AN ADDRESS BY CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER - YALE CLUB OF WASHINGTON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 25, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9 yr
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
An Address By CIA Director Stansfield Turner
Yale Club of Washington
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, October 25, 1978
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
ADM IRAL STANSF IELD TURNER: Thank you very much. And
thank you for being here with us tonight.
As all of you I'm sure appreciate, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and Yale have a great affinity. If this were 30
years ago, I suspect we could have filled the whole auditorium
with just employees who were graduates of Yale. We still have a
lot here. And I only regret that there isn't as good recruiting
of the young men and women on the Yale campus today as there was
years ago. I hope that the new model we're trying to create of
intelligence and of the Central Intelligence Agency will help us,
in time, be more attractive to the graduates of your fine uni-
versity.
What I would like to talk with you about tonight is
what the roles of intelligence are in a free democratic society
like ours, what we, the intelligence professionals, need in
order to fulfill those roles successfully, and what you and the
entire society also require in order to be certain that we are
doing our job well for you and that we're doing nothing else.
Good intelligence, in my view, is more important to
our country today than any time since 1947, when we first organ-
ized a central intelligence operation in our country. Back then,
clearly, we were the pre-eminent military power, we were inde-
pendent economically, and we were the nation from whom most other
free countries took their cues in the political sphere.
Look how different the world is today. We are closer
to military parity, we are very interdependent economically, and
even the smallest and most pipsqueak and newest of nations is
independent politically and very active politically.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
And what does this mean to us? It means that it is
much more likely that actions and events which are not under
our control will have a major influence on our fate and our
future.
Military power is proliferating around the world, and
more and more small countries are able to exercise economic
leverage. And as I say, more and more countries are demanding
to be active and independent politically.
As a result, we frequently find that these forces are
encouraging countries to take actions deliberately inimical to
ours, or at least so selfishly in their own interests that they
don't care what happens on the international scene as a result
of what they do.
Under these circumstances, if we as a country are to
protect our interests, we simply have to know what is going on
in these other countries of the world. And therefore we need
an intelligence service, an intelligence capability that will
provide our policymakers with good information. And in many
areas today, information can provide better leverage to our
policy- and decision-makers than even military power and economic
prowess.
The successful conclusion of agreements, such as SALT,
are very dependent, for instance, on good intelligence, good infor-
mation. How can you enter into such negotiations if you don't
have a good feel for what the military strength, military plans
and programs of another country are? How can you sign such an
agreement and tie this nation's future fate to it unless the in-
telligence authorities of your country can give some reasonable
assurance of verification of such an agreement, assurance against
violation of it?
Now, if this were the best of all possible worlds and
other nations were forthright about their plans and policies, we
wouldn't need spying in order to gain this necessary information
for the security of our country. We a l l know it isn't the best
of all possible worlds. Many, if not most, of the world's soci-
eties are closed societies, in our terms. They simply do not
share with us information often vital to our own interests.
Take the great Russian wheat steal of 1972. Simple,
basic economic statistical data not available to us, much to our
detriment.
So, what I'm saying to you is that the collection of
foreign intelligence, the collection of information about what's
going on in other countries is the first role of your intelligence
community today.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
The second role is the obverse of that coin. It is
counterinteel I igence, or the prevention of other countries' ob-
taining the secrets, the information which we must hold private.
We are the most open society in history. There is little that
we think or do that doesn't become apparent to other people.
And yet, if we are to be prepared to counter deliberate or un-
intentional actions of other nations that are inimical to us,
we must be able to make some preparations in private, in secret.
We cannot afford, for instance, to develop expensive
military weapon systems or devices for collecting intelligence,
and then disclose their particulars to countries against whom we
may find it necessary to utilize them. In almost all cases, you
can find some counter if you know enough about the basic system.
We cannot afford to enter into these negotiations for SALT and
other treaties if the terms on which we are going to negotiate
are likely to be disclosed in advance.
Consequently, we must have some good capability to
uncover threats to our secrets and to be able to frustrate or
counter them. And this is our second role, counterintelligence.
The third role is what we call covert political action.
Now, this really isn't intel l igence, because intelligence is this
collection and evaluation of foreign information. But cover poli-
tical action is the attempt to influence the course of events in
foreign countries without the source of the influencing being
apparent.
Since 1947, although this is not, as I say, i ntel l igence,
the Presidents of this country, whenever they have authorized
covert action, have directed the Central Intelligence Agency carry
it out. And it is, unfortunately, here where the agency has gained
the majority of its brickbats.
Why, then, do we have covert political action? Why do
we persist in this contentious capability?
