NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AMENDED WORKING GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: MIN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL I INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
WORKING C. OUP
Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting
1030 Hours, 29 January 1975
NSC Conference Room, EOB
Chairman: LTG Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC
Members present: Mr. Leslie H. Brown, Dept . of State
(representing Mr. George S. Vest
Director, Bureau of Politico--Military
Affairs)
Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs)
Mr. William N. Marell, Special
Assistant to the Secretary on National
Security, Department of the Treasury
LTG John H. Elder, J-5 (Plans and
Policy), JCS
Mr. Richard Ober, NSC Staff, Executive
Secretary of the NSCIC.
Others present: VAdrn Earl F. Rectanus, with Mr. Ellsworth
George A. Carver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO J
agenda Item l: Briefing on i;h.e National Intel.l_iaerice Officers
1. Mr. George Carver, Deputy`to the DCI for National
Intelligence Officers, described the functioning and structure
of the NIO organization. He said it represented an effort
to cope with the bureaucratic: problem of organizing resources
against changing problems without a constant reorganization.
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2. Mr. Carver cited CIA efforts to cope with the
Southeast Asia problem during the 1960's as an example. of an.
effort to adapt changing problems and organizational responses.
He noted Mr. McCone had used a "kitchen cabinet" system of
informal advisors on SEA problems. Admiral Rahorn sought to
establish a line organization, but CIA was not structured to
accommodate such. The end result was creation of a staff
directly responsible to the DCI and collectively aware of
everything CIA was doing, but not disturbing internal lines
of authority. This same concept. of a corps of senior officers
directly responsible to the DCI for estimates was used in
setting up the NIOs, which Mr. Carver described as"roving
linebackers" for the DCI: in gcographic'or topical areas. Dr.
Schlesinger, while DCI, laid the basis for the NIO concept;
and Mr. Colby brought the organization into being.
3. Each NIO is a conselor/spokesman to both the Community
and consumers in his area of responsibility, but has no line
authority. The authority of each NIO is derived from his
position as advisor to the DCI. Each NIO must be cognizant
of intelligence resources in his area, know how these resources
can be brought to bear,'and serve as DCI spokesman to users.
He is expected to be knowledgeable of user needs and of the
capabilities of Intelligence Community consumers and producers.
/l. Mr. Ellsworth asked if, since each NIO is an individual
-representative.._.of the DCI, it was expected the NIOs would
change whenever a new DCI was appointed.
5. Mr. Carver said, yes., commenting that Mr. Colby's
concept is that NIOs should serve a rotational two-year tour
to avoid development of.a rig:Ld organization.
6. Mr. Carver described the responsibilities of the. 11
NIOs now serving and commented on the various intelligence
organizations represented as either NIO pr Assistant NIO in
each area. Mr. Carver emphasized that he was not an admi.nistra--
tive buffer or substantive filter for the individual NIOs
and the DCI, but sought to serve as a clearinghouse on NI;O
matters. He personally maintained close contact with officers
at the level of Assistant Secretary and above and senior
program officials within the Intelligence Community. .
7. Mr. Carver described the coordination system used
in the development of papers sponsored by the NIO}, emphasizing
that while the elaborateness of coordination depends on time
availability, the NIOs are charged with seeking to get a
product which reflects the best thinking of the Community.
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8. The NIO tool for focusing the Community on major,
current concerns, Mr. Carver. said, is the KIQs. He noted
ha.t in _afc wrld,~laQ$QNC would draft these
{IQ ', but as a practical matter, the COs e '~,. a an icipate
tie needs of major users and develop the NIOs in concert
with Community colleagues. He noted that a "strategy" has
been developed by the NIOs and the Community for each,of the
69 Fy--1975 KIQs, and at the end of the year an after action
report will be prepared on how well the Community has done.
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9. Commenting on relations with the Intelligence
Community Staff, Mr.. Carver rioted that. the IC focuses on
resources in a broad sense, and the NIQs on substantive
matters, but that there was a "gray area" of.common concern
since some issues involve both. He considers the present
arrangement is working well. The NIO system is still evolutionary,
but Mr. Carver feels that it has given the DCI "comfort"
about his control over the substantive intelligence output.
10. In response to a suggestion from General Wilson,
Mr. Carver described how the topics for estimates are selected
and the process by which estimates are produced.
11. He emphasized that although the NIO assumed the
Board of National Estimate's functions, the NIOs, have a
broader scope since BNE was not concerned with collection
capabilities
12. Mr. Carver said that any NSC member or, in practical
terms, his senior staff officers or senior intelligence
community officers, can request or suggest an NIE topic. It
is the NIO role to find out ''what does the requester need,"
and it may not be an NIT. If a formal estimate is to be
prepared, the DCI must approve the topic. No formal list of
future estimates is developed, but decisions are made on a.
case--by-case basis.
