TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010036-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: October 14, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~Illllllllll~u!~III IIIIIII~~~
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
14 OCTOBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 41)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Lnteded hem euIe~eeIit
ds~e01".0 sed
de11e16fte8se
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Communique on Podgornyy Visit Registers "Unanimity" in Talks . 1
USSR and DRV Sign Aid Agreements, Discuss Future Cooperation . 4
Tirana Sees Podgornyy Visit Aimed at Dividing DRV and China . 6
National, Provincial Media Cease Referring to Lin Piao . . . . 7
Mao Has "Friendly Conversation" with Haile Selassie . . . . . 9
Kweiyang Radio Reverts to Solid Relay of Radio Peking . . . . 9
NIXON TRIP TO USSR
Moscow Stresses Consistency with "Constructive" Soviet Policy. 11
MIDDLE EAST
As-Sadat Visit: Moscow Reaffirms Stand on Peaceful Settlement. 13
FORCE CUTS IN EUROPE
Moscow Chides NATO for Dilatory Response to Brezhnev Proposal. 15
EAST EUROPE
Tito Tones Down Prepared Text of Speech on Yugoslav Exercises. 17
Soviet, Hungarian Troops Hold Joint Exercises in Transdanubia. 19
Armenian President Urges Right of Interpellation for Soviets . 20
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FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
Moscow (2780 items)
Peking (1526 items)
Indochina
(9%)
21%
Domestic Issues (32%)
33%
[Podgornyy in DRV
(3%)
20%]
Haile Selassie in PRC (--)
17%
Kosygin in Algeria
(1%)
8%
PRC National Day (27%)
16%
CDR National Day
(0.1%)
6%
Indochina (17%)
8%
UK Spy Charges
(4%)
4%
[South Vietnam (--)
3%]
Against USSR
China
(4%)
2%
Elections
PRC Seat in UN (6%)
2%
Yemen Premier in USSR
(5%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, r-3vern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted ab commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
INDOCHINA
Hanoi media have not mentioned the announcement on 12 October of
President Nixon's plans to visit the Soviet Union in May 1972.
The DRV's silence is consistent with its failure to have ever
directly mentioned the President's projected trip to China.
Hanoi made clear its general opposition to such travels in a
final blast in the polemic sparked by the China trip announcement--
a charge by NHAN DAN's Commentator on 22 August that "Nixon has
taken every opportunity to 'visit"' places in "the socialist world
with the objective of dividing and destroying."
The joint statement issued at the close of Soviet President
Podgornyy's 3-8 October Hanoi visit warns of "imperialist" efforts
to undermine the unity of socialist states. While couched in
innocuously general terms, the passage accords both with Hanoi's
earlier polemical line and with Moscow's charges that Peking's
invitation to the President was motivated by anti-Sovietism. The
statement sass the two sides expressed "unanimity" on all
questions discussed, but only Soviet comment has echoed this
evaluation and DRV propaganda reflects Hanoi's resolve to maintain
its neutral posture vis-a-vis Moscow and Peking.
The 3 October GVN presidential election continues to be denounced
in Hanoi and Front broadcasts which dismiss the results as
"fabricated" and claim that the election has further demonstrated
Thieu's "dictatorial" nature and thus exposed him to mounting
attacks by opposing forces in South Vietnam. The statements by
both communist delegates at the 131st Paris session on 7 October
were devoted to routine denunciations of the election.
Peking echoes the Vietnamese condemnation of the GVN election
"farce" in a 9 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which
also reiterates China's support for the PRG's seven-point
proposal of 1 July as the basis for a Vietnam settlement.
Vietnamese communist media have not mentioned the Viet Cong
release of a U.S. prisoner on 8 October and the reciprocal
allied release of a North Vietnamese lieutenant on the 10th.
This was the first release of a U.S. POW in the South since
three were freed in January 1969.
COMMUNIQUE ON PODGORNYY VISIT REGISTERS "UNANIMITY" IN TALKS
Podgornyy's 3-8 October visit to Hanoi produced new agreements on
economic and military aid and predictably profuse thanks from the
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
North Vietnamese; at the same time, the differing approaches
and concerns of the two sides show through in the propaganda
surrounding the visit.
The 8 October joint statement, signed by Podgornyy and Le Duan,
says the two sides "exchanged views in an atmosphere of fraternal
friendship, cordiality, and comradely openness." It adds that
"expressing unanimity on all the questions discussed, the
participants in the talks decided to continue strengthening and
developing in every way friendship between the two countries on
the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism."
The reference to "unanimity" seems to have been included at
Moscow's behest; where the Soviets have repeatedly described the
talks as being marked by "complete mutual understanding and
unanimity," Hanoi has avoided these characterizations. A
9 October followup editorial on the visit in NHAN DAN says the
joint statement "clearly expressed both sides' positions
concerning burning international issues," with no reference to
"unanimity."
