TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: September 9, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

 -~o Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-c%lc
Confidential
TRENDS
~IIIIIIIIII~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIII~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~ II ~I
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 36)
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person Is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from eulemede
dewnpredinp and
deebalhetlen
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Hanoi Marks National Day, Anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's Death .
1
Pharr Van Dong Reviews Achievements, Discusses Flood Disaster .
3
Propaganda Calls for Flood Control, Protection of Populace . .
5
Peking Reassures Hanoi, Derides Idea of New Geneva Parley . . .
8
Moscow Stresses Its Aid to DRV, Attacks Chinese Policies . . .
10
Delegation of Sihanouk's Front Visits USSR to Improve Ties . .
11
Communists Score Thieu Decision to Run Unopposed in Election .
14
Aleksandrov Article Signals Intensified Anti-China Polemic
15
NEW TIMES, IZVESTIYA, RED STAR Develop Lines of Attack . . . .
18
Soviet Central Media Hail Signing of Accord on "West Berlin" .
20
Stress on GDR-USSR Unanimity, Respect for GDR Interests . . . .
21
Moscow: No Reason Now to Delay European Security Conference .
23
Warsaw: Accord Is Another Recognition of Postwar Status Quo .
24
Prague: Atmosphere Is "More Conducive" -to Talks with Bonn . .
25
DISARMAMENT
Gromyko Letter to U Thant Resurrects Call for World Conference. 27
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Says Exclusion of Communists Weakens Arab Unity . . . . 29
NEW TIMES Appraises Reconstituted Arab Social.:dt Union . . . . 33
POLAND
Plenum Guidelines for Party Congress Chart Balanced Course 35
KOREA
Pyongyang Says Pak Tries to "Scuttle" North-South Contacts 38
(Continued)
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
CONTENT S (Continued)
CHINA AND DPRK
PRC Signs Military Aid Agreement with North Korea . . . . . . . kl
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Kansu Colleges Reopen; RED FLAG Discusses Education Reform . . 42
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
Moscow (2805 items)
Peking (1544 items)
Indochina
(5%)
17%
Indochina (20%)
42%
[DRV National Day
(--)
10%]
[DRV August Revolution (2%)
23%]
[Podgornyy October
Visit to DRV
(--)
2%]
Anniversary, National
Day
China
(8%)
7%
[Laos (2%)
8%]
[I. Aleksandrov
(--)
3%]
Domestic Issues (33%)
25%
PRAVDA Article
PRC Military Delegation (5%)
5%
West Berlin Accord
(1%)
5%
in Romania
U.S. Economic
Measures
(7%)
3%
Japan-China Friendship (--)
Association Meeting,
Tokyo
4%
Uganda-Tanzania Border (--)
Incident
3%
PRC UN Seat (11%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
INDOCHINA
Hanoi propaganda calling for all-out flood-control efforts and
protection of lives and property registers the DRV's serious
concern over the damage caused by the recent floods in North
Vietnam. The uiusual severity of this year's flooding was
recognized in Premier Pham Van Dong's 31 August DRV National
Day address when he described the floods as even worse than
the "catastrophic" ones of 1945. Hanoi media have publicized
a succession of official proclamations on how to cope with
the flooding, as we]' as almost daily press editorials on the
subject. Messages or sympathy and offers of assistance have
come from the PRC, USSR, and other communist allies.
Further Hanoi propaganda on DRV National Day reaffirms basic
policies and reiterates attacks on U.S. failure to respond to
the PRG's 1 July peace proposal, which Pharr Van Dorg said was
advanced at a notably propitious time. His optimistic comments
on the military situation in the South accord with recent
scattered claims in the propaganda that the worst of the war is
over.
Moscow has emphasized its aid to Vietnam in continuing propaganda
on the DRV anniversary, including a 2 September PRAVDA article by
the deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations. Concurrently, Moscow pursues its propaganda assault on
Peking's Indochina policies. An authoritative I. Aleksandrov
article in the 4 September PRAVDA, calling for a closing of
communist ranks against Chinese splittist policies, includes passages
playing on Hanoi's fears that Peking might sell out the North Vietnanese.
Peking has reassured the Vietnamese that their interests are not
jeopardized by current Sino-U.S- developments. In an unexpected
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the DRV's anniversary, the Chinese again
endorsed the PRG's seven-point peace proposal while deriding
speculation about a new Geneva conference. PLA Chief of Staff Huang
Yung-sheng's speech on the anniversary, however, reflected Peking's
broader interests in its reFtraint toward the United State..
HANOI MARKS NATIONAL DAY. ANNIVERSARY OF HO CHI MINH'S DEATH
The 2 September DRV National Day was marked as usual this year with. a
meeting addressed by Premier Pham Van Dong on 31 August, a T'reath-
laying cer.mony at Hanoi's military cemetery on 1 Septembt.., and
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0003000105Q31-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREND
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
editorial comment in the press on the 2d. Pham Van Dong's
speech and other anniversary comment reaffirmed basic DRV
policies, with Dong reviewing Vietnamese communist diplomatic
initiatives in the past few years and stating that the latest
proposal, advanced by the PRG on 1 July, has come at s, time
when "the situation has matured in the unfolding of the war
and in the minds of the people for advancing to a solution"
of the war.* Dong claimed that "very seldom in a fierce and
complicated confrontation like this war has a solution put
forth by one side enjoyed such wide and deep response, even
among political circles in the United States."
The DRV premier went on to score the U.S. Administration for
not responding positively to the PRG proposal, despite
opposition to the war in the United States and the alleged
failure of Vietnamization. He attacked the Administration for
refusing to "declare in a clearcut way to withdraw all U.S.
troops" and for failing to recognize the South Vietnamese
right to self-determination, in this context decrying the
U.S. attitude toward the (rr4 elections. "It is clear," he
said, "that Nixon does not want to talk seriously to settle
the Vietnam question on the basis of the seven points, although
he has no legitimate reason to reject" the proposal.
While warning that "the enemy may cause us new difficulties,"
Dong spoke optimistically about the progress of the war. He
said u1 t "i, very new and very inspiring thing" about the war
in the Soit;1 is that "everyone has seen" that the enemy has
"already lost the game and that its days are numbered. More
remarkable still, the enemy itself is believing so." Dong's
characterization of the war situation is consistent with
recent scattered claims in Hanoi propaganda that the worst of
the war is over.** The same view was suggested in the
2 September NHAN DAN anniversary editorial, which held that
the "peak of U.S. war escalation" ended in the spring of 1968
and cannot be reached again. The editorial maintained that
President Nixon cannot reverse the trend of the war and that
"there is limited time" at his disposal.
* See the 1 September TRENDS, page 1, for a report on Dong's
remarks dealing with relations with other communist countries.
** Such claims are noted in the 25 August TRENDS, page 5.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/022 : CIA--RDP85T00875 OO0300001100S31-0
C 9 SEPTEMBER 1971
DRV LEADERSHIP The DRV National Day meeting an& a memorial
service marking the anniversary of Ho's
death prompted appearances by all of the North Vietnamese
party's Politburo members except Pham Hung, who has been absent
from public functions for the last four years, and Hoang Van
Hoan, currently leading a National Assembly delegation visiting
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Truong Chinh delivered the
opening remarks at the meeting; he has performed this function
in previous years except on last year's 25th national day, when
President Ton Duc Thang spoke. Politburo member Le Due Tho
and alternate members Tran Quoc Hoan and Van Tien Dung were
not listed among those present at the national day observances,
but all were reported as attending the 3 September memorial
service marking the second anniversary of Ho's death.
The 3 September NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary of Ho's
death, like the party paper's editorial last year, reviewed
efforts to carry out the wishes expressed in Ho's testament.
Among other things, it recalled Ho's concern with party unity
and asserted9, that "the strengthening of the solidarity and
unanimity of the entire party under the clearsighted leadership
of the party Central Committee has an extremely important
significance."
PHAM VAN DONG REVIEWS ACHIEVEMENTS. DISCUSSES FLOOD DISASTER
In the pattern of his national day speeches in previous years,
Phan Van Dong on 31 August rou Finely reviewed achievements in
agriculture, industry, communications and transportation,
education, and other domestic spheres. Recalling that the
19th plenum of the VWP Central Committee had "laid down great,
urgent and immediate tasks" for the war and for building the
North's economy, Dong singled out the development of
agriculture and the improvement of economic management as
special goals. In line with earlier propaganda references to
large crop yields, he asserted that the 1970-71 winter-spring
rice crop recorded "unprecedented results in acreage, crop
yield, and total output" and that "the target of five tons of
paddy per hectare per year is becoming more and more a reality
in North Vietnam." The goal of producing five tons of paddy
per hectare annually has been given wide attention in Hanoi media
since the fall of 1965, when it was first advocated at govern-
ment and party conferences on agriculture.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL F'BIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
-4-
In the area of the management of the economy, the DHV premier
called for "big efforts" from central organs to basic units
to improve the quality of management, first of all in drafting
the 1972 state plan. He said special. importance must be
attached to organizational work and the use of cadres: "We
must step up and improve our organization, raise the
efficiency of the managerial system, train and foster factory
management cadres, assign cadres to the right places according
to their abilities, and foster an increasing contingent of
skilled workero."
La:-ply ignoring defense issues, Dong routinely reminded his
audience that the North must "constantly heighten vigilance,
strengthen the people's armed forces, uphold the duty of
defending the homeland and the gains of the socialist
revolution in the North, and stand ready to fight and fight well."
UNPRECEDENTED Pham Van Dong's national dey speech provided
FLOODS IN DRV the first substantial propaganda recognition
of the unusual severity of the recent floods
in North Vietnam. The premier stated that in recent weeks the
DRV "has been affected by a very big flood, even bigger than that
of 1945, which was a catastrophe." According to Dong, waters
from the flooded streams in the northern part of the DRV have
caused "water in the entire system of the Red River and Thai
Binh River to rise to an unprecedented level, while heavy
downpours in the delta caused added difficulties for the defense
of the dike system and the combat against inundation."
Dong claimed that the flood-fighting efforts had "in the main
triumphed over the flood and warded off a big disaster," but he
acknowledged that "many areas in the midlands and delta have
been submerged" and that there have been losses in agriculture,
communications and transport, and property. Warning that "at
present the water level remains high and the weather may change
abruptly" and that resolute efforts to defend the dike system
and combat floods must continue, he urged that all forces be
mobilized and urgent steps be taken to step up winter crop
cultivation in the areas spared by the flood and to replant the
fields in the stricken areas.
Dong also called for the speediest possible restoration of main
roads and attention to "the paramount role of communications and
transport in the present conditions." He called it "extremely
urgent" that the people in flood-stricken areas be provided with
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-l DP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
adequate care--food, housing and disease prevention. Efforts
to overcome the floods, he said, must be carried out along with
efforts to fulfill the 1971 state plan: "In the next dry
season, we must gain time to step up all activities of the
national economy, capital construction in particular."
