SCOTT, ET AL. V. CASEY, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO. C81-291A

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000200330018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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UNITED ~EJJ li. CVR. Clerk
DON 1,JDERICK SCOTT, et al.
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STAT
I
Plaintiffs filed this action against the defendants, seeking
monetary relief for injuries sustained as a result of their par-
ticipation
in a medical experiment conducted during the late
1950's at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.l"
On February 14, 1983, a trial was held on the limited question
whether the plaintiffs' claims are barred under the two-year
or six-month statute of limitations of the Federal Tort Claims
it
Act (hereinafter 'FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. ? 2401(b). Upon careful
1 consideration of-the evidence, the oral arguments presented by
counsel at-the trial, and the parties' proposed findings of fact
it and conclusions of law, the court makes the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law. See Rule 52,- Fed. R. Civ. P.
Between 1955 and 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency (here-
inafter "CIA") of the United States Government conducted an
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"umbrella project" known as Project MKULTRA, under which various
subprojects were funded. MKULTRA was "concerned with the research
and development of chemical, biological, and radiological mate-
rials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control
human behavior."?/ While MKULTRA was underway, the CIA contacted
Dr. Carl C. Pfeiffer, who was then Chairman of the Department
of Pharmacology at. Emory University School of Medicine in Atlanta,
Georgia, concerning a proposed study. of lysergic acid diethyl
amide (hereinafter "LSD") and its antidotes. Subsequently, Dr.
Pfeiffer contacted the United States Bureau of Prisons to request
permission to conduct the. study under the auspices of the United
States Public Health Service (hereinafter "PHS") and Emory Uni-
versity at the United'States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia. Permission was granted and, in 1956, the study commenced. 4/
Prior to acceptance into the study, prison applicants were
interviewed by the prison psychologist, Dr. L. Bryan. A consent
agreement was read to each participant by a medical, staff person5~
which stated:
CONTRACT BETWEEN
DEPARTMENT OF PHARMACOLOGY, EMORY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
and
HUMAN VOLUNTEERS AT U. S. PENITENTIARY, ATLANTA, GEORGIA
Date
I, , the undersigned applicant,
hereby apply for permission to participate in an in-
fl
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vestigation designed to study the hallucinatory
effect of lysergic acid diethyl amide, LSD-25, and
similar compounds which is being conducted by Emory
University School of Medicine in cooperation with the
Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice. I
understand that 1 will be required to undergo a phys-
ical examination, including laboratory tests, in
order to ascertain if I am a suitable candidate. I
further agree to take the drugs offered me on the day
of the experiment. The procedure, the potential bene-
fits to humanity, and the risk to my health of par-
ticipation in this study have been explained to me by
Dr. , and I understand that there can
be no guarantee t at I will not become ill as a result
of this experiment. I hereby-freely assume all such
risks of participation in the investigation.
I further agree to cooperate to the fullest
extent with the personnel conducting the investigation
during the experimental period. I understand that
upon completion of my participation in this experi-
ment, the fact that-I have thus voluntarily rendered
outstanding service to humanity will be placed in my
official record. In addition, I understand that each
time I am used as a subject, a sum of $3.00 will be
deposited in my trust fund account. No such deposit
will be made until the Medical Officer has certified
that my participation has been satisfactory.
In consideration of the money referred to above,
the other considerations referred to above, and for
other..good.-and valuable-consideration, receipt of
which in full is hereby acknowledged by me, 1, act-
ing for myself, my heirs, personal representatives,
my--estate-and my -ass-igns-, -do--hereby release Emory.
University, the doctors, physicians, their assistants
and-all others participating in this experimental
progr-am-from all liability of any kind or character,
including claims and -suits.in law or in equity for
damages,-injury or death which may result to me or
to my property from my participation in this experi-
mental investigation. .
In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and
affix my seal this the day of,
19 .