13. Once the topic has been selected, the NIO selects a
chairman (usually not the NI() himself) responsible for the
initial draft. The NIO has no line authority, but he can
request the head of a production organization to make the
desired chairman available. The first draft is a non-
institutional product. It belongs to the NIO. Drafters do
not "vote the stock" of their parent component. After the
draft is approved by the NIO and the chairman, it is circulated
to the USIB organi:nations. A group of representatives
considers the draft, and it then goes to the USIB.
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14. Mr. Carver emphasized that considerable effort is
taken to avoid masking differ.onces of view. If there are
contrary views, these are argued in advocacy form in the
text of the estimate. He considers that consumers should be
aware if there are clear differences of opinion, but they
should not be provided a wide variety of views among which
they can make their own selection. What the estimate drafters
try to do is focus on true differences. and ensure significant
differences of opinion are reflected in-the document. He
noted that in some instances,, it has turned out that the
institution from which the drafter came did not share the
drafter's opinion when the document reached USIB for final
consideration.
15. Mr. Morell asked how consumers really use the .
.NIOs. He saw the NIO as responsible for laying out strategy,
coordinating requirements, and getting coordination, but
this represents only about fie percent of Treasury requirements.
He said he did not go to the NIO for specific economic
information and 95 percent of the Treasury contacts were
with intelligence officers responsible for substance. He
asked if this was the way the NIO system was expected to
work in the future.
16. Mr. Carver replied that a person who knew whom to
call could operate as Mr. Morell described, but that any levy
-- on an individual officer is referred to the appropriate NIO.
"If' the NIO considers the wrong office has been contacted or
others should be involved, he can move to see to it the
request is properly handled. When a consumer has a problem
and does not know whom to call, he should contact the NIO.
-- 17. Admiral Rectanus said that OSD officers'call the
Director, DIA, not an NIO; and if DIA could not handle the
problem, it would contact the NIO.
18. Referring to what he called a "continuing, unresolvable
pr. oble.m at USIB," Mr. Carver referred to relations between
the NIOs and the military services. He said the NIOs have
no desire to intrude on or disrupt the DIA role as head of
the military intelligence effort, but when there are
y ~, , problems
on which a military service has high expertise, the NIO will
not refuse to discuss that matter with the service involved.
He admitted this is a "thin wire to walk." if a component
is to work on a Community task in which it is expert, the
.NIO, in Mr. Carver's view, must be able to deal directly
with that service.
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19. Mr. Ellsworth said the comments were very helpful.
Mr. Ober said the Working Group was trying to involve itself
in the substantive Objectives and the KIQs so the group
could play a role in assessing and implementing the NIO
effort.
20. Mr. Carver said the KIQs were more than a requirements
list. The. components of the Community need a more definitive
focus. fie specifically mentioned the need of NSA for authoritative
tasking as a basis for its doing one thing and not another.
He said the KIQs provided this kind of tasking, but if the
system is to be effective-, there is a heed for an expression
from consumers as to what is needed and what can be done:
without.
'Agenda Item 2: Approval of the Minutes' of the ?20 November
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Meeting
a revised and updated set of substantive objectives. He
said that if each member focused on one or, two objectives
close to his area of interest, it might be possible to get
agreement at the meeting on a new set of five or six objectives.
If the members wished to submit separate lists and agreement:
was not reached during the meeting, he would assume the task
of assembling a final list from the inputs and disseminate it with a request for telephonic concurrence. fie said he
would like to go to the NSCIC rather soon with a request for
concurrence on the new list. General Wilson said that new
DCI management objectives for FFY-19'16 are being developed,
and since they will flow in :part from the substantive objectives,
it was desired to have the new listing of substantive objectives
by mid-February.
22. Mr. Morel..l noted that at the last meeting he had
submitted a list of proposed: changes in intelligence products
and wondered what had happened. General Wilson said that
for the next meeting he proposed to present a work program
listing in priority order subjects which should be undertaken
-in response to.-the inputs previously made such as those from
Mr. Morell. He said the proposed work plan would be disseminated
before the next meeting.
