THE AMERICAN STYLE OF WARFARE AND THE MILITARY BALANCE

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• Publication Date: April 10, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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FEATURES COLUMNISTS
SURVIVAL
Volume XXI, Number 2 (10 APRIL)
March /April 1979
The American Style of Warfare and the
Military DA~ce
The structuring o ce to meet a conventional attack from the Soviet Union and her allies in
Europe remains a central issue within the Western Alliance. In this article, Edward Luttwak argues that
the United States military clings to a concept of 'attrition' warfare when it may no longer have the
superiority in material and fire power necessary to wage such war. He recommends consideration of
'manoeuvre' strategies which would seek not to wear an opponent down but to outflank it - the classic
strategies of inferior forces.
National styles differ in war, as they do in the
pursuits of peace. Embodied in the tactical
orientation of military forces and revealed by
their structures, these national styles reflect not
only the material and human attributes of societies
but also their collective self-image. That is why
the attempt to transplant a national style of
warfare into the armed forces of another nation,
with a different pattern of strengths, weaknesses
and social relations, usually fails. One recalls
vividly the failure of Egypt to practice Soviet-
style armoured warfare in 1967, and equally her
success with her own tactics, at least during the
first days of the 1973 war.
To each his own, therefore. But even so a fatal
dissonance can arise: national styles of warfare,
embedded as they are in culture and society, may
retain their domestic authority even while
being overtaken by changes in the external
military environment. Particularly dangerous are
those changes which are subtle and cumulative
rather than overt and dramatic. The latter may
awaken attention and stimulate a re-thinking of
military methods and structures which may yet
save the situation. But when change is slow and
not manifest, routines are apt to go on as before,
until the sudden and catastrophic discovery of
inferiority in war itself.
Attrition versus Manoeuvre
There is now a real danger that the American
style of warfare is being overtaken by precisely
this kind of change in the external military
environment. Even while the Soviet Union is
closing the quality gap in one dimension of
military strength after another, and even while
the United States' overall military resources are
declining relative to those of the Soviet Union,
she holds on to the belief in her own material
superiority. To be sure, the official spokesmen of
the services constantly remind us of the growing
Dr Luttwak is Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies at the
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies and a private consultant on defence in
Washington.
Soviet advantage in numbers and the steady
improvement in the quality of Soviet weapons,
and yet the operational implications of these facts
have not been absorbed. The American national
style of warfare remains unchanged: it still
presumes a net superiority in material, for it is a
style based on the methods of attrition rather
than manoeuvre.
We all know what attrition is. It is war in the
administrative manner, of Eisenhower rather
than Patton, in which the important command
decisions are in fact logistic decisions. The
enemy is treated as a mere inventory of targets
and warfare is a matter of mustering superior
resources to destroy his forces by sheer fire-
power and weight of materiel.
Manoeuvre, by contrast, is not a familiar
practice in recent American military operational
form. In fact, in the language of the US Army,
manoeuvre is frequently confused with mere
movement, or at least offensive movement.
Manoeuvre may well call for movement but it is
very much more than that. It can be applied not
only in ground combat but in all warfare, and
indeed in all things military, even research and
development. Manoeuvre describes 'relational'
action - that is, action guided by a close study of
the enemy and of his way of doing things - where
the purpose is to muster some localized or
specialized strength against the identified points
of weakness of an enemy that may have superi-
ority overall.
Manoeuvre thus depends much more on
Intelligence (and intellect) than attrition warfare,
which can almost be a matter of mere procedure.
It also entails a higher degree of risk. But while
the side that has materiel superiority can choose
freely between attrition or manoeuvre, the side
whose resources are inferior overall can only
prevail by successful manoeuvre. If an inferior
force remains tied by tradition and attitude to
low-risk or low-pay-off attrition methods, it must
be defeated. In the cumulative destruction of the
forces ranged against one another which
(See MILITARY BALANCE, Pg.2-F)
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Part II -- Main Edition -- 10 April 1979
MILITARY BALANCE -- CONTINUED
characterizes an attrition contest, the inferior
force will inevitably be exhausted first,
American Concepts Out of Date
It is not surprising that manoeuvre warfare is so
unfamiliar to American military men - in whose
self-image materiel superiority still looms large -
while it is almost instinctive to those who see
themselves as inferior in resources, be they from
Vietnam or Israel.
It is by now obvious that the US Army, Navy,
and Air Force would no longer enjoy an auto-
matic superiority in materiel if confronted by the
forces of the Soviet Union, and yet their structure
and methods still implicitly reflect the pre-
sumption of a net advantage in resources.
The US Army, for example, has recently
promulgated a new manual of tactical doctrine
for a major conflict in Europe (FM 100-5). This
is a doctrine of pure attrition: Soviet forces are
expected to attack in deep columns of armour,
and the Army means to oppose them by position-
ing armour and infantry battalions in their
path - some pushed forward to act as a'covering
force', but the bulk concentrated on the main line
of resistance. Advancing Soviet armour is to be
defeated by sheer fire-power, in sequence ; first
air attacks well forward of the battle line, then
artillery (with precision munitions), then the
guns and anti-tank missiles of the yielding
'covering force' in a, shoot/fall-back/shoot
sequence, then the main forces with their own
guns, missiles and small arms. Single battalions
are to leap-frog one another in a slow with.
drawal, to reload with ammunition so that they
can resume the orderly administration of fire-
power.. Catch phrases associated with the new
doctrine have an industrial sound: 'force-
generation', 'target servicing', etc. The invading
enemy is treated as a mass of individual targets
to be destroyed one by one, with the strength of
the defence in fire-power being ranged against
hard armour. No attempt is made to seek out
and exploit weaknesses in the modus operandi of
the enemy or in his array of forces. No thought
is given to the possibility of attacking the long
flanks that columns of armour must necessarily
have.'The Army's new doctrine thus continues
to presume a net superiority in fire-power: US
forces are to 'mow down' Soviet armour as
British imperial infantry once dealt with the
Zulu impis. The British won, though they were
outnumbered as the US Army would be today,
but unfortunately the Soviet forces are not
Zulus and they will not be outgunned.
A Manoeuvre Defence for NATO
A manoeuvre defence for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) would be quite
another thing. Far from seeking to muster
strength against strength in a frontal clash of
fire_p9w_er -versus--armour, it -would--rely-on-
attacks against the weak points of the Soviet
array. For example, Soviet divisions draw their
re-supply from convoys of trucks following in
their wake, 1,800 trucks for each tank division
and 2,200 for each 'motorized rifle' division.
Behind each hard wedge of armour there is the
soft column of unprotected and road-bound
trucks. A manoeuvre alternative to the Army's
new doctrine might deploy all-armoured and
highly agile strike forces which would side-step
the oncoming thrust of Soviet armour columns,
penetrate through the spaces between the
columns, and then advance deeply enough into
the enemy's rear so that they could then turn to
attack the 'soft' traffic of artillery, combat-
support and service units, and supply columns
following in the wake of the Soviet armour.
While American tanks and combat carriers would
be formed into these strike forces, the infantry
(which is already well equipped with anti-tank
missiles) would be placed in the path of the
Soviet advance to form resilient and amorphous
defence zones. The aim would be to slow down
and embed the enemy armour spearheads rather
than to destroy them in costly combat. In the
meantime, the strike forces would be on then
way, to advance in parallel to the advancing
enemy columns before turning to wade into them.
While American battle tanks could no doubt do
much better against trucks and artillery carriages
than in tank-to-tank combat, the operational
goal - as in all genuine manoeuvre - would not
be so much to destroy enemy resources as to
dislocate the enemy's scheme of operations.
Instead of being faced with an entirely pre-
dictable frontal resistance (which they are well
organized to defeat), Soviet commanders would
be confronted by confused entanglements and
sudden emergencies in their own vulnerable rear,
as the elusive strike forces attack road-bound
traffic, only to disappear (when attacked in turn)
to come back and attack again somewhere-else
along the columns. Soviet armour spearheads
would in some cases run out of supplies while
fighting it out in the resilient defence zones;
above all, the stream of reinforcement echelons
(on which the Soviet method depends) would be
drawn away to confront the strike forces in the
rear, instead of being fed into the penetrating
advance to keep up its momentum.
This is not by any means a fully analysed idea,
and it is of course at the extreme end of the
risk/pay-off spectrum, but it does illustrate the
general principles of manoeuvre warfare as they
apply to all combat - land, sea, or air.
First, one's own high-quality forces must not
be expended against those of the enemy;
instead, they are to find and attack the weak
points in the enemy's array of forces.. In the
meantime, the enemy's main effort is to be
contained (though it cannot be defeated) by a
specialized defence, organized from the lower-
cost forces.
Second, the key to victory in manouevre is
force disruption rather than destruction. Of
course there will be some attrition, but its
purpose must be to dislocate the enemy's system
of war, rather than to reduce his forces in piece-
meal combat. The goal is to force the enemy to
abandon his programme, rather than just to
reduce the forces he has to implement that
programme.
Finally, manoeuvre warfare cannot be fought
by standard, general-purpose forces shaped by
-traditional--preferences- -and bureaucratic priori-
ties. Instead, one must deploy. forces especially
tailored to cope with a specific enemy - that is,
forces wiucn are _ configured to exploit,. his
particular weaknesses, rather than to maximize
all-round capabilities. One allows the enemy to
dictate one's force-structure and tactics;, the
'organizational initiative' is conceded in . order
to seize the operational advantage.
Examples of Manoeuvre Defence . .
An outlined air-power example illustrates the
(See MILITARY BALANCE, P9.3-F)
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Part II -- Main Edition -- 10 April 1979
NEWSWEEK 16 APRIL 1979(10) Pg.21
SETTING UP A SUMMIT
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev is keeping his schedule open for
a possible SALT-signing summit with Jimmy Carter in the first two
weeks of May. Although protocol specifies that it is Brezhnev's
turn to go to the U.S., his frail health may rule out the long flight to
Washington. Brezhnev's doctors don't want him to fly at all, in
fact. Carter might go to Moscow if necessary, but the betting now is
that the Soviet and American presidents will com-
promise by meeting in a neutral capital-one that
Brezhnev could reach comfortably by train. The
Russians seem to lean to Helsinki, Vienna or Warsaw
as the summit city.
THE OMINOUS HOSPITALS
Y.S. intelligence sources report that both Egypt and Libya have
begun installing field hospitals near the border that divides the
unfriendly Arab neighbors. Both countries have engaged in mili-
tary buildups in the wake of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's
signing of a peace treaty with Israel, and the emergency hospitals
could mean that open hostilities are in the offing. U.S. analysts
don't think Sadat would tarnish his statesman's image by going to
war unless Libya strikes first, but they don't rule out the possibility
that Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi might start something. In
that event, some analysts say, the Egyptians might launch a drive to
the Libyan oil fields.
generality of these rules. Soviet battlefield
air-defence systems are now much more formid-
able in Europe than they were in Arab hands in
October 1973, when Israel lost almost a quarter
of her air force in three days. To do its work,
which is to help in the land battle, the US Air
Force (USAF) plans to defeat the array of Soviet
anti-aircraft guns and missiles by attrition and
sheer weight of materiel: special `defence
suppression' aircraft are deployed to attack
Soviet radars directly, while other special aircraft
are to neutralize Soviet radars with electronic
counter-measures. In addition, each line aircraft
is to carry self-protection electronic devices. In
the first few days of a NATO war, when air power
would be needed most to give time for the ground
forces to deploy, the USAF would in fact be busy
protecting its own ability to operate at all.
It is interesting to note that others have
reacted differently. The Royal Air Force (RAF)
simply cannot afford to fight it out with Soviet
air defences; its plan is to evade rather than
defeat them. The RAF has decided to use its
aircraft in the immediate rear of the battlefield,
to attack Soviet reinforcement echelons rather
than the first wave of Soviet forces on the
battlefield itself-where defences are thickest.
As some RAF officers see it, the American insis-
tence on taking on the Soviet Union where she is
strongest may result in an air force which will
be 'taking in its own washing' instead of earning
its keep. The RAF approach is 'relational'
manoeuvre; that of the USAF a form of attrition.
