ADMIRAL TURNER`S ADDRESS TO THE DETROIT ECONOMIC CLUB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200080007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 13, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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ADMIRAL TURNER'S ADDRESS TO THE DETROIT ECOVO~~IC CLUB
DETROIT, MICHIGAN - 13 APRIL 1978
Thank you very much, Joe. Distinguished guests, ladies and
gentlemen. I am really very pleased to be here in Detroit,. the city sa
symbolic of the industrial might of our country. I am very grateful
that so many of you would take the time to show this interest in the
intelligence activities of our country.
Interestingly, one of the trends in those activities today I
believe is developing a more symbiotic relationship between the American
intelligence organizations and the American business community. That
trend is that we are moving more and more in intelligence to the study,
the analysis, of international economic activities. It's a marked change
in our process of intelligence, but a very important and significant one,
and one that I hope will spill over to the benefit of the American
business community. If I may look back thirty years to when we first
organized a Central Intelligence activity--at that time, the primary product
of intelligence was information about Soviet military activity. That was
the principal threat to the country; it was the prineipal concern of alt
of our intelligence agencies. Look how, in the last thirty years, that
has changed; much as I assume as your businesses have changed in their
international concern and aspects.
Today, our country is, of course, quite interested, quite
involved with so many more countries than just the Soviet Union and its
ir~;nediate satellites. .!e have intercourse with most of the 750-some
nations of this world. That intercourse is much more in political and
economic matters than it is in military. Accordingly, we have had to
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begin to shift our focus from just military concerns to much more in these
other spheres. Now let me not overstate the case to you. Our primary,
our number one intelligence concern must continue to be the military
posture of the Soviet Union-that continues to bz our number one threat.
But on top of that today, we in the intelligence community have had to
expand our horizons, have had to expand our capabilities, our areas of
technical expertise, into these spheres of international economics,
international politics, the prevention of international drug traffic,
prevention of international terrorism, and so on. It's an exciting, a rtew
and a demanding challenge to us. It'.s one that I believe is called for;
it is one that I think we are doing an excellent job in. It relates to
you in the business world because of another trend in American intelii-
Bence today, and that's the trend toward greater openness.
As you would suspect, traditionally, intelligence organizations
have operated under maximum secrecy and minimum disclosure. That may
have been a good policy in the past, I don't happen to think it's
effective or appropriate to the United States today. The American public
has a right to know something of what we are doing, and something of what _
we are producing. They have a right to see something of the return on
their investment in our intelligence activities. And so, today, we are
. out speaking more, we are responding to~the media more, we are partici-
pating more in academic and other symposiums, conferences, and we are
publishing more. Here, I think, is where there is a direct benefit and
spillover to the American business community. Today when we develop an
estimate, an evaluation, a study on some international aspect of our
nation's policies, we carefully look at it and we say, does that label--
you know we. label it secret, or top secret, or destroy before reading,
whatever it may be--tee ask ourselves does it really have to have that
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7abe1 on it. Or, can we take out of it t4ro things: first, information
that would reveal how we obtained the data in the study, what was our
source. Because if we reveal that, you can well expect that ~~re won't 6e
able to get anything from that source again. Or, secondly, take out of
it material that is valuable to our President, to our principal policy
makers, because they have an exclusive on it, they know it and other
people do not. If we take those things out which would hurt the national
interest to publish, is there enough of substance left to be of value ttx
the American public. If there is, we publish it on an unclassified basis.
4Je hope this is going to help the public interest and improve the quality
of public debate on important national issues. But we also think shari~tg
it with the business community will be of particular value because many of
these will be of more interest to people like yourselves than they tiiill
be perhaps to the general public. - .
let me cite a few examples of the over 100 unclassified studies
we published in 1977. Just a year ago we published one on the prospects.
for the world energy situation. We were not predicting that the ~rorld is -
going to run out of oil, that there won't be enough reserves to carry us
through the rest of thi s century or further. on; .we were simply predi ctirtg
that the slope of the curve of demand for oil and all other forms of .
energy v~ras rising more steeply in our opinion than could any possible -
curve of supply of energy, and that sometime in the next eight to ten
years, the world as a whole was going to avant to consume more energy than
it was going to be possible to obtain. Principally because we couldn't
get it out of the ground in the form of oil in this time frame--not in the
indefinite future, but in the next eight to ten years--as rapidly as we
would need to meet this demand. The basic conclusion is, of course, that
there may well be an. increase or a pressure on the price of energy if
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these events do succeed in this way.