No claim of "unanimity" was contained in the last comparable
Soviet-DRV joint statement, on Pham Van Dong's October 1969 trip
to the USSR, and Hanoi exhibited a reluctance to express an
identity of views with Moscow during Le Duan's talks with
Brezhnev in May of this year after the conclusion of the 24th
CPSU Congress: Where TASS said those talks took place in an
atmosphere of "complete unanimity and cordiality," VNA
described the atmosphere as one of "militant solidarity and
fraternal friendship." Against the background of the Laos
incursion, the joint communique on Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi
last March recorded "completely identical views" specifically
oa "questions of how to deal with possible military adventures
by U.S. imperialism."
The Soviets also seemed more inclined than the North Vietnamese
to stress the links between the two parties consolidated by the
visit and reaffirmec. in the joint statement. At a reception
on the 7th, Podgornyy called the joint statement "an important
political document" which "not only sums up and consolidates
the experience of fraternal interaction but also outlines
prospects and the main lines of development of Soviet-Vietnamese
cooperation in the years to come." This view is repeated in an
11 October PRAVPA editorial on the visit, but NHAN DAN's
9 October editorial is more reserved in its evaluation. NHAN DAN
hews to the terminology of the joint statement in pointing to the
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
two sides' resolve to do everything possible "to further strengthen
friendship and all-sided cooperation between the two countries."
A muted assertion of the DRV's insistence on its right to
determine its own fate and pursue an independent foreign policy
is incorporated in the joint statement, and recognized by the
Soviets, in the avowal that both sides "believe the solution of
topical international problems must be carried out in accordance
with the vital national strivings of the peoples."
Differences between Hanoi's and Moscow's policies toward Cambodia
are reflected in the joint statement when it registers both
sides' support for the "political program" of the National United
Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) as well as for the five-point proposal
of the Patriotic Front of Laos. Normally Hanoi would have
expressed support specifically for Sihanouk's 23 March 1970
five-point declaration on Cambodia; Le Duan reaffirmed support
for Sihanouk's stand in his speech at the 4 October meeting
honoring Podgornyy, and such support was proffered in the
10 March 1971 joint statement signed by Chou En-lai and Pham Van
Dong. Moscow has previously endorsed the FUNK "proposals,'`
but in the absence of Soviet recognition of Sihanouk's Royal
Government of National Union (RGNU) it avoids referring to
Sihanouk in his capacity as leader of the RGNU. The statement on
Vietnam issued at the 24th CPSU Congress expressed the Soviet
Union's conviction "that the proposals made by the DRV, the PRG,
the Patriotic Front of Laos, and the National United Front of
Cambodia serve as a constructive basis for settling the
Indochinese problems."
Some passages in the joint statement seem noteworthy in the con-
text of Hanoi's polemics this summer reacting to the prospect of a
Sino-U.S. detente. The statement's reference to efforts by
"imperialist reaction" to "split the ranks of the anti-imperialist
front" and to "u-.idermine the unity of the socialist states and
the world communist movement" is couched in innocuously general
terms. But it could be read--against the background of Hanoi's
polemical reaction to the PRC's invitation to President Nixon
and of Moscow's charges that the invitation reflected anti-
Sovietism--as a muted expression of shared concern over the moves
toward Sino-U.S. rapprochement. The October 1969 joint statement
on Pham Van Dong's visit to the Soviet Union said nothing about
efforts to split the communist movement.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
Both sides make a general call for communist unity on the basis
of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, with the
latter principle specifically cited as the basis for party
relations. While invocation of the principle is standard in
descriptions of Soviet-DRV relations, its appearance in the
statement and in DRV speeches during the visit brings into
sharpened relief Hanoi's evident reluctance in recent ninths
to similarly characterize its relations with Peking. The DRV
message on the PRC's 1 October National Day did link the
principle of proletarian internationalism to the relations
between the two peoples, but references to the principle were
pointedly absent from Hanoi statements during the September
visit of the PRC economic delegation led by Li Hsien-nien as
well as from authoritative North Vietnamese statements last
August.*
Hanoi's propaganda on the Podgornyy visit again demonstrates
the determination of the North Vietnamese to sustain their
balancing act between Peking and Moscow. The NHAN DAN editorial
on the visit and speeches by Le Duan and Ton Duc Thang
specifically mention Chinese as well as Soviet aid, just as
Hanoi gratuitously referred to Soviet along with Chinese aid in
September during Li Hsien-nien's visit. The DRV-USSR joint
statement notes that the Vietnamese side "emphasized the
exceptional importance" of aid from the USSR and "from other
socialist countries."
USSR AND DRV SIGN AID AGREEMENTS, DISCUSS FUTURE COOPERATION
Just as the Chinese broke with precedent last month to send
Li Hsien-nien to conclude the annual PRC aid agreements in Hanoi,
rather than in Peking, so the Soviets departed from past
practice by signing their annual agreements in Hanoi during the
Podgornyy visit. The accords were signed, as usual, by Vice
Premiers Le Thanh Nghi and V. Novikov, a member of the Podgornyy
delegation.** Podgornyy and Le Duan were among the officials
* See the TRENDS of 6 October, pages 1-3, and 29 September,
pages 4-5.