In the case of naval forces, a counter-example
can be cited from the opposite side. When
Stalin decided to build an oceanic navy as part
of the armament programme that began in
earnest very soon after VE day, his plan reported-
ly called for a non-relational 'balanced fleet' on
the Anglo-American pattern, with destroyers,
cruisers, and aircraft carriers, as well as sub-
marines - the indispensable weapons of the
weaker fleet. Had Stalin's successors continued
on this path, the Soviet navy would have been a
much inferior imitation of the American and
bound to be outclassed in every encounter. But
after Stalin's death his naval plans were scrapped
and the Soviet Union adopted a relational
'manoeuvre' approach; she built her own navy
specifically to exploit the weaknesses of the US
Navy, instead of trying to imitate its structure.
As a result, the American surface navy of
carrier task-forces is now confronted by an array
of Soviet anti-carrier forces, based on the use of
anti-ship missiles carried in submarines, naval
aircraft and surface warships. The Soviet navy
which this relational scheme has produced
cannot do many of the things that the US Navy .
does so well, but it does have a fair chance of
winning a naval war, at least in some circum-
stances. A non-relational Soviet navy, built to
realize the typical naval ideal of a `balanced
fleet', would by contrast have guaranteed
absolute and total inferiority at sea for the
Soviet Union.
The Implications of Inferiority
Now that the United States has chosen to place
herself in a position of military inferiority to the
Soviet Union by reverting to the pattern of
underspending of the inter-war years, the
non-relational procedure, with its low-risk/high-
cost attrition solutions to every threat, is becom-
ing increasingly obsolete. In one area of defence
after another there is no third alternative
between higher-risk manoeuvre methods and a
guaranteed defeat. In part, the persistence of an
obsolete style of warfare is due to an under-
standable cultural lag: the services are in the
position of those remaining ill-informed
American tourists who, in Germany or Japan,
still offer sotto voce to pay their hotel bills in
dollars - and expect a discount. But aside from
cultural lag there is another source of irration-
ality, and ironically it is the product of the
striving to substitute logic and calculation for
military instincts and bureaucratic goals. Many
of the 'systems analysis' techniques introduced
by McNamara and revived by the present civilian
defence chiefs are based on mathematical models
which treat warfare as a cumulative exchange of
fire-power; they are in fact pure attrition models
in most cases. Even though the historical record
of war shows quite conclusively that superior
fire-power is often associated with defeat, and
that winners more often than not were actually
inferior in fire-power, these mathematical models
continue to be devastatingly influential because
they capture all that is conveniently measurable
about warfare. Thus book-keepers may fancy
themselves strategists.
Unfortunately, these models miss the essence
of warfare, which has little to do with the orderly
administration of superior fire-power on a
passive set of targets. To their great discredit, the
uniformed military have chosen to play the
bureaucratic game, and now have their own
models, suitably rigged. Instead of resisting the
pressure to conform, and devoting their intellect
to the study of war as it really was in history, and
as it may be again on the battlefield, the military
waste their talents on studies and models which
are based on premises which are false, and which
they know to be false. Hence the blind lead, and
those who could see follow in order to defeat the
mathematics of the civilian 'systems analysts'
with their own, ever more elaborate computer
models. Unfortunately, the tactics of bureau-
cratic conflict in the Pentagon are of no use on
the battlefield.
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Part II -- Main Edition -- 10 April 1979
ARMED FORCES
JOURNAL APRIL 1979 (10) Pg. 36
The Inoperability of Interop~rability?
By Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr.
AN INDEPENDENT LOOK AT "NATO wastefully developing eight different mis- at the present rate 4% annually.
Standardization, Interoperability and siles, which can then only be procured in ? Contrary to a long-held view,
standardization and interoperability are
Readiness" was released late in February small quantities at high unit cost.
by a House Armed Services Subcommittee Standardization is no substitute for not cure-alls that will lead to vast savings
of that title. The report criticizes the state adequate defense budgets. But when Allied for NATO nations. It is unlikely that there
of Allied Readiness. It finds the agreed 3% defense budgets are not adequate will be savings from arms cooperation, at
are largely Predictions of
real annual growth in Allied defense unnecessary duplication of effort must .be least nthe near
budgets to be inadequate. It questions the eliminated; wasteful, low volume potential savings 8ay unsupported
production must be avoided. by data at present.
advantages claimed for Standardization Nobod questions the validity of these ? Annual savings resulting from stand-
b
q
and Interoperability. It finds fault with the
mestic defense
d
e
o
our
views r
concept of a "two-way street," gives poor
marks to the "family of weapons" concept, procurement. Indeed, in each of the past
and concludes that the NATO Long-Term two years, the House Armed Services
Defense Plan (LTDP) is one of Committee has stated its belief that "the
questionable value. It advocates a review Department of Defense ... _ must avoid
(and possible revision) of the Culver-Nunn unnecessary duplication of effort."
Amendment, which calls for the Secretary The strength of the report is its
of Defense to establish procurement recognition of the fact that "The present
practices aimed at standardization of the shortfall in Western European defense
US European forces' equipment. demands unique solutions." Its weakness is
The report will be a disappointment to not that it rejects every feature of every
many, but a challenge to all. unique solution proposed by the President,
Strength and Weakness the Secretary of Defense and the Congress
The central weakness of the NATO itself, and finds no virtue whatsoever in
Subcommittees report is that one must Standardization, Interoperability and
read through forty es of detailed Allied Arms Cooperation.
criticism before finding a positive Why So Negative a ReporN
statement expressing "the hope that the On 31 January 1979, the American,
NATO alliance can be strengthened and Canadian and European members of the
improved"-and a statement recognizing North Atlantic Assembly's Defense
the fact that "the present shortfall in Cooperation inSubio Subcommittee held
Western Europe defense demands unique ,Services Committee. Much of the
solutions."
One might say the Subcommittee has discussion centered on the quite different
produced two reports. The first deals with American and European views of what
Standardization, Interoperability and constitutes measurable traffic on the two-
Arms Cooperation, for which no way street, "NATO-ese" for reciprocal
redeeming military, economic or political trans-Atlantic
The Subcommittee trade.
s Report reflects the
benefit is cited. The second addresses the
issue of NATO readiness with a high sense fact that the Administration has not
of urgency. presented its case effectively. The
The strength of the report is the attention marketing function in policy formulation
it focuses on the lack of Allied readiness. It doesn't get the attention it deserves.
l Subcommittee report need
i
D
Th
an
e
e
argues for example, that:
"One of the most critical readiness not be a disappointment. The Executive review of the "Culver Nunn" amendment
deficiencies of the Alliance is its lack Branch, our Allies, and the Congress itself to determine whether modification is in
of reserve stocks of ammunition and must recognize the report as a challenge to order; 2) increased coordination of
equipment. These stocks translate bring for the concepts, structures and procurement procedures for arms
into staying power or sustainability proposals needed to create the cooperative cooperation by the Executive branch; 3)
in a war. Incredibly, after 30 years, Alliance framework called for by General the minimization of the use of government-
NATO now hopes; by 1983, to Haig. to-goverment agreements; 4) the
develop a capability to fight for 30 Western European defense does demand transmittal of all international agreements
days " unique solutions. other than treaties between the US and its
The Subcommittee finds the European The Subcommittee submitted the NATO allies to the House and Senate
shortages of ammunition and replacement following findings and conclusions: Armed Services Committees; 5) an increase
stocks to be critical, and they are. Unfor- ? NATO's ability to conduct a successful in personnel training in combat-related
tunately, the Subcommittee see standar- conventional defense against a Warsaw areas to augment equipment-related
dization as being of little relevance to Pact attack is extremely doubtful because improvements; 6) a requirement that the
readiness, saying for example, "The major of serious readiness problems and Secretary of Defense include a NATO
anti-armor deficiency of the alliance is not inadequate defense sperding. readiness report with his annual Defense
the existence of eight different missiles, but ? NATO's goal of a \3% annual real budget submission to the Congress; 7) a
rather the lack of adequate inventories. growth in defenscjpending is a requirement for annual authorization of
o orations and maintenance, and all
re p
77somas-J.-C-alaghan.-dr.=rr-Director
the Allied Interdependence Project of
I Strategic and international Studies.
"compromise between m-ldary _ regui
ments and political practicality" and will procurement accounts; 8) authorization
do little to reverse the trend of Warsaw for the Secretary of Defense to enter into a
Pact superiority as long as the Soviets well defined class of agreements for specific
continue to increase their defense spending host nation support services.
1979 (10) v- -7 Page 191
April 9
,
NATO TALKS: Brig. Gen. Charles W. Dyke of the Army's International Rationalization Of-
fice tells the Senate Armed Services' research and developnent subcommittee that the
U.S.-German staff talks have resulted in "major strides" toward standard NATO doctrine.
He said 11 concept papers have-been approved and signed by the chiefs of staffs of the
U.S. and German armies. Among these are papers dealing with anti-armor, air defense,
airmobile operations, mobility/cotmterability, fire support, reconnaissance and night
e
ardization and interoperability would
less than 2 percent of the total annual
Alliance budgets.
? The term "two-way street" too often is,
by Pentagon officials and some European
spokesmen, presented as a device to
equalize the economic benefits for
European defense industries without
sufficiently considering the contribution to
military effectiveness.
? The European approach to defining the
two-way street solely in terms of defense
trade shows a large advantage to the US. A
broader definition of the two-way street
that encompasses all defense-related goods
and services would show a balance in
Europe's favor.
? The Pentagon's "family of weapons"
concept, an approach designed to group
families of weapons and divide up the
development work among the NATO
Allies, eliminates competition and
therefore lowers technological standards.
? NATO's capability to fight a protracted
war is almost nonexistent. NATO lacks the
capability to fight for thirty days and
present plans will not provide such a
capability before 1983. Evidence available
to the Subcommittee suggests that
European forces will begin to run out of
equipment and ammunition in a matter of
days rather than weeks or months.
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Western press that five days would have to
elapse before tactical nuclear weapons
could be fired, and it is not hard to imagine
circumstances in which a longer period than
that would be necessary before the political
leaders of the NATO countries could bring
themselves to agree to a nuclear release.
(iv) It therefore follows that the Soviet
Armed Forces have five days. or even more,
within which to attain their military objec-
tives before NATO decides to go nuclear.
Five days is not really a very long period, so
the Russian's only hope of attaining a really
worthwhile objective is to move extremely
fast; and it is well known that the Soviet
Armed Forces are trained and equipped to
do this as a first requirement.'
(v) It also follows that the USSR has a
great need to achieve surprise in these
circumstances because its speed of advance
would be very much greater than if NATO
were to be properly alerted. The achieve-
ment of surprise would also bring the further
cwtsiderable advantages of fewer casualties
and much higher chances of victory.
We are therefore postulating a non-
nuclear and very fast-moving battle, in
which NATO mobilisation and deployment
have been at least partially pre-empted. The
Soviet Army
Wave Attack
Philosophy
The
single-echelon
option
purpose of this article is consequently to
enquire into what sort of echelonning might
be used by the Soviet commanders for the
purpose of fighting this sort of battle.
Prerequisites for victory
The Soviet view has traditionally been
that the chief factors making for victory in
any particular military operation were:
(a)- the correct choice of direction for the
main axis of advance:
(b): the mass concentration of men. and
equipment along that axis:
(c) a capacity for manoeuvre at all levels;
(d) surprise.
Today, it includes the factor of speed. For
this and a number of other reasons, the
relative importance of the various factorsSTATINT
has probably now been changed to the
following:
(a) the correct choice of direction for the
main b/ow (not the main axis because, in the
nuclear age, the main blow may have to be
delivered along two orthreeaxes ratherthan
along one, as formerly);
(b) surprise:
(c) speed;
rd) concentration of effort in support o
the main Clow;
(e) simultaneous attacks upon the enemy
throughout the entire depth of his cepioy-
ment and upon objectives deep in his rear.
It should beemphasised that no actual list
giving these factors in the above order is
known to the present author, but Soviet STATINT
writing in recent years has strongly indicat-
ed that it is, nevertheless, the correct one.
The existence of nuclear weapons has
made it far too dangerous to mass men and
equipment along only one axis of main
advance, as the Red Army in the Second
World War so successfully used to do. As a
result, the Soviet concept of the offensive
now envisages the advance of the troops
along two or three sub-axes, these being not-
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A military commander, if he is to take a
sensible decision concerning the number of
waves, or echelons, in which to deploy his
forces, can only do so if he bases that
decision on the actual conditions of the
particular operations he is engaged in.
