TACTICAL USE OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE ASSETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001000190001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1977
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SLREF
TACTICAL USE OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE ASSETS
The Intelligence and Military Communities have for some time
recognized the need for policy guidance on the use of satellite
reconnaissance systems in support of military operations. Technological
advances have allowed and have resulted in intelligence systems with
significant and growing military support capabilities. In attempting to
improve intelligence flow from national assets to operating military
forces, a number of questions have arisen as to the extent to which national
reconnaissance assets in space should be configured and operated to
provide tactical intelligence* support to military commanders. Issues
arising from tactical use of space satellites are also enmeshed in other
subjects addressed in this study related to security and survivability of
intelligence collection from satellite systems.
I
configured with an increasing emphasis to providing tactical support
to field commanders?
The term "tactical intelligence" as used herein means that informat
or analysis required by the operating forces of the military service
to maintain their readiness for combat operations and to support tl
planning and conduct of operations under combat conditions. For
information o
"
means
comparison, the term "national intelligence
relating to the national defense, the national security, or the fore
policy of the United States which is used primarily by policy mak
involved in the formulation and direction of national policy partic
foreign policy and national security policy.
r
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ISSUE: Should national reconnaissance assets in space be
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resources, and the increasing need for information from denied territory.
Space assets contribute significantly to operational military needs and can
improve the effectiveness of strategic and general purpose forces.
II
Requirements for tactical support are being developed and associated
capabilities are being examined and in some cases implemented. In general,
information derived from space systems provides a baseline of military
intelligence which could be better exploited and would supplement organic
military assets. Exercises and studies have already looked at the problem,
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underway.4 More experience in active suppo` t of nary
and more are
operations with intelligence satellites is required to resolve issues one
requirements and capabilities.
I
optimize usefulness at a reasonable investment, increased tactical
support has been supported by the Intelligence Community but with the
caveat that increased tactical dependence on space satellites should be
approached cautiously due to their vulnerability and the likelihood that
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Within the single national intelligence space program, to
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they would be interfered with in wartime. Where national and tactical
needs overlap, the question of increased support to tactical elements is
not a significant issue. But the extent to which tactical support requiremer
should influence the design, deployment and tasking of these assets is a
policy issue and one which has been addressed only piecemeal. As a t'"
result of existing procedures and directives tactical intelligence fequ
W
for space collection are transmitted to the NRO via the military chain
of command and the appropriate DCI collection committees. In developing
and configuring the satellite collection systems, the NRO responds to NSC
Policy Review Committee (Intel) program guidance which indicates that
interfaces for data and product dissemination into tactical intelligence
processing and production centers will be provided for but that solely
tactical intelligence collection or processing capabilities will not be
programmed. This latter restriction stems from the FY 77 Appropriati
Bill where Congress indicated that use of national space satellites on a
part-time basis for tactical purposes is appropriate but a total dedicate(
program should not be initiated without Congressional review and appro-
The NRO must also justify to Congress in their program recommendati(
inclusion of capabilities that duplicate tactical assets.
II
To date, there has been one case of agreement whereby t)'
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YVV lligence support. T i
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timum
o
p
in an
matched ies that control and tasking be m that are not SwO
lies on national satellite systems
re
commander military responsive tasking
control or direct tasking. The existence of ject to his ho
would ameliorate the problem to some extent, in
chanisms, while they
t desire for direct
heren
military commander's in way satisfies them this problem
kin authority. Perspectives on
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erational control and tas
tactical satellites under military
Given an acceptable cost/benefit ratio,
ry.
ntory.
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)ntrol could become
tactical
the context of existing policy on use
ithln
f concerns have arisen on the matter.
ational
Increased support of oper m
d
h
atellites, a number o
ilitary requirements
tellite
compromise U. S. intelligence sa cap
of space
Some of these are:
treaty
1
verification, nationa stems less capable
Tactical assets might be traded for national sy
o T and less
of supporting the forces in a timely and useable way,
sive to the combat commanders in the field.
xespon elements could
o NRO interfaces with tactical intelligence bilitie s.
ea
adversely affect the ability of our over
may
to meet all needs (i. e. ,
reconnaissance inventory
).
'ntelligence, etc.
