TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010047-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: December 29, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
Confidential
~Illllllllll~~~ullllllllllll~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~I
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
29 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 52)
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CONFIDENTIAL
a
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press mcdia. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GOO" 1
fuIuded Geer eureerer4
ds.rrpr fd;ea eed
deden,L,tiee
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
29 DECEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . .
. i
Sustained Air Strikes Prompt DRV Foreign Ministry Statements
. 1
PRC Foreign Ministry Statement Assails U.S. Attacks . . . . .
. 8
Routine Moscow Comment Scores U.S. Bombings, Attacks Peking .
. 10
North Vietnam Army Anniversary Marked by Peking, Moscow . . .
.x.13
Hauo4 and Pathet Lao Acclaim Four-Day Offensive in Laos . . .
. 13
DRV Reports Fatherland Front Congress, Truong Chinh Speech .
. 14
Cambodian Visit to DPRK Promotes Asian "Revolutionary" Unity
. 17
Peking Issues Second Protest Against Indian Border Intrusion
. 20
Moscow Portrays Chinese Perfidy in South Asia . . . . . . . .
. 22
DISARMAMENT
USSR, PRC Clash at UNGA Over World Disarmament Conference . .
. 24
GERMANY AND BERLIN
Honecker Reviews State of Relations Between GDR and FRG . . .
. 29
CHINA
Peking Claims Record Grain Yield Despite Natural Disasters .
. 32
Moderate Policies in Agriculture Urged by RED FLAG . . . . .
. 32
Brezhnev's 65th Ignored in USSR, Marked in East Europe . . .
. 35
Papers Differ in Treatment of Tvardovskiy Obituary . . . . .
. 35
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FBIS TRENDS
29 DECEMBER 1971
Moscow (2800 items)
Peking (1286 items)
China (5%)
5%*
Domestic Issues
(22%)
36%
Indochina (7%)
9%
India-Pakistan Conflict
(37%)
21%
[Solidarity Week, (5%)
7%)
Indochina
(12%)
21%
NFLSV Anniversary
[NFLSV Anniversary
(2%)
11%]
Cuban President (--)
5%
[U.S. Air Strikes
(--)
3%]
Dorticos in USSR
[VPA Anniversary
(0.2%)
3%]
India-Pakistan Conflict (15%)
5%*
PRC Delegation Return
(--)
3%
Mars 2 & 3 Probes (11%)
European Security (3%)
3%
3%
from UN
Sudanese Government
(3%)
3%
Kosygin Congratulations (--)
3%
Delegation in PRC
to UN Secretary
General Walc.heim
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the 'nnxthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party jtatement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events gi?ren major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the
Indo-Pakl tani conflict. These commentaries are counted in the figure
on India-Pakistan and amount to roughly one-fourth of the total
on the conflict last week and one-half this week.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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29 DECEMBER 1971
INDOCHINA
The sustained, heavy U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam which began
on 26 December brought a prompt DRV Foreign Ministry statement
that day which echoed the 18 December foreign ministry statement
in calling the strikes by "many" aircraft "extremely serious acts
of war." The statement thus obscured the different nature of the
current action from that on the 18th--concentrated bombing of DRV
territory instead of alleged intrusions into DRV air space by U.S.
planes engaged in action in Laos. Subsequent lower-level protests
by the foreign ministry spokesman on the 27th and 28th also
obscured the intensity of the coni:inuing strikes. But acknowledgment
of the more serious nature of U.S. action came on the 29th in another
statement issued at the level of .he DRV Foreign Ministry. It
differed markedly in tone from the foreign ministry statement on the
26th and contained elements present in earlier protests of U.S.
escalated actions. Moreover, also on the 29th, Hanoi publicized a
VPA High Command order on vigilance, the first such order since one
issued last December in the wake of the massive U.S. air strikes and
the abortive prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay near Hanoi.
Peking officially condemned the air strikes against the DRV with a
PRC Foreign Ministry statement on she 29th which is similar to one
protesting the heavy strikes last September. While calling the
renewed bombing hypocritical, it is devoid of personal attack on
the President. Moscow has reacted to the bombings with only
routine-level comment and statements by solidarity and friendship
organizations.
The current spate of DRV statements fails to repeat the warning in
past protests that air provocations against the North threaten the
work of the Paris talks--perhaps because of their current
suspension. Vietnamese communist media on the 23d had publicizc.l
statements that their delegates would be present at the session
on the 30th following the suspension of the previous two sessions
at U.S. request. But a Hanoi domestic broadcast on the 28th
reported that the DRV had proposed that the 30 Pecember session be
postponed until 6 January in view of U.S. "serious war acts" against
the DRV on the 26th and 27th. Hanoi ignored the fact that a joint
U.S.-GVN statement on the 28th announced their decision not to meet
on the 30th.
SUSTAINED AIR STRIKES PROMPT DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENTS
Following the pattern of the 18 December DRV Foreign Ministry
protest, the foreign ministry statement on the 26th was broadcast
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29 DECEMBER 1971
some two hours after a Hanoi radio item had charged that the
United States that day had "recklessly sent many waves of
aircraft to strike many populated areas of Quang Binh and Thanh
Hoa provinces and to encroach on the airspace of Nghe An Province."
The foreign ministry statement echoed this initial announcement in
charging that the targets were populated areas and included a
hospital on the outskirts of the provincial capital of Thanh Hoa,
and in claiming that five planes were downed and a "number" of
pilots captured--the statement said "killed or captured."
Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking at a banquet on the evening of
the 26th for the visiting Bulgarian party-government delegation,
made a passing reference to the strikes. As broadcast by
Hanoi radio on the 27th, Dong expressed appreciation for
socialist aid and said that in the spirit of maintaining and
consolidating Vietnam as the "inviolable outpost of the
socialist camp in Southeast Asia," the DRV armed forces
"strongly resisted many waves of attacks by the U.S. air force
from Quang Binh to Thanh Hoa, downing five aircraft and
capturing pilots."
Despite the dies-.milarity of the actions, the statement on the
26th echoed the protest on the 18th in calling the strikes
"extremely serious acts of war," but it did add the additional
negative assessment that the U.S. "imperialists" are encroaching
on the DRV's sovereignty "in an extremely gross manner." The
statement also echoed that on the 18th--and earlier foreign
ministry statements on air strikes against the DRV--in saying
that U.S. actions violate the U.S. pledge to cease bombing of
the North. And this standard charge is repeated in the DRV
Foreign Ministry statement on the 29th as well as in the
statement by the foreign ministry spokesman on the 27th--
protesting strikes that day "in many waves at populated areas,
a shoot and the outskirts of Dong Hoi," capital of Quang Binh
Province, and the foreign ministry spokesman's statement on
the 28th, which protested repeated bombings that day against
populated areas in Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces.
Although the protest on the 28th was issued at the spokesman's
level, it escalated the description of the strikes when it
called them "extremely serious and criminal acts of war."
(This accords with the language used in the 22 September 1971
DRV Foreign Ministry statement, the protest over the last
previous massive air attacks.) The statement on the 28th was
longer and more detailed than those usually issued at the
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2C DECEMBER 1971
spokesman's level, and it seemed concerned to stress the civilian
nature of the targets. Recalling the bombings of 18, 26 and
27 December, it says that on the 28th a "large number" of U.S.
planes "repeatedly bombed and strafed populated areas" of Quang
Binh and Nghe An provinces, "including the Dong Hoi hospital
and the Le Minh agricultural farm" in Le Thuy district, Quang
Binh Province. The protest adds that in the past few days,
the United States has "mobilized a large force of the U.S. air
force to launch repeated attacks against many populated areas
including hospitals, schools, agricultural farms, . . . which
are situated deep inside" DRV territory. It charges that a
large number of civilians including women, children and
hospital patients have been killed or wounded.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY T1 foreign ministry statement issued
PROTEST OF 29 DECEMBER on the 29th differed markedly in tone
and content from that of the 26th.
It refers to action on 17, 18, 26, 27, 28 and 29 December--thus
again implying a similarity in the action last weekend--but it
differs from the protests of the past three days in not citing
any specific new action. Shortly before the statement on the
29th was broadcast, Hanoi radio claimed that on the 29th four
more planes were downed over Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces,
bringing the total since the 26th'to 11 and bringing Hanoi's
grand total to 3,419. But the statement refers only to "many"
downed planes and a "number" of captured pilots. As had the
earlier protests this week and supporting propaganda, the
statement stresses that populated areas, including a hospital
and school, have been hit with resultant civilian casualties.
