VIETNAM: SOME NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300200015-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 25, 1965
• Content Type: PREL

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REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE ON PLANNING AND RESEARCH
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
LE .:khN~ii Yl 3G
FILE C'N"Y
For Release:
11:00 A.M., Wednesday
August 25, 19W
A White Paper:
VIETNAM: SOME NEGLECTED ASPECTS
OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD
Members of the Committee on
Planning and Research
Catherine May (Wash.)
Thomas B. Curtis (Mo.)
Glenard P. Lipscomb (Cal.)
Robert H. Michel (I11.)
Robert T. Stafford (Vt.)
Samuel L. Devine (Ohio)
William E. (Bill) Brock (Tenn.)
This paper is being issued by the Republican Committee on Planning and
Research of the House of Representatives to recall facts which, while well
known to specialists, have become obscured or forgotten in the mind of the
public.
In the serious crisis in which the United States is now involved, support
of the objective of stopping Communist aggression and safeguarding the
freedom and independence of South Vietnam is the duty of all responsible
people. Support of the President, who alone can lead the nation to this
objective, is a duty as long as the lresident holds to the objective and
uses the means needed to attain it.
Support does not preclude examination of history to see how the nation
arrived at the present crisis and to evaluate past policy. That is the
function of this report. A clear perspective on the past is a first requisite
to making the right decisions in the future.
(Note: ,Because of an error in pagination, there is no Page 26
in this reprt.)
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SUTIO.RY AND CONCLUSIONS
The involvement of the United States in Vietnam after World War II
began with the decision of the Truman Administration to provide economic
and military aid in Ilay 1950.
A fragile peace was brought to Vietnam by the Geneva Agreements of
1954, partitioning Vietnam into a Communist north and a non-Communist
south. Contrary to most expectations, South Vietnam survived. Indeed,
with generous aid from the United States, it achieved what the late
President John F. Kennedy called "a near miracle" between 1954 and 1960.
Secretary McNamara spoke of the history of South Vietnam in this period
as "a success story."
When President Eisenhower left office, there was no crisis in
South Vietnam. There were problems arising, particularly from a renewal
of sporadic guerilla activity by the Viet Cong. The dimensions of the
problems then compared with the present situation can be gauged from
these facts:
(1) In 1960, there were fewer than 700 American military personnel
stationed in South Vietnam to train South Vietnamese; today,
125,000 troops are there or on their way there to fight.
(2) In 1960, there were 5000-6000 Viet Cong regulars in South
Vietnam; today there are 70,000 regulars and 100,000 other
Viet Cong troops.
(3) In 1960, the cost of aiding South Vietnam to the United States
was $250 million - 72 per cent of it economic aid; As of
April 26, 1965, it was 1.5 billion dollars on an annual basis,
of which 25 per cent was economic aid.
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(4) In 1960, 2000 South Vietnamese were killed or kidnapped by
the Viet Cong; in 1964, 11,349 were the victims of a
similar fate.
(5) In 1960, exports from South Vietnam (a good barometer of
economic activity) amounted to $86 million; in 1964,
( exports had dropped to $48 million.
(6) In 1960, and in 1962, more than 80 per cent of the land area
of South Vietnam was under the control of the South Vietnamese
government; today, it is 30 per cent or less.
(7) In 1960, two Americans had been killed by Viet Cong action;
as of Augustl9, 1965, 561 have been killed and more than
3000 have been wounded, taken prisoner, or are missing.
The policy of the Democratic Administration has too often been
uncertain, providing a basis for miscalculation by the Communists.
Policy has been altered abruptly. Conflicting statements have been
issued. Deeds have not matched words. Among the specific features of
policy subject to this criticism have been the whole handling of the
problem of Laos, the reversal of the position of the United States toward
the Diem regime, the cover-up of the gravity of the desperate dangers of
the situation in Vietnam, President Johnson's campaign oratory of 1964,
and the progressive dilution of official statements of the Nation's
objective in Vietnam. The most generous recognition of the need for
flexibility and change of policy in some circumstances cannot justify
making a habit of inconstancy.
Both because it invites miscalculation and because it confuses the
American public, the Administration's lack of candor about the situation
in Vietnam and about its own plans and actions is regrettable.
There should be no doubt that the American people will support the
Administration in the actions needed to establish the freedom and the
security of South Vietnam. There will be greater national unity when the
Administration abandons the defects of substance and style noted in this
report.
