CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE DUBCEK PAUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 29, 2001
• Content Type: MEMO

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u"
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
G
Secret
8 1990
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
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MORI
Secret
13 June 1968
No. 12-68
28
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: The Dubcek Pause
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
It!: transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC
DO.NOT tADINC AND
UECI ASSIPICAT!ON
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13 June 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM No. 12-68
SUBJECT: Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Pause
1. The related crises in internal Czechoslovak politics
and in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations seem to have eased -- at
home, into a delicate and perhaps temporary domestic equilibrium
and, abroad, into an uneasy truce with Moscow. The regime of
Party leader Dubcek and Premier Cernik has, in effect, promised
that it will control the pace of domestic reform; Moscow has
gained the appearance of Czech compliance; but Prague seems at
the same time to have been able to preserve the essential sub-
stance of its democratic experiment.
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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2. The compromise seems to have come about, sequentially,
as a result of strong Soviet pressures, rising Czech concern,
mildly concessionary Czech responses, and, finally, the Soviets'
own anxiety to find some way to avoid direct military interven-
tion. It is true,` nonetheless, that if quiescence has been
restored to the relationship, it is by no means assured in-
definitely. An undetermined number of Soviets are currently
engaged in a Warsaw Pact exercise on Czech soil; their presence
serves, at a minimum, as an ominous reminder to the Dubcek
regime of Soviet power and of the USSR's continuing interest in
Czech developments. The recently concluded plenum of the
Czechoslovak Central Committee was reassuring to the Soviets
in some respects but not at all in others. Dubcek, in fact, is
working both sides of the street. He is trying to buy off
Moscow with promises of continued Communist authority in Czech-
oslovakia and unswerving Czech loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. At
the same time, he is seeking to strengthen his domestic position
by pledging at least the gradual growth of democracy at home
and independence abroad.
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Prague's Concessions, Domestic and Foreign
3. Prague yielded to the Soviets on two major foreign
policy issues and on several domestic issues of great concern
to the USSR. First, concerning policy toward Germany, the Czechs
evidently discarded the possibility of an early move toward dip-
lomatic recognition of West Germany. In addition, they reversed
their recent public opposition to East Germany's claims on the
Berlin access question and began to mute their bitter open
quarrel with the Ulbricht regime.
4. Recent East German moves affecting West German
access to West Berlin may cause the Czechs some considerable
anxiety. A crisis over Berlin would perhaps give the Soviets a
pretext for insisting that their troops in Czechoslovakia remain
there at least for the duration. Some Soviet military figures
apparently brought up the subject of stationing other Warsaw
Pact forces in Czechoslovakia last month; the Czechs, of course,
refused. But, in the event of renewed trouble over Berlin --
attended by strident Soviet propaganda against West German
"fascists and revanchists" -- Prague might find it difficult
to demand the removal of Pact troops already present on Czech
soil.
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5. In any case, as a second concession to the Soviets,
the Czechs had already reaffirmed their military commitment to
the Warsaw Pact. They did so both in word and deed, the latter
by permitting the Pact exercises now under way. This, of course,
was of crucial importance to Moscow. The political significance
of Pact membership is obvious. In Czechoslovakia's case, there
is in the Soviet view some considerable military significance
as well. Geography aside, Czechoslovakia has contributed more
manpower per capita to the forces of the Warsaw Pact than any
other member state, including even the USSR, and by and large
the Czechoslovak soldier is better equipped and better trained
than all the others except his Soviet counterpart. There had
been several indications that all this might change: the Czechs
might hold fewer training exercises, decrease their participa-
tion in joing Pact exercises, shorten conscript terms, lower
overall troop strength, and sharply reduce their military budget.
6. As a third concession to Moscow, the recent Central
Committee plenum reasserted the leading role of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party and implied that Czech political life would not
be subjected to sudden and drastic change. (Even before the
plenum met, the Interior Ministry had indicated that no new
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political parties would be allowed to form at this time.) In
a related move, the plenum -- though disposing of Novotny --
allowed most of the 4+0 or so relatively orthodox and pro-Soviet
members of the Committee to retain their membership, at least
for the time being. The plenum also went back on earlier Party
statements and, well aware of Soviet sensitivities on this score,
denied that the new Czechoslovak course was intended to be a
model for other Communist countries and parties.
