THE KAREN PROBLEM IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300300006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 10, 1952
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300300006-7
10 April 1952
OCI No. 5589
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
1101 menf Ne_
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By:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300300006-7
 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300300006-7
COK"NALMIAL
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Karen Problem in Burma
The problem posed by the Karens in Burma has recently been accentuated
by Communist efforts to make an alliance with them.
be-
lieved that an effective alliance would severely impede,iifgnotrcheck., the
Burmese Government's efforts to restore internal security throughout the
country. It is also widely held that a peaceful Karen-Government settle-
ment is essential to permit the concentration of troops necessary for a
decisive campaign against the Communists.
The Karens, the largest ethnic minority in Burma, numbering two to
three million, inhabit the Irrawaddy Delta area and the mountainous re-
gions of southeastern Burma. Their long-standing animosity toward the
Burmans resulted in a revolt in 19+9 against the newly-'independent
Government. The immediate cause of the rebellion was the failure ofuthese
Karens to obtain an autonomous state within the Union of Burma.
Most Karens at least tacitly support the insurgent leadership, al-
though there are two political groups, relatively insignificant in numbers,
which have not rebelled. The least influential of these is the Union
Karen League. It is an appendage of the government party, and its leaders
are considered "quislings" by the great majority of Karens. The other
"loyal" faction, the Karen Congress, acts as a le al o
mexlt, although it is known to be in sympathetic g PPosition to the govern
. ymPathetic contact with the insurgent
The military organiz
Def
ation of the
th
ense Organization, is
e Karen National
25X1
commands -- the (
ivided into two di
Irrawad
mountains of the southeas
e a o
t mmand and the
stinct
Eastern Command in the
25X1
goVernmen , e 6LOVt?rr na ~. .. a aS u A.v
Karen Population. It is+believed1tocexerciseionlynoose p 1 tic nl~co trn1Q
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*AW
C .0 ILI 1;,
Although the Karens are still capable of mounting occasional sizable
and effective attacks against specific targets, their situation is pre-
carious because of acute arms and food shortages. Most of the Karen units
in: the
25X1
have been forced lnt~o its remoter areas- while the-eastern
for e
area e o y to hold.their positions.
n recen y government arme orces concentrated their efforts against
the Karens rather than the Communists, and large forces are still committed
to suppressing the Karen insurgency to the serious detriment of the campaign
against the Communists.
The continuing Communist efforts. to obtain a high level alliance with
the Karens have thus far been unsuccessful, although there have been in-
stances of cooperation in local operations. The Karens' aggravated supply
predicament, however, makes them increasingly vulnerable to Communist in-
ducements.
Contrary to popular belief, only 10 to 20 percent of the Karens have
been converted to Christianity. Almost all Karen leaders, however, are
Christians wh
h
b
o
ave
een educated in schools which imbued them with the
ideals of Western democracy. It is this Christian and pro-Western leader-
4- a --
shin- as well of th
e
l
n
s
B
---
,..+.,....
i. as
cads
uri!!ans
that has chiefly prevented a Karen-Communist ~~tiAM~a
The Communists' most compelling argument, however, is that neither
the United States nor Britain has provided any assistance. For their part,
the Karens have used the Communists' promises of aid-in their requests
for Western support.
25X1
25X1
The Burmese Defense Minister recently stated publicly that the Karen
problem must be settled by political, not military methods. There have
been other indications that the government may be willing to adopt a more
compromising attitude. There have as yet been no signs of a favorable
Karen reaction to these hints which, if sincere, represent a significant
modification of the government's position,
con
IAL
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