadcast on
the 28th reported that the P.S. Kutakhov, commander-in-chief of
the Soviet air force, was scheduled to arrive in the Indian
capital the next day for a six-day visit.
* The visit is reviewed in the TRENDS of 6 October, pages 26-30.
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Soviet concern over the situation had been registered in the
joint communique publicized on 26 October at the end of Kosygin's
visit to Canada. The communique called--na Moscow has done
repeatedly before--for a "political settlement" in East Pakistan
"that would take into account the legitimate rights and interests
of its populat n and would facilitate a speedy and secure return
of the refugees," but it added now that "this would be facilitated
if the interested parties exerc_ied restraint." Thus in a formal
document to which India was not a party, Moscow sharpened the
thrust of earlier statements by Soviet leaders on the necessity
for both Paiistan and India to display the prudence necessary
to forestall military hostilities. In a speech on 14 September,
at a dinnar for the king of Afgha