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1. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
The involvement of the United States in the struggle in Vietnam
that followed World War II dates from the Truman Administration. It
began with a decision announced by Secretary Acheson on May 8, 1950
to send "economic and military equipment to the Associated States of
Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability
and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic
development.it
The decision to aid the French in Vietnam was taken as part of a
tardy and somewhat inconsistent policy of containment which the Truman
Administration put together after the fall of China to the Communists.
Aid to Vietnam under that policy implied no commitment to put
more than arms and equipment and dollars into the conflict. This was
clear.from the authoritative statement of the Truman Administration's
Asiatic policy given by Secretary Acheson on January 12, 1950. The
mild and equivocal warning which Mr. Acheson gave to the Asiatic ag-
gressors in that speech drew a line in the Pacific 0sean marking the
outermost limits of the "defense perimeter" of the United States. The
islands east of that line were said to be vital to the security of
this country and, Mr. Acheson implied, would be defended by the
United States by force. The Asiatic mainland, including Indochina
(and Korea) lay beyond the defense perimeter where, according to Sec-
retary Acheson, an attack should be met by action of the United
Nations.
Although the policy enunciated in January was reversed in Korea
six months later by the commitment of American forces in
warfare, the Truman Administration never considered providing manpower
in Indochina. In fact, it twice rebuffed appeals from the French for
a pledge of air and naval support in the event that the Chinese Com-
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munists provided manpower for the conflict in Indochina. In response
to such appeals, the Government of the United States said only that
Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia "would require the
most urgen and earnest consideration by the United Nations."
Involvement in a costly war in Korea did not, however, prevent
the Truman Administration from supplying substantial aid to save
Indochina from Communist conquest. Approximately $375 million of
military and economic assistance was channeled to Southeast Asia by
the American taxpayer through fiscal year 1953.
In August of 1950, an American Military Assistance Advisory
Group of 35 personnel was sent to Indochina to advise on the use of
American equipment. Despite this assistance, the situation of the
French and their native forces continued to deteriorate. When
President Truman left the White House, all of Vietnam above the
17th parallel except Hanoi, a narrow corridor connecting to a coastal
strip around Haiphong and a part of the northeastern T'ai Highlands
was under control of the Communist Viet Minh. In addition, Viet Minh
forces were in effective control of large areas south of the 17th
parallel - the central highlands and the tip of the Camau peninsula,
the southermost part of the country.
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President Eisenhower continued the program of military and economic
aid to France and the Associated States of Indochina at levels set by
the previous Administration until the fall of 1953. In September 1953,
increased aid of $385 million through 1954 was promised by the United
States after two modifications of French policy had been decided on -
both of them measures designed to avert impending disaster.
Under the twin pressures of military reverses in Indochina and the
prodding of the United States, France agreed on July 3, 1953, to take
steps "to complete the independence and sovereignty of the Associated
States ... within the French Union." Although France, in 1949, by the
Elysee Agreement had conferred a measure of self-government on the
Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, too little was given
to satisfy the thirst for independence. Secretary Dulles, hailing the
belated French decision of July 1953, said, "...the peoples of these
countries needed something of their own for which to fight." There was
hope that the war, even at this late date, could be cleansed of the
appearance of colonialism and would no longer seem to Asiatics to be an
effort by France to hold on to her Asiatic possessions.
The second significant decision was incorporated in the Navarre Plan -
a plan of aggressive military action with increased French and native
forces.
With these two conditions realized - a promise of independence for
Indochina and the decision to intensify the military effort - the
Eisenhower Administration increased American assistance.
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4.
After the conclusion of the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953, keeping
the Chinese Communists from active military participation in Indochina became
one of the concerns of American policymakers. On the day of the armistice,
the sixteen members of the United Nations that had helped to defend South Korea
issued a joint warning against Chinese Communist action in Southeast Asia. On
September 2, Secretary Dulles warned that such aggression in Indochina "could not
occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.''
In the Spring of 1954, as the French situation became desperate, the
Eisenhower Administration sought to persuade other nations with interests in
Southeast Asia to engage in a joint undertaking to stave off collapse. On
April 4, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Winston Churchill suggesting
"united action" on the part of the United States, England, France, the Associated
States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. "...The coalition,"
Mr. Eisenhower wrote, "must be strong and must be willing to join the fight if
necessary."
If the forces of the United States were sent to Southeast Asia, the President
made it clear that they would go principally for purposes other than ground war-
fare. He told Churchill, "I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground
forces on your or our part...' Shortly thereafter, in a letter to General
Gruenther at NATO, President Eisenhower reaffirmed his intention to avoid
commitment of American forces to ground warfare, writing, "Additional ground
forces should come from Asiatic and European troops already in the region."