One of the cardinal principles of the foreign policy of
our country since the founding of the Republic has been to eschew
military conflict whenever our national objectives could be
achieved or preserved by other means. This means we'd prefer
diplomacy, we'd prefer negotiation, we'd prefer economic leverage
before resorting to military power. But in addition, there are
times when such influences as these -- negotiation, leverage,
political influence -- simply will not work if the source of the
influencing is apparent to the beholder. There are times when
it can be very counterproductive, if you are trying to influence
another nation, that it be known that you are the influencing
source.
Let me g i ve you a couple of examples. Take an election
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
in a democratic country where there is a severe challenge by the
Communist Party, and we know, from intelligence, that that party
is being financed and helped through the Soviet embassy in that
nation. What should we do? Should we step in and help with
financing and advice to the democratic politicians who are stan-
ding up to this pressure?
Well, clearly, each individual case is a separate
decision which must be made on a very difficult set of judgments.
But there have been times in the past when valuable allies have
only been able to sustain these pressures against them because
of this kind of support. But you can appreciate that if that
were overt support, it might redound against those politicians,
those democratic politicians' purposes.
So, what I ' m s a y i n g to you is that I ' m not talking
about rigging an election, in a case like this; I'm talking about
trying to bolster the democratic elements in making their case
to their own public.
Another instance goes to a terrible problem in the
world today, and that's international terrorism. Here, we make
a real effort to understand what's going on, and even to pene-
trate into terrorist organizations. But if we can do that and
in that process influence the course of that terrorist group,
that's not intelligence, that's covert action. Clearly, we can
only be effective if we can do that without it being known that
we're the motivating element.
So, there i s, i n my v iew, a reduced role for covert
political action in our country today. It isn't as useful as
it was many years ago, when there were some very outstanding
successes for our country in this area. But I still very sin-
cerely believe that we must keep in our quiver an arrow that
says "covert action," a capability that we cannot afford to be
without. So that if and when the decision-makers of our country
need and authorize it, we have that capability. And it is here
in the Central Intelligence Agency that that potential, that
residual capability resides.
So, the roles of intel I igence, then, are three: col-
lecting foreign intelligence about activities in other countries,
conducting counterintelligence operations to deny access to our
secrets to other nations, and, when authorized, conducting covert
political action.
Now, what do we in the intelligence community require
in order to carry out these roles?
Well, first, we need the understanding and the support
of the American people. I think we've had that over many, many
years a Imost enti rel y on faith, a faith that the country did need
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
to collect intelligence and that it did need to do it in a secret
way. Unfortunately, the allegations and the revelations of intel-
I igence abuses over the past three or four years has shaken that
faith. And I believe we're in a position today where although
the American public still strongly supports a good intelligence
capability, they want and need a stronger foundation for that
support. Accordingly, we are trying to be more open, to share
more, within the limits of necessary secrecy, with the American
publ ic. The pleasure at having you here with us tonight is an
earnest of that intent to share with the American public as much
as we possibly can.
Having said that, the second fundamental requirement
of a good intelligence activity is an ability to keep secrets.
Now, if that seems like a contradiction with being more open,
let me try to explain.
One o f the problems we have today i n keeping secrets --
i n f a c t , i n my v iew , probably the greatest problem -- i s that
there are too many of them. There is too much secrecy in our
government, and we must recognize that, as Winston Churchill
once said, when everything is classified secret, nothing is secret.
In short, we have lost the respect for that label. Sometimes it
says "confidential," "secret," "top secret," "destroy before
reading," whatever it may be.
[Laughter]
By sharing more with the public, we not only, I believe,
help strengthen this country, by making it better informed and
encouraging good debate on important topics, but by reducing the
corpus of classified information that must be preserved, I hope
that we are engendering respect for that which remains. It is
important that we do this and that we have an understanding of
the need for secrecy.
I happen to have had the pleasure of speaking to the
National Press Club today, and I pointed out to them an interesting
juxtaposition in our m o r n i n g Washington Post. I f you look back at
it, on the front page, middle of the bottom, there was a story
about the pending prosecution of the International*Telephone and
Telegraph Company, two of its officials charged with perjury before
Congress concerning events in Chile some years ago. And the thrust
of the story was that the Central Intelligence Agency is delaying
or frustrating the prosecution of this case because we're reluc-
tant -- we are reluctant, it said, to release documents necessary,
either for the prosecution or the defense. Very interestingly, in
the very next column and just below it was another story about a
murder trial in New Jersey in which the principal element that
attracted national attention was the fact that a New York Times
reporter refused to disclose some notes that he had taken about
this case and which the defendant claimed were necessary for him
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
6
to prove himself innocent. That case was settled, the reporter
went to jail for some time, and never has disclosed his notes.