Soviet writers, indeed. repeatedly empha-
sise the imperative need to study the actual
circumstances before coming to a decision,
and roundly condemn any general who has
imbued himself with a fixed theory of eche-
lonning which he applies quite irrespective
of the situation with which he is faced.
Since, therefore, there is no fixed Soviet
doctrine which can be applied, blanket-
fashion, so as to determine the number of
echelons, it is clear that any attempt to
discuss the Soviet attitude to echelonning
must be narrowed down by making a num-
ber of assumptions concerning the type of
operations being dealt with. For the pur-
poses of this article, these assumptions are
as follows;
(i) This hypothetical war in Europe will be
one that the Russians have started. A war in
Europe might arise from other causes (by
accident, for example). but our present
study is of a n outbreak of hostilities resulting
from a deliberate attack on NATO by the
forces of the Warsaw Pact.
(ii) The war will be fought without the use
of nuclear weapons of any kind. It would
obviously be a colossal advantage to the
Russians if this could be accomplished. In a
conventional war, large numbers of Soviet
soldiersand airmen might perhaps be killed,
and the territories of Poland, East Germany
and Czechoslovakia might again be a battle-
ground; but so long as Russia herself
remained effectively inviolate, these casual-
ties and those other kinds of damage would
certainly be acceptable in the eyes of the
Kremlin.
(iii) NATO, on the other hand. is pledged
to resist invasion, and to resist it even by
using nuclear weapons if this should prove
to be necessary. Nevertheless, it is well
known that nuclear release would not be
given at the outset of a Soviet offensive.
Indeed, it has often been stated in the
 .Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP83MOO171ROO1100040001-1
necessarily equally spread across the whole
width of the attack sector. There is, howev-
er, an unwelcome consequence for the
Russians in that the present composition of
the Group of the Soviet Forces in Germany
(GSFG) would not permit the.attainment
along each of these sub-axes of a crushing
superiority over the enemy in men and
equipment without the bringing-up of con-
siderable reinforcements from within Soviet
territory before the attack began. To bring up
these reinforcements, however, would im-
mediately sound the alarm for the NATO
countries and the attainment of surprise
would thereby be rendered impossible. But
since we have postulated that the USSR
attaches enormous importance to achieving
surprise - and since-it believes that, if
surprise could be attained, a much smaller
superiority over the enemy would be accep-
table along the various sub-axes of the main
advance -the.only solution available to the
Russians is to attack NATO from a standing
start'. The assumption that the Russian of-
fensive will be launched from a standing
start is therefore a natural and basic premise
of this article.
he purpose of echelonning
Soviet military writing declares that the
urpose of deploying forces in more than
ne echelon is to maintain the momentum of
nd thereby keep up the pressure on the
nemy defenses.
[There is, incidentally, a difference be-
tween a second echelon and a reserve. A
second echelon is a body of troops appointed
for a specific task: to take over from, and
then complete the i ork of, the first echelon.
A reserve is a body of troops to be used ad
hoc, according to the wishes of the comman-
der.)
Deploying troops in more than one eche-
lon is particularly necessary when the
enemy has prepared a defensive position in
depth. In the Second World War on the
Eastern Front, German defensive positions
in depth were typically divided up intothree
lines of permanent fortification, each being
5-6 km deep and separated from the next
line by 10-12 km. The total depth of the
German position would therefore be 40-50
km. The German defenses around Gumbin-
nen in 1944 were a good example of this.'
The Russians found that the best way to
deal with this sort of defensive position was
to assault the first line after a heavy, though
often rather short, artillery bombardment,
using theirfirst echelon forthe purpose. This
first echelon was expected to pierce the first
of the enemy's defensive lines and to pene-
trate into the depths of the enemy position.
At this juncture, the Soviet formation's
mobile group would be committed to the
battle, would pour into the breach, exploit
the success of the first echelon and, at the
same time, help that echelon to continue its
advance. Assuming that all went well, the
first echelon was expected to continue to
advance until it bumped up against the
second line of the enemy's prepared posi-
tion, by which time it was likely to be
exhausted.
At that moment, therefore, the Soviet
second echelon took over; and it was this
second echelon, as yet uncommitted to
battle, which was expected to pierce the
paign in Manchuria in 1945 is an excellent
example of this and it will be used later to
illustrate in some detail the thesis of this
article.
Before going onto discuss that campaign,
however, it is essential to point out that
echelonning can be and is practised at-all
levels in the military chain of command. In
other words, if an army group attacks, it can
arrange its constituent armies in one, two,
three or even more echelons. By the same
t "if the ground overwhich tyro attack is to be made is s
broad. flat plain with a firm surface. the choice can be
made as to the number of echelons without any regard to
topography." Note box-like structure on top of Soviet T-
55s' gun mamlet (/DR 8 / 78. p. 1206). now identifie s as a
combined laser rangefinder/designator (see also inter-
national Defense Digest. IDR 9178).
MEW,
second line and to fight its way forward to
the third line. With a bit of luck, the third
echelon would be captured relatively easily.
But if the battle was expected to be particu-
larlytough, and casualties heavy, the Soviet
senior commander might well deploy his
attacking formations in as, many as three
echelons in order to have a completely fresh
echelon with which to assault the third
defensive position. It is worth remarking
that the Stavka expected that Soviet first
echelons would pierce the first line of the
enemy defenses within 24 hours of the
commencement of the attack or, at the very
most, within 36 hours. Anything else was
regarded as highly abnormal and none-too-
pleasant consequences were likely to follow
for the commander.
Of course, in actual practice, by no means
every offensive of the Red Army worked out
as neatly as is implied above. But we are
talking here about concepts and, though in
the course of the Second World War the
execution might sometimes have faltered,
the concept remained unchanged.
Although the double-echelon deploy-
ment was standard practice where the
enemy defenses were heavily fortified and
deeply echelonned, the Soviet commanders
were often willing to attack in only a single
echelon when ci rcumstances were different.
This was because a deployment in just one
echelon allows the maximum weight of men
and firepower to be brought to bear on the
enemy defenses at a given moment of time.
There were a number of occasions during the
Great Fatherland War when the need forthis
outweighed the need for having fresh forces
to maintain the pressure on the enemy.
Deployment in a single echelon, however,
may well be impossible because of the
nature of the terrain. If the ground over
which the attack is to be made is a broad, flat.
plain with a firm surface, the choice can be
made as to the number of echelons without
any regard to topography. If, however, the
route to be taken traverses mountains,
swamps or forests, it may well not prove to
be at all practicable to deploy in a single
echelon, however much the commander
may wish to do so. This point is of impor-
tance, and must be borne in mind when
reading the rest of this article.
Soviet practice suggests strongly that
Russian commanders are particularly will-
ing to attack in a single echelon at the start of
a war or a particular campaign. The cam-
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/24: Cl
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two echelons, while the divisions might
have been in two echelons and their consti-
tuent battalions in one.
The battalions themselves were most
frequently deployed in just the single eche-
lon during what the Russians call the first
period of the Great Fatherland War, when
the Red Army started upon its first counter-
offensives. Up to that time, the divisions,
regiments and battalions had all always
attacked in two echelons, because this was
what was prescribed in the regulations.
However, the two-echelon deployment was
soon seen to be a mistake. This was because
the German defenses at that time did not
consist of deeply echelonned lines of well
prepared fortifications, but of scattered,
fortified strongpoints and defended areas.
Furthermore, the Soviet forces at that time
were not numerically superior to the Ger-
mans in men and equipment; on the con-
trary, they were usually inferior. Conse-
quently, a state of affairs which in any case
was bad for the Russians was made much
worse by the deployment into two echelons.
A significant portion of any Soviet formation
was unable to play any part in the first stage
of the attack since it was being kept back. in
its capacity as the formation's second eche-
lon, for the second stage of the battle.
Therefore, when the Soviet first echelon hit
the German defenses, it was frequently
outnumbered and outgunned by the Ger-
mans, and suffered defeat as a result.
To remedy this, the Stavka ordered the
Red Army to adopt the single-echelon for-
mation as the standard mode of deployment
for the attack, 4 and that order remained until
circumstances changed later in the war. By
then, the Germans had gone over to defense
based on deeply echelonned, well prepared
lines of permanent fortifications. Secondly,
the numbers of Soviet men and weapons
had by then increased so much that the Red
Army could afford to have two echelons and
still have numerical superiority over the
Germans at the critical points of the first line
of defenses.
token, the armies themselves can deploy
their respective divisions in one or more
echelons; the divisions, their regiments
similarly; and this process continues down
to and including the battalions.
Nor, in a given operation, does the num-
ber of echelons have to be the same at each
of the various levels in the chain of com-
mand. It often happened in the Great Father-
land War that a Soviet army group (front)
attacked with its armies in one echelon, that
? T Deployment in a single echelon may well not prove
to be practicable it the attack route traverses mountains.
forests or swamps. BMPs of Soviet motor nfle regrmem
cross a water barrier the simplest way (below), while
other units use bridging (above): in the foreground a T-55.
followed by a T.55T recovery vehicle and. on the far bank.
a BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicle.
The war on the Eastern front
The history of the war on the Eastern Front
also makes it clearthat, where the maximum
blow possible was required and subsequent'
supplementary effort was a secondary con-
sideration, a one-echelon formation was
phy permitted. This was particularly true
when surprise was regarded as attainable.
When, however, surprise was not thought to
be attainable. when the offensive came in
the middle rather than at the beginning of a
campaign, or when there was clearly a
requirement for a second echelon of a
means of breaking through an enemy's
second line of defense, then a two-echelon
formation was decided upon at any and
every level.
Further examples of these various consid-
erations being applied in practice by the
Soviet Armed Forces can be found in this
campaign. It is indeed a particularly per-
tinent campaign to study, because it marked
the opening by the Soviet Union of a new
theatre of war. What was done by the Soviet
commanders in Manchuria may therefore
have something to say about what would be
done by their modern successors if the
Kremlin decided to open a theatre of war in
Europe. It is all the more likely to do so
because the Russians secured in Manchuria
an overwhelming surprise at both the
strategic and the operational level; and this,
as discussed earlier, would be their aim if
they were to plan an offensive in Europe.
The Russians started their offensive at
0010 hours on August 9, 1945, when note
of the Japanese politicians or military com-
manders was expecting them to do so.
Admittedly they thought it probable that the
Russians would attack them, and they even
thought it likely that they would attack them
in September, but they had no notion that
the Soviet offensive would hit them in the
month of August.
The Russians appear to have been pretty
confident that they would in fact achieve
surprise, and they took their decisions on
echelonning on the assumption that they
would. Whatever mode of deployment was
adopted. the aim was to secure the max-
imum possible exploitation of the expected
surprise. So it is perfectly understandable
that, of the three fronts or army groups
which took part in the campaign, two
decided to deploy their armies in only a
single echelon. These were the First and the
Second Far Eastern Fronts. The third, which
appears an exception, was the Transbaikal
Front; but in fact its two-echelon deploy.
ment was not so much of an exception as
might appear.
There were no sizeable Japanese forces
within about 400 km of the Transbaikal
Front's forming-up area. The principal diffi-
culty that faced its main forces at the outset
of the campaign was the broad belt of desert
and mountainous country that separated
them from the Central Manchurian Plain.
Only when that obstacle had been sur-
mounted could 6th Guards Tank Army come
into contact with the principal Japanese
forces centred upon Kwantung.
The task assigned to the main forces of
Transbaikal Front, therefore, was to hurl
themselves at top speed across the belt of
desert and mountain, and smash into the
westward-facing flank of the Japanese at the
same time as the First Far Eastern Front
smashed into their eastward-facing flank.
But in an advance made by a group consist-
ing of one tank army and four combined.
arms armies, the tank army was bound to
forge ahead unless it was ordered to reduce
speed. No such order was given. On the
contrary, General Kravchenko, GOC of 6th
Guards Tank Army, was told expressly that it
was the job of his formation to move forward
as fast as it possibly could. The inevitable
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP83M00171R001100040001-1
gap that would thereby be created between
6th GuardsTank Army'soriginal neighbours
to its left and right would then be plugged by
53rd Army, which thus became the Front's
second echelon. It therefore seems reason-
able to say that Transbaikal Front's adoption
of a two-echelon formation was due to
special circumstances.