PROPAGANDA CALLS FOR FLOOD CONTROL. PROTECTION OF POPULACE
The disastrous nature of North Vietnam's floods, directly
acknowledged in Pham Van Dong's national day address, has
been reflected in a series of official party and government
statements and editorials it the central press. And the
concern of Hanoi's leaders was further underscored on
9 September when DRV media publicized inspection tours of
flooded areas by Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong.
The report on the leaders' visits briefly noted their remarks
to the populace, saying Le Duan stressed that it was "essential"
to "save human lives" and observed that "as long as there are
men, there is everything." Pham Van Dong, according to the
report, assured his audience that difficulties would be
surmounted "despite the inundation of vast areas."
OFFICIAL The first cfficial directive on the floods was
DIRECTIVES an "instruction" from the premier, reported by
Hanoi radio on 26 August, which called for the
protection of state, cooperative, and private property in
flood-stricken areas and warned of punishment for anyone who
took advantage of the floods to _erpetrate theft. A joint
meeting of the North Vietnamese party (VWP) Central Committee
Secretariat and the Council of Ministers Standing Committee at
about the same time in August drafted a resolution spelling out
tasks to overcome the floods and called for efforts to restore
production. The joint resolution was first detailed in a Hanoi
broadcast on 1 September. The date of issue of the resolution has
been indicated only in an undated instruction on an emulation
drive to overcome the consequences of the floods, issued by the
Emulation Department of the Central Committee and broadcast on
7 September. The instruction referred without further
explanation to two resolutions of the Secretariat and the
Council of Ministers Standing Committee dated 25 and 27 August.
Further instructions from the premier, detailing actions
needed. to "overcome difficulties in regard to the people's
livelihood" in flooded areas, were publicized in a Hanoi
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
-6-
broadcast on 2 September. And on the 9th Hanoi reported that the
National Assembly Standing Committee had met the previous day,
chaired by Truong Chinh, and heard a. report on the floods and
rehabilitation work.
EXTENT OF The many official statements on the floods and
DISASTER accompanying propaganda--including eight NHAN DAN
editorials on the subject since 25 August--provide
little in the way of concrete details on the flood situation.
The general nature of the problem is indicated, however, in
repeated references to the need to evacuate people and provide
them with food, shelter, and medical care and in emp.~asis on
the importance of resuming all-out efforts in agricultural
production as soon as possible.
The extent of the evacuation effort is indicated, for example, in
a 1 September NHAN DAN editorial which specifies that transportation
operations have continued day and night and notes that planes have
been used in some areas for rescue missions and distribution of
foodstuffs. An 8 September NHAN DAN editorial on medical tasks
similarly suggests the severity of the problems, calling on public
health personnel to work in shifts around the clock to organize
rescue operations, give first aid, and care for pat:'ents. It
notes that special efforts will have to be made to prevent
epidemics, especially after the flood waters recede.
Agricultural basses due to the floods have evidently been
widespread. A 1 September NHAN DAN editorial, urging that crops
be replanted as soon as the flood waters recede, is most explicit
about the extent of damage when it states that "the flooded areas
embrace the majority of the ricefields."
In an apparent effort to counter a defeatist attitude that would
result in incorrect planting of crops, the NHAN DAN editorial
recalls that a good harvest had been reaped from the crops
replanted after the severe floods in 1968* and disputes the
* Hanoi comment during the period of flooding in 1968 noted that
some of the rivers that year were higher than in 1915--the year
Pham "an Dong used as his base of comparison in the current
national day address. The head of the Directorate of Dikes,
Duong Ngoc Vo, declared in 1968 that the DRV that year was
experiencing the worst year for floods and storms since the
restoration of peace in 1954. For comment on the floods during
1969 and background on propaganda treatment of the 1968 floods,
see the FBIS SURVEY of 28 August 1969, pages 11-13.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/ J L85T00875RV1-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
view that rice crops produce low yields if they are planted
late. Arguing against this "incorrect view," which prompts
some people to plant subsidiary crops after the flooding,
it says "experience as well as scientific research demonstrate
that the 10th month crop, if planted late in September, can
produce a good hsxvest provided proper techniques are used."
USSR, PRC Successive VNA reports in the same transmission
ASSISTANCE on 4 September publicized messages of sympathy
and promises of aid from the USSR and PRC. The
Soviet message, according to VNA, was dated 30 August and came
from the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers. VNA noted that
it expressed "sincerest sympathy" and said that "as an initial
aid to the victims, the Soviet Red Cross is sending emergency
relief to the DRV including food, medicine, textiles, and tents."
The ensuing VNA report of the Chinese offers noted that
Chou En-lai had sent messages to Pham Van Dong on 25 and 29 August
conveying the "great concern" of Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, and the
party, government, and people of China and announcing "measures
taken by China to come to the Vietnamese people's relief."
A third message sent on 2 September, this time from all three
PRC leaders, was quoted in the VNA report as referring to China
and Vietnam as "intimate neighbors" and the two peoples as
"comrades in arms and brothers" and as pledging that the Chinese
people "will do their utmost to help the fraternal Vietnamese
people to triumph over the current floods."*
GVN OFFER VNA and LPA on 8 September scathingly rejected the
offer of assistance made by the GVN Foreign
Ministry through the International Red Cross on the 6th. Hanoi
radio in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on the 8th broadcast a VNA
authorized statement, issued the same day, denouncing "this
offer-of-assistance farce" as a "brazen deceitful trick" aimed
at masking the real nature of the U.S.-GVN allies and their
"war crimes." It also called the offer one of Thieu's "crafty
tricks aimed at scraping up the property of our compatriots in
South Vietnam and at misleading the struggle of the South
Vietnamese people. who are resolutely opposing his deceitful
election farce."
* Peking media have been heard to publicize only the message
of 2 September.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
0
About an hour later Liberation Radio broadcast an LPA authorized
statement charging that the Thieu a''-+.nistration "is resorting
to the trick of providing material assistance for the compatriot
flood victims in the North and is unleashing donation drives
in the cities and in the other areas under its temporary
control." Scoring this "odious, hypocritical trick" to cover
U.S.-GVN "crimes" and to enhance Thieu's image in the election
campaign, it also brands the offer "a dishonest and cruel
trick to take advantage of the southern compatriots' sacred
sentiment toward the kith-and-kin North in order to step up
exploitation of the people."
Stating that the South Vietnamese people are "resolved to
boycott all the relief drives and organizations" created by
Thieu and "not to fall into this deceitful trap," the LPA
statement says the South Vietnamese people are determined to
devote their human and material resources to the resistance
as !ithe most realistic way to help" the flood victims. It
expresses the conviction that the northern compatriots,
"with the great assistance of the socialist countries," can
overcome the floods, restore production, "and fulfill the
vast rearbase's noble duty to the vast frontline under all
circumstances."
PEKING REASSURES HANOI. DERIDES IDEA OF NEW GENEVA PARLEY
Peking has taken the occasion of the DRV's 26th anniversary to
reassure the Vietnamese that their interests are not Jeopardized
by current Sino-U.S. developments. This message was conveyed
in editorial support for the PRG's seven-point peace proposal,
coupled with what amounts to a denial that the PRC is
contemplating a new Geneva conference to arrange a Vietnam
settlement. Peking departed from the standard pattern by
marking the anniversary with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial,
evidently as a vehicle for reassuring Hanoi. There was an
editorial last year on the 25th anniversary, an occasion
calling for special treatment, but none on the 24th
anniversary in 1969. Otherwise the observance this year
has been like that of 1969.
While reaffirming Peking's endorsement of the PRG's 1 July
proposal as "the correct way to a peaceful settlement" in
Vietnam, PEOPLE'S DAILY accused "U.S. imperialism" of
"evading a reply" to the proposal and of spreading "words
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
about the convening of a Geneva conference" in an effort to
obstruct a peaceful settlement. This represented Peking's
second attempt in recent authoritative comment to take the
wind out of speculation about a wider conference to deal with
the Vietnam question. A 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article had done the same thing in expressing support for
Prince Sihanouk's angry denunciation of this line of
speculation.*
As in other recent comment, including the Chinese leaders'
message on the anniversary, the 2 September editorial got in
a jab at the Nixon Doctrine--a major target in Hanoi's
polemics against Peking's invitation to the President--in the
course of an attack on the United States for allegedly
intensifying the war in Indochina, refusing to announce a date
for withdrawal of U.S. troops-from South Vietnam, and pursuing
"the 'Vietnamization' scheme and the 'Nixon Doctrine' of making
Asians fight Asians." The editorial also seemed responsive to
Hanoi's polemics in its characterization--within a wide
historical context--of "the U.S. imperialist aggressors" as
"the most ferocious in our epoch." After noting that Sino-
Vietnamese solidarity had been "personally cultivated" by Mao
and Ho Chi Minh and "can stand the test of any storm," the
editorial reaffirmed the PRC's "unswerving policy" of rendering
"all-out support" to the Vietnamese until "complete victory."
While the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial seemed designed to reassure
the Vietnamese, the speech by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng
at the 2 September DRV embassy reception on the anniversary
reflected the restraint currently marking Peking's comment on
the United States. Fuang made no mention of the Nixon
Administration cr of a Vietnam settlement, taking the occasion
rather to express concern over recent floods in North Vietnam
and to offer pro forma support for the Vietnamese in their
"war of resistance." Echoing the Chinese leaders' message,
he described the Vietnamese situation as "unprecedentedly fine"--
a characterization which grew out of the Lam Son 719 operation
and which justifies a broader Chinese manueverability in Asia.
Last year on this occasion Chou roundly attacked the United
* In an interview published in the Yugoslav paper VJESNIK on
28 August, Chou En-lai said that there is no need for a new
Geneva conference and that the Vietnam question must be settled
between the Vietnamese and the United States.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
States for being "the most ferocious imperialism" of the present
era and for "practicing political deception and contriving
peace-talk schemes."
MOSCOW STRESSES ITS AID TO DRV. ATTACKS CHINESE POLICIES
Moscow propaganda on DRV National Day includes a 2 September
PRAVDA article by I. Arkhipov, deputy chairman of the USSR
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which reviews
Soviet aid to the DRV in some detail in the vein of other
recent Moscow comment, including Vice Premier Novikov's speech
at the Moscow meeting on the DRV anniversary.* The article
again notes Soviet help in the building of various enterprises
in the DRV, the assistance of Soviet specialists in Vietnam,
and the training of Vietamese in the USSR. It also again points
up Soviet military aid, the "basis" for the DRV's air defense.
Documenting Soviet political support for the DRV, the Arkhipov
article notes that the USSR "played a important role in
convening and achieving the success of the Geneva conference."
