BALUCHISTAN: A PRIMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000200070016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM

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Summary
Baluchistan: A Primer
The area in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan inhabited by some
3 million Baluchi tribesmen is arid, with few natural resources. It is
important primarily because of its strategic location near oil routes from the
Persian Gulf. The society is tribal, and rivalries among its many tribes
dominate its politics. The Baluchis have always resented outside control, and
if they believed that conditions were favorable, many would support efforts
to win independence. Baluchistan has no good natural harbors, and there is
only one modern road-in Iran-from the USSR to the coast.
Pakistan and Iran have long believed that the USSR hopes someday to win`
control of Baluchistan and thereby gain access to warm-water ports. There
is no evidence that the Soviets have taken recent steps to support the
Baluchis, but the Baluchis themselves-traditional tribal leaders as well as
the small but growing number of leftists-view the major Soviet presence in
Afghanistan as intimidating to Pakistan and as a way of extracting
concessions from the government in Islamabad.
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Baluchistan: A Prime
The Area Baluchistan is an ethnic region spanning the borders of three countries:
and Its People Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Somewhat over 3 million people, generally
referred to as Baluchis, inhabit this area. About 600,000 live in the Iranian
province of Sistan va Baluchistan. Some 25,000 live in scattered areas from
the lower Helmand River valley northward to Herat in Afghanistan. In
Pakistan's Baluchistan Province, there are more than 1 million Baluchi
speakers, and another 700,000 Brahui-speaking tribesmen, who differ from
the Baluchi in little except language. Almost a million Baluchi speakers are
significant minorities in adjoining areas of Sind and Punjab Provinces in
Pakistan. Most Baluchi are nomadic herdsmen, some raise fruits and small
grains in irrigated oases, and a few are traders or coastal fishermen
X1
Baluchistan has a feudal social structure, tribally organized, that empha-
sizes allegiance to a paramount chief (a sardar) in return for protection and
the provision of justice, the tenets of their Sunni Muslim faith, and a tribal
code that demands vengeance and retribution for perceived wrongs.
Nonetheless, obligatory hospitality-under certain conditions-is extended
to friend and foe alike. These traditions are strongest among the larger,
more powerful Baluchi tribes in Pakistan, especially the Marris, the Bugtis,
and a related group, the Mengals. The Baluchi feudal structure, particularly
the leadership system represented by the institution of the sardar, has been
under attack by the Pakistani Government as an obstacle to assimilation of
the tribesmen into the mainstream of Pakistani political life. 25X1
Ethnic frictions are a fact of life for the rebellious Pakistani Baluchis.
Tensions between Baluchis and aggressive Pushtun tribal groups who
inhabit the the mountains north of Quetta have been intensified by the
influx during the past year of large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan
who are also mostly Pushtuns. Baluchis resent the colonial-style
overlordship of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani Government and the
massive presence of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani Army. The Baluchis
blame the government-equated to Punjabis-for the economic under-
development of Baluchistan, for the dearth of water development projects
benefiting Baluchis, and for allowing Punjabi and Sindi settlers to migrate
into newly opened irrigation projects in Baluchistan. They also resent the
almost total exclusion of Baluchis from the state government, the local
police force, and other positions of authority. Baluchis feel that the small but
growing number of Baluchi college graduates are qualified to fill many of
these posts.
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The economic factor has assumed greater importance in recent years. As an
ethnic minority in each of the countries, a major Baluchi grievance has been
the low level of economic development in tribal territory compared to other
areas in each state. In Iran, the development programs of the Shah's
government included Baluchi territory, and the jobs created by construction
activity (primarily military related) produced a degree of prosperity that
tended to mollify Baluchi demands for autonomy; nonetheless, a small but
some rimes active expatriate underground movement existed. In Pakistan,
Baluchis see most development funds benefiting the Army. Quetta is a
major Pakistani Army post established by the British as a frontier fort, the
location of which controls the passes and routes from the Afghan frontier
that 1:ad to the Indus plains. Other Pakistani military posts at strategic sites
monitor activities of the frequently rebellious local tribesmen. The presence
of numerous military bases and installations aggravates Baluchi sensitivities
and underlines the role o itary as an army of occupation and as
enforcers of martial law.
25X1
Politics in Political activity in Baluchistan has been confined largely to Pakistani
Baluchistan Baluchistan. The Iranian Baluchis, poor, isolated, and with few educated
leaders, have seldom been affected by the central government, and have
depended on Tehran's economic aid. It was not until after the fall of the
Shah, when the central government appeared to be both a threat to their way
of life and vulnerable to Baluchi agitation, that the Iranian Baluchis formed
their first political party. The Afghan Baluchis, a small minority, have never
been politically signficant.
