TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010033-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: September 22, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~IIIIIIU~uiiiiiii~~llllllll
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
22 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 38)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
ollour I
Included from eulewnle
deeearedlel end
detlsulleelion
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 SEPTEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
DRV, PRG Score the President, Porter for Negotiations Stance . 1
DRV Foreign Ministry Protests Heavy U.S. Air Strikes at North . 4
Mme. Binh Stops in Moscow, Peking on Way Home from Paris . . . 7
Moscow Stresses Aid to DRV, Assails Sino-U.S. "Maneuvers" . . . 8
DRV Propaganda on Japanese CP Visit Avoids Polemical Issues . . 11
Hanoi Reports Fighting in U Minh Jungle, Notes Lam Son 810 . . 15
GDR Party Wa,.'ns Against Chinese Anti-Soviet Divisive Tactics . 16
Ceausescu Denies Romania Has Sinned Against Internationalism . 17
Zagreb Press, Radio Assail GDR Meddling in Balkan Affairs . . . 19
Soviet Media Continue Propaganda Efforts to Discredit Peking . J.9
PEKING ON JAPAN
"Manchurian Incident" Recalled in Attack on Japan Militarism . 21
GERMANY AND BERLIN
Moscow Hails Brandt Visit, Plays Down Inter-German Differences. 23
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Anticipates UNGA Mideast Debate, Notes Council Session . 27
Suez Canal Incidents Draw Brief Mention, No Soviet Comment . . 28
USSR Selectively Reports Cairo Developments, Not Joint Talks . 29
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Moscow Reviews Key Agenda Items, Backs PRC's Seating . . . . . 31
USSR-AFGHANISTAN
Communique on King's Visit Reflects Close Relationship . . . . 33
(Continued)
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CONTENTS (Continued)
Peking Silent on Report That National Day Parade Canceled . . . 36
Wired Broadcasting Net Reportedly Far Advanced in China . . . . 36
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: PRC SUSTAINS DIFFERENTIATED LINE
ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 1
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
22 SEPTEMBER 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 SEPTEMBER 1971
Moscow (2872 items)
Peking (11+07 items)
Afghan King in USSR
(--)
7%
Domestic Issues
(31%)
40%
China
(10%)
7%
Indochina
(10%)
23%
Brandt-Brezhnev Talks
(--)
6%
[Cambodia
(4%)
10%]
Indochina
(3%)
4%
[Vietnam
(4%)
9%]
World Disarmament
(2%)
3%
Korean Item on UN Agenda
(--)
9%
Conference Proposal
Japan
(2%)
8%
West Berlin Accord
(11%)
3%
[40th Anniversary of
(--)
3%]
Middle East
(1%)
2%
Japan Action in
Manchuria
DPRK National Day
(18%)
3%
Chilean Independence Day
(--)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow knd
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
In the first Vietnamese communist comment on the Paris talks since
the end of July, a NHAN DAN Commentator article on 21 September
says that neither the replacement of Bruce by Ambassador Porter nor
"recent statements" by the President have indicated any change in
the U.S. attitude. Commentator spells out points one and two of
the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal and complains that the Nixon
Administration "has always said no to this correct and well-meaning
stand." Vietnamese communist media carried the standard, cursory
account of the 16 September session of the Paris talks. And there
is no acknowledgment of Ambassador Porter's attempts to get the
communist delegates to confirm or deny reports--by Americans who have
interviewed them--that the matter of U.S. troop withdrawal and the
release of prisoners can be dealt with separately from the question
of a political settlement in South Vietnam.
Moscow continues routinely to accuse the United States of
procrastinating at, the Paris talks and of refusing to answer the
PRG peace proposal. At the same time Moscow, continues to publicize
its aid to Vietnam, reviewing economic and military aid provided
over the years and calling attention to current relief aid being
sent in connection with the floods in the DRV.
The heavy U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam on 21 September
are condemned in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 22d--the
first protest at that level since March of this year. The statement
appeals to the socialist countries as well as U.S. and world public
opi.nion "to resolutely struggle to check the Americans' criminal
hands."
Hanoi propaganda on the 10-18 September visit of a high-level
Japanese Communist Party delegation to the DRV avoided the anti-
Chinese polemical themes that had marked North Vietnamese propaganda
in July and August following the announcement of President Nixon's
planned visit to Peking. Polemical remarks by the delegation head,
party Chairman Kenji Miyamoto, were omitted in Hanoi's reports, and
the joint communique released at tile close of the visit does not
even bring up the issue of world communist unity or the principle
of the independence of individual parties.
DRV, PRG SCORE THE PRESIDENT, PORTER FOR NEGOTIATIONS STANCE
After an avoidance in Hanoi media of any reference to Ambassador
Porter except in the VNA account of the 9 September Paris session
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when he first participated, a NHAN DAN Commentator article on
the 21st says that the conference has not been moved. forward
either by his taking over from Ambassador Bruce or by the
President's "recent statements." As broadcast in Hanoi radio's
domestic service, the article says that no change in the U.S.
attitude or policy has been api,arent since the net, chief
negotiator took over, and it adds cryptically that at the
9 September session Porter proposed holding restricted meetings
while at the session on the 16th he asked for further
clarification of the PRG's seven-point initiative. Commentator
dismisses this as "more of the tortuous maneuvers" to which
the Nixon Administration has resorted in attempting to cope
with public opinion.
The unchanged U.S. policy, Commentator says, was made clear
when "Nixon himself said on 17 September" that "the United
States would continue to keep its eye on the main objective,
which is 'a South Vietnam able to defend itself against a
communist takeover' and the 'release of our POW's." The
article adds that what the President implied is that he is
bent on pursuing his Vietnamization policy, which precludes any
real effort to negotiate a Vietnam settlement. (The allusion
is clearly to the President's statement in his press conference
on the 16th, not the 17th, when he in fact said "the main
objective is to end the American involvement just as soon as
that is consistent with our over-all goal, which is a South
Vietnam able to defend itself against a communist takeover and
which includes, from our standpoint, our primary interest in
obtaining the relea6e of our POW's.")
While Commentator does not explicitly refer to the President's
press conference,* it was mentioned on the 18th--in a
Liberation Radio broadcast and a Hanoi radio item in
Mandarin--and in a 19 September NHAN DAN commentary pegged. to the
"struggle" 7.n South Vietnam. Only the latter mentioned the
President's remarks on prisoners, stating that the President
"revealed his intention" to continue the war while carrying on
* Hanoi and PRG media, atypically, completely ignored the
President's 4 August press conference in which he spoke about
his planned trip to China as well as about Vietnam. The last
Presidential interview which prompted a NHAN DAN Commentator
article was that on 16 April 1971 before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors. Hanoi commented on a lower level on his
press conferences of 29 April, 1 May, and 1 June.
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the pretense about his "primary interest in obtaining the release
of our POW's." All three items, however, said that the President
defended the 3 October presidential election in South Vietnam
even though Thieu is the only candidate.
The NHAN DAN Commentator article--which spells out the provisions
of points one and two--is the first Vietnamese communist comment
on the Paris talks or negotiations since July when the PRG's
seven-point proposal was being pressed. (There was, most recently,
a NHAN DAN Commentator article on 25 July and a Liberation Radio
commentary on the 31st,) It is unclear what prompted the comment
at this level at this time, but it seems most likely that it was a
combination of circumstances--Ambassador Porter's assumption of
his post, the President's press conference, and perhaps the recent
flurry of speculation in the U.S. press, particularly pegged to
Senator McGovern's remarks on his talks in Paris, that the communists
are flexible about their proposals and willing to separate points one
and two. The VITA account of the Paris session on the 16th,
predictably, gave no hint of Ambassador Porter's attempts to get the
communist delegates to confirm or deny reports that there had been
changes or clarifications of their negotiating position. In its
standard, cryptic fashion, VNA dealt with the U.S. representative by
saying that he "again resorted to the old trick of asking questions
so as to avoid answering" the PRG proposal.
VNA mentioned the give-and-take following the presentation of the
formal statements only when it reported that Thuy in "additional
remarks" said the U.S. representative's "allegations" at the
session prove that the Nixon Administration refuses to withdraw
U.S. troops in 1971 and "to get rid of the bellicose Nguyen Van
Thieu clique, thus impeding the progress" of the Paris talks.
Thus, there is no acknowledgment of his question whether the United
States is willing to announce a troop withdrawal and an end to the
"maintenance" of the Thieu regime "at the same time." In line
with standard practice, Hanoi media did not report the post-session
briefings*; hence there i s no acknowledgment that reporters
pressed the communist spokesmen on the issue of whether troop
withdrawal and the release of prisoners can be settled
separately or whether they are interdependent.
* The DRV's long-standing practice has been to transmit its
"memoranda" on the communist press briefings back to Hanoi on
VNA's information and service channel, but not to report the
briefings in any of its propaganda media.
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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS HEAVY U.S. AIR STRIKES AT NORTH
The heavy, sustained U.S. air strikes against the DRV on 21 September
prompted a DRV Foreign Ministry statement rather than another of
the usual, continuing protests against air strikes by the
spokesman for the foreign ministry. The most recent previous
protest at the more authoritative foreign ministry level was
issued on 22 March 1971 in connection with the concentrated
strikes of 21-22 March. Before that there were DRV Foreign
Ministry protests over heavy air strikes on 21 November and
1-2 May in 1970.* The current statement, like the three previous
ones, says that the air strikes violate the U.S. bombing halt
and threaten the work of the Paris conference. But at this
writing Vietnamese communist media have not carried the
announcement--reported by Western news agencies--that the DRV
and PRG delegates will not attend the 23 September session
of the Paris talks and asked for a resumption of the talks on
the 30th.**
The current statement charges that the United States "mobilized
more than 200 aircraft" to conduct "repeated strikes against
many populated areas in Quang Ninh and Le Thuy districts,
Qiiang Binh Province." It also charges that the strikes
"killed or injured a number of civilians, including many old
people, women, and children and destroyed many homes." The
statement claims that the U.S. acts were "appropriately
punished" and that the Quang Binh armed forces and people
downed two planes "and damaged many others." A Hanoi radio
broadcast early on the 22d had reported the downings, saying
they brought the total of downed U.S. planes to 3,999. (The
U.S. Command, in reporting the sustained strikes, said that
no U.S. planes were hit and that all returned safely to their
bases in South Vietnam and Thailand.)
