KGB MAY HAVE TAKEN SOVIET WRITER OUT OF LONDON, EX-CIA DIRECTOR SAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600420023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2007
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: September 20, 1984
• Content Type: NSPR

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ARTICLE APPEARED PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
ON PAGE 20 September 1984
.GB may hake. taken Soviet writer
- L
o os-
a network that feeds commercial raw tors," the British intelligence source cow had caused "considerable con-
dio stations in Britain. The interview sat .. sternation to British intelligence."
was broadcast on Capitol Radio in -'Te source declined to say how the Duff Hart-Davis, a writer with the
London, return of Bitov, viewed as a "signifi- Sunday Telegraph, edited some of
The British government has said - cant defector" because of his links the anti-Soviet articles Bitov had
that Bitov had defected and been with top officials in Moscow, would written when he was in Britain.
granted asylum in Britain after he affect Britain's chilly relations with Hart-Davis said, "One of his favorite
disappeared on Sept. 9, 1983, while" the Soviet Union. phrases concerned 'the unmatchable
covering the Venice Film Festival. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey pleasure' of being free. His friends
Britain protested strongly to Moscow Howe was scheduled to meet Soviet ... feel certain that he was abducted
after Bitov, 52, denied Tuesday that Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko or at the very least enticed."
urner sat 3ournaltst Oleg Bttov, _ Quite an expensive lifestyle, said a Bitov worked devoted a full page
who vanished from his London hide- 13 n is ante-Ihgence source, who yesterday to his reappearance there
out Aug. 16 and turned up Tuesday in spoke on con noon of anonymity, and said Bitov soon would reveal-
Moscow at a news conference, was 'But he missed his wife and daugh- more. It said Bitov would return to
probably forced to make the accusa- ter very much." Bitov's wife and work for the gazette, although he
Lions against the British "or die." daughter were in the Soviet Union may not :regain the high post of for.
"I'm sure they [the KGB] would . when Bitov disappeared in Italy, eign culture editor with the right to
have used torture too, if necessary, "It seems likely that he was lured. travel abroad.
to get him to make his television back to, Moscow. is Press confer In Britain, the Daily Mail said that
appearance," Turner said in a tele- ence had a ua purpose - to black- Bitov identified seven alleged Brit-
phone interview from the ' United en our intelligence service and to ish operatives and two safe houses in
States with Independent Radio News, discourage potential Soviet defer.. London and that his --t
M
out of London, ex-CIA director says
By Ed Blanche "from now on has n
Associated r?5? o future ahead of later this month in New York at the
him. He certainly isn't going to be re- U.N. General Assembly. Gromyko
LONDON - Former' CIA Director employed in his old job..I .think he's also has an invitation to visit London
Stansfield Turner sai esterda that lucky if he avoids a prison camp in next year.
e s~ovtt journalist who spent the last Siberia"
The source dismissed the possibili.
year tin Britain and then en surfaced in Four days after Bitov vanished ty that Bitov had been placed as a spy
Moscow on Tuesda accusing ' the from his London apartment last in the West by the KGB, the Soviet
British- of k dna in him m ave month, his car was found parked secret police and intelligence agen-
been smuggled from London by the near the Soviet Embassy in London. cy.
KGB. "He was settling in very nicelv to In.Moscow, the gazette for which
Turner said, "I would by no means
rule out his having been drugged,
locked up in some kind of a crate and
taken out of Great: Britain surrepti.
tiously.
"We all know that you've had a
case of.that with a different country
recently. The Soviets would have
been much more skillful in clearing,
it up."
Turner was referring to an abor.
tive attempt to smuggle former Nige-
rian Transport Minister. Umaru
Dikko, drugged, out of Britain in a
crate July 5. A Nigerian and three
Israelis have been charged with kid-
napping him.
Turner said Bitov, former foreign
cultural editor of Moscow's Litera-
turnaya Gazeta, or Literary Gazette,
Office statement branded Bitov's as-.
sertion that he was snatched in Ven-
ice by British agents as "absurd and
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r 7)
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 September 1984
][.7S prepares new concessions,
new initiatives on arms
ABM debate revived
as both sides seem
poised to break treaty
By Brad Knickerbocker
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
On Oct. 3, 1972, it seemed as though half the nuclear
arms race had been halted.
That is when a treaty between the United States and
the Soviet Union limiting antiballistic missile systems
went into force. In essence, as Henry A. Kissinger said at
the time, the idea was to give offensive missiles "a free
ride to their target" and thereby ensure that both nuclear
powers retained their retaliatory force. .
Today, though, many arms-control doubters - in-
cluding some key Reagan officials - wonder whether the
ABM treaty ought to be changed, if not scrapped.
