THE SPANISH SAHARA SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100250015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Spanish Sahara Situation
--Arab mediation efforts have failed to get Morocco
and Algeria to compromise. Arab League Secretary
General Riad's current effort has little chance of
success.
--Morocco continues to insist on Algerian recognition
of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara before enter-
ing into meaningful negotiations.
--Algeria refused to drop its demand for a referendum
on self determination for the people of Spanish
Sahara. Algiers maintains that the Moroccan-Mauri-
tanian takeover is illegal and that Spain is still
accountable to the UN as the administering power of
a non-self governing territory.
--Morocco should be able to contain--but not eliminate--
the Polisario Front's insurgency in Spanish Sahara so
long as the conflict remains an insurgency with only
limited Algerian support.
--An escalation of the fighting short of all-out war
would most likely produce a repetition of the incon-
clusive border war of 1963 between Morocco and Algeria.
--In the unlikely event of a full-scale war, Algeria
should win because of the numerical superiority of
its air and armored forces.
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Economic Intelli ence
Why does the Agency, rather than
some other agency, conduct economic analysis?
Why doesn't the Agency just address
and military intelligence? Political
Answer
International economics is now an foreign policy. Moreover, internationalneconomiice
impact heavily of
oil, meat y on US domestic Policy. The high matters l Economic inteadependence hasgcreaaee to events abroad.
of
paints with both the Third World and a multitude of
cti
And it is still necessar our traditional allies.
the war-making PotentialyofotherSovietnandSChinese
y to know
There is widespread acceptance of CIA's economies.
unique role:
We can provide an inde
economic issues. pendent assessment of
CIA has no stake in any
particular policy or course of action.
We provide analysis based on all kinds of
sources.
We can provide integrated analysis of the
relevant political and militar
that bear on economic Issues. y factors
And we have the ability to res and
and flexibly to the needs offi of p Policy cials.
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 Approved For Re
Recent Political Developments in China
The present political infighting in China looks both
backward and forward. It grows out of personal and political
quarrels of the past decade. At stake is the shape of the
succession to Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung.
-- The central issue is whether or not the
Cultural Revolution was really legitimate.
-- As a major victim of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the "rehabilitated" Teng Hsiao-ping
is a very controversial figure. If he
were premier the Cultural Revolution
would be in effect repudiated; the party's
left wing also feared he would take
revenge against them.
-- The left wing has not yet reversed recent
political trends.
-- Acting premier Hua Kuo-feng is a compro-
mise candidate. Politically he is closer
to Teng than to the leftists. He will
probably eventually be confirmed as per-
manent premier.
-- The left is now attempting to eliminate
Teng again from political life. The
returns on this struggle are not yet in.
Teng has many powerful friends.
-- Although a major political struggle is
under way, it does not appear that China
is in for another Cultural Revolution.
-- There is as yet no sign that major
foreign policy changes are contemplated.
Chinese officials have been insisting
that there will be no changes in this
area.
-- China's invitation to former President
Nixon indicates that Peking does not
intend to abandon its connection with
Washington. Propaganda attacks on the
Soviet Union are continuing.
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 Approved For Release
The Soviet Part Con ress
The 25th Soviet Party Congress opens on Tuesday, Feb-
ruary 24. We expect the following results:
--Brezhnev and the core of top leaders will be
reconfirmed in office.
--Some leadership changes are likely at the
secondary level; if a top leader should de-
part, Premier Kosygin seems the most likely.
--Shifts among second-echelon leaders may offer
some clues about how the succession problem
will develop in the post-Congress period.
--The basic outlines of present policies will
be reaffirmed, but account will be taken of
policy disappointments and difficulties.
--Brezhnev will come out for a new SALT agree-
ment and for getting detente with the US back
on the tracks--while noting the increasing
activity of "anti-detente forces" in the US.
--He will emphasize Soviet leadership of the
world communist movement as well as support
for national liberation movements.
--Concerning the economy, the leadership will
try to gloss over the worst aspects and will
stress improving quality and efficiency at
this stage rather than quantitative growth.
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ANGOLA
-- After more than six months of fighting, the conventional
aspect of the war in Angola is over.
-- In the north, the National Front has retreated into
Zaire and is finished as a political and military force.
Zairian President Mobutu, the National Front's long-time
backer, is now attempting to reach an accommodation with
the Luanda regime of Agostinho Neto. Neto's prime minister
is scheduled to travel to Kinshasa this weekend for dis-
cussions with Mobutu.
-- As a result of the Popular Movement's overwhelming
military superiority, National Union leader Jonas Savimbi's
forces are now confined to remote areas of southeastern
Angola.
-- Savimbi claims he will continue fighting a guerrilla
war. Some local skirmishing is going on, but in the long
term we doubt Savimbi can maintain an effective insurgency.
-- Thus far, the Popular Movement and Cuban forces in
the south have made no move against the South African
forces still in southern Angola. The South Africans are
approximately 30 miles inside Angola while the Popular
Movement is still some 100 miles away from the South
African lines.
-- The OAU has officially endorsed the Neto regime as
the Peoples Republic of Angola and only six OAU members
have not yet recognized the Luanda government. Major
European governments, led by France and Great Britain,
are extending recognition.
-- The Neto government faces formidable tasks in extend-
ing its political control throughout Angola and in
restoring Angola's potentially rich but shattered economy.
The Popular Movement will need extensive technical and
financial support from the Cubans and Soviets for some
time to come.
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USSR: Military Costing
The Washington Star carried several stories this week
claiming that CIA has been grossly underestimating Soviet
defense spending and that new information has caused CIA
to double its estimates. Would you please comment on these
allegations?
--The man who wrote the stories has obviously talked to a
number of people in Washington about the problem. As is
often the case in such matters he got some things right,
some things partly right and some things wrong.
--It is true that CIA is engaged in a review of a large new
body of evidence bearing on our estimates of Soviet ruble
defense spending. Preliminary indications are that our
estimates of the number of rubles the Soviet spend for
defense will be substantially higher than in the past.
It is important to note, however, that this review is not
yet complete.
--It is even more important not to misconstrue the implica-
tions of this reassessment. If the forthcoming estimates
do indeed show defense activities cost more rubles than
we had believed:
--it would mean that we have been crediting Soviet
defense industries with being more efficient
than they are;
--it would mean that the Soviets have been willing
to bear a greater burden for defense than we
had believed;
--on the other hand, it would not mean the Soviets
have recently engaged in a more rapid buildup of
their forces than previously believed,
--it would not mean that the physical size of Soviet
forces--as measured in dollars--were any larger
than we have believed. These estimates are based
on direct observation of their forces, not on
ruble costs.
--Nor would it mean that the capabilities of Soviet
forces are any greater. A different body of
force related data, including technical character-
istics, must be considered for such judgments.
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