SOP SEC;RET
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o A visible military support role for reconnaissance satellites
may increase the likelihood that they will become targets at
certain levels of crises or conflicts.
o Some operational requirements (e. g. , ocean surveillance
and over-the-horizon targeting) can only or most efficiently
be satisfied by satellite collection (under geographic and other
scenario-related constraints). If national assets do not satisfy
these needs, should "tactical satellites" be considered? Shoul<
they be configured to supply national intelligence in peacetime?
o Should the policy of a single integrated intelligence space
program be maintained? If a distinction is to be made between
national and tactical satellite systems; there could be a
considerable impact on the efficiency of central management,
budgets, and tasking. What satellite systems should be
considered as primarily national or primarily tactical, e. g. ,
etc. ?
I Y
o Increased military reliance on space systems must be evaluat
in the context of a potential "tit-for-tat" space war.
o Adjustments in current security controls to facilitate support
tactical applications need to be evaluated.
'/o Current NR' collected information of value to presently deplc
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 In principle, the range of possibilities for space recon-
issance runs from a single national security space program to meet
telligence and military support needs in peace and war; to two separate
ograms, one configured for peacetime, another for war. Numerous
termediate possibilities also exist. To illustrate these various -alter-
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,tives, consideration is required of:
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Requirements: During combat operations, military com-
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.anders need support for the timely intelligence assessment of damage
om ground, naval and air operations, and location, identification and
ascription of potential military targets to support operational planning
.id decisions. During peacetime, timely intelligence is required on the
imposition, readiness and movement of foreign naval, ground and air
)rce's to support war planning, force posturing and decisions for active
eacetime operations. In addition, timely reporting of new deployments
f strategic offensive and defensive forces and weapons is required to
upport contingency and force structure planning for strategic nuclear
-perations. The bulk of these intelligence needs (e.g., missile, ground,
aval and air order of battle) are also required to produce national intelli-
;ence studies and estimates on foreign military capabilities. However,
he tactical intelligence needs call for more volume, more selective, and
Lsually :more discrete levels of information, and more demanding perio-
licity and timeliness of reporting. In general, intelligence space systems
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provide significant support to these requirements covering areas where
attrition of organic assets which if utilized would be prohibitive, beyond
range, capabilities or authority of organic assets, and covert collection
is desired.
Satellite Capabilities: In meeting the needs of military
commanders, space satellite systems vary in effectiveness. It is clear-
that most intelligence satellite collection systems capabilities lack the
full flexibility required to support the rapidly changing and unpredictable
elements of tactical situations. It also should be recognized that some
space reconnaissance products of value to the military commander are not
now being used because we have been unable to satisfactorily effect either
rapid dissemination of data to military elements, or to conduct the desired
levels of exploitation and operational use when the data is disseminated.
System Control & Tasking: An important provision of
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existing agreements is that operational control and tasking of intelligence
space satellites is vested in the NRO and DCI. There is no major concern
within the Intelligence Community with respect to the question of control
in peacetime. Some concern has been expressed that systems capable of
support to military operations may not be responsive to military commandea
in times of need. The capabilities of NRP systems are being explored and
applied to the extent feasible to current military needs. The ability to
rapidly develop and transmit intelligence requirements through the military
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chain of command into the COMIREX/SIGINT Committee arena is viewed
by some as unwieldy and inappropriate in a blitzkrieg war environment
where the tactical commander's requirements are satisfied without
resorting to a formal bureaucratic process. Others, however, point out
that the DIA and Service elements provide 24-hour a day support to tacti-
cal and national intelligence needs of military commanders and defense
officials, and provide interface with the. DCI collection committee staffs,
requirements. Concern is still.expressed that tasking priorities applied
to these requirements at intermediate levels might not reflect the tactical
commanders' needs when the requirements eventually reach the NRO. This
matter is currently being addressed through the medium of military exer-
cises.
I, which provide a 24-hour a day capability to act immediately on urgent
Product Dissemination/ Communications: During crises
and war the United States has experienced communications overload in support-
ing the needs of military commanders. Whereas transmission of intelligence
requirements from the theaters to Washington generates only a minor impact
on communication, dissemination of collected data to the military elements
uses a significant part of the communications capabilities. Alternatives
such as downlinking and processing intelligence data in-theater are feasible
and tests are being conducted in this area. There will remain, however,
a significant need for long-haul communications to transmit
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to a theater command. Exercise experience is providing the basis for
solving some of these problems.