Slightly after that, last summer we published another study
about the Soviet economic prospects. !de said that in our vieav the Soviets
have kept their economy growing for the last several decades by a policy
of increasing infusions of labor and capital, and that eve believe they`re
coming to the end of that line. If you look at the Soviet Union's
demography today you'll find that in the 1980x, there is no question about
it, the rate of growth of their labor force is going to decline, Not the
size of the 7 abor force, the rate of grotivtii. There just weren't those
babies born in the 1960s, so they cannot continue to infuse increasing
quantities of labor. As they look around for more capital to infuse,
they're having to reach further and further into places like Siberia, and
we. happen to think they also are going to have a particular problem with
their oil supply. We believe that in the next three or four years, they
will peak out for production and decline sharply. Again, this is not a
long-term forecast, this is because they have mismanaged the. development
of their oil, and they are going to reach a paint where they'll hit
diminishing returns before they can bring vast new quantities that are
available to them in reserves onto the production line.- Now, they may
emphasis on the military, take manpower of of that9 they can do a number
of other things, they can stop selling as much oil as they do to the
overcome some of these problems one way. or another, they can reduce their
Eastern European countries and so on. But we feel that those will be
difficult decisions, the don't know how they will manage them. Some of
the solutions would make them go contrary to their basic economic
philosophy, and some of those difficult economic decisions may just
happen to confront them at a time of important change of their leadership,
.which appears likely to happen sometime in the next few years. So it may
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be a difficult time to take these tough decisions.
You might also be interested that we published a study on
international terrorism. I wish I could report in a more sanguine tone
to you but the conclusions of this study were not favorable. They saw no
prospect for the decline of international terrorism, and they saw over
the last few years a marked increase in the number of international
terrorist incidents that involved United States citizens or business
interests outside this country. A disappointing conclusion, but one that
we have to face up to. ~-
- 41e hope that these and other studies .that tive are publishing
will be of value to you as citizens and of value to the American business
community, and we're making them available on that basis. At the same
time, again, i do not want to overstate the case. 4Je cannot, in any way,
disclose all that tyre study, all that we collect in the way of intelligence.
So much of what we do, so much of what we learn, simply must be kept -
secret in the national. interest. But it is my opinion that we_are helping
to protect those necessary secrets about how we collect information, and
about information that is of unique vaiue.to qur decision makers, by- -
publishing as much as we can in an unclassified form. Perhaps the principal
problem the have today with keeping secrets is that we have too many of
them. And when you have too many, people do nat respect them. So by -
narrowing the corpus of classified infor:rration, I hope to engender greater
respect for that which remains and protect it much better.
The lack of respect today is typified, for instance, by the
number of people who have decided to take it upon themselves, unilaterally,
to release what could well be classified secretive information. They
write stories, they write books, they give intervie~rs, they say things
that they should not say, often violating contracts with us to be sure
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that they don`t release information of a classified nature. I think we
have come to the point in this country where the public should n o longer
be quite so willing to welcome these disclosures, which are often made in
a guise or in a name of stopping those of us in the government from doing
heinous things that we are accused of doing. I think that if we carry
this trend to its logical extreme, you have to say that each one of the
215 million Americans in this country is empowered to decide what secrets
the country should have and what secrets the' country should release.
That could be nothing but chaos in the long run. The time has come to
put more faith and trust in the elected and public officials and not
start, at least, from the presumption they were .only out to obscure
things and cover up our mistakes.
