TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010043-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1
Confidential
Illlllll~~iiiuiii~~llllllli~~l~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICEI
~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~ I~
T1~]EI~1DS
in Communist .Propaganda
Confidential
1 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, N0. 48)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
6~OU- 1
[.dubd Lsw eu~s^alle
ds.e~.edie~ sed
data,~ts,iee
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
CONT~NTS
Topico and Events Givca Mayor Attention i
Communique on Pham Val Dong 4.:.sit to PRC Sees Closer Tiea 1
Communi^ts Denounce New South Vietnamese Move Into Cambodia 8
Laos: Souphaaouvong Letter Reverts to Ca11 for Bombing Halt 9
Joint Editorial Condemns "Swindlers," Calls for Party Unity 11
"Swindlers" Are Attacked for Errors in Agricultural Line 12
PRC-PAKISTAN
Peking Reaffirms Measured Support for Pakistan 13
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Pictures Israel as Increasingly Militaristic 17
ormer Mideast Cou.mentator Maksimov Authors Series in Arabic 18
S~scow Notes Jorda.niaa Premier "Ki.lled" in Caixo 19
ROMANIA-YUGOSLAVIA
Tito-Ceausescu Communique Stresses Indepe-auence, Affinity 20
GERMAN CP
Illegal KPD Treated as Still Extant, Though Inoperative 24
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prague Comment During Bilateral Talks Anticipates Progress 28
CZECHOSLOJAK ELECTIONS
Prague, Moticow Defensive on Mandate of *,ong-Delayed Vote 3.0
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Central Committee, Soviet Meetings Approve Five-year Plan 33
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 NOVEMBER 1971
Moscow !2817 items)
Peking (1344 items)
Supreme Soviet Session
(1%)
21%
Indochina
(20%)
40%
[Kosygin Speeches
(--)
7%]
[Pharr Van Dong
(11%)
32%]
CPSU Central Committee
(--)
l3%
in PRC
Plenum
Domestic Issues
(18%)
13%
Indochina
(5%,
4%
United Nations
(28%)
11%
Middle East
(3%)
3%
[Disarmamen~ Debate
(--)
3%]
China
(5%)
3%
[PRC Seat un
( -)
3/]
Somali President
(3%)
2%
Security Council
Barre in USSR
Guinea Invasion
(--)
5%
West German CP (DKP) (0.1%)
2%
Anniversary
Congress
Albanian National Day
(--)
3%
Indian-Pakistani
Conflict
(1%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow ~.nd
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given mayor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENT L9L FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
I NDOCN I PJA
CONWIUNIOUE ON PRAM VAN DONG VISIT TO PRC?SEES CLOSER TIES
Both the Chinese and Nnrth Vietnamese used the 20-27 November
visit to the PRC by Pham Jan Dong's party-government delegation
as an occasion. for e_`fusive testimony to Sino-Vietnamese
solidarity while skirting areas of possible discord. Zhe
Chinese were at pains to impress upon their guests ;.zd the
world at large that President Nixon's forthcoming visit and
the recent PRC leadership reshuffle will not divert Peking
from continuing unstinting support to tY~e Vietnamese. Having
received reassurances on this score, the Vietnamese ~ oined
with their hosts in a communique registering satisfaction
that relations of "intimate and solid friendship and unity"
are binding the two sides "ever more closely."
After signing the joint communique on the 25th, the DRV
delegation toured Shanghai and Canton accompanied by Chou
En-lai before returning to Hanoi on the 27th. As in the
communique on Chou's visit to Hanoi last March, the currenC
document says the talks between the two sides were held in
"a most cordial and friendly atmosphere, which fully manifested
the fraternal friendship and militant unity" between the two
peoples. Also like the March communique, the current one
lists the situation in Indochina and "questions of common
interest" as subjects of the talks. But in adding another
subject--"the strengthening of the friendly relations and
cooperation" between the two countries--the current communique
may reflect concern by the two sides to overcome strains in
their relations resulting from Peking's invitation to
President Nixon.