But it does not go on to claim--as did a 30 August Moscow radio
talk in foreign languages on Podgornyy's forthcoming visit
to the DRV--that the Soviet Union "took the initiative" in
convening the Geneva conference and that Ho Chi Minh "highly
estimated" the Soviet Union's role. The reference to Soviet
"initiative" had been at variance with the USSR's usual line
of recalling, in the context of appeals to Peking for communist
unity in support of Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet cooperation at the
1954 Geneva conference as an example of how united action can
thwart U.S. "aggression."
The PRAVDA article cites expressions of gratitude for Soviet
assistance by DRV leaders; and the DRV ambassador, in his usual
Moscow TV interview on DRV National Day, praised Soviet aid
and added that Podgornyy's forthcoming visit to the DRV will
help strengthen the "combat solidarity and fraternal friendship"
of the two parties and peoples.
* See the 1 September TRENDS, pages -5, for a discussion of
Moscow's initial commei:t on the DRV anniversary, including the
leaders' message and Moscow meeting.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
Moscow's reports of anniversary activities in Hanoi include a
4 September TASS summary of Phan Van Dong's 31 August speech.
TASS briefly notes that Pham "stressed the great significance
of the material and moral support given by the socialist
countries" and "expressed gratitude for it," obscuring the
fact that he did not specifically thank the socialist countries
for their aid but rather said pointedly that the DRV had "won"
the assistance of the USSR and PRC through its correct line
in holding the diplomatic and military initiative.
Continuing Soviet attacks on Peking's Vietnam policies include
passages in the 4 September PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov
broadly attacking Peking's divisive policies.* Again playing
on Hanoi's suspicions that Peking might sell it out, Aleksandrov
asks if "a deal against socialism" is not being prepared behind
the scenes in Peking and Washington, "a deal at the expense of
the interests of the peoples fighting for national independence
and freedom." Routine Soviet radio comment in Mandarin continues
to charge that Peking's invitation to President Nixon to visit
China permits him to postpone a reply to the PRG's peace
proposal. A 3 September commentary again attacks Chou En-lai
for failing, in his interview with the New York TIMES' James
Reston, to demand that the United States stop sabotaging the
Paris talks and withdraw its troops from Vietnam by a definite
date. It repeats the charge that Chou is thus "serving"
Washington and "impairing" the Vietnamese people's struggle.
DELEGATION 0' SIHANOUK'S FRONT VISITS USSR TO IMPROVE TILS
The arrival in the USSR of a delegation of Sihanouk's National
United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) led by Pol3u-buro member
Gen. Duong Sam 01 represents a continuation of the Sihanouk
government's persistent quest for Soviet recognition and is
being used by Peking to twit the Soviets on this issue.
Moscow has adhered to past practice in hosting the delegation
at the "solidarity committee" level and has exhibited no
intention so far of altering its practice of virtually ignoring
Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU).
* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a
discussion of the article.
I CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREP?DS
9 SEPTEMB1R 1971
The arrival of the delegation on 1 September was first reported
in a Moscow broadcast which said without elaboration that it
had come at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee. The FUNK Radio first announced the visit in a
2 September broadcast which said the delegation will "try"
to strengthen ties between the Soviet and Cambodian people and
will "also try to create favorable conditions to obtain the
the USSR Government's recognition of the RGNU." Unlike
Moscow, the FUNK broadcast used Duong Sam Ol's government title,
Minister of Military Equipment and Armament, as well as his
FUNK title. NCNA publicized the visit on 4 September by
carrying a FUNK "press communique" dated 30 August which
announced the visit and noted pointedly that the delegation
would tell the Soviet people that the RGNU now controls eight-
tenths of the country's territory, with nearly five million
inhabitants, and that 28 countries have already recognized it.
SOVIET COVERAGE In a moderate amount of publicity for the
visit, Moscow has nowhere mentioned the RGNU
on its own authority, citing the delegation's FUNK credentials
only. Some Radio Moscow broadcasts, in Cambodian only, have
quoted Duong Sam 01 as praising the policies and growing
influence of the RGNU?and as referring to Sihanouk as Cambodian
head of state. But in PRAVDA on 4 Septemt:r, Duong is quoted
as referring in an interview to "Prince Sihanouk" with no
further title. TAS`i has quoted Duong Sam 01 on several
occasions as saying he has come to thank the Soviet people for
their support of the Cambodian people's struggle and to
inform them of "the real state of affairs" in Cambodia.
A 9 September PRAVDA article, as summarized by TASS, expresses
the Soviet people's approval of the struggle of "the Cambodian
people" under the leadership of "a militant political
organization," the FUNK. It acknowledges that according to
data provided by "the leadership of the Front," the liberated
zone of Cambodia now includes eight-tenths of the country's
territory with a population of five million. It says that
"people's power bodies" are being formed at all levels, that
"democratic transformations" are being made, and that the
"foundations of a future free Cambodia are being laid," but
PRAVDA still avoids mentioning the RGNU.
The delegation so far has not been received by any Soviet
central government officials, although it did meet during a
side trip with the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan.
Statements by officials of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 0/22 D REDP85T0087 909j031 -0
N M1
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
Committee in connection with the visit have been limited to
routine expressions of support for the "Just struggle of the
Cambodian patriots" and for the FUNK as leader of that
struggle. They mention neither Sihanouk nor Lon Nol, although
the secretary of the committee, in a statement broadcast by
Radio Moscow in Cambodian on 1 September, referred briefly
to the "coup d'etat of the rightist forces in Phnom Penh"
which "allowed the United States to gain political and military
control in Cambodia."
BACKGROUND Moscow media have rarely mentioned the RGNU
since TASS reported its proclamation in a
6 May 1970 report. Such mentions as have occurred have
usually been in connection with visits by its officials, The
highest-level Soviet treatment of a RGNU minister was accorded
to Thiounn Mumm when he was received by Soviet deputy foreign
ministers during visits to the USSR in June and December 1970.
On 29 June 1970, reporting that Thiounn Mumm was received by
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, TASS acknowledged
his title of "Minister of Economy and Finance of the RGNU,"
but other reports of his week-long visit identified him only
as a FUNK Politburo member. On 29 December 1970, reporting
that Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev received Thiounn Mumm the
day before, PRAVDA identified him as Minister of Economy and
Finance but did not mention the RGNU.
On 30 October 1970 a Moscow domestic service report said a
delegation of the "Cambodian national front" attended a
Moscow meeting sponsored by solidarity committees to mark a
week of solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. The radio report, the only available publicity for
the delegation, said that the group was headed by Thiounn
Prasith, "Minister for Coordination of Struggle for National
Liberation of the Royal Government."
Although Moscow never withdrew recognition from Chea San,
the Gihanouk government's ambassador in Moscow as well as its
Minister of Justice, Moscow has referred to him infrequently
and without: mentioning the RGNU. Thus, for example, PRAVDA on
26 February 1971 published a TASS report that Chea San,
"Cambodian ambassador in the Soviet Union," attended a solidarity
meeting that day. On 24 March 1971 a Moscow Radio broadcast in
Cambodian reported that "the embassy representing FUNK" had
received a number of solidarity messages from Soviet workers; and
on 29 April TASS reported a Moscow solidarity meeting attended by
"Cambodian ambassador" Chea San.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/186?JiDfP85T00875fP6Lg31-0'
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 14 -
CONNIUNISTS SCORE THIEU DECISION TO RUN UNOPPOSED IN ELECTION
Hanoi and Liberation Front media have predictably denounced
President Thieu's 2 September speech in which he announced that
the presidential election would be held as scheduled on 3 October
even though his slate would be the only one on the ballot. The
communist reaction was highlighted by a 5 September NHAN DAN
article which maintained that the United States is backing
Thieu's stance although Washington had hoped to cover the
election "farce" with a "facade" of democracy. The article
did not mention Thieu's promise to resign if the vote does not
demonstrate that he has the people's confidence, but this
pledge is noted and disparaged in other Hanoi and Front comment.
The 5 September NHAN DAN article asserted that the Nixon
Administration is committed to keeping Thieu in power and, as
evidence, incorrectly claimed that Secretary Rogers, in his
3 September press conference, characterized Thieu's decision to
run alone as "encouraging." Despite such remarks, the article
asserted, the "crisis" in Saigon "cannot be concealed and
becomes even more apparent." The article maintained that the
United States has failed to establish a "viable stooge
administration" despite three years of Vietnamization and that
Thieu is so isolated that "he has to resort to naked dictatorship
to assure his survival."
The NHAN DAN article predicted that "compatriots" in the allied-
controlled areas in South Vietnam will "oppose" the election
"farce," but it did not suggest more specific action. Liberation
Radio commentaries have claimed that there is a growing movement
in the South demanding that Thieu resign in order for a "Just"
election to take place. And Front media, on 1 and 2 September,
publicized the formation of a "Popular Front Against Elections,"
reportedly including supporters of the former candidates Icy and
Minh, which is said to be calling for the boycott of the
election. Liberation Radio on the 1st also reported that
"compatriots" in Saigon have "demanded that the right to organize
the election be handed over to a central committee composed of
the representatives of the various religious and patriotic
organizations." According to the radio, a number of organizations
are "actively working for the formation of a people's committee
for national conciliation" which will demand Thieu resign,
that Ambassador Bunker go home and that a national conciliation
government be formed.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00030001 031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREND
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 15 -
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE SIGNALS INTENSIFIED ANTI--CHINA POLEMIC
Moscow's concern over the impact of the newly flexible Chinese
tactics and its intensified effort to counter them are reflected
in a major article in PRAVDA over the authoritative signature of
I. Aleksandrov, the second in less than two months, which sharpens
the Soviet attack on Peking and calls for a cloning of communist
ranks in the face of Chinese divisive activities. The earlier
Aleksandrov article, on 25 July, conveyed Moscow's first
authoritative reaction to the announcement of the President's
decision to visit Peking; along with the ensuing major article
by Georgiy Arbatov in the 10 August PRAVDA, its context was the
Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangular relationship--the possible impact
of Sino-U.S. detente on relations between the Soviet Union and
the United States. The current article seems addras~--'
primarily to the international communist movement.
The TASS international service underscored the importance of the
article by disseminating it in full text the night before it
appeared in the Soviet party organ on 4 September. Recapitulating
Moscow's catalog of charges against Peking, the article assembles
what seems designed as ammunition for an intensified Soviet bloc
propaganda campaign to discredit the PRC leaders as warmongers
and renegades from Marxism-Leninism, at the same time removing
the onus for present Sino-Soviet tensions from the Soviet
leadership.
Along with a spate of other anti-Chinese articles in the Soviet
press, it also lays propaganda groundwork for Moscow's projected
fall diplomatic offensive, which includes a Brezhnev visit to
Belgrade and a Podgornyy visit to Hanoi, by underscoring a
portrayal of the USSR as champion of the national liberation
struggle and of world peace. Released by TASS just after the
four-power Berlin agreement was signed, the article juxtaposes
this portrayal to attacks on the Chinese for trying to undermine
the national liberation movement and harming the cause of peace.