So far as First Far Eastern Front was
concerned, its task was to strike the initial
blow with the maximum strength possible,
in order to smash through the enemy's
fortified positions at a single go. Having
done that, it was then to exploit the break-
.through at the greatest speed and to the
greatest extent possible. Given that the First
Far Eastern Front was expected to achieve
operational surprise, it seemed to the com-
mander that a one-echelon deployment of-
fered the best chance of success. This
decision was approved by his superior,
Marshal Vasilievsky. the commander-in-
chief of all the Soviet forces engaged in the
campaign.
The offensive launched by Second Far
Eastern Front was a secondary operation.
The front had only about half the number of
men that had been allotted to the other
fronts, and furthermore had a lot fewer
tanks, guns and supporting aircraft. Since it
had no tank army and only three combined-
arms armies (plus a few supporting units)
with which to attack alonC a front of several
hundred kilometres, a one-echelon forma-
tion was essential if its initial attach: was to
carry any weight at all.
The Manchurian Campaign of 1945 is the
only example available of an attack launch-
ed by the Soviet armed forces at the start of a
war which had been begun on their initia-
tive; when the forces themselves were in
good shape and had plenty of good equip-
ment; and when, moreover, the Russians
expected to achieve both strategic and
operational surprise. Under such circum-
stances, a one-echelon formation was
chosen for two of the fronts while the two-
echelon formation adopted by the third front
was the result, we have argued, of special
circumstances which are not likely to recur
in Central Europe at front level.
Lower down in the chain of command in
Manchuria, there was no uniformity in the
deployment of the corps and divisions. Thus,
although First Far Eastern Front deployed all
its armies in one echelon, many of those
armies deployed their corps (and most of the
corps deployed their divisions) in two eche-
lons. This was because the commanders at
those. levels were confronted with tasks
which, in essence, consisted of penetrating
the Japanese first line of defense, and then
going on and attacking and penetrating the
second. In other words, they were faced with
A Regardless of the number of echelons deployed in a
Soviet attack. organic air defense would be an essential
ingredient of me forward forces. Photo shows two ZSU-
23.4 Shilka self-propelled arrtiaircrah gun vehicles; each
Soviet tank division and each motor rifle division has 16
ZSU-23.4s plus self-propelled and towed 57 mm and 23
mm AA Duns.
T While a single.echelon snack at army level by the
Soviet Union on not be ruled out. corps. divisions and
lesser units would almost certainly deploy in two or
possibly more echelons. Photo shows M1974 122 mm SP
howitzers which would follow up the first wave of tanks,
providing direct as well as indirect fire to suppressenemy
defensive positions.
the classic requirement for a two-echelon
formation; and a two-echelon formation was
consequently adopted.
It should not be taken as evidence in
rebuttal of this article's thesis that 6th
Guards Tank Army, the flower of the Soviet
forces engaged in the campaign in Manchu-
ria in 1945, deployed its corps in two
echelons despite the fact that it expected to
surprise the enemy and that it knew that
Japanese opposition for the first 300 km or
so would be little more than feeble. The
reason for the two-echelon formation was
purely topographical; and as soon as 6th
Guards Tank Army had crossed the Great
Khingan range of mountains and had de-
scended on to the level ground of the Central
Manchurian Plain, 5th Guards Tank Corps,
the army's second echelon on thefirst day of
the offensive, was to move forward level
with the remaining corps belonging to 6th
Guards Tank Army. As a result, that army
engaged the enemy's main forces in a
single-echelon formations Had General
Kravchenko expected the Japanese on the
far side of the Khingan Mountains to put ups
prolonged and bitter resistance a Is Stalin-
grad, he would no doubt have deployed his
corps in two echelons. But he had come to
believe that the resistance would not be of
that order and that by a heavy initial blow he
might hope to smash it. He deployed so as to
deliverthe heaviest possible initial weight of
blow and the result proved him justified. It is
not wholly ludicrous to suggest that a Soviet
commander in Europe might make similar
calculations, especially if, as has been as-
sumed throughout, he might hope to
achieve surprise over the NATO defenders.
On the other hand, the nature of the
terrain in certain sectors of the NATO front
makes it unlikely that all the Soviet armies
would deploy all of their divisions in a one-
echelon formation too. Furthermore, the
likely tasks confronting Soviet 8th Guards
Army (launching holding attacks on the US
7th Army in Bavaria, coupled with a thrust
into Germany to the north of the American
sector so as to prevent the Americans from
moving northwards to take part in the main
battle) might well impose a two-echelon
formation upon the Soviet divisions there.
At regimental and battalion level, it is most
unlikely that anything other than a two-
echelon formation would be adopted by the
Russians anywhere.
Nevertheless, in the light of the above,
one or tv: o interesting trains of thought
suggest themselves. If we assumethat in our
hypothetical attack the Soviet forces
achieve surprise at both the strategicand the
operational level, they will not only want to
deliver the maximum initial weight of blow.
They will also bear in mind that, by gaining
surprise, they can more safely deploy into
one echelon for the purpose of delivering the
blow. Provided that the circumstances in
Central Europe were approximately those
assumed for the purpose of this article, it is
reasonable to imagine that, at least at army
level, a one-echelon formation is what the
Russians would decide upon. +4
tadv.rws
1. See. ioresample. Colonel G. Lobschev'sanicie in
the February 1977 issue of Voennyi Vestnik.
2. See, for instance. Sovietskaya Vomneya Entsiklo-
pediya. v,2., p. 421.
3. Voenno-lstonc heskii Ihumal (hereafter referred
to as V.I]h.). 4/1971, p. 71.
4. NKO Order No. 306 of 1942.
S. V.IZh., 12/1962.
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RD~>3%TOM i-R001100040
Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet Army
Recent debates in the Soviet military press
by C. N. Donnelly, Soviet Studies Centre, RMA Sandhurst, UK
Until about 1970 Soviet Military doctrine
held as a basic tenet that any major war in
Europe would naturally escalate rapidly to
involve the widespread use of at least tacti-
cal, and quite probably strategic, nuclear
weapons.
During the late 1960s there grew up in
Soviet political circles the realization that, if
for any reason a major war were to start, it
was clearly in the interests of the Soviet
Union to be able to win it before the Western
alliance could reach a decision to use nuclear
weapons.
As a reflection of this political realization,
the first 2-3 years of this decade saw a
gradual shift of emphasis in the Soviet
military press from a study of the nuclear
battlefield to a study of conventional opera-
tions, albeit with the proviso that, in any
major conventional conflict, weapons of
mass destruction might be used at any
moment.
Whether any war which began in Europe
would remain purely conventional or would
involve nuclear weapons, the Russian victo-
ry, the Soviets believe, would only be certain
if the war could be won quickly'.
On a nuclear battlefield, weapons of mass
- Soviet motor rifle troops will normally assault on foot
over the last 2-300 m to the objective. remaining as close
as possible behind the leading wave of tanks in order to
suppress enemy anti-tank fire with their small arms.
BMPs, having disgorged their infantry, should slowly
follow the latter about 3.400 m behind them, providing
fire support from the shop-halt directed into the 50 m
gaps between attacking infantry sections. The new 122
mm SP howitzers , when used in the accompanying role,
also provide direct fire between the infantry sections,
from ranges of only 5061,000 m away from the enemy
positions.
such a war is to achieve a rapid rate of
advance through a country where going has
been rendered difficult by contamination
and destruction. By speed and manoeuvre,
armoured protection and mass decontami-
nation the Soviets would hope to reduce
their own vulnerability to enemy nuclear
weapons. To improve their chances of doing
this, the Soviet General Staff began in 1967
to issue to their Army a vehicle expressly
designed for - and, all agree, very well
tailored to - rapid offensive operations in
nuclear war. This vehicle is the BMP.
Since one of the main threats to the
viability of highly mobile attacking units
under nuclear conditions was considered to
be enemy air power, large funds were also
allocated during the 1960s to improving
anti-aircraft systems, probably at the ex-
pense of armoured self-propelled artillery.
Forced, as they were in 1970, to meet the
political requirement that the Soviet Army
be able not only to fight and win a war with
conventional weapons, but to do so very
quick/y indeed so as to lessen the dangers of
rapidly become clear to the Soviet Genera
Staff that both the tactics and equipment o
their army were not adequate to the task.
Equipment was available in insufficient
quantity, and was often of an unsuitable
type. Tactical doctrine for conventional war
was weak, and the army was poorly prac-
tised in it.
For models of conventional operations
upon which to base their plans, training
schedules, and calculations of weapon and
equipment norms for this 'new' conven-
tional battle, the General Staff turned its
enormous military history department to
studying successful - and unsuccessful -
offensive operations of the 1941-45 war. At
the strategic level, this study has provided
adequate information for a model of a war
won quickly (the Soviet campaign against
the Japanese in Manchuria in 1945 is
considered an excellent example for study
and, presumably, emulation). At the lower
tactical level, however, the advance of tech-
nology (for example the increase in the
ranges and destructive effects of weapons,
the increase in mechanization and mobility
of troops, the emergence of guided missiles,
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/24: Cl
TINTL
etc.) have rendered much of World War 2's
tactical experience much less valid.
One of the principal effects of the predict-
ed wide-spread use of tactical nuclear wea-
pons had been that it necessitated the
dispersal of sub-units, and therefore the
combination of different arms at a low
tactical level (battalion); without combined
arms teams, due to the distances involved
between dispersed sub-units, mutual sup-
port would have become impossible.
On the modern conventional battlefield,
considerable dispersal is still necessary, the
Russians insist, because of the ever-present
threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore,
combined arms action at battalion level
remains essential, because improved wea-
pon technology renders each fighting arm
(infantry, artillery, tank, aircraft, etc.) very
vulnerable when operating on its own. That
is to say, the tank a and aircraft fall easy prey to
the missile, the field gun to the fighter-
bomber, the attacking infantryman to the
artillery barrage, etc.
Between 1970 and 1974, in the light of
these developments, several authoritative
principles appeared3, and most of the stan-
dard special-to-arm text books on tactics
were rewritten'. A modern version of the
most authoritative general reference book
"Taktika" (Tactics) which last appeared in
1966 has, to the best of the author's knowl-
edge, not yet been issued, and will presuma-
ly not appear until a final solution to the
tactical problems discussed below have
been decided upon.
However thorough these new text books
might appear, it has become obvious from
subsequent comment in the Soviet military
press that, probably as a result of hasty
compilation, they relied too heavily on tacti-
cal theory, and not enough on practical
manders perused them in vain toranswers to
many of the practical problems they encoun-
tered when actually carrying out battalion
level combined-arms exercises for conven-
tional battle. The unsatisfactory tactical
performance of the Arab armies, using
Soviet tactics and equipment during the
1973 Yom Kippur War, must have been an
added incentive to the Soviet General Staff
to give serious consideration to these prob-
lems of tactics, and how best to ft-id a
solution to them.
The Soviet press has always been a means
whereby the Soviet citizen could voice his
complaints or suggestions about "the sys-
tem providing the aim or purpose of his
complaints was to effect an improvement in
the functioning of the system. not a radical
change of it. The military press is no excep-
~ Soviet gunners are fre-
guemly criticized by senior
commanders for deploying
in line, as in Ww2, since this
makes them vulnerable to
NATO counter-battery fire.
The six-gun battery of D30
towed 1.22 mm howitzers
(ptato) integral to the single
Motor Rifle Regiment of
-a ch Tank Division has
recently been replaced by no
fewer than IS self-propelled
122 mm howitzers. as is also
the case in one of the 3 MR
Regiments of each MR Divi-
sion. The two other MR
Regiments in each MR Divi-
sion now have 1s D-30s
such.
ideally suited for nuclearwar, but rather less
suited for conventional war. This is not to say
that the BMP is not suitable at all for the
conventional battlefield, but rather that
there are certain phases of war for which it is
more suited than for others. For use in those
phases of war for which it is not ideally
designed. it is considered essential either to
adopt tactics which minimise its vulner-
ability, or to create local battlefield condi-
tions with conventional weapons resem-
bling as closely as possible the conditions of
mass destruction in which the BMP was
designed to operate. This is the basis on
which the discussion was opened, and the
debate concentrated on the tactical details
by which means the above requirements
might best be met.
The BMP in attack and defense
The BMP, it was stated without contradic-
tion, is best used for exploiting success.