In sharpened language, the statement calls U.S. actions "an
extremely serious escalation of the war" and "an extremely
savage crime of the U.S. aggressors." And it adds that along
with the "expanding of aggression" in Laos,
this frantic and criminal escalation of the war by
the United States against the DRV exposes all the
more clearly the aggressive, extremely stubborn,
and warlike nature of the Nixon Administration.
It also lays bare the deceitful allegations of
President Nixon that the United States has ended
its combat role in Vietnam and that it is ending
the war in Indochina.
In addition to the standard assertion that the U.S. action is a
"challenge" to American and world public opinion, the statement
interjects an assertiun similar to a passage in the 21 September
1971 foreign ministry statement when it appeals to the
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governments and peoples of "fraternal nations and various
peace- and justice-loving nations" to struggle to stay the
hands of the U.S. "aggressors."* It also interjects an
unusual element when it pointedly notes that the DRV "is a
socialist country" and a sovereign and independent nation.
This brings to mind--even though it stops short of--a passage
in a 3 March 1971 foreign ministry statement at the time of
the Laos incursion and when Hanoi seemed to be displaying
particular concern. That statement said that U.S. acts
against the DRV constituted "an impudent challenge to the
socialist countries" and others.
VPA ORDER, COI+IENT Calls for increased vigilance and combat
ON VIGILANCE readiness in propaganda on the air
strikes culminate in a 28 December VPA
High Command order to military and security forces which is
publicized on the 29th. The last such order publicized by
Hanoi was that of 10 December last year which urged
implementation of the unprecedented joint VWP-l'overnment
appeal for vigilance issued after the massive November 1971
U.S. air strikes and abortive prisoner-rescue attempt at Son
Tay. The current order is similar to the one last year in
many of its basic appeals. Thus, it calls for the defense
of property and lives, insurance of security and order, and
maintenance of unity and coordination, as well as for the
downing of "many enemy aircraft on the spot and the capture of
many" pilots.**
The 29 December Hanoi radio report of the downing of four more
U.S. planes that day, after praising the downings as evidence
of high combat readiness, urges the armed forces to "further
heighten vigilance and combat readiness, fight better, and
strictly implement the VPA High Command's order."
In calling for the downing of aircraft and the capture of
pilots, the 29 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial is unique
in adding that "enemy tricks aimed at rescuing the downed
pilots" must be frustrated. There has been no other known
mention of U.S. attempts to rescue downed pilots. The editorial
also points to the need for "devoting time and m:Lnpower to
* The September statement, as well as statements in February
1971 during the Laos incursion, appealed to "socialist" countries.
** The order last December had additionally called on the
military to "wipe out commandos and infantry" and keep communica-
tions and transport open "in all circumstances." See the TRENDS
of 16 December 1970, pages 1-4.
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repairing or building trenches and shelters." Exhortations
to repair or build shelters appeared sporadically following
the joint party-government appeal and VPA High Command order
last December. But since then such appeals have appeared only
infrequently.
While the propaganda refers generally to the "armed forces and
people," the VPA High Command order, of course, specifies
particular services and there are other occasional references
to the air force. Thus, the QUAN DOI NHAN D._.d editorial on
the 27th singles out the air force, just as an earlier
article in the army paper had done on the 19th. Hanoi radio
broadcasts and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 29th also do so,
with the radio saying that air defense and air force units
"are intensively training and are taking many positive steps
to satisfactorily implement the slogan 'detect the enemy as
soon as he appears and annihilate him as soon as he comes."'
It describes one group as "conducting many coordinated
training flights at night over all terrain conditions and
under all weather conditions in order to create conditions
for the pilots to train themselves in coping with all
eventualities." It later adds that the infantry, people's
armed security and self-defense militia units "have complemented
their plans to counter the enemy's surprise raids and commando
and reconnaissance activities." A Hanoi radio commentary on
the 26th in listing tasks includes the wiping out or capturing
of "all enemy commando groups," just as a radio commentary had
done on the 18th.
PLANE DOWNINGS, Of the initial five downings claimed on
CASUALTIES 26 December, Hanoi media have basically
exploited only one of the downings in Thanh
Hoa Province--said to be the 100th by the armed forces and
people of Ham Rong. That incident prompted a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
article on the 27th describing the details of the raid and the
downing. It also prompted a letter of congratulations--dated
28 December and publicized on the 29th--to the people and
armed forces in the Ham Rong bridge area from President Ton
Duc Thang. Congratulating the armed forces of the area, Thang
scored the United States for remaining "stubborn," predicted
it would "embark on new adventures" and urged that everyone
"promote unity, heighten vigilance and stand ready to fight . . . ."
Hanoi on the 28th briefly reported that a plane had been
downed in action on the 27th over Quang Binh and on the 29th
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that another plane had been downed over Quang Binh on the 28th.
Later ou the 29th, Hanoi radio reported that four more U.S.
planes were downed over Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces, two in
each province.
Hanoi radio on tl'e 29th broadcast a report of a press conference
held in Thanh Hoa on the 27th by the Thanh Hoa provincial
military command and the provincial committee for investigating
U.S. "war crimes" to denounce crimes committed when U.S. planes
struck a number of populated areas in the province and hail
the downing of two planes on the 26th. The report says that
both Vietnamese and foreign newsmen attended. According to
the deputy head of the provincial war crimes committee, Pham
Van Tuong, U.S. planes on the 26th attacked four different areas
in Thanh Hoa, including a village and Thanh Hoa provincial
hospital. He charged that the planes "dropped 24 250-pound
steel-pellet bombs" killing 24 people--"mostly women and
children"--and injuring 47 others--including the elderly--
in addition to "inflicting many losses on the people's
property." (VNA on the 27th, in reporting the bombing of
Than, Hoa hospital, claimed that four patients were killed and
several others wounded. It also said that several members
of the medical staff and their families were killed.)
The radio report on the press conference also notes that
newsmen had the opportunity to inspect and photograph equipment
taken from the plane reported downed in Ham Rong area, as well
as the identification cards of the two dead airmen. (Hanoi
radio on the 27th had reported the death of the two men in that
crash. Hanoi media have remained vague on other deaths or
captures of U.S. airmen.)
ATTACKS ON LAIRD In addition to the general attacks on the
Nixon Administration's "aggressive" policy,
Hanoi levels particular criticism at Secretary Laird. Both the
foreign ministry spokesman on the 28th and the foreign ministry
statement on the 29th complain without elaboration that he
ch.?:rged that North Vietnam "has violated understandings."
Neither statement takes direct note of his detailed explanation,
at his press conference on the 27th, of the grounds for the
U.S. air strikes.
Laird's press conference statement had been noted promptly in
a Hanoi radio commentary on the 28th. It did not, of course,
acknowledge that he specified shelling of cities in South Vietnam,
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violations of the demilitarized zone, including the building
of a road through it, failure to engage in substantial
negotiations at Paris, and firing on unarmed U.S. reconnaissance
planes over North Vietnam. The commentary similarly ignored
Laird's implication that the strikes were in part retaliation
for Hanoi's downing of U.S. planes on 17-18 December. Hanoi
said that the Secretary's "allegations" about an understanding
and carrying out strikes to protect troops in the South have
long been rejected by public opinion and that in fact U.S.
actions "brazenly violate" the U.S. commitment concerning a
total bombing halt. However, it did not--as Hanoi has done
in the past--directly argue that the DRV was not a party to
any "understanding" in connection with the bombing halt.
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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ASSAILS U1S1 A773~'(S
Peking condemned the U.S. air strikes against 1.a PRV with a
29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement citing the DRV Foreign
Ministry statements of 18 and 26 December. Earlier, Peking had
supported the 18 December DRV statement on air intrusions that
day with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 24th. On
the occasion of the last previous heavy U.S. air raids on North
Vietnam, on 21 September, Peking had issued a foreign ministry
statement and a Commentator article three dayR after the bombing
and two days after a DRV Foreign Ministry statement.
Much like the Chinese statement in September, the current one
takes the United States to task for failing to respond to the
PRG's seven-point proposal, adding the complaint that the United
States has also "irrationally obstructed" the Parts talks. The
statement charges that the United States, while talking about
ending the war, has stubbornly pursued its plans of "Vietnamization,"
"Laotianization," and "Khmerization," supporting puppet regimes,
and prolonging the war.