Security: Current security controls inhibit effective
tactical use of satellite-collected information. For example, the mini-
mum classification of SECRET NOFORN on satellite imagery and derived
information limits use by lower echelons and by Allies; some imagery and IL
derived information is still compartmented further limiting use; and
satellite SIGINT is under multiple compartmentation.
As previously discussed, the DCI recommended in November
1976 that the security of satellite data be controlled according to content
sensitivity. Failure to adopt the DCI's administrative recommendations
will impact adversely on utility of satellite data for supporting military
operations.
Vulnerability: National intelligence space systems have
gained international legitimacy for monitoring compliance with strategic
arms agreements, under the euphemism "National Technical Means.
Noninterference with these means has been written into arms agreements,
but the implications of Soviet perception of tactical use of these same
systems are not clearly understood.
Some assert that tactical use may make the systems more
provocative and may have political implications. Efforts to make the
systems less vulnerable have been proposed through Gnrviyal,iliftr
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proc
exp e.
the p
to a fi
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 measuresAp \M'U
J1igks
and installation of a limited number of attack indicators has been taken.
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space systems presently exists and is likely to be employed under certain
conflict conditions. Thus, the matter is dependent on system and situation
A Soviet capability to interfere with or destroy some of our intelligence
variations. This subject is treated as a separate issue under the heading
configuring existing space programs to support the needs of military
commanders, and in transmitting, processing and exploiting data of
potential military value.
process and exploit tactical intelligence collected from space are at the
expense of dollars which might be spent on purely tactical systems. Also,
the potential overlap of satellite and aircraft systems in collecting the
same general kind of intelligence information must also be analyzed in
terms of cost/benefit factors. Another significant cost factor that could
be attributable to tactical use hinges on the scope of the survivability pro-
gram, i. e., if a decision is made to protect some intelligence space systems
more extensively because they are capable of providing tactical intelligence
to a field commander.
A budgetary issue is that dollars used in the NFIP to collect,
The issues can be summarized as follows:
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- There are no major issues concerning tactical require-
cises and studies have and continue to examine the problem, and should
iof
31
i
ments and existing NRP capabilities to satisfy those requirements.
the extent to which design of future NRP capabilities should be influenced
by tactical requirements and whether the military should be able to develop
their own systems independent of the NRO should the need arise.
- There are no major issues concerning the current cen-
ng
resolve any residual questions. There is an issue, however, concern
Of
te
4a"
tralized control by NRO of national intelligence satellite systems. However, Im
there is an issue concerning the extent and timing of increased military
involvement in tasking national intelligence satellites to support military
needs.
- There remains the issue of the extent to which satellite
is likely the USSR will assume the U. S. would support its military comman-
ders with satellite data just as the Soviets do with their own systems.
The related issue of security (i. e., restricted tactical use) versus vulnera-
bility (i. e., increasing ASAT target potential through association with
broader tactical uses) is no longer as serious as once believed, since it
collected data should be downlinked directly to support military
or disseminated indirectly from centralized processing sites in
Possible Actions
25X1 On the issue of configuring NRP assets, one approach is
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of impairment of NRP assets orimary capability as an acceptable traue-
off to achieve significant improvement in military support. 'third approach
would be maximum satisfaction of both peacetime and wartime requirements
through NRP systems designed primarily for either tactical support or
technical intelligence collection but with capabilities for both.
On tasking procedures for NRP satellites, one approach
would be to continue current practices while on occasion requiring increased
military involvement in establishing tasking priorities for NRP systems.
A second approach would be to remove the tasking of current and future
assets from exclusive control of intelligence organizations and insure
As to whether the U. S. should permit military development
system would be funded and justified by the military.
of reconnaissance capabilities that are not operated by the NRO, one
approach is to continue current practices. A second approach would take
the approach that space reconnaissance systems which are considered by
the military as essential to their tactical needs, but which are not planned
under the NRP, would be conceptually studied by the Services. The concepts
would be reviewed by an equitably represented military/intelligence group
and a decision made on whether development and operation should occur
under the aegis of the military or fall under the NRP. In either case, the
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