Moscow's East European allies have given the Aleksandrov article
prompt publicity. Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO and Warsaw's
TRYBUNA LUDU published the text, and the GDR's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
and Prague's RUDE PRAVO carried lengthy summaries. The Budapest
press had not carried the article as of 7 September, but the
daily MAGYAR HIRLAP published a Moscow TRUD attack on Maoist
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 16 -
militarism. The Romanians, whose cordial relations with Peking
have not abated in the face of such attacks, have pvedictably
ignored the Aleksandrov blast.
Entitled "The Slogans and Deeds of the Chinese Leadership," the
new Aleksandrov article's central theme ?s that though ?'eking
has altered its rhetoric and its tactics, its policy remains
the same and constitutes an unabated danger--a message for all
who would seek cordial relations with Peking. "No matter what
ultrarevolutionary phraseology was used to cover up its course,"
the article says, "its essence remains uncharged--the striving
for hegemony in a war-devastated world . . . , even a nuclear-
missile war in w:,ich, as estimated by Mao, one half of mankind
could perish." Developing the theme that in reality the Chinese
leaders are enemies of world peace, Aleksandrov points to
Peking's opposition to collective security in Europe and Asia
and its opposition to "concrete steps" toward disarmament and
the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
Betraying concern over Chinese diplomatic activity in Eastern
Europe, Aleksandrev adds thc~ Peking also "stints no efforts
in transferring the situation of military psychosis to Albania
in the hope of sowing the seeds of tension in the Balkans by
this or other methods." In another passage in the same vein,
he explains that Peking is using "a differentiated approach
to the socialist countries in an effort to draw some of them
into the orbit of its policy." Without naming names but clearly
alluding to Romania, and to a lesser degree Albania and Yugoslavia,
he observes that in pursuing this policy Peking is making "alluring
gestures and promises" but has "for the time being not asked much
from the objects of its flirting." The implication is that in the
future Peking may call in its debts. Aleksandrov goes on in effect
to warn the dissidents of the possible consequences of their
flirtation with Peking by printsdly recalling "the tragic fate
of the Communist Party of Indonesia and some other parties whose
leadership harkened to advice from Peking."
Against the background of the 30 August announcement of
Podgornyy's projected visit to Hanoi in early October and
President Nixon's planned trip to Peking, the article seeks to
fan Hanoi's suspicions that Peking might sell it out. After
noting the support and aid the Soviet Union and the other
socialist countries have given the DRV, Aleksandrov comments
that the members of "the anti-imperialist front of struggle
cannot but be alarmed by Peking's undermining of the unity of the
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/'kipi[MP85T008753AflR4W31-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 17 -
revolutionary forces and its infliction of serious damage to
their common cause." In another passage developing the theme of
Soviet concern for the interests of its friends and of socialism,
Aleksandrov asks: "Is a deal against socialism being prepared
behind the scenes in Peking and Washington, a deal at the expense
of the interests of the peoples fighting for national independence
and freedom?"
Turning to Peking's developing relations with the United States,
Aleksandrov sustains Moscow's cautious line in noting that the
Soviet Union "regards with due understanding the development of
normal relations between states . . . , and the normalization of
relations between the PRC and the United States is no exception."
But he goes on to convey again the USSR's apprehensiveness over
this development in commenting that "the Soviet people cannot
help giving attention to the fact that in its overtures to
Washington, the Chinese leadership again frankly stresses its
hostility toward the Soviet Union."
As evidence of the anti-Soviet nature of Peking's policy toi.ard
the United States, Aleksandrov cites a recent RED FLAG article
which he says sought to justify the tactics of "political couble
dealing" under the name of "revolutionary dual tactics." He
explains that the article "corroborated the tactics of China
forming blocs with any forces, including imperialist ones, for
achieving Peking's foreign policy aims." But Aleksandrov
obscures the thrust of the RED FLAG article--the need to identify
the main enemy and to exploit contradictions within the enemy
camp in order to isolate him. While Moscow's reluctance to
identify the Soviet Union as China's main enemy falls into the
pattern of earlier Soviet propaganda, Aleksandrov in effect
admits as much in citing further evidence of the anti-Soviet
nature of Peking's r6pproehemerttwith Washington. In giving an
example of Peking's dual tactics in action, he says Chou indicated
"the essence of Peking's platform and its steps aimed at
rapprochement with Washington" when he took a cue from the
New York TIMES' James Reston in their recent interview to comment
on "the provocative thesis of a Soviet military threat to China."
As a prescription for coping with such anti-Soviet tactics and
"the dangerous striving of Peking's leaders for hegemony in the
world movement," Aleksandrov concludes with what amounts to a
call for Soviet oriented parties to increase their attacks on
Peking in remarking that communists face "the task of increasing
their political vigilance, the task of further exposing the real
essence of Maoist ideology and policy."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/1 ( / ISg- E85T00875%N3%%' V1-0
CONF 9 SEPTEMBER 1971
-18-
19
NEW TIMES. IZVESTIYA. RED STAR DEVELOP LINES OF ATTACK
Articles in NEW TIMES, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR have developed
a number of the themes in the Aleksandrov article and
resurrected some sensitive issues designed to discredit
Maoism. A NEW TIMES article by Krivtsov on 3 September
raises the question of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in
charging that Maoist nationalism aspires to world domination.
In this context Krivtsov comments: "It is characteristic that
not a single state apart from China advances such great and
such unfounded claims against other states and periodically
creates an atmosphere of tension on the frontiers of its
neighbors."
In IZVESTIYA on the 8th, Grigoriy Apalin seeks to underscore
the non-Marxist-Leninist character of Chinese foreign policy
in calling the PRC's concept of "two superpowers" a nonclass
approach that seeks to put the United States and the USSR on
the same footing and to play off one against the other.
Citing Maoist doctrine on war to buttress his case, Apalin
asserts that Peking would provoke a military conflict between
the USSR and the United States and then "build on their ruins
'a civilization a thousand times more magnificent.'" The last
public comment on this Maoist doctrine by a Soviet leader
had been made by Brezhnev in his 7 June 1969 sreech 't the
Moscow international party conference, when h':-.ecalled that
Mao in 1957 "spoke with appalling airiness and cynicism of
the possible destruction of half of mankind in the event of an
atomic war." Maoist nuclear doctrine also came under attack in
an I. Aleksandrov article in PRAVDA during a time of apparent
difficulties in the gino-Soviet border talks: A 19 March 1970
article by Aleksandrov said the Chinese press had spoken of
the need for war to achieve ultimate victory and went on to
lament that the Chinese "are not at all alarmed by the fact
that a new world war would be a terrifying calamity for the
peoples, including the Chinese, and that it would inevitably
wipe out hundreds of millions of human lives."
On the subject of Peking's relations with the United States,
Apalin in IZVESTIYA observes acidly that the doctrine of
."two superpowers" did not prevent the Chinese leaders from
deciding to develop contacts with the United States at a time
when it is "intensifying its aggressive war against Indochina."
Against the background of Peking's attempts to "weaken the
anti-imperialist front" fad ita dissemination of anti-Soviet
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
propaganda, Apalin concludes, "the defrosting of Sino-American
relations looks like an intention on Peking's part to bring
'pressure' to bear on the Soviet Union and even to join the
United States to the anti-Soviet 'front.'"
The Soviet army paper RED STAR made its contribution to
"exposing" Maoism in an article by V. Vasilyev on the 7th which
charges that the PLA is being used to "militarize all aspects
of Chinese public life." Maintaining that Peking is using an
alleged "threat from the North" as justification for its military
indoctrination and war preparations, Vasilyev says "soldiers
are being called upon to follow the example of those who
participated in the armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese
border organized by the Mao group in 1969." Vasilyev makes no
effort, however, to depict any immediate threat to the Soviet
Union and notes in passing that the PLA's "war preparations have
been proclaited a long-term task." He seems to define his
basic point in remarking that while the Soviet party is exposing
Peking's ideological and political platform, "at the same time,
as the 24th party Congress Central Committee report stated, the
CPSU and the Soviet Government, maintaining restraint and not
succumbing to provocations, have done and are doing everything
incumbent upon the USSR to achieve a r.urwalization of relations
with the PRC." Brezhnev has personally identified himself with
such a position of restraint since the Chinese border tensions
in 1969.
The intensified Soviet ideological campaign against the Chinese
suggests that Moscow sees little hope for a near-term improvement
of its relations with Peking and that it has decided to press
the attack on the Chinese as outlaws in the international
community while pursuing its own rapidly evolving diplomatic
moves.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 20 -
GERMANY AND BERLIN
SOVIET CENTRAL MEDIA HAIL SIGNING OF ACCORD ON "WEST BERLIN"
Markedly reticent on the 23 August announcement that the Big
Four ambassadors had agreed on a draft agreement on Berlin,
Soviet central media have greeted the signing of the accord
on 3 September with a barrage of propaganda on the significance
of what Moscow and its East European allies call the four-power
agreement "on West Berlin."
The Soviet Government withheld official public endorsement
until after Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov declared, in a
prepared speech after the signing ceremony, that he had
been instructed to state that the Soviet Government "positively
evaluates" the results of the negotiations and regards the
signing of the agreement as "a substantial step in the
direction of strengthening peace and security in the center
of Europe." Within minutes of Abrasimov's speech, TASS and
Moscow radio reported the signing ceremony in detail. TASS
on 3 September and PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA the next day printed
the text of the agreement and annexes under the headline
"Quadripartite Agreement," thereby avoiding designation of
the subject matter as "Berlin." Soviet media are currently
publicizing what is portrayed as almost universal favorable
world reaction, including the remarks by Secretary Rogers
in his 31 August Houston speech and at his 3 September press
conference, along with numerous commentaries.
Soviet media's reticence in the period from the announcement
of the agreement until the signing was pointed up by IZVESTIYA's
failure to publish an interview given by its deputy chief
editor, Polyanov, a specialist on European and German affairs,
to Vienna television.* The interview appeared in the Austrian
Communist Party organ VOLKSSTIMMiE on 2 September. Polyanov's
listing of three main results of the "West Berlin agreement"
* Original Soviet press comment during that period was
limited to a brief article, couched in generalities, in
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by TASS commentator Kornilov on 28 August
and a roundup of favorable world reaction in a PRAVDA inter-
national review the next day. See the TRENDS of 1 September,
pages 22-28.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
have been echoed since the signing in a PRAVDA editorial on
the lth, in an unsigned IZVESTIYA article on the 5th, and in
numerous other commentaries. The agreement is said 1) to
"ease" the tensions in a critical area of central Europe,
2) to remove any barrier to West German ratification of the
Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn and to convening of a
European security conference, and 3) to clear the way for
"various settlements" between East and West Germany, including
FRG recognition of the GDR and admissior. of both German states
to the United Nations.