The communique cites the "excellent" situation in Indochina
resulting from the "victories o# strategic significance" won
in the past year. That the Chinese may have favored a
stronger statement is suggested by the fact that Chou En-tai
in a major speech on the 23d described the situation in
Indochina as "unprecedentedly fine"--an appraisal that began
to appeaz in Chinese comment following the Lam Sa:~ 719
operation. The communique last March--issued during; Lam
Son 719--was replete with warnings about the "extremely grave
war escalation" in Indochina and directly linked China's
security with that of the DRV. That communique also said the
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1 DECEMBER 1971
two sides "reached completely identical views" in discussions
on how to deal with possible further military actions by the
United States. In the only reference to unanimity in the
current communique, the two sides "una:~imously point out"
that the Indochina war "was caused by U.S. aggression and it
will end only with the United Stags' stopping its aggression
and aJ.l its interference."* Consistent with tine emphasis in
Hanoi's recent statements, notably Dong's speeches during the
visit, the communique focuses on Washington's Vietn.:mization
policy and support for the Thieu regime as the central concern
in the present circumstances.
CHINE;,- SUPPORT In the communique the Chinese reaffirm
their "unshirkable internationalist duty"
to support the Vietnamese war effort "to the end," repeating
the assuran;.e that the Chinese "will not flinch even from the
greatest national sacrif ices.' This formulation dramatizing
Peking's commitment, which dates back to 1965, was revived by
Chou during his Hanoi visit in March and appeared. in the
communique on that vie it; it was also repeated by Li Hsien-nien
when he headed a Chinese aid delegation to Hanoi in September.
Some of the Chinese comment on assistance during the Dong
visit was couched in unusual. terms that may reflect some of
the issues in the recent PRC leadership crisis and disputes
over economic priorities. On the 24th, Chou repeated Mao's
"instruction"--first voiced by Chou during his Marcn visit
to Hanoi--that "if anyone among us should say that we should
not help the Vietnamese" that would be "betrayal of the
revolution." This formula, with ins overtones of discord
over the nature and extent of aid to the DRV, had been
paraphrased by Li in Hanoi in September and then by Chou in
his 23 NoveMber Peking rally speech, in effect reassuring the
Vietnamese that Sino-U .S. developments will not affect
Peking's comm~tIDents to its allies. In his speech on the 24th
* In contrast, the point communique on the recent visits to
the DRV by Soviet President Podgornyy, the DPRK's Pak Song-chol,
and Ieng Sary, "special envoy" of Sihanouk's governmeTc, said
tl~e talks registered unanimity of views on the sub~.~.:ts
discussed. These more comprehensive assessments seem to have
been included at the visitora' behest. DRV spokesmen during
the visits avoided referring to unanimity of views even s.?
the guests so characterized the talks.
0
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
in which he revived the full instr~iction, Chou added other
zemarks suggast_ng that the Chinese are now in a better
positior_ to assist the Vietnamese. Noting that Deng was
going to tour southern parts of China, Chou said that "you
will see that the mental outlook of our people, through
tempering in the Great Proletarian Culture; Revolution, has
deeply chan~_d," adding that in the future ''it will be possit;le
for our people to perform oc~r internationalist duty better than
beige and give more support and assistance to the Vietnamese
and Indochinese peoples."
Chinese speeches during Dong's tour of Shanbnai and Canton
were even more explicit in acknowledging that the PRC had
fallen short in aiding the Vietnamese. Both Chang Chun-chiao,
Politburo member and Shanghat party chief, and Kwangtung
party head Liu Hsing-yuan admitted that what their respective
areas have done to support the Vietnamese "falls far short
of the expectations" of the Vietnamese comrades and that the
Chinese "still have many shortcomings" in their work. Both
speakers solicited the guests' "criticisms and suggestions"
to help the Chinese improve their assistance.
During the provincial tour Dong, for his part, was unusually
specific in thanking the Chinese for their assistance. In
Shanghai he thanked the people for having provided "complete
sets of equipment for many important factories in the North,
many transportation facilities, farm machinery, materials
and equipment as well as large quantities of consumer goods.