* While a 3 March 1971 foreign ministry statement came on the
heels of U.S. announcements of concentrated strikes against the
North, it did not acknowledge them but focused instead on alleged
U.S. plans for "new military adventures" against the DRV.
** The communist delegates asked for a postponement of the weekly
Paris session in each of the three previous instances. After the
postponement of the 25 March session at the communists' request,
the allied delegates asked for a postponement of the 1 April
session. Although in March the Foreign Ministry statement was
issued three days before the next scheduled Paris session, VNA
did not report the delegations' statements that they would not
attend the session until 0519 GMT on the 25th.
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Unlike the previous three foreign ministry statements, the
current one appeals to the socialist countries, peace- and
justice-loving countries, and U.S. public opinion "to
resolutely struggle to check the Americans' criminal hands
and to intensify their support of the Vietnamese people's
just cause until total victory." But it echoes the
21 November 1970 statement when it says the strikes
"constitute an insolent challenge to peace- and justice-
loving public opinion in the world and the United States."
(The 3 March 1971 statement--at a time when Hanoi seemed to
be displaying particular concern--claimed in addition that
U.S. acts against the DRV constituted "an impudent challenge
to the socialist countries" and others.)
In more severe language than that of the three previous state-
ments, the current one says the DRV Government sternly condemns
"these extremely grave and criminal acts of war" and places
full responsibility on the United States. The 22 March and
21 November statements on air strikes merely condemned the
"acts of war," while the 1 May statement called them "criminal".
The expression of resolve to persevere in struggle against the
United States is common, of course, to all the statements.
RADIO CG+IENT In the same domestic service program on the
22d that carried the foreign ministry statement,
Hanoi radio broadcast a commentary scoring the U.S. strikes and
hailing the alleged feat of the Qiang Binh "armed forces and
people" in downing the planes. Stating that the new "barbarous
war acts" have further exposed the Nixon Administration's
"stubborn and bellicose nature," the commentary adds:
"Ballyhooing about its so-called good will for peace and about
ite will to negotiate, Nixon's bellicose hands" have continued
to press the war and Vietnamization. It asserts that the
President's "pledge of support" has enabled Thieu to carry out
its bloody campaign of terror" in South Vietnam and that it was
on President Nixon's orders that the planes carried out their
strikes against the North. It cites AP in stating that the
bombings were authorized by President Nixon or Defense Secretary
Laird.
Taking a familiar tack, the commentary says that the strikes do not
demo"strate U.S. strength but only "recklessness and rashness" at
a t.me when the United States is being "shouted by repeated blows".
Recalling that President Johnson could not sv.bdue the North
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Vietnamese people after four years of bombing, it asks how
President Nixon "can hope to use bombs and shells to shake our
heroic Vietnamese people's iron-firm determination to achieve
independence and freedom." It warns "Nixon 2nd company that the
more stubborn and insolent" they are, the more defeats they will
suffer. It reminds them of the inviolability of DRV territory,
and it expresses Vietnamese resolve to punish "all U.S. adventurous
acts."
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NTME. BINH STOPS IN MOSCOW, PEKING ON WAY HOME FROM PAR I S
MOSCOW PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's 11-14 September
stopover in Moscow on her way home to Hanoi from tha
Paris talks received minimal publicity. Her arrival in Moscow,
after a 6-11 September visit- to Poland, was briefly reported by
TASS that day, and PRAVDA on the 12th noted that she was met at
the airport by Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin. A short
PRAVDA report on the 14th noted that Gromyko hosted her at a
luncheon the day before. According to PRAVDA on the 16th,
Firyubin saw her off on the 14th.
During her last stop in Moscow en route home from Paris, from
11 to 13 June 1970, brief PRAVDA and TASS reports indicated
that she was again met at the airport by Firyubin, but there
were no reports that she had talks with any Soviet officials.*
PEKING NCNA on 16 September reported at some length on the
warm welcome accorded Mme. Binh on her arrival at
Peking's airport that day "on her way home from Paris." It
said she deplaned "amid cheers and the beating of drums and
gongs" to be greeted by a flag- and banner-waving crowd and
the dancing of "merry children" at the airport "permeated
with a very warm atmosphere of the great friendship and
militant unity of the people of China and Vietnam." She was
accompanied by PRG Ambassador to Poland Tran Van Tu and was
met, according to NCNA, by leading government and party
officials--led by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei--
and by leading members of various organizations. The report
did not mention the Paris talks.
Mme. Binh was feted at a welcoming banquet hosted by Chi
Peng-fei on the evening of the 16th. On the 17th she was
"called on" by Chou En-lai in the afternoon and had "a very
cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou, Chiang Ching,
and Chi Peng-fei that evening, according to an NCNA report
of the 17th. On the 18th NCNA said that Mme. Binh met with
Her return to Paris in August 1970 followed visits to
India, Ceylon, Tanzania, and Zambia, and there were thus no
stops in Peking and Moscow.
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Sihanouk that day. Chou and Chi Peng-fei gave a banquet on the
19th in her honor, NCNA said. No speeches or toasts were reported
for either the banquet on the 16th or that on the 19th. NCNA
announced her departure "for Vietnam" on the 22d; she was seen
'J1:' by the same group which had met her on arrival with the
exceptioi. of Fang I, who was not present for her departure.
In contrast, time. Binh's 13 June 1970 arrival in Peking "on her
way home from Paris" was not reported until the 17th, when a
single brief Peking domestic service item noted that Chou
En-lai had had a "warm and friendly talk" with her that day
and had given an "informal banquet" in her honor. As this
time, no speeches or toasts were reported. Peking media
gave no other publicity to that visit.
MOSCOW STREFSES AID TO DRV. ASSAILS SINO-i.S. "MANEUVERS"
Moscow continues to publicize its aid to Vietnam in routine-level
comment. A 17 September IZVESTIYA article by Ilinskiy, for
example, echoed some recent comment in reviewing Soviet economic
and military aid given over the years in crap detail as regards
type and volume.* An article -i Soviet aid transported, by sea,
in the Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY on the 15th, said among other things
that in the first half of 1971 "enough cargo to fill 380 trains
was brought to the DRV by sea." On the 17th the Moscow domestic
service reported that Soviet ships were unloading cargoes in
Haiphong "for the DRV national economy" that are "particularly
necessary" at present when the-Vietnamese are overcoming the
effects of the floods.
Moscow currently plays up Vietnamese gratitude for Soviet relief
aid sent in connection with the floods. On 13 September TASS
reported the arrival in Hanoi that day of three Soviet cargo
planes with medicines, food, and clothing sent by the Soviet
* A 2 September PRAVDA article and Vice Premier Novikov's
speech at a 31 August Moscow meeting on DRV National Day, for
instance, referred to industrial projects the USSR built in
the DRV, the training of specialists, and military aid
such as planes and rockets.
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Red Cross Society. TASS on the 17th and PRAVDA the next day
reported a message from Le Duan to Brezhnev thanking him for
a sympathy message of 2 September and for the relief aid
sent by the USSR. The only known official Soviet message
on the floods to have previously been reported by Moscow was
dated 30 August and belatedly reported briefly by TASS on
2 September and in full by PRAVDA on the 3d. The message
was sent by "the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers" and did
not mention Brezhnev by name. To date, Hanoi media are not
known to have publicized the Le Duan message.*
In its continuing campaign to discredit Chinese motives in
inviting President Nixon to visit Peking, routine-level Moscow
comment repeats the charge that Peking hopes to reach an
agreement on the Indochina question "behind the backs" of
the people of the region. The 4 September PRAVDA article by
I. Aleksandrov broadly attacking Peking's divisive policies,
which includes the charge that a "deal" at the expense of
the Indochinese people is being planned, has continued to
be rebroadcast by Moscow radio in installments as recently
as 20 September.** Much of Moscow's current comment consists
of replays of articles in the organs of foreign communist
parties which charge that the United States also hopes to
make a deal and claim that the invitation has enabled the
President to avoid responding to the PRG's peace initiative.
Moscow's minimal attention to President Nixon's 16 September
press conference includes a domestic service commentary which
focuses on his remarks on the Thieu government. It says that
the President defended the regime's conduct of the election
"farce" and stated that the United States will continue
supporting that regime so that it can "withstand the communist
threat"; it does not mention the President's comment on the
release of U.S. prisoners. The commentary contrasts President
Nixon's remarks with those made in Saigon by Senator McGovern,
who spoke of the failure of Vietnamization and of the corruption
in Saigon and called for a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.
* Peking has not mentioned relief aid to the DRV since the PRC
leaders' sympathy messages on 25 and 29 August and 2 September
promised "relief" measures and "all-out support and assistance"
to the Vietnamese people in overcoming the floods. However, VNA
on 19 September announced the arrival of both Chinese and Soviet
relief shipments.
** See the 9 September TRENDS, pages 11 and 15-17, for a discus-
sion of this article.
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Some. Mbscow comment continues, routinely, to~ accuse the United
-States of procrastinating at the Parrs talks and of refusing
to respond to the PRG's seven-point plan while at the same
time continuing to expand the aggression.. Reporting statements
by members of Congress, including Senators McGovern and Bayh,
denouncing U.S. "aggression" and support for the Thieu
government: and calling for a deadline, TABS, sees. such
statements 'as proof of the growth -of protests in, the United
-States against the continuation of the, war.