** Last year the annual aid agreements were signed by Vice Premiers
Nguyen Con and N.A. Tikhonov, but in previous years Le Thanh Nghi
and Novikov have usually had this responsibility. For a discussion
of the signing of the accords last year, see the 28 October 1970
TRENDS, pages 4-5.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
attending the 7 October signing ceremony, reported by both Hanoi
and Moscow media that day.
A VNA report on the 8th listed three agreements: on nonrefund
military aid for 1972, on nonrefund economic aid for 1972, and
on new loans to the DRV. These agreements, VNA explained,
"provide that in 1972 the Soviet Union will deliver to the DRV
a great quantity of food, fuel, transport facilities, complete
equipments, ferrous and nonferrous metals, chemical fertilizers,
weapons, ammunition, and other materials.':
Moscow's announcement of the agreements contained no such detail
on their substance, but Soviet propaganda continues the practice
of regularly citing specific aid to the DRV. No details of the
agreement signed last year were publicized at the time of its
announcement, nor were details mentioned in the announcements of
accords in 1965, 1966, or July 1968; however, announcements in
September 1967, November 1968, and October 1969 listed some of
the types of materials to be given as aid. Hanoi does not
report specific aid provided for in the annual agreements with the
Chinese, presumably because Peking itself is always silent about
such details.
The 7NA reports on the 7th and 8th noted that a further agreement
on Soviet military aid was signed by Vice Ministers of Defense
Tran Sam and Sokolov. The latter report added that the accord
dealt with Soviet assistance to the DRV in improving military
techniques in 1972. Both VNA reports also noted that a trade
agreement between the two countries was signed on the 7th by
DRV Minister of Foreign Trade Phan Anh and Soviet Deputy Minister
of Trade Ivan Grishin. Unlike the usual annual trade accords,
this pact is said to cover the exchange of goods for both 1972
and 1973.
Further information on Soviet assistance to the DRV is contained
in the joint statement on the Podgornyy visit, which note,,, r_hct
the two sides "reached agreement on entrusting correspondini.
organizations and offices with working out measures aimed at a
long-range development of economic cooperation, trade, cultural,
scientific-technical and other exchanges between the two
countries." It adds that proposals on these measures will be
submitted to the two parties' central committees and the two
governments.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
Highlighting one aspect of future Soviet assistance, the statement
also announces that the two countries agreed to "continue to
explore the possibilities for building a hydroelectric station on
the Da River" and that a group of Soviet specialists will be sent
to begin surveying and other preparations. The statement notes
that the Podgornyy delegation took part in a ceremony opening
the first section of the Thac Ba hydroelectric plant, built with
Soviet aid.
TIRANA SEES PODGORNYY VISIT AIMED AT DIVIDING DRV AND CHINA
While Peking has remained predictably silent on Podgornyy's
visit to Hanoi, its Tirana ally issued a blast against the
Soviet President's diplomatic efforts in a 7 October editorial
article in the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT. Calling on Hanoi
to be vigilant in the face of Soviet "intrigues," the article
warned the North Vietnamese that Moscow "pretends to be their
friend only to stab them in the back." The purposes behind
Podgornyy's visit, it said, are to undermine the North Vietnamese
"struggle," to "save the Yankee imperialists," and "to drive a
wedge between the DRV and China." Elaborating on the latter point,
the paper went on to say that the Soviet leaders are "sabotaging"
the Vietnamese struggle by "their limitless insinuations
concerning the fraternal aid provided by the PRC to Vietnam,
as well as by their efforts to cast dark shadows on the just and
profoundly internationalist policy of the PRC."
Defensively insisting that North Vietnamese-Chinese friendship
is based on "Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian
internationalism," ZERI I POPULLIT added that this is "precisely
why the Soviets want to belittle and liquidate this friendship."
The article also sought to exploit Soviet vulnerability on the
score of support for Indochina by noting that Moscow still maintains
normal diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia,
thereby demonstrating "the hypocrisy of the Soviet revisionists
toward the Vietnamese people." ZERI I POPULLIT lectures that
"American aggression is one and indivisible in Cambodia as in
Vietnam, and there is no distinction between a Thieu or a Lon
Nol."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
C H I 14A
NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL MEDIA CEASE REFERRING TO LIN PIAO
A survey of published FBIS-monitored material indicates that
since 15 September the name of Lin Piao has virtually disappeared
from Peking media except in the case of foreign messages
addressed to him, as on National Day. Scattered references
to Lin have continued in provincial media, with his name last
appearing in such sources on 8 October when the Kirin radio
referred to his instructions on grasping company-level units
and on studying Mao.