7. Dubcek personally dominated the plenum proceedings,
and this must be comforting to Moscow. Whatever their suspicions
of the man, the Soviets certainly prefer his leadership to some
of the likely alternatives: a party without firm leadership
and direction, threatening to collapse; or a party in the hands
of ultra-liberals susceptible to non-communist and even anti-
communist influences. In any case, the Soviets -- though still
apprehensive about the continued influence of these ultra-liberals
in the present regime -- now seem ready to accept that the
Novotny forces probably cannot stage a comeback.
8. Finally, various Czech leaders promised to discourage
anti-Soviet statements in the press. These had in recent weeks
reached surprising proportions, suggesting that Soviet advisers
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were implicated in the death of Masaryk, the purge of Slansky,
and the genesis of Czechoslovakia's present economic problems.
Some articles had doubted whether the USSR had been willing to
help defend Czechoslovakia in 1938 -- in other words, doubted
whether alliance with the USSR had ever done the Czechs any
good. But what the Czechs have not yet publicized, what some
members of the regime still implicitly call for, is the chronicle
of moves last winter by Soviet officials, especially the Ambassa-
dor and Warsaw Pact representatives, as they intervened to try
to save Novotny. That the Soviets are not yet satisfied with
the degree of restraint the Czechs have shown and intend to
keep the pressure on is indicated by Moscow's unusual resort
a few days ago to a formal note protesting the anti-Soviet
implications of an article on General Sejna in a Czech news-
paper.
Prague's Gains
9. Clearly the principal instrument Moscow has employed
against Prague during the past several weeks has been the threat
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of military intervention. The Soviets are still in a good
position to use military force, and it is likely that the Soviets
would prefer to intervene under cover of an exercise. Yet most
signs now indicate that Moscow has decided not to use force, at
least for the time being. The decline of tensions during recent
weeks and authoritative reports of a new "political understanding
(privately described by diplomats of both countries) are the
best general signs of this. Other specific signs include the
suddenly more cordial attitude toward Prague on the part of the
previously hostile Polish regime and the decline of polemical
innuendoes in the Soviet press.
* The extraordinary number and variety of visiting Soviet
military figures have in themselves constituted ominous
portents: first, Yakubovsky, the Warsaw Pact commander;
then Marshals Moskalenko and Konev attended by about two
dozen Soviet generals; next the Defense Minister, Grechko,
along with the Chief of the Political Administration,
Yepishev, and the commanders of the Soviet troops poised
around Czech borders; then the chief of staff of the Warsaw
Pact, Kazakov, along with more Soviet military equipment and
personnel than the average Czechoslovak citizen expected or
desired for a "staff" exercise; and probably Yakubovsky
again, since he is scheduled to command the exercise. More
than one of these Soviet officers apparently promised "good
Czechoslovak communists" the aid of the Soviet army if they
asked for it.
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10. The first and most direct "concession" the Dubcek-
Cernik regime extracted from the Soviets appears to be that the
Warsaw Pact exercise will be only an exercise. The second direct
gain, related to the first, may have been that the Soviets
agreed that there was no need to permanently station other
Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia (an agreement which, in
the Soviet view, might be subject to change in the event of a
flare-up over Berlin). An additional concession may be that
Soviet Warsaw Pact representatives in Prague will be restricted
in their activities and access to Czechoslovak officials.
11. Dubcek has probably benefited indirectly from the
USSR's handling of the crisis. Most Czechs and Slovaks are
likely to hold the Soviets, rather than the leadership of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party, responsible for the fact that
concessions were made. Soviet pressure has been blatant, and
the Soviets' press tirade against the elder Masaryk greatly
aroused anti-Soviet sentiments among the people at large.
Dubcek and Cernik are probably credited with forestalling
Soviet intervention and staving off the worst of the Soviet
demands. Thus the Czech Party leaders still stand as symbols
of national independence, an image cultivated to good effect
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by their counterparts in Romania. Finally, the USSR's military
pressures presumably alarmed the ultra-liberals, along with
.everyone else, and this may have led them to ease their pressures
on Dubcek and Cernik for further immediate moves of democratic
reform.
12. The Czech regime may also have gathered additional
sympathy in Eastern Europe for its independent position partly
as a consequence of Soviet heavy-handedness. Early in May,
there were plausible reports that Janos Kadar had cautioned the
Soviets against exerting massive pressure on the Prague government.
Foreign Minister Hajek's hurried trip to Budapest on 22-24 May
evidently produced additional encouragement from Kadar; Hajek
expressed gratitude for "Hungarian understanding for our foreign
and domestic aims" and for "moral support." It is clearly
Prague's hope that Moscow's concern over such attitudes -- both
in Eastern Europe and within the Communist Parties of Western
Europe -- will help to deter any rash Soviet moves.