Now I'm not really going to ask you just to take us on faith
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or trust because a~third trend in American intelligence today protects the
citizen of this country in many ways. It's a trend toward greater over-
sight. 41hen you consider that I've pointed out that we must keep a great
many secrets, it's clear that we cannot have fu71 public oversight of our
activities. Instead, out of the crucible of .three years of intense _public
criticism of some past abuses in the intelligence ~~~orld, we have today
forged a process. of surrogate public oversight of our intelligence
mechanisms. Let me describe a couple of~those surrogates-for you. The
first is the President and the Vice P resident, who. today take a very
active, intense interest in our intelligence activities. I report to the
President weekly and he is well abreast of what we are doing and gives me
complete guidance. But on top of that, two years ago we established an
Intelligence pversight Board of three distinguished Americans: forrr~r
Senator Gore from your near neighboring state of Tennessee, former
Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania, and a P~Ir. Tom Farmer of bJashir-gton, D.C.
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These three gentlemen report only to the President of the United States.
Their only function is to oversee the legality, the propriety of our
intelligence activities. Anyone in the intelligence community, any public
citizen, may communicate with them and say, look, I think something is
going wrong or I think some information ought to be published that isn't
being published. They will consider that complaint and report to the
President what they think should be done about it. It`s a good relief
valve. But on top of that, in the Congress we have created two committees--
- one in the Senate, one in the House of Representatives-~-also to oversee
the intelligence process. These committees do a superb job of that.
They have me up there regal arly, we're very forthri girt with them, are keep_
them well informed. But at the slightest indication of some prob]em; same
question as to what we're doing, they ask us fora report and we come up
and explain it. I think that these processes today give much greater
assurance than existed in the past that we are not aff running things on
our. o~hn, doing things in the intelligence world that the American public
would not support, or that are not in conformance with American foreign
policy. .I think here .are mechanisms to which those peoptc called whistle-
blawers have an opportunity to go and I would respect their whistle-blowing .
much more if they would try the authorized, the established oversight . ~ ~.
procedures first, before they take it upon themselves- to release inform~-
Lion that should be kept private.
? Out of this oversight process--I want to b~ honest with you--
we are encountering risks. There i s the ~ri sk that as you tell more and
more people about your intelligence process, there Svi11 be mare and more
leaks. There is the risk that as you recognize that you're going to have
to tell people about things, you may get timid and not undertake risks
that you should take in the interest of our country. tde must be careful.
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that the don't have so much oversight that ire have intelligence by timidity
and lack of intelligence by virtue of too many leaks. I think tide are
working out a proper balance between this in protecting the citizens of
this country on the one hand, through good oversight, and insuring that
our intelligence activities are in consonance with our national objectives
and aims, and, on the other hand, preserving enough privacy of the intelli-
gence process that it can .go on in an effective manner as is so necessary
for our country's security. - - - - - -
Asa result of these several trends that I have mentioned to
you, j~hich I believe are dramatically reshaping the intelligence process
in this country, reshaping it into what I would call an American model of
intelligence, a new and unique model of intelligence. Last January the
President of the United States directed a modest reorganization of our
intelligence activity. He did so by trying to go back in many ways to
the original Intelligence Act of 1947, which established a Director of
Central Intelligence to coordinate a71 of the intelligence activities of
our nation. I hold this position. Tt's a separate position from my role
as Di rector of the Central Intelligence Agency. In January the President
modestly strengthened the authorities of the Director of Central
Intelligence giving him authority over the budgets of all of our national
intelligence organizations; giving him autharity to do what T call taskjng,
directing the agencies of intelligence that collect information, to be sure
that we are using them to best advantage and we're using them in a teamwork
fashion, not helte r-skelter, not letting things drop between the cracks,
not duplicating and spending additonal or unnecessary resources; and -
finally additional authority to insure that the other half of intelligence, -
besides collecting information, the half which is analyzing it, studying
it, drawing conclusions from it, is also well coordinated. But here I'd
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like to make one point: while I can coordinate the intelligence analysis,
I cannot direct people outside the Central Intelligence Agency on hoar to
do that analysis. tde want independent views coming fortward from the
Defense Department, the State Department, the Treasury? and others,
because no one is so smart in intelligence as to be able to put all the
pieces of the puzzle together exactly right. You need different opinions
coming forward so the decision makers will be able to judge what the
strength and the weaknesses of an intelligence analysis are.
