THE HUNCH: HOW HE WAS CAUGHT (JUST)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000300030008-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: NSPR

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/V AI V 1
THE H~JNC~-I:
"IOW
he way caught (,us
ON APRIL 21 this year a
14-year-old girl named Jacque-
line was alone at her home near
Hereford. She opened the door
to a man who said his name
was Williams. and had cone to
estimate a painting job.
Once' inside, however,
"Williams" embarked on a
sordid sexual attack. He
persuaded Jacqueline to go
upstairs to the bathroom where
he -threatened her- with the
blade of a bottle-opener.- He
ordered her to lower her pants,
and masturbated in front of
her. After he had left the
terrified girl the police were
called.
As he read the incident
report at police headquarters
at Worcester, Chief Superin-
tendent David Cole, head of
West Mercia CID, had a hunch.
He recalled two similar attacks
on young girls in their homes,,
one almost precisely a year
earlier, the other a year before
that. In both cases, the
attacker appeared to have been
a voyeur; and each time bad
vanished without trace.
Cole was as certain as he
could be that the same man
had carried out all three
attacks. But this time there
were important clues. People
working in a field near Jac-
queline's home had spotted the
man and--crucially-a distinc-
tive two-tone bronze Ford
Cortina with an " S " registra-
tion. Jacqueline confidently
helped construct a photolit
picture.
Cole ordered a computer
check on all similar cars in
Hereford, Gloucester and
Worcester. It seemed a daunt.
ing task: there were 426 in all.
But witjiin six days the police
had traced 300 owners and on
April 27, two detectives, Sgt
Michael Wilkes and Police.
woman Marion Rhodes, arrived
at Laburnham Cottage in Pitt-
ville Crescent Lane, Chelten.
ham - the home of Geoffrey
Prime.
Asked where he had been
on the day Jacqueline was
attacked, Prime said he had
been at' home. The detectives
took his fingerprints - only
to eliminate him, they assured
him - and left. But when they
conferred outside they agreed
that Prime's likeness to the
photolit picture was remark-
able. Both marked their notes
that Prime should be reinter.
viewed " urgently ".
It is an overwhelming irony
that had the two officers
arrested Prime at once, his
espionage might never have
been detected. But they were
unable to do so before checking
his fingerprints. Meanwhile,
their questioning left Prime un.
settled. That night, he decided
to confess to his wife Rhona.
Ile told her first about his
sexual attacks--but also said
he had been involved in "spy.
ing " at GCHQ. It was this
admission Rhona eventually
reported to the police, to
launch their inquiries into his
espionage. Had Prime been in
custody that night, he might
never have made that second,
devastating confession.
In the morning, Prime tole.
phoned Hereford police station
and confessed to the attack on.
Jacqueline.
But for three weeks the
police remained unaware of
Prime's espionage. His wallet
contained ` one-time " coding
pads-sheets of paper with
grids of numbers on them-
but they meant nothing to the
investigating officers. Even
wzien Prime appeared in court
to be remanded on the assault
charges, no alarm bells rang at
GCHQ or in the government
security services in Whitehall.
Rhona Prime meanwhile was
wrestling with her conscience.
Prime's sudden confession the
night before lie was arrested
had come as less than a total
surprise, for she had been dis-
tmrbed by his occasional fur.
tiveness about the house. She
had also been puzzled by the
sudden inflow of unexplained
amounts of money.
Now, under a bed, she found
a carrier-bag containing items
of Prime's spying kit. She
sought advice from her priest
-she and Prime are both
Catholics-her doctor, and her
solicitor. Three weeks after
Prime's arrest she went to the
police.
The West Mercia police
immediately consulted the
security services-and were
surprised to be told that
although advice and "guid-
ance " would be forthcoming,
the investigation was to be left
in their hands.
Rhona Prime's dramatic in-
formation placed the local
force in an awkward dilemma.
She had assured them she'was
telling the truth, but she
emphatically did not want her
husband to know she had
shopped him.