E Pr%)NS
Er SPACE
They look at the continuing
buildup in nuclear weapons on
both sides ,(which the ABM
treaty was supposed to slow),
the big advances in technology
since then, and the allegations
saes may not have more than one warhead, nor may their
launchers be rapidly reloadable or mobile. Both coun-
tries also agreed not to develop, test, or deploy sea-based,
air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM sys-
tems, although research in these areas is allowed.
The treaty was an acknowledgment of the overwhelm-
ing destructive force of nuclear weapons.
"It is a realpolitik approach, not an ideal one," says
Sidney Drell, phy3icist and codirector of the Center for
International Security and Arms Control at Stanford
University. "The ABM treaty is the formal recognition
that mutual destruction could not be escaped if the super-
powers were drawn by accident or design into nuclear
war.... It accepts deterrence as a present necessity and
objective condition, not as. an active threat which would
be intolerable."
Today's debate over missile defense - prompted by
President Reagan's controversial speech last year - ech-
oes the one heard in this country in the late 1960s. But
there are several important reasons for its revival.
First., A, c even critics ~? the president's ;. Limative ac-
knowledge, there has been remarkable progress in those
technologies (sensors, computers, directed energy, and
ways to transport things into space). that could be part of
an advanced defensive system.
Second, fears about the possibility of nuclear war -
due in large measure to the lack of significant progress in
limiting weapons of mass destruction - have heightened
public interest in pursuing protective measures. Opinion
surveys (including polls taken a few months before
Reagan's "star wars" speech in March 1983 before the
conservative Heritage Foundation) consistently show
more than 80 percent of the public favoring strategic
defense. -
And third, there is mounting evidence that the Soviets
may be positioning themselves to "break out" of the
ABM treaty by deploying systems not allowed under the
agreement. Among these is a large phased-array radar
(which can track many targets at once), advanced mobile
antiaircraft missiles that could possibly be used against
other missiles as well, and ABM launchers that US intel-
ligence sources suspect can be quickly reloaded.
The United States in the mid-1970s built its allowable
ABM system .(called Safeguard) around 150 Minuteman
strategic nuclear missiles in North Dakota. But it was
dismantled a few months later because of its high cost
and the realization that Soviet missiles probably could
penetrate it.
The Soviet Union has kept its Galosh missile defense
facilities around Moscow and now is building an im-
proved ABM-X-3 system with better interceptors and
radars.
Critics of the President's strategic defense program
are quick to point out that the US also may now be test-
ing systems that encroach upon the ABM treaty. These
that the USSR is violating the
ABM treaty .in fashioning a nationwide missile-defense
system. They wonder if the 12-year-old treaty has not
outlived its usefulness, if the US should not use its tech-
nological edge to defend against Soviet missiles..
In response, many nuclear strategist's and' former
arms-control and defense officials have mounted a vigor-
ous defense of the ABM treaty. They view President
Reagan's controversial strategic defense initiative ("star
wars") as a direct threat to what some see as the most
successful superpower agreement in the nuclear age.
"The American people are being misled into believing
there is a magical solution to the nuclear predicament,"
says Gerard C. Smith, the Republican who -negotiated.
the first US-USSR strategic arms agreement as well as
"A US `star wars'-effort will prompt a similar effort
by the Soviets," says Ambassador Smith, and "compel
both sides to accelerate their race in offensive weapons,
and increase the risk of nuclear war."
The essence of the 1972 ABM agreement (and its 1974
protocol) is that the superpowers should be limited to a
single defense system of no more than 100 interceptor
missiles around the national capital or one ICBM (inter-
continental ballistic missile) field. These defensive mis-
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f ^rrt pPrETP~
Political interference
cited in 1980 inquiry,
Ex-Carter official tied to loss of spy
NEW YORK TRIBUNE
10 September 1984
~ new probe of Mo
By Bill Gertz
NEW YORK TRIBUNE STAFF
?1984 New York Tribune
WASHINGTON - The Senate
Intelligence Committee recently
weighed a congressional request to
reopen its ultra-sensitive 1980
probe of Walter Mondale's top for-
eign policy adviser.
The committee denied the
request despite charges that the
investigation was obstructed by
political tampering and unwilling-
ness to air explosive, top-secret
information, according to intelli-
gence sources and congressional
documents made available to the
New York Tribune.
The investigation 4 years ago
reportedly cleared the Mondale
aide, David Aaron, of charges he
revealed information that led to the
loss of a deep-cover American spy
working in the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry in Moscow.