You have trained and brought up for us thousands of workers
and technicians, and sent to Vietnam many enthusiastic and
experienced experts." In Canton Dong similarly noted that
"you have provided us with large quantities of equipment,
materials, and consumer goods, trained many technical personnel
and workers for us, and taken meticulous care of the
Vietnamese cadres re:eiving medical treatment here."
INTERNATIONALISM The two sides registered a meeting of
minds on the key issue of proletarian
internationalism, which had emerged as a touchstone of
divergent Chinese and Vietnamese positions in recent months in
the wake of the announcement of President Nixon's visit to
Peking. In the joint coranunique the two sides "note with
satisfaction" that their relations "have continuously been
consolidated and developed on the basis of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism." This "intimate and solid
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1 llECEMBER 1971
friendship and unity of 'both comrades and brothers,"' credited
to the nurture of Ho Chi Minh and Mao, "are binding ever more
closely the parties and peoples of China and Vietnam."
In the course of the visit, Dong's formulations on proletarian
internationalism converged with those of the Chinese after an
Initial reluctance to match the Chinese claims.* By the time
of Dong's 23 November Peking rally speech, in which he
effusively praisad Sino-Vietnamese unity, the DRV leader was
prepared to acknowledge that "our relations based on Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism have developed daily
and become all the more unbreakable;" he further added an
expression of gratitude for Chinese support 'filled with noble
proletarian internationalist sentiments."** At the Peking
banquet his delegation gave on the 24th, Dong noted that the
Chinese speeches during his visit had been "full of proletarian
internationalist spirit," and he forcefully reaffirmed that
Si:~o-Vietnamese friendship "is based on Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism and no force on earttii can shake it."
At the same time, however, Dcng continued the DRV's practice of
singling out the USSR as well as the PRC in expressing gratitude
for aid. Although he had not mentioned Moscow in his rally
speech on the 23d, he did include references to the Soviet Union
in his speeches on the 20th and 24th. A 27 October QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN editorial on the point communique thanked the USSR as
well as the PRC for assistance, pointedly noting that assistance
from tre Soviet Union and other socialist countries has been
valuable in the struggle against U.S. imperialism, "the ~anemy
number one of progressive mankind."
* The divergence between Chin~?se and Vietnamese positions on
this issue i.n recent months, including that reflected at the
beginning of Dong's visit, is discussed in the TRENDS of
2=~ November, pages 4-5.
** One of the first authoritative indicators of the degree of
Hanoi's disquiet over Peking's invitation to President Nixon
was Defense Minister Giap's failure for the first time in his
annual congratulatory message on the 1. August anniversary of
the Chinese PLA to characterize Chinese assistance as being in
the spirit. of "proletarian internationalism."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
CONWIUNIST Dong's speech on the 24th included, for the first
UNITY time during the visit, a renewal of the plea
contained in Ho's will that "our party will do its
best to contribute effectively to the restoratian of unity among
the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism." The appeal in Ho's will, issued
in September 1969 at a time when Sino-Soviet tensions were at
a peak, had been recalled by DP.V leadars three times previously
in the past two months. Le Duan's invocation of the appeal fcr
communist unity at a 4 October rally welcuming Podgornyy
represented the first such high-level DRV pledge to work fur the
restoration of unity since last June--that is, since before
Peking's invitation to President Nixon and Hanoi's July-August
polemics charging that the Nixon Doctrine is aimed at splitting
the communist countries. Ho's "teachings" on the restoration
of 4olidarity of the socialist camp were mentioned in an
article on DRV diplomacy by Foreign Minister Trinh in the
October issue of the party journal HOC TAP. In a 14 October
interview with the Italian CP organ L'UNITA, ss carried by
VNA English on the 18th, Dong responded to a question on the
DRV's policy of unity within the communist world by pledging
to carry out Ho's will. (Strangely, however, the 29 October
joint communique on the visit to the DRV of ?7orth Korea's
Pak Song-chol said nothing about efforts to divide the communist
countries or about the need to work for restoration of communist
solidarity.)