And what I said to the newsmen and -women today was
that these are very analogous problems, very analogous problems
of how do you protect your sources, your sources for your news-
papers, your sources for collecting intelligence. If you do not
honor the pacts that you have made to keep that kind of relation-
ship private, you're not going to have those relationships in
the future.
Newspaper men feel very strongly about one side of it,
they're very easy to criticize us on the other.
Let me on I y assure you that we a I I recognize that secrecy
is a very delicate matter. It's a delicate matter because too
much secrecy will stanch the flow of free information within our
society and too much secrecy can impede justice. But, on the other
hand, too little secrecy can let out vital secrets which country
needs to keep.
So, there is more than openness required to preserve our
secrets. What I'm suggesting and what I'm asking of you is an
understanding that there is a legitimacy to secrecy. It's all too
easy in this day to assume that any public official, elected or
appointed, uses secrecy only for the purposes of covering wrong-
doing. And, also, people are very quick to assume that any so-
called whistle-blower is a hero.
I would suggest to you that when our country puts more
emphasis on criticizing and tearing down its society, and less on
building it up and constructive criticism of it, that we're in
for problems. And we must recognize very c l ear l y that there is
a need in every government, in every business, in every newspaper,
in every one of our private lives, a need for some privacy. Drawing
the l i ne when it is a public organization like ours which needs to
keep secrets is very important.
We, here, recognize that intelligence secrets are par-
ticularly sensitive because we are in a risky business. The
reputation of the country, the security of the country is at stake.
And therefore we cannot ask you or the Congress of thi s country
simply to accept us on face value as to being able to keep those
secrets which we want to keep.
So, what we have done, out of these several years of
intense public criticism, is to forge a series of checks and
balances that will give assurance to the public that we are not
abusing the sensitive trust that we have, not improperly abusing
the right of secrecy.
How have we gone about this? Well, the policy of open-
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
ness that I have described to you is part of it. But that, of
course, is not all. What we have done is we have created a
series of mechanisms to check on the day-to-day activities of
our intelligence organizations.
First, we have what we call guidelines. The first
guideline is that intelligent collection by espionage is an
extraordinary remedy. We must not resort to collecting things
clandestinely that can possibly be available openly.
Our second guideline is that we must be able to defend
in public the actions which we take in secret. But that means
that we can: only defend them in principle, in their general
character. We cannot describe each ongoing espionage activity
and expect it to be successful. But I do believe that we can
justify the types of activities which we undertake and show that
they are in conformance with American standards and American
foreign policy.
Now, beyond these guidelines, we also have prohibitions.
There are some activities that are simply so repugnant to our
American values -- assassination, for instance -- that we will
totally prohibit them. There are other activities for which a
total prohibition is a bit too rigid, and here we have what we
call injunctions. An injunction simply says that as a general
rule this activity is proscribed, but under certain given circum-
stances it can be authorized. This is a very common thing to all
of us. You're all familiar with it in the world of law enforce-
ment. None of you here expects your house to be invaded by a
police officer, except if he has a judicial warrant to do so.
So, similarly, we are establishing a series of controls whereby,
sometimes with warrants, sometimes with other measures, other
levels of clearance, and so on, we can make exceptions to these
various injunctions.
Now, the most exciting, the most revolutionary thing
that we have done in recent years in American intelligence is to
establish an effective oversight process external to the intelli-
gence community itself, and, in fact, resident in both the Execu-
tive and the Legislative Branches. And the reason we have done
this, also, is that we need this oversight to check on whether
the guidelines, the prohibitions, and the injunctions are in
fact being carried out as they should.
The first oversight activity is the Intelligence Over-
sight Board. It has been in existence for over three years. It
presently consists of former Senator Gore, former Governor Scran-
ton, and Mr. Thomas Farmer of this city. They work only for the
President of the United States. You, any of my employees, anyone
who feels there is something improper in the way we are conducting
our intelligence activities may communicate with them; they will
investigate it and report only to the President.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
Beyond this, for over two years now in the Senate, and
for over a year in the House of Representatives, we have had
Select Committees on Intelligence dedicated exclusively to over-
seeing this intelligence process. The relationship between these
committees and the intelligence community is cooperative and
helpful, but it is definitely one of oversight and supervision.
It is clear that we must account to these committees, and we do
so regularly.