On June 11, 1954, Secretary Dulles, in a speech delivered at Los Angeles,
detailed the conditions under which the United States would consider additional
help to the French: (1) a request for assistance from the states fighting the
Communists; (2) clear assurance (from France) of complete independence to Laos,
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5,
Cambodia, and Vietnam; (3) an indication of concern and support on the
part of the United Nations; (4) assurance of collective action by other
nations along with the United States; and (5) a guarantee that France
would not withdraw from the conflict once a further commitment was
extended by others.
The last two conditions laid down by Secretary Dulles were the
decisive obstacles to the formulation of any plan for intervention.
Negotiations to bring about the formation of a coalition of nations to
support the French failed because England was unwilling to participate and
becauseFrance was unwilling to continue a fight which had gone on for eight
years and had cost more than 140,000 French casualties.
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954
In these circumstances the Geneva Con#er4nce opened. On May 6 - the
eve of the negotiations on Indochina and of the fall of nsai, Bin Phu -
Lyndon B. Johnson, Harry S. Truman, and other leading Democrats issued
ill-timed statements condemning Administration policy in Southeast Asia on
vague grounds. The New York Times of May 7, under the headline, "DEMOCRATS
OPEN ALL-OUT ASSAULT ON ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY, I' reported:
'An all-out Democratic attack on the Eisenhower Administration's
foreign policy, the first such attack since the President took
office, was opened tonight.
The effect was to put the Administration on dual notice
(1) that the bipartisanship of the last sixteen months was
breaking up and (2) that the Congressional Democrats could
not be counted upon for unquestioning general support in
the field of world affairs.
The article quoted Mr. Johnson as saying:
It is apparent only that American foreign policy has never
in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal.
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'We have been caught bluffing by our enemies. Our friends
and allies are frightened and wondering, as we do, where
we are headed.
We stand in clear danger of being left naked and alone in
a hostile world."
Despite this effort by the loyal opposition to pull the rug out from
under the Eisenhower Administration as the critical Geneva Conference opened,
the United States attempted to salvage what could be saved.
Representatives of nine governments assembled at Geneva to ring down
the curtain on the French empire in Asia - Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
France, Communist China, the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(north), The State of Vietnam (south), Cambodia, and Laos. Three similar
armistice agreements were concluded relating to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia,
and a declaration was issued.
Besides stipulations on the cessation of hostilities and pledges against
resumption, the armistice agreements provided for withdrawal of foreign troops
and prohibited Laos, Cambodia, and the two parts of Vietnam from joining any
military alliance or granting military bases to foreign powers.
The Geneva Agreements in effect recognized as Communist territory Vietnam
north of the 17th parallel and two provinces in northeastern Laos - Phongsaly
and Sam-Neua.
Presenting the Agreements to the French Parliament, Premier Mendes France
characterized them as "cruel because they sanction cruel facts." They
reflected, he declared, "losses already suffered or made inevitable by the
military situation."
If anything, the territorial settlement reached at Geneva was better than
the non-Communist nations deserved on the basis of the existing military
situation.
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Vietnam north of the 17th parallel had already been almost totally occupied by
the Viet Minh forces. The treaty provisions formalized this conquest, but they
also required the Viet Hinh to withdraw from South Vietnam, vast areas of which
were under their control. Some 80,000 - 90,000 Viet Minh troops were moved out
of South Vietnam in the execution of the agreement. Perhaps 5,000-6,000 melted
into the civilian population and remained in violation of the Geneva Agreement.
The territorial arrangements contemned in the agreements were, on their face,
temporary. North and South Vietnam, like North and South Korea, were ostensibly
established for primarily military reasons as zones for the orderly liquidation
of hostilities and the beginning of peaceful reconstruction.
The armistice agreement relating to Vietnam reads that the 17th parallel
"should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial
boundary." The Conference declaration envisaged the reunification of Vietnam,
providing for the selection of a government for the entire country by "free general
elections" to be held in 1956.
Similarly, the assignment of two northeastern provinces of Laos as sanctuaries
for troops of the Communist Pathet Lao not wishing to be demobilized was, by the
terms of the agreement, temporary - "pending a political settlement."
The United States did not sign any of the three treaties concluded at
Geneva nor the Conference declaration. Nor did South Vietnam.
At Geneva the United States issued a unilateral declaration pledging not to
use force to disturb the agreements and warning that renewed aggression in
violation of the agreements would be viewed as a threat to international peace
and security. At the same time President Eisenhower announced that steps would
be taken to establish collective defense against Communist aggression in South-
east Asia.