Lin began to draw less media attention this past summer, and
Army Day observances on 1 August notably downplayed his role,
with the usual quotation from Lin dropped from the Army Day
editorial.* Accounts of a provincial congress of Mao activists
and "four-good, five-good" representatives in Kiangsi last
August suggest that the clampdown on mentions of Lin may have
been reinforced at the provincial level toward the end of
August. Texts of two KIANGSI DAILY editorials on 22 and
30 August, on the opening and closing of the congress, are
available. The first one makes a normal closing obeisance to
the party Central Committee with Mao as leader and Lin as
deputy leader. The second concludes with a bow to Mao, but
nowhere does it refer to Lin. Kiangsi First Secretary Cheng
S' .t-ching, delivering the opening speech at the congress,
referred twice to Lin as deputy leader.
BANQUET TOASTS Peking references to Lin during the first
TERMINATED two weeks of September, before and during
the first few days in which anomalies were
noted in PRC behavior, were minimal, averaging less than one
a day. Most of these were obligatory mentions in messages
to the DRV and DPRK on their national days and in toasts to
Mao and Lin by foreign visitors to China. Since early
September Peking has dropped the practice of reporting
banquet toasts in the media; in the past toasts offered
during a major visit such as Haile Selassie's would have
been reported and would have included wishes for the good
health of both Mao and Lin.
* See FBIS TRENDS, 4 August 1971, for a discussion of this
and other indicators of diminished status for Lin, page 23.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
The only Lin reference in central media during September which
singled him out for special praise was the 12 September
announcement that 50 photographs of Mao, including some with
Lin, were to be disseminated in honor of the 50th anniversary
of the party. Of the half-dozen provincial radios reporting
local activities in distributing the photos, only Tsingtao
(in Shantung) on 30 September singled out Lin for praise or
even mentioned him. The Hupeh radio on 27 September did note
that Lin appeared in five pictures with Mao in a photo book
printed lccally. There were scattered provincial references
to Lin through September. In October, apart from the Kirin
reference noted above, he was mentioned by the radios of Hunan and
Tsinghai on 1 October, Tibet on 4 October, and by Sinkiang on
the 6th. In none of these accounts was he singled out for any
special praise.
Several top PLA leaders besides Lin have been absent since
10 September, most notably Politburo members Huang Yung-sheng,
Wu Fa-hsien, and Li Tso-peng. Lin himself has not appeared in
public since he met Romanian chief Ceausescu on 3 June. Issues
reflected in the media which might reflect discord with or
within the military are minimal, although there is some
evidence that an attempt has been made to place the PLA more
un er party control, and that there may have been some
n eemet-over r_ he bud-get pr or ty to be accorded advanced
weapons.*
The joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY
editorial on Army Day placed stress on party control of the
army, a theme missing from such editorials since 1967. This
line :ias been reflected to some extent in a number of
provincial articles in the past month emphasizing that the
party must assume a leading role in militia work on the county
level. The theme of "absolute leadership of the party over the
work of militia building" was m;,at recently sounded by Ningsia
on 5 October. Most of the provincial articles indicate that
the local armed forces departments will still exercise much
control, but that the principle of party control must be
firmly adhered to in militia organization.
* For a discussion of the advanced weapons controversy see
FBIS TRENDS, 18 August and 1 September 1971.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
MAO HAS 'FRIENDLY CONVERSATION" WITH HAILE SELASSIE
Underscoring Lin's continued absence was Mao's reappearance to
receive Haile Selassie on 8 October. Mao's last previous
appearance had been to greet Ne Win on 7 August. an occasion
also misse'.by Lin. As in the case of the Ne Win reception,
Peking merely noted that Mao and Haile Selassie had a "friendly
conversation" and named those present. For the party-state
visit of Ceausescu last June, Lin and almost the entire
Politburo made appearances; for Yahya Khan's trip in November
1970 Lin did not appear, but most other top Politburo members
did.
Notably fewer Politburo members showed up at occasions
honoring Haile Selassie than had appeared for any of the
previous visitors who were heads of state; even many who
have appeared in public since 10 September made no appearance,
which may suggest that a meeting was being held outside Peking.
Li Hsien-nien's appearance in Canton to greet Chou and Haile
Selassie, and Chou's apparent failure to return immediately
to Peking after Haile Selassie's departure on the 13th, may
relate to this possibility.
KWEIYANG RADIO REVERTS TO SOLID RELAY OF RADIO PEKING
Kweiyang radio, Kweicktow provincial service, reverted to a
nearly solid relay of Radio Peking following its nioraiag
broadcast of 8 October. Since that time, Kweiyang has
relayed Radio Peking except for brief local announcements,
weather forecasts, and an occasional musical program.
Radio behavior of this sort has been a fairly reliable
indicator of local dissensions at the provincial level since
the onset of the Cultural Revolution. The practice of
reverting to a solid relay of Radio Peking for a few weeks,
sometimes for months, was common during the 1966-69 period.