Using time-honoured and
painstaking methods, the West
'Mercia police gradually
assembled .a case. After two
weeks of checking credit-card
accounts and bank statements,
and visiting local travel agents,
they had enough evidence to
confront Prime. They dis-
covered that he had' twice
booked flights to Helsinki-
something that had eluded
GCHQ's own security division
five years earlier, when it
briefly investigated why one of
its section heads had resigned
to become a taxi-driver.
For a further two weeks,
Prime stuck to his denials. But
finally, the day after a seven-
hour grillingi he announced:
" I now wish to tell you the
whole truth of this tragic
affair . It will take a long
time." The local police had
finally uncovered the betrayal
that had escaped both GCHQ
and the security services for a
decade and a half.
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'SET
It w
0
I
IF Geoffrey Prime had set out
to penetrate the National Sec-
urie-,' Agency -' the American
equivalent of Government
Communications Headquarters
(GCIIQ)-are would, in theory,
have fallen at the first fence.
Th,' inquiry into his back-
ground would have lasted at
leas; four or five months. He
would have been submitted to
a, battery of psychological ex-
aminations. And, crucially, he
would have been given a poly-
graph, or lie detector, test,
which depends heavily on
embarrassing per-
sonal questions. Ott average;
the agency rejects a quarter of
potential recruits each Year and
95 Per cent of them fall victim
to the polygraph.
Evert so, at least one agent
has penetrated the agency and
in 1960 two of its anah'sts di-
presented to Parliament last
May, 68,000 government posts
require positive vetting. The
coniniission.l ecomtnended -that
the number should be cut.) ,
The system depends largely
on a tiuestionnaire. Each time
Prime was 'vetted he had to
write answers to questions
inquiring into his background,
his friendships, his finances
and his tastes -- even down to
the newspapers he read. He
was also asked to name two
referees.
The referees are supposed to
be questioned by GCHQ's own
security officers and these
interrogations can be severe :
we know of one referee who
found the experience so
unpleasant he refused to lot
anyone else nominate him.
illusioned, defected to Russia- ? `~1oi Loners'
no s
st
i
f
l
y
em
s
oo
proof. 1-low-
ever, American officials are
adamant that no one with
Prime's sexual and psycholo--
gical problems could have sur-
vived undetected in the US for
14 years.
Laxity
Eve)) before Prince was.
nnniasked, NSA officials had
been pressing the British to
adopt the polygraph. That
pressure is now increasing.
However, it is the funda-
mental laxity of security at
Cheitenham revealed by
Prime's case that has provoked
the greatest auger in Washing-
ton-and the accusation than
GCIIQ is " as leaky as an 'old
SCOW."
Certainly by American stand.
ards, British screening methods
are far from rigorous. The
positive vetting to which
Prime was subjected at least
four times can take up to three
months to complete--but it
takes so long, more because of
the work-load of the security
services, than hecause of the
thoroughness of the investiga-
tion. (According to the- report
of the security Commission
But we also know, of cases
where?iiominated referees were
never questioned. And there is
another flaw in the system.
In theory, Prime should have
provided fresh nominees each
time he was vetted-a sensible
precaution designed to over-
come the risk that a referee
may he in collusion with the
person being vetted. The snag
is that ".loners " such as prime
could. genuinely claim not ? to
know more than a couple of
people who could vouch for
them.
We do not know if that hap-
pened in Prime's case, but we
do know of other GCHQ staff
who found themselves in that
dilemma. They found the
security division " most under-
standing "
In addition.to vetting, GCHQ
screens its employees through
a Personnel Security Super-
vision System. This, in theory,
should detect suspicious
changes in behaviour. It, too, is
flawed, however. It depends on
the willingness of section heads
to "snitch" on their colleagues.
-something which, according
to our information, most super.
visors will not do.
Once a year, the section
beads'at GCHQ's two Chelten-
ham bases-Oakley, where-
Prime worked; and Benhall-
at?e sent a long, memo by the
Security Division detailing the
"suspicious 11 signs, to watch
for: too much money, which
might indicate that the em-
ployee is selling secrets, or too
little,wliiclt Haight indicate that
he or, she is open to bribery.