The propaganda repeatedly stresses that the agreement "does
not touch on the sides' political and legal positions" but
rather is aimed at "practical improvements" of the situation
of the West Berliners while respecting GDR sovereignty. It
points up Soviet "initiative" in bringing aboi!t the agreement
and cites the success of the four-power talks as proof that
all international problems can be solved through negotiations
if a__l sides show good will. There is insistent stress on the
point that the agreement is based on "territorial and political
realities."
STRESS ON GDR-USSR UNANIMITY. RESPECT FOR GDR INTERESTS
Like East German media, Moscow has been at pains to underscore
the "cooperation and consultations" between the GDR and USSR
during the period of the negotiations. In an evident effort
to reassure the East German6, Abrasimov described the agreement
in his speech at the signing as "a reasonable balance between
mutual interests" and told East German reporters that the
agreement "benefits everyone," to neither side's advantage.
Moscow comment has repeatedly echoed Abrasimov's remarks,
insisting that no side has scored any "gains" at the expense
of any other and deploring Western speculation "about who
has gained more or less."
Soviet media have reported promptly and at length a succession
of East German public endorsements of the agreement calculated
to present it as consistent with East German interests. GDR
media have followed up a text of the "German translation" of
the agreement with almost daily editorials and statements by
East German leaders, including interviews with Ulbricht and
St.oph as well as Honecker. Emphasis is on the "West Berlin
agreement" as constituting recognition of GDR sovereignty by
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
the West, a point made over and ever again by Honecker in
an interview carried by ADN on th, 4th and published in
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day. Ct is also said to encompass
Western recognition of the "integrity of Biurlin'' as the
capital of the GDR and to confirm t:1e GDE position that West
Berlin has a "special political states"--points included in
Moscow's publicity for the East Germs-i stat::meLts but not
made directly in the USSR's own cowmen
Moscow and East Berlin have both noted that concessions and
"accommodations" made the agreement possible, Honecker stating
defensively on 4 September that there are two criteria for
judging whether the GDR's "accommodation was right and useful":
An accommodation must serve "detente and the consolidation of
peace in Europe" and must also take cognizance of "the sovereign
rights F'nd interests of the Gi;R." He asserted that the agreement
measured up on both counts. Without defining what "the GDR
accommodation" was, he went on to say that "West Berliners
will appreciate the fact that the transit traffic across GDR
territory has been put on an agreed basis and that its
procedures will be facilitated, for example by the sealing
of trains and through-buses." At this point Honecker added
caustically: "We have no objection to one seal more or less."
He also noted that West Berliners will be able to visit the
GDR, "includinS its capital," once the West Berlin Senat-GDR
talks are concluded.
POLEMIC WITH A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 7 September
THE CHINESE anticipated a charge from Peking that the USSR
has sold out GDR interests in the four-power
agreement. Pointing to extensive Soviet consultations with
the GDR during the negotiations and to Honecker's strong
endorsement of the agreement, the broadcast complained that
Peking propaganda "has always chimed in with" the "imperialists"
in attacking Soviet foreign polic3r, among other things going
"all-out" to attack the USSR for signing a treaty with the FRG
and trying to "sow seeds of dissension between the Soviet Union
and the GDR."
The charge that the PRC opposes "the attainment of collective
security in Europe" and is against the Soviet and Polish treaties
with the FRG appears in the authoritative I. Aleksandrov article
in the 3 September PRAVDA--publicized by TASS just three hours
after the Berlin agreement was signed--which in effect sets
guidelines for an intensified Soviet bloc assault on the Chinese.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
Peking's first mention of the agreement came on 9 September
in an NCNA report denouncing "anti-China propaganda" being
disseminated by TASS. "To have a treaty ratified by West
Germany and to obtain economic and technical aid from it,"
NCNA said, the Soviet "revisionist clique" has "of late in
an agreement on West Berlin liberally given away what belongs
to others, unscrupulously selling out the German Democratic
Republic." Peking media had ignored the four-power negotia-
tions, but Tirana has been vocal in airing charges of a Soviet
sellout of the GDR. Albanian comment now says the agreement
"brutally violates the sovereign rights of the GDR" and
charges that the USSR has in effect abrogated its 1955 treaty
with the GDR giving the latter control over civilian movement
between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.
MOSCOW NO REASON NOW TO DELAY EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
The very limited Soviet comment on the Berlin agreement during
the period after the 23 August announcement had refrained from
pressing the notion that the West could now cite no reason to
delay the convening of a European security conference--a theme
stressed, however, in substantial East European comment,
consistent with Moscow's own long-standing rejection of the
NATO position that such a conference could not be held until
a Berlin settlement had been reached. In its considerable
propaganda since the signing, Moscow has now picked up the
theme, keynoted in PRAVDA's editorial observation on the 4th,
that "realistically thinking Western politicians" have noted
that the agreement removes an obstacle in the path of reducing
tension in Europe, putting "in a difficult position" the
opponents of ratification of Bonn's treaties with Moscow
and Warsaw and of the convening of a conference on European
security. Articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR the
next day--all drawing on foreign reaction to the Berlin
accord--note that opponents of a security conference have
lost a decisive round in their campaign to block the conference.
Some of Moscow's comment has gone on to say that the Berlin
accord may also be instrumental in getting talks on force and
arms reductions in Central Europe off the ground. Participants
in the 5 September domestic service commentators' roundtable,
observing that opponents of a European security conference
"have now had their guns spiked" by the four-power accord,
imputed to Western diplomats the view that the agreement
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 24 -
"improves the atmosphere for an approach to the problem of
reducing armed forces and armaments" in Europe. The USSR is
willing to begin negotiations on this problem at any time,
one panelist said, recalling that such talks had been proposed
in the foreign policy program set forth at the 24th CPSU
Congress.
The TASS account of Secretary Rogers' 3 September press conference
reported that he called the signing of the agreement "a first
step to be followed by other efforts directed at cooperation in
Europe." TABS then said that Rogers, in response to a question,
indicated that Washington "has not yet finally worked out its
position in respect to possible talks on the question of a
reduction of armed forces in Europe and the convocation of
the all-European conference." The account reported Rogers as
saying that Washington is prepared to discuss both issues but
has not decided whether the talks should be held simultaneously
or separately.
WARSAW: ACCORD IS ANOTHER RECOGNITION OF POSTWAR STATUS QUO
Warsaw comment has continued to discuss the four-power agreement
n the context of Poland's interest in achieving confirmation
.' the postwar political map of Europe. It has emphasized the
point that the Western powers, by signing the agreement, have
granted the GDR de facto recognition. In passages betraying
Polish fears of a reunited Germany, a TRYBUNA LUDU article
on 4 September stated that by entering into negotiations with
East Berlin under the umbrella of the Big Four agreement, Bonn
has accepted the permanent division of the area of the Third
Reich into two German states plus a "separate territory" of
West Berlin "which is not a part of the FRG and cannot be
ruled by the Bonn government."
PAP commentator Guz said on the 4th that the Soviet "presence"
in West Berlin has been strengthened and that the USSR and
the Western Big Three are "responsible for the further
evolution" of West Berlin. The TRYBUNA LUDU article of the
4th, noting that the USSR will have a consulate general in
West Berlin under the "West Berlin agreement" which it has
signed, observes that this deals a "considerable blow" to
the West Berlin "cold war politicians" who would like to
extend FRG authority to West Berlin and even to "the GDR
capital."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS '!'RENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
Using the occasion of a fall harvest festival in Opole, in
the old German Silesia 'taken over by Pound after World War II,
Premier Jaroszewicz indirectly brought up the theme of
confirmation of Poland's present borders in praising the
inhabitants' struggle "for their Polish character, for their
unity with the hinterland, and for social freedom and
progress." In the speech broadcast live by the Warsaw
radio, the Polish premier said his government "welcomes"
the four-power agreement "with satisfaction and gives it
full support," deeming it "another important element" fostering
European peace, based on recognition by all states of postwar
"political and territorial realities." Like Warsaw comment
generally, he called for early FRG ratification of the Moscow
and Warsaw treaties.
PRAGUE: ATMOSPHERE IS "MORE COP..,J.IVE" TO TALKS WITH BONN
In comment immediately following the 23 August announcement
on the four-power agreement, Prague media referred obliquely
to enhanced prospects for resumption of the Bonn-Prague
exploratory talks on normalizing relations. On 8 September,
the day after Chancellor Brandt told a group of high school
editors the talks would resume, RUDE PRAVO said the Berlin
agreement had "created an atmosphere more conducive to talks
on the normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and
the Federal Republic." And on the 9th RUDE PRAVO announced
that the talks would resume in Prague at the end of September.*
A statement by an FRG Foreign Ministry spokesman on 27 July
to the effect that the talks would probably resume in September
had been ignored in Czechoslovak media.
In limited comment on the talks since the second meeting
between FRG State Secretary Frank and Deputy Foreign Minister
Klusak on 13-14 May, Czechoslovak media had continued to
stress the necessity for Bonn "to recognize the invalidity
of the Munich diktat ab initio." In a 31 July commentary,
apparently indirectly responsive to the FRG Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement of 27 July, RUDE PRAVO reiterated the
stand that Bonn must take "a principled position on the
* DPA on 7 September quoted an "informed source" as saying
they would be held on 27 and 28 September.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER -971
- 26 -
nonvalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio with all
consequences arising therefrom." This statement has recurred
in almost every official Czechoslovak foreign policy statement
over the past several months and was incorporated in the
communique of the 2 August Soviet bloc summit meeting in the
Crimea, though without the final phrase on the "consequences
arising therefrom."
In early comment on the draft Berlin agreement, RUDE PIIAV0
and the Slovak trade union daily PRACA both saw enhanced
hope that the vestiges of the Munich "diktat" could now be
erased. A RUDE PRAVO ertiele on 4 Se,)tember, in reiterating
the Czechoslovak stand, followed the lead of the Crimea
communique in dropping the phrase on "consequences arising
therefrom." On the 8th, in discerning an improved atmosphere
for the Prague-Bonn talks on normalizing relations, RUDE
PRAVO did not mention the Munich agreement at all; it stated
only that the situation created by the Berlin agreement is
"better" because the position of "reactionary West German
circles," including the Sudeten German Landsmannschaften,
has been "considerably eroded."
On the 9th, in the article announcing that the talks would
resume, RUDE PRAVO said "it can only be hoped" that the
new round in Prague "will ;I)en the road to an agreement
which would correspond to the real 'conciliation between
the FRG and all socialist states' which is now being talked
about in Bonn." Referring to Chageellor Brandt's projected
trip to the USSR, the article saw the trip as a continuation
of East-West contacts and added that although Bonn has not
yet ratified the Moscow treaty, the Chancellor's visit "might
be useful not only for a further improvement of relations
between the USSR and the FRG but for all European nations."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
DISARMAMENT
GROMYKO LETTER TO U TWANT RESURRECTS CALL FOR WORLD CONFERENCE
TASS on 8 September released the text of Foreign Minister Gromyko's
letter of the 6th to U Thant requesting that the issue of a
world disarmament conference be placed on the agenda of the
General Assembly, which opens on 21 September. The proposal
represents the third agenda item suggested by the USSR:
Gromyko in a letter of 4 June to U Thant had asked that the
UNGA consider the USSR's draft treaty governing man's activities
on the moon, and in a 13 July letter Gromyko called for debate
on the implementation of the declaration on strengthening
international security, a declaration approved by the UNGA
last year.