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Defendants' Exh. 9. The agreement was signed by each participant:
Upon acceptance into the study, each participant was initially
given varying oral dosages of LSD and other drugs. Each partici-
ra&16 w=~ #IILULUI o vi Lne aosage level in order to acquaint the
participant with the effects of the drugs. If the participant
chose to proceed, he reported on a weekly basis for an exper.imenta:
session which lasted approximately twenty-four hours. Each par-
ticipant was given varying oral dosages'of LSD or other drugs
and then observed and tested by medical researchers. The objective
signs of drug effect were measured and recorded by one of the
physicians participating in the study, who, among other things,
took hourly measurements of blood pressure, pulse rate, pupil
diameter, oral temperature, and hand steadiness. The subjective
mental effects were assayed on the basis of an interview with
each participant. At the conclusion of a session, the participant
was offered a stipend of $3.00 per session, good-time credit,
and a promise of a favorable recommendation to the United States
Parole Commission.
Plaintiff Scott became a participant in late 1957. At that
time, he knew the study involved the ingestion of LSD and other
drugs. Scott testified that he signed a consent form prior to
his participation in the study. He stated, however, that he
did not sign the form that was identified by the government's
witnesses, Drs. Pfeiffer and Murphree, as the form used in the
r
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study. Scott remained in the study until late 1958, at which
time he voluntarily left because he was told by a prison staff
person that "there was more to it [LSD) than meets the eye."
During and after the study,'Scott experienced hallucinations
and flashbacks.
Scott testified that he did not learn of the government's
involvement in the study until 1977 when he was shown the book
In Search of the Manchurian Candidate by jailhouse lawyer James
Miller. Upon cross-examination, Scott was confronted with a
copy of In Search of the Manchurian Candidate and admitted that
the book was not published until 1979. This inconsistency selves
to discredit generally Scott's testimony.
Plaintiff Knight became a participant in September 1958.
At that time, he was informed that he would be ingesting LSD
and other drugs. He testified that he underwent an initial trial
period in the study. He recalled that he signed a consent form
I prior to his participation in the study but was unable to-recall
whether he signed the version identified by Drs. Pfeiffer and
Murphree. Knight testified that he believed the study was being
I article concerning the study in The Atlanta Constitution. Knight
stated that he filed his administrative tort claim approximately
it involvement in the study until 1977 when he read a newspaper
conducted by Emory University and was unaware of the government's
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I six months after reading the article. The article, however, was
p
e
study, he was told that he would be ingesting LSD. Kirk testified
that he did not undergo an initial trial period in. the study.
This testimony is inconsistent with that of plaintiffs Scott and
Knight and Dr. Murphree. Kirk testified that he signed a consent
form but claimed that the form referred only to the sponsorship
1 of Emory University and, furthermore, that it was not the form
j identified by Drs. Pfeiffer and Murphree. Nevertheless, Kirk
testified that the study was conducted in the prison hospital
and that he applied to the prison psychologist to participate.
Despite his awareness of these aspects of the study, Kirk insisted
1 that he did not learn of the government's involvement in the study
until.1977.
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published on August 10, 1975, and not in 1977. This fact discred-
its Knight's testimony.
Knight also stated that he?felt that the Bureau of Prisons
"let the study go on," that the study was conducted in the prison
hospital, that he applied to the prison psychologist to partici-
pate, and that he believed the Bureau of Prisons would be giving
him good-time credit for his participation in the study. These
admissions discredit Knight's testimony that he was unaware of the
government's involvement in the study. During and after the study,
Knight experienced flashbacks and a loss of memory, which he
attributed to his ingestion of LSD.
Plaintiff Kirk participated in the study from approximately
1 1957 until 1959. At the time he applied for acce
tance into th
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n an ear ier
I written statement made by Kirk. During the government's presen-
tation of its case, Kirk first testified that he knew that the
The court finds Kirk's testimony to be lacking in credibility.
It conflicts with an earlier in-court statement
d 1
study was being conducted by Emory University and the federal
government. Kirk later testified that he believed the study was
being conducted only by Emory and that he was unaware of the
sponsorship of the PHS. But, upon cross-examination,,.Rirk admitted
that prior to the trial he had attested that at the' time he applies:
to participate in the study, he was told that the study was being
conducted by Emory and the PHS. In an attempt to explain this
inconsistency, Kirk claimed that although he read and signed this
attestation, he did not mean to make this statement. Rather, he
claimed the affidavit was incorrectly drafted by his attorney.