Hungary's apparent moral support of Czechoslovakia was not
an act of simple altruism. Hungary seeks closer relations
with Western Europe and to free itself from what one
Hungarian writer referred to as "Soviet Russian methods of
economic policy making." Moreover, Kadar evidently
wants to be a popular national figure in Hungary and some-
thing of a Danubian statesman.
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The Soviet Leaders
13. Prague (like Belgrade) seems to be convinced that the
Soviet leaders are divided over how to proceed vis-a-vis
Czechoslovakia -- whether to be tolerant or rigid, whether to
temporize, hoping for the best, or to move forcefully in order
to forestall the worst. Even before tensions rose in May,
some high Czechoslovak officials felt that the regime in Prague
was counting on such a division to work in its favor. And in
late May Pudlak said publicly:
I have the impression that the official Soviet
leaders .... support the (Czechoslovak) Party leader-
ship and the government .... But even (in the USSR)
there exists a certain difference in opinions .... I
think that our task is to truthfully explain the funda-
mentals of the political development and changes in
Czechoslovakia and, at the same time, oppose unfounded
criticisms and doubts.
If the Soviet leadership is in fact divided, Prague has some
added room for maneuver. Dubcek and Cernik may believe (or
hope) that concessionary gestures from Prague will help to
strengthen the position of the moderates in Moscow.
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14. In fact, little hard information is available on
current moods and maneuvers within the Soviet leadership. There
are, however, three general theories concerning the impact of
the Czechoslovak crisis on domestic Soviet politics:
a. Soviet leaders reacted without major disagree-
ments or strains on the collective system, banding to-
gether to present a solid front both to the Czechs and to
their own party. (The evidence for this construction is
largely negative, i.e. there is nothing on the public
record to refute it.)
b. Though the four top Soviet leaders were united
on the Czech issue, there was discontent elsewhere within
the elite. Pressures were brought to bear on these leaders
by those who feared the consequences of a "do-nothing" policy
and who may, in addition, have seen in this issue an oppor-
tunity for personal political gain. (The evidence for this
interpretation is slim, consisting of a few reports of un-
certain reliatiliby.)
Such pressures could have come, for example, from a stalwart
on the Central Committee (someone like Yegorychev, the man
who criticized the leadership's actions during the June War),
or from a tough old hand in the high commend (someone like
Moskalenko, who in fact travelled to Prague and tried to
intimidate the Czechs).
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c. There were splits within the quadrumvirate itself.
Kosygin was opposed to rash action and hopeful of a satisfactory
solution over time. Brezhnev, perhaps urged on by Suslov, came
to favor forceful moves, partly because his earlier efforts to
save the situation (e.g. his interference on behalf of Novotny)
had obviously failed. Eventually, some sort of compromise was
worked out; Brezhnev was permitted to make a forceful (troop)
move, Kosygin was then allowed to go to Czechoslovakia to try to
arrange a political solution. (The evidence for this kind of
scenario consists chiefly of reports from the Yugoslavs, who
maintain -- with Czech concurrence -- that Kosygin and Brezhnev
were indeed split along lines such as these.)
15. There is no sure way to choose among these various
hypotheses. Degrees and combinations of each are possible;
indeed, we are inclined to think that there was pressure from
below to do something tangible about Czechoslovakia -- perhaps
especially from a concerned military-- and possibly differences
within the top leadership as well. All the Soviet leaders were,
of course, alarmed, but some foresaw the need for sudden and
dramatic action; others did not, or were fearful that hasty
moves might only accelerate Czech movement out of the camp and
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force the Soviets to intervene militarily. Something on the
order of the compromise suggested above was then perhaps arrived
at. And so far -- with help from Dubcek -- the compromise seems
to be working.
The September Congress and Beyond
4 16. Dubcek has indicated that a main item on the agenda
of the Party Congress scheduled for September will be the formal
expulsion of his opposition from the Central Committee. With
that done, Dubcek, according to Soviet hopes and perhaps expec-
tations, should begin to act as Gomulka did after 1956 by gradually
reimposing firm Party control over public activities. Among
other things, the Soviets will look for signs that the Party
is reinstituting patterns of censorship which were in effect
until January 1968, restoring the Socialist and Peoples'
(Catholic) parties and the National Assembly to a state of
political irrelevance, and emphasizing democratic centralism
rather than intra-Party democracy.