Making a point contained in the 24 November 1970 PRC statement
on U.S. air strikes that month but not mentioned in last
September's statement, the current statement claims that the
renewed bombing exposes Washington's hypocrisy in the light.
of the 1968 decision to end the bombing of the North. But while
charging that Washington has not kept its promise, the current
statement does not'draw the conclusion made in the November 1970
statement that the words "particularly" of the Nixon Administra-
tion "have never counted."*
The statement interprets the renewal of the U.S. air strikes. as
demonstrating that the United States is "desperately struggling
after suffering disastrous defeat" on the Indochina battlefield.
After referring to "exciting victories" in South Vietnam, along
Cambodian Route 6, and on the Plain of Jars in Laos, the statement
offers the assurance that in raiding North Vietnam the United
States appears ferocious but in fact is "extremely feeble."
* The November 1970 statement had mocked the President's call
for an era of negotiation to replace an era of confrontation as
an attempt to "cover up aggression under the camouflage of
negotiation."
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Like the statement in September, the current one warns that the
Chinese Government and people are "closely watching the
aggressive moves of U.S. imperialism in Indochina" and will
support the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in their
war until complete victory. Unlike in September, however, the
current statement does not preface this pledge with the
observation that Vietnam is China's close neighbor.
Like the September statement and in contrast to the-November
1970 statement's repeated attacks on the President, the current
statement mentions the Nixon Administration by name only once,
citing recent unspecified declarations that the United States
was prepared to intensify its bombing actions and to take other
action to cope with the military situation. Similarly, the
24 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article avoided the
personal attacks on the President characteristic of Hanoi's
statements. Commentator did not mention the President by
name in charging that with the air incursions "U.S.. imperialism"
had "once again torn away its masks of so-called 'peace,'
'negotiations,' 'cease-fire,' and 'troop withdrawal."' While
expressing "intense indignation" over the U.S. incursions into
DRV airspace, Commentator professed marked optimism about the
situation in Indochina, exulting that "the entire Indochina
battlefield rings with the song of victory and the situation
is excellent." Commentator forecast "new and greater. victories
in battles in this dr"" season." There was no mention of
Chinese support or assistance.
Peking's circumspect treatment of the President was j7 -so
apparent in other recent propaganda. Thus, while a DRV
military attache, speaking at a celebration of the VPA's
anniversary sponsored by the PRC Defense Ministry on the
21st, called the President "obdurate, cunning, and bellicose,"
the Chinese speaker did not mention the President.
Divergences between Peking and Hanoi caused by the former's
invitation to President Nixon were reflected in NCNA's account
of DRV Defense Minister Giap's speech at the 18 December Hanoi
meeting marking the anniversaries of Resistance Day and of the
VPA. NCNA omitted a remark by Giap which could be read as an
s.llusion to the President's summitry plans. Pointing out that
the United States is "running here and there in an. attempt to
seek a way out of its fix, to seek a so-called position of
strength," Giap declared that such "perfidious maneuvers are
mad illusions."
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ROUTINE MOSCOW COMMENT SCORES BOMBINGS, ATTACKS PEKING
Moscow thus far has reacted to the aeries of bombings of'the DRV
beginning on the 26th with only routine level press and radio
comment and statements by solidarity organizations. The most
authoritative commentary was a PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy which,
as briefly summarized by TASS on the 28th, said that the raids
show the falseness of Washington's assertions concerning a
"curtailment" of American air operations in Indochina and are
violations of the U.S. "commitment" to completely end the
bombing of the DRV. The 18 December intrusions similarly had
prompted only routine comment although Kosygin, at a 22 December
banquet for visiting Cuban President Dorticos, did condemn in
passing the recent "savage bombing" of the DRV and reiterate
that an expansion of aggression can only meet with "an
intensified rebuff and growing support to the Vietnamese
people from its friends."
Moscow has not customarily supported DRV Foreign Ministry state-
ments on heavy or sustained air strikes with statemerts of its
own at that level. The raids of September and March 1971
received only routine comment or, at most, statements by
Soviet public organizations. A TASS statement was issued on
the raids of November 1970. A May 1970 gover.unent statement,
read by Kosygin at a press conference, condensed both the air
raids and the incursion into Cambodia.
Propaganda on the current raids cited foreign press reports
that they are the heaviest since President Johnson's announce-
ment of the bombing halt in November 1968: and cited reports
from Saigon that some 350 planes daily were involved. A
commentary by Kozyakov, broadcast in English to North America
on the 27th, echoed Iianoi'a claim that "population centers
and hospitals" were hit on the 26th. TASS Ln the 27th cited
th; New York TIMES as quoting a "high-places representative in
Washington" as saying that the raids are only a "prelude" to
new escalation of the air war in Indochina. On the same day
another TASS report very briefly acknowledged Secretary Laird's
press conference that day, noting that he "made threats" about
intensifying the air war, saying that the United States will
bomb the DRV when "necessary."
The most substantial comment thus far is a 27 December Kharkov
commentary carried by TASS which said that the raids were
"sanctioned by President Nixon himself" and are "provocative
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and advanturistic" actions. Vaguely acknowledging U.S. motivation
for the bombings, it said that the U.S. military command Is trying
to present the "piracy" a,3 a "defensive measure!' to "p .event
enemy activity" which "Jeopardizes the reduction of American troops
in South Vietnam." Another Knarkov commentary carried by TASS
on the 28th dismissed as "untenable" the U.S. argument ;:fiat the
current raids are not a "resumption" of bombings bit. "only some
protective reaction."
On the 27th Kharkov said that the present aggression--including
the raids on the DRV, military actions elsewhere in Indochina,
and "sabotage" of the Paris talks--shows that Washington has
not given up its attempts to solve the Indochina problem by
armed force and shows the "hypocrisy" of U.S. leaders' statements
that they are "curtailing" the war. Other comment charged that
the United States is "sabotaging" a discussion of the PRG
proposals at the Paris talks. In his commentary on the 28th
Kharkov blamed the Americans for the three-week hiatus in the
meetings at Paris and said that the "piratical actions" of
the United States air force against the DRV no doubt "are
str:.king a telling blow at the Paris talks too."
The only reference to the issue of U.S. POWs in available
Moscow comment came in the 27 December Kozyakov commentary which,
in saying that there is "but one solution" to the Vietnam problem,
pointed out that the PRG and the DRV have proposed that a
deadline be fixed for two "simultaneous" actions. the withdrawal
of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, and the "release of all U.S.
airmen taken prisoner in the course of the war."
ATTACKS Some comment on the bombings, reiterating charges
ON PEKING that Peking's policies have encouraged the United
States to escalate the war, pointedly noted that
the current air raids have come at a time when Sino-U.S.
relations have warmed. The Kharkov TASS commentary on the 28th
asserted that Peking has maintained silence on the latest raids
because it does not wish to disturb the atmosphere for President
Nixon's forthcoming visit. A foreign-language commentary on the
29th also complained that Peking is a "silent spectator" to U.S.
aggression in Southeast Asia, launching propaganda attacks
against the USSR and other socialist countries which aid the DRV,
rather than against U.S. imperialism. A Mandarin-language
commentary on the 28th, condemning Peking's "compromising policy,"
recalled Peking's alleged assurances in 1964 that it would not
interfere if the United States bombed the DE.V, and reiterated
that Peking's invitation to President Nixon permitted him to
avoid answering the PRG's seven points.
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29 DECEMBER 1971
The commentaries on the bombings echoed the line pLt forward
authoritatively in a 22 December Mayevskiy article in PRAVDA
broadly attacking Peking's "betrayal" of the national
liberation movement throughout the world. Mayevskiy had
included the assertion that Peking's alinement of its
policies elsewhere with those of the United States gave
Washington a "green light" for unleashing aggression in
South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. He added that the Western
press sometimes speculates on the possibility of an "exchange"
of Taiwan for Indochina--that is, the United States would
somehow recognize the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and
Peking would, in turn, help "pacify" Vietnam.
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CONFI()ENT'TAL FBIS 'TRENDS
29 DEC)Nu BER 1.971
NORTH VIETNAM ARMY ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY PEKING, MOSCOW
PEKING Peking's observance of the 22 December VPA anniversary
this year reflected the recent leadership purge which
resulted in the fall of Defense Minister Lin Piao and PLA Chief
of Staff Huang Yung-sheng. The usual greetings message--in
previous years from Lin Piao to DRV Defense Minister Giap--was
not reported this year, and the DRV military attache's
reception, attended by Huang Yung-sheng last year, had as its
ranking guest Li Te-sheng, the director of the PLA's General
Political Department. The customary PRC Defense Ministry
meeting was attended, like last year, by Li Te-sheng and
addressed by a deputy chief of staff.