Finally the President directed something new and important in
establishing a commi-tee of the National Secu wity Council which oversees
the entire intelligence operation and gives me my marching orders as to
what the priorities are by which we should be working. The point being,-
that I a~hould not establish priorities for.us, I am not a consumer of
intelligence. This committee is composed of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Treasury, the ~Jational Security -
Council Advisors to the President; the people who know what tiwe need and
can tell me and give me that overall guidance and direction. ~I sincerely
believe that these new trends that I described to you and a.fe~r others. I -
haven't had time for; and these new orders of the President, are strengthening
our capabilities in the intelligence field, and I do believe we are the
best intelligence service in the world. 'At the same time they are also
strengthening the assurances to this country that :v~ are performing our
functions in ways that will protect the rights of the individuals and the
values of American society. I assure you that I am dedicated to maintaining
us as the number one intelligence service in the world and doing so in
ways that will only support and defend our wonderful democratic institutions.
Thank you very much. ~~
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Q&A - Detroit Economic Club.
Q: l?~hat is the relationship betareen a free society and undercover
intelligence? Related to that, how can we have a dependable intelligence
system under present conditions of mass media exposures, political
interference and disclosures, and threats of legal action against agents?
A: There is an inherent contradiction between having an open and free
democratic society and having to maintain a certain number of secrets in
the process of conducting the international affairs of that society--
there is no question about it. The ~vorld is such today that mast of the
nations of the world are not blessed by the wonderful openness of our
society. 4Je must be able to .maintain an intelligence capability to know
what's going on in some of those other societies whose actions have such
daily and direct import on you and me, our taxes, our. national policies
and programs. You reconcile the need for secrecy in a democratic society
by establishing the checks and counter-checks that I have mentioned to you
today, to be sure that on the one hand you can maintain secrets, and on
the other hand that no one abuses that privilege. 4!e have to have them,
so are have to have enough oversight, enough checks, to be sure that it is
not abused. I believe we are keeping that balance today. I believe that
arhat I've asked you for today also is a little understanding, that people
who run to the press with things that should not be released, should not
necessarily be acclaimed as heroes right off the bat. Some of them are
doing it out of great patriotism and motives; some of them are doing it
in a self-serving tivay. But are have now established procedures for them
to voice their complaints, to release their information, which gives the
people of this country some check, some assurance that it's not being done
to the detriment of our national interest.. I hope they will use that
and that are will all encourage them to use that.
Q: Are you satisfied, that you still have the kind of authority and
organization that can do a good job of. intelligence world-wide?
A: Yes,~I definitely am. In part, because of the additions to my
authority that the President has recently given me. In part, because in
addition to the standard fornr of collecting intelligence that goes back
as far as history--the human intelligence agency, the spy--we have a .~ _
pre-eminence 'in the world in what w~ calf technical means of colleting
intelligence. These have been burgeoning over recent years and providing
us just vastly increasing quantities of data. They have not outmoded the
old traditional human intelligence agent, they have in fact extended his
importance. Because, from a technical system of collecting intelligence,
you generally learn what happened yesterday. Then when I produce that
information to a policy maker, he says, but cvhy does that happen and
what's going to happen tomorrow. And finding out aihat people are thinking
and aihat their plans are is the role of the intelligence agent. So today,
the challenge to us, and it's an exciting one, is to bring this together
in a complementary fashion to ensure that we fill the gaps that .can't
be filled by human agents, by technical means; then with human agents we
fili.the gaps that can't be filled with technical means. It's a new form
of production line for us and a very, very demanding one.
