THE SECRET: PRIME REVEALED ARGUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000300030001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2007/12/14: CIA-RDP96B01172R000300030001-5
THE SECRET:
rnme reveal
IN THE spring of 1975, the
Soviet intelligence body the
KGB had two amazing strokes
of luck. Early in April, a 23-
year-old American drop-out
named Daulton Lee walked in-
to the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City and offered to sell
information about one of the
USA's mpst vital strategic
secrets. He handed over sample
documents and told a KGB
officer there were more to
come, if the price was right.
Within a month, Lee had
begun a voluminous trade. For
his first full delivery he was
paid $3,000.
Then, at just about the same
time, Geoffrey Prime contacted
his KGB controller in East
Berlin. Prime, a linguist at the
blandly-named joint Technical
Language Service in London
-part of British Government
Communications Headquarters,
or GCHQ - had been spying
for the Soviet Union since
1968. In seven years, however,
he had provided only a desul-
tory flow of information, and
for almost two years - after
suffering the embarrassment
of losing his `one-time' coding
pads - had been out of touch
with the KGB altogether. Now,
Prime reported, he had some-
thing major to offer. He had
just been briefed to take on
a far more important job. The
Joint. Technical Language
Service was to be transferred
to the principal GCHQ instal-
lation at Cheltenham; and
there, it seemed, he was to
take part in a project that
would sub,iect the USSR to
vastly more surveillance than
hitherto.
What Prime had to report so
excited the KGB that it asked
him to meet his controller in
person. Prime could hardly
visit East Germany and so was
instructed to travel to Vienna
instead. (Since Vienpa is
renowned in intelligence circles
as Europe's spy capital, this
could have caused some raised
eyebrows at GCHQ; apparently
it did not.)
He arrived in Vienna in
September and passed on in-
formation about the west's
latest surveillance techniques.
Unlike the, American, ? Lee,
Prime's motives were less
financial than ideological; the
KGB paid him just #800. But
the information he supplied
the KGB was priceless. Put
together with the documents
Lee had sold in Mexico City,
it provided the USSR with its
first intimation that electronic
espionage conductert by the
west had entered a new era.
As the Lord Chief justice
said at the Old Bailey on Wed-
nesday, it was in Vienna that
Prime committed his most
serious treachery, and it was
the information he passed no
there that earned hint the bulk
of his 38-year sentence. The
Lord Chief Justice. did not, of
course, shell oot just what
secrets Prime had betrayed in
Vienna-and even during the
40-minute in camera session
only the bare outline was told.
Similarly, in the US, few de-
tails of what Lee and his part-
ner, Christopher Boyce, told
the KGB have ever emerged.
When they stood trijpl, Ameri-
can security officials threatened
to abandon the prosecution,
and set Boyce and Lee free, if
The Cheltenham base
there was any risk of that in-
formation being made public.
Now, from our inquiries in
Britain and the USA, it is pos-
sible to indicate the true dim-
ensions of the West's multiple
intelligence disaster, one com-
pounded by the coincidence
that two sets of informants
were leaking parallel informa-
tion at the same time. ' Front
Boyce and Lee, and from
Prime, the KGB learned details
of it surveillance system, code
named Byenian, that trans-
cended all predecessors in both
its scope and its cost: a series
of satellites that can observe
almost every aspect of Soviet
life, exposing the USSR to
virtually unhindered Western
scrutiny.
The Byeman project had
been launched by the US
National Security Agency,- or
NSA, and the British GCHQ, in
1966. The British were full.
partners, not only advising the
NSA on gaps in intelligence
about the USSR, but also help-
ing to lobby the US administra-
tion for funds. The first
requirement, the NSA and
GCHQ concluded, was for satel-
lites that could photograph
Soviet military installations
and for others that could
record the results of Soviet
missile tests. The most power.
rgus
fu1 satellite of this type, code.
named Rhyolite, was launched
in March, 1973. In July, 1974,
Christopher Boyce joined the
California manufacturers of
Rhyolite, and soon afterwards
received a full NSA security
clearance. Six months later, dis.
illusioned with his work, he
went into partnership with Lee,
a petty criminal and drug.
dealer, to sell the secrets of
Rhyolite to the USSR. .