Apart from Donp's invocation of Ho's will, the subject of Sino-
Soviet discord was largely avoided in the mutual effort of the
Chinese and Vietnamese to project a sense o.f harmony. The
sole anti-Soviet barb was contained in Chou's speech on the
23d when he voiced Peking's line on the medium and small
countries uniting against the Quperpowers. On the same
occasion Dong in effect rebutted Peking's line by linking
China and Vietnam with "the entire powerful socialist camp.''
During the visit Dong did not, however, repeat North Vietnamese
statements at the time of Chou's visit last Marc:t that the DRV
stands at the socitheastern outpost of the socialist camp.
U.S. POLICY In another area of likely divergence, policy
toward the United Stares, the two sides sought
to reach an accommodation by expressing mutual concern orer the
application of the Nixon Doctrine in the form of Vietnamization.
In a reference to the American role in Asia generally, the
joint communique points out that Washington is applying the
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1 DECEDiBER 1971
Nixon Doctrine in Indochina by "talking about 'reducing U.S.
commitments' in Asia; this in essence is to prolong, intensify,
and expand its war of aggression against Indochina." The
Chinese took the occasion of the visit to ascribe priority
to the Vietnam conflict among current international problems,
in etf;ct seeking to reassure the North 4'ietnamese that
Sino-U .S. relations will not take precedence over their
cause. This point, which was made by Chou in his welcoming
remarks on the 20th, was repeated in a 28 November PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial on the visit.
Perhaps in a gesture to Hanoi's apprehension over the mear~ng
of the Nixon visit, the Chinese joined the Vietnamese in
asserting ir. the communique that "U.S. imrsrialism," though
"constantly altering its tactics and methods," has "not in
the least changed its aggressive amibition." However, while
reciting standard views of the two sides on Korea, Japan, and
other subjects, the communique dons not diractly address
itself to the Nixon Administration's policies or the role of
the Nixon Doctrine outside the Indochina context.
VIETNAM In noting that the two sides affirm that the
SETTLEMENT PRG seven-point proposal provides the corract
basis for a Vietnam settlement, the joint
communique repeats Pham Van Dong's 20 November hardened
elaboratior. of points one and two on U.~. withdrawal and
support for President Thieu: ThLS, it specifies Chat U.S.
withdrawal and ceasing aggression as outlined in point
one must include putting "an end to all activities of U.S.
air and naval forces and all other military acts against the
people in both the so~ithern and northern parts of Vietnam";
and it explains that the provision under point two for an
end to L'.,S. interference 4ad support for President Thieu
means that the United States must "relinquish all its
commitments to the fascist Nguyen Van Thieu clique."
Editorials in the 27 November DRV party organ NHAN BAN and
the army paper Ql'AN DOI KHAN DAN reviewing the joint communique
quote these passages verbatim. However, a PEOPLE'6 DAILY
editorial on the 28th refers more generally to the two "most
important points" of the PRG proposal: "U.S. i.nperialism
must spe?~dily, totally and unconditionally withdraw its troops
from South Vietnam and stop supporting the Nguyen Van Thieu
clique.'
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
SOVIET TASS and Moscow radio broadcasts carried brief,
COVERAGE Factual reports of Ph~am Van Dong's activities in
China. The reports predictably singled out his
expressions of gratitude for Soviet aid, his toasts to the
solidarity of the communist countries, and his recollection
of the call in Ho's will for a restoration of communist unity.
A commentary broadcast in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress
on 27 November cited Dong's thanks to the Soviet Union for
assistance and said that these remarks reflect "a close,
genuine internationalist relationship" between the Vietnamese
people and the peoples of the USSR and other socialist
countries. The commentary went on to cite examples of Soviet
aid, including shipments of weapons, military equipment, and
ammunition, the assistance of Soviet military specialists in
setting up a DRV antiaircrafC system, and economic aid. It
concluded with the assertion that these facts contradict
"Chinese propaganda machinery's fabrications" Chat the Soviet
Union "has betrayed the interests of the friends in Indochina."