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[At this point the cassette aras turned over and the question eras lost as
well as a portion of the answer]
A: ....gets us or has. got us into the most rouble in the past is what rr~e
call political action--interfering in the politics or other activities of
foreign nations. This is not an intelligence activity. It is a political
action. It has been assigned by this governrren* as an adjunct to the
responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency ever since it eras
founded in 1947. It is the most controversial part of our activities; but
,,
in recent years these activities have been placed under very strict control.
Before tie can interfere in the politics or other activities of any other
country, we must today gain approval of the National Security Council,
signature of the President of the United States, and I must inform the
appropriate committees of Congress of what tte are doing. So tire have
two branches of the government involved in this as a check and a balance
and there's just no way, without violating the labv, that I can ga charging
off and direct interference in other countries political activities
And
.
~
I can assure you I`ve no desire to go to jail. .
tJhat is the internal attitude of the CIA concerning agents such as
James Agee and others who have exposed CIA operations upon their
leaving the Agency?
~: We are all very disappointed with people who have assumed the responsi-
bi]ities of tmrking in our intelligence agencies and ~rould be as
irresponsible as this ~?~hen they leave. Mr. Agee has done very severe
damage to our intelligence operations. He has taken, for instance, an
i ndivi dual LvhO has tiv~o rked .for us for ten , fifteen , t~rlenty years ; u~rorked
at great personal sacrifice to himself by being under cover. By that I
mean he_does not acknowledge, maybe to his family even, that he works for
th
e Central Intelligence Agency. I can assure you that is not done
easily and is not done t~ri~thout sacrifice. For instance, this man may
have climbed up in our organization and have a positian of great responsi-
bility, and have to pretend that he is 4rorking for somebody else in a
position of much lesser importance and what do. his children think of his
stature. 11hy didn't father get promoted; why didn't he advance like
others and so on. Yet after al l these years of that sacri fi ce, ~ Agee aril l
publish this man's name in a book and in many ways reduce his usefulness
_
to us; hurt his own career prospects, his ability to serve his country
to
,
progress within the Central Intelligence Agency, because of some irresponsible
'
individual like this. I think it
s most unfortunate....
Does, or did the United States have some CIA contraption high in the
mountains of Asia and if, in fact, there is a nuclear monitoring device
on Indian territory, is such an unauthorized invasion of tither countries`
sovereignty considered justifiable practice by our intelligence agencies?
One of the most difficult things about being in the intelligence
business with this combination of openness and secrecy, is that often are
can't defend ourselves against false accusations. Because, if I comment
on this particular alleged activity, then I'm in a spot if I don't comment
on the next one, it just leaves you in a very vulnerable position. So we
have to take a policy of never commenting on alleged or actual past or
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ongoing intelligence operations. I wish I could do better far you, but
Joe pointed out to me at lunch, it's like somebody asking him are you
really trying to take over hlarshall Field--with a merger or something
like that--you know you just can't, in his position either, comment
sometimes on that because if you say no to one, then you are in a spot.
if the next one has a true anstiver of yes, you can't say no when you need
to, to keep things private. So, I'm afraid I can't answer that question,
Joe.
t~lhat is the CIA's position on the defection of the senior Soviet UH
executive?
CIA's position is that this is one of the most delicate of diplomatic
and political problems and that it is entirely in the hands of the
Secretary of State and I'm not going to muck up the waters by commenting
on his problems.
Do you have a group of paramilitary people trained to go to the aid -
of Americans that might be held for ransom abroad by a terrorist group?
The answer is no, but the President has directed the Secretary of
Defense to establish such a capability and it is in being and will be
very effective in due course..
Q: Your opinion of Panama Canal Treaties as they affect our military
strength?
A: One of the principles of being an intelligence. officer is that you
stay absolutely clear of policy. And that's really a very important
point because if I ever become associated with a pro-Panama Canal Treaty
or arr anti-Panama Canal Treaty position, from then on any intelligence I
produce on that kind of a subject is suspect. We must scrupulously keep .
ourselves clear of expressing opinions on policy matters in order to
preserve the objectivity which is essential to good intelligence.
Q: Do you agree with the "punishment" given Richard.Nelms and would you
try to suppress the prosecution of CIA agents for illegal activities as
recently happened with the former FBI director? ~.