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DRV PROPAGANDA ON JAPANESE CP VISIT AVOIDS POLEMICAL ISSUES
Hanoi propaganda on the 10-18 September visit to the DRV of the
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) delegation led by Chairman Kenji
Miyamoto* points up the sharp curtailment of the anti-Chinese
polemics which marked North Vietnamese propaganda for six
weeks following the 15 July announcement of President Nixon's
planned visit to Peking. Not only have Hanoi statements
during the visit failed to raise the questions of socialist
unity or the independence of individual parties, but Hanoi
media have ignored even mildly polemical statements by Miyamoto
on these and other issues.
On 14 September Hanoi carried brief accounts of an 11 September
reception for the JCP delegation at which Vietnamese party (VWP)
First Secretary Le Duan and Chairman Miyamoto spoke. Hanoi's
cursory reports ignored remarks by Miyamoto--published in full
in the JCP organ AKAHATA on the 15th--which were in line with
Hanoi's previous public polemic following the announcement of
President Nixon's plans to visit Peking.
Among other things, Miyamoto warned that the United States
"has pursued a policy of 'divide and strike' against the
socialist camp and national liberation forces" and underlined
the importance of "the international solidarity of the broad
anti-imperialist forces in their struggle to support the
Indochinese people." In addition, he urged unity among
communist and anti-imperialist forces in the face of "insidious
tricks" by the United States on the Indochina question,
asserted that the JCP never had "any illusions about the aggressive
nature of U.S. imperialism," and denounced the views of "certain
people in Japan who have suddenly begun to idealize Nixon as an
'apostle of peace' in commenting on the way he has been handling
matters recently." (This transparent reference to President
Nixon's projected China visit echoes earlier JCP comment--for
example, in an article in the 21 August AKAHATA--which scored
opposition parties in Japan for claiming that the decision to
make the trip represents a favorable change in U.S. policy and
charged that, on the contrary, the visit was aimed at diverting
public attention from U.S. "aggression" in Indochina.)
* When the Miyamoto delegation left Japan on 19 August, AKAHATA
announced that it would visit Romania, Italy, North Vietnam, and
the Soviet Union. The delegation is now on the last leg of its
tour, paying an official visit in Mosccw.
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Monitored' Hanoi media have not even mentioned a 17 September
Pham Van Dong meeting with the JCP delegation which AKAHATA
reported on the 19th. Miyamoto remarked on this occasion,
according to the JCP paper, that the North Vietnamese party
and government, "in a complex situation," are "pushing
their independent activities while strengthening unity with
the anti-imperialist forces in the world." Hanoi radio did
broadcast the text of a nonpolemical speech delivered by
Miyamoto at a 16 September Hanoi meeting, in which the, JCP
leader made no reference to the socialist camp but did state
that the Vietnamese "struggle is a positive contribution to
the unification of all anti-imperialist forces."
The communique issued at the close of the JCP visit refers
to the solidarity of the two parties but mentions neither
the importance of communist unity nor alleged U.S. efforts
to split the socialist countries. The communique does label
the United States the "arch enemy" of the world and holds
that the Indochinese problem "has always remained the focal
point of the duel on a world scale between imperialism and
anti-imperialist forces."
In contrast to the JCP-VWP document, earlier joint communiques
issued by the Miyamoto delegation with the Romanian, Italian,
and Spanish communist parties uniformly called for efforts
to unify communist and anti-imperialist forces and for respect
for each party's autonomy and independence.* The communique
with the Romanians particularly emphasized the issue of
communist unity; it declared that the two parties "consider
that one of the present tasks of greatest importance is to
firmly campaign for the unity of all the democratic, progressive,
and anti-imperialist forces, with the participation of the
Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian peoples."
* The JCP communique with the Romanian party was released on
3 September at the close of the Miyamoto delegation's visit to
Romania, which began on 20 August. AKAHATA on 6 September
published a communique signed jointly with a delegation of the
Spanish CP following talks between those two parties in late
August; the Spanish CP delegation with' which the Japanese
conferred was in Romania from 6 August to 1 September. The
JCP communique with the Italian party was released following
Miyamoto's 3-8 September visit to Italy.
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DRV CAUTION Hanoi's failure even to join with the JCP
TOWARD PEKING in an appeal for communist unity may reflect
the delicate position of the DRV in playing
host to representatives of a party openly hostile to the
Chinese leaders. But Hanoi's new caution with respect to
Peking was already apparent in its propaganda prior to the JCP
delegation's visit and seems to reflect a decision by the DRV
leaders to call a halt to public censure of Peking's moves
vis-a-vis the United States.
Hanoi media have not pressed warnings about U.S. maneuvers to
split the socialist camp or assertions of DRV independence
since the end of August. The last major polemical attack was
the 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article blasted the
Chinese as "opportunist." An editorial on the 19 August
anniversary of the August Revolution, published in the QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN mor:thly magazine and broadcast by Hanoi on
29 August, did reiterate Hanoi's argument that the Vietnamese
must decide their own fate. But Pham Van Dong's 31 August
national day address did not raise the issue of DRV
independence or include the standard reference to the need
to consolidate the socialist camp.* Similarly, Hanoi
propaganda marking the 3 September second anniversary of Ho
Chi Minh's death did not recall the appeal in Ho's testament
for the restoration of unity among communist parties.
Hanoi media's treatment of the 22 August Commentator article
and of an earlier QUART DOI NHAN DAN article on 3 August by
"Chien Thang" (The Victor)* attacking the Chinese had
suggested that there might have been some disagreement in
August over publicity for ;urther criticism of Peking.
While Hanoi's first attacks in July on Peking's invitation
to the President were promptly publicized in Hanoi's domestic
radio service, the Chien Thang article was not broadcast and
was only belatedly summarized by VNA eight days after its
* Pham Van Dong's 1970 national day speech noted that the
DRV had endeavored to restore the solidarity of the socialist
camp and thus was consistent with other DRV statements in
the wake of the testament, released after Ho's death in
September 1969, which appealed for the party to attempt to
unify the socialist camp.
** The Chien Thang article is discussed in the TRENDS of
18 August, pages 1-Ii.
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publication. The 22 August Commentator article, the most bitter
of the attacks on Peking, was similarly not broadcast in the
domestic service, although excerpts were carried by VNA and in
Hanoi radio's Mandarin-language service. (A translation of the
text of the Commentator article as published in NHAN DAN is
still not available.)
MIYAMOTO'S Miyamoto last headed a JCP delegation to the DRV
1966 TOUR in February 1966, in the course of a tour that
included official visits to China and North Korea.
Undertaken just prior to the 23d CPSU Congress, the tour appeared
to be aimed at seeking some basis for unifying the world communist
movement in support of Vietnam.* The joint JCP,VWP communique in
1966 said both sides held that "at present the formation and
expansion of a united front of the world's people against U.S.
imperialism, for peace and national independence is an extremely
important and urgent task." No joint communique was released at
the close of Miyamoto's visit to China, but in January 1967--
following the deterioration of relations between Peking and to
Japanese party- AKAHATA revealed that a communique had been
drafted and approved by a CCP delegation headed by Chou En-lai
but that Mao would not consent to its publication because the
JCP refused to include a call for a united front against both
the United States and the Soviet Union.
An article published in the 9 September 1971 issue of AKAHATA,
.just prior to the arrival of the current Miyamoto mission in
Hanoi, referred to the 1966 dispute with Peking and claimed
that the CCP's theory of an "anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet united
front" had met with "complete failure." The article--full
text of which is not yet available--noted that joint
communiques signed by the CCP with other parties since last
year had not criticized the Soviet Union. The article goes on,
however, to charge that "the great-power chauvinists of the
CCP have.not abandoned, once and for all, the 'anti-U.S. and.
anti-Soviet' policy." It explains that Peking has refrained
from directly pressing this policy to avoid being "isolated:'in
the international arena," but that the Chinese continue to
indicate their position by the use of "sub3titute terms" such
as references to opposing "superpowers."
w See the 31 March 1966 FBIS SURVEY, pages 39-41, for a
discussion of the JCP delegation's tour and relations among the
Asian communist parties. -+ s"~1"`H^'l~rite
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HANOI REPORTS FIGHTING IN U MINH JUNGLE, NOTES LAM SON 810
Vietnamese communist media reflect the stepped-up fighting in the
U Minh jungle of South Vietnam, with reports that the PLAF on
14-16 September launched heavy attacks on allied positions
there. An article in the 19 September QUAN DOl NHAN DAN claims
that the PLAF'has foiled the allied pacification operation in
the U Minh area; it recalls that a large-scale allied operation
was begun in the area last December and that new forces were
sent there in May. From December through August, according to
the paper, "liberation forces" in the area have put out of
action more than 11,000 allied troops. The article comments
that the allies "could not drive out the liberation forces"
but that, "on the contrary, the U Minh resistance base has
become stronger and the people's war has further developed."
The recently concluded ARVN operation in northern Quang Tri--
Lam Son 810--has been mentioned in passing in Hanoi comment
praising PLAF action in the area in past weeks.* An article
in the 16 September QUAN DOl NHAN DAN, for example, recalled
communist attacks on ARVN positions last August and said
that "to save the puppet troops from danger, the U.S. command
ordered massive fire-support and sent many American battalions
back to Highway 9 to support the puppets in their highly
touted 'Operation Lam Son 810.1" The article claimed that
recent battles demonstrated that the defense line along
Highway 9 has been "attacked and broken through."
* Hanoi's first references to Lam Son 810 were in comment on
the alleged downing of a U.S. plane over the DRV on 7 September.
See the 15 September TRENDS, pages 3-5.