MOSCOW Moscow observed the VPA anniversary in the customary
manner with a greetings message from Soviet Defense
Minister Grechko to Giap, routine comment, and reports of the
Hanoi meeting. Some radio comment called attention to Soviet
military aid but Grechko's message, unlike last year's did not
point to Soviet measures to render "comprehensive aid."
HANOI AND PATHET LAO ACCLAIM FOUR-DAY OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
Alleged achievements in the communists' four-day offensive in
northern Laos were tabulated in a 25 December communique from
the "command of the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA) in the
Plain of Jars-Xieng K.hoang military sector." The communique,
publicized on the 27th by Pathet Lao and Hanoi media, claims
that, in the fighting from 18 through 21 December, the army and
people in the sector killed or wounded 3,100 troops, captured
over 200 Tao and Thai troops, put out of action 11 battalions,
inflicted heavy casualties on nine other battalions, captured
or destroyed 34 artillery pieces and 20 armored cars and trucks,
shot down 17 aircraft, and "made a big haul of weapons of
various kinds and military equipment." Applauding the LPLA's
success in "recovering the whole of the liberated area in the
Plain of Jars and Muong Soui," the communique maintains that
this is a "victory of great strategic importance, especially on
the political and military plane." Although initial
propaganda on the offensive did not acknowledge the communists'
use of tanks, the communique does note that armored units took
part in the coordinated attack.
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29 MCI tBER 1971
The communique concludes with a call for the army and people to
press their attacks "continually," deal "powerful and accurate
blows," and "win many and yet bigger victories." A "combat
order" from the LPLA command, also released on the 27th,
similarly urges persistent attacks. It stresses the "important
significance and heavy task of this dry-season action" and
calls on the armed forces to "make deep thrusts to divide the
enemy forces, encircle them, and completely wipe them out."
Hanoi commented on the Laos fighting in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI
NHA14 DAN editorials on 28 December which held that the LPW's
"victory" has further undermined the United States' "new
formula" of using Thai and Vang Pao troops supported by U.S.
planes and that it has exposed the "impotence" of the U.S. air
force. The army paper claimed that "the Americans and their
lackeys" are now in a critical situation, with their defense
network extensively breached revealing many vulnerable points,
and with many of their important bases being threatened. NHAN
DAN maintained that the recent achievements in Laos constituted
"a great success of strategic significance that has changed
the balance of forces in Laos in favor of the Lao revolution."
Like the LPLA communique, NHAN DAN charged that encroachments
by the "lackey" forces into the Plain of Jars during the past
rainy season were not only aimed at bolstering the position of
the Vang Pao forces but also at "threatening" the DRV. A
similar charge was made by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap
in his 18 December speech marking the anniversaries of Army
Day and Resistance Day.*
DRV REPORTS FATHERLAND FRONT CONGRESS.'TRUONG CHINH SPEECH
Hanoi radio's account of the closing session of the Vietne.m
Fatherland Front (VFF) Third Congress, on 17 December, reported
that the congress elected a new VFF Central Committee, with
134 members, which in turn appointed a 34-man Presidium, again
headed by DRV President Ton Duc Thang.** A nine-member
Of For a discussion of Giap's remark and initial propaganda on
the communist offensive in Laos, see the 22 December TRENDS,
page five.
** For a discussion of the opening of the congress on
14 December, see the 15 December TRENDS, pages 13-15.
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Secretariat was also named. The broadcast on the 18th also
said that the congress adopted a resolution on future tasks
and issued an appeal calling for strengthened solidarity and
efforts to score new achievements in the war and building
socialism. The congress drafted a letter addressed to South
Vietnam promising that the North would "fear no sacrifices
and hardships" in fighting the United States. Truong Chinh
addressed the concluding session of the congress, but Hanoi
did not report any of the substance of his remarks until
the 21st.
The congress also heard reports by Vice Premier Nguyen Con
on socialist construction in the North and by Le Quang Dao,
deputy head of the army's General Political Department, on
the war. Brief accounts of these speeches were released,
with Hanoi radio on the 16th, for example, noting that Dao
reported on the "good prospect" of the war and proposed that the
congress "strongly urge the armed forces and people . . . to
heighten their fighting will, exert greater efforts, and
heighten determination." Speeches were also made by
representatives of various branches of the Front; excerpts
from the statement of the army delegate, Chu Van Tan, were
broadcast on the 17th.
The "success" of the congress was immediately hailed at a
large meeting held by Hanoi citizens on the evening of the
17th and in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 18th and an LPA
editorial on the 21st. Comment uniformly noted that the
congress demonstrated the "unity" of the Vietnamese people.
TRUONG CHINH SPEECH The Truong Chinh speech, delivered at
the closing session of the VFF
congress on the 17th, was not publicized until 21 December
when excerpts of his "important talk" were carried by the
Hanoi press and radio. According to the radio report, Truong
Chinh analyzed the United States' global strategy and scored
the Nixon Doctrine as an "extremely cruel, perfidious scheme."
Perhaps reflecting Hanoi's apprehension about the possible
repercussions of the Nixon Administration's moves to better
relations with Peking, Truong Chinh urged that in the face of
"such a cruel, dangerous enemy" as the United States, it is
"necessary to promote unity and to motivate all forces in the
struggle in the military, political, and diplomatic fields."
He went on to call for the establishment of a three-fold
"anti-U.S. imperialist united front"--the national united
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front, the Indochinese people's united front, and the world
people's front--"to unify action in the struggle against the
U.S. imperialists." He added that "if we succeed in forming
this Lhree-fold front, we will certainly isolate the U.S.
aggressors more seriously, will catch them in the people's
steel net, and will sut3ly lead them to complete defeat."
While underscoring the need for Holidar lcy domestically,
Truong Chinh acknowledged that there were contradictions
within the Fatherland Front and differences of views that
had to be worked out. He offered some criticism, among
other things condemning the "erroneous idea" held in some
quarters that the role of the VFF had been lessened. He
noted that the war is the "prime duty" at present and called
on the VFF to help heighten vigilance, organize an all-people's
defense, achieve combat readiness, fulfill the troop-recruiting
task, and "strictly implement the laws, regulation3, and
policies on military service." Truong Chinh urged the
mobilization of manpower and material resources "in order to
send aid to the frontline," and also called for the consolid.j?{on
of the North so that the rear would be in a position to sup;:
this aid.
On the Front's role in socialist reform and coci3truction in
North, Chinh reportedly urged concentration cn the civilian
proselyting task. He asked the localities "to overcome all
erroneous thought regarding the Front task," stating that
on the one hand "the party echelons and administrative levels
have disregarded the civilian proselyting, and Front tasks and,
on the other hand, the civilian proselyting and Front organs
have nurtured an inferiority complex, failed to realize their
responsibilities and adopted a passive, negative attitude."
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29 DECEMBER 1971
CAMBODIAN VISIT TO DPRK PROMOTES ASIAN "REVOUJTIONARY" UNITY
leng Sary, "special envoy of the interior part" of the pro-
Sihanouk Cambodian movement, led a delegation of Sihanouk's
front and government on a "goodwill visit" to the DPRK from
10 to 19 December.* He thus continued to play a prominent
coordinating role for the Sihanouk forces, having arrived in
Peking in'August "directly from the front lines" in Cambodia
and having led a delegation to Hanoi in mid-November. He was
accorded high-level treatment in Pyongyang, being received by
Kim 11-song for a "friendly and cordial" talks and hosted by
President Choe Yong-kon, First Vice Premier Kim Il, and Second
Vice Premier Pak Song-chol.
According to the joint communique on the DPRK visit, the two
sides held talks on "the new situation created in the inter-
national arena at present and the struggle of the people of
the two countries proceeding from this, on strengthening and
developing the relations of friendship and cooperation between
the Korean and Cambodlan peoples and other questions of common
concern." The communique registers "complete unanimity of
views" on "all" questions discussed.
Unanimity had similarly been claimed in the 11 August communique
on Sihanouk's most recent visit to the DPRK, as well as in the
20 October and 16 November communique on Pak Song-chol's and
leng Sary's visits to the DRV. In the.'.latter two cases, however,
the characterization seemed to have been included at the
visitors' behest, having been avoided by DRV speakers during
the visits even while the guests so characterized the talks.
