EXTRACTS FROM SECTION V. (PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040032-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: STUDY

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Extracts from Section V. (Preliminary Recommendations)
1. In cooperation with appropriate agencies, offices and
committees, the IC Staff will sponsor and chair, perhaps on an
annual basis, a review of collection products in terms of their
format, timeliness, assigned priorities, and general usefulness
to analytical consumers. Emphasis in this review will be placed
on means to help consumers understand the significance of infor-
mation provided to them.
2. The IC Staff will review the existing system of collection
requirements in terms of its ability to respond quickly and effectively
in crisis situations. This review will concentrate on the identifica-
tion of the principal questions which need to be answered during a
crisis. It will lead to the establishment of a system which would--
through person-to-person contacts and lively exchanges of infor-
mation and opinions- -promote the search for actual information
and the formulation of analytical judgments; such a system will
not try to assess the data as it arrives or seek to draw up formal
lists of requirements.
3. The Community as a whole will establish a common alert
mechanism to deal with crisis situations.
1. IC Staff, with all-agency participation, will develop
regular systems to be implemented by the NIOs to ensure that
serious divergent points of view and conflicting elements of infor-
mation not be submerged by managerial fiat or the mechanism
of reinforcing consensus.
a. Such systems will be charged in addition with
ensuring that in a crisis the analytical Community is
aware of the significance collectors attach to the
information being provided.
b. Such systems will also be charged with ensuring
the establishment of means to provide the views of devils'
advocates, adversary procedures, and the use of gaming
techniques as appropriate.
2. A community-wide review will be undertaken under the
IC Staff to determine the advisability of revamping existing warning
mechanisms, procedures, publications, doctrines, and analytical
methodologies; and to study ways to assign a clear warning function
to production offices and analysts; and to recommend ways to
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Crisis Study
OPERATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DURING THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
6-25 OCTOBER 1973
The purpose of this element of the Arab-Israeli post-mortem is to
examine the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the intelligence community
in supporting the national consumers' need for intelligence during the
period 6-25 October 1973. Special attention is being given to the operation
of the various agency task forces which were created in response to this
crisis with emphasis being placed upon interagency coordination, the quality
of the products produced, and recommendations concerning how the operation
of these task forces might be improved.
Extensive interviewing throughout the intelligence community has been
conducted. Insofar as possible, national consumers have been queried.
(.'
However, none of the principals (Sec/Def, Sec/State, JCS, etc.) have been
interviewed. In addition, the principal products which the principal
intelligence agencies produced hat been collected and reviewed.
The findings of this element of the post-mortem, as I see it now,
will not be startling. The principal shortcomings of the current crisis
response system are fairly well known already. I believe that the principal
value of this.study will be to provide further ammunition to advance the
cause of improving community communications in times of crisis, encourage
more communit crisis reports (i.e., amalgamate DIA/CIA Sit Reps, etc.) and
to further emphasize the need for more intelligence analysis and less
factual reporting. Another issue may be a recommendation to get NSA/NPIC
more into the production business.
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The final product growing out of this element of the post-mortem,
as I see it now, will likely be a relatively low key memorandum or series
of memorandums rather than a report of the scale of
1 December magnum opus.
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Arab-Israeli War Study
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Status of Post-Mortem Studies
anuary 1974
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1. The original Phase II stud has been narrowed 25X6
material is ready for posting.
in order to make the "new tan avai a e, we designed a "posting machine"
which will eliminate the requirement of many feet of blackboards. There
has been a considerable delay in the delivery of this machine which is, in
turn, delaying the execution of this project. 25X6
2. Within the next few days we will have the DIA 'al
ro 'ect
beyond the intelligence
implications, is study also has implications on management and exploita-
tion of collection.
3. A special oral briefing has been prepared on how the NOIAN
NOIWON nets could have been used during Phase I (pre 6 October) of the
Middle-East crisis. This briefing is related to the question of alerting
procedures in the intelligence as well as operational community.
4. A study on the exploitation of intelligence, particularly
emphasizing the collation of intelligence with "overhead" collection,
is being outlined. This will also relate to the alerting and management
mechanisms and procedures noted in 2 above. This should be done in
cooperation with group.
Distribution:
Orig - PRG Subj
1 - PRG Chrn
1 - TGB Chrn
IC/PRG/TGB:smg 11 Jan 74
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Mr. Colby addressed the question of subsequent post-mortem
reports on the Middle East during the pre-USIB session on 11 Decem-
ber. I will recount my impressions of his remarks as best I can in
what follows, but I am not wholly certain that my interpretations of
the DCI's remarks are 100 percent accurate.
Mr. Colby made two major points of interest to us:
1. As he sees it, Phase II of our effort will be
devoted primarily (perhaps even almost exclusively)
to an examination of the period following 6 October.
What he implied, I think, is that this Phase II exami-
nation should be a fairly general one, along the lines
of the existing Preliminary Report, but presumably
shorter and less ambitious. This does not rule out,
in my mind, the issuances of separate reports con-
cerning, for example, collection problems, nor does
it require a single Phase II effort. But it does reflect
the DCI's relative disinterest in future lengthy explora-
tion of the Community's performance during the Middle
East crisis. Which leads us to a second major point:
2. Mr. Colby does not want our specific recom-
mendations concerning changes and improvements in
intelligence machinery to be appended to specific post-
mortem papers,, He wants the specific recommendations,
G'" r in effect, to stand on their own feet and to reflect broad
community considerations, not just those drawn from
the Mid-East experience. He said specifically, for
example, that a paper on challenge mechanisms should
discuss this problem in general and not in the context
of particular Middle East post-mortem lessons. The
same applies to other recommendations concerning,
for example, ways to improve exchanges between
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analysts and collectors, etc. I don't think this rules
out, references to what we have learned from the Middle
East exercise. Nor did it necessarily rule out explicit
recommendations or references to broad ongoing efforts
to improve the Community's performance in individual
Phase II post-mortem papers.
If all the above raises as many questions as answers, it is
because that is more or less the way the conversation went. But
there are two lessons here: First, we retain some flexibility;
but second, we are going to have to redirect our Phase II effort
somewhat.
Obviously this will require further conversation. I just
wanted to get these thoughts down as soon after the meeting as
possible.
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Dis}ribution:
t eneral Graham
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