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1 DECEHIBER 1971
COMMUNISTS DENOUNCE NEW SOUTH VIETNANfESE MOVE INTO CAMBODIA
The 22 November launching of anew ARVN operation into Cambodia
prompted official protests from the PRG's spokesman in Pxris on
the 23d, from a spokesman of Sihanouk's fcreign ministry on the
25th, and by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 30th.
Feking endorsed the Sihanouk government's protest in a
28 November PROPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which denounced
"U.S. imperialism" ~nr "this new crime of aggression" and
expressed confidence that the operation would "certainly end
in ignominious defeat."
All three Indochinese statements claimed that the United States
is behind the new military move. The PRG and DRV spokesmen,
charging that the operation is commanded by U.S. officers and
supported by U.S. aircraft, maintained that t-ie new "aggression"
demonstrates the "deceitful character" of President Pdixon's
"allegation" about the cessation of the U.S. combat role and
refraining from direct interference in Cambodia.
The ARVN incursion was also condemned in articles published 'in
the DRV party organ NHAN DAN a.nd the army paper QUAN OOI NHAN
DAN on 27 November. The papers also stressed U.S. responsibility
for the operation, with NHA.V DAN asserting that the ARVN troops
"were sent into Cambodia on U.S. orders, with direct support
of the U.S. Air Force, ani with the participation of U.S. troops."
To document the latter charge, KHAN DAN cited a Western news
report that an American captain had been seen with South
Z'ietnamese forces in Cambodia. In addition to denouncing the
Cambodian operation, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN scored "fierce U.S. air
sr_rikes," the ''scheme" to send ARVN troops into southern Laos,
and "recent repeated" air strikes against the DRV. The army
paper routinely claimed that these actions demonstrate that
"Nixon is very stubborn and still persists to scheming to
prolong and expand the war of aggression" in Indochina.
APPEAL TO CITIZENS Shortly after the launching of the ARVN
OF PHNOM PENH operation an unusual broadcast on the 23d
over Sihanouk's clandestine radio sought
to play upon Cambodian concern about fighting near the capital
and hostility toward the Saigon forces. It charged that the Lon
.Vol government had "decided that before they are completely
defeated and before they take flight abroad they will allow the
U.S. imperiali~~ts and Saigon running dogs to d~astroy Phnom Penh.'
The broadcast alleged that "according to the U.S. imperialist
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
l DECEriBER 1971
radio, on 19 November 1971 the U.S. imperialists sent planes to
bomb the outskirts of Phnom Penh and dispatched Thieu-Ky troops
to destroy Phnom Penh and quell the people." It called upon
the Cambodian people to ''prevent the Thieu-Ky gang from
entering Phnom Penh, the U.S. pirates from annihilating Phnom
Penh," and the "wounded" Lon Not regime from "escaping." The
broadcast also urged the people to take up arms against the
govern?:aent and to "evacuate" to the "liberated zone" to avoid
U.S. bombing and straf ing.
LAOS: SOUPWANOINONG LET'.?ER REVERTS TO CALL FOR BCY'~ING hIALT
Prince Souphanouvong resumes the nearly two-year-old correspondence
with Prince Souvanna Phouma on the issue of a settlement in Laos
with a hard-line letter dated 20 November and delivered on the
23d by the NLHS permanent representative ii. Vientiane, Soth
Pethrasi. This reopens the correspondence which had been
interrupted last August when Tiao Souk Vongsak, Souphanouvong's
"special envoy," left Vientiane for Sam Neua after delivering
a letter denouncing Souvanna Phouma for refusing to accept the
22 June NLHS proposal for a simultaneous bombing halt and
cease-fire throughout the whole territory of Laos.*
The current message reverts to the NLHS stand prior to the
22 June proposal in demanding that the United States "stop its
war of aggression in Laos," and that "first of all it must stop
immediately and unconditionally the bombardment of the whole
territory of Laos so that contacts may be created for the Lau
people to sit down together and settle their own affairs
without foreign interference." In apportioning the blame, the
message, like previous letters, places "full responsibility''
for the consequences of new military adventures on the Nixon
Administration and warns Souvanna Phouma that he will also have
to bear his "share" of the responsibility. While Souphanouvong's
sharpest attack is against President Nixon, he also assails
Souvanna Phouma. He claims that the situation in Laos is
worsening due to the "sinister schemes of the Nixon Administration "
and calls the President "the most barbarous murderer of our times."