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EAST GERMANY-USSR-PRC
GDR PARTY WARNS AGAINST CHINESE ANTI-SOVIET DIVISIVE TACTICS
Soviet bloc concern over Peking's contacts with the United
States and efforts to penetrate the Balkans is registered for
the first time at the party leadership level in a Politburo
report delivered by Hermann Axen to the SED Central Committee
on 16 September. As summarized by the East German news agency,
the report indicates that China's new flexible tactics were a
focal point of discussion at the 2 August Crimea meeting of
Soviet bloc leaders and that the upshot was a plan for
coordinated efforts to "first and foremost strengthen the alliance
of the socialist community" (counter Chinese diplomatic activity
and try to bring the Romanians into line) and to press Moscow's
diplomatic offensive ,,ith both "the socialist countries" (Hanoi
and Belgrade) and the capitalist states.
In line with earlier Soviet bloc press comment on the PRC's
invitation to President Nixon, the SED report pays lip service
to the desirability of improved Chinese-American relations in
accordance with international norms, then drives home the point
that "at the same time, it cannot be overlooked that Peking's
'flirtation' with Washington is undoubtedly inspired by anti-
Sovietism and antisocialist aims and is therefore directed
against the anti-imperialist liberation movement and peoples."
In passages clearly addressed chiefly to the Romanians and in
a lesser degree to the Albanians and Yugoslavs, the report
says that "efforts of the Mao group to come to terms with the
imperialists are accompanied by a striking intensification of
the Chinese leadership's activities in the Balkans." It adds
that the Chinese leaders are exploiting "certain nationalist
tendencies deviating from proletarian class positions"--trends
"which manifest themselves, for example, in the approval ex-
pressed by Maoist slogans for the so-called cultural revolution
and the 'struggle against the superpowers.'" Further, it says,
they "seek to undermine the unity of the community of socialist
states."
Maintaining that this Chinese "venture has no realistic pro-
spect" of success, Axen's report states that these developments
in the Balkans "must be watched for the present." In this
context, as if to underscore the right of the Soviet bloc to
monitor "socialism" in the area and take action if necessary
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to defend it, the report adds that "the course of historical
development is determined neither by Mao Tse-tung nor by
Richard Nixon, but first and foremost by the growing might
and unity and community of socialist states, with the USSR
as its principal force."
TASS TREATMENT TASS picked up the ADN account of the SED
OF ADN REPORT report on the 17th, including the comments
on U.S.-Chinese relations but deleting the
warning on the Balkans. This followed the pattern of Moscow's
treatment of earlier veiled threats to the Romanians emanating
from the East European press organs in the wake of the Crimea
summit. Moscow did not publicize the 13 August Budapest MAGYAR
HIRLAP article raising the spectre of an anti-Soviet, pro-Peking
Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest axis in t!ie Balkans. And a PRAVDA
account of a 14 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article deleted the
East German paper's warning--clearly directed at the Romanians--
that "anyone who pursues a policy of tolerance and concession
toward the Mao group's great power chauvinism... violates the
fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism." But
the PRAVDA summary of the article included NEtTES DEUTSCHLAND's
demand that communists"decisively repudiate the unprincipled
divisive policy of the Chinese leaders" and its call for "a
struggle against all aspects of opportunism, against anti-
Sovidtisnand nationalism"--the latter a codeword for the
Romanian deviation.
Thus Moscow's propaganda tactics at this juncture appear to
emphasize continued use of the proxy of its East European
allies to apply periodic pressure on the Romanians, while
concentrating in its own media on discrediting the Chinese
as warmongers and projecting a positive image of the USSR
as a champion of peace and detente as a backdrop to the
Soviet leadership's wooing of Tito and its other fall diplo-
matic activities.
CEAUSESCU DENIES ROMANIA HAS SINNED AGAINST INTERNATIONALISM
In apparent response 'to the-East German party's-charges
that some Balkan countries have violated the principles
proletarian internationalism, Romanian party chief Ceausescu
used the occasion of a party aktiv meeting on the evening-of
the 16th,. several hours after ADN.carried the SED report, to
make an unusually detailed and assertive defense of Romania's
loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism--as
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interpreted in Bucharest. Forcefully rejecting the idea that
his country has placed its national interests above its inter-
nationalist obligations, Ceausescu stated that "Just as we have
never neglected our national duties, neither have we neglected
our international duties." Declaring that when one speaks of
internationalism one must "refer not to slogans but to deeds,"
he went on to list Romania's contributions to the communist
movement from the days of the Paris commune to its solidarity
today with the North Vietnamese.
Ceausescu defined Romania's view of proletarian internationalism
in stating: "Our party's internationalism is reflected in the
continuous development of relations with all the communist and
workers' parties . . ., in the fight for strengthening communist
unity and cooperation on the basis of respect for the right of
each party to self-dependently work out its own political line."
And he argued by implication against the Soviet bloc view of
Balkan security under Moscow's hegemony in adding pointedly that
the Romanian definition of proletarian internationalism includes
struggling for the establishment of "a climate of trust and close
cooperation among the Balkan countries that should make of this
zone a region of peace in Europe and permit each Balkan country
to devote its energies to the respective people's progress and
welfare." He emphasized again that the Romanian concepts of both
internationalism and European security are based on respect "for
sovereignty and independence, mutual advantage, and refraining
in interstate relations from the threat or use of force."
In effect summarizing the message for his communist neighbors
that Romania will not be intimidated by propaganda pressures,
Ceausescu concluded that it is in the spirit of these princi-
ples that Romania has acted in the past and "will continue to
act in the future, too, as we consider that in this way we are
implementing our duty both toward our people and to the cause
of socialism and peace."
Further testimony to Bucharest's intention to pursue contacts
with the Chinese was provided by an 18 September NCNA report
on the arrival in Peking of a group of "vacationing" Romanian
army officers led by General Ion Tutoveanu, Director of the
Military Academy of the Romanian Armed Forces. NCNA said the
group was met by Peng Shao-hui, deputy chief of the PLA General
Staff.
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ZAGREB PRESS, RADIO ASSAIL GDR MEDDLING IN BALKAN AFFAIRS
Against the background of efforts by Belgrade's semiofficial
BORBA and POLITIKA to prepare propaganda, groundwork for
Brezhnev's arrival by dwelling on the "traditional friend-
ship" of the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples, the more free-
wheeling Zagreb press and radio have responded critically
to the SED's expression of concern over the situation in the
Balkans. Zagreb's VJESNIK, which recently published a lengthy
interview with Chou En-lai, commented in an article on the
18th that the SED report is "impermissible interference in
the affairs of others." It added that "the pharisee-like
East German concern over an imagine^i Chinese penetration into
the Balkans is in fact unworthy of polemics." The article
nevertheless went on to wonder why "it has been precisely the
SED which has taken over the relay race baton from the Hungarian
newspaper [MAGYAR HIRLAP].,.whieh started as a warning and now
already is turning into a campaign." Noting the timing of the
release of the SED report, the Zagreb paper asked further whether
it might be "a possible accompanying tune or even possible advice,
or even pressure, on the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia."
Also on the 18th, Radio Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic assailed
the SED report as "gratuitous and lacking in good intentions,"
He added that the Soviet camp does not like to see Chinese rela-
tions with the Balkan countries normalized because "it wants to
proclaim the Balkan area its own sphere of interest in its
unspoken desire to meddle in the internal affairs of the
countries in this area as it sees fit." Declaring that "no one
can have special privileges and rights in this area," Sundic
concluded that "as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, it will
resist any attempt at direct or indirect interference in its
internal affairs, no matter where the interference comes from."
SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT PEKING
Almost three weeks after the appearnace on it September of the
latest article under the authoritative signature of I. Aleksandrov
in PRAVDA, which portrayed the Chinese as outlaws in the interna-
tional movement and called for intensified eff'.)rts to "expose"
the Maoists, Radio Moscow is still broadcasting Installments
of the article to audiences worldwide while developing its basic
themes in routine-level radio and press comment. Texts or
lengthy summaries of the Aleksandrov article appeared promptly
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in the leading party dailies of most of Moscow's orthodox East
European allies.* Pro-Soviet communist parties, taking their
cue from PRAVDA, have published a spate of articles elaborating
on Aleksandrov's catalogue of charges against the Chinese, and
Soviet media in turn have reproduced or summarized these
articles to picture a groundswell of anti-Chinese sentiment
among communists throughout the world.
On 18 September, for example, PRA.VDA reprinted an article from
EL POPULAR, the organ of the Uruguyan Communist Party, playing
the themes that Peking's invitation to President Nixon is
basically anti-Soviet in its motivation, is against the best
interests of the world communist movement, and is particularly
adverse to the interests of North Vietnam. PRAVDA used the
proxy of the Uruguayan party to impugn President Nixon's
motives for the trip, which Moscow has stopped short of doing
in its own name. Thus the EL POPULAR article, as reprinted
in PRAVDA, commented that although the President is trying to
make some reople believe U.S. foreign policy has changed; "even
the most reactionary U.S. press regards Nixon's upcoming trip
to Peking as a foreign policy act dictated by mercenary motives
and by anticommunist interests..., and reactionary circles
throughout the world link these contacts with plans to undermine
the unity of the anti-imperialist forces."
Similarly, the 10-16 September issue of ZA RUBEZHOM published
a four-page roundup of foreign press articles on the PRC's
uplittist policies. The largest amount of space was devoted
to a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article, "From Leftwing Adventures to
Complicity with the Imperialists," which developed the theme
that Peking's "hegemonistic aspirations are causing serious
harm to the national liberation movement." ZA RUBEZHOM's
roundup also included an.article from the Bulgarian army
organ NARODNA ARMIYA attacking Peking's diplomatic activity
in Asia and Africa, which the paper maintained is in reality
aiding the imperialists and "preventing the developing
states from acquiring true political and economic independence."
And an article taken from the Colombian Communist Party organ
VOZ PROLETARIA suggested that the Chinese would be willing to
sell out the North Vietnamese to achieve "an alliance" with
the United States.