The court finds Kirk's attempts to recant his testimony that he
knew )f the. involvement of the PHS to be unavailing.
Kirk also testified that during and after the study he
experienced flashbacks. And, while participating in'the study,
Kirk suffered an injury to his hand, which he attributed to the
ingestion of LSD.. He left the study due to this injury and, at
that time, believed his mind was not as sharp as it had been prior
to participating in the study.
After leaving the study, neither Scott nor Knight sought
medical assistance for their alleged injuries. Kirk did not seek
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medical assistance after 1960, nor did he inform psychiatrists or
psychologists whom he subsequently saw that he had been given LSD.
By the late 1960's, the general properties of LSD, including
its propensity to cause hallucipations, flashbacks, and person-
ality disorders, had become a matter of
public knowledge. Defen-
dants' Exhs. 11A-F. On August 10, 1975, an article describing the
study conducted at the Atlanta Penitentiary was published. Defen-
Dr. Bryan, the prison psychologist, in the study. It specifically
stated that the study involved the ingestion of LSD and other mind-
altering drugs by prisoner volunteers, that "[t)he National Insti-
tute of Mental Health, a'government branch, contributed some of
the funding for Pf",iffer's work ...," and that "the medical directo
of the [Bureau of Prisons) knew the experiments were going on in
Atlanta, but there are no hints that anyone higher than~the local
prison warden had to give permission for them." Id. And, Dr.
Pfeiffer published an article in 1960 concerning the study, which
described the methodology of the study and specified the identity,
nature, and dosages of the drugs given to the participants. Defen-
dants' Exh. 12B.
On October 21, 1977, plaintiff Scott filed an administrative
claim for personal injuries in the amount of $500,000 with the
Bureau of Prisons. Defendants' Exh..BA. Thereafter, on January
10, l'78, the Bureau advised Scott that his claim had been received
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Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on February 17, 1981.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under the FTCA, a tort claim against the United States is
barred "unle.ss_it_is_presented_in--writin g to-the--appropr-iate
Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues...."
28-U.S..C. y 2401(b). The question of when a claim accrues within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. ? 2401(b) is determined-by federal law.
See-Nendiola v. United-States, 401'F.2d 695 (5th Cit. 19.68). In
the present case, if plaintiff Kirk's claim accrued prior to
October 22, 1975, and if plaintiff Scott's and Knight's claims
11 accrued before 1976, their suit is time barred.
"The United States as sovereign, is immune from suit save
as-it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to-be
.sued--in-any . Court define that-.court's jurisdiction --- to-entertain
the suit." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586:(1941)
(citations omitted). Congress-created a limited-waiver of
sovereign immunity in the FTCA. United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111 (1979). That waiver allows suit only on prescribed
terms and conditions. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967).
Thus, although the FTCA allows suit against the government for
torts committed by its employees while acting within the-scope.
of their employment, the Act specifically requires that -a claim
be presented to the. appropriate federal-agency within two years
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 of its accrual. Because the FTCA constitutes a waiver of sovereign
immunity, courts should strictly construe the limitation period
established by Congress. See Flickinger v. United States, 523
F.Supp. 1372, 1375 (W.D. Pa. 1981); United Missouri Bank South
v. United States, 423 F.Supp. 571, 577 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Thompson
v. Dugan, 427 F.Supp. 342, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
In the context of medical malpractice cases,2/ courts have
held that the tort action does not accrue for statute of limi-
tations purposes until the plaintiff is put on notice of the wrong.'
Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1980)(citing
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949)). "The question of what
knowledge should put a claimant on notice of the existence of a
viable claim is not soluable by any precise formula." Id. Courts
considering this question, however, have distinguished between
plaintiffs who are ignorant of the underlying facts of the act
or omission that allegedly caused the injury and those who are
ignorant of the legal or medical significance of a known act and
For example, in United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, a
veteran was treated at a Veterans Administration (hereinafter
"VA") hospital.in 1968 with neomycin for an infection of the
right femur. The irrigation of the infected area with neomycin
led to a ringing sensation and some loss of hearing in Kubrick's
ears six weeks later. In 1969, Kubrick was advised by an ear
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.j specialist, who had secured Kubrick's hospital records, that the
loss of hearing might be due to the neomycin treatment
adminis- tered at the hospital. Kubrick filed for disability benefits,
but the VA denied his claim' In the course of pursuing his
administrative claim in 1971, another ear specialist informed
Kubrick that the neomycin treatment had, in fact, caused his
I hearing loss and. that the treatment should not have been adminis-
tered. Kubrick subsequently filed suit under the FTCA.
The Supreme Court held that Kubrick's claim accrued in 1969
when he was first advised of the probable link between the neo-
mycin treatment and his subsequent loss of hearing. The court
reasoned that the statute of limitations is triggered when a
plaintiff possesses "the critical facts that he had been hurt and
who inflicted the injury," and not at a later date when he learns
that his injury was negligently inflicted. ld. at 122-23.
Subsequent tc.Kubrick, three district courts have applied
this test to claims brought by confirmed LSD experiment parti-
cipants. In Sweet v. United States, 528 F.Supp. 1068 (D.S.D.
1981), aff'd on other-grounds, 687 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1982), the
--plaintiff argued :that his cause of action did not accrue until
he was informed that he had ingested LSD. Rejecting this argument.
the district court stated:
Sweet knew the nature of his injuries as early as
September, 1957. Sweet testified that while-at
Edgewood Arsenal,_he suffered a "terrifying exper-
ience" after drinking the unknown substance a third
time. He also testified that he experienced.a
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"flash-back" during the first month or two follow-
ing his participation in the experiments. During
the two-year period between his discharge ... and
re-enlistment (1959-1961), Sweet testified that-he
was plagued by a nervous condition that made it
difficult to concentrate on his.work.. Sweet further
testified that following his re-enlistment, he exper-
ienced a flash-back at a restaurant in Germany in
1961.
Sweet's testimony indicates that he believed
in his own-mind long before October, 1978 that the
cause of his nervous condition was linked to a
drug?-he?--recei-ved--at--Ed ewood--Arse nal. He- stated-
this belief to various doctors on at least four
occasions between- -1961---and---1976.-- More importantly-,
in his application to the Veterans Administration
dated August 4, 1976, Sweet described the nature
of the injuries for which he was seeking compensa-
tion as:
Nervous condition, stomach condition, dental
conditions, and residuals of hernia operation.
The nerves, stomach and teeth are the result
of a drug experiment I participated in at George
G. Meade, Maryland, during my first enlistment
with the Army Chemical Warfare Department.
At that'time, Sweet certainly possessed the critical
facts-concern-ing--his-injury and its alleged cause
"which would prompt a reasonable man to seek legal
advice."
528 F.Supp. at 1072 (citations omitted).
Similarly in Loeh v. United States, No. 77-2065-B, slip op.
(S.D. ill. January 21, 1982), the plaintiff maintained that his
cause of action did not accrue until he was informed that he had
received LSD. Nevertheless, the court found
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Loeh knew the nature of his purported injury as
early as December of 1957. He testified that he
suffered an extremely frightening experience
while he was at Edgewood Arsenal and that he
was plagued by feelings of numbness, isolation
and subsequently anxiety....
June of 1965, when.Loeh was informed by the
Veterans Administration that his Army records
1GLLD LUIJLClulllb' 1115 11JJLIy dllu 1l5 allege0
it cause sufficient to "prompt a reasonable man
to-seek legal advice."