A: The solution of the Nelms case was one. that worked out very well from
my point of view. On the one hand, had he been prosecuted, it would have
been necessary bath for the prosecution and certainly for the defense to
disclose a great quantity of highly classified information. It would not
have been fair not to have done so as the prosecution proceeded. It
would have hurt our country's interest in many respects. On the other -
hand, the process through which N1r. Nelms went was a poignant reminder to
all of us in the go-ernment, and particularly in the intelligence world,
that none. of us stands above the law. The law of the United States of
Ame rica is the governing factor in all of our activities and we have no
license, no excuse for violating it in any respect. Nor da I have any
intention'of trying to exonerate, or in any way get off the charges of
the law, anybody in our organization who violates it. They know that and
they have to live up to it.
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Is there much possibility that the terrorism plaguing Europe anal the
Mideast could spread to the United States?
There is always that possibility. But I think the country has a good
record in high-jacking and terrorism because of the precautions fire have
taken at our airports and elsewhere; because of the attitude of our people
in supporting the la~,v enforcement agencies in that type of activity; and
because we, being a free society -vhere dissent can be voiced, don't have
the same impetus to this kind of activity. But it is a danger, and it's
one to which we all must be continually alert. I would say, if I could,
Joe, that we in the intelligence world as I briefly mentioned are spending
a great deal of effort in keeping track as best we can through our resources,
through out liaison with other friendly intelligence agencies, of interns--
tional terrorist activities. I am proud to tell you that in a number of
instances it has been our information that has thwarted some international
terrorist plans that have been maturing--not in this country, but elsewhere.
We think that is a valuable service and we intend to continue doing the
best we can to help out here. - .~
Q: Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs were tremendous fiascos of the
intelligence collecting agencies. Can this happen again?
A: The honest answer is. yes. The other answer is that we are doing
everything we can to prevent that. We're human, we're fallible, we're
trying to ensure, as I brought out in some of my remarks, that differing
views on what the trends or likely developments in different world
situations are, do come forward. If you suppress the minority.view ~vheR
it is reasonably tirell reasoned and set forth, you are doing a great
disservice and you are inviting the possibility of overlooking some
potential problem such as the Bay of Pigs or Pearl Harbor. In short, one
of the real challenges in the intelligence world~is~constantly to question
your hypotheses--are you making the same assumption over and over again:
the Arabs will never increase the price of oil; the Arabs tivill never attack
-
Israel; or the Japanese will never attack Pearl Harbor.
Whatever the
assumption may be that seems so true, you've got to constantly probe an
aspect. I can't guarantee you ~rre won't make a mistake again, but I wilt.
guarantee we're trying our best to avoid it.
Q: Do you think there are any Soviet agents in the audience reporting on
you today?
A: Is there a Soviet Consul.General in Detroit? I frequently find a~
Soviet representative at my talks. I mentioned the 100 and some unclas-
sified publications. Any one of you can write the Library of Congress and
subscribe to our annual product of unclassified studies for X225.00. I
would just let you know that the Soviet Union is spending X450.00 in that
department. I just happened to look at the list the other day. But I'm
not giving away secrets today. I'm trying to .be as open and forthright
with you as I can and I'm doing it sincerely in the interest of keeping
the American public informed and in that process, generating greater respect
for what must be kept secret_ I'm working very hard in both directions--
openness on the one hand, and tighter secrecy on the other. That which.
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must remain secret must be kept secret. All that possibly can be made
available must be made available. I'm so grateful to you for being here
and.tiva.nting to hear about this today. It's your support that will
determine the future of our intelligence activities in this country. I
sincerely believe they are more important to our country today in an era
of near military parity; in an era of political -and economic interdepen-~
Bence with so many other countries of the world than they ever have been
before when eve had great superiority in a17 these fields. You need thm
leverage of good information in order to make right decisions and we need
your support in that activity.
Thank you.
Approved For Release 2007/03129: CIA-RDP99-00498800020.0080007=8~_"