THE STATUS OF THE MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100260005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 5, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No. 0476/76
March 5, 1976
SUBJECT: The Status of the Moroccan-Algerian Dispute
Introduction
The Moroccan-Algerian dispute over the Sahara
is still marked by diplomatic wrangling over the
legal status of the territory and continuing low-
level guerrilla operations by the Algerian-backed
Polisario Front. Neither side sought to escalate
the conflict following the clashes between Moroccan
and Algerian regulars inside the Sahara in late
January, and there are no indications that either
Algiers or Rabat is deliberately seeking an all-out
confrontation. Algiers seems to be concentrating
on pursuing a two-track policy of attempting to
secure UN and international censure of the Moroccan-
Mauritanian takeover while continuing to develop the
Polisario into a credible military and political
force. The Moroccans are continuing to consolidate
their hold over the territory and so far have ob-
tained support for their position from the key
Arab states. Neither Rabat nor Algiers shows any
inclination to compromise, and the Arab effort to
mediate the dispute so far has failed.
Over the next few months at least, Algiers
is likely to step up its military and logistical
support for the Polisario. The Moroccans should
be able to both defend the towns under their
control and to mount counterinsurgency operations
inside the Sahara. In an effort to expand their
area of operations, the Polisario are likely to
concentrate their major efforts against the
weaker Mauritanian forces in southern Sahara and
northeastern Mauritania. Algiers will increase
its political and economic pressure on Nouakchott
in an effort to drive a wedge beweeen Morocco and
Mauritania and to force Mauritania to abandon its
claim to the southern Sahara.
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Diplomatic Wrangling
Morocco and Mauritania have assumed de facto
control over the Sahara. Spain's role as co-
administrator of the disputed territory under the
tripartite agreement it concluded with Rabat and
Nouakchott ended last week. The legal status of
the territory, however, remains a contentious issue.
Madrid insists that its transfer of administrative
control does not resolve the question of sovereignty.
Algeria, which has rejected the tripartite agree-
ment entirely, continues to demand a referendum on
self-determination.
Morocco previously had argued that the
Saharans were consulted via the territorial
assembly last November. Nonetheless, Rabat con-
vened another special meeting of the Moroccan-
dominated assembly on February 26 to "express the
will of the people." Rabat argues that the
assembly's unanimous approval of a motion to inte-
grate the territory into Morocco and Mauritania
meets the requirement for consultations called for
in the pro-Moroccan resolution adopted by the UN
General Assembly last December that, in effect, en-
dorsed the tripartite accord.
Rabat's gambit to dispose of the troublesome
consultation process has satisfied no one but the
Moroccans. UN Secretary General Waldheim declined
a Moroccan invitation to send an observer to the
territorial assembly session. Spain wants to avoid
any association with the Moroccan scheme and has
disclaimed all responsibility for future develop-
ments in the Sahara. Algiers denounced the assembly's
action and is playing up the UN's refusal to sanction
the meeting.
The Polisario Front countered the assembly's
endorsement of the Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover
by announcing on February 27 the formation of the
"Democratic Saharan Arab Republic." The Front
controls little territory, however, and has, in
effect, set up a government-in-exile. Algiers
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undoubtedly hopes that formation of a Polisario
"government"-will strengthen the Front's political
credentials and forestall international recognition
of the Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover.
The Algerians also are working to keep the
Sahara dispute alive at the United Nations. They
will try to exploit the UN's unwillingness to accept
the Sahara assembly's action as a proper consul-
tation of the Saharan people and the pessimistic
report of a UN envoy who visited the Sahara recently
to push once again for a referendum on self-deter-
mination.
Meanwhile, Polisario guerrillas continue to
mount harassing actions in southern Morocco, the
Sahara, and northern Mauritania. Estimates of
the number of Polisario combatants range from
1,000 to 5,000 but we doubt that there are more
than 2,000-3,000 active guerrillas. The Front
depends heavily on Algeria for training, supplies,
and financial support.