But the last time a provincial-level radio went over to a
solid relay of Peking--after once resuming local broadcasts--
occurred in January 1970. It was the Inner Mongolia radio
that ceased local broadcasting at that time, and since last
August it has been the only provincial-level radio not carrying
any local news.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
Previously, the Kweiyang radio carried no local news and relayed
Peking for a 20-month period, from 30 September 1969 until
18 May this year. The return to local broadcasting, which
lasted until 8 October, coincided with the announcement that
a provincial party congress meeting at Tsunyi--site of the
1935 conference which placed Mao in control of the CCP--had
established the Kweichow Provincial CCP Committee. Among the
party secretaries named, there was only one survivor of the
group that headed up the early "model" Kweichow Provincial
Revolutionary Committee formed in February 1967.
The Kweiyang radio's report on National Day activities in the
province was less substantial than the reports from most other
provinces. No reference was made to provincial 'Leadership organs,
let alone individual leaders.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS '.RENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
NIXON TRIP TO USSR
MOSCOW STRESSES CONSISTENCY bWITiI ''CONSTRUCTIVE" SOVIET POLICY
TASS and Radio Moscow on 12 October carried the announcement
that President Nixon will visit the USSR in the latter half of
May 1972 with no acknowledgment that it was a joint announcement
rraleased simultaneously in Washington. About an hour and a half
later, a one-sentence TASS report under a Washington dateline
said the President told a press conference he would be visiting
the Soviet capital. While TASS totally ignored the questions
and answers at the press conference, a 14 October Kiev radio
report singled out the President's remarks dissociating the USSR
trip from his planned journey to the PRC and quoted his statement
that neither trip was being made "for the purpose of exploiting
what differences may exist between the two countries."
The first substantial Soviet comment, by TASS commentator
Kornilov on 14 October, views the planned U.S.-Soviet summit
as "a big and important event that may have a positive influence
on the international situation." Kornilov underscores the idea
that the trip accords with the "constructive" foreign policy
worked out at the 24th CPSU Congress and "unswervingly promoted"
by the USSR. Such a policy, Kornilov says, goes hand in hand
with the USSR's equally unswerving resolve to firmly rebuff
"aggression." But he reiterates that the USSR proceeds from
the assumption that there are no political or other problems,
"however complex they may appear, that could not be resolved
at the conference table given a mutual striving for agreement
and good will." He cites the four-power Berlin accord and the
two recent U.S.-Soviet SALT agreements as examples but does not
specify areas of possible discussion during the President's
visit.
An earlier brief reference to the visit had appeared in a Moscow
radio commentary in Czech and Slovak on the 13th, in the
context of a discourse on consistent Soviet pursuit of a
policy of peaceful coexistence. And TASS on the 13th quoted
extensively from an ADN summary of a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article
that day which observed that the agreement on the trip "shows
once more that there is no basic issue of international politics
which can be solved without the Soviet Union." Notably absent
from the TASS report of the article was a passage--cit:'ed in a
Prague CTK version as well as by ADN--that the agreement
"clearly thwarts the plans of the Peking leaders, who intended
to knock together an anti-Soviet bloc by flirting with Washington."
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Peking media have ignored the announcement of the Moscow visit.
There has also been silence from Hanoi, which has never
directly mentioned the President's projected trip to China
and has made abundantly clear its concern and misgivings about
such journeys.
COMMENT FROM All of Moscow's East European allies, including
EAST EUROPE Romania, have reported the announcement of the
trip, and comment has been monitored from
Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak as well as East German
media. Prague's domestic service on the 12th and a RUDE PRAVO
article reviewed by CTK the next day emphasized the point that
the visit will not be directed against any third party. Polish
media have touched on the likely agenda for the talks, with a
PAP commentator on 12 October saying the discussions will
treat the problem of ending the war in Indochina, the Middle
East conflict, and disarmament issues. A 13 October PAP
review of dispatches in ZYCIE WARSZAWY and TRYBUNA LUDU said
that the former paper, citing "foreign correspondents in
Moscow," listed strategic arms limitation and the Middle East
problem as "the most probable platforms of rapprochement"
during the President's talks in Moscow.
PAP said TRYBUNA LUDU pointed up the fact that the President
chose to announce the trip personally and concluded that he
"certainly had in mind" the 1972 elections. In the same vein,
an article in Warsaw's EXPRESS WIECZORNY, summarized by PAP
on the 13th, said that if the visit ends in success the
President's predicted "era of negotiation" will have been
realized and his victory in the elections will be assured.
A TRYBUNA LUDU roundup of world reaction on the 13th said the
announcement of the visit has placed the British in an
"embarassing" position in view of the cooling of London's
relations with Moscow following the expulsion of Soviet
diplomats from the United Kingdom.