Agenda. Item 3: Substantive Objectives for the DCI's "Objectives
for the Intelligence Community for FY. l9 16"
23. In accordance with the memorandum sent to members
on 1.6 January enclosing the DCI's substantive objectives for
FY-1975, General. Wilson asked for suggestions and inputs for
amendment to paragraph 64 as proposed by Admiral Rectanus
21. The minutes were approved with inclusion of an
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244. As a general comment, Mr. Morell said the present
substantive objectives used the term "reliable, timely,
comprehensive assessments," but the objectives should apply
to all kinds of production; and he suggested the word assess-
ments be replaced by "intelligence." He also felt it was
important that it be made clear the objectives referred to
intelligence relevant to U.S. policy and negotiations and
not to basic tomes like the National Intelligence Survey.
He suggested the introduction should read, "provide reliable
and timely intelligence relevant to U.S. policy and negotiations
on the following priority topics."
25. General Wilson called on Mr. Ellsworth, who said he
had no comment. Admiral Rectanus said it should be made
clear that if the phrase, "policy and negotiations" were
used, matters of importance for military operations were not
being excluded. He noted "this whole other world exists."
26. Mr. Brown said it was not clear to him what utility
these objectives served. Were they for presentation to
Congress or for guidance to the Community? Is there an
analog to the Defense program and planning documents? He
said the present objectives were "all things to all men" and
could justify 500 intelligence targets. He did not consider
they were useful as a means of identifying where the real
intelligence effort should be put. He felt that the first
and second sentences of objective two represented entirely
different topics. He wondered what the phrase, "political
capability to exert influence or power" in objective two
really meant.
27. In response to a comment that, as written, the Objectives
were not useful to the consumers, Mr. Ober noted that the con-
sumers themselves should write the Objectives which should then
be used as a basis for drafting new KIQs.
28. Mr. Carver said the objectives were an attempt by
the DCI to focus the Intelligence Community on the five
major matters that concern consumers most. He said objectives
one and two were deliberately split--the first to apply to
political intelligence and the second to military capabilities
of the USSR. He noted it would take time to reverse the way
requirements have traditionally been viewed; and this is
what the Objectives/KIQ process is intended to change. He
cited activities of a CIA Station Chief as an example, and
Mr. Brown commented that he thought that the existing objectives
list would enable a Station Chief to fit anything he is
doing into the list.
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 A pro d For Rele ber- a03thalA-RDP8onsideRredlt consumers must
be more active ineveloping intelligence requirements and that
the consumer must drive the requirements process rather than
being a passive recipient. Mr. Ellsworth responded that the
consumers can focus on the KIQs better than on the Objectives.
Mr. Ober then said that was why he felt intelligence consumers
should draft the KIQs. Mr. Ober added that he considered NSCIC
participation in the formulation of the Objectives to be an
important milestone in the development of the role of the con-
sumer in articulating his needs to the Intelligence Community.
30. General Wilson said that the present effort is to
simplify the process by identifying the basic consumer needs
and intelligence objectives and refining KIQs and other
requirements from these objectives.
31. Mr. Ober said there was a need to get the cycle
adjusted so that the consumer is in the process earlier and
has more time to formulate Objectives and KIQs. He
said he had NSC Staff suggestions for revisions of the
proposed Objectives and would provide a copy to General Wilson.
32. General Elder also submitted a proposed listing of
five tentative objectives, and noted that they turned out to
be quite similar to the existing objectives. Mr. Morell
submitted a proposed change to objective four noting that
the focus should be on crisis situations and not on areas.
33. Mr. Ober said he felt the existing Objectives would
hold with amendments but that either a sixth Objective should
be added or Number five should be expanded to include specific
references to several aspects of the oil problem.
314. General Wilson said. he would have the proposals
which had been submitted reviewed and would concur with Mr.
Carver on development of a revised set to be submitted to
the members.
Agenda Item 4: The Omnibus NSCID
35. General Thomas reported on the status of the omnibus
NSCID, on which the NSCIC has tasked the Working Group for a
recommendation as soon as USIB coordination is completed.
USIB considered the NSCID on 5 December, but since then DIA
has proposed additions and a restructuring of the document.
The revised draft has not yet been resubmitted to the USIB,
but in view of the ongoing investigations of the Intelligence
Community, the DCI may well want to have an approved document
on hand on short notice. Conversely, the DCI may decide to
defer formal submission of the omnibus NSCID to the NSC in
the expectation that major changes may be called for in
existing NSCIDs, which the omnibus NSCID is intended to
replace. General Thomas said. it was with the first of these
situations in mind that the Chairman had considered it
appropriate to make the Working Group aware of the current
status of the paper.
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36.
