INCREASED INSTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300300008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 24, 1952
• Content Type: IM

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L
24 April 1952
OCI No. 5819
Copy No.
53
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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N
INPELLIGENCE mmaRA1MUM
SUBJECT: Increased instability in Latin America
The increased instability of several of the twenty Latin American
governments during the past few months has resulted primarily from
economic difficulties, internal political tensions arising from pre-
election activities, Argentine proselytizing, and, to a lesser extent,
Communism and anti-Americanism.
During the past seven weeks there have been two violent changes of
government in Bolivia and Cuba -- and the possibilities for other re-
volutions are increasing, particularly in Chile, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador
and Venezuela.
Further violence in Bolivia may result from the struggle for dominance
between various factions of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. The
strongest factions are President Paz Estenssoro's relatively moderate
group and the extreme nationalists headed by the Minister of Mines and
Petroleum, Juan Lechin, and other important labor leaders. Lechin, who is
pro-Argentine, has urged the miners to retain arms, which he would prob-
ably not hesitate to use to threaten or displace Paz Estenssoro.
Peru and Chile are alarmed about possible Argentine and Communist in-
volvement in the revolt and current agitation in Bolivia. They fear that
any new disorders in Bolivia might eventually spread to their countries.
Signs of instability are also present in Cuba, where Batista is op-
posed by some embittered army officers, the majority of students, the
Communists and others who did not benefit from the coup.
The political situation in Chile is unstable, and the country is ex-
periencing economic and financial difficulties. A presidential election
scheduled for September has precipitated increasingly vocal opposition to
the weak government, and given rise to anti-LAS expressions. The most
popular presidential candidate today appears to be ex-dictator Ibanez del
Campo, who may attempt a coup if he loses.
The Communist Party, outlawed in 1948, is now an active, relatively
overt organization with 14.0,000 to 50,000 members. Penetration of organized
labor is significant, and the government is reluctant to crack down. The
vote potential of the Communists,.who with important Socialist groups are
backing a "popular front" candidate, is sought by most parties.
C
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CON"OENTIA
Management-labor-government relations at the large US-operated copper
mines which supply about 55 percent of United States copper imports, are
at a low ebb. A strike has been scheduled for 25 April. In view of
extreme nationalist pre-election statements, the government's insecure
position, and its declared interest in raising the price of copper sold
to the United States, it is uncertain in what quantity and at what prices
copper will be available to the US during the rest of 1952.
Current instability in Panama centers around the 11 May presidential
election. The two chief candidates are former police chief Jose Rem?n
and his cousin Roberto Chiari. Remon's supporters say that he will be
Panama's next president, by fraud or force if necessary. Certain sup-
porters of Chiari, however, assert that they will oppose a Remon victory
by force. Ex-President Arnulfo Arias, who is aligned with neither side,
probably holds the balance of voting strength.
Although Chiari's forces and, to a lesser extent, Remon's have both
attacked US policies in the Canal Zone, neither candidate is basically
anti-US. Panamanian Communists are more antagonistic to Remon than to
Chiari, but have actively campaigned for neither candidate, and in any
case control few votes. The Argentine Labor Attache has reportedly cam-
paigned with some success for Remon.
Increased guerrilla activity throughout much of Colombia, along with
a sharp division within the controlling Conservative Party, has forced the
administration to rely heavily on the army. However, growing army dis-
satisfaction over the government's inept handling of the guerrilla problem
has increased the possibility of a coup and a military dictatorship. The
Communists have played little part in the guerrilla disturbances. The
government, meanwhile, is trying to reconcile the opposing factions, and
possibly may have some success.
In Ecuador, the possibility of coup and counter-coup, always present,
has been increasing with the approach of the 1 June presidential election.
Earlier prospects for a "relatively normal" election have been upset by
the unexpected candidacy of the twice-deposed rightist demagogue Velasco
Ibarra and by the withdrawal of the left-wing coalition candidate., Salazar
Gomez. The contest is now chaotic enough to encourage a bid for power
from either the opportunistic Defense Minister, Diaz Granados, or, the
neo-fascist Mayor of Guayaquil, Guevara Moreno. Should President Plaza
succeed in conducting an election despite these threats, a victory of a
right-wing candidate might set the stage for a liberal revolt.
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C UTIA I
Prospects for trouble in Venezuela have remained at a fairly high
level since the Constituent Asseblmbly`election campaign started last summer
and it became clear that the governing junta intended to rig the results.
The chief threat to stability is the outlawed, leftist Democratic Action
Party, whose exiled leaders have been plotting to regain power since they
were overthrown in 1948. Capabilities of the Democratic Action have prob-
ably been reduced somewhat by the Cuban coup, which has made Havana unavail-
able as a base of operations, and by the fact that the army is"apparently
still united behind the junta. Harassing activities and continued plotting,
if not an actual revolt, can be expected.
In Argentina, Peron's strict security controls since last September
have prevented the organization of a revolutionary movement, but the
government is extremely worried about continued plotting, labor unrest,
and dissension among labor leaders.
Although Brazil is relatively stable, President Vargas' tenure could
be threatened by a -continuing division within the armed forces and by an
increase in the current dissatisfaction of certain high-ranking army officers
with his policies on economics, foreign affairs, and Communism.
In arma, the current situation now appears more favorable to re-
volutionary attempts than a year ago. Tension can be expected to increase
with political machinations in anticipation of the 1953 presidential
election. Maladministration, corruption, the high cost of living and food
shortages have caused growing discontent, even, reportedly, in the higher
army echelons.
Uruguay is faced with serious economic and financial difficulties,
and reportedly there is deep dissension in the newly organized government.
Until the 6 July elections in Mew o, domestic political frictions
may cause outbreaks of violence. These are not likely to affect the govern-
ment's stability or United States interests.
Guatemala is at present under a greater degree of Communist influence
than any other Latin American country. A small hard core of Communists
has exerted influence out of all proportion to its size. Recently, however,
there has been a growing anti-Communist movement which now extends to two
of the major labor unions. Even if Communist influence should be drasti-
cally reduced, it is unlikely that there would be any diminution in the
manifestations of nationalism and the campaign of harassment against US
companies operating in the country.
SECRET
C _ TI AL
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The Caribbean Legion, led by political exiles from various Caribbean
countries, is not believed to be actively organized at present. Although
it has not acted as a military force since 1949, its rumored existence,
as well as meetings of Legion leaders, is a major psychological factor and
the Legion remains a potential threat to the peace and stability of the
Caribbean area. The Legion's main objective is to eliminate dictatorships.
Argentina's intensified propaganda and labor activities have increased
anti-US feeling, developed obstacles to hemisphere unity, and created
difficulties among labor in other Latin American countries. The improved
proficiency of these activities has resulted in the establishment of a
third-position Latin American Committee for Syndical Unity and increased
influence among important labor leaders, especially in Chile, Peru, Colombia,
Bolivia and Panama. In Panama the Argentine Labor Attache was able to
organize a pro-Argentine political group, and in several other countries
pro-Argentine cultural societies have been established.
Since most countries in the area have been traditionally suspicious
of Argentina's motives, the lattex's propaganda technique emphasizes the
protection of Latin American interests, such as a just price for raw
materials, and capitalizes on nationalism and dissension within various
trade unions.
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