* See the TRENDS of 9 September for a discussion of-the
Aleksandrov article and the immediate followup in the Soviet
and East European press.
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PEKING ON JAPAN
"MANCHURIAN INCIDENT" RECALLED IN ATTACK ON JAPAN MILITARISM
Chinese propagandists have seized on the 140th anniversary of the__,
18 September "Manchurian Incident" as an occasion to inveigh
against the alleged revival of militarism in Japan. Highlighting
Chinese attention to the anniversary is a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial,
released by NCNA on 18 September, which picks up the theme--common
in comment on Japan since the Nixon-Sato talks in 1969--that
Japanese reactionaries are successfully turning Japan into a
powerful military force commensurate with its economic influence
in Asia. NCNA has given wide domestic and international
dissemination to the editorial as well as other commentaries on
the anniversary.
Peking's attention to this anniversary has been slight in
recent years. On the last decennial anniversary in 1961,
however, there was also a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and related
propaganda.
While the editorial fully exploits the theme of a revival of
militarism in Japan, some soft-pedaling of the terms for
improving China-Japan relations could be read into the
editorial's omission of any specific demand that the Japanese
abrogate the 1952 Japan-Nationalist China treaty. That
requirement was spelled out in last July's joint communique
between the China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation
of the Komeito Party, Japan's second largest opposition party.
In Peking's last authoritative editorial on Japan--a joint
PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial released on
3 September 1970 to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Japan's
wartime defeat in China? "military collusion between Japan
and Chiang Kai-shek" was firmly denounced; no such reference
appears in the editorial just released. However, Japan's
"attempt to lay hands on China's sacred territory Taiwan
province" by arguing that the "status of Taiwan remains to be
determined" is firmly condemned. The "mass movement for
Japan-China friendship" is portrayed as a "mighty current"
which "Eisaku Sato and his ilk" will not be able to hold back.
Seeking to sharpen the desired image of Japan's growing military
threat to peace in Asia, the editorial focuses on a detailed
account of the "18 September incident"--the beginning of Japan's
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"blood-smeared history of aggression and war" in China.
Portraying Japan today as an economic power whose "economic
strength is seven or eight times that of prewar days," the
editorial argued that "economic expansion definitely leads
to military expansion."
Peking's fear that the Nixon Doctrine will ultimately place
Japan in the role of protecting U.S. interests in Asia was
reflected in the editorial's assertion that "U.S. imperialism
is eager to use Japanese militarism as its stormtrooper in
launchiiie aggression in Asia." The editorial also sniped
at "social-imperialism" for seeking to "enlist Japanese
militarism in opposing China and undermining the revolutionary
movement in Asia." Turning its attention to pro-Peking
forces within Japan, the editorial drew a distinction between
the Japanese people and "Japanese militarism" and called upon
"farsighted people in Japanese economic and political circles"
to counter the influence of a "handful of pro-U.S. monopoly
capitalists" and work for dismantling U.S. military bases
within Japan as well as abrogation of the U.S.-Japan military
alliance.
In an apparent effort to add historical depth to local
discussions on "Japanese militarism," MCNA on 17 September
publicized reference material for use in studying the 1931
incident. The material includes information on the rarely
mentioned "Tanaka memorial" of 1927--which revealed Japanese
plans to use Manchuria as a foothold for expansion in China--
and details the historic events leading to the Marco Polo
Bridge incident of 1937 when Japan launched an all-out war
against China and "barbarously pursued a policy to kill all,
burn all, and plunder all."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 SEPTEMBER 1971
GERMANY AND BERLIN
MOSCOW HAILS BRANDT VISIT. PLAYS DOWN INTER-GERMAN DIFFERENCES
Voluminous Soviet propaganda, replete with praise for West German
Chancellor Brandt personally, characterizes Brandt's 16-18
September talks with Brezhnev in the Crimean resort or Oreanda
as a "substantial" contribution to the strengthening of European
peace and security. Underscoring the point that the meetings
are in keeping with the "peace program" outlined at the 24th
CPSU Congress, Moscow says the reoults are evoking feelings
of "deep satisfaction" among all who cherish peace and detente.
Reflecting the main points of the joint communique issued on
the 18th, followup Soviet comment, keynoted by a PRAVDA editorial
or, the 20th, stresses that the two sides noted the importance of
FRG ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties for the
development of West German-Soviet relations; that they would
consult with each other and with their respective allies to
accelerate the convening of a European security conference;
that they found "common" positions on the question of reducing
armed forces and armaments in Europe "without detriment to the
participating states," and that they would promote the
normalization of relations between the GDR and the FRG,
including both states' participation in the United Nations.
While giving prominent and generally thorough coverage to all
aspects of the Brandt visit, including the Chancellor's
comments before his departure from Bonn and his post-visit.
remarks on his talks with Brezhnev,* the Moscow central
press has watered down the strong protestations issuing from
East German leaders at the 16-17 September SED Central
Committee plenary session, which coincided with the Brandt
visit, over the difficulties being encountered in the current
GDR-FRG and GDR-West Berlin Senat talks.
* Moscow media have yet to acknowledge that Brezhnev has
accepted an invitation from Brandt to visit the Federal Republic
at a date "convenient" to the Soviet leader.
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GDR positions on the Berlin agreement and the inter-German
talks were underscored in speeches by BED leader Honecker,
Politburo member Axen--who gave the Politburo report on BED
activities since the eighth BED congress in June--and Politburo
member Sindermann, as well as in a Central Committee resolution
formally stating BED endorsement of the quadripartite agreement
"on West Berlin." The Central Committee resolution declares
that the GDR wants "rapidly to reach positive results in the
negotiations with the FRG Government and the West Berlin Senat,"
adding the GDR's "expectation" that Bonn and the Senat "will
also display the required realism and good will so that the
corresponding agreements can be concluded in the interests of
all parties concerned and European detente." Axen said in his
report that the Politburo had given "the appropriate directives
to make possible the conclusion, in negotiations with the FRG
Government, of a general traffic treaty [vertrag] and an
agreement [abkommen) on civilian transit traffic of persons
from the FRG and goods from the FRG to and from West Berlin.
The negotiations with the West Berlin Senat are aimed at
obtaining an agreement on questions of normalizing the
relations as well as alleviating and improving traffic from
and to West Berlin." Axen went on to assert that it is the
GDR's aim to reach "positive results" in the two series of
negotiations. The TASS summary of Axen's report omitted
the details of the East German proposrils to Bonn and the
Senat, noting only the call for "positive results."
In contrast to Axen, both Honecker and Sindermann charged the
West Germans with hindering the progress of the negotiations.
In a long discr.ssion of GDR-FRG relations and the importance
of the quadripartite agreement for GDR sovereignty, Honecker
sought to place the blame for lack of progress in the inter-
German talks on the Federal Government, alluding to the
difficulties over an agreed German translation of the Berlin
accord: "Anyone seeking to impedes -h a development [based
on contractual agreements between the GDR and FRG and the GDR
and West Berlin Senat] by threat cf blackmail against the
GDR will have to bear the responsibility for the ensuing
consequences." He added that the proposed GDR treaties and
agreements are based on "realism" and are "on the table and
could be signed tomorrow." However, in a more conciliatory
manner, Honecker said that "despite the difficulties which
have arisen in the negotiations" the GDR ,iaintains that
"today, as before, it is still possible to bring the
negotiations to a rapid successful conclusion, given good
will on all sides."
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0
Soviet reports on Honecker's speech included his comments on
"difficulties"--the first acknowledgment of difficulties in
the current German phase of the Berlin negotiations to appear
in the Soviet central press, although direct and indirect
references to differences between Bonn and East Berlin over
the "inter-German" talks have appeared in routine Moscow
radio propaganda. An initial TASS report citing ADN, and
following ADN's account very closely, noted both Honecker's
remarks on the "difficulties" and his "blackmail" charge.
But dispatches in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 19th, without
attribution to ADN, referred only to the difficulties and
left out the charge against the West Germans.
COMMENT, REPORTAGE East Berlin media carried a spate of
IN EAST BERLIN MEDIA comment on the eve of the Brandt
visit to the Crimea denouncing Bonn
for attempting to conduct "inter-German negotiations" under
the umbrella of the four-power agreement. These commentaries
followed by a day the third sessions of the talks in the
German phase between the GDR and the FRG and the GDR and the
West Berlin Senat, which were abruptly broken off after brief
meetings on the lhth over the German translation problem.
Seeking to evince support for the GDR stand on the translation,
ADN and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND have carried reports citing "Western
diplomats" as saying there is no "official" German translation
of the agreement and quoting Abrasimov's statement to GDR
newsmen after the 3 September signing to the effect that only
the three official languages are "authentic" and that the
Big Four had "n-thing to do with the German translation of
the agreement."
Noting the cancellation by Senat representative Mueller of his
fourth post-signing meeting with GDR State Secretary Kohrt,
which was to be held on the 22d, ADN i3aid on the 20th that
"evidently" the Senat is "not interested in a rapid and
constructive consideration of the GDB proposals." Similarly,
ADN said that GDR State Secretary Kohl "regretted" the
attitude of FRG State Secretary Bahr expressed at their
fourth meeting on the 22d--which lasted only 30 minutes;
ADN noted that Bahr "was still not authorized to enter into
substantive negotiations on the GDR drafts" presented on
6 September.
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Regarding Brandt's talks in the Crimea, Eest.Berlin media
carried a limited number of brief straightforward reports,
and the text of the joint communique appeared in NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND on the 19th. East Berlin's first commentary on
the visit, a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the 22d, reported
by ADN, refers to the endorsement of the visit given in the
communique on the visit of a Honecker-led GDR delegation to
Warsfw 18-20 September, which said both the Polish and GDR
leaders "welcomed with satisfaction the results" of the
Brezhnev-Brandt talks. The editorial stresses that Brezhnev
pd Brandt "noted coinciding elements in their positions"
on the establishment of normal relations, valid under
international law, with the GDR.