Politics in Pakistani Baluchistan is a function of group rivalries at different
levels: the Pathans in the northern part of the province against Baluchis in
the south; in the south, the Baluchi and the Brahui against the minor ethnic
group; and the immigrants from other parts of Pakistan; and among the
many Baluchi and Brahui tribes and subtribes. In addition to the Pathans,
Pakistani census reports mention 42 Baluchi tribes, 15 Brahui tribes, and 62
belonging to neither ethnic group. Within each tribe, of course, there are
also rivalrie I
Any political activity is often influenced by all of these rivalries simulta-
neously. Rivalries within the province have prevented any unified action in
the past and outsiders have always found allies among those who were more
intcra~ited in settling scores with local rivals than in issues of wider concern.
Probahly the two most important political issues in Baluchistan are the
relations of the tribes with the central government and the role of the tribal
chiefs.
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Almost everyone in the province would agree that Baluchistan has been the
victim of exploitation by the Punjabis and other outsiders. Most political
leaders, if given a free choice, would probably opt for independence-as part
of a greater Baluchistan-or a very extensive form of autonomy within
Pakistan. Many of them have recognized, however, that such goals are
unrealistic and they have striven for more modest objectives. With
substantial outside help-for example from the USSR-or under other
conditions that prevented Islamabad from making an effort to hold on to
Baluchistan, they might well try to achieve independence 25X1
The most important factor limiting Baluchi aspirations has been the power
of the central government in Islamabad, particularly its willingness to use
force if necessary to control the Baluchis. Even if they were united, the
Baluchi tribesmen would have little chance of winning independence as long
as Islamabad made a serious effort to hold the province. Even during the
most serious tribal rebellions in the past only a small part of the Pakistani
armed forces have been required to contain the insurgents. The Pakistanis
have been able to control any part of the province they consider important.
able t
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The tr;hes have be
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Islamabad has not thought it worth the cost of going after them
Although parallels may be drawn between the success of Afghan insurgents
against the regular Army there, such parallels can be misleading. The
Pakistani Army is far more professional, disciplined, and better led than was
the Afghan Army. Unlike their Afghan counterparts, Pakistani troops-
primarily Punjabis-have no reason to identify with the tribesmen or
sympathize with their causes. Moreover, some of the most valuable parts of
the province are in or near Pathan areas, and thus are unlikely to be seriously
affected by a Baluchi revolt. (A Pathan rebellion, in conjunction with the
Pathans in the North-West Frontier Province, would be a far more serious
threat to Pakistan. 25X1
Baluchi leaders have also been concerned about the viability of an
independent Baluchistan and its vulnerability to outside interference. 25X1
Additionally, fears that independence would lead to dominance by rival
tribes, or by leftists who would ultimately eliminate the tribal system, have
also tempered the views of the politicians, most of them tribal chiefs.
Although they still seem to speak for Baluchistan, the power of the
traditional leaders has been eroding steadily. Student and leftist organiza-
tions are becoming more influential. In local elections held last year, 25X1
Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party for the first time made significant gains in
Baluchistan, a vote many interpret as directed against the tribal chiefs
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Although final decisions in Baluchistan are still likely to be made by the
tribal leaders, these leaders will probably be under growing pressure from
the let and others to do something to win more concessions from Islamabad,
or even independence for Baluchistan. The chiefs could react by seeking
support from the central government, but their past history makes it more
likely that they will look for help elsewhere. Moreover, their perception of
the difficulties of achieving independence is changing rapidly, with the
Sovie : invasion of Afghanistan bringing potential great power help closer
and the domestic turmoil in Iran loosening Tehran's hold on Iran's Baluchis.