There was no such reluctance shown by the North Koreans during
Ieng Sary's visit.
PRESIDENT NIXON'S There was no direct reference to President
TRIP TO PRC Nixon's planned trip to the PRC in propa-
ganda on the visit, but the communique's
assertion that the sides discussed "the new situation created n
thr_ international arena at present" indicates that Sino-U.S.
developments weve among the subjects. The hardline positions
of the Koreans and Cambodians, with overtones of disquiet over
the changed situation in Asia, were reflected in concern expressed
in the communique over Washington's current policies. Both sides,
* The delegation's arrival and initial activities are discussed
in the TRENDS of 15 December, pages 16-17.
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29 DECEMBER 1971
according to the communique, stressed that it is necessary to
"further strengthen mutual support and solidarity" among anti-
imperialist forces at a time when the United States is attempt-
ing to "disorganize" these forces. Saying all events in the
international arena today show that "U,S. imperialism is the
most ferocious and shameless aggressor," the communique warns
that Washington is clinging to "the double-dealing tactics of
open 'policy of strength' and 'peace strategy."' The
communique also contains a reference to "the notorious 'new
Asia policy' of U.S. imperialism" in the course of an attack
on Japanese militarism..
The Koreans offered support to the Cambodians on a point of
special concern--the possibility of a compromise settlement
on Indochina falling short of Sihanouk's goals. The communique
cites support for the Cambodian struggle waged "without compromise
or retreat" and denounces all attempts to impose a policy of
compromise or "a splitting policy" on Cambodia by means of an
international conference or otherwise.
Duri--g Sihanouk's visit to the DPRK last summer, presumably a
mission to convoy Peking's assurances that the invitation to
President Nixon would not affect its support for its allies,
both Sihanouk and Kim Il-song endorsed the invitation as a victory
for the PRC and the world revolutionary forces. However, the
Cambodians subsequently expressed concern over the implications
of the visit. Speaking at a 9 November Peking meeting marking
Cambodian National Day--on the eve of his departure for the
DRV--Ieng Sary warned that "though U.S. imperialism is compelled
to come to China with a white flag" (an image first used by Kim
I1-song on 6 August), it continues its "vicious intrigues" of
denying the rights of weak and small countries and is resorting
to "new trickery" to deceive public opinion. A 10 November AKI
commentary timed for Ieng Sary's trip to the DRV made similar
remarks.
ASIAN UNITY The theme of Asian unity recurred in propaganda
throughout the visit. A 10 December NODONG
SINMUN editorial greeting the arrival of the delegation cited
Kim I1-song's statement that "the people of Korea, China,
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia" and "all other revolutionary
countries in Asia" should consolidate their "anti-imperialist,
anti-U.S. united front" and deal a "collective counterblow" to
U.S. aggression {s: Asia. The Korean speaker at a Pyongyang
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rally similarly quoted Kim Il-song. For his part, Ieng Sary
asserted at the rally that the Cambodian people are joining
in "concerted efforts" for the strengthening of "militant
solidarity" along with the peoples of Korea, China, Vietnam,
and Laos and "other revolutionary peoples of Asia and the
world people."
While avoiding the more forceful formulations on Asian unity,
the joint communique registers the two sides' determination
to "wage a joint struggle to check and frustrate the aggressive
schemes against Korea, China, and the three Indochinese coun-
tries" pursued by Japan, and it says that "when the peoples of
Asian countries making revolution and all other revolutionary
peoples of the world join efforts" U.S. imperialism will be
finally defeated.
The 11 August communique on Sihanouk's visit to the DPRK had
emphatically praised the "anti-U.S. common front of the people
of Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and other Asian revo-
lutionary countries." However, in accordance with Hanoi's
evident reluctance to associate itself with such formulations--
which might be read as having anti-Soviet imp1Lcations--the
16 November communique on Ieng Sary's visit _o the DRV had
omitted any reference to Asian unity, as had the 29 October
communique on Pak Song-chol's visit to the DRV.
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INDIA-PAKISTAN
FBIS TRENDS
29 DECEMBER 1971
While Peking and Moscow continue to maneuver for support c-tthin
the third world, the Chinese have sustained their pressure on
India by issuing a second protest against alleged incursions.
across the Tibetan border and charging that the Indians are
seeking to remain in East Pakistan indefinitely in violation of
UN resolutions. The Chinese have also sought to maintain-their
position in Pakistan with pledges of continuing zupport. A
message from Chou En-lai to new President Bhutto on the 22d
combined such a pledge with an expression of confidence that
the people of Pakistan will "certainly be able to overcome .
temporary difficulties" if they "uphold unity and persist in
struggle." The Chinese have not suggested, however, that this
struggle should take the form of renewed hostilities or that
its object be the recovery of East Bengal.
In addition to its persisting polemical campaign against the
Chinese as traitors to the national liberation moiement, Moscow
has proceeded with laying the propaganda groundwo4 i; for. event..al
recognition of Bangla Desh. TASS dispatches from Dacca have
been reporting the activities of Bangla Desh authorities,.
including statements by the new regime's leaders thanking .the
Soviet Union for its support. One dispatch quoted someone
identified as the general secretary of the Communist Party-of
Bangla Desh, who called for unity of "democratic and patriotic
forces" and condemned the stands taken by the United States
and Peking.
PEKING ISSUES SECOND PROTEST AGAINST INDIAN BORDER INTRUSION
A PRC Foreign Ministry note on 27 December registered. a second
"strong protest" with India over a "grave encroachment". of
Chinese territory. The alleged intrusions, by eight armed
Indian personnel across a pass along the.Sikkim-Tibet border and
an aircraft across the Indo-Tib.'tan border, took place. on 15
December. On the 16th a previous protest note had.charged.that
Indian personnel crossed the Sikkim-Tibet border six days earlier.
Where the earlier note demanded that India "immediately stop
its activities of intrusion," the 27 December note "demands
that the Indian Government inm ediately take effective measures
against the recurrence of similar incidents in the future."
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Along with the new protest note, with its implicit warning of
Chinese pressur on the border, Peking has also sought to
mobilize pressure within the international community against
the Indian presence in East Pakistan. Speaking at a banquet
in honor of an Iraqi delegation on 26 December,.. Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien charged that "the Indian aggressor forces. and
the East Pakistan rebels under their command" are "barbarously
massacring and cruelly persecuting innocent. Pakistan people".
in East Pakistan. Li demanded that India "immediately and
unconditionally withdraw its aggressor forces.from East. Pakistan
and all the other places it has occupied"--a demand for. troop
withdrawals that would not be contingent on a political settle-
ment or a redemarcatio. of the Kashmir cease-fire line. As
in earlier reports of Chinese leaders' statements-on such
occasions, NCNA disseminated Li's remarks on the Indian-
Pakistani conflict ahead of its account of the banquet and
Li's speech as a whole.
On the 27th Peking followed up Li's denunciation of atrocities
in Eat Pakistan by releasing a message from the Red. Cross
Society of China to the International Committee of the Red Cross
describing East Pakistan as being in "the grip_of.terror of
carnage." The message appealed tc' the international committee
and humanitarian organizations "of various countries" to condemn
"the Indian forces for their sanguinary atrocities."
SOVIET ROLE In its current comment Peking.is.not.portraying
Moscow's geopolitical i!.terests. in. South As- 3
in terms of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. as such. The
emphasis is on Moscow's "social imperialist!'. moves in the Indian.
Ocean and other regions as part of its "contention.with.U.S.
imperialism for hegemony." Reflecting sensitivity to.Moscow's.
charges of Sino-U.S. collusion, Peking.on-the-29th ended its.
silence regarding the U.S. naval task force sent to the. Bay
of Bengal. An NCNA account of the Soviet presence in the Indian
Ocean said that the United States made a show of force to.the
Soviet Union and India by dispatchiug the.task.force and that
the Soviets countered by deploying warships oftheir Pacific
Fleet to the Bay of Bengal.
Making a pitch for support from third-world countries bordering .
the Indian Ocean, the NCNA account claimed that the naval activity
of the two superpowers in that region has aroused strong opposition
from "the medium and small countries of Asia and. Africa.". . NCNA
approvingly cited the Ceylon prime minister's proposal for a
peace zone in the Indian Ocean.