CONFIDENTIAL
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW ANTICIPATES UNGA MIDEAST DEBATE, NOTES COUNCIL SESSION
While TASS on the 20th says it is believed in UN circles that a
debate on the Middle East is one of the basic tasks o?^ the
session, Moscow touches on the issue only in general discussions
of matters before the Assembly, with no suggestion that the
Soviet Union is contemplating any initiative. One such broad
report, by PRAVDA correspondents on the 21st, does take the
occasion to reiterate Soviet support for a political settlement
based on the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, and
again reaffirms Moscow's readiness to participate, along with
other permanent members of the Security Council, in,inter-
nationa.l guarantees for such a solution. (This Soviet position
on guarantees was first stated at the elite level by Brezhnev
in his 30 March CPSU Congress report.) Podgornyy, in a
14 September speech at a dinner honoring the visiting Afghan
king, restated.the standard Soviet call for Israeli implementa-
tion of Resolution 242, whose "main demand" is Israeli with-
drawal from "all" occupied Arab lands. He added that the Arab
Republic of Egypt (ARE), with the support of the other Arab
states, had made constructive proposals to this end.
TASS reports without comment Egyptian President as-Sadat's
16 September proposal for a Security Council meeting at the
foreign minister level to provide clarification of attitudes
on the Middle East problem. An account of the speech broadcast
in Arabic noted that as-Sadat said Egypt would try at the UNGA
session to obtain "decisive measures" for implementation of UN
resolutions and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied areas.
TASS on the 20th, noting that U Thant had stressed in his
annual report that resumption of the Jarring mission was
hardly advisable before Israel changed its stand on the troop
withdrawal issue, observed that the General Assembly must
therefore consider "effective measures to curb the aggressor."
COUNCIL DEBATE TASS routinely reports the current Security
ON JERUSALEM Council debate on Jordan's complaint against
Israel's "unlawful actions" in Jerusalem,
accompanying the accounts with continuing attacks on Israeli
occupation policies in the administered Arab territories, along
with occasional comment pointing up economic and social
problems in Israel itself. A Koryavin article in IZVESTIYA
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on the 19th points out that in the debate the Jordanian repre-
sentative asked the Security Council to employ sanctions
envisaged in the UN Charter to get Israel to respect UN
decisions, and that the Egyptian representative proposed
that the Council pass a recommendation on the expulsion of
Israel from the United Nations. While Soviet propaganda from
time to time has referred to the possibility of political and
economic sanctions, mention of expulsion is rare: In a single
known instance, an article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS this June,
by Dmitriyev and Ladeikin, cited Article 6 of the UN Charter
as stating that a UN member which persistently violates
Charter principles may be expelled from the organization.
Moscow has generally avoided addressing itself to the question
of the ultimate status of Jerusalem, but the Koryavin IZVESTIYA
article doee: recall UN decisions "establishing the status of
Jerusalem as a separate entity enjoying a special international
status." And a foreign-language commentary by Viktor Kudryavtsev
on the 21st cites the 29 November 1947 UNGA resolution declaring
Jerusalem, "which lies in Jordanian territory," a demilitarized,
neutral city with a "special regime."
SUEZ CANAL INCIDENTS DRAW BRIEF MENTION, NO SOVIET CONWIENT
Moscow gives only the barest acknowledgment of the 17-18 September
incidents along the Suez Canal in terse reports citing an
Egyptian military spokesman's statements. On the 17th, TASS
promptly reported the downing of an Israeli Phantom, apparently
failing to pick up Cairo's subsequent acknowledgment that the
downed. aircraft was an army transport plane. On the 18th, TASS
again cited an Egyptian military spokesman for the report that
Israeli planes had fired at Egyptian positions on the canal, and
quoted APP to the effect that an Israeli army spokesman had
reported Israeli artillery fire on Egyptian antiaircraft missile
positions. There was no mention of the Israeli charge that
Egyptian missiles were fired at Israeli planes that day. And
in a two-sentence report on the 21st, TASS said that according
to AL-AHRAM, the Israeli military in the last few days had
stepped up their military preparations on the east bank of the
canal, and that movements of artillery units as well as activi-
ties of land and air forces had been observed.
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In the incident a week earlier, Moscow had likewise briefly
reported, an Egyptian military spokesman's statement that Israeli
forces "fired on" an Egyptian military aircraft on the 11th;
Israel claimed that an Egyptian Sukhoi-7 overflying Israeli-
held a ,ritory on the west side of the canal had been shot down.
USSR SELECTIVELY REPORTS CAIRO DEVELOPMENTS1 NOT JOINT TALKS
In keeping with its generally low level of comment on the Middle
East question, Moscow is silent with respect to Cairo reports of
Soviet-Egyptian consultations on the problem in the context of a
"Joint working paper." With regard to internal developments in
the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE), TABS on the 9th noted publica-
tion of the ARE permanent constitution, adopted by referendum on
the 11th, and reported formation of the new cabinet on the 19th,
witho,it mentioning that one of the new ministerial posts--that of
minister of state for foreign affairs--would have "special
responsibility" for Arab-Soviet relations. (Noting-.that Murad
Ghalib, Cairo's ambassador to Moscow since 1961, was appointed
to this new post, AL-AHRAM on the 19th pointed to his experience
in the "intricacies" of Soviet-Egyptian relations, which it
called a matter of "first priority.") Nor has Moscow as yet
made mention of the planned observances in Cairo commemorating
the first anniversary of Nasir's death, on 28 September.*
Perhaps suggestive of continued Soviet affront at Arab treatment
of local "progressives," Podgornyy in his 14 September Kremlin
dinner speech decried attempts by "reaction and imperialism" to
disunite the Arab countries, undermine them from within, and
"strike a blow against the patriotic forces," and declared that
the Soviet Union "will not be indifferent" with respect to these
intrigues. In the sume vein, Mayevskiy in the 19 September
PRAVDA deplored attempts by imperialism and "internal reaction"
to split the Arabs' front, attack the patriotic forces, and
undermine friendly Arab relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow
presumably has in mind the continuing Sudanese denunciations of
communism, but may well also be thinking of the Egyptian trials
of 'Ali Sabri and other former Nasir associates.
* Moscow could scarcely have been pleased by as-Sadat's condolence
cable, publicized by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 12 September,
on the death of Khru3hchev, one of the "greatest leaders" of the
Soviet Union who would be remembered in Egypt with "pride and
appreciation."
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AS-SADAT Reporting as-Sadat's 16 September radio and tele-
SPEECH vision statement to the nation, TABS noted his
criticism of the United States for insisting that
U.S.-Egyptian consultations were continuing and that there was
hope of an early settlement despite the fact that there had
been no contacts for over two months. An Arabic-language report
of the speech additionally mentioned that as-Sadat denied U.S.
"pr:paganda fabrications" concerning points of agreement between
Cairo and Washington on a settlement and on Egypt's acceptance
of a partial solution. The broadcast did not mention as-Sadat's
statement that the United States "even said to the Soviet Union"
that Egypt accepted a partial solution.
USSR-ARE TALKS, Cairo radio reported that after making his
"JOINT PAPER" statement on the 16th, as-Sadat summoned
Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov to study the
situation in light of the "Joint Soviet-Egyptian working paper
which has been discussed in the past months," and in light of
the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.* Cairo has shed no further light
on the "working paper," and Moscow has made no reference to
such a document. The communique on Egyptian Foreign Minister
Riyad's 15-20 April talks in Moscow did say the sides had agreed
on unspecified "further joint steps" to normalize the Middle
East situation. Such language was not unique to this communique,
however; similar references to future joint steps had appeared in
the communiques on Nasir's July 1968 and July 1970 visits to the
USSR. A Dmitriyev article in the April INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
this year also referred to Soviet-Egyptian "contacts, coordina-
tion of positions, and joint actions" in the context of a search
for a political settlement.
Cairo's AL-AHRAM on the 17th is the only source for a report that
a "special diplomatic envoy from the Soviet Government" was due
in Cairo that day to exchange views and information with Foreign
Minister Riyad, and the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY reported on the
19th that Riyad had received Vinogradov, who was accompanied by
an "ambassador at the Soviet Foreign Ministry."
* The Soviet-Egyptian treaty, signed in May, calls for regular
consultations at various levels on important questions affecting
the interests of both states, and says that in the event of
developments creating a danger to or violation of peace, the
sides will contact each other to concert their positions.
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UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
MOSCOW REVIEWS KEY AGENDA ITEMS. BACKS PRC'S SEATING
A moderate volume of Moscow comment and reportage on the 21 September
opening of the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) focuses predictably on the USSR-sponsored agenda items calling
for debate on implementation of the declaration on strengthening
international security and for discussion of the question of a world
disarmament conference. In its rundown of agenda items, available
Soviet propaganda has assigned "top priority" to the debates on these
two initiatives. A third agenda item suggested by the USSR--
consideration of the Soviet draft treaty governing man's activities
on the moon--is mentioned in current propaganda, but has not
received the attention accorded the other proposals.
The propaganda has pointed to the importance of other disarmament
issues on the agenda, including the questions of banning chemical
and bacteriological weapons and the suspension of all nuclear
tests. It notes that a "broad debate" on the Middle East will be
held. And as in past years, it underscores the importance of
fully implementing the declaration on granting independence to
countries and peoples under colonial rule.
Soviet propaganda has touched only briefly on the question of
U Thant's pending resignation from the post of secretary general.
TASS noted on the 14th that in a press conference that day he
said his decision was final; and a participant in the 19 September
commentators' roundtable show in the domestic service, referring
to the same press conference, said U Thant indicated that he
would not remain in office "even for a limited period" after the
end of his current term, which expires on 31 December. Moscow
has not speculated on a possible successor to U Thant beyond
noting the Secretary General's own views on the necessary
qualifications: Reporting U Thant's remarks at a luncheon on the
17th, TASS said he indicated that a secretary general must have
"an independent opinion and never become an agent of some one
country or group of countries" and that he must display
impartiality regardless of his nationality.