But Souphanouvong also accuses Souvanna Phouma of having discussed
* For a discussion of the Souvanna Pl. ;a-Souphanouvong exchange
of letters following the 22 June NLHS proposal see the TRENDS of
14 July 1911, pages 8-9 and 11 August 1971, pages 7-8.
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l D);C):rt4}3ER 19 71
intensification of the U.S. bombing and an increase of Thai
troops in Laos with the President during his Washington visit
in September. And he warns the Prince that "unless you
resume without delay the line which conforms to the aspirations
of the nation and which you adopted in the 1961-62 period, the
Lao people will not tolerate these misdeeds of yours."
Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow media have all reported the
Souphanouvong message as usual, but thus far there has been
no comment. There has as yet been no communist acknowledgment
of Souvanna Phouma's 27 November reply to Souphanouvong which
complains that the latter once again was silent about North
Vietnamese aggression in Laos, and which repeats suggestions
that Tiao Souk Vongsak be given authority to negotiate and
that the Plain of Jars be neutralized.
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COIVI! ZDI;NTIAL rIiZS TRCNDS
1 ncccrtDl;R 197x.
cwi~vA
JOINT EDITORIAL CONDENWS "SWINDLERS.' CALLS FOR PARTY UNITY
A ,joint RLD rLAG-PLOPL>r'S DAILY-LII3LRATIUN !1RMY DAILY editorial,
released on 30 November, calls for strengthening party leader-
ship to overcome "the great harm to the unity and unification
of the party" caused b~- Liu Shao-chi and "other swindlers." The
use of a point editorial, the most authoritative form of media
comment, raises the propaganda campaign against Lin P::ao to a
higher stage and underscores the need to step up efforts to
strengthen party authority over all aspects of society. All
other point editorials issued since August 1969 have been pegged
to specific anniversaries; with none released fog National~Day
this year, the last such point editorial came on Army Day, 1 August.
Utilizing a lengthy quotation from a speech by Mao in 1964, the
current editorial recalls the past "conspiracies and intrigues"
that "emerged on the Central Committee." Plao is quoted as
saying (in 1964) that "even now persons plotting is an
objective fact." The editorial Chen pointedly observes on its
own that throughout the party's history "bourgeois careerists,
conspirators and persons having illicit relations with foreign
countries" have only brought "disgrace and destruction upon
themselves in the end."
While it is clearly indicated that plotters threaten party unity
Today, the editorial says there are only a handful of "hidden
antiparty, antisocialist counterrevolutionaries" within the
party. All party members, "particularly the. party's high-
ranking cadres," are instructed to "be frank and forthright
politically." In order to improve the work style of the party
as well as party spirit, party members ure encouraged to state
their "political views openly" and to express agreement or
opposition "on every important political issue, adhering to
what is right and correcting what is wrong."
The necessity for party committees to exercise unified
leadership "over all kinds of work" including "industry,
agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army and
the government" is given specific stress. Members of party
cotmnittees "at all levels" must work to strengthen their
concept of the party "and place themselves within the party
committee and not outside it, still less above it." Deeper
study of the works of Mar. x, Lenin and Mao is prescribed for
all party members to help them distinguish between the "Marxist
line and the opportunist line."
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rl3IS 7.'ltlsNDS
1 1)LCI~P4iil;R 1.97.1
" 3W I NDI.ERS~~ ARE ATTACI'.o has in recent years had a certain important position
in politics made himself heard by way of bourgeois channels,
alleging that only about 10 percent of the people are behind
this communist regime."