The renewal of the call for a world disarmament conference
coincides with a stepped-up Moscow attack on China as a threat
to world peace and follows by a month Peking's 30 July rejection
of a June proposal by the USSR for a conference of the five
nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. In rejecting
the proposal, the Chinese repeated the long-standing PRC
proposal for a summit conference of all countries of the
world to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to
reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The
latest Soviet proposal serves also to enhance the image of
the USSR as a prime mover in the struggle for detente.
In his 6 September letter Gromyko routinely hails previous
agreements restricting the arms race and notes that talks
,re currently under way to resolve specific issues--
presumably a reference to the 26-nation Geneva disarmament
talks and the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limita-
tion. But he observes that "no cardinal shift" has yet
taken place in the direction of curbing the arms race, and says
this is a cause of concern to the Soviet Union and to the
peoples of the world. Gromyko recalls that the USSR in
its continuing effort to brake the arms race has proposed
a conference of the five nuclear powers,* and now suggests
* The letter does not go on to note that the Chinese rejected
the USSR's proposal, although this rejection continues to be
deplored in other propaganda. Most recently, the authoritative
4 September PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov charged that the
PRC has come out against steps aimed at disarmament, citing the
rejection of the five-power conference proposal.
Approved For Release 2003LJa E MDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
the convocation of a world disarmament conference which would
discuss both conventional and nuclear disarmament, with stress
on the latter. Observing that "all countries" should be
represented at this forum, Gromyko concludes that the participa-
tion of "all states possessing considerable armed forces and
arms" is of "special importance."
BACKGROUND The proposal fnr a world lisarmament conference
was surfaced at the October 1964 Cairo conference
of nonalined states. It was subsequently endorsed by Gromyko
in his December 1964 UNGA speech and was hailed with regularity
in Soviet propaganda through the end of 1965, when the General
Assembly unanimously approved it. The question remained largely
quiescent since. then until Brezhnev--in his 30 March 1971 report
to the 24th CPSU party congress--suggested convening both a
conference of the five nuclear powers and a worldwide conference
"to examine every aspect of the disarmament question." Propaganda
since March has routinely endorsed the proposal for a world
conference, in most instances merely citing it as one of the
elements in the USSR's "peace program."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/(IONMDIIADDP85TOO875RB083I)BOND831-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW SAYS EXCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS WEAKENS ARAB UNITY
Moscow has given only lukewarm welcome to the Federation of Arab
Republics (FAR) following the 1 September referendums in the
member countries--Egypt,* Syria, and Libya. Past unity experi-
ments have generally been regarded with qualified approval; the
establishment of the FAR, announced in Benghazi last April, was
received "with satisfaction" by Moscow, which abstained at that
time from any reflections on the difficulties to be encountered.
The preceding November, a Soviet propagandist had observed, in
connection with the announcement of a union of the Tripoli
Charter states--Egypt, Sudan, Libya, and later Syria--that
strengthening of the alliance presented "no few practical
problems."**
Now Moscow offers a critical and detailed assessment of the
"extremely complex" problems facing Arab unity in a NEW TIMES
article by R. Petrov, the text of which was broadcast in
installments to Arab audiences on the eve of the referendum.
Petrov's strictures against the exclusion of Arab communists
from the "common struggle" reflect Soviet concern following
the communist reverses in Sudan, Libya's stern rejection of
communism, and, presumably, the May ouster and current trial
of former Nasir associates in Egypt. But the admonition
against anticommunism in the context of unity moves is not
unique to the present situation, for veiled warnings along
these lines appeared in propaganda at the time of the April
1963 Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi unity statement. Petrov additionally
implies disapproval of Egypt's acceptance of U.S. efforts to
assist in a Middle East settlement. He derides the idea voiced
"even at top levels" in some Arab countries of seeking support
from the West as well as the East, regarding the United States
* Following the referendum Egypt's name was officially changed,
on 2 September, from the United Arab Republic to the Arab
Republic of Egypt.
** For discussions of Soviet comment on earlier unity moves,
see the 21 April 1971 TRENDS, pp. 20-22, and the 2 May 1963
FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS, pp. 7-10.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/~~QP85T008753qg~j~p31-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
as "allegedly holding the 'key'" to a settlement, and trying to
"neutralize" the U.S. role--a concept identified with AL-AHRAM
chief editor Haykal.
Meager and restrained comment since the referendum routinely
stresses the importance of unity on an anti-imperialist basis,
as supported by "all Arab patriots and democrats," and cites
unidentified Arab papers as pointing to the vital necessity for
the FAR to strengthen its friendship and cooperation with the
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. PRAVDA on the
3d claims that the FAR members, "just as before," do not reject
a political settlement of the Middle East crisis--a point also
made in comment on the unity actions in April and last November.
NEW TIMES The Petrov article in NEW TIMES (No. 35, 27 August)
ARTICLE analyzes the disparities in Arab societies--
economic and social systems, ethnic and religious
features, political structures--complicating the Arabs' "half-
century-old aspiration" for unity. Petrov allows that earlier
unity attempts were "by and large undertaken on an anti-
imperialist basis," but says "this was not enough."
Petrov approvingly explains the Arab communists' "scientific
approach to unity" involving struggle against imperialism and
Israeli aggression, democratization of sociopolitical life in
the interests of the working people, participation of all
progressive national groups, and support of the socialist
community and other revolutionary forces. At the same time,
he rejects the narrow "nationalism and traditional conservative
views" by which imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reactionaries,
he says, seek to impede the Arab unity movement. And he assails
"reactionary and rightwing forces" in the Arab countries for
trying to persuade people that it is possible to draw on the
support of the socialist countries and at the same time wipe
out the local Arab communists and ban the communist parties."
Petrov says that experience--"the Arabs' included"--has shown
that imperialism can be successfully combated only if all
national progressive forces stand united; "any attempt to
exclude the communists and their parties from the common
struggle can only weaken the united front."
Politburo member Kirilenko delivered a similar admonition in a
19 August speech in Minsk. In the first elite reference to
the events In Sudan since the 2 August Crimea statement of
Sov?et and East European leaders, Kirilenko said that at times
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/01 DlgfTNPP85T008751t 3 P@31-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
undesirable and "even dangerous situations" may occur in the
development of certain countries belonging to the "national
liberation zone," and he referred to the Sudanese developments
as causing "grave alarm and condemnation." Kirilenko went on
to say that the CPSU facilitates the cohesion of national
patriotic forces, "of which communists are a steadfast and
courageous detachment," and he added that "only this united
alliance" can achieve solutions of the difficult tasks facing
the liberated countries. A Korionov article in the 27 August
PRAVDA obliquely made the same point in stating that the
socialist countries and the communist parties "consistently
oppose actions which can undermine the unity" of people fighting
against imperialism, for national independence and social
progress.
COMMENT FROM East European media are also appraising the new
EAST EUROPE federation in light of recent developments in
the Arab world and cautioning against anti-
communist trends. Unlike NEW TIMES, Prague's RUDE PRAVO explicitly
discusses the FAR in the context of the arrests in Egypt, events
in Morocco, anticommunist "massacres" in Sudan, and Jordanian
actions against the fedayeen. While Arab national and progressive
forces basically welcome the new federation as a positive step,
RUDE PRAVO says on 1 September, "there should be no room for
anticommunism" in the new federation. Objecting, as does NEW
TIMES, to a purely "national" basis for Arab unity, the paper
believes that the Arabs are now striving for unity not only in
national but also in social terms: The federation's success
will depend on its economic, social, and political lines, 1.6
says. Predicting that the new federation will strengthen its
ties with the Soviet Union, RUDE PRAVO recalls that AL-AHRAM
chief editor Haykal--in his weekly article on 27 August--put
this as the federation's first task.
A Budapest radio commentary in English on the 27th also publi-
cizes Haykal's views, commenting that his article seems to be
addressed not only to the Western press but also to certain Arab
leaders. The commentary goes on to recall "open anticommunist
tendencies" in recent Arab developments, citing the "virtual
liquidation" of the Sudanese CP and of the guerrillas in Jordan,
and adding that there have been indications that the political
balance established by Nasir in Egypt "has been upset to a
certain extent." An article in the Hungarian party organ
NEPSZABADSAG the following day, discussing socialist countries'
relations with states of varying political systems and conditions,
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 20034p&i WP85T008753,M31-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
expresses "resolute opposition" to any anticommunist witch hunt
and full solidarity with the Sudanese CP. In the belief that
driving back the imperialist "aggressors" and restoring peace in
the Middle East is the most important issue in the region, the
socialist countries, the article says, patiently try to convince
noncommunist fightors against imperialism of the primary need for
cohesion.
In Warsaw, TRYBUNA LUDU on 27 August also discusses the increased
"backward, anticommunist trends" in some Arab countries which
have "gone through rather profound national liberation processes."
Like NEW TIMES, the paper touches on constitutional, political,
economic, and cultural differences among the Arab states as well
as increased rivalry for leadership of the Arab world. The paper
identifies the masses and the leftwing parties led by the
communists as the "most consistent force" of the Arab liberation
movement, noting that in the countries where these elements are
strong, acute struggles and repression of the left occur.
TRYBUNA LUDU observes that friction and struggle oven take
place within the governing middle classes, which are "not
homogenous politically," and it cites the Ba'thist struggle
in Syria last fall and "political differences" in the Egyptian
ASU leading to the arrest of 'Ali Sabri and others. The paper
warns that Washington and Tel Aviv are seeking to intensify
inter-Arab contradictions And give more power to the Arab right
wing, which is ready to make concessions to Washington and
lessen cooperation with the socialist states. "Realistic"
Arab politicians, it adds, are cautioning against this.