The USSR and
Warm Water Ports The Pakistanis have long feared that Russia's age-old interest in securing a
warm-water port would encourage the Soviets to give all-out backing to an
Afghan Government effort to secure "independence and freedom" for
Pakistani Pushtuns. The fears date back at least to 1956 when Moscow
provided some diplomatic and propaganda backing to Afghanistan in its
confrontation with Pakistan on the Pushtunistan issue. Moscow, however,
appears to have supported the Afghans primarily out of its desire to curry
favor with the Afghan Government and to intimidate an ally of the United
States, not out of intrinsic interest in the issue itself. We have some evidence
of Soviet contacts with both Pushtun and Baluchi tribal leaders, but we have
not been able to confirm Pakistani reports of Soviet material support to
either "independence" movement. The Afghans, not necessarily with Soviet
encouragement, have been involved for years with separatists across the
border, and some separatist leaders who fled to Afghanistan in the early
There is no evidence in the aftermath of the Soviet interventions in
Afghanistan that either the Soviets or Afghans have been in contact with the
Baluchis or that they have otherwise provided them support. Pakistan is
aware, however, that Soviet troops in the Qandahar area are only 200
kilom -,ters from Quetta, in the heart of Pakistani Baluchistan. There has
been one report that some Baluchi leaders see the nearby Soviet presence as
intimidating to the Pakistanis and thus providing them an opportunity to
press Pakistan for much greater autonomy
The Soviet military movement into Afghanistan revives speculation
concerning the century-old Russian quest for a warm-water port. Although
the Baluchi coastline, extending for nearly 1,000 kilometers, lacks good
natural harbors, it does have several small ports currently used by local
fishing; boats and by sea-going dhows that serve points in the Persian Gulf.
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25X1
The best port for development along the Baluchistan coast is at Chah Bahar
in the Iranian province of Baluchistan va Sistan. The former Shah
envisioned a small naval facility there from which shipping in the Gulf of
Oman could be monitored and which would augment Iran's major naval
base at Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz. Although the naval
installations and port improvements necessary for it never got beyond the.
planning stage, considerable work was completed on the airbase. The
aproximately 3,000-meter runways are operable, though only limited
support facilities were completed 25X1
The major advantage of Chah Bahar over other ports on the Baluchi coast is
that during the summer monsoon the sea approaches to Chah Bahar
experience more subdued sea conditions. Nevertheless, much of the
embayment at Chah Bahar is open to onshore surf, and heavy surf is typical
of the northern shore of the bay. Some protection for anchorages is afforded
by headlands on either side of the bay, at the small town of Chah Bahar on
the east side, and at Konarak on the west side where the naval facility was to
have been constructed. Depths in the bay range up to six fathoms.
5X1
The Baluchi ports in Pakistan, principally at Gwadar and Pasni, are less
promising for development. Only small fishing settlements are located there,
they lack good road access, and heavy sea conditions frequently preclude
their use during the southwest monsoon months. The ferry supply ship
between Karachi and Gwadar, for example, does not operate during the
summer months. 25X1
Afghanistan to Mashhad in Iran, then southward to Chah Bahar.
Access Routes Access to the Baluchistan coast from Afghanistan is limited to an eastern
and a western route separated by several hundred kilometers of difficult and
largely uninhabited country possessing no through north-to-south roads.
The eastern route from southeastern Afghanistan connects Qandahar, via25X1
Quetta, to Karachi; the western route leads from Herat in western
The best road access from southeastern Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean is
the paved all-weather route from Qandahar via Chaman to Quetta in
Pakistan, and thence to Karachi. A railroad parallels the route within
Pakistan. This is a principal route for Afghanistan's imports and exports.
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The western route from Afghanistan to Chah Bahar runs from Herat to
Mashhad in Iran along a segment of the Pan-Asian highway (Istanbul to
Dacca in Bangladesh), thence southward over an all-weather road to Chah
Bahar via Zahedan and Iranshahr. The section of the road between Chah
Bahar and Zahedan in Baluchistan via Nikshahr, Iranshahr, and Kash-a
distance of about 845 kilometers-was completed several years ago. Thus,
all-weather roads provide a connection with the rail terminus at Kushka in
the Soviet Union by a relatively direct route to the limited capacit ort at
Chat. Bahar on the Indian Ocean overlooking the Gulf of Oman
An ai.ternate route branches from the main road north of Zahedan. From
here :o the border town of Zabol, a distance of about 128 kilometers, the
road was being improved. Some sections have been upgraded to two lanes,
with a bituminous surface, but the remainder is still under construction. In
Afghanistan, the first 20 kilometers of the road between the Iran border and
Delaram is one lane, but has been improved by bituminous surface
treatment. The carrying capacity of the route in Afghanistan is low.
Betw -.en the two major routes no through north-to-south roads exist. This is
the heart of Baluchistan where the terrain alternates between sandy to salt-
baked clay basins and low east-west trending mountain ranges that
generally parallel the coast. Lack of water, searing heat, and high-velocity
winds in summer, added to its moonscape appearance, have deterred
development in spite of its location as an historic bridge between the Middle
East and the subcontinent of India. There is, however, one modern east-west
route. A road and railroad traverse the region between Quetta and the
Iranian border, where the road continues into the Iranian portion of
Baluchistan at the transport junction at Zahedan.1I
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