Depression, an " undue " inter-
Tovey: he objected
est, in sex, and over-indulgence
in alcohol are among other
signs listed. Section heads are
instructed to report to security
without telling the person coil-
cerned if they spot any of these
signs.
It is to that final admonish-
ment that most section heads
object. They sign the memo
promising compliance----as they
are required to-but we be-
lieve they do not always stick
to the letter of that agreement.
As one forinet? . GCHQ section
head put it: "If -I had thought
that anybody was a spy, of
course I would. have reported
him Iikq a shot. But I would
not have reported people for
some minor Personal peccadillo
-certainly not without .telling
them."
Another criticism of GCHQ
is that much, of its security is
devoted to keeping secrets not
from the Russians, but .from
the British public. -
.fn so much as GCHQ
says
,
anything in public about its
work, it. claims it is devoted to
" research and development in
the field of communications
and coin nnuuications security,.
Employees are sternly and
constantly warned not to admit
to anyone that; GCHQ is in the
business of espionage.
When, in 1981, a senior
GCHQ linguist, Alex Lawrie,
made a speech to the Fabian
Society in his capacity as a
Labour councillor, during
which he acknowledged that
GCHQ was part of the "Intel.
ligence community " he was
severely reprimanded'and fined
#25. He` later took early retire-
ment after GCHQ's director, Sir
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CABINET OFFICE
I( joint Intelligence Committee)
UKUSA Pact 1947
links' Ut1/USA/
Australia/Canada
Nato later-
included
NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL
spies on Russia
Brian Tovey, objected to
involvement in such " pout
controversy " as the del
over whether Denis Healey
Tony Benn should be der
leader of the Labour Party
GCHQ's obsession with In
ing its secrets from the pu
has sometimes led it acti?
to loosen security. For exam
employees were once iss
with- security passes for t?.
cars. These were later w
drawn because they gave a,
the fact that their beat
worked at. GCHQ. Undoubte
it is now possible for an
authorised person to penetr
they perimeter fences. (r
Russian agent who wants
identify GCHQ employees it
do no more than wait outs
Oakley or Benhall, then fol
one of the hundreds of e
that' stream out of the bz
every evening.)
The harsh light that
Prime case has cast on w
really goes on at Cheltenh
may persuade GCHQ to di
its pretence of innocence ~ '
concentrate on security rats
than secrecy.
But it is plain that Amt
can intelligence officials v
require it lot of convincing
and Britain will have to ad,
the polygraph-if they are
continue sharing such rna
secrets as Prime betrayed.
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'OP fie 7 ep
0
S Curl -0
What PrIale
betrayed
to Moscow
GEOFFREY Prime, the man
convicted last week of spying
for the Russians, gave away
details of the most sophisticated
satellite surveillance system the
West has ever developed.
Codenamed the Byeman Pro-
ject, the system enabled the
Government's communications
headquarters at Cheltenham
(GcPQ), and its equivalent in
America. (the NSA), to monitor
communcations within the
Soviet Union. Until Pritae
handed over his secrets in the
spring of 1975, Coe Russians
were unrwar.e that GC,-IQ and
NSA could listen in to any
conversation they considered
significant.
Sunday Times iontiiries have
established that Prinie handed
over his secrets at the same
time .:s two A.tncriccns, Daulton
Lee and Christopher .Loyce
were also leaking details about
other parts of the li;yen:an
system. The combined informa-
tion showed Moscow just how
vulncral:lc they were to west=
ern scrutiny. It allowed them to
switch channels of comecunira?
Lion or to feed " disinforma-
tion " to the West.
The Shadow Uor,ic Secretary
Roy Hatterslcy said yesterday
that the onoostion would con.
tinue to press for a House of
Commons inouiry into Britain's
security services
Meanwhile, a group of left-
wing La:5our MPS has tabled a
Common s motian !er a ir'i a w
t;:at the security s vice;
si!culd be more accoun z'ale.
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