But the Byeman project had
other, even more audacious
aims -- on which Prime re-
ceived his first briefing in the
spring of 1975. Ever since
1966, the Soviet telephone
system had been based on a
microwave network that, the
USSR believed, was largely in.
vulnerable to surveillance.-But
the NSA developed a satellite
that could listen to any part
of the microwave network and
thus eavesdrop on discussions
- for example - between
members of the Politburo or
Soviet military commanders.
It could 'also intercept short.
wave radio conversations be-
tween, say, Soviet tank com-
manders on the Polish border.
It could even penetrate the
Soviet military computer sys-
tem.
Until now, the fact of a satel-
lite that could ' detect voice
transmissions has - in theory
- been , one of the most
tightly-guarded secrets of the
NSA and GCHQ. Its code-name
was Argus; it was launched on
June 18, 1975.
" You art inquiring into one
of the most secret areas of the
US government " a former
NSA technical official told us.
" Even after 17 years much of
this advanced capacity is not
in the public domain ". An-
other official, declining to dis-
cuss the topic; said: "I don't
want to go to jail." It was this
secret, several US officials
have told us, that Geoffrey
Prime betrayed in Vienna.
It is not certain exactly how,
much Prime knew about the
voice-detection satellite itself.
But at the very least, as a
linguist and analyst, the pro-
ducts of its surveillance
reached his desk, Eger if Prime? .
did no more 'tlfan, 'supply-
samples of these, it must soon
have become clear to the KGB.
that the West had developed
a capability not only to
detect voice transmissions but
also to process them at extra-
ordinary speed.
Between them, Prime and
the KGB were also able to
make deductions about the
awesome computer systems
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Geoffrey and Rhona Prime: after three anguished weeks, she gave him away
gence official laments, the'
damage is literally incalcul-
able. "There is simply too,
much ground to cover to make
a full damage assessment
now. All we can do is look to
the future ". It is no wonder
that as early as May 1976,
during his second -visit to
Vienna, the KGB acknowledged
'Prime's value to the USSR by r
offering to make him a colonel
and provide him with a pension
for life, should he ever want
to defect.
ALTHOUGH Prime twice came
to the brink of, defecting, he
did not do so. He booked two
flights to Helsinki, and once
even set off for Heathrow, but
did not go through with his
plans, he later said, because
he could not bear to leave, his
new wife or her three children.
It is from the time of.that fate- '?
ful decision that his life offers
several of its most opaque
conundrums.
It is important to realise that
the account presented in court
of the hulk of his career as a
spy, including his recruitment,
his decision to leave Chelten-
harn, and his final contacts with
the KGB; depends entirely on
what Prime himself has said.
Some parts are frankly implau-
sible. Of these, the episodes in
1980 and 1981 are the most
striking.
For almost three years after
leaving Cheltenham, according
to Prime, he had no further
contact with the KGB. But then i
lie says, he was telephoned and
" summonsed "-the term used
by his counsel, George Carman
QC-to Vienna. He flew there
on May 16, 1.980, carrying 15
rolls of film o ftop-secret docu-
ments he had photographed
during his final spell at GCHQ.
1-Ie was treated to a three-day
cruise in a Soviet liner on the
Danube where he was ques-
tioned about the photographs,
which he sold for #600-even
though they must have been
obsolete.
In October, 1981, Prime was
summonsed " again. On
November 16, he flew to Berlin
and was taken from there to
Potsdam. This time he was
questioned on technical matters
'both NSA and GCHQ were
developing, such as the
'CRAY-1' computer installed
at NSA headquarters at Fort
Meade, near Washington, early
!in 1976. It was the world's
most powerful-and most ex-
pensive - computer, a "num.
ber-cruncher " capable of
making 150 million calcula-
tions per second and of storing
.30 billion words. Its principal
function was to 'decrypt Soviet
information transmitted in
code. Other computers in
Pritain and the US were pro-
grancnced to sift through the
voluminous satellite data to
;record and transcribe conver-
sations containing significant
hit-words " of strategic
importance to the west.