Substantial Hungarian press comment on the 14th welcomed the
announcement of the trip, forecasting a general improvement
in international relations as a result. MAGYAR NEMZET, while
questioning whether the President's decision to make the trip
reflects any real change in U.S. policy, found it significant
that a U.S. politician aspiring to election or reelection
as President is "compelled" to go to Moscow to meet the
Soviet leaders rather than maeting them on "neutral" ground.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
MIDDLE EAST
AS-SADAT VISIT: MOSCOW REAFFIRMS STAND ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
Extensive Moscow publicity for the 11-13 October visit of President
Anwar as-Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) lays stress
on the USSR's continuing efforts to achieve a political settle-
ment of the Middle East conflict but indicates little flexibility
in the known Soviet position. Thus Podgornyy in his 12 October
luncheon speech honoring as-Sadat, leveling the customary attack
on Israel and the United States as the "procrastinators" in a
peaceful settlement, observes that the "only possible realistic:
program" foL establishing peace in the area is the withdrawal
of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied by them
since 1967, the implementation "in full volume of the Security
Council's known resolution," and respect for the lawful rights
of all the peoples of the Middle East, including the Arab people
of Palestine.
In the pattern of the communique following ARE Foreign Minister
Riyad's 29 June-4 July visit to the USSR, the 13 October
communique on as-Sadat's visit treats in detail the elements
of a peaceful settlement. The document endorses the Jarring
mission and says that the 22 November 1967 Security Council
resolution and the call for an Israeli pullback to the lines
of 4 June 1967 have the support of all peace-loving states and
peoples. And it calls for insuring the rights and interests
of all the countries of the area, including the Arab peoples
of Palestine.
In the recent flurry of Soviet communiques signed jointly with
other Arab states, the Middle East issue has been treated in
less detail. Thus those following Kosygin's 4-8 October visit
to Algeria and his 8-10 October visit to Morocco, as well as
the joint Soviet-Yemeni communique following Prime Minister
'Ali Nasir Muhammad's 30 September-9 October visit to the USSR,
failed to mention the Jarring mission, the 22 November Security
Council resolution, or the 4 June 1967 lines. All three
assailed the Israeli and U.S. roles in the Middle East and
noted the need to support the Palestine Arabs; the Soviet-
Algerian and Soviet-Moroccan communiques went on to call for
the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
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The Soviet-ARE communique does not detail the nature of military
aid which will be forthcoming from the USSR, noting only that
the two sides "agreed specifically on measures aimed at further
strengthening the military might of Egypt." And Podgornyy in
his 12 October speech pledged that as long as the aftermath of
Israeli "aggression" remains, the USSR will combine efforts
toward a political settlement "with the adoption of energetic
measures to help the Arab Republic of Egypt and other friendly
Arab countries in the further strengthening of their defenses."
Reflecting continuing Soviet concern over the treatment of
"progressive" elements in the Arab world, including those in
the ARE, Podgornyy on the 12th took note of the "anti-communist
and anti-Soviet campaign fanned by the imperialists and their
agents" which serves purposes alien to the Arab peoples.
Obse-ving that the Arab peoples "know full well who is their
ally . . and who is their enemy," Podgornyy cited as evidence
the "growing rebuff to subversive, hostile actions of
reactionaries." (It, a 14 September speech at a dinner
honoring the visiting Afghan king, Podgornyy had decried
attempts by "reaction and imperialism" to disunite the Arab
countries, undermine them from within, and "strike a blow
against the patriotic forces.")
In what appears to be a concession by the ARE, and no doubt
as a result of hard bargaining, the Soviet-ARE communique
similarly notes that "attempts to spread anti-communism and
anti-Sovietism" are designed to split the ranks of the Arab
revolutionary fighters and disrupt solidarity. According to
the communique, the "two sides strongly condemn anti-communism
and anti-Sovietism as prejudicing the peoples' urge for
liberation and their national interests and as serving only
the interests of the international imperialist forces."
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FORCE CUTS IN EUROPE
FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 197]
MOSCOW CHIDES NATO FOR DILATORY RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV PROPOSAL
Soviet media continue to laud the Brezhnev proposal for the
opening of talks on force and armaments reductions in Europe
and to chide NATO for allegedly dragging its feet on the issue.
Attention currently centers on the 5-6 October meeting in
Brussels of high-level NATO officials at which it was decided
to appoint former NATO Secretary General Brosio as the repre-
sentative to Moscow to explore the possibility of force cuts.
Acknowledging Brosio's appointment, a 7 October domestic service
commentary by Levin complained that his functions are "only to
sound out positions." Levin cited UPI for the observation that
Brosio will carry with him "no detailed proposals," concluding
that the promise in the NATO communique in early June to appoint
a plenipotentiary to huld talks on arrangements concerning the
site, date, and agenda for talks has not been fulfilled.* In
Levin's words, NATO is continuing to pursue "tactics of procrasti-
nation . . . by again avoiding a clearcut answer."
Also on the 7th, a Moscow radio commentary for foreign audiences
complained that the NATO countries have repeated their call for
"mutual and balanced reduction of troops" and have argued that
because of geographical factors the Soviet Union should pare a
larger number of its troops in Europe. But with the development
of troop transport capabilities, the commentary added, this argu-
ment "seems an attempt to obtain certain military advantages."