Even in this short span of several years, many in the
itelIigence community have come to recognize the positive
values
of this congressional
oversight. Ultimate accountability
is
essential to responsible action, in my view. And with as
delicate
an operation as intelligence, where the stakes are high,
where
risks must be taken,
and where there's a driving sense of
enthu-
siasm and patriotism,
it's very salutary to know that you
have
a process of accountability.
As a result of this oversight today, I believe we are
being more judicious. We are thinking not only of the benefits,
but of the risks of the intelligence process as we go about it.
If we overdo this and end up with intelligence-by-timidity, we
will have lost everything. But I do not believe that is happening.
And I believe if we are alert, we can tread that fine line, gaining
the benefit of accountability and not losing out to timidity.
These congressional oversight committees today are
engaged in developing new legislation for the intelligence com-
munity, legislation which will codify the guidelines, prohibi-
tions, the injunctions, and the oversight procedures. I strongly
support this activity. I strongly support this move to legislate
what will be known as charters for the intelligence community.
In the first place, this wi I I give to us a legal founda-
tion for our actions. Beyond that, it will provide to the intel-
I igence officer on the street in a foreign country, or to those
of us here in headquarters, a set of standards, a set of guide-
lines as to what is expected of us and what is not, and what kinds
of activities we can anticipate being required to have to justify
to our overseers. I think it will be very helpful to our intel-
ligence officers throughout the world. And I hope that the next
session of the Congress wilI see the passage of this charter
legislation.
Where does a l l th i s leave us? What does it all add up
to? Well, I think it means that we are in the midst of an exci-
ting and important, I would even venture on, a historic time in
American intelligence. What we are doing is creating a new, a
uniquely American model of intelligence, a model that is tailored
to the standards and the values of our country, but a model which
at the same time is designed to insure that we can have effective
intelligence capabilities, and at the same time insure that there
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
is adequate regulation of them.
We're not there yet. In my view, it will take several
more years for these procedures to settle out and these charters
to be enacted and carried out. But I believe that we are on the
right course and that we are generally finding this right balance
between the risks of too much oversight, which can lead to leaks
and problems of timidity, and so on, and not enough oversight to
give assurance to the American public against potential abuses.
Throughout the process of the next several years, as
this settles down, the support of the American public and the
understanding of the American public in what we are trying to
do and in the importance of the intelligence function for this
country will be very important.
The fact that you have come out here tonight i s i nd i-
cative of your interest and support. And for this I am very
grateful.
Thank you.
[Applause]
I'd be happy to try to field any questions or hear any
Yes, ma'am.
WOMAN: You spoke about your guidelines and prohibitions
and the external oversight process. I'm interested in knowing
what kinds of structural and procedural approaches that the CIA
internally has formally instituted to assure that you personally
can satisfy yourself about the effectiveness of your own oper-
ations.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Can you hear that in the back? What
has the CIA done internally to...
WOMAN: ...doing what you think you should be doing.
ADMIRAL TURNER: To make sure we're doing what we
think we should be doing.
WOMAN: Effectively.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Effectively. Wow.
That's a very big order, but it's a very genuine and
very important question.
As part of this whole process I've been attempting to
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
to describe, there are levels of controls. What the Congress
will legislate in charters, hopefully, in most areas, will be
reasonably broad, establish general guidelines. The President
has an executive order on intelligence which has elaborated on
those guidelines. And then I have more and more detailed con-
trols here: "If you're going to do this, it must be cleared
by me."
For instance, we have a rule against using American
media representatives, newspapermen or TV broadcasters, as
intelligence agents. They country has decided they don't want
to do that any longer. It was authorized until three years
ago. But it would be foolish, in my opinion, to make that a.
flat prohibition. Because, you know, what if an American stringer
in Lebanon happened to be just the fellow to work into that ter-
rorist organization I described to you a minute ago and stop an
imminent threat? So, we have a control here that if we're going
to use such a person, I personally must approve it.
So, we have established a number of those and are still
working on more of them.
But let me be honest with you. The way anyone controls
any sizable organization, in my opinion, is partly by example; by
establishirig standards, sticking to them and insuring that people
working for you know that that's what you want; being explicit,
not letting people have ambiguities as to what your policies and
programs are. And you have to get that into the organization and
make it per-mate through. And you do that by lots of ways: by
talking, by actions, by firing people who don't adhere to it, by
promoting p e o p l e whom you have confidence i n , and, finally, by
what we call eternal vigilance.
You do all these things, and you go to bed at night
and you get up the next morning, and you start all over again,
and you never let your guard down. You have to constantly be
checking, asking questions, asking yourself, "Where could some-
thing go wrong?" and probing into it.