Therefore units or formations equipped with
it, when operating as part of the main forces.
can expect to act in the second echelon' of a
deliberate attack. In practice, however, due
to the chaos of modern battle, units
equipped with BMP will undoubtedly be
called upon to take part in all sorts of attack,
even amongst the first echelon in break-
through operations. During nuclear opera-
tions, it is normal practice forall attacks to be
carried out with the troops mounted inside
their fighting vehicles. During conventional
battle, however, due to the high density of
anti-tan in NATO armies, and due
to the silienceofastrong defense toSoviet
air or arti cry ment, an attack on a
prepared defensive position will normally
require the troops to dismount and attack on
foot, in close co-operation with accompany-
ing armour and under cover of well co-
ordinated artillery fire.
h is the apparently simple operation
described in the last sentence which gen-
erated most of the heated discussion. The
tactical details in dispute are as follows:
(a) At what distance from the enemy should
the sub-units deploy from the line of march
orfrom pre-battle order (company or platoon
columns) into attack formation? (b) At what
distance from the enemy defense should the
motor-rifle troops dismount? (c) How far
should they be behind their accompanying
tanks when this dismounting takes place; or
should they even be in front of them? (d) How
close together should infantry and tanks be
when actually assaulting the defenders' first
line? (e) How close should the BMPs stay to
the motor-rifle troops who have dismounted
to attack? (f) How best can the BMP support
the attack by fire from its missile, cannon or
machine gun? (g) Should it fire over the
attackers' heads, or into the 50 m gaps
between attacking sections? (h) If a BMP
battalion, supported by a tank company (13
tanks), is attacking in 2 echelons ratherthan
one, should all the tanks be in the first
echelon, or should some be in the second?
(i) How close under the artillery bombard-
ment should the tanks and BMPs try to get
before dismounting the infantry (remember-
ing that in Soviet doctrine such a bombard.
ment is essential to the success of an attack
against prepared defenses)? (j) Whet is the
drill fordealing with any mixed minefields in
front of the defense?
Articles in the debate show clearly that el I
possible variations on the distances and
timings referred to above have been prac-
tised: infantrymen have been dismounted,
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tion to this rule. and the military authorities
have allowed and even stimulated the devel-
opment of open discussions on disputed
tactical issues, considering such discussion
as helping to solve many of the tactical
problems as well as helping to improve the
general tactical education of the sub-unit
officers.
The discussions in the press' have cen-
tred on two areasof concern. Thefirst relates
to actual tactical practice and the ability of
combined arms combat and logistical units
to remain viable in the face of enemy action;
the second relates to the ability of the officer
himself, in particular his capacity to cope
with tactical problems, and the extent to
which he should solve such problems using
his own initiative. Discussions on the latter
theme have been much more restrained, as
they come close to questioning many of the
Soviet system's long-held and most basic
assumptions'.
On the theme of tactical practice an
which have been subject to intense debate to
date are: ? the use of the BMP infantry
combat vehicle; ? the deployment of artil-
lery and the effectiveness of artillery sup-
port; a the flexibility and the resilience of
command and control practices; ? and the
special effect that the maintenance of a high
speed of offensive has on co-ordination in
combined arms units.
On the theme of the officers' ability,
rather looser debate has discussed: the
definition of "initiative" (initsiativa) and the
practical extent and consequences of its
application; the requisite qualities that a
young officer is expected to develop nowa-
days to enable him to perform his duties
effectively; technical means of improving
command efficiency; and the way to im-
prove the training, motivation and morale of
soldiers so as to increase tactical perfor-
mance.
In many areas the topics under discus-
sion, naturally, overlap. We will attempt
below to identify and outline the main points
of each topic debated and make some
conclusion as to the final stance taken and its
possible effect on the future development of
the Soviet Army at sub-unit level.
The first topic to become the subject of
serious debate, and the one which has
attracted most attention in the West,
concerns the employment of the BMP infant-
ry combat vehicle. The characteristics of this
vehicle (described in detail in !DR No.
6/ 1975 pp. 896-898) have rendered it
1,000
article
ered d
onexe
tional
The
debat
their
arms
barra
rapid
be so
as t
emer
tank
effec
oure
time
ing;
tank
sol
poin
give
 Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP83MOO171ROO1100040001-1
to take just one example, anything between
1,000 and 200m from the objective. Further
articles have indicated that a considerable
difference exists between what is consid-
ered desirable and what is usually achieved
on exercise. This latter problem is clearly not
one confined to operations with the BMP,
nor even to the Soviet Army as a whole, as
any NATO officer can all too easily confirm.
This should be borne in mind when making a
realistic comparative assessment of opera-
tional capabilities.
The basic problem as it emerged in the
debate is as follows: tanks without infantry
support attacking an unreduced defensive
position sited in depth will be destroyed by
the defending infantry's anti-tank weapons.
The same fate will befall the supporting
infantry as well, if they attack mounted in
their armoured vehicles, because small-
arms fire from armoured vehicles is so
inaccurate' (the Soviets maintain) as to be
only effective for the suppression of the
weakest of defenses. In fact, the artillery
barragewhich a unit orsub-unit involved in a
rapid attack can call down in its support will
be so limited as to suppress the defense only
during the duration of the fire. It will not
destroy the defense. and therefore as soon
as the barrage lifts, the defenders will
emerge from their holes to put their anti-
tank weapons and machine-guns to good
effect.
For infantry, even those mounted in arm-
oured vehicles, to approach closer than 300
m to their own barrage was considered by
most contributors to the debate to be ex-
tremely unwise; normally, twooreven three
times this distance is maintained as a safety
zone during exercises, especially if rocket
launchers are being used in the barrage.
Consequently, the exact place of dismount-
ing; the relative position of accompanying
tanks: the effectiveness of fire support from
BMPs in the last moments of the attack; the
timing, accuracy and weight of the artillery
strike, all assume critical proportions. Sever-
al variations on tactics were suggested as
solutions to aspects of the problem. A
consensus of opinion was reached on some
points, but by no means on all. A ruling was
given on some issues in a closing article to
the debate by Col. Gen. Merimskiy, Deputy
Chief of Combat Training of the ground
forces. The most authoritative and best
support "solutions" can be summed up as
follows:
(A) -Actual distances for (1) deploying
from pre-battle formation (company and
platoon columns) into attack formation (line
abreast) and (2) dismounting, can be expect-
ed to vary with the ground, strength of
defense etc, but they must be as close as
practicable tothe forward edge of the enemy
defense. Normally, in actual battle as op-
posed to exercises, deployment into attack
formation will be carried out no more than
1,000 m from the forward line of the enemy
defenses, and infantry will dismount at
between 400 and 300 m from the enemy
lines.
(B) - Infantry should always dismount
from BMPs as close behind the tanks as
possible (never in front of them), and ad-
vance behind the tanks to the obstacle.
When the tanks reach the forward edge of
the defense the infantry should be as close to
them as possible and no more than 200 m
away, otherwise their small-arms fire will be
ineffectual in protecting the tanks from the
defenders' anti-tank weapons.
(C) -Companies will never attack in more
than one echelon and will not normally keep
a reserve of any size. Battalions will often
attack in one echelon. When attacking in two
echelons, a battalion's accompanying tanks
will usually all go into the first echelon. This
will be particularly truewhen the battalion is
operating in the second echelon of a unit or
formation attack.
(D) - Attacking sections of infantry
should keep gaps of 50 m between them.
Having dismounted their infantry, BMPs
should follow at about 300-400 m and
deliver fire support, firing at the short halt
through the 50 m gaps between attacking
sections, and concentrating their attention
on enemy strong points. BMPs should fire
over their infantry's heads only in hilly
country; otherwise, morale will be adversely
affected. The ideal assault formation is
therefore to be as shown in Fig. 1.
(E) -The commonly observed tendency
is for all these distances to become greatly
enlarged, and for the time gap between the
lifting of the barrage and the attackers
reaching the first trenches to widen drasti-
cally. Such slipshod tactics, readers of
"Voenn y Vestnik" were warned, will inevi-
tably result in disaster.
(F) - Asa general rule BMPs will not be
used in the first echelon of an assault on a
prepared defense when any suitable alterna-
tive exists.
The debate also touched on matters relat-
ing to the organization of defensive posi-
tions using BMPs. Suggestions that sub-
units could deploy to defend wider sectors of
the front than recommended in the existing
manuals (up to 2 km width of front for a
company was suggested), were dismissed
with scorn, 1200 m being officially consid-
ered as the maximum effective sector that a
company could hope to defend. The "invert-
ed arrowhead" is the preferred defensive
deployment fora battalion, with two compa-
nies in the first line and one positioned in
depth, because this provides a "killing area"
where the enemy can be engaged from the
front and flanks simultaneously.
Raiding tactics with the BMP
Throughout the debate, all participants
were in agreement as to the suitability of the
BMP for certain types of combat operations
where its speed and mobility could be a
great advantage and where, since those
operations envisaged no desperate assault
on a strong defense, its vulnerability did not
put it at a disadvantage. These are those
operations in the depth of the enemy posi-
tion which many contributors to the debate
referred to under the general title of "raiding
tactics" (reydovaya taktika). This was a
phrase of which General Merimskiy disap-
proved, but only because it blurred the
distinction between the tactical ideas it
blanketed. Of the idea itself of using the B M P
in operations in the enemy's rear, Merimskiy
heartily approved, indicating that not only
should commanders think first of their BMP
sub-units when choosing troops to carry out
such tactics, but that, if they had sub-units
available equipped with BMPs, command-
ers should consider using such tactics on
every possible occasion.
The term "raiding tactics" covers the
tactics of: (1) long-range recce groups: (2)
raids proper ("reydy", involving a large
group of reinforced battalion or even
regimental size assigned a recce and des-
truction mission, and designed to remain in
the enemy rear indefinitely); (3) forward
detachments (assigned a specific function in
the depth of the enemy's position to facili-
tate the advance of the main forces); or 44)
outflanking detachments (aimed at out-
flanking enemy defenses and hitting the
defenders from flank and rear). The high
speed and cross-country ability of a BMP-
equipped unit is ideal for such tactics, where
the attackers seek to avoid strong enemy
defenses and to penetrate into his rear. This
type of action can have an effect on the
organization and morale of the enemy quite
disproportionate to the effort involved in
mounting it. Such tactics, the Soviets con-
sider, are particularly applicable to the initial
and pursuit phases of war, especially during
an offensive when surprise has been
achieved.
In such an action the BMP unit, it is
thought. is most likely to meet an enemy on
the move rather than dug-in in defense. That
enemy should then be engaged in an en-
counter battle. and routed before he can
establish himself in defense. The BMP, with
its considerable fire power, is considered
em'nently -ell suited to this type of battle.
Two problems which were raised during
the debate, and for which no convincing STAl~INT
answers were proposed, were: how to deal
with defended minefields, and how to en-
sure tight co-ordination and control between
tanks, infantry, engineers and artillery. The
failure to come to grips with the enormous
problem of co-ordination during the rapidly
evolving situation usually met with during
an encounter battle was particularly note-
worthy. A further interesting assumption
was that without effective artillery prepara-
tion, a deliberate attack wasalmost bound to
fail, no matter how good the drill. The ability
of artillery to "deliver the goods" has, in
fact, been questioned during other debates.
Most contributors to the BMP debate
favoured deploying all available artillery
immediately in support of the first echelon,
with the job of laying down fire on enemy
strong points. All artillery in BMP units, and
a good proportion of artillery in BMP-
equipped formations, is armoured and self-
propelled.
The debate on the viability of towed
artillery
Whilst the debate on the tactics and
viability of BMP units was in full swing, the
second debate was launched with an article
in "Voenniy Vestnik" of October 1975. In
this article, concern was voiced about the
viability of artillery10 units, and comment
was invited. Subsequent articles were pub-
lished from April 1976 onwards, i.e. after
the conclusion of the BMP debate.
The initiators of the debate, two artillery
colonels (Nesterov and Ivanov), had taken
their lead f rom a section of a book by Marshal
Grechko, the then Minister of Defense, in
which the Marshal drew attention to the
lessons of the Yom Kippur War. This war, he
said, had shown the extreme vulnerability of
unprotected artillery batteries when firing in
line from open positions.
The assumption made in the BMP debate.
that there would always be effective artillery
preparation and support for an attack, was
not seriously challenged initially, although
the authors did point out that the viability of
artillery was important not only to the
gunners, but also to the motor-rifle and tank
troops which they were expected to support.