CHINESE Moscow continues to voice pro forma support for the
SEATING restoration to the PRC of its "legitimate rights" in
the United Nations and to call for the expulsion of
the Chiang Kai-shek delegation, stressing the consistency of the
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USSR's position on these questions over the years. A commentary
in Mandarin beamed to Southeast Asian listeners on the 21st, for
example, asserted that the USSR's policy "has never wavered . . .
despite the anti-Soviet and othe antisocialist splittist
activities conducted by the current Peking leaders." Like other
Soviet comment, the broadcast went on to criticize "Washington's
maneuverings" aimed at a "two-Chinas" solution. In the words
of a participant in the 19 September commentators' roundtable,
Washington is pushing for the passage of resolutions whose main
aims are to keep "the Chiang Kai-shek mission in the United
Nations while simultaneously making definite curtseys in the
direction of Peking."
An international review article by PRAVDA's authoritative
commentator Mayevskiy on the 19th is atypical in suggesting that
the Chinese representation issue is less than crucial. After
noting that the American press has vigorously played up U.S.
efforts to keep Chiang in the United Nations while at the same
time making goodwill gestures toward Peking, Mayevskiy says
"some observers" have assumed that "the fuss surrounding the
'problem of Taiwan's representation' is an attempt to distract
the Assembly's attention from truly important problems, and
above all from the problem of disarmament."
Peking has remained adamant in its opposition to the concept
of dual representation in the United Nations. In the month
since the release of the 20 August PRC Foreign Ministry statement,
which declared categorically that Peking "will absolutely have
nothing to do with the United Nations" unless the Taiwan
delegation is expelled, Chinese propaganda has publicized
foreign support for the restoration of the PRC's "lawful rights"
in the world body and for expulsion of the ROC delegates.
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USSR - AFGHANISTAN
COMMUNIQUE ON KINGS VISIT ktFLECTS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
The joint communique issued at the end of the 14-19 September
visit to the Soviet Union of Afghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir
Shah reflected the highly satisfactory state of Afghan-Soviet
relations, proclaimed Soviet intent to assist Afghanistan in
its fourth five-year development plan, and registered "a
coincidence or closeness of positions" between the two countries
"on the major problems of the present-day international
situation." On East Pakistan, the two sides "exchanged views,"
and their jointly expressed "hope" in regard to conditions for
the refugees' return was stated in terms considerably milder
than the previously outlined Soviet position. During his stay
in Moscow the king and his entourage engaged in a series of
talks with several top Soviet political and economic leaders,
including Podgornyy, Mazurov, Gromyko, Skachkov, and Kuzmin,
and met with Brezhnev on the 15th. The king's invitations to
Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to pay return visits to
Afghanistan "at a time convenient for them" were "accepted
with gratitude." Following a two-day visit to Irkutsk, the
king continued on to Ulan Bator on the 20th for an official
visit to Mongolia.
BILATERAL Soviet publicity for the visit, speeches by
RELATIONS Podgornyy and the Afghan king, and the joint
communique portrayed Soviet-Afghan relations
as a model of long-standing friendship, good-neighborly
cooperation, and peaceful coexistence. On the day of the
king's arrival PRAVDA described him as an "outstanding
statesman" who was making a "great contribution to
strengthening the relations of friendship and good-neighbor-
liness between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union." Speaking
as the host at a dinner on the 14th, Podgornyy said that
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were linked by "bonds of
friendship, good-neighborliness, and multifaceted mutually
advantageous cooperation," and he observed that meetings
and exchange of opinions between leaders of the two countries
had become "traditional"--a "testimony" to the "high level of
development" of bilateral relations. Citing the bilateral
treaties of 1921 and 1931, the king in his speech declared
that Afghan-Soviet relations were a striking example of fruit-
ful peaceful coexistence in the field of international ties,
especially between countries which have different political
and social systems."
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In a similar vein, the communique expressed "deep satisfaction"
with the state of bilateral relations and "great satisfaction"
at the marking earlier this year of the 50th anniversary of
the 1921 treaty of friendship and of the 140th anniversary of
the 1931 treaty of neutrality and nonaggression. Noting both
sides' desire to strengthen further Soviet-Afghan friendship
and "reciprocally advantageous cooperation," the communique
recorded that discussions had taken place on further expanding
trade relations and economic and technical cooperation, that
subsequent talks in Kabul would focus on means of Soviet
assistance to the 1972-1977 fourth five-year development plan
of Afghanistan, and that negotiations later this year would be
aimed at concluding a new long-term trade agreement.
INTERNATIONAL Afghanistan's foreign policy received similar
AFFAIRS accolades. Noting that the "mutual under-
standing and trust which have so characterized
Soviet-Afghan relations for decades past" are spreading to
cooperation in the international sphere, Podgornyy said the
Soviet people "regard with approval" Afghanistan's policy of
"positive and active neutrality" and its support of peoples'
struggles against colonialism. Claiming a "coincidence or
proximity of positions" between the Soviet Union and
Afghanistan on major international problems, Podgornyy
expounded in routine terms on Indochina, the East Pakistan
situation, the Middle East, European security, and problems
of disarmament and arms control. In-his return-.speech the
Afghan king touched on all these issues with the exception
of the East Pakistan situation.
The communique treated in similar terms a number of inter-
national issues on which it was claimed that there was a
"coincidence or closeness" of positions. The Soviet side
"highly assessed" Afghanistan's policy of nonalignment; both
sides declared their "full support" for the declaration on
strengthening international security adopted by the UNGA on
16 December 1970; arms control and disarmament measures were
supported, as was the convocation "in the nearest future"
of an all-European security conference. Calling for the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina and a
political settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords,
the communique registered the contention that "there exist at
present real prerequisites" for an Indochina settlement.
Podgornyy on the 14th had asserted that the PRG's seven-point
proposal and the proposals of "the patriotic forces" of Laos
and Cambodia had created "real preconditions" for a "Just
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settlement in Southeast Asia." The "continuing dangerous
situation in the Middle East," said the communique, "results
from Israel's aggressive policy"; a "Just and lasting peace"
there can be established on the basis of the withdrawal of
Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in
1967 and the full implementation of the 22 November 1967
Security Council resolution. Racism, colonialism, and
neo-colonialism were also condemned by the communique.
CRISIS IN On the subject of the East Pakistan crisis,
EAST PAKISTAN the communique revealed a degree of
disagreement and its wording reflected a
compromise. Using carefully selected straightforward terms,
the communique noted that the sides "exchanged views" on the
"serious situation in the Asian subcontinent" resulting from
"the events in East Pakistan" and which has led to the flow
of millions of refugees from Pakistan to India. The communique
registered the hope that "conditions will soon be created in
East Pakistan to enable the Pakistani refugees to return to
their country in full confidence of their safety."
Such phraseology is significantly milder than the Soviet
position, which Podgornyy in essence reiterated in his speech
on the 14th. Referring to the "well-known events" in East
Pakistan and the resulting increase in Indian-Pakistani
tensions, Podgornyy contended that "there are forces"--
unnamed--"which are not above utilizing the tense situation
that has been created to implement their own unseemly aims
and to kindle armed clashes in the region." He went on to
reiterate the Soviet line calling for "the speediest possible
achievement of a political settlement" in East Pakistan "taking
account of the legitimate interests of its population," for
"the creation of secure conditions there for the return of
the refugees," and for Indian and Pakistani leaders "to
prevent the occurrence of a slide toward military conflict."
In this context Podgornyy recalled the recently concluded
Soviet-Indian treaty on peace, friendship, and cooperation--
"which is not aimed against any state."
The Soviet position favoring a "political solution" involving
"the legitimate interests of the population"--a clear allusion
to the overwhelming electoral victory in East Pakistan of Sheik
Mujibur Rahman's now illegal Awami League--is not reflected in
the communique; and the "creation of secure conditions" for the
return of the refugees is watered down to the creation of
conditions enabling the refugees to return "in full confidence
of their safety." In his return speech the Afghan king did not
mention the East Pakistan situation.
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PEKING SILENT ON REPORT THAT NATIONAL DAY PARADE CANCELED
There has been no reflection in PRC media of Western news reports
that the traditional National Day parade in Peking will not take
place this year and that airplane flights in China were halted for
several days last week. PRC broadcast patterns reflect no anomalies,
either on the part of Peking or provincial radios. All provincial
radios except Inner Mongolia, which ceased broadcasting local
political materials in January 1970, continue to carry their usual
local programs. The media reflected relatively few public
appearances by top PRC leaders between 12 and 17 September,
indicating the possibility of a leadership conference; it has
been a year since the last party plenum, and plenums are
traditionally held before NPC meetings.
The content of Peking broadcasts has been fairly standard for
this time of year. There have been numerous economic claims in
anticipation of National Day, and the anniversary of Mao's
15 September 1965 instruction on broadcasting has received the
usual voluminous coverage, perhaps even a little more than
usual. Several articles on economics, continuing to criticize
ultraleft notions, do not indicate any change in the relatively
moderate policies of recent years.
Peking's buildup for National Day festivities has varied from
year to year, although a parade has always been held. In 1970
the media did not announce beforehand that any provincial
leaders had journeyed to Peking for the celebration, and did
not note specifically that foreign groups in Peking were to
attend National Day functions until a report on 28 September
Stated that an Overseas Chinese group was an route to attend.
WIRED BROADCASTING NET REPORTEDLY FAR ADVANCED IN CHINA
On 15 September, the sixth anniversary of Mao's inscription on
radio broadcasting, NCNA reported that the wired broadcasting
network is "vigorously developing" in China's countryside.