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29 DECEMBER 1971
MOSCOW PORTRAYS CHINESE PERFIDY iN SOUTH ASIA
Seeking to justify its role in the dismemberment of a country,
Moscow has insistently recapitulated its explanation for. the
outbreak of the Indian-Pakistani conflict and -pressed- its polemics
against Peking a: a traitor to the national liberation- movement.
V. Mayevskiy's 22 December PRAVDA. article,. entitled. "The- -
Peking Leaders--Betrayers of the National Liberation Movement,"
was given worldwide dissemination by Radio Moscow. The article
was particularly notable for its rebuke to Chou En-tai personally
for his recent blistering attack on the Soviet role in the South
Asian conflict. Chou's speech and Mayevskiy's rebuke underscore
the intense animosity now complicating Sino-Soviet relations as
a result of that conflict.
The theme of Chinese perfidy dominates. G.. Yakubov!s account in
PRAVDA on 28 December of how the Indian-Pakistani -war came about.
While blaming the United States for "conniving" with the policy
of repression in East Pakistan and failing- to.use. its influence
in behalf of a political settlement, the article concentrates
its attack on the Chinese for having long pursued.a policy of
hostility toward India. In this connection the rrticle.pointed
out that Peking has raised the border. question. with India
on several occasions, including recently, and has interfered.
in Indian internal affairs by supporting extremist elements.
After recounting Peking's role in the development: of. the Indian-
Pakista.ii conflict this year, the article concluded that "the
Maoists" have once again shown that they will betray-the
national liberation movement "if they find that- their selfish
nationalistic interests dictate a deal with reaction." Further,
the conflict "has demonstrated that the Peking leaders-are
pursuing a great-power social chauvinist. course which often
unites them with American imperialism."
BANGLA DESH Reports in Soviet media of the activities-of.
Bangla Desh authorities have been laying the
groundwork for an eventual recognition of the new.regime. On.
23 December the Soviet consul in Dacca visited -the.Awami. League
headquarters to convey congratulations on the liberation. of
Barala Desh, as reported by Delhi and--with outrage--by
NCNA but not by Moscow. Various Soviet reports have told of
statements and decisions by Bangla Desh officials, including..
expressions of gratitude for Soviet support. Moscow has also.
publicized appeals in West Pakistan for President Bhutto to
undertake .iegotiations with Mujibur Rahman on a political
settlement.
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Reportage in IZVESTIYA on 27 December depicted. a growing.norwali-
zation of life in "the Bangla Desh capital" of. Dacca.. According
to the paper's account, the recent arrival of "members of the
Bangla Desh Government" is regarded as "proof of the. beginning
of improvement of the situation" after a period of terror.
Apart from the question of formal recognition, Soviet interest
in the political composition and stability of the Bangla Desh
regime was reflected in a TASS dispat:h on the 25th citing an
article by the general secretary of the Communist Party of
Bangla Desh which appeared in the pro-Soviet Indian communist
journal NEW AGE. According to the TASS account, the Bangle
Deoh communist app-qaled for "unity of democratic and patriotic
forces" as "the supreme call of the times" in the face of a
difficult struggle. The article may-represent an effort by
the pro-Soviet communists to gain a place in theBan;le.Desh
Government. In view of its reference to the importance. of. .
unity to withstand "intrigues" attributed to the Chinese, the
article may also bean attempt to close ranks againstMaoist
and other extremist elements among the Bengalis.
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29 DECEMBER 1971
DISARMAMENT
USSR, PRC CLASH AT UNGA OVER WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
With the entry of Peking into the United Nations In November,
the just-concluded session of the General Assembly provided a
forum for the PRC and USSR to renew face-to-face polemics and
to press their respective proposals on disarmament. The Soviet
proposal for a world dtsarrnament conference--which Moscow had
suggested be put on the agenda in a letter to the Secretary
Ceneral in early September--was the focal point of the
confrontation. Peking propaganda assailed the proposal as
an effort to "camouflage arms expansion" and pressed instead
for the long-standing Chinese proposal for a world summit
conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. The debate also
spilled over into other areas--notably the problem of a total
ban of nuclear tests.
Peking's propaganda on the disarmament polemic has for the most
part been confined to the accounts of variour Chinese speeches
in the General Assembly and in that body's First Committee,
although a 23 December People's Daily editorial reviewing the
session assailed the Soviet position. Moscow for its part
has initiated more press and radio comment, predictably broad-
casting a sizeable proportion of its propaganda in its Mandarin-
language programs, including the purpcrtedly unofficial Radio
Peace and Progress.
Gromyko introduced a draft resolution, underscoring the urgency
of a world disarmament conference in his Assembly speech on
28 September--before the admission of the PRC. He strewed
the desirability of agreement on the date and agenda for such a
conference before the end of 1912 and suggested that the conference
could be made "a permanent forum or . . . a forum operating over
a long period of time. Its sessions may be called periodically,
say once in two or three years."
PRC delegation head Chia- Kuan-hua in his maiden address to the
Assembly on 15 November did Dot mention the Soviet proposal for
a world disarmament conference but pressed familiar Chinese
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positions, including the longstanding Chinese proposal for a
world z,ummit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament and, as
a first step, an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons,*
Chiao first dealt with the Soviet proposal in a lengthy speech
before the Assembly on 24 November, arguing that the USSR's
draft resolution not be put to a vote at this session of the
General Assembly. He said the conference proposed by the USSR
had no clear aim and "would inevitably become a permament club
for endless discussions that solve no substantive problems."
Chiao again called for the convening of a world summit conference
on nuclear disarmament, conceding, however, that the PRC is
ready to hear and consider the opinions of others on the level
of the conference. In the vein of his 15 November address,
he challenged the United States and the USSR to commit
themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to
dismantle all nuclear bases in foreign countries, and Co
withdraw nuclear weapons from abroad.
A Moscow Mandarin-language broadcast on the 25th reported that
chief Soviet delegate Malik, in exercising his right to reply
on the 24th, pointed to the "clear U.S.-China duet" on a world
disarmament conference, and asserted that the Chinese in their
opposition "have performed a service for the imperialist forces,"
The TASS account of the exchange on the 24th--which was also
published in the press--noted more cryptically that Malik
emphasized that only the Chinese and U.S. delegations have
taken a ::egative stand on the Soviet proposal.
Returning to the rostrum on the 27th, Chiao said that Malik's
charge of a U.S.-PRC duet was "cheap and demagogic . . . not
worth refuting" and that his speech was in fact "splendid self-
exposure." Among other charges, Chiao assailed the USSR for
colluding with U.S. imperialism in attempting to surround the
PRC with military bases. And he observed that China's opposition
to the Soviet disarmament proposal was not "anti-Sovietism" but
rather opposition to the USSR's "great-power chauvinism and . ,
social-imperialism." He concluded that if the U?SR insisted on
putting its resolution to a vote, the PRC would not participate
in the voting and would assume no obligation as to the results
of the voting.
* Chiao's speech is discussed in detail in the FBIS TRENDS for
17 November 1971, pages 30-31.
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The attack on the Soviet proposal was sustained by the vice
cha.Lrmnn of the PRC delegation, Huang Hua, in remarks to the
Assembly on 16 December. On that occasion, he noted the
Chinese decision to vote for the substitute resolution on a
world disarmament conference put forward by Mexico, Romania,
and 25 other nations.* lie added, however, that in order for
a conference to he fruitful, two "prerequisites" were
eswentia)--the declaration by the "two superpowers" not to
be the first to use nuclear weapons and the dismantling of
their overseas nuclear bases and the withdrawal of their
nuclear weapons from abroad. The NCNA account of the 16
December UNGA session said that the Mexican-Romanian resolution
was approved "amid ovation," and concluded that this wound up
the debate "on 'the Soviet proposal for convening a world
disarmament conference."'
Moscow for its part widely acclain-ed the Assembly's 16 December
vote on a world disarmament conference resolution. Acknowledging
that the resolution voted on was that sponsored by Romania and
Mexico and 25 other nations, not that placed on the agenda by
the USSR, propaganda has nonetheless concluded that "the Soviet
initiative has been positively assessed by the overwhelming
majority of states in the world." A NEW TIMES article,
summarized by Moscow radio in a broadcast in English to South
Asia on the 27th, said that the developing countries and
socialist nations cosponsored a resolution on a world
disarmament conference and that the Assembly, despite Chinese
efforts, "endorsed the Soviet proposal."