17. But Soviet hopes may be severely disappointed. Though
his personality and his ideas remain in some respects unclear,
Dubcek does not appear to be a Gomulka, either in temperament
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or political disposition. He has already shown himself more
tolerant of domestic criticism than Gomulka ever pretended to
be, and many of his political preferences seem distincly un-
orthodox in Communist terms. He believes that Marxist notions
of class conflict have no relevance to his own country, and
indeed this apparently was one of the major reasons he attacked
Novotny last October. Dubcek and other liberals in the Party,
as indicated at the recently concluded plenum, apparently
wish to make the National Front a more meaningful organization,
not merely windowdressing for. the Communist Party.
18. Dubcek's views presumably are to some extent a re-
flection of the company he keeps. Dubcek was probably re-
sponsible for Zdenek Mlynar's promotion at the plenum to full
party secretary and head of the Party's legal commission. In
these posts Mlynar may continue to advocate some of his own,
far-reaching ideas: e.g., in his words, the establishment of
a "multi-chamber representative body" similar in function to
the "House of Lords and House of Commons in Britain or the
Congress of the United States."
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19. In addition, Premier Cernik is scheduled to present
draft proposals for a new constitution at the September Congress,
and many of them will probably displease the Soviets. Cernik
has vigorously called for a "democratization of society" and
seems to believe that the Czechoslovak government will function
better if it is insured against "the system of personal power"
and is made more' responsive, through such means as regular
press conferences and opinion polls, to the public at large.
Moreover, Cernik's economic proposals will probably be aimed
at lessening Czechoslovakia's economic dependence on the USSR,
and more important, will probably reduce Czechoslovakia's po-
tential military contribution to the Warsaw Pact. He evidently
concluded several years ago that Czechoslovakia's disproportionate
emphasis on heavy industry, including defense industry, should
be corrected. Cernik and other economic reformers for some time
waged an unsuccessful campaign against Novotny's inflated
defense budget; now he will surely be able to set a lower figure.
Also, Cernik and the other ministers appear to be drafting serious
proposals aimed at extensive, if not exhaustive, judicial re-
habilitation of victims of the Stalinist period in Czechoslovakia.
In any event, the Czechs, not the Soviets, are increasingly likely
to make decisions of this nature.
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20. At some stage in the game, as projected here, the
Soviets will, of course, become aware that their earlier hopes
for a return to anything like the status quo ante in Czechoslo-
vakia were without foundation. It is the Czech hope that this
realization will have come too late and that the Soviets'
reactions will be minimal -- limited to words alone. In part
because of this hope, and in part to insure its own survival,
the Czech regime will surely seek to control both the pace and
scope of the process of democratization. Sudden alarm in Moscow
could thus perhaps be forestalled, disagreements within the
Soviet leadership could perhaps be encouraged, and a pretext
for Soviet intervention -- one good enough to overcome doubts
and fears within the Kremlin, within the other socialist
countries, and within other communist parties -- could perhaps
be avoided. Ultimately, if Dubcek and Cernik are thus able to
continue to fend off both the Soviets and their potential critics
at home, it is apparently their hope that a genuinely reformed
and significantly freer Czechoslovakia will be able to achieve
real independence within the Bloc and also restore its historic
ties with the West.
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21. This road, however, will certainly not be an easy
one. So very much depends on the uncertain ability of the Dubcek
regime to hold both itself and the Czech people together. For
the moment, the Czech party -- having probably rid itself of
the threat of a conservative, pro-Novotny revival -- seems to
be essentially united. But the party nevertheless includes the
more or less cautious (and often vague) liberals of Dubcek's
stripe -- who foresee a continued, though newly benevolent
Communist dominance of all political life -- and the extreme
liberals -- who advocate a return to one form or another of
genuine parliamentary democracy. A clash between these groups
may eventually be inevitable. Moreover, given the extraordinary
openess of the press and the growing feeling of political in-
volvement among all sorts of non-communist elements, public
participation in any such clash is a distinct (and complicating)
possibility.
22. Thus there is a good chance that relations between
Prague and Moscow will again become very tense. The Soviet
leaders, or at least most of them, wish to avoid drastic and
costly, military action. Nevertheless, should Dubcek's control
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threaten to collapse, or should the Czech regime's policies
become, in Moscow's view, "counterrevolutionary," the Soviets
might once again use their troops to menace the Czech frontier.
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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