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The attitude of the United States government toward Geneva was summarized
by the President, The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a
great deal depends on how they work in practice."
The chief flaw of the Geneva settlement lay in provisions relating to the
International Control Commissions, set up to supervise the execution of the
agreements. The Commissions, composed of representatives of Canada, India, and
Poland, could act only by unanimous vote in cases involving violations o::: the
territory covered by the agreements. A veto in the hands of a Communist repre-
se=tive was an instrument for sabotaging the execution of the agreements.
Reaction to Geneva
The negotiations at Geneva produced a flood of criticism of the Eisenhower
Administration's foreign policy,
Yet all of the critics flatly opposed the only step which remained to undo
the Communist conquest in Indochina - the commitment of American troops to a
long and costly war. General Ridgeway estimated that 5 to 10 American combat
divisions would have been required "at the outset" to win such a war.
Critic T-like ilansfield said, "...almost all opinions converged on one point:
The United States should not become involved alone in a shooting war in Indochina."
At another time, he said:
`No, I was never in favor of intervention and I am opposed
to it now. I think it would be suicidal. I believe the
worst thing that could happen to the U.S. would be to have
our forces intervene in Indochina and then bog down in the
jungles there...`
Senator John F. Kennedy said:
I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
and at the same time nowhere, an enemy of the people which has
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the sympathy and covert support of the people....I do not think
Indochina can be saved unless the other Asiatic nations... are willing
to take their fair part in the struggle....For the United States
to intervene unilaterally and to send troops into the most
difficult terrain in the world, with the Chinese able to pour
in unlimited uan^ower, would mean that we would face a situation
which would be more difficult than even that encountered in
Korea. It seems to me it would be a hopeless situation.
Senator Estes Kefauver had this to say:
But if the decision is to be made to intervene, I say this
nation needs more than the help of Great Britain, of
Australia, of New Zealand, and of France. It must have
the moral and physical support, in addition to the Philippines and
Thailand, of Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and, if
not the help, at least the understanding of India.
Senator Hubert Humphrey said, We have had our bluff called two or three
times in the last mouth. We have been defeated at Geneva." Somewhat illogic-
ally, since he opposed military intervention by the United States, Senator
Humphrey attributed the "defeat" at Geneva to cuts made by the Eisenhower
Administration in the defense budget.
The critics were not in agreement on the basis for their attacks on the
Administration. Adlai Stevenson thought the United States was too rigid and
inflexible in negotiations. dike T.ansfield thought the United States should
not have negotiated at all but should have stayed away from the Geneva Conference,
ignoring the fact that such provisions, as that permitting Vietnamese who wished
to escape Communist control to move to South Vietnam, were the result of the
bargaining effort of the representatives of this nation.
Finally, the critics undermined their case by conceding that the war in
Indochina was lost because of French colonialism and not because of anything
the United States did or failed to do. Adlai Stevenson made the point when he
declared, Had France... granted genuine independence in orderly, sincere stages
to Vietnam, there very likely would have been no war in Indochina..."
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The Disputed Election of 1956
The Final Declaration issued at Geneva in 1954 (subscribed to by neither
the United States nor South Vietnam) called for free elections to unify all of
Vietnam in 1956. Recently Senator Fulbright and others have deplored the fact
that the election was not held.
At Geneva the representatives of what was to be South Vietnam
vatLy protested against the partition of the country and
against the principle of general elections being agreed
upon when more than half of the voters would be north of
the seventeenth parallel. It vainly asked that the whole
territory and population be placed under the control of
the United Nations until the reestablishment of peace
and security would permit the holding of really free
general elections.
The reasons for the refusal of South Vietnam to acquiesce in the holding
of the election were stated by Prime Minister Diem on July 16, 1955:
We did not sign the Geneva Agreements. We are not bound
in any way by these agreements entered into against the
will of the Vietnamese people. Our policy is a policy of
peace, but nothing will divert us from our goal: the unity of
our country -w a unity in freedom and not in slavery...
We do not reject the principle of elections as a peaceful
and democratic means to achieve unity. But elections can
be one of the foundations of true democracy only on the
condition that they are absolutely free. And we shall be
skeptical about the possibility of achieving the conditions
of free elections in the North under the regime of oppression
carried on by the Viet Minh...
There was clearly no legal obligation on the government of South Vietnam
to abide by the terms of the Final Declaration. The position of South Vietnam
on this point was sustained by the United Kingdom, one of the c0-chairmen of
the Geneva Conference in the following statement:
Her Majesty's government has alw