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP83M001
TINTL
The article identified as the potentially
vulnerablefeaturesof Soviet artillery: (1) the
lack of armoured protection for 50% of the
batteries; (2) the inability, through shortage
of time and equipment, to provide engineer
protection (trenches. shelters, etc.) for gun
crews, command and observation posts and
assembly areas for prime movers; and (3)
the state of training and psychological prep-
aration of conscripts (the loss of its compara-
tively small fully trained cadre could render
a sub-unit ineffective). A particular threat,
the article maintained, was posed by
NATO's excellent observation and counter-
battery (CB) capacity, particularly in view of
the Soviets' normal practice of deploying
batteries in a straight line, 200 m long.
The authors consequently suggested that
the six guns of a battery should be dispersed
over a 600x300 m rectangle, and dummy
and alternate positions be prepared for the
purposes of deception and manoeuvre.
Wide dispersal, already the norm for anti-
tank guns and anti-tank guided missiles
(ATGMs) firing direct did, however, cause
problems of ballistic adjustments when fir-
ing indirect.
. The article concluded with further warn-
ings about the effectiveness of enemy anti.
artillery action, mentioning helicopter gun-
ships and radio jamming; and the authors
called for measures to ensure better co-
ordination with AA troops, for better support
from engineers for digging-in and camou-
flage (especially for anti-tank weapons), and
for more consideration to be given to im-
proving "shoot and scoot" procedures for
field batteries.
It is interesting to compare this article
with an earlier piece by one of the same
r'.'ira~l
Artillery barrage lust
terminating on forward
line of enemy defenses
'
c?o~
..ivcf
Tanks on the
enemy position
(as small IF. distance
as possible. and no more
than 200 ml
authors (Ivanov) on the same theme. Al- his article by stressing the great important
though, in his previous article, he did identi- of artillery, stating that nowadays it i
fy more or less the same range of threats to responsible for 80% of missions to destroy
artillery batteries, his emphasis was com- the enemy by fire, asopposedtoonly70%in
pletely different. The main concern he ex. World War 2.
pressed in the earlier article, which ap- He laid great stress on ensuring the
peered in "Voenniy Vestnik" of Nov. 1972, viability of artillery batteries by improving
was with the threat posed by air strikes; and Soviet CS performance" especially against
his suggestions at that time were limited to NATO self-propelled (SP) batteries. This he
passive protection, camouflage and decep- identified as the foremost task for Soviet
tion measures. artillery to master. He further emphasized
The subsequent articles in the debate the need for effective deception, camou-
threw a great deal of light on Soviet percep- flage, engineer preparation, and manoeuvre
tions of their own vulnerabilities" and devel- ("shoot and scoot" tactics). He pointed out
oped the colonels'suggestions (whichwere, that effective "shoot and scoot" tactics
in general, very favourably received). The could, in some cases, obviate the need for
most important points raised were as fol- complex dispersal, and permit the use of the
lows: 80-85% of artillery crews in unar- much faster (but unprotected) deployment
moured artillery units were unprotected, in line. He also considered desirable an
and consequently dispersal (to confuse
sound ranging and reduce the effect of CS
fire) was to be encouraged. Moreover, as the
enemy (i.e. NATO) would certainly locate a
battery 2-3 minutes after it opened fire,
would take 2-4 minutes to process this
irformaticn, and would take a further 2-3
minutes to prepare his own guns, effective
NATO counter-battery fire could be expected
within 6-10 minutes of the opening of a
Soviet bombardment. Consequently a bom-
bardment of over 7 minutes' duration was
considered too long for safety. Ideally, bat-
teries should move at least
a 5-minute bombardment"
A widely dispersed battery was co sl - a o
ANandcomputers soreadily available toNATO,
enemy armoured attack from a flank, but to
be an easier target for enemy diversionary
raids. Dispersal, it was also stated, reduces
speed of reaction, complicates control and
reduces accuracy.
The debate was concluded in October
1976 with an article by Lt. Gen. Anashkin,
Chief of Artillery CombatTraining. He began
Attacking
infantry
BMPs
dismounting
their infantry
Fire support
from amps
BMPs
advancing slowly
(This is the ideal maximum distance from the enemy defenses
for BMPS to be at the moment when the tanks actually arrive
on the enemy position.)
improvement in both speed of opening fire
(to forestall the enemy), and in overall
accuracy.
In conclusion, this debate raised many
fundamental points about the vulnerability
of unarmoured artillery, and while many
suggestions were proposed for improving
the situation, none appeared which were
radical or concrete. Reading between the
lines, the principal problems seem to be: (1)
the inability to break away from 70-year-old
patterns and the adherence to linear deploy.
ment. probably reinforced by a rather low
standard of training; and (2) a general -an?~TATI NT
much lamented -lack of the mechanizti f~
This debate is of particular interest, because
improvement in the efficacy of modern
Soviet artillery practice has received con.
stant attention in the Soviet military press
for some years, although not in the form of a
debate. The articles referring to artillery
practice have shown a constant preoccupa.
tion with Soviet ability to maintain contin-
uous effective fire on the enemy during an
offensive. A good example of this is the
report of an artillery officers' conference that
appeared in "Voenniy Vestnik" in Novem.
ber 1975 (p. 82) under the title "The uninter.
rupted delivery of effective force".
The papers presented at the conference
dealt with improving long-range accuracy;
firing on moving vehicle columns in the
enemy rear; counter battery bombardment;
firing for effect against enemy anti-tank
weapons; the suppression of platoon strong
points: the improvement of artillery recon.
naissance; the problems of integrating artil-
lery into combined-arms groupings; and
increasing the competence of officers and
gunners. Other topics raised by speakers
were fire planning and party political work.
The editors of the Journal called for readers'
comments and the topics raised were
covered in subsequent articles. However, it
was not really until the discussion on the
high-speed offensive was initiated that
debate on the subject became heated.
Commencing in April 1976, and running
in the pages of "Voenniy Vestnik? at the
same time as the debate on the viability of
artillery, wasa rather more impressive series
of articles discussing troop control.
The bones of the problem were laid out in
an authoritative article by Col. Gen. Grinke?
vich. Chief of Staff of the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany (GSFG). The points he
raised, and on which he invited critical
comment, were as follows:
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 Approved For Release 2002/01/24: CIA-RDP83M00171R001100040001-1
requires a corresponding increase in the
effective Mess oft; oop control, otherwise the
benefit of these weapons will be lost.
The increase in troop mobility and the
effectiveness of weapons will result in fre-
quent, rapid and radical changes in battle
situations, ina vast increase in the amount of
intelligence to be collected and processed,
and in a drastic reduction in the amount of
time available to make any assessment and
to implement any decision. In other words,
commanders and staffs will have to do a lot
more work in a lot less time.
Those phases of the battle at which
Grinkevich considered effective control to
be positively crucial were: ? the time and
place of the introduction of a second echelon
or a reserve; ? the co-ordination of fire and
manoeuvre; ? the switching of pressure
from one axis to another; and ? co-ordina-
tion and cooperationwith adjacent unitsand
formations.
k
i
h
nti-
l G
i
G
d
n
ev
troop contro
r
c
co
oo
.ued, presumes the following qualities:
____________________uick ) - firmness; i.e. the ability to come to a
decision and see it through with
etermination and toughness.
2) - flexibility; i.e. a capacity for quick
eaction to rapidly changing circumstances.
(3)-security; i.e. the taking of all measures
designed to prevent the enemy from predict-
ing one's intentions.
(4) -continuity; i.e. the waging of combat
without respite, which only uninterrupted
control would ensure.
Good troop control further requires: (a) a
good standard of training of all sub-units,
and good morale and political preparation so
that the officers and men respond instantly
to any order; and (b) a very high degree of
knowledge and skill on the part of the
commanders and staff so that they can reach
correct decisions rapidly and implement
them effectively.
-4 Amphibious 122 mm SP
howitzers swimming a river
during Exercise Karpary in
July 1977. Deployment of
these SP weapons permits
dose support artillery to
keep up with the fast-mov-
ing advance. provides a
degree of protection to the
crew. and also enables?
..shoot and scoot..
manoeuvres to avoid being
hit by NATO counter-battery
ICa) fire. Soviets plan on
NATO Ca fire starting to
arrive on target within 6-10
minutes of the opening of a
Soviet bombardment.
technical mains' of control and communica-
tion available. and the frequency with which
those means of communication actually
available were misused.
The effect of these failings is to make the
whole control procedure too slow. Too much
time is spent trying to reach a decision; and
too much time is spent in the drawing up and
conveyance of orders. Furthermore, orders
are often imprecise and confusing, said the
General.
To improve things, Grinkevich stated.
several things were to be done. First, there
must be warning orders and operational
instructions, and the method of parallel
work (i.e. conveying orders at "O" groups,
etc.) down two or more links of the chain of
command at a time must replace the tradi-
tional long-winded orders procedure.
Secondly, there should be specific training
for staff officers in specialized skills.
Moreover, a general increase in the staff
officers' overall professional skill was over-
due. Thirdly, an increase in the use of
"automatic" systems of control (this last the
General considered essential). The term
"automatic systems" covers everything
to suit individual circumstances, t we a certain slant. and
calculating equipment and even b to seeking for ways of
electronic computers. lity of control and its
One can conclude from Grinkevi y action. One popular
cle, therefore, that the efficiency o troop su I plit the battalion head-
control has not kept pace with the increasing quarters into a Command Post (CP) and a
volume and sophistication of equipment. Staff HQ in the fashion of higher command
The prime need is for an increase in the and control procedure. The Battalion Com-
speed and effectiveness of troop control in mander would travel and command from a
order to gain time, so as to forestall the position well forward in the vanguard, whilst
enemy in deployment. manoeuvre, and in the Chief of Staff would stay in the second
the delivering of attacks. echelon and maintain communications with
The exposition of the control problem was higher control. In event of the commander's
continued in the next article by Maj. Gen. demise, the Chief of Staff would take com-
Tovstukha, who reiterated Grinkevich's mand. In event of his death, command
points about more work in less time; and should pass to company commanders in
about the need to improve the level of designated order of succession' t, unless a
training of staff officers. both in terms of senior commander orders otherwise.
their general ability and in terms of the In this context, the chief threat to the
specific skills required in staff jobs. viability of control was clearly perceived to
The main failings in the Soviet army at He considered that a high quality of staff be nuclear weapons. The assessment of the
present Grinkevich identified as: an all-too- work requires: (1) a good knowledge of average reduction in effectiveness of the
frequent low standard of personal profes- military art; (2) good organization and docu- surviving personnel (due to injury orpsycho-
sional preparation and staff work; a lack of mentation; (3) the effective use of the most logical stress)tobeexpected inasub-unit hit
knowledge about the performance of new modern calculation and control equipment; by a nuclear strike, is as follows:
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(4) the rapid issue of orders: (5) the ability to
conceal control measures and to deceive the
enemy; (6) a continuous checking of all
subordinate officers' actions by the com-
mander, so as to eliminate inconsistency
and error.
To achieve all this in an ever shorter time,
the perfect staff officer needs: an ability to
phrase commands well; a great deal of
personal presence (strong will power, tact,
an absence of coarseness, etc): and the
ability to keep a good, neat operational map.
Long hours of private study, the author went
on, may well be necessary to achieve this
level of expertise and ability. The idea,
concluded Tovstukha, that in a highly fluid
battle, maps and documents are unneces-
sary or superfluous is wrong.
We have covered the opening articles in
this debate in such detail because they
amount to quite a strong complaint about
the lack of expertise on the part of staff
batta-
at sub-unit (i
e
articularl
officers
.
y
.
p
,lion) level. The suggestion in the third article
in this series. that large amounts of private
study plus command post exercises (orga-
nized, of course, in the officers' spare time)
would help imp-ove skills must have been
greeted with dismay by young officers, who
are already very hard-worked. One cannot
but pose the question, why did these officers
not learn how to mark a map properly during
their 3or4yearsata Military College?Partof
the answer could be that an increasing
number of young officers are being drafted
from university, when they hin ve com-
pleted areserveofficertrainingcourse,for 1-
3 years' compulsory service. However, this
is unlikely to be a fully satisfactory explana- STA I NT
tion.
Retaining control in battle
Later articles harped on the need for
improving the procedures for transmission
of orders and suggested various detailed
improvements such as the issue of standar-
dized proformae, reducing documentation.
and the training of all signallers to operate
HF morse in order to beat enemy jamming.