Soviet propaganda grudgingly acknowledged the affirmative
Chinese vote on the Mexican-Romanian resolution but asserted,
in a broadcast in Mandarin on the 18th, that the Chinese set
"prerequisites" which are "actually a form of opposition" to
a world disarmament conference, also opposed by "the imperialists."
Spelling out the "prerequisites," the broadcast noted that the
PRC has challenged the nuclear powers to pledge not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons and to remove nuclear bases from
foreign countries, demands which "the United States and other
imperialist countries are unwilling to fulfill."
* The Mexican-Romanian resolution invites all states to
communicate to the Secretary General, before 31 August 1972,
their views and suggestions on questions relating to a world
disarmament conference, including agenda, site, and date for
such a conference, and provides for the inclusion on the
provisional agenda for next year's Assembly session an item
entitled "Convening of a World Disarmament Conference."
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Soviet pi,opagandn belnbor,s the theme of U.S.-PRC collusion
which Malik raised in his 24 November speech. '.Chus, an article
In LZVES'IIYA on 25 December, reviewed by TABS, observed that
the PRC's negntLve position on the proposal. for a world
disarmament conference--as we.Ll as its stand on a Middle East
settlement and the conflict on the Hindustan peninsula--
"exposed the true face of Poking's policy, which In many
qurgtions actually coincides with Washington's course."
In defending the proposal for a conference, Moscow shows
sensitivity to Chino's charges that the USSR undercuts the
national liberation forces. Chiac on 24 November resurrected
this classic argument when he said it ts not proper "indiscriminately
to demand disarmament by all countries alike." Pointing to the
struggles of the peoples of Indochina, the Arab world, and Africa,
Chiao observed that the question of "paramount importance" ig
not disarmament, but "the defense of national independence and
sovereignty and the winning of the right to national. existence."
While av.ilable Moscow propaganda does not directly acknowledge
that Chiao pressed. such an argument, a passage in an article by
V. Rybakov in NEW TIMES (uatea 10 December) seemed clearly aimed
at countering it. According to Rybakov, no one in the Soviet
Union "'.as ever raised the question of disarming the Vietnamese
people: and the peoples of the Arab countries who are struggling
against an aggressor, or of the detachments of the national
liberation movement who are defending their rights to independence
with weapons." And other propaganda routinely points to the
advantages of disarmament, stressing that the savings thus
realized could be rechanneled to the development of economically
backward countries.
TEST BAN, Chinese delegation member Chen Chu spoke to the
OTHER ISSUES test-ban question on 9 December at a meeting of
the Assembly's First Committee. He echoed
Chiao's remarks of 24 November in stressing the self-defense
nature of Chinese weaponry and in pledging that the PRC will
never be the first to use nuclear weapons. In a rehash of the
known Chinese position, Chen said the halting of nuclear tests
will only serve to consolidate the monopoly of these weapons by
the "two superpowers" and deprive other countries of their "Just
rights" to develop nuclear weaponry. While some countries have
favored a test ban "out of good intentions," Chen added, other
countries will turn it into a means for lulling and deceiving
the people of the world. He concluded that for these reasons
the Chinese delegation will oppose a draft resolution on the
"so-called prohibition of nuclear tests."
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While Moscow Is not known to have acknowledged that the USSR
abstained on the three resolutions before the Assembly on encling
nuclear tests, 1.t has not hesitated .o take the Chinoiae to task
for their negative votes. Thus an article in IZVBSTIYA on
1S December by S. Yurkov and an article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
on 22 December by Prof. M. Ukraintsev noted that China and
Albania were the only states to vote against the three
resolutions, citing the negative votes as further evidence
of Peking's "militarization" of China. The same Ukraintsev--
long on record as an authoritative propagandist critical of
China's policies--in a lengthy domestic service talk on
14 December reviewing the PRC's first month in the United
Nations, had noted that the PRC heralded its entry into the
world body "by exploding an atomic bomb."
Speaking in the First Committee on the 10th, Chen Chu indicated
that the PRC would not take part in the vote on a protocol to
be added to the existing treaty on a Latin American nuclear-
free zone. Noting that China has no soldiers stationed abroad,
no military bases on foreign soil, and that it has'pledged not
to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Chen said that this
principled stand--which contrasts with the stand of the
"superpo-vers"--is the "best support to the good wishes of
many countries for the establishment of nuclear-free zones
and peace zones."
Chen argued in a similar fashion in addressing himself to the
Ceylonese proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean,
asserting before the First Committee an the 10th that the
"obligations China has undertaken far exceed what the draft
resolution calls upon the countries concerned to do." He
sa'd that the resolution is "iefective" in not holding the
United States, Britain, the USSR, and India to obligations,
adding that without obligations "the root cause of aggression
and threat to the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent
will still remain and the peace and security in this area will
have no guarantee at all." But after voicing these "reservations,"
according to NCNA, Chen voted in favor of the draft resolution.
Moscow, which has not mentioned the proposal despite its criticism
of U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean during the India-
F-kistan crisis, abstained on the vote along with the other
major powers.
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GERMANY AND BERLIN
HONECKER REVIEWS STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GDR AND FRG
East German party head Honecker, in a concluding speech to the
fourth plenum of the SED Central Committee on 17 December,
extensively examined the course of relations between East and
West Germany In the aftermath of the agreements reached by the
two states following the Big Four accord on Berlin. He
repeatedly reassured the plenum, convened to approve the
1972 economic plan and the draft of the GDR's new five-year-
plan, that the agreements signify that the postwar status quo
has now been confirmed by the West: GDR sovereignty has been
preserved, and the Western powers and Bonn have been forced
for the first time in the postwar period to conclude agree-
ments that recognize the existence, sovereign rights, and
inviolable borders of the GDR as well as the status of
"Berlin" as its capital. These various facets have been
the stock themes of East Berlin propaganda since the sign-
ing of the quadripartite accord.
In an unusual step for an East German spokesman, Honecker
complimented the Brandt government for-the "positive" side
of its #creign policy in "taking the real situation into
account" by recognizing the existence of the GDR. Asserting
that European cooperation is dependent upon "efforts at
accommodation by both sides, East and West," Honecker noted
that those "West German foreign. policy circles" who also
accept this premise for European cooperation "have become
stronger." But Honecker did take Bonn to task for its
"Scheel doctrine," the thesis that third-party countries
should not establish relations-with-the GDR until a modus
vivendi has been reached between the FRG and the GDR in the
form of a general treaty. Completely discounting any possi-
bility that such a thesis might prove effective, Honecker
said the GDR must plan for the establishment of new GDR
embassies abroad and for foreign embassies at home over the
next five years.
Repudiating at length the concept that "special inter-German
relations" exist between the two German states, Honecker
emphatically reiterated the stock East German line that rela-
tions between the two must be established-according to the
norms of international law, with-recognition that one state
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29 DECEMBER 1971
belongs Lo the socialist bloc and the other to the capitalist.
He referred sarcastically to Brandt's view of two German
states within one German nation: "We have always known that
relations between two countries have nothing to do with
whether one has an aunt or an uncle abroad--for instance, in
Switzerland, the Federal Republic, Austria, France, or the
United States."
TRANSIT AGREEMENT, Discussing the recently signed German
SENAT-GDR ACCORDS accords--the 17 December FRG-GDR transit
agreement and the 20 December West Berlin
Senat-GDR accords on visits and travel arrangements and land
exchanges--negotiated under the umbrella of the giadripartite
agreement on Berlin, Honecker argued that the FRG "has been com-
pelled to accept the borders with the GDR unc-ar international
law" three times "in a short period." First, in signing the
Moscow treaty Bonn recognized the GDR borders and accepted them
as inviolable. Second, with the signing of the GDR-FRG transit
agreement Bonn "for the first time" reached an agreement
"binding under international law directly with the GDR Govern-
ment," recognizing the GDR borders in the process. Third, in
the quadripartite agreement the Big Three "for the first time
signed an agreement valid under international law under which
the GDR 1; respected as a sovereign state, its territory and
borders as undisputed facts."
Honecker then immediately went on to say that the "Four Powers
have concluded an agreement on West Berlin" and introduced new
terminology to define West Berlin: The agreement "expresses
the fact that West Berlin exists as an entity within its
existing borders and is surrounded by the GDR including its
capital. Accordingly, the accords between the GDR Government
and the West Berlin Senat take into account the fact that Berlin
is the capital of the GDR." In another effort to underscore
the point that GDR sovereignty was respected in the German
negotiations, Honecker declared that "the specter, active only
recently, of a 'corridor' through the GDR controlled by the
West has dissolved into thin air" with the signing of the
GDR-FRG agreement, which "makes it possible to handle transit
traffic between the FRG and the western sector,: of Berlin
through the territory of the GDR in accordance with inter-
nationally valid norms" and which serves to "compel" the FRG
to accept the GDR bnr"crs.