It's not easy, but I will give you my sense of very
strong confidence that there is no intent in the Central Intel-
ligence Agency today to try to evade the controls, the policies,
and so on, of the Director. I have no concern when I do go to
bed at night that things are intentionally going wrong in any
area.
But it's still a risky business. And day by day, hour
by hour, people have to make decisions in my name. They do their
best. I have to keep checking that they're doing it the way I
really want it.
Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
MAN: I wonder if you'd comment on the relationship
between the CIA research role and that of some of the law schools,
for example, George Washington, where I am now, in terms of a
common interest in providing effective controls and limitations
on the subject of terrorism. How can the universities and the
CIA work together and protect the values of each?
ADMIRAL TURNER: How can universities and law schools
and the CIA work together on effective controls on terrorism?
Well, we are very dependent on a good interplay with
academia in our country. Because, as Tom suggested at the
beginning of his comments, a large portion of our activity is
simply research. After this information's been collected, you
have to do something with it and you have to evaluate it. And
in analyzing and evaluating, there's no simple, obvious conclu-
sion. You have to put different minds and different perspectives
to work on it.
And, Tom, as far as terrorism and universities is con-
cerned, we do a great deal on the psychological side, of trying
to understand terrorists. And we try to help immediate situations,
to understand what may be an effective ploy or maneuver with a
terrorist. And I'm sure there's a lot of help that can be had
here from academic faculties.
On the legal side, I think the interplay between your
schools and this problem is more on the policy than the intelli-
gence side of the house. I mean what -- was the Bonn Summit
agreement on this a good or a bad, or a workable or an unworkable
program? I don't really get into that side of it because that's
a policy matter rather than an intelligence one.
But we certainly are open to and looking for ideas on
how to help thwart this very pernicious global problem.
MAN: [Largely inaudible] I'd like to say, though,
something seems a little bit inconsistent. And I'm referring
to some remarks that you made on TV the other day. Speaking
not as a taxpaying citizen, but as an alumnus of Yale, I was
a little bit bothered by what I would regard as rather intem-
perate remarks about covert recruiting of students at Harvard.
I ' l l speak just to Y a l e . I t seems to me a l i tt l e bit intem-
perate to say there are no restrictions -- if I'm paraphrasing,
please correct me -- that there's no restriction that Harvard
could place on the Central Intelligence Agency.
I was wondering if you -- am I paraphrasing you right,
or did you envision -- let's say Yale -- are there any restric-
tions in recruiting that you can envision Yale putting on you
think you would abide by?
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm glad to see that Yale is so inter-
ested in Harvard
[Laughter]
VIA N: [Inaudible]
ADMIRAL TURNER: My policy is that any university that
establishes regulations with regard to contact with the intel-
ligence community has the privilege of doing that. Any univer-
sity's regulations apply to its people, not to IBM or U.S. Steel
or CIA or DOD or anybody else.
But my instructions are that if we deal with people on
a college or university campus that has a rule against what we're
doing, or whatever, we encourage the member of that university to
follow the rules of the university.
At Harvard it's a question if we're doing covert re-
cruiting on their campus, the professor assisting us is supposed
to tell the administration he's doing that. We encourage them
to do that. But if the professor refuses not to do so, I prefer
to stand on the professor's right to free association and his
privilege of either obeying or not obeying the rules of his uni-
versity. It is not my job to enforce President Bach's regulations.
And if I tried to enforce every of 2000 universities' presidents
in this country, I'm going to be in, first, an impossible task,
and, secondly, a ridiculous one, because I can be almost regulated
out of business by these.
We're not here to undercut academia. I have tightened
our interplay with the academic world since I have been here to
be sure that we don't, in any way, undercut them. But I do think
it's a bit presumptuous to say that only when a professor gives
advice to the Central Intelligence Agency about Student X must he
report it to the administration of Harvard University. Because
when he gives advice to IBM or U.S. Steel or the Department of
State as to whether this student will be a good employee, he does
not either tell the student or tell the administration of Harvard
University that he is doing it. And I think it's unwise for a
university as close to Salem, Massachusetts as is Harvard...
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: ...to single out one element of society
which they happen to feel is unpopular today.
[Applause]
MAN: Does the Soviet counterpart of the CIA operate
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
13
with the same or similar guidelines, prohibitions...
[Laughter]
MAN: And if not, how can we hope to compete with them,
or even hope to survive?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, he certainly does not. My counter-
part, Mr. Andrapov (?), it appears to us, has very few controls
over him, and certainly nothing like we do.