An alarmist note was injected by an officer
who pointed out that a command post and a
main headquarters would be a priority
enemy targe. nd that commanders and
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1-As to why this should be the case. see P.H. Vigor: "The Soviet View of War. Peace and Neutrality"-R.K.P. 1975.
2-The Soviet term "tactical" Itakticheskii) describes military activity up to divisional level; the term "operational"
loperativnyi) denotes action by an army or front (army group). Above that level, the term "strategic'* (strategicheskii)
is applied.
3-For example: Ya. E Savkin: "Osnovnyye pnmsipy operativnogo isskustva i taktiki" -Moscow. Voyenizdat. 1972.
Translated by USAF as "The basic principles of operational an and tactics".
4-Compare, for example. Messrs Lou. Garbuz & Sazonov; "Motostrelkovii batal'on v sovremennom boyu" (The
motor rifle battalion in modem battlel-Moscow. Voyentzdat. 1965; and the same authors ' "Motostrelkovii betal'on v
boys" (The motor rifle battalion in battle)
- Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1972.
5-See Pravda, 19.2.78. p.2. An article by Marshal Ogarkov entitled "Soviet Military Science", in which he outlines
the role both of historical research and of the military press in helping to develop military an and extend the Soviet
officers knowledge,
6- As the debates have concentrated on pertomance at sub-unit level, the chosen forum has, logically, been the
monthly magazine "Voenniy Vestntk" (Military Herald). although related anicfes have appeared in many other Soviet
military periodicals.
7- It is perhaps worth noting here that the Russian language has no native Slav word for "initiative". The modem
8-As a general rule. at unit(regimentap level and* bove it issta rd Soviet pb eto mount an attack in two waves,
or echelons. The task of the first echelon, which usually compri stwo-thirds of evadable teeth arms and most of
the engineer or fire support, is to smash a hole in the first line of.. mydef es. The teak of thesecond echelon is
to exploit any success achieved and rush through any Drsach formed, pe rstinges deeply sodas rapidly as possible
into the enemy position so as to cause maximum disruption and confusion among the enemy. At battalion level.
attacks may be mounted in either one ortwo echelons. At unit and formation level, snacks in one echelon (with a small
reserve) will be preferred when the enemy can be surprised. pre-empted or when his defense is weak or in no great
depth. Suitability of ground is also important.
9- Recent Soviet studies have s hown that only one infantryman in six can hit a moving target when firing his AKM or
PKM from inside a MP.
10- It is important to appreciate that. in this context, the Soviet concept of artillery in?: fudes mortars and multiple
rocket launchers.
11-Since this point was raised. it is presumably nor standard procedure at the moment to hand down command on a
pre-designated chain.
12-This was stated by Gen. Alexander Haig (SACEUR) in a recent speech at The Royal United Services Institution.
London.
13 - The Taman Guards Motor Rifle Division is an elite formation, known especially for its young and energetic
command cadre. It was at a Taman Guards Division barracks that the new T.72 battle tank was first displayed to
western (French) visitors in October 1977 (see photos first published in IDR No. 6/ 1977 pp. 1031.1034).
14- In Soviet usage. suppression (podavlemyel means the infliction of 25% casualties on enemy personnel and
equipment. so that he is incapable of action during the period of bombardment and fora short time after it has ceased.
Destruction (unichtozhemel means the infliction of over 60% casualties. and the consequent inability of the enemy to
recover for a long time after the attack.
15-150 rounds of 122 mm shells are required-the Soviets calculate-to suppress one hectare of target area. hastily
prepared for defense. A NATO platoon defensive position is said. by the Russians. to cover 4 hectares.
16 - The Rogachev Guards Motor Rifle Division is the elite formation of the Belorussian Military District, and
participated in the Berezina manoeuvres in early 1978.
17-Voenno Istoncheskiy Zhurnat. No. 6.1976.
at moment of burst-down to 20% effective-
ness
30 minutes after burst - rise to 75%
24 hours after burst -down again to 40%
48 hours after burst - rise again to 60%
10 days after burst - rise to 80%
In order to recover control of a severely
damaged sub-unit (particularly one hit by a
nuclearweapon), when the Commander and
Chief of Staff are both dead, some officers
considered it essential that the senior com-
mander (regimental or divisional) should
take charge. In event of there being enough
survivors, he would make an all-stations call
on the sub-unit net to appoint a new com-
mander and C of S. If the sub-unit were too
badly shattered, its components would be
regrouped and amalgamated with other
sub-units. This latter procedure, it was said,
is henceforth to be considered the standard
procedure fora sub-unit suffering a direct hit
by a nuclear weapon. Its chief, but unavoid-
able, disadvantage is the time it takes to
accomplish. Good drills, good camouflage, a
good spread of battle information amongst
all officers, and a chain for devolution of
command in emergency will help to lessen
the chaos.
Final articles in the debate hammered
ome t he points about the need for improve.
ment in individual skills, the need for more
specific staff training; and the glaring lack of
computers to aid in the processing of infor-
mation.
Logistical failings
Though it was chiefly conducted in the
pages of "Voenniy Vestnik". the debate
naturally spilled over into other areas,
receiving some attention in "Tyle i Snabzhe-
nie", ("Rear and Supply") the journal of the
logistics service. Here, the speed and effec-
tiveness of control is just as topical a subject,
and it emerged that the problems are identi-
cal with those met in the teeth arms. The
most frequent and serious failing of rear
service staffs was their failure to deliver fuel
on time, thus delaying the advance or
pursuit. Their lack of staff skills, poor train-
ing in command procedures, unfamiliarity
with new kit, a lack of computers and so on
were held to be the cause of this failing.
The debate was rounded off in December
1976 by a veryweakfinal article by Col. Gen.
Yakushin, Chief of the Main Staff and First
Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces.
He lent his weight to the calls for a speeding
up of the procedure of transmitting orders;
for the training of staff officers in individual
specialities; for the establishing of standard
proforma blanks for orders, etc; for the
introduction of computers and automation,
and for a general increase in an officer's all-
round education. In a word, he said, troop
control is too clumsy and too slow by far.
It is almost an error for the editors of
"Voenniy Vestnik" to call this discussion a
debate; for, unlike the BMP tactical prob-
lem, the contributors found very little to
debate, but much to criticise. They were in
general agreement both in what was wrong
and in what needed to be done; and most
seemed aware at the time of their writing
that the gap between what was seen to be
necessary and what could actually be
achieved was a wide one, and that reducing
this gap would not be easy.
The root of the Soviet problem
Our comment, reading between the lines.
is that one of the main problems-is the
Russians' tendency to sit and do nothing
until an order is given. Making preparations
in anticipation of an order so as to speed up
its implementation is just not generally
done. Routine overwork of junior officers.
long a feature of Soviet Army life, naturally
reduces their ability and inclination to ex-
pand their professional knowledge by spare
time work. Moreover, the system effectively
prevents time off for study during working
hours, because it burdens the officer with so
many petty responsibilities. The problem of
initiative is a thorny one; but a traditionalr,TATI N
lack of it in Soviet life at any level other them
the very top certainly increases adherence to
stereotype and to rules, and increases
dependence on contact with a senior com-
mander.
Furthermore, the cry comes through very
clearly that, if nuclear weapons are used
effectively by the enemy, then there is little
cha nce that an offensive will succeed. This is
because, even i; the defenders are similarly
reduced by Soviet nuclear strikes, the prob-
lems of recovering control and continuing
the offensive in a purposeful manner are
almost insuperable. If one calculates on the
scale of one NATO nuclear warhead for each
Soviet all-arms battalion group, then 15
warheads will wipe out a division, and 500.
accurately delivered, should be ample to
account for the whole of GSFG. As NATO is
reputed to have over 7,000 warheads in
Europe, it is not surprising that "destruction
of the enemy's means of nuclear delivery" is
always the first priority for any Soviet com-
bat unit, be it an artillery battery or a
sabotage squad in the enemy rear. It was the
Soviet Army's realization of this factor that
to a large extent determined the topic and
course of the next debate.
The debate on the high-speed
offensive
This debate has been the most general
and wide-ranging one to date, and it has
covered much of the ground dealt with in
earlier debates. Its particular interest.
however, lies in its approach, which is to
force Soviet officers to assess their tactics,
their use of artillery, and their control proce-
dures from the point of view of an ability to
sustain a high-speed offensive rather than
simply to survive an enemy attack. The aim
of the game, in other words, is to win the war
quickly; and the aims of this debate, proba-
bly the most important one so far, were first
to impress upon commanders and staff that
a high speed of advance is their first priority
and, secondly, to seek ways of perfecting
performance so that the high speed of
advance can be not only guaranteed, but
actually increased.
If war breaks out in Europe, NATO is
committed to fighting a conventional delay-
ing battle for several days before the use of
nuclear weapons will be condoned' 2. The
faster the Soviet Forces can advance into
NATO territory, therefore, the more likely is a
rapid political collapse and the less likely is
the esca lation to nuclear war. Even if nuclear
release is given to NATO troops at an early
stage, a rapid Soviet advance will bring
Soviet forces into the heart of Western
Europe and into close proximity with NATO
forces or centres of population, thus making
the effective use of nuclear weapons muci
more difficult,
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It is in the light of this concept that Colonel
(now Major General) Lobachev, commander
of the Taman Guards Motor Rifle Division' 3.
penned his article "High Speed of Advance
is an Indispensible Condition of Victory" for
the February 1977 issue of "Voenniy Vest-
nik".
The pace of the advance. said Lobachev,
is crucial; and raising the tempo of an
offensive is the critical problem facing
today's commander. The h ig her the speed of
advance, the more the enemy is thrown off
balance, losing his freedom of manoeuvre
and his ability to deploy his troops and
weapons. especially NBC weapons, to good
effect. The faster the advance, the lower the
daily casualty rate and the lower the daily
consumption of fuel and supplies. The aim of
a breakthrough into the enemy rear is to
achieve the main object of an offensive-thS
complete rout of the enemy and his rapid'
political collapse. Lobachev drew an exam-
ple from World War 2 to support his conten-
tion (which every subsequent contributor to
the debate has upheld without question),
r.-.entioni -g massive concentration and the
achievement of overwhelming superiority
on narrow sectors as being one of the best
means of achieving a rapid rate of advance at
that time. He also mentioned the importance
of good reconnaissance; of effective artillery
suppression; of the use of large numbers of
tanks in direct support of infantry; of the
timely deployment of second-echelon for-
mations; of the use of predominantly tank
forces to exploit breaches in the defense;
and of the prompt and adequate supply of
fuel and ammunition, as being important
factors in ensuring the success of such a
rapid advance. It later became clear that
these examples were chosen because of
their special relevance to warfare in the
1970s.
Lobachev went onto stress the suitability
and adequacy of modern forces to fight such
warfare; but he declared that without good
control, the best superiority can be wasted.
Secondly, he stressed the importance of
good intelligence, of close cooperation of all
arms, and of quickand effective manoeuvre.
Thirdly, he stressed the need for the effec-
tive suppression of defenders' weapons,
especially anti-tank weapons, and for the
destruction of attacking enemy aircraft,
without which suppression, he said, "the
high-speed offensive is unthinkable." Signi-
ficantly, he considered nuclear weapons to
be the best means of accomplishing this
suppression. Fourthly, he stressed that deci-
siveness and initiative are needed by all
commanders, to enable them to react to the
rapidly changing battle situation. And final-
ly, Lobachev underlined the need for good
political preparation of personnel, to inspire
in them the desire to learn and the will to
fight.
The problem having been laid bare in the
by now usual fashion, contributors weighed
in at a brisk pace, either to expand on points
raised by Lobachev or to air their own
foremost worries or pet ideas.