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CHIZ.ISTMAS VISITS Again seeking to place the blame on the
West Berlin Senat for the failure to initial
the. Senat-GDR accords on 4 December(they were finally initialed
on the 11th along with than FRG-GDR transit agreement), Horecker
repeated the East German argument that "West Berlin is not part
of the-FRG and must not be governed by it." He went on to explain
why it was not possible for West Berliners to visit East Berlin
during the current holiday season: "If it has been impossible for
unilateral gestures of good will on the part of the GDR vis-a-vis
the West Berliners to have come into effect already this year,
the inhabitants of West Berlin must thank those who tried up to
the last minute to obstruct the accords that had already been
coazluded." Following the 4 December failure to initial the
Senat-GDR accords, East Berlin propaganda has repeatedly stressed
that if "technical" preparations were to have been completed in
time to allow West Berliners to visit "the GDR capital" between
20 December and 20 January the Sent accords had to be initialed
on th-i 4th.
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29 DECEMBER 1971
CHINA
PEKING CLAIMS RECORD GRAIN YIELD DESPITE NATURAL DISASTERS
According to NCNA on 23 December, China has achieved a record
grain harvest for 1971, overcoming natural disasters that
affected a total area three times larger than last year. But
there are indications that this year's increase is rather small.
One indicator is the fact that so far there have been no
percentage claims for the 101 year; last year several. provinces
claimed that grain yields were up as much as 30 percent. An
NCNA report on 26 December did single out the southwest
provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan as having exceeded
last year's harvests, and it was said that Kweichow and Yunnan
have now become basically self-sufficient in grain. Traditional
grain-importing provinces in North China--Hopei, Honan and
Shantung--were report-d to have achieved basic set{-sufficiency
last year, and this year they are again said to have achieved
"good" harvests; a Tsinan radio report on 18 December claimed
a new Shantung record.
In Northeast China, where Kirin and Liaoning provinces each
claimed 30 percent grain increases last -year, there appearo to
have been no further increase. The Liaoning provincial radio
on 19 December indicated that the crop this year was about the
same as last, and Heilungkiang merely claimed a "bumper" crop
without reference to prior records.
MODERATE POLICIES IN AGRICULTURE URGED BY RED FLAG
Two articles in RED FLAG No. 13, both by writing groups in Hunan
province, indicate i:hat agricultural policies designed to
provide work incentives for the peasantry will continue to
hold sway. One of the items is an investigation report on a
commune, broadcast by Peking radio on 20 December. It stresses
the need for continual vigilance against capitalist revivals,
warning that attacks will stem from both the right and the
left. The policy of allowing sideline production is elucidated
in order to show that the middle road must be maintained--
sidelines must not be allowed to interfere with major agricultural
tasks, but neither should they be rejected completely under the
pretext of "avoiding the rise of capitalism."
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The second RED FLAG article, broadcast by Hunan :adto on
18 December, F??-'ys more attention to general policies, targeting
especially the notion that "left is better than right." The
article states that the interests of the middle peasants must
be considered, because "if the people modify the party's
policies arbitrarily . . . the consolidation and development
of the collective economy will be affected." The article
devotes special attention to leftist deviations which followed
the cultural revolution; at that time, it said, there were some
who felt that party policies stood in the way of completing
"requirements for stepping up socialist rural construction,"
and thus various communes went their own way and "changed the
party policies at will." (The reference appears to be to the
period when, according to Hong Kong reports, some communes
were seizing private plots and restricting the prerogatives of
production teams.)
The article sets forth several reasons, all based on material
considerations, why the advance to communism must be slowed at
this stage. It warns that "we cannot . . . disregard objective
conditions, alter the objective possibility of histo,ical
development, and confuse different stages." When the masses'
ideological awareness is heightened and productive forces
developed, policies can be changed, but "the party's policies
should be comparatively steady at one stage and at one period."
The article seems to skirt rather closely the often-denounced
theories of "productive forces" and "mechanization before
collectivization." It makes the specific point that "the
level of rural mechanization is still not high enough" to
proceed to a new stage.
CONFERENCE ON Inner Mongolia chief Yu Tai-chung, in a
MECHANIZATION 24 November speech released by the regional
radio on 11 December, referred to a national
conference on agricultural mechanization convened by the State
Co""ncil. There was no media report of such a conference at
the time, but it apparently called for new local efforts,
? including "going in for semimechanization as well as mechaniza-
tion" when the former is more practical.
The conference also may have given local areas the task of
drawing up 10-year plans for mechanization. A Kiangsi
broadcas,. on 18 December reported that a recent provincial
conference heard a report on the national meeting and then
worked out plans "for basically mechanizing the province's
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agriculture by 1980." The broadcast notes that the current
area under mechanization is about 10 percent of the total,
up from three percent in 1965; the magnitude of the task is
thus considerable. Priority for the first five years is to
be given to developing machinery for tillage, drainage and
irrigation. For 1972, special attention is to be paid to
tillage machinery, tractors in particular.
PRICING Pricing policies have also clearly been designed
POLICIES to furnish the peasant with incentives. An NCNA
article on 27 December focused on the rise in
rural bank deposits since the cultural revolution, claiming
that the increase is the result of state policies; over the
past few years prices paid for the peasants' agricultural
goods have gone up while state taxes and prices for fertilizers
and insecticides have been reduced. The article also points
out that conswner prices for food have remained constant during
this period.
A second NCNA article on the same day listed several products
for which the state price paid the peasants has been raised
this year while the charge to consumers has remained unchanged.
These cuts may reflect improved efficiency in processing, but
in most cases they probably represent an effort to encourage
the production of needed materials. Total incentives of this
type offered this year, including reductions in prices of
agricultural manufactured products, is claimed to run to a
billion yuan ($400 million).
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FBIS TRENDS
29 IuECa!BER 1971
BREZFNEV'S 65TH IGNORED IN USSR. MARKED IN EAST EUROPE
Brezhnev's 65th birthday passed unmentioned in the Soviet press,
following the usual Soviet practice of ignoring 65th anniversaries.
The leading dailies of Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia
carried photos of Brezhnev on the front page on 18 or
19 December, while Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG on 19 December
carried Kadar's message of congratulations on page three.
Honecker praised Brezhnev as an "outstanding fighter"
(NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 December), Kada_ hailed nim as an
"outstanding" leader of the international communist movement,
and a lengthy, effusive RUDE PRAVO article on 18.December
spoke warmly of Brezhnev's role in liberating Czechoslovakia
in 1945. The Bulgarian press has not yet mentioned the birthday.
The treatment of Brezhnev's birthday is similar to that of other
recent 65th birthdays of Politburo mem..ers. Kirilenko's 65th
birthday on 8 September 1971 was warmly noted by NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND but not in the other satellites nor in the Soviet
press. Kosygin's 65th on 21 February 1969 was marked by
flattery and a large photo in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND: it was also
noted in Poland and Hungary, and Bulgaria sent greetings--three
weeks late, on 11 March--but Soviet media did not mention it.
PAPERS DIFFER IN TREATMENT OF TVARDOVSKIY OBITUARY
On his death, former NOVY MIR editor Aleksandr Tvardovskiy was
accorded normal official honors--including a large photo in
PRAVDA and a long obituary signed by all the Politburo and
writers union laaders--although some newspapers that had been
especially antagonistic toward him neglected to pu')lish his
obituary. Following his death on 18 December, PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA,
SOVIET RUSSIA, TRUD and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carried a uniform
picture ._nd obituary, but RURAL LIFE, RED STAR and SOCIALIST
INDUSTRY published only the original succinct announcement of
his demise. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA differed in granting slightly
more favorable treatment than PRAVDA. Below the obituary,
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published an article by Tvardovskiy's
friend, liberal writer. Kcnstantin Simonov, who wrote emotionally
of his merits and hailed him as "a man of huge talent and high
courage."
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Again on 22 December, in connection with the reporting of
Tvardovskiy's funeral, the same pattern prevailed. Only RURAL
LIFE, RED STAR and 60CIALIST INDUSTRY totally ignored the
funeral, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA printed the longest and by
far the most laudatory account.
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