"Almost all" counties and municipalities in China now have
their own radio stations, and wired broadcasting has been
installed "in more than 96 percent of the nation's production
brigades and more than 87 percent of the production teams."
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Comparable figures on a national scale for recent years are
not available. NCNA did report in August 1963 that 80 percent
of China's counties had at that time set up their own radio
stations. Previous figures available for selected provinces
indicate that more populous provinces in the east had already
achieved the 90 percent level at this time last year. Shantung
reported wired broadcasting facilities for 97 percent of its
production teams at the end of last year; in April 1969 on1.y
60 percent of its teams had possessed such facilities. Kiangai
reported wired broadcasting for 98 percent of its production
brigades and 90 percent of its production teams in September
1970; in September 1969 the comparable figures were 90 percent
and 60 percent. By September 1970 Liaoning had installed wired
broadcasting for 90 percent of its production teams. On the
other hand, Kansu had installed such facilities for only 53
percent of its teams by September 1970.
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S ].
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
PRC SUSTAINS DIFFERENTIATED LINE ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES
Moves in August portending improved Chinese relations with Burma
and Malaysia at the state level have produced no essential
changes in Peking's dual-level propaganda tactics toward these
countries, marked by restraint in PRC official media while the
national administrations are subjected to continuing abuse in
broadcasts of the Chinese-sponsored clandestine radios.
While on one level Peking received Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win
on a well-publicized visit from 6 to 12 August and sent a
Chinese trade delegation to Malaysia from 22 to 28 August,'
the Chinese-sponsored clandestine radios backing the insurgent
movements in those countric3--the Voice of the People of Burma
(VPB) and Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR)--were pulling
in an opposite direction by impugning the motives of the two
Southeast Asian regimes in their dealings with the Chinese.
VPB broadcasts on 5 and 8 August, just before and during Ne
Win's sojourn in Peking, suggested that the "Ne Win military
clique" was seeking improved relations with the PRC in order to
shore up its tenuous position at home and that the visit did
not signify any ideological metamorphosis on Ne Win's part.
The VOMR suggested that "Razak and his ilk" were acting out of
similar motives of expediency in receiving the Chinese trade
delegation.
Peking media have carried no followup propaganda on Ne Win's
visit or, for that matter, on any aspect of Burmese affairs
since the visit. PRC official media do not carry VPB material..
Peking does air material originating with the Voice of the
Malayan Revolution, but almost invariably over the past year
has sanitized it to exclude direct attacks on the Malaysian
Government. T%us in the period since the PRC trade delegation
returned home, NCNA on 4 and 5 September carried excerpts of
* Propaganda on the Ne Win visit is reviewed in the TRENDS
of 18 August, pages 23-26, and treatment of the PRC trade
delegation's visit to Malaysia in the TRENDS of 1 September,
pages 3k-36.
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22 SEP'.l'.EMBER 1971
VOMR comment describing the "Malayan people's revolutionary
struggle," with derogatory references to the Malaysian leader-
ship edited out.
The most recent of Peking's periodic roundups of revolutionary
armed struggles in Southeast Asia--a 19 May NCNA correspondent's
report issued in connection with the first anniversary of Mao's
20 May 1970 statement on the inevitability of world revolution--
provided a standard list of countries in the area where armed
struggles endorsed by Peking are taking place: Burma, Thailand,
"Malaya," the Philippines, Indonesia, and "North Kalimantan"
(East Malaysia). Peking has since sustained a differentiated
approach to these noncommunist Southeast Asian countries, ranging
from hardline propaganda on Thailand through gradations of
moderation on Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to the
most restrained line on Burma. Peking also follows a two-pronged
approach toward the individual countries, making use of three
clandestine radios--the Voice of the People of Thailand, the
Voice of the. Mr.layan Revolution, and the Voice of the People of
Burma--to support the insurgent movements while observing diplo-
matic constraints in its own official media.
The official PRC media provide a channel for both original
comment on the Southeast Asian countries and further dissemination
of material taken from the clandestine stations, the media of
other communist countries, and some noncommunist sources. Publi-
city for resident leaders of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP)
and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) oc''.ers another means for
Peking to show support for communist insr,.gencies.
THAILAND As a U.S. ally repeatedly censured for its role in
the Indochina conflict, Thailand is the target of
Peking's most abusive and extensive propaganda attacks. The
communist-led Thai insurgents get propaganda support from both
the official PRC media and the clandestine Voice of the People
of Thailand. The communist insurgency received considerable
attention in early August in comment marking the sixth anniver-
sary of the launching of armed struggle against the "Thanom
clique" and the United States. A connection between the insur-
gent movement and the Indochina conflict is frequently pointed
up in references to support provided the communist cause in
Indochina by the armed actions of the insurgents in Thailand.
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CONI"IDENT.LA:L Fl) I',B 'J'RI9N1)B
22 SEPTEMBER 1971
Peking media have not acknowledged recent calls by Thal govern-
ment and business spo'.cesmen for cautious steps toward normali-
zation of relations with the PRC. However, a 13 September NCNA
summary of a commentary by the clandestine radio denouncing
Thai support for a "two-Chinas" position in the United Nations
was notable for a call for normalizing Sino-Thai relations.
The commentary demanded that "the Thanom-Praphat clique" cease
its "hostile" policy toward the PRC, "abolish the fasclnt law
that bans trade with China," and "restore normal relat ,ns"
with the PRC. 'These themes were developed at length in a
7 September broadcast by the clandestine radio claiming that
there is strong popular sentiment for friendly relations
with the PRC. The broadcast said that even some parliamen-
tarians have called for repeal of the law prohibiting trade
with the PRC and that the chairman of the Thai Chamber of
Commerce spoke of the benefits from such trade. NCNA did
not mention this broadcast.
PHILIPPINES In the absence of a clandestine radio, Peking's
infrequent reports on the Philippine insurgency
provide little propaganda support for the communist-led Philippine
New People's Army. NCNA reports on 28 August and 4 September--
attributed to Philippine communist and other sources--telling of
a successful action by the New People's Army against "the
reactionary troops" was the first monitored Peking coverage of
the Philippine insurgents since 28 June. Peking has abstained
from commenting on the insurgency in its own name and has care-
fully avoided direct attacks on the Marcos government in carrying
material attributed to other sources.
Extending recognition to the Peking-oriented wing of the
Philippine communists, NCNA on 10 July carried a message on
the CCP's 50th anniversary from "Comrade Amado Guerro, chairman
of the Communist Party of the Philippines." Replete with
accolades to "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" and condemna-
tions of deviationist lines, the message referred briefly to the
Philippine communist struggle but refrained from attacking the
Marcos government by name.
Publicity for the Philippine communists was provided by the
Voice of the Malayan Revolution on 15 September when it belatedly
carried a 23 June statement by the Philippine CP Central Committee
alleging a massacre of Moslems. The statement denounced "the
Marcos fascist clique" and called for the minorities to join
with the New People's Army in applying Mao's people's war precepts
and to practice guerrilla warfare.
CONFIDENTIAL
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P2 UEP'!'EMi3li H 1.9'(i.,
U h
INDONESIA Peking has offered little propaganda support for
the PKI in recent months. Infrequent PRC comment
on Indonesian Xfaira in general has censured the government
for its relations with the United States and Japan. One such
commentary on 27 April denounced the "Suharto fascist military
clique," but the last monitored commentary on this subject--on
9 May--softened the characterization to "the Indonesian Suharto
military regime,"
Peking's only propaganda support for the Indonesian coiimunists
has consisted of publicity for two PKI documents signed by
Jusuf Adjitorop, head of the PKI's resident delegation in
Peking. A 2 July message to the CCP on its 50th anniversary
and a 4 July statement on the previous day's elections in
Indonesia, both carried by NCNA, proclaimed the importance
of communist-led armed insurgency in Indonesia and attacked
the "Suharto fascist military regime." NCNA did not mention
Adjitorop's presence at the 31 July PLA anniversary reception,
an event at which he was reported to be a guest of honor the
previous year.
MALAYSIA The two levels of Peking's propaganda approach
are most sharply defined in its treatment of
Malaysia. On the one hand, it has publicized the exchange
of trade delegations, in the process acknowledging the legiti-
macy of the federation by using its official name of Malaysia.
On the other hand, PRC media continue to disseminate material
from the Voice of the Malayan Revolution detailing the activities
of the armed insurgents in both East and West Malaysia, while
carefully excluding the clandestine radio's direct attacks on
the Malaysian leaders.
The Voice of the Malayan Revolution has served as a forum for
pro-Peking communist parties throughout Southeast Asia, including
both those without their own clandestine radios--as illustrated
by the VOMR's broadcast of the 23 June statement by the Philippine
CP--and those having clandestine stations of their own. This
clearinghouse role was acknowledged by the Voice of the People
of Burma on 16 September in noting that both the VOMR and the
Voice of the People of Thailand broadcast material originating
with the Burmese clandestine radio.
BURMA Peking has never acknowledged the existence of
the Voice of the People of Burma, which continues
to air regular attacks on the Ne Win regime. The most recent
reference to the Burmese insurgent movement in PRC media was
contained in the BCP's message on the CCP's 50th anniversary,
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CONFI1)ENTIAL1 FBIS `i'REN1)S
22 SEP'TEMBI!11t 19'rl
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carried by NCNA on 3 July. The message called for victory
over "the Ne Win regime." There has been no comment in
Peking's own name on the armed insurgency in Burma since
September 1970.
The last Chinese reference to the BCP's resident delegation
in Peking was contained in NCNA's report on the PLA anniver-
sary reception on 31 July. NCNA reported on 31 July--the
same day it carried the announcement of Ne Win's impending
visit--that Ba Thein Tin, vice chairman of the BCP Central
Committee, had been among the "distinguished guests on the
seats of honor" at the reception. Pe Tint, another member
of the BCP delegation, was also reported present.
CONFIDENTIAL
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