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li.sted the only matters in the
present draft which had not yet been considered by the USIB
as these:
a. The DIA proposal that all intelligence elements
of the Defense Department be included under a single
paragraph heading--which paragraph would represent
about 45 percent of the total length of the paper.
b. A rather detailed treatment of DIA responsibilities
internal to the Defense Department.
c. A brief general statement-proposed by DIA on.
the internal intelligence functions of the military
departments and services.
d. A revision of materials from the proposed NSCID
No. 9 on CIA foreign intelligence operations within the
United States and clandestine operations affecting U.S.
citizens abroad. The text of NSCID No. 9 is still
beirXq.X@afted .
37. suggested that on completion of USI}3
consideration of the omnibus NSCID, the Working Group task
would essentially be to draw two conclusions as the basis
for its recommendation:
First, does the omnibus NSCID?represent a satisfactory
codification of the existing NSCIDs, with appropriate updating
to reflect changes in matters which the present eight NSCIDs
address, and
Second, is the material which has been added to
cover matters not previously addressed in any NSCID appropriate
for inclusion in a NSC directive. Assuming the document
remains as now drafted, these additions would include material
from the proposed NSCID No. 99, a sub-paragraph on national
reconnaissance activities, a sub-paragraph on the DIA, a
sub-paragraph on the military intelligence services, a
paragraph on the Treasury Department and a paragraph on the
Energy Resources Development Administration.
38. If either of these conclusions is negative, General
Thomas suggested it would be the responsibility of the
Working Group to recommend such additional action as it
. considered appropriate.
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39. General Wilson commented that he saw an anomaly in
the Working Group being tasked to review and make a reconimenda-
tion on an omnibus NSCID which was essentially a management;
document. He wondered whether the group might want to
indicate that it considered the NSCID outside its
jurisdiction and suggest that.the DCI send the USIB-
coordinated document directly to the NSC.
110. Mr. Ober noted that this situation had arisen
because the DCI originally had referred the omnibus NSCID to
the NSCIC for approval of the concept. Nothing in. the NSCIC
charter applies to this. He asked whether the Working Group
might respond only on those parts of the document which were
appropriate to a.group of intelligence consumers since, in
any event, there would be a NSC staff and Dr. Kissinger
position on the paper.
111. General Wilson said this would make the task simpler,
and, in response to a question, he replied that production
responsibilities were addressed and identified in the document.
112. Mr. Carver said that; USIB members may differ on how
producer roles are to be defined, in which case there would
be a DCI recommendation. Mr? Carver felt that the DCI may
consider a document of this kind very useful to him, and.
even though future legislative actions could require a re-do
of the omnibus--NSCID, Mr. Carver hoped that would not defer
action on the paper:
. 113. Mr. Ellsworth asked what the impact of the Rockefeller
Commission recommendations m ght be, and Mr. Carver suggested
the DCI may or may not want to delay the paper until these
recommendations become known.
114. Mr. Ober felt that USIB action should continue, but
he wondered about NSC action., in particular since the provisions
of NSCID No. 9 would be directly relevant to Rockefeller
Commission proceedings.
.115. General Wilson said he did not feel these were
questions the Group was ready to address.
116. Mr. Ellsworth said the Defense Department was not
prepared to move on the draft until to questions had been
settled--one involving structure of the document with respect
to inclusion of all Defense elements under the Department of
Defense, and the other involving the inadequac of the 25X1A9a
content with respect to Defense components.
said that the present re-draft has all Defense elements in a
single paragraph and the other DIA inputs had been included
exactly as written by DIA, but the DCI reaction to the re-
draft had not been obtained.
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clarity as to the responsibilities of the Intelligence
Community and the internal. responsibilities of Defense
components.
48. General Wilson closed the discussion with the
comment that responsibility for, this was now up to USIB..
149. General Wilson asked if there were any suggestions
as to topics for future meetings. He said he wanted to
develop- a list of projects the Group :should address in order
of priority. Some matters, he felt, could be handled by
briefing papers which could be disseminated, with questions
and comments handled at a following meeting. He mentioned
three possible projects: (1) a review of national intelligence
publications, (2) development of an effective process for
obtaining consumer reaction to particular products----he noted
the Intelligence Community Staff already was working on
this--, and (3) a mechanism for Working Group participation
in the Key Intelligence Questions process.
(At this point a copy of the IC Staff 25X1X4.
study was provided each member.)
50. Mr. Ober said he hoped that the Working Group would
form a sub-group for product review, and he would like to
discuss how this might be done at the next meeting.
51. Mr. Morell said, it would be useful if the group
could get an evaluation of where the Congressional Select
Committees seem to be heading.,
The session adjourned at 1200 hours.
25X1A9a
Executive Secretary
)SCIC Working Group
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