The KGB made the most of
its good fortune. Soon after
Prime's first visit, Lee went to
Vienna; 'in March 1976, with
copies of Rhyolite trans-
missions and plans of the voice-
detection Argus..In May, Prime
was called to Vienna again. He
took with him more docu-
ments and gave further details
of his new job at Cheltenham.
When the KGB eventually
questioned Boyce about the
satellites, in Mexico 'City in
October, he was astonished" at
how much the Russians already
knew.
By the end of the year the
KGB had acquired a complete
picture of western satellite
surveillance of the Soviet
Union, and with it the knor-
ledge of how to preserve its
most sensitive communications
from- detection, and perhaps
also how to ply the west with
false information about Soviet
intentions. The most complex
and costly surveillance system
ever devised had been under-
mined.
Thus, when the KGB's luck
began to run out in 1977, it
hardly mattered. Boyce and
Lee were arrested in January
and in September, suffering -
he now claims - from the bur-,
den of his double life, Prime
resigned from GCHQ. Even
now the KGB had a small
bonus to come. The NSA soon
learned from Boyce and Lee
that the Rhyolite satellites had
been "compromised". But it
was not until Prime confessed
teo espionage this summer that
the truth dawned about the
full extent of the damage.
Because of the five-year
interval, a senior, US intelli.
about which he knew nothing;
even so the KGB paid hint
#4,000 before taking him back
of the KGB to pay something
for nothing, Prime was given
#4,000. Can it really have been
a farewell gift ? Or was it a
payment for more recent ser?
vices. rendered ? There was no
shortage. of allegations, last
week that GCHQ must conttaih
further "moles" - one that
reached 'The Sunday Times front
an American source was that
there could be as many as Firer
" either two senior figures all
three junior ones-or five all as
important as each other," t;
were advised. The weakness i
any suelf"'theory is thee ,I
a vulnerable figure seth -tR
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Prime as a contact, for it was
certainly aware of his flaws,
even if the British security
services were not.
It is unlikely that the
British public wil ever know .
the answer to these questions
but perhaps the security,
services will. For it is a start-
ling fact, as Mrs Thatcher
revealed to the Commons on
Thursday, that. they had not i
questioned Prime until after
his trial. Until then the entire
investigation had been con-
ducted by the West Mercia
police who arrested him on
f charges of sexually assaulting
young girls.
The local . force performed
heroically in discovering so
much to corroborate details in
Prime's confessions, including
his visits to Vienna and his
aborted decisions to defect.
But the closed world of GCI-IQ
was beyond their experience
and even comprehension, and
they had no access to its inner
secrets. (In that they were
far from alone, for a former
junior defence minister has
told us that even to him
Cheltenham was out of bounds,
without "special clearance ".)
It was therefore hard for West
Mercia police to judge the
significance of what Prime was
Open line?
telling them, or to know how
to follow it up.
Mrs Thatcher told the Com-
mons that the security services
had not questioned Prime be-
fore his conviction for fear of
complicating the case. against
him and prejudicing his trial.
But there could have been a
more calculating and self-inter-
ested reason. The case against
Prime depended almost solely
on his own confession to the
police-more than sufficient to
convict him.
If the security services had
investigated Prime fully, they
might have uncovered matters
they would be most reluctant to
produce in court; far better to
conduct their own investigation
when his trial was over, when
the results need never be re-
vealed in court or anywhere
else.
We believe Prime himself
cooperated in this process. Be-
fore sentencing him on Wed-
nesday, the Lord Chief Justice
declared that he had given
Prime "credit" for his con-
fession and for pleading guilty.
It is our understanding that
Prime himself believed that
his sentence would thereby be
reduced by' S or 6 years.
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