Id. at 22-24. Finally, in Cox v. United States, 513 F.Supp..564
(W.D. Ky. 1981), the court ruled that the limitations period
had fully discharged a duty to advise plaintiff of the dangerous
propensities of the drugs and to provide medical assistance to
his medical problems and that he had participated in LSD experi-
ments while in the Army. There, the plaintiff was informed on
April 26, 1976, of his participation in the experiment. On May
18, 1977, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant stating that he
was experiencing unexplained medical problems. The court found
that the plaintiff's claim accrued on-May--18, 1977. *In reaching
this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the limitations period did not begin to run until the "defendant
overcome any such effects." Id. at 565.
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In the present case, the plaintiffs' claims accrued for
purposes of the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations at the
latest in the early 1960's when they possessed the critical facts
that they had suffered injuries from their ingestion of LSD and
other drugs and who inflicted those injuries. Plaintiffs'
testimony indicates that, at the time they participated in the
study, they knew the identity of the primary drug administered.
during the study--LSD--and the nature of its effects--halluci-
nations and flashbacks. Their testimony also reveals that they
experienced hallucinations and flashbacks during and after the
study, which they attributed to their ingestion of LSD. Plain-
tiffs' testimony shows that they knew that the study was being
conducted at the prison hospital, that they initially applied for
acceptance into the study with the prison psychologist, Dr. Bryan,
and that they knew they were to receive good-time credit and a
promise of a favorable recommendation to the United States Parole
it Commission.
As Judge Cardozo once observed, "[w)e are not to close our
eyes as-judges to what we must perceive as men." People ex rel.
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 63, 129 N.E. 202,
208 (1920): The court is hard pressed to:believe that, given the
foregoing circumstances, the plaintiffs were unaware of the
government's involvement in the study. In light of the evidence
presented by the parties, the court concludes that at the time of
the study or shortly thereafter the plaintiffs possessed
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I the critical facts concerning their injuries, its alleged cause,
and the identity of the alleged tortfeasor which would prompt
reasonable men to seek legal advice. See Sweet v. United States,
528 F.Supp. at 1072; Loeh v' United States, slip op. at 23-24;
Cox v. United States, 513 F.Supp. at 565.
Plaintiffs' contention that their cause of action did. not
i accrue until they were informed of the CIA's involvement in the
I study is unfounded.8' No such requirement can be gleaned from
the single case, Liuzzo v. United States, 485 F.Supp. 1274 (E.D.
Mich. 1980), cited by the plaintiffs.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Liuzzo, the plaintiffs in the
present case knew the identity of the alleged tortfeasor--the
federal government--at the time they participated in the study.
Plaintiffs testified that they applied to participate in the study
with the prison psychologist, Dr. Bryan, that the study was being
1 conducted in the.prison hospital, and that they were to receive
tion. In the court's view, it is not.unreasonable to impose upon
the_.pl.ainti.ffs.,.whD_wez.e-in.possession of this information, the
obligation to investigate the legal identity of the tortfeasor.
1 The court rejects the contention that the plaintiffs' cause of
it action did not accrue until they knew which agency of the federal
t government sponsored the study.- Plaintiffs' failure to seek
relief under the FTCA until nearly seventeen years later is fatal
to their claims.l0/
good-time credit and a promise of a favorable parole recommenda-
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 Accordingly, the clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment in favor of the defendants.
This, the = day of April, 1983.
A FREEMAN
Unilted States District Judge
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j 1/ The original complaint asserted claims against the United
1 Statsf Ai Willi C i hi
e omerca,amasey,ns capacity as Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, Norman Carlson, in his capacity
as Director of the Bureau of Prisons, and William French Smith,
1 in his capacity as Attorney General of the United States, under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. ?
1346(b); 10 U.S.C. ? 1089; the United States Constitution; and
the Nuremburg Code. By order dated September 15, 1981, the court
dismissed plaintiffs' claim based on the Nuremburg Code and dis-
missed plaintiff Donn's claim on the ground that he had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. By order dated April 13,
1982, the court dismissed defendants Casey, Carlson, and Smith in
their individual capacities because the defendants had not been
properly served. By order dated August 23, 1982, the court dis-
missed plaintiff Malone's claim due to his failure to respond to
I the defendants' discovery requests and his status as a fugitive
from federal authority. By order dated January 6, 1983, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional cause of action on the
II ground that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
2/ Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions
at 170.