ARAB CP'S The Lebanese communist daily AN-NIDA on 31 August
ON UNITY carried a Syrian CP communique supporting Arab unity
and the FAR and calling for a "yes" vote in the
Syrian referendum. But on 2 September an AN-NIDA editorial
criticized "recent developments" in the FAR states and said the
federation could not play its proper role unless it was firmly
anti-imperialist and supported the "unity of the Arab progressive
forces." It accused Egypt--by implication--of "concessions and
bargaining" in response to U.S.-Israeli "maneuvers," and of
alliance with Arab reaction represented by Saudi Arabia. And
it denounced the anticommunist campaign in Sudan which "spread
to other Arab countries," complaining that while certain attempts
were made in federation states to prevent aggravation of these
developments, firm attitudes were not adopted, and the Libyan
rulers were even trying to fan enmity toward communism and
"true socialist ideas."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/'=W85T00875F~QiQi1-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
'NEW TIMES' APPRAISES RECONSTITUTED ARAB SOCIALIST UNION
An article by Lykov in NEW TIMES (No. 34, 20 August) on the
reconstruction of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) seems to suggest
that Moscow is, on the surface at least, resigned to the new
order in Cairo following the May purge of top officials and the
reconstitution of the ASU and other governmental and public
bodies. In what is apparently the first Soviet propaganda
explanation of the Egyptian upheaval, Lykov assesses the May
political crisis as one of the ASU itself, caused, among other
things, by "inner contradictions" and inadequate forms of,
public life in relation to the level of the country's socio-
economic development. He notes without elaboration that the
May events resulted from the existence of "so-called 'centers
of influence,' that is, from manifestations of factionalism."
(Moscow in May had merely cited as-Sadat as saying, in explana-
tion of the leadership changes, that the resignations of certain
governmental and ASU officials were due to their opposition to
the establishment of the FAR. Soviet media did note that the
officials who had resigned were placed under arrest.)
Lykov finds fault with the old ASU, even if it did represent a
"big step along the road of progressive development on new
lines," and he ticks off various weaknesses which prevented it
from becoming a real directing force in Egyptian society. He
notes that, "as has now become known," there even existed within
the ASU a "secret organization, the socialist vanguard"--a
grouping Moscow has been advocating for some years,* He later
observes that the new ASU program envisages formation of a
vanguard organization within the ASU, this time a "legal
organization."
He approvingly views the reconstitution of the ASU as an attempt
to create an effective, "not just formally existing, political
organization." Calling the July session of the ASU National
Congress "an event of signal importance" in the country's history,
he points out that the congress for the first time adopted a
program for the country's reconstruction. In Moscow's first
praise for this document, Lykov ranks it in importance with "the
other fundamental documents" of the UAR--the 1962 National Action
Charter, and the 30 March 1968 program. (As in propaganda since
Nasir's death, Moscow material on the July ASU Congress--including
* See the 18 November 1970 TRENDS, pages 10-13.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 34 -
CPSU CC Secretary Ponomarev's speech at the session--underscored
the importance of the 1962 and 1968 documents as the "main
programs" for the UAR, and glossed over the new national action
program presented by as-Sadat.)
Lykov does nevertheless foresee difficulties, since the ASU is
still young as a political organization and "its new functionaries
are younger still" in organizational political experience. Lykov
also p,)intedly notes that local reactionaries try to promote the
idea that people of Marxist persuasion must not be allowed to
share in active political life.
TRIAL OF In line with its cautious propaganda approach to
'ALI SABRI the changes in Egypt, Moscow has given virtually
no attention to the status of the former officials
ousted in May. TASS on 25 August carried the first--and thus far
only--report on the trial of 'Ali Sabri and others, which opened
that day, noting that the indictment accused the defendants of
participating in a plot against the "existing regime." The
report mentioned that the defendants pleaded not guilty, and
added that at the request of the defense the case was postponed
to 4 September.
The French CP, in an appeal to President as-Sadat reported in
L'HUMANITE on 6 September, cited the anticommunist repression in
Sudan, the trial in Marrakesh, Morocco, and the call for nine
death sentences in the "secret trial in Cairo," declaring that
the PCF could not remain indifferent to this series of blows
"directed against communists, democrats, and Arab patriots."
The appeal added that political differences among anti-imperialist
fighters "must not be resolved by judicial and repressive
methods," and asked as-Sadat not to convict these men who "have
participated with great distinction in the Egyptian people's
struggles for freedom, dignity, and progress."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/1 0 i QjE85T00875Rpg2g0 R??1-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
POLAND
PLENUM GUIDELINES FOR PARTY CONGRESS CHART BALANCED COURSE
With the memory of the December riots still freQr, t ne Polish
leadership's continued concern about its acceptance jy the rank-
and-file workers is strongly in evidence in the materials of
the llth plenum of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) held
on 4 September. The plenum adopted a decision to convene the
Sixth Congress of the PZPR on 6 December--"nearly one year
before the date envisioned by the statute," as noted by First
Secretary Gierek in his plenum speech. The brief three-year
interval since the fifth congress in November 1968 is
unprecedented in the modern history of the East European
ruling parties; it has been paralleled only in the rapid
succession of Soviet party congresses in 1956, 1959, and 1961.
The 11th plenum adopted "guidelines" for the congress in a
document that balances pledges of liberal practices with
assertions of orthodoxy in the critical sphere of Poland's
position in the Soviet bloc. Entitled "For the Further
Socialist Development of the Polish People's Republic," it
was summarized at length by PAP in Engli.,h on the 6th and,
according to TRYBUNA LUDU, put on sale to the public in
pamphlet form by the "Ruch" press circulation enterprise the
same day.
While TASS in English on the 7th referred to the document as
"directives" for the congress in reporting its adoption by
the plenum, Gierek underscored the designation "guidelines"--
used consistently in PAP's English-language summary of the
document--and emphasized that the document is not "final"
but is merely to serve as the basis for precongress "discussion"
by the workers.
GIEREK SPEECH In his relatively brief plenum speech, as
read by an announcer in the Warsaw domestic
service on 4 September, Gierek said at the outset that "the
reasons for the earlier convening of the congress were stated
at the eighth Central Committee plenum" in February. At that
meeting, he had wound up a lengthy discussion of the problems
and tasks facing the party with the remark that "the great
importance of the tasks before us in further developing
socialist construction in Poalnd makes it imperative to
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 36 -
examine the question of an earlier convening of the sixth party
congress." Now Gierek recalled the "tragic" December events,
claiming that "we mustered enough strength and'ideological
fortitude to lead our country out of the dangerous situation."
He noted that the seventh plenum (20 December) and eighth
plenum (6-7 February) had "corrected the party policy" and
"made the essential personnel changes"--most notably Gomulka's
removal from the Politburo and "suspension" from the Central
Committee.
The main pitch of Gierek's 1+ September speech was to underscore
the "democratic" character of the congress docum-:nt, leaving
it to the document itself to develop the orthodox message--
stress on the party's leading role and on Poland's alliance
with the Soviet Union, CEMA, and the Warsaw Pact. He paid
brief tribute to the CPSU's experience as the "inspiration"
for the guidelines and remarked that the congress would "also
provide the forum for the international communist and workers
movement, whose representatives we shall invite to our congress."
Pointing up a departure from the usual communist practice,
Gierek noted the absence of a full report by the Politburo to
the plenum and explained that it was "unnecessary" since the
draft guidelines constituted "a correct and adequate basis
for our deliberations and resolutions." The PZPR leader
underscored the inadequacy of orthodox communist practices to
deal with the current Polish situation in stressing the use
of the term "guidelines," stating that "we have chosen not to
use the traditional form of precongress theses," which usually
contain "a detailed and final" draft of the upcoming five-year
plan. Such a draft, he added, has "very often been quite
difficult for the party and the public to understand, being
more in the nature of information about what was going to be
done than something encouraging people to think, discuss, and
act." Further emphasizing the "open character" of the
guidelines, he envisioned discussion of the document by the
rank and file as "the basic property of socialist democracy,
which does not divide society into those in power and those
ruled."
Gierek added a word of caution about the standard routine of
workers' "pledges" in honor of the upcoming party congress:
Party organizations, he said, must see that such pledges are
"of the 'from below' and voluntary character and most resolutely
forestall formalism and striving for effect."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22: ~NTI RDP85T0087~R~0$0031-0
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
CONGRESS The congress guidelines, as summarized by 1AP on
DOCUMENT the 6th, stress a determination to develop socialist
democracy, to "modernize" and achieve more
"flexibility" in planning and management, and to improve the lot
of the worker. In the process the document aims new barbs at
the Gomulka regime, citing such "negative phenomena" of the
1966-"0 plan period as insufficient production-of consumer goods
and le,ck of development in housing construction.
The guidelines' liberal features are balanced by hardlining,
orthodox pronouncements which convey the assurance that the
liberalized practices do not portend a deviation of the
Czechoslovak or Romanian variety. Thus, in stressing the "key"
role of the USSR and the results of the 24th CPSU Congress,
the PZPR document declares: "We will oppose any centrifugal
tendencies within the socialist camp and the international
working class movement--tendencies which, proceeding from the
positions of rightist or leftist revisionism, turn against the
socialist community under a common nationalist denominator."
In the same vein, the guidelines call for "vigilance," warning
that the "class struggle" within the country is by no means
over and that the "enemies of socialism" are still operating
under the cloak of socialist slogans. In the realm of
cultur-?, they call in the same breath for "overcoming limita-
tions that constrair cultural life" and for "fighting
tendencies hostile to socialism." And they state that the
mass information media--the chie. culprit, in orthodox eyes,
in the Czechoslovak episode--should both "reveal negative
phenomena" and "win social support for the party's policy"
and "strengthen socialist consciousness and discipline."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 38 -
KOREA
PYONGYANG SAYS PAK TRIES TO '*SCUTTLE* NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS
While publicizing the continuing contacts between the North and
South Korean Red Cross organizations and calling attention to
other efforts to institute North-South contacts, Pyongyang has
resumed sharp attacks on the ROK after a period of relative
restraint. In an apparent effort to prepare the ground for
putting the blame on Seoul should the talks fail to satisfy
the growing demand for progress in this area, Pyongyang since
28 August has mounted vitriolic attacks on the "Pak Chong-hui
puppet clique" for planning to "scuttle" the Red Cross
contacts. These contacts, dealing with the problem of families
separated by the division of the country, were continued on
26 and 30 August and on 3 September. The two Red Cross
organizations have agreed to hold preliminary discussions
in Panmunjom on 20 September, preceded by an exchange of
namelists of the respective delegations on the l6th.*
The charges that the Pak "clique" plans to obstruct the Red
Cross talks came after a period of restraint in Pyongyang's
treatment of the ROK Government following the initial
14 August agreement to begin the Red Cross contacts. The
period immediately following the agreement was not wholly
devoid of criticisms of President Pak, however, and the
current attacks were foreshadowed in a 17 August KCNA
commentary on Pak's National Day speech two days earlier.
Coming before the first Red Cross meeting on the 20th, the
commentary claimed that Pak had "cunningly worked to foil"
the contacts, even instigating his prime minister to warn
against pinning much hope on a dialog.