But isn't that true of all of our competition with the
Soviet Union, a country that isn't dependent upon the votes in
the Congress to decide whether we sell airplanes to Saudi Arabia
or recognize Communist China or conduct a SALT treaty, and so on?
Aren't we inherently at a, quote, disadvantage, unquote, when
dealing from a free democratic base, where you must gain consensus
of the public in what you are doing? And yet there' s not one of
us in this room who would trade those disadvantages for the power,
the strength, the advantages that having the support, the under-
standing of our country as a whole brings to us.
And I'm saying we have moved some direction towards
bringing an understanding of intelligence into our body politic.
I don't think we are moving to the point where it is going to
encumber us, and I would strongly resist that.
MAN: A question about the usefulness of covert activi-
ties. And that is, I can see how in a particular situation a
particular activity might be useful. But don't you feel that,
perhaps, that particular utility in one situation is counter-
balanced by the fact that it brings a general discredit to the
government and a general lack of -- a decrease in the amount of
trust the government has, both with the people in this country
and with people overseas? Where you gain in one small area at
one time, you don't -- and the overall effect is that you have,
perhaps, a net loss.
ADMIRAL TURNER: The question is, is it not possible
that the net gains of individual covert actions are offset by
the cumulative deleterious impact on our national image, and so
on, of conducting this type of activity?
I don't think so. That's a close and difficult judg-
ment. It's in large measure, though, I think, because we have
retroactively applied today's morality to yesterday's actions
that we're so down on some of the covert actions of yesterday.
And I can only assure you that if I could unve i l for you on a
screen up here the covert actions which are in place and underway
in our country today, I don't think you would be concerned,
ashamed, or in any way disturbed. They wouldn't make a good 007
novel if we gave them to you to write up.
Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
MAN: Another question about covert action. You pointed
out earlier that a lot of the public problem of the intelligence
community has to do with the carrying out of covert actions. Is
there any realistic alternative outside the intelligence community
for carrying out these activities?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, Ivan, there isn't.
The question is, is there an alternative to intelli-
gence activities for carrying out covert action?
I've looked at that very carefully because, very frankly,
after all the brickbats, I'd just as soon shuck it off and give
it to the State Department or the Defense Department, or somebody.
But the fact is that the kind of people you need overseas, both
Americans and foreigners, to carry out these covert actions are
precisely the same kind of people that do our clandestine collec-
tion of information. So if you shucked it off and created a
separate entity reporting to the National Security Council, or
something, first of all, you would duplicate your so-called infra-
structure overseas. You would have a whole new organization set
up of U.S. people to do it and that have contacts in the foreign
country, and you'd be stumbling over each other with the contacts.
But more importantly than that, perhaps, if you create
an entity that has this as their purpose, for which people's jobs
are dependent on their being covert action, instead of their just
being another part of this large organization, where if covert
actions should die tomorrow the people would just move over into
other positions, I think you sort of create a head of steam to
conduct covert action; you get people whose only virtue in life
is thinking up and carrying out covert action. And I think that
would be bad.
There should be a demand for covert action from outside
of us. We try not to cook it up. We try to offer it when policy-
makers ask us, "Can you he I p us i n th i s case?"
MAN: In Science magazine this week there was an inter-
view granted by the head of the National Security Agency, Admiral
Inman, about several recent attempts to classify academic research.
Can you comment on the policies that the intelligence community
has for doing this?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The policies for interfering with
academic research, as commented on by the head of the National
Security Agency in Science magazine. I really can add very little
to the, I thought, rather good statement that Vice Admiral Inman
made on this.
I'm trying to think if I can draw an analogy in some
field other than intelligence. But there is a danger of the
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
15
inventiveness of this country putting capabilities into other
people's hands that can be very injurious to us.
I don't know, I suppose if 30-40 years ago somebody
was inventing -- 40 years ago somebody was inventing a nuclear
weapon and giving the formula to Hitler, we all would wanted
to have taken some action to prevent that.
Clearly, that's an exaggerated statement over what's
at stake here, but there are problems with technology prolifer-
ating around the world that could be brought to play against us.
I think the National Security Agency has sometimes been
over-accused of trying to stile this research. And I know that
they and we try to take as understanding and lenien a view of it
as the national interest dictates.
MAN: About 12 years ago, when I was last able to read
classified documents, there were some initials referring to CAS,
which I hope has been abandoned. Because it seems to me that
the implications of the phrase "a controlled American source"
is that any such person, foreigner is sure to be control l ed,
truly; and anything he does is an instrument of American policy.
