(Sanitized) PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

~1. Still think this artifical numbering systme in the introduction ought to
be abandoned in favor of the usual type of summary. If nothing else were gained,
you would at least reduce unwonted emphasis on not-too-brilliant sounding
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points like the improbability of attempted dominance in Latin America.
Minor considerations like this could be bet"er incorporated into a paragraph
of miscellany.
Another and similar approach would combine the political and military
in one very brief summary; then place separate xummaries before. each part.
Body p. 2. This is the nub of the big argumwnt of the other day, and
I suppose there is little that could develop in it now but an impasse, but
poisonally, I just don't find it convincing even yet.
The argument, so far
as I can see, is mainly based on the word "inconceivable" which doesn't sup port
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an argument. Over and above this, it says that faced with physical
destruction would give prior consideration to ideological destruction. Well,
ILLEGIB
would tkey? As of today, contemplating this
eventuality as something in the remote future---probably so.. But, as
000036
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pointed out, the other day, when the actual bomb is under your actual house and
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WW-
'Ir
the fuse is lit, you can do some quick and sometimes peculiar thinking. Even the
might, under such c ircumstwrtces and perhpaps vaguely to their surprise,
find quite a lot of sweetness and light in the Soviet system, given proper
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international cooperation and a chance of - leadership. Even if this
view is settex is 179.9 0 off the beam, oughtn't it to be glen a chance? Can
we state any more than that we believe that, even in the most stringent q
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circumstances, t e would never fall us and give the most cogent possible
reasons to substantiate our position?
Or, if, we can't be 100% convincing on this crucial point, saga wouldn't
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it be better simply to admit that the - like any other people, will have
/p.9) The Near East section is better because it goes into more considerations,
but a lot of it sounds practically like double-talk to me. E.G. "Nevertheless,
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an increasing d identity- of views between the US and the M is likely to flow
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from the presently increased coordination, although th extent of holdings
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will compel the M to retain a strpng voice in future joint policies regarding
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22
Among other tings, the ultimate question I asked last time is still
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unanswered' if it became a question or the US or what would the M do?
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Frdm 1st drat of ORS 79.49---Technical aspects, p. 18:
"Only if we shoull succeed in circumventing her present tight cordon, would we
expect her to dredge from her Pandora's box any new hornets."
p. 48-.--"Until they certain intelligence questions) are answered, we are always
u
in the position of Fitt in Blind Man's Buff---we could just as easily pin
the tail o* a friend instead of a jackass."
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