Current Soviet comment on the issue of force and arms reduction
at times calls for cuts in "Europe" and at times for cuts in
"central Europe," the area specified by Brezhnev when he first
raised the matter in his 31 March 1971 report to the 24th CPSU
Congress. The Levin commentary referred to the NATO meeting's
discussion of reductions in "central Europe," for example,
while the foreign-language talk mentioned only "Europe." At
the elite level, the most recent pronouncements--including
Gromyko's 28 September UNGA address and the 25 September
statement signed by Brezhnev and Tito--have referred simply
* For a review of propaganda surrounding the 3-4 June meeting
of NATO foreign ministers in Lisbon, see the TRENDS of
9 June 1971, pages 22-23.
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1.4 OCTOBER 1971
to "Europe." But Politburo member Kirilenko specified central
Europe in a 19 August speech in Minsk, as did Gromyko in a
13 July letter to U Thant. Brezhnev also limited the area to
central Europe when he elaborated on the proposal for force
cuts in his 14 May speech in Tbilisi.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
EAST EUROPE
TITO TONES DOWN PREPARED TEXT OF SPEECH ON YUGOSLAV EXERCISES
Climaxing unprecedented fanfare surrounding the 2-7 October
Yugoslav "Freedom 71" maneuvers, Tito's speech at the windup
ceremony in Karlovac, Croatia on 9 October portrayed the
exercises as a new rallying of the country's united nationalities
in the spirit of the Yugoslav Partisan resistance to the Nazis
in World War II. The import of what TANJUG on the 7th called
Yugoslavia's "biggest postwar maneuvers" was underscored by their
locale--the northwestern region of Yugoslavia in the vicinity
of Hungary, where joint exercises were simultaneously under way
involving Soviet and Hungarian forces.
Reflecting concern to avoid appearing unduly provocative in the
wake of Brezhnev's Belgrade visit, Tito's speech as broadcast
live in the Belgrade domestic service somewhat toned down the
stance of defiance against the "foreign" threat that pervaded
an embargoed pre-release by TANJUG some four hours earlier.
Tito retained a reference to "forces and circles which are
resorting to the means of force to achieve domination over other
countries," but he dropped a passage that immediately followed
in the prepared text: "The objects of this foreign pressure
and attack are mainly small and medium-sized countries. Such
pressures, as you know, are not bypassing our country either."
Instead Tito launched into an elaborate disclaimer, in the
style typical of his extemporaneous remarks, that the maneuvers
were aimed against any foreign power:
A small section of the [foreign] press wants to harm us
as much as possible, and if possible to give rise to
uneasiness, conflicts, or suspicion between us and some
countries which are close to and friendly with us, for
instance the East European countries--that is, as if
these maneuvers were directed against anyone in
particular, instead of being a tryout which enables
us to see what our army has achieved so far, what our
territorial defense amounts to now, and so forth, that
is, to enable us to see how we would defend ourselves
if it became necessary to do so one of these days, not
against one country or another but against anybody who
would violate our integrity and sovereignty and imperil
our country.
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14 OCTOBER 1971
Tito did, however, retain from the prepared text a pointed
warning against any foreign power succumbing to the temptation
to try to take advantage of the internal squabbling among the
Yugoslav nationalities--a warning clearly aimed at Moscow.
Those who think that the debates and disagreements in Yugoslavia
are "splitting us, weakening our cohesion, and can be used for
foreign pressures are badly deceiving themselves," he said,
"because as far as the questions of defense of our country are
concerned there have never been any disputes:" and "all our
peoples are united and firm."
Tito portrayed the successful conduct of the maneuvers as a
vindication of the Yugoslav brand of socialism, declaring that
the success of "our all-people's defense system also reflects
the self-management consciousness of the citizens and
producers, who regard the tasks and obligations concerning
the defense of the country with full responsibility." He
added to the prepared text the observation that the "spirit
of unity" among all the Yugoslav nationalities which had
prevailed in "the liberation war" also prevails today.
The Yugoslav leader had been more candid on the nationality
problem in a speech the previous day, also in Karlovac, to
representatives of the municipalities where the "Freedom-71"
maneuvers were held. In that speech he took note of "various
elements sowing discord among us" and of the "very difficult"
situation "in this part of Croatia," denouncing "both the
Serbian and Croatian nationalists" who are trying to sow the
discord and "anxiety."
SOVIET TASS on the 10th duly summarized Tito's 9 October
REPORT remarks, predictably ignoring the "all-people's
defense" and "self-management" keynotes of the
speech. Saying nothing about the participation of "territorials"
and "auxiliaries," TASS reported only that Tito congratulated the
"servicemen" involved in the maneuvers. An.; .tn noting a statement
by the Yugoslav leader on the subject of resistance "from anti-
self-management and antisocialist forces," TASS referred only to
resistance "from antisocialist forces."