In the discussion of control, one of the
points of interest noted by this commentator
was the increasing tendency for battalions-
even those in fully equipped formations-to
be commanded by captains, with a senior
lieutenant as Chief of Staff. It would be
interesting to know whether the youth of
these battalion officers can explain the low
level of staff skills that was the cause of so
much bitterness in the ution was as fo
troops. to the attack i
of contributors was the 21a suppr s mortar) fire delivered during the move up,
large percentage (fro 40 to ove 60 but before the troops deploy for the attack.
was suggested) of the emy's weapons - Its aim is to destroy enemy nuclear delivery
(especially anti-tank weapons) before the means and artillery (including anti-tank),
attack could expect tosucceed. An attacking CPs, radar and communications, manpower
Soviet reinforced battalion group,thecontri- and other weapons (presumably in that
butors maintained, would be likely to face a order of priority). Preparation should inflict
mortars, plus tanks, radars. etc. To effect the
sure destruction of 50% of this before the
attack can expect to succeed will require a lot
of effort. A modern NATO defense, said one
contributor,. has indeed 10 times as many
effective anti-tank weapons than had the
Wehrmacht in 1944-45; and whereas, dur-
ing World War 2, it took between 2 and 3
minutes (i.e. 8-10 aimed shots on average)
to destroy one attacking tank, nowadays 30
seconds will suffice, and the second shot is
usually enough. An anti-tank guided missile
system is considered by the Russians to be
just as effective an anti-tank weapon as
another tank,
Nor can artillery be expected to accom-
plish the task of suppression alone. A large
percentage of the space allotted to the
debate was given over to a discussion as to
such losses throughout the entire depth of
the defense that the enemy can no longer
offer organized resistance to the attacker,
and the high speed of offensive is thus
ensured. This means, in modern terms,
destroying at least 40% of all enemy
resources. Careful and imaginative choice of
fire plans and types of shell. and careful
adjustment on to the target, can do a great
deal to improve the effectiveness of artillery
preparation. The standard drill is for 3 heavy
bursts of aimed fire or successive concentra-
tions of fire to be laid on strong-point targets
over a short period. The final bombardment
should last long enough to cover the attack-
ers' progress from the time they come within
affective range of enemy anti-tank weapons
to the time they deploy to attack (normally
about 4-6 minutes for BMP units).
why artillery could not easily ensure the ? Support (Podderzhka) is the term given to
complete suppression of the defense, and artillery fire which takes place during the
how things might be improved. The artil-n assault. with the aim of assisting the troops
specs was unusually frank, and probably
hides considerable inter-arm bickering.
One of the main causes of all these
problems is the increasing speed of the
battle. Even assuming that the guns accom-
panying the tank and BMP units deploy
quickly and fire on target at the right time
(which is itself not easy to ensure), the time
taken for the BMPs to move forward and
advance to within 400 m of the enemy
defenses is so short that there is not enough
time to get off sufficient shells to ensure that
the defense is effectively neutralized' a.]
Secondly, if a bombardment lasts for 1
minutes or so, enemy CB fire will put th
doubling the normal rate of fire. Other:
suggested a manoeuvre of batteries, and ye
others that a more extensive use of mortar:
might be the answer. A great deal of practi
cal advice on patterns of fire to adopt fo
Maj. Gen. Biryukov, Professor and Doctoro
Sciences, in "Voenniy Vestnik" of Mal
1977. All contributors were agreed on the
need to exploit fire very quickly indeed (2
minutes delay was considered the max-
imum permissible) and increasing reference
to rapid exploitation of nuclear strikes was a
noticeable feature of many articles. Some
suggestions were made as to how, by more
effective prediction and correction, accura-
cycould be improved to the theoretical ideal
of 1 % of the range.
The artillery "debate within a debate",
which had become extremely intense and
technical, was curtailed by a most compe-
tent and thorough article by Marshal Pere-
delskiy, C-in-C Rocket Troops and Artillery,
in the June 1977 of "Voenniy Vestnik". He
identified and defined the 3 classic phases of
artillery assistance totheattackand detailed
the special problems that had to be solved
for each phase
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successful breakthrough of the enemy
defense. Support. therefore, involves firing
on targets offering resistance to the attack-
ers, and moving the points of aim ahead of
the attacking troops. There are two critical
points, the first of which is the changeover
from Preparation to Support. If it is discern-
able, it will warn the enemy of the im-
minence of the assault. The second critical
point is the moving of fire to targets in the
depths of the defense ahead of the troops.
Close and strict cooperation is essential if
the support is to be effective, and not a
danger to one's own troops. During actual
battle, tanks should approach to within 200
m of shell burst, BMPs to 300, and infantry
on foot to 400 m, before the bombardment
lifts.
? Accompaniment (Soprovozhdenie) is the
third phase, when individual guns or artil-
lery units follow closely behind tanks and
infantry into the depths of the enemy posi-
tion in order to render effective support. This
is a task eminently suited to the new 122 mm
and 152 mm SP guns but by no means
denied to towed pieces. The tasks in this
phase are to assist the attackers to capture or
destroy enemy positions, to help beat off
counter-attacks, and to seek and destroy any
targets of opportunity, usually by means of
direct fire.
Authoritative though Peredelskiy's arti-
cle may have been, it clearly was not heeded
by as many Soviet gunners as it should have
been, because it was considered necessary
to restate the definitions at a high-level
artillery conference held in the Frunze Mili-
tary Academy and reported in April 1978 in
"Voenniy Vestnik". The aim of this confer-
encewasto seek ways of developing artillery
theory so as to improve the Soviet gunners'
ability to deliver effective fire on the enemy
STAlINT
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mentioned above. He has emerged as one of
the most authoritarian Soviet artillery tacti-
cians of recent years. From Ivanov's report
on the conference, it is clear that Soviet
gunners are still not satisfied with their
performance, and are still a long way from
completing theirthorough revision of Soviet
artillery practice. We must expect further
discussion on this point, with particular
eference to the employment of self-pro-
lied artillery.
Ither contributions
To return to the debate on the high-speed
{fensive, more than one contributor men-
oned the value of manoeuvre, so as to
ypass strong-points and attack the
nemy's flank and rear. Strong-points thus
ypassed were to be reduced by subsequent
chelons. Frontal attack was to be consid-
red as a last resort. However, whilst many
ontributors admitted the truth and value of
his ideal, few paid serious attention to the
eans of implementing it. In the '"Manyovr,
gon', Udar" trinity (manoeuvre, fire, shock
action), which is often quoted as summing
up the essence of Soviet tactics,
"Manoeuvre" is definitely the junior pan-
net.
Deception and surprise were other favou-
rite solutions to the problem of finding some
way of guaranteeing a high rate of advance.
Smoke was a favoured tactic, laid either by
armoured vehicles, artillery or engineers
and chemical troops. The advantage of
reducing visibility, and hence reducing the
effectiveness of the enemy's long-range
ATGMs and tank guns, was obvious to
everybody, although engineers warned that
it might give cover to the enemy to enable
him to retire, leaving minefields behind.
Comparatively little space was given to a
study of engineer support to the advance,
and the sapper colonel who did contribute
spent a large portion of his allotted space in
describing the horrors of NATO's offensive
mine warfare capability, and the havoc that
this could wreak on an attacker who was not
provided with copious quantities of en-
gineers possessing masses of the most up-
to-date equipment. He did devote some
space to a rather unconvincing description
of how his men actually proposed to clear
mines and speed up the rate of advance.
Late contributions to the debate were: a
suggestion (by a tank man) that putting a
few infantrymen onto each tank to suppress
the defenders" close-range anti-tank wea-
pons was a good idea; and a plea not to
forget the dangers of enemy anti-tank heli-
copters. In this latter contribution, the au-
thor identified the main problem in anti-
helicopter defense as being fire control. The
observed tendency is apparently for every
anti-aircraft gunner, infantryman and SA-7
operator to fire ad lib at even a single
helicopter, with a consequent massive (and
irreplaceable) waste of ammunition.
The debate was rounded off with an
rticle by Colonel General Salmanov. Depu-
discussion and exchange of ideas. He was
particularly pleased that the debate had
sparked off officers' conference and practi-
cal exercises to examine the topic further,
the commanders and staff of the Rogachev
Guards Motor Rifle Division's being espe-
cially commended for their performance in
this respect.
-Soviet regimental cwn-
wanders traditionally com-
mand from dug-in forward
observation posts. together
with the commander of their
subordinate artillery bat-
tery. This photo, published
here for the first time, shows
the new ACRV-2 mobile
command post/observation
post. which provides the
regimental and battery com-
manders with the armour
protection and mobility
necessary to keep up with a
high-speed offensive. Note
numerous observation
periscopes on unarmed tur-
ret, and what appears to be e
housing for an electro-opti-
Cal device on turret right
side.
Salmanov was particularly concerned
with the performance of battalion com-
manders and staff. "It is on their high ability
that the successful implementation of the
senior commander's intention depends to a
considerable extent," he said; and he
recommended strict attention tothe training
of personnel in efficient battle and control
procedures and in the best use of available
equipment. He was particularly keen to
press home the point that there would be
less and less time available for the solution
of ever complex problems as the rate of the
offensive mounted.
Salmanov's main criticisms were direct-
ed at encouraging officers to devote atten-
tion to topics which he considered had been
neglected. Manoeuvre of fire was one; the
study of deception and of enemy tactics was
another, particularly in respect of interpret-
ing enemy actions and predicting his next
moves. Most important of all, he said, there
had been far too little attention paid to
morale and the importance of party work. It
was essential in all war, and especially in
nuclear war, Salmanov stressed, to incul-
cate a moral and aggressive enthusiasm in
the men. A great deal of psychological
preparation was needed to give the men
faith in their own ability and in the perfor-
mance of theirweaponsand equipment (and
much of the preceding debate had done the
opposite of this). Much more danger and
realism should be injected into training to
prepare the men for the actualities of the
battlefield. "Frequently in the last war
[WW2],"'the General said, "an attack halted
because at the crucial moment of the battle,
attempts to overcome fearamongst the men
failed." A strikingly frank and sobering
comment with which to round off a debate!
Echoes of the debates listed above found
their way into the pages of "Red Star" and
the Soviet Journal of Military History. Partic-
ularly relevant was the article by Army
General Radzievskiiy (then Commandant of
the Frunze Military Academy) on ways to
ensure troop viability in offensive opera-
tions, based on his study of World War 2
operations". On the whole, the debates
were remarkable for the frankness with
which problems and failures were dis-
cussed, and they were marked bye distinct
lack of ideological claptrap. One of their
most impressive features is the evidence
they present that the Soviet officer corps is
taking the identification and solution of its
tactical problems very seriously indeed. The
debates constitute a continual attempt to
refine and perfect a constantly evolving
tactical doctrine so as to provide the best
instructional framework forthe training and
operation of the Soviet Army. It can be seen
from the tone of many of the articles appear.
ing in the debates that, whilst the natural
Soviet tendency toenforce the application of
the -hook answer" is very strong indeed, it
is by no means in all cases overpowering;
and, moreover, interpretation of what the
"book answer" really is differs widely from
unit to unit or college to college, often
affected by the whim of the unit or college
commander. Consequently, it would beas
unwise to assume that any final authorita-
tive solution to a tactical problem will urn
questioningly or unerringly be applied at all
times and on every relevant occasion, as n
would be to assume that because a sub-unit
officer may lack competence or initiative.a
divisional or unit commander will likewise
demonstrate such faults.
Another point which struck the present
writer forcibly was that, after a full seven
years during which the emphasis in tactical
discussions has been heavily on convert
tional operations, a renewed impetus was
given in many of the articles during the las
debate to the study of the offensive use arc
effect of tactical nuclear weapons. This mat
be simply a reassertion of what is considere
to be a realistic balance in training, in views
the ever-present threat of nuclear weapons
even in a conventional war. On the nthe
hand it may reflect a determination to us
nuclear weapons if necessary, and a belie
that their use could be restricted to th
battlefield (i.e. that the war may not new
sarily escalate to a use of strategic nuclei
weapons). The acquiring of new, h:gN
accurate, nuclear artillery by the Sow
army, and the determination with whir
Soviet politicians are attempting to prever
the neutron warhead and nuclear-arme
versions of the cruise missile from fallin
into European hands might be taken a
supporting this point of view.
From the very serious attention given'
NATO defense, and the great strength it
puted to it, it is certain that in future wars'
which nuclear wea pons are not used, fa r le
formidable defensive positions than we
necessary in WW2 will be sufficient ,
compel the Soviet Ground Forces to eng%
ina massive concentration of effort in ore
to maintain the tempo of their offensive, or
hence win the war very quickly. Put anoth
way, this Soviet realization of the potent
strength of a modern prepared defense mr
make pre-emptive surprise attack ever ms
attractive to every Soviet soldier, from c
poral to Commander-in-Chief. To quote r
most common "cry" voiced by contribute
to the last debate. "you forestall -you
all!"
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