Algeria Loses The First Round
Although Algerian efforts to prevent the
Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover of the Sahara have
failed, the Boumediene government refuses to accept
the takeover as a fait accompli. Algiers opposes
Moroccan absorption of the northern Sahara, with
its rich phosphate desposts, because this could
reduce Algerian predominance in North Africa.
President Boumediene has invested consider-
able prestige in the Sahara dispute. Acceptance
of Moroccan-Mauritanian control of the territory
would mean admitting humiliating defeat by King
Hassan. The Boumediene regime would survive such
a setback, but it is unwilling to swallow such a
bitter pill.
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Algeria does not seem to want a direct
military confrontation with Morocco, but it
almost certainly will continue to support
Polisario guerrilla warfare in the Sahara. The
Algerians believe that time works in favor of
liberation movements and hope the Moroccans will
be bogged down fighting a long and costly insur-
gency. Having made a political decision to back
the formation of a Polisario "government," Algiers
may also be willing to support an increased'level
of guerrilla operations.
Algerian Constraints
Although Algiers, perhaps with some continued
support from Libya, can finance a sustained insur-
gency effort, Algeria's economic development needs
are a major constraint against Boumediene's pursuing
an all-out confrontation with Morocco. In 1975,
Algiers borrowed heavily abroad to sustain its
ambitious development program and to finance its
payments deficit. The Algerians were forced to
turn to wealthier Arab states for large-scale
financial support and probably will do so again
this year. Saudi Arabia provided $400 million
in balance of payments support, a contribution
that helped the Algerians out of a short-term
currency bind.
Diplomatic support for Algeria's position in
the Sahara dispute has been less than Algiers ex-
pected. Among the Arab states, only Libya and
South Yemen publicly support Algiers. Africans
are divided on the issue; the recent OAU ministerial
meeting in Addis Ababa side-stepped the question
of recognizing the Front either as a liberation
movement or a government. Algerian lobbying at
the UN last fall produced mixed results. Although
the General Assembly adopted a pro-Algerian
resolution on the Sahara by a wide majority, it also
passed a second pro-Moroccan resolution that in
effect endorsed the tripartite agreement.
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Concern-over the possibility of a conflict
with Morocco prompted the Algerians
to seek additional military assistance. Algiers
Morocco Settles In
With the Sahara in his grasp, King Hassan
is unwilling to consider a political compromise
that would dilute his control of northern Sahara.
Almost all Moroccans, including those who oppose
the King's autocratic style of rule, have sup-
ported Hassan's campaign. He has mortagaged his
own future to securing the territory and will not
give.it up.
At the same time, Hassan cannot afford to
risk an all-out military confrontation with Algeria.
He recognizes Morocco's overall military inferiority
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Morocco has had some success in securing
diplomatic support in its dispute with Algeria
over the Sahara. While some Arab states have
avoided taking a public position in the dispute,
several, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria, have indicated their support to Rabat.
Moroccan concern about its weaker military
posture vis-a-vis Algeria has generated requests
to the US to accelerate arms deliveries provided
for under a long-term military modernization pro-
gram. The program, designed to equip two mecha-
nized brigades, establish a radar network to
support an air defense system, and provide a
second squadron of F-5 aircraft, was initiated
in 1974. Delivery dates have been advanced for
some M-48 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
some air-to-air and anti-tank missiles.
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Mauritania Faces Trouble
Mauritania, the smallest and weakest party
to the Sahara dispute, is in the most vulnerable
position. The Polisario Front has directed a
large part of its guerrilla effort at Mauritania's
weak, poorly equipped and trained, and largely in-
experienced armed forces. Algiers has exerted
pressure on Nouakchott through caustic propaganda
attacks and hostile
Algerian and Polisario pressure
Lac tics are clearly intended to drive a wedge
between Rabat and Nouakchott and ultimately to
force Mauritania to abandon its role in Sahara.
Nouakchott, at least in the short run, will
continue to follow Rabat's lead in the hope of
obtaining a share of the Sahara. It is expanding
its small army of 1300 men, but so far has had
only limited success in isolated clashes with the
guerrillas. In larger encounters with Polisario
forces, the Mauritanians have usually sought and
obtained Moroccan ground and air support.