And as I'm sure you know, some disastrous things have happened
by people who actually did get subsidies once, but work against
us.
Is that -- could this be explained, as part of your
openness campaign?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I'm the head of intelligence, and when
you said CAS, I thought you meant close air support.
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: I haven't heard this "controlled
American source" in the year and a half I've been here. I hope
it's died.
MAN: When I was recruited vol untar i l y, when I was
on a summer between years at Yale, to work for an agency, I was
asked to take an oath never to admit that I worked for that
agency. It's been mentioned recently, and I still don't admit
that I worked for that agency. But I wonder whethe your counter-
part, the Vice Admiral, at that agency shares...
[Laughter]
MAN: ...concerning openness, albeit with tactical
intentions in mind, an openness of a very limited nature. Does
he share your views, and do you see more openness concerning the
activities of that agency?
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
ADMIRAL TURNER: Absolutely no.
Let me make clear how we do this openness. I said there
are two aspects to intelligence; one is collecting the information
and the other is evaluating it and analyzing it.
If you disclose much about how you collect the infor-
mation, whether it be your sources, that we talked about some --
that is, human sources -- or whether it be what we call methods,
the technical systems used by the National Security Agency in
the satellite programs and so on, if you disclose that kind of
information, you're out of business. There's a counter to almost
everything of that sort.
So, there's no intent to be more open with the public
in those areas, except in a very limited way.
I just mentioned photographic satellites. It's only
been in this last 25 days that I have been able to say that.
That is a step of greater openness. We did not acknowledge we
had such satellites before that. I thought it was a bit obtuse...
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: ...and lobbied to say that much. But
if you ask me one more question about what they're like, I won't
say a word to you.
Where we can be open is on the other side of the house,
on the analytic side, on the product side of the house. Because
if you take an a n a l y s i s o f these events a n d you s a y , " I f I remove
from that document anything that discloses how we got it, or any-
thing that gives our decision-makers a real advantage because
they've got a monopoly on that information" -- you know, "We know
that you know," and that kind of thing -- "if there's still enough
left to be meaningful to the American public, not mislead them,
and be useful and intersting and contribute to the quality of de-
bate in this country, then we can declassify and publish."
And that's where the openness comes, not in the agency
you were never employed in.
WOMAN: ...a very simple question. [Largely inaudible
remarks about architecture of room]
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: Those are al I great big, wide micro-
phones listening to everything you're thinking about.
[Laughter]
 ? Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
MAN: Admiral, presumably your counterparts in friendly
nations don't intend to emulate this policy of openness, particu-
larly with respect to providing information to Congress. How do
you feel that this new policy will affect your relations with
friendly intelligence agencies?
ADMIRAL TURNER: How does this policy of openness
affect our relations with other intelligence agencies?
Interestingly, we've had one foreign intelligence
agency already come over and sit down with us and ask, "How do
you get around with the Congress, because we're about to have
to do it?" And there are several more right behind. None of
them are enthusiastic about it, I must say, but they're all
being pushed in this direction in the democratic countries of
Western Europe. It'll be different times in different countries,
but we're setting a model that I suggest to you will be conta-
g ious.
In the meantime, there are some problems. But they're
careful to watch what we're disclosing and understand. They
don't care if I put out a study on Soviet oil production when
they realize the study is unclassified. But if I do start talking
about how I collected that information that got us there, they'd
be very upset.
So, yes, it's a problem, but I don't think it's a lasting
or serious one, because they understand this.
In addition, there's a very unique problem here. I
have no counterpart in any of the free countries of the world.
There's no single person who is responsible for both the analytic
and the collection side, both the human collection and the tech-
nical collection. It's all sort of scattered around elsewhere.
And therefore it's difficult for them to sort of understand how
I play this.
But I think it's working out very well, and we work very
hard to keep good relations with them.
MAN: I understand from the introduction that you're
responsible for coordination of the various intelligence agencies.
MAN: Including the Department of Defense and the
several service agencies.
Is there anything that -- since all of us are tax-
conscious these days, is there anything that would indicate that
a more efficient overall intelligence service can come out of
this coordination that you are responsible for?
 ? Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-004988000200100003-9
ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I certainly hope so. That's one
of our intentions.
And I have two jobs, by law: Director of Central
Intelligence, which is the coordinating function of all national
intelligence. I don't get down into troops in the field with
binoculars and reconnaissance airplanes off aircraft carriers
and very tactically oriented military things. And I'm head of
the CIA. And they're quite separate.