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CONFIDCNTIAL 1!IIIS 7.'BCNDS
l 1)1aCL'MI11rR 197.1
The regime's sensitivity to such statements was exemplified
further in a harsh commentary by Rohacek in the Prague domestic
service on the 29th which leveled new direct atta~~.ks on
Smrkovsky, who "dared to assert" that only l0 percent of the
populace backed the leadership, as well as on Dubcek and
Frantisek iCriegel. The commentary scored alleged Western newrr
reports that Smrkovsky "abstained" from the elections and
alleged Western efforts to exploit the recent birthday of "a
man who ie hardly remembered by anyone in this country today,
the bankrupt politician Alexander Dubcek." It appeared to
revive the spectre of prosecution of Dubcek in adding than:
a wavering opportunist has become a patron of the counter-
revolution." The talk concluded that "the mandate" of both
parrs of the CSSR "is firmly in the hands of our leadership,
and it will never be otherwise."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 DECEMBER 1971
- 33 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL CONln1ITTEE. SOVIET MEETINGS APPROVE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
Final formal ratification of the USSR's ninth five-year plan
occurred at the Central Committee plenum on 22-23 November and
the Supreme Soviet session on 24-26 November. At the plenum,
Baybakov delivered the main address on the five-year plan and
the 1972 plan, while Garbuzov reported on the budget. Brezhnev
delivered a mayor address on the party's conduct of foreign
policy since the 24th Party Congress as well as a summing-up
speech on the economic issues. These speeches have not been
released, but a plenum resolution routinely approving the
Politburo's handling of foreign policy is given w?~de publicity.
At the Supreme Soviet session, Kosygin delivered the report on
the five-year plan as well as a further closing statement
following the debate, while Garbuzov again reported on the
budget. Excerpts of Kosygin's speeches have been very widely
publicized, and text of his snd Garbuzov's speeches are carried
in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. Moat of the summaries of Kosygin's
report, as well as editorials in IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA on
27-28 November, reiterate the relatively restrained prediction
of the plan documents that total Soviet industrial and
agricultural output in 1975 will exceed the current U.S.
level of output.
The moat dramatic development of the meetings was a negative
one--Voronov was not removed from the Politburo. Last July,
almost certainly at Brezhnev's instigation, Voronov had been
demoted from RSFSR Premier to the relatively insignificant
post of chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee. It
was widely thought that he would soon be removed from the
Politburo--in what would have been the first such ouster since
late 1964 apart from the retirement of overage members Mikoyan
and Shvernik in 1966. But the plenum did no more than elevate
Mikhail Solomentsev, Voronov's successor as RSFSR Premier,
from the secretariat to candidate membership of the Politburo.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
l DECI~IBER 1971
CONSUMER GOODS Kosygitt's report displays continued high-level
seneitiv':-ry over the changed relationship
between the two sectors of industry--producer goods (Group A)
and consumer goods (Group B)--in the new five-year plan. Unlike
Brezhnev, who had candidly discussed the relationship between
the two branches of industry in his report to the 24th CPSU
Congress last March and had justified "a certain preferential
growth rate for Group B," Kosygin skirted the subject entirely.
Lnste~d of disclosing the planned growth rates for the two
sectors of industry, as he had at the congress, Kosygin merely
reported the planned growth rate for industry as a whole
(47 percent) without any breakdown by sectors. In the body
of his report, however, he gave a rounded-off growth rate for
consumer goods production in the new plan (49 percent).
Kosygin's omission was corrected in the official version of the
five-year plan published on 27 November, which reported the
growth rates for Groups A and B at 46.3 percent and 48.6 percent,
-zspectively. Commenting on these rates, a L December PRAVDA
editorial reassures its readers that the higher growth :ate for
consumer goods production "does not mean, of course, any
lessening of attention ~lven to heavy industry, which is the
foundation of the country's economic and defensive strength."
Although Kosygin gave similar reassurances, his deliberately
vague treatment of the problem highlights its sensitivity both
as a political issue and, more recently, a public relations
problem.
CONFIDENTIAL
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