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Mauritania, with its limited resources,
cannot afford a long and costly struggle against
the Polisario. Nouakchott may eventually seek
a way out of the dispute to avoid heavy casualties,
domestic ferment over the wisdom of-its Sahran
venture, and an economic disaster. The principal
alternatives to a long struggle are to arrange
an accomodation with the Front, possibly entailing
some form of shared administration in the southern
Sahara, or, if all else fails, to pull out of the
Sahara altogether.
Military Buildup Continues
During the past several months Rabat has
called up reservists to form about a dozen new
battalions; these units probably will be sent
to areas formerly manned by units now deployed
to the Sahara. Morocco has 10,000 to 15,000
troops in northern Sahara and about the same
number across the border in southern Morocco.
All ..14 of Morocco's flyable F-5 fighters--out
of a total inventory of 19--are in southern Morocco
or northern Sahara; northern Moroccan air space
is virtually defenseless.
Algeria has continued to strengthen its
forces along its western border with Morocco
and in the tri-border area adjacent to the Sahara.
This year's draftees were called up six months
ahead of schedule. Algiers is believed to have
formed a new motorized brigade in northwestern
Algeria and has deployed a squadron of MIG-21
fighters in the same general area. Since last
fall, the Algerians have built up their forces
between Bechar and Tindouf from some 10,000
troops to about 15,000 men;
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Evolution of the Dispute
The most likely course of developments is
continued tension between Morocco and Algeria
and a sustained insurgency effort by the Polisario
Front. Neither Hassan nor Boumediene has yet
indicated a willingness to compromise.
Morocco will be able to contain, but not
eliminate, Polisario guerrilla activity in Sahara
and southern Morocco. A counterinsurgency effort
to control the present level of guerrilla haras-
sment will be a severe though probably tolerable
drain on Morcco's resources. Algeria will be
able to sustain its commitment to a "national
liberation struggle" at a relatively small cost.
Mauritania may opt out of the dispute in the
face of the heavy drain on its limited resources.
Various Arab mediators are likely to continue their
efforts to reduce military tensions between
Rabat and Algiers.
A negotiated settlement of the dispute
is unlikely in the short run, but an eventual
political solution cannot be ruled out. Algiers
would have to settle for limited consultations
with the Saharan people that did not alter
Moroccan control. Rabat would have to accept
at least a token exercise of self-determination
and possibly establish a special administration
that provided a facade of local self-government.
A negotiated settlement in the forseeable future
likely would involve greater political costs and
loss of personal prestige for Boumediene?than for
Hassan.
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The possibility of serious clashes be-
tween Moroccan and Algerian forces will increase-
if either leader perceives a raising of the
ante in their dispute. Algiers might again
send into the Sahara some regular army units
to support Polisario operations, as was in
the case in late January when fighting occurred
at the Saharan oasis of Amgala.
If major fighting does break out, it would
most likely be confined to the Sahara and along
the long Moroccan-Algerian border. Both sides
would encounter logistic problems in sustained
fighting. Arab mediators would intervene quickly
to establish a cease-fire. In the unlikely event
of a full-scale war, the Moroccans would have an
initial advantage in the Sahara, while the
Algerians would be able to seize territory
along the Moroccan-Algerian frontier. Algeria's
forces are clearly superior to Morocco's in vir-
tually every category of medium and heavy weapons,
especially jet fighters, and in time probably
would be able to inflict a humiliating defeat on
Morocco.
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Arab Reactions
The Arabs will continue periodic efforts
to mediate the dispute and will step in quickly
to keep the lid on any hostilities between
Morocco and Algeria. No matter what course
the Sahara dispute follows, including even
major hostilities, it is likely to have few
repercussions elsewhere in the Arab world.