Last January the President strengthened my authorities
as the Director of Central Intelligence in several ways. The
most important one, from the point of view of your question, was
I am now responsible for tasking the collection elements of all
intelligence agencies: the agency the gentleman near you never
worked for, the reconnaissance satellites, the human intelligence
activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and anything else
in the Department of Defense and here, except these tactical
elements. In short, tasking means telling them what to do: what
do you collect?
And you can see the object. We don't want to pay to
have two different groups collecting the same information; nor
do we want to have both of them thinking somebody else is doing
it, and nobody does it.
So, it is intended to be both more efficient and more
cost-effective. And I hope that as this really takes hold we'll
get there and save you and me, as taxpayers, some money.
MAN: I think that, certainly, with the spirit of the
times today, there has been a lot of sharing of technological
information with the Russians. And it seems to me -- my own
personal opinion. I might be mistaken -- that they're getting
the better of the deal. I think there are a lot of things that
might take them years to develop that we're handing over to them.
And I wonder, am I correct in my worries? Is this
something the CIA advises the government about?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, we do advise on it, in the sense
that we try to keep abreast of what the state of technology is
in the Soviet Union and where they are looking for technology
most.
There's a tremendous human intelligence activity in
this country on the part of the Soviet Union, particularly as
detente has brought more and more Soviet citizens to this country.
But interestingly, a large portion of what they're doing is going
out and getting unclassified literature and documents on tech-
nology.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
I don't get into: is the plus or minus on our side or
not? Because there are so many policy issues involved here. But
let me just give you a piece of personal philosophy, perhaps: that
there's very little we can exchange with the Soviets where we don't
have more to offer than they, in my opinion.
There are those who feel that when a free and a controlled
society interact, the impact is going to be greater on the con-
trolled society than on the free one. You may lose some secrets,
but you may begin to break down those terrible barriers that are
so onerous on the world.
MAN: Do you have a guideline, an injunction, or a pro-
hibition with respect to covert domestic activities?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I certainly do. And worse than that,
I've got laws.
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: We are not in the domestic field. If
there is tapping of telephones or that kind of thing inside the
United States, that has to be handled by the FBI. Congress, in
its closing week, passed a law which for the first time requires
a judicial warrant for any telephone tapping inside our country.
That's not exactly an accurate statement but it's pretty close.
But certainly any that involves American citizens.
And we are -- I can't tell you how many regulations
there are around here about the accidental intrusion into American
privacy. It's very thorough, down to all kinds of detail. And
I think the public is well served and well protected.
Time for one more, I'm afraid....
MAN: Admiral, in recent years there have been a number
of books published that have divulged names of CIA agents and
their informants. Could you comment on what effect this might
have -- this might have on your ability to recruit and your
ability to have informants overseas?
ADMIRAL TURNER: What effect do the books, like those
of Mr. Agee, publishing the names of CIA agents have on our
ability to recruit and to perform?
Well, it's a very serious impact. The first is that
sometimes we have to actually get out and move people, because
of the risk to their life. As you may know, in December 1975
one of our senior people in Greece was murdered, we think because
Mr. Agee had published his name in some kind of a pamphlet that
had been put out.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100003-9
Secondly, it certainly inhibits the effectiveness of
our people overseas when the other intelligence services know
easily who they are.
And let me make a point here. The young men and
women who come in and undertake this clandestine side of our
activities as a career make tremendous sacrifices, and you
have to be very proud of them, and they're marvelous people
when you meet them. But what they do sometimes is they dedi-
cate themselves to a career of anonymity, not even being able
to tell their children why daddy doesn't keep getting promoted
in whatever he's supposedly working in. You know, he never
becomes the top fellow -- right? -- because he's working for
us, really. Tremendous sacrifice. And maybe you've invested
10, 15, 20 years at this. And suddenly, along comes a traitor
like Agee, and what have you got? Much less usefulness to the
organization for the rest of your career. Your investment is
largely down the drain. And it's a terrible thing to do.
And, certainly, it doesn't help our recruiting. Though
his publishing names of Americans doesn't help, but it's not as
serious as when we do have some exposures in the press of who
somebody from a foreign country may have been who was assisting
our country, even though not a citizen of it, but just dedicated
to helping us.
The problem of maintaining secrecy is clearly the
number one problem that we have today in maintaining for you
an effective intelligence capability. We're doing a lot of
things to tighten down so that we, internally, are doing all
we can to keep our secrets. We need the understanding and the
cooperation of the media, of the public of the fact that there
are legitimate secrets and that we have established, I believe,
adequate control mechanisms to insure that we're not taking
advantage of that secrecy.
Thank you for being with us. Beat Harvard.
[--Applause]