While duly reporting Tito's statement that the exercises had
showed the state of readiness "to uphold the sovereignty and
inviolability of socialist Yugoslavia," the TASS summary
appear-! to deprecate the external threat: It concluded by
reporting that Tito called for struggle against the enemies
of the Yugoslav socialist system "which are in some degree or
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other connected with external enemies" of Yugoslavia. A brief
reference by Tito to his "thorough and frank" talks with Brezhnev
was unmentioned in the TASS account.
SOVIET, HUNGARIAN TROOPS HOLD JOINT EXERCISES IN TRANSDANUBIA
The Budapest domestic service reported on 8 October that maneuver..
involving "units of the USSR southern army group and troops of
the Hungarian People's Army" had been under way "since the
beginning of the week" in Transdanubia--the region of Hungary
between the Danube and the Yugoslav border. The exercises are
commanded by Soviet Lt. Gen. Ivanov. Neither this report nor
another on the same day by MTI mentioned the Warsaw Pact in
connection with the exercises, but the MTI report said they
were observed by, among others, "several high-ranking
representatives of the associated armed forces." The
exercises were described as "large-scale," involving air and
ground attacks as well as simulated "atomic strikes" against
the "enemy." Both Budapest reports concluded with a special
mention of the role played by Hungarian "reservists" in the
maneuvers, possibly in response to the concurrent Belgrade
propaganda on the "all-people's defense" aspect of the
Yugoslav exercises.
The current exercises in Hungary are the second announced joint
maneuvers in that country in a span of two months. The Warsaw
Pact's "Opal 71" maneuvers were held in Hungary and Czechoslovakia
from 2 to 5 August involving Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian
troops. The Yugoslav press was unusually vocal regarding
threatening aspects of those maneuvers, concurrently decrying
the rumors circulating at the time about planned Pact exercises
in Bulgaria. With Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia then in the
offing, commentaries in Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR
HIRLAP indirectly responded to the Yugoslav comment as well as
to Western press discussion of the maneuvers by stressing the
"routine" nature of Opal 71 and denouncing speculation that
those exercises were aimed at "neighbors."
There has been no monitored Yugoslav comment on the current
Soviet-Hungarian maneuvers, in the aftermath of Brezhnev's
visit. Tirana has roundly assailed the maneuvers: An
Albanian domestic radio report on the 11th cited MTI on the
involvement of "modern weapons, including nuclear weapons" and
commented that "these military games are taking place at a time
when the Soviet revisionists and their partners are making
noises about peace and so-called European security."
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FBIS TRENDS
14 OCTOBER 1971
ARMENIAN PRESIDENT URGES RIGHT OF INTERPELLATION FOR SOVIETS
In an 8 October IZVESTIYA article N. Arutyunyan, the unconventional
Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium, has proposed
that Supreme Soviet deputies be given the right to exercise control
over government officials by parliamentary interpellations. Citing
Brezhnev's call at the 24th party congress for a new law defining
the rights of deputies--from the Supreme Soviet down to village
soviets-"and the obligations of officials in relation to deputies,
Arutyunyan urges several measures to give deputies concrete legal
recourse against the bureaucracy.
Arutyunyan notes that although officials are now required by law
to act upon requests and complaints by deputies, there is no
redress if the law is ignored since legislation provides no
"concrete" responsibility. Therefore, he argues, administrative
responsibility and, in some cases, even "criminal responsibility"
should be established for officials insufficiently responsive to
questions raised by deputies or permanent commissions of soviets.
In addition to this strengthening of deputies' powers to act on
behalf of constituents with informal requests and complaints,
Arutyunyan urges that a "very specific" process be set up whereby
deputies can request official explanations at soviet sessions and
receive clear, timely answers to these formal questions. He
states that "interpellation is a powerful means for control by
deputies and soviets as a whole over the work of the administrative
apparatus." He cites as an example one of the Armenian Supreme
Soviet sessions, at which a group of deputies addressed a question
to the republic Council of Ministers on the trends and prospects
of Armenian industrial development and location of production
facilities, which was answered by a deputy premier. This action
helped improve the decisions on this subject, he maintains.
Arutyunyan goes on to declare that "this form of control" is being
insufficiently used; it must be strengthened by legislation and,
in addition, extended upward, he argues. Union republic laws
provide for the interpellation procedure for village, rayon and
city soviets, he notes, but "corresponding provisions" must be
introduced for sessions of soviets at "all other levels"--
presumably including the USSR Supreme Soviet.
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Arutyunyan has previously indicated he holds unconventional ideas
regarding Soviet democracy. In a March 1966 speech to the
Armenian party congress (KOMMUNIST, 5 March 1966), he proposed
that more than one candidate be nominated for deputies in Soviet
elections. He rejected the "prevailing" opinion that there can
be a choice of candidates only in bourgeois democracies.
Arutyunyan has long pressed for more rights for soviets. His
5 August 1965 IZVESTIYA article helped lead off a successful
campaign to expand the power of local soviets over agricultural
matters, and eventually his proposal to subordinate rayon
agricultural administrations to rayon soviets was also put into
effect (at the end of 1969).
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