The dispute seems to be regarded by the
other Arabs more as a nuisance than as an op-
portunity for advancement of a "cause," and
the large majority of the Arabs simply wish
the problem would go away. Most Arabs do not
support either side with particular enthusiasm,
and the dispute has not caused a polarization
among the Arab states, as might be expected in
a stand-off between a "reactionary" and a
"progressive" regime. For example, "progressive"
Syria and Iraq sympathize not with Algeria, as
would be expected, but with Morocco.
The Arabs, in short, have their own
interests rather than "principle" uppermost
in mind in the Sahara dispute, and they are
unlikely to allow their broader policies to be
affected by their Moroccan and Algerian col-
leagues' problems.
Soviet Role
The Soviet Union has sought to avoid direct
entanglement in the Spanish Sahara conflict
because it would force Moscow to choose between
Morocco and Algeria--two states with which it
wants to maintain good relations.
The Soviets place more importance on their
relationship with Algiers, because they view
Algeria as a "progressive state" and because
they have a long standing military assistance
relationship with it. Nevertheless, Moscow's
public support for Algeria's position favoring
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self-determination for the Spanish Sahara has
been restrained. Moreover, Moscow recognizes
that Algeria has been an inconstant friend,
resistant to Soviet pressure, and it wants to
protect its significant economic dealings with
Rabat. For these reasons, the Soviets have
moved slowly in delivering promised arms to
Algiers and have not blessed the Polisario
Front as a legitimate national liberation move-
ment.
If war were to break out between Algeria
and Morocco, the Soviets would couple efforts
to end the conflict with political support for
Algeria. Moscow probably would also make at
least a limited effort to resupply Algerian
arsenals. Nevertheless, Moscow would not be
anxious to underwrite an all-out Algerian
military effort against Rabat; it would not be
sure of the outcome, particularly if it believed
Soviet military support to Algiers would lead
to increased US support to Rabat. Moscow, how-
ever, would intensify its support for Algiers
if it thought the US was moving first to increase
military shipments to Rabat.
US Role
Whatever position the US takes in the Sahara
dispute will be criticized by either Rabat or
Algiers. King Hassan will continue to press
Washington for accelerated arms deliveries and
additional military sales, as well as more visible
political support for Morocco. If fighting with
Algeria erupts, Hassan would exert intense pressure
on the US for emergency military resupply.
Algeria has condemned Morocco's military
relationship with the US and major new US arms
sales or emergency resupply of Morocco in the
event of hostilities would be viewed by Algiers
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as a serious provocation. Bilateral political
relations, already strained by the Sahara dispute,
could reach the breaking point. Although Algiers
values highly its economic ties with the US to
obtain badly needed capital and technology, some
form of economic retaliation, such as refusing
new purchases of natural gas, cannot be ruled
out.
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French Interests
France has taken a pro-Moroccan stand on
the Sahara issue, but it also wants to remain
on good terms with Algeria. Paris hopes to
preserve its considerable economic relations
with both countries. The French recognize the
prominent role Algeria plays among developing
countries--a group with which they want to
develop closer ties--but they do not want Algeria's
influence strengthened, especially at Morocco's
expense.
President Giscard d'Estaing has offered to
play a mediating role in the Sahara dispute if
asked by both sides. If serious fighting develops
between Morocco and Algeria, Paris is likely to
repeat its offer. The French might also agree to
expedite delivery of previously ordered equip-
ment to the Moroccans.
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Foreign Involvement
There is circumstantial evidence that
Havana is providing the Front with some material
support. It is quite possible that some Cubans
in Algeria are aiding Polisario guerrillas as
advisers. We doubt that more than a dozen or so
have gone into the Sahara or that they have
actually participated in guerrilla operations.
It seems unlikely that significant Cuban involve-
ment would be required by Polisario or desired
by Algiers; Cuba would almost certainly respect
Algeria's wishes.
While the Boumediene government has sought
diplomatic support, verbal backing, and material
aid for Polisario activities, it has kept the
matter almost exclusively a Saharan-Algerian
affair and will probably continue to do so. The
Algerians are experts at desert guerrilla war-
fare, drawing on their years of experience against
the French, and they do not have a military require-
ment, at least, for foreign advisers.
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