COORDINATION OF THE CIA SERIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040062-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: February 16, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Assistant Director, Chief, Global Survey Group
Coordination of the CIk Series
Reference: Memorandum for the Director from the Chief, ICAPS, 8 February 1949
1. The Reference, para. 6, implicitly recommends that the CIA
Series be subjected to the same processes of coordination as are
required in the case of the ORE Series. The basis of this recortenda-
tion is indicated in para. 7, which says:
...the basic law and regulation under which we function give to
CIA the responsibility for only national intelligence, and the
method of setting up national intelligence is participation by
the various established intelligence agencies...
2. The concept of national irfelligence indicated in the foregoing
quotation is obviously taken from the "Dulles Report", where, I believe,
it finds official expression for the first time. It is entitled to
respectful consideration, but is, in my opinion, the most controversial
aspect of the "Dulles Report" and certainly has not yet the force of
"basic law and regulation."
3. This controversial concept equates "national intelligence"
to "coordinated intelligence" in terms that made "coordinated intelli-
gence" mean nothing more than "joint intelligence". But I know, of
my own knowledge, that CIA was created to produce, as "strategic and
national policy intelligence", something above and beyond joint intelli-
gence. "Strategic and national policy intelligence" (now called
"national intelligence" for short) was understood in terms of the func-
tion such intelligence was intended to serve, not in terms of a particu-
lar method of production. The essential idea with respect to the
production of such intelligence was expressed in the term "final synthesis":
it was to be an authoritative final evaluation and synthesis of all avail-
able intelligence, free from the influence of departmental bias. A
process of "coordination" was retained, not because joint intelligence
was the end in view, but as a means of discovering and noting any
departmental position substantially different from the essentially
independent final analysis and :i_nterpretation of CIA.
4. Admittedly, this clear concept has been lost sight of in the
confusion of thought which has existed since June,1946. It is still
valid, however, and is consonant with the existing "basic law and
regulation." Moreover, the Dulles-ICAPS concept finds no explicit
support in the existing law and regulations.
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5. The law says only that CIA shall "correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national security". It makes no
stipulation with respect to "coordination": it is CIA that is to
correlate and evaluate, language originally used to express the
concept of independent final analysis and. interpretation set forth
above.
6. NSCID No. 1 defines "national intelligence" in terms of the
national security its function), not in terms of "coordination" of
any other process of production. It specifies that, insofar as is
practicable, CIA shall not duplicate departmental research, but shall
make use of departmental' facilities and production. It says nothing
whatever about any coordination of interpretation.
7. NSCID No. 3 describes "national intelligence" as "integrated"
(not "coordinated" departmental intelligence. This distinction appears
to be deliberate and points toward the original concept ("final synthesis")
rather than the Dulles-ICAPS concept of CIx's'function. Coordination
is referred to only with respect to the procurement of departmental
contributions for CIA consideration, not with respect to any process of
joint interpretation.
8. DCI 31, intended to "facilitate departmental participation
in the preparation of national intelligence", is the highest law or
regulation pertinent to the subject and the Reference. In view of the
preceding demonstration, its relevant provisions must be regarded as
a matter of current policy rather than of compliance with the law or
with NSC direction. DCI 3/1 prescribes various procedures .or obtaining
departmental contributions to and concurrence or dissent on "national
intelligence reports and estimates" (the SR and ORE Series). It
specifically provides that coordination is not required with respect to
current intelligence.
9. DCI 3/1, dated 8 July 1948, was contemporary with the tenth
number in the CIA Series (CIA 7-L.8). It was specifically understood
at that time that the procedures prescribed therein with respect to the
ORE Series were not intended to apply to the CIA Series, which, by
mutual agreement with the departmental agencies, was already accepted,
for these purposes, as current intelligence.
10. This agreement was not reached on any basis of abstract
consideration, but as a result of practical experience. Initially wTe
undertook to coordinate items in the CIA Series as though they were
items in the ORE Series. CIA-1 (September 1947) was so coordinated, at
a cost in time and effort, to the agencies as well as to ourselves, far
in excess of any resultant benefit. CIA-2 was not-coordinated, for
absolute lack of any time in which to do so. I do not recall precisely
when the agencies begged off. They may well have been prompted to do
so by their relief on those occasions when coordination proved impossible
to accomplish for want of time. In any case, I do recall distinctly
that agreement to regard the CIA Series as current intelligence was
reached on agency initiative and was as much for the relief of agency
analysts as for our benefit. If any agency representative now wantsto
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resume coordination, he is presumably a headquarters character arguing
in the abstract without appreciation of the practical consequences of
his proposal.
11. This observation has particular application in the case of
State. One obstacle to the efficient coordination of any appreciation
of global scope, such as items in the CIA Series, is the lack of any
unit in the IAC agencies comparable to G/GS. To coordinate with us in
such a case OIR has to employ a team of half a dozen area specialists.
Each such specialist is inclined to demand that his area be treated as
though it were the sole subject of consideration. The net result is
vexatious delay and diversion of effort for us and a much greater loss
in man-hours for OIR, without substantial effect upon the tenor of the
estimate.
12. The Series is presently prepared with cognizance of departmental,
views as conveyed to us through various media and in discussions relative;
to estimates in the ORE Series. Specific prior consultation with depart-
mental specialists would consume their time and ours without contributing
materially to the preparation of the initial draft. Moreover, experience
shows that the comment elicited in the process of coordinating a draft
of such scope and character as an item in the CIA Series is essentially
editorial in character and without significant substantive effect.
13. It is, of course, quite feasible to coordinat items in the
CIA Series as though they were items in the ORE Series, but it can be
done only at considerable cost in loss of timeliness and in terms of
man-hours expended,without commensurate gain. Under present procedures,
which include elaborate coordination within ORE, it is necessary to
write in terms of the situation existing ten days in advance of the
publication date. The imposition of external coordination would require
allowance of at least an additional week, very definitely impairing the
timeliness of the appreciation as of its date of publication. (In this
connection ICAPS should be advised that there is not, and cannot be, in
real life any such thing as a meaningful oral coordination.) Moreover,
in view of the fact that the Global Survey Group is already experiencing
difficulty in giving proper attention to its many and various commitments,
the additional consumption of time (approximately one man-week) would
require the provision of an additional member to the Group. These
consequences could be avoided only be relieving G/GS of any responsibility
for prior consultation and subsequent coordination with the Branches of
ORE. This development is, indeed, the logical ultimate consequence of
the position taken by DAPS. If consultation and coordination with the
departmental agencies (including consultation with half a dozen area
specialists in OIR) is the controlling consideration, consultation and
coordination with the Branches of ORE is an unnecessary and inconsequential
duplication and the best procedure would be to set up a permanent inter-
departmental committee to produce the monthly review for the Security
Council.
14. The issue is, in essence, whether the CIA Series is intended
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or desired to be (as we suppose) a responsible synthesis and interpreta-
tion of the developing global situation, written with cognizance of
departmental views, but with independent judgment, or merely a routine
joint intelligence periodical.
1s. I recommend that the Director be briefed with respect to the
foregoing considerations and advised to defer decision on this incidental
matter pending a basic policy decision by the NSC with respect to the
doctrine enunciated by the Dulles Report and latterly copied by ICiLPS
in this connection. If,however, an immediate decision in conformity with
the Reference is taken, I recommend that he then be advised to form at
once a permanent IAC subcommittee to continue the CIA Series.
LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE
cc AD/ORE
S/PP
G/SI
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