The current attacks, beginning with statements by spokesmen
of various North Korean public organizations carried by KCNA
from 28 to 3U August, similarly score the Southern "traitors"
for warning against placing too much hope in the contacts and
* See the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 27-32, and of 25 August,
pages 40-42, for discussion of the agreement to institute Red
Cross contacts and of the first meeting at Panmunjom on
20 August.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
thus showing their true colors as foes of Korean reunifica-
tion. The most authoritative comment thus far has been a
NODONG SINMUN editorial article on 5 September attacking
President Pak's budget message, read by Prime Minister Kim
Chong-pil to the National Assembly on 2 September. NODONG
SINMUN says Pak revealed himself to be a, foe of reunification
by speaking of UN responsibility for unification and
endorsing the continued existence of UNCURK and by warning
of the threat of an invasion from the North at a time when
North-South contacts were taking place. Other statements
by the ROK prime minister have also come under attack. A
1 September KCNA report construed a statement by the prime
minister on 29 August, warning the South Korean people
against over-optimism about the outcome of the talks, as
showing that he is trying to frustrate the talks. He was
similarly attacked in a 7 September KCNA commentary on a
press conference he gave on the 4th.
OTHER PROPOSALS While the Red Cross contacts continue,
Pyongyang has publicized other DPRK
efforts to institute North-South contacts. A Pyongyang
domestic radio report of the 1 September meeting of the
Military Armistice Commission (MAC) noted that the North
Korean representative once again demanded that the "enemy
side" implement the seven-point demand made at preceding
meetings. The brief report did not, however, recall the
content of the projosal--presented apt the 29 July MAC
meeting and repeated at the meeting on 25 August--which
included a demand that the United States stop preventing
civilian travel across the military demarcation line.
The activities of the DPRK-sponsored General Association of
Korean Residents in Japan (GAKRJ) continue to be publicized,
KCNA on 30 August reporting a letter from the organization
to its ROK-sponsored counterpart repeating a proposal for
meetings of Koreans in Japan to support the Red Cross talks.
It expressed regret that the first letter in which it advanced
the proposal--reported by KCNA on the 19th--had received no
reply.
On 6 September KCNA reported a letter to the DPRK Committee
for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland from the
chairman of a committee of overseas Koreans in Canada
supporting the convening of a conference of overseas Koreans
to discuss reunification. The DPRK Committee had agreed to
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDLNTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
-1O-
such a conference in an 11 August letter to Ko Pyong-chol,
president of the United Front for Korean Democracy in New
York. The GAKRJ had offered to send representatives to such
a conference in a statement carried by :CCNA on 18 August.
Kim Il-song's 6 August offer to contact all political parties
in South Korea, specifically including the ruling Democratic
Republican Party, received further publicity in a 6 September
KCNA report of statements attributed to various overseas
Koreans praising Kim's offer.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDLNTIAL FBIS T E
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
- 41 -
CHINA AND DPRK
PRC SIGNS MILITARY AID AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA
Peking's show of support for the DPRK--reciprocated by Pyongyang's
endorsement of its ally's invitation to President Nixon--was again
in evidence with the signing on 7 September of an agreement
providing "military aid gratis" to the North Koreans. Neither
Peking nor Pyongyang has disclosed the nature of the aid, but the
high-level North Korean military delegation which negotiated the
agreement included KPA Chief of Staff 0 Chin-u and the air force,
artillery, and naval commanders. Arriving in Peking on 18 August,
the delegation was hosted by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng
and had talks with Chou En-lai during its three-week stay.
The military aid agreement follows up a Sino-Korean "economic
cooperation" accord signed on 15 August during the visit of a
DPRK economic delegation led by Vice Premier Chong Chun-taek.
That an agreement on military aid was to follow was hinted by
Li Hsien-nien at a 16 August banquet for the Korean economic
delegation when he observed that the Chinese and Korean people
have always cooperated with each other in the cause of
"strengthening the national defense capabilities," adding that
the Chinese people regard the Koreans' achievements in national
defense "as their own and are very happy about it."
There had been no mention of military aid in connection with the
last previous aid agreement, signed in October 1970, though the
presence of Huang Yung-sheng and a PLA deputy chief of staff at
the signing ceremony suggested that military aid may have been
involved. 0 Chi-u previously led a Korean military delegation
for "a friendly visit" to the PRC in mid-1970, taking part in the
PLA anniversary celebrations during the visit. There was no
report of a military aid agreement at that time.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
-42-
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
KANSU COLLEGES REOPEN; RED FLAG DISCUSSES EDUCATION REFORM
The six principal institutions of higher education in Kansu
province have completed enrollment of new students for the
coming school year, according to a Lanchow broadcast of
4 September. The radio specifies that this is the first such
enrollment since the cultural revolution. Thus it appears
that colleges in the more remote areas of China are to
reopen this fall, following last year's resumption in the
major cities of the East.
Qualifications for enrollees are apparently unchanged from
last year. The major target, according to the Lanchow radio,
will be workers, peasants and PLA members with several years
of practical experience and an educational level above junior
middle school, although "young intellectuals" with two to
three years experience iii productive labor will also be
admitted.
In other respects, ''.'--ever, there will be some further
softening this fall of the cultural revolution guidelines
on higher education, judging by an article in RED FLAG No. 10
reviewing the experience of last year at Tsinghua University
in Peking. Broadcast by Radio Peking on 3 September, the
article. was written by the model worker-PLA propaganda team
which entered Tsinghua University to curb recalcitrant students
and reform the educational system on 27 July 1968--an event
later blessed by Mao himself with a gift of mangoes sent to
the team. In an unusual reference, the authors laud the working
class for "smashing the criminal plot of the counterrevolutionary
16 May scheming clique." References in official media to the
ultraleftist "16 May group"--an issue in central leadership
disputes surrounding the missing Chen Po-ta--are extremely rare,
and particularly so in the context of educational reform.
The article reflects a generally moderate educational line,
and its public condemnation of the radical group at this time
is probably aimed at forestalling any continuing insistence
on a rigid interpretation of cultural revolutionary higher
educational reforms. Previous educational guidelines, such
as those contained in RED FLAG No. 6, released last June as
a special issue on education, tempered radical demands for
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
-113-
educational reform but did not specifically mention the "16 May"
group. "Sham Marxist political swindlers" who support "idealist
apriorism" and have slowed rebuilding of the educational
apparatus were condemned at that time, however.
ABILITY The current RED FLAG article addresses itself
GROUPINGS directly to the practical problem of how to teach
effectively when poorly prepared worker-students
are placed in classes with students at a higher educational level,
an issue also discussed in other recent articles. The article
explains that soon after the worker-students entered Tsinghua,
this problem became "very conspicuous in a certain specialty
course" and had a negative effect on teaching, studying and
"relations between the teachers and the students." When
teachers asked the authorities within the university "if they
could treat the students differently and give supplementary
lessons on basic theoretical knowledge to those students who
had a poorer educational background," some members of the
propaganda team incorrectly concluded that this was a
reflection of the "revisionist theory of education of the
talented" and ignored the suggestion. Only after the
problem "became more and more conspicuous and a few teachers
reiterated their viewpoint" did the leaders recognize the
need to give supplementary lessons to those students with
lower educational levels in order to give them the basic
knowledge necessary "to study and manage the university
well.". Emphasizing the lesson to be learned, the article
unequivocally declares that teaching should be carried out
"with different lessons and requirements for different
students in accordance with their actual levels, and a
number of students should be given supplementary lessons
on basic theories."
ROLE FOR While the leading role of workers and peasants
INTELLECTUALS in educational work is routinely reaffirmed in
the RED FLAG article, the formation of alliances
with intellectuals is strongly argued as a means to insure
progress in educational reform. The teams are cautioned not
to "pretend to understand everything and make hasty decisions
on important issues which they do not have the confidence to
handle." Leading cadres must acknowledge that most intellectuals
want to make ideological progress and that only a "very limited
number of intellectuals take a hostile attitude toward our
country." The "leftist" evaluation of intellectuals--"all
intellectuals serve the interest of the bourgeoisie" and
"cannot be trusted politically"--must be avoided.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
~~
The "rightist" tendency to view the ideological transformation
of intellectuals as almost completed is, however, also not in
agreement with "objective realities," the Tsinghua team declares.
Leading cadres are instructed to be fully aware that intellectuals
"will experience ideological vacillations and reversals in the
course of their ideological remolding," and "if we fail to
recognize this, we will tend to demand too much of others and
reduce our own tasks." Those cadres who "cannot dialectically
handle the ideological reversals of the intellectuals, and
tend to detest them," were firmly urged to recognize the positive
qualities intellectuals possess.
Sharp limitations to the concept of student-power--at its zenith
during the Red Guard phase of the cultural revolution--are
outlined in the article. Students who criticize teachers
"whenever they feel dissatisfied with them" are castigated for
"elevating minor problems to the level of principle" and for
making "teachers feel under great pressure and reducing their
revolutionary enthusiasm." At Tsinghua, at least, this attitude
has been corrected and the students there now understand "that
mistakes are unavoidable in lectures." When a teacher makes
a mistake in his lecture today "it is not a serious matter,"
merely "something for the entire class to discuss, study and
correct."
The article also criticizes leading cadres who accept criticism
"by workers but not by intellectuals." Cadres guilty of this
shortcoming are instructed "not to turn a deaf ear to the
correct opinions expressed by some people just because they
made mistakes in the past." Leaders who fail to distinguish
between "studying for the sake of revolution" and "putting
professional work in command" are rebuked for their responsibility
in creating the present situation in which "teachers are failing
to study and are afraid to engage in professional research."
AUTHORITY OF A dominant theme of recent articles on higher
CCP COMMITTEES education has been the need to recognize the
authority of the revived party committees
over the entire educational apparatus. Mao's August 1968
injunction that the workers must control the schools is now
interpreted specifically to mean party control over the schools.
An article in RED FLAG No. 6, for example, declared that a
struggle persists "around the fundamental question of leader-
ship" and that in this struggle it is necessary to "follow
firmly the leadership of the working class, that is, the
leadership of the party."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 SEPTEMBER 1971
-45-
The current RED FLAG article spells out in detail the authority
of local party committees over schools and also discusses the
party's relationship to the propaganda teams in the schools.
Party committees have the responsibility of "conscientiously
grasping the ideological revolutionization and organization of
the propaganda teams" and must provide the necessary assistance
to those team members "who aspire to join the party and are
qualified to do so."_ Policy decisions concerning school work
are to be made by the local party organization, and propaganda
teams must then "be informed of the school work so that they
can promptly implement it." In this way, it was argued, the
propaganda teams will "give full play to their political role
under the unified leadership of the party committee."
While revived party committees apparently will have the final
say in educational policy decisions, the propaganda teams are
not to be excluded from the decision-making process. It was
argued that "a certain number of these propaganda teams
should be maintained and their quality taken into consideration."
Paying attention to the "quality" of the remaining members may
suggest that most teams, at least at the university level,will,
in effect, be reduced to their PLA cores. Operating in this
manner, the teams, instructed to "participate in the leading
groups at schools and departmental levels," probably will be
better able to function as ideological watchdogs over the
entire educational process.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010031-0