3/ Dr. Pfeiffer was the principal medical researcher in
charge of the study. He was assisted by Dr. Harry L. Williams.
4/ At the time the study was conducted, a series of articles
was published in the prison magazine, "The Atlantian," describing
the study. Defendants' Exhs. 10A, lOB, 10C. There is' no evidence'
in the record that the plaintiffs read any of these articles.
Plaintiffs deny having done so.
5/ Dr. Pfeiffer testified that all participants signed a
consent agreement, of which there was only one. version. That
version was identified by Dr. Pfeiffer and Dr.-Henry MUrphree, who
served as a Public Health Fellow in the study, as Defendants'
Exhibit 9. Plaintiffs testified that, while they recall signing
a consent agreement, they did not sign the agreement identified
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as Defendants' Exhibit 9. The court finds the testimony of Drs.
Pfeiffer and Murphree on this issue to be credible and the plain-
tiffs' testimony on this issue to be lacking in credibility. Dr.
Pfeiffer is_a former department chairman at Emory University and
the U.iversity of Illinois Medical School. Having observed his
demeanor and listened closely to his testimony, the court believes
that he testified truthfully. Dr. Murphree is the Chairman of the
Department of Psychiatry at Rutgers University Medical School.
i' He served as a fellow in the study and has little professional
stake in the outcome of this litigation. Whereas, as discussed
infra at4-7, the plaintiffs' credibility was undermined by various
i cnonsistencies and admissions.
6/ Defendants were unable to produce the consent agreements
signed by the plaintiffs. Dr. Pfeiffer testified that, when he
moved his office to smaller quarters in 1972, copies of these
agreements were destroyed.
7/ Both parties have analyzed the plaintiffs' claims as
alleging medical malpractice. Although the government has con-
sistently denied that a,'doctor-patient relationship existed between
the doctors conducting the study and the participants, the govern-
ment concedes that, for purposes of the statute of limitations
issues, the plaintiffs' claims allege malpractice.
The court notes that at the close of the trial the plaintiffs'
counsel raised the contention that the plaintiffs had also set
I forth cognizable claims against the government based on the alleged
negligent funding of.the study, which were not barred by the two-
year statute of limitations. The court finds this contention un-
availing. Plaintiffs have cited no authority supporting the impo-
sition of liability for a cause of action based on the negligent
funding of a research project, which is independent from malprac-
tice liability. Moreover, during the litigation of this case, the
plaintiffs have not challenged the defendants' characterization of
h the plaintiffs' claims as alleging malpractice. Finally, assuming
arguendo that the plaintiffs have set forth claims based on negli-
gent funding which are legally distinct from their malpractice
claims, the plaintiffs have given the court no reason to believe
that such claims would not also be barred by the FTCA's two-year
statute of limitations. The court has concluded infra at 15 that
j the plaintiffs knew of the government's involvement in the study
at the latest in the early 1960's. This conclusion applies with
it
ii
II
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I equal force to the plaintiffs' negligent funding claims. At that
time, the plaintiffs possessed the critical facts concerning their
injury and its alleged cause which would prompt a reasonable man
to seek legal advice.
8/ Plaintiffs also attempt to avoid the statute of limita-
lionsby alleging that the United States concealed the identity
of the tortfeasor from them and that they were "blamelessly igno-
rant" of their injury. First, there is nothing in the record to
support the plaintiffs' allegation that the Bureau of Prisons
denied that the plaintiffs had been given LSD or that the Bureau
had covertly concealed the information concerning the plaintiffs'
participation in the Atlanta Penitentiary study. Second, there is
nothing in the record to demonstrate the presence of a latent
injury or an injury of which the plaintiffs were blamelessly
ignorant.
9/ See Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980);
Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1979); West v.
United States, 592 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1979); Flickinger v, United
States, 523 F.Supp. 1372.(W.D. Pa. 1981).
10/ Because the court finds that the plaintiffs' claims are
barrenby the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations, the question
whether their claims are also barred by the six month statute of
limitations will not be addressed.