At the time, Aaron was Pres-
ident Carter's deputy -national
security adviser. He is currently a
close adviser on foreign affairs to
the Democratic presidential nomi-
David Aaron, left, was investigated by the Senate Intelligence Committee, uw
chaired by Sen. Barry Goldwater, after the loss of a key CIA agent in Moscow
important foreign policy adviser,
earlier served as his staff assistant
on the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee when it was headed by the late
Sen. Frank Church. He recently
returned from Israel where,
according to a report in the New
York Times, Aaron attempted to
improve both Mondale's and his
own relations with the Israelis.
In October 1983, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
was first asked to provide records
of the Aaron investigation by the
House Post Office and Civil Serv-
ice subcommittee on human
resources. A letter from subcom-
mittee Chairman Don Albosta,
D-Mich.; and the subcommittee's
minority leader Dan Crane, R-Ill.,
requested records "relating to the
possible compromise of highly
classified information" involving
"high-level personnel of the
National Security Council at that
time [1980):'
decision;' Aaron said of the com-
mittee's recent determination not
to reopen the 1980 probe. Gold-
water could not be reached for!
comment.
A spokesman for the Mondale-:
Ferraro campaign refused to com-
ment on the report. Aaron, who has
been described as Mondale's most
nee.
Aaron, in a telephone interview,
would not comment on the allega-
tion. He confirmed that there was
an "extensive investigation;" but he
denied that it was "an investigation
of me." He referred questions to
the office of Sen. Barry Goldwater,
R-Ariz., chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
"He's the man who made the
Report on leaks
In May, the subcommittee.
released its report on unauthorized
disclosures during the 1980 elec-
tion, specifically covering the
transfer of former president
Jimmy Carter's debate notes to the
Reagan campaign. The leaks were
traced to Carter's National Secu-
rity Council (NSC).
According to congressional
sources close to. the investigation,
"numerous allegations" of Carter
NSC leaks during the subcommit-
tee probe were ignored. The sub-
committee's final report was
described as "highly partisan" and
incomplete. The report mentioned
Aaron as the person responsible
.for preparing the foreign policy
section of the purloined Carter
briefing book.
A House staff member who pur-
sued the NSC leaks on behalf of
Crane was told by Intelligence
Committee staff director Rob Sim-
mons last June 22 that committee
records were "too extensive to per-
mit perusal -hy.outaiders," includ- .
ing investigators with top-level
security clearances. Simmons did
not see the subcommittee's Octo-
ber request from Albosta and
Crane, sources said.
Intelligence Committee Chair-
man Goldwater, in a reply to Crane
L1 9f1tinupa
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ARTICLr APP.E.ARED
qN PAG_
Former CIA director Adm.
Stansfield Turner confirmed that
the Central Intelligence Agency
funded psychic research under
Vice President George Bush the
admiral's predecessor.
"The CIA had had a program of
investigating psyc Chic phenomena.
before in
parapsyc o ~ time, i it which they had
try to demon-
strate t they could conjure up
images of things they had never
seen. Sometimes it worked; some-
times i n't. The pro ram was by
my time, one o eeping up with
wFat was going on outside the CIA.
We. tried to monitor what was going
on in the Soviet Union and also what
was going on quite openly in the
U.S.," Ad . Turner said.
"You've got two kinds of people,"
he continued, "Those who think it's
kooky and those people who are
kooky and think it can do much
more than it can. I'm in the middle.
ESPionage and the arms race r
B
Ste
hanie Voss
y
p
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
J tem: Hella Hammid, a photog-
rapher, sat in a room and accu-
rately described a microscopic
image contained in a sealed
envelope a block away.
Item: Submerged in a submarine
off the California coast, Ms. Ham-
mid accurately described a cliff-
hanging oak tree on shore as a
partner toured the randomly cho-
sen site.
Item: Painter Ingo Swann was
given.a set of geographic coordi-
nates. From the figures (49 degrees
20 minutes south latitude and 70
degrees 14 minutes east longitude),
he accurately described the rocky
terrain and outhouse at a Soviev-
French weather station on the ant-
arctic island of Kerguelen.
These reportedly successful
experiments are part of the contro-
versial history of a field laughed at
by most of the scientific commu-
nity, yet closely watched - and per-
haps heavily funded - by the
governments of the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The field is called parapsychol-
ogy: the study of ESP, clairvoyance,
telepathy and mind-over-matter
techniques. Now, after years of
wondering how - and if - psychic
powers work, researchers say they
are ready to face the test of prac-
ticality.
Not only is the government
reportedly working on ways to
replace James Bond gimmickry
with ESPioniage, but psychics are
ready to offer their services to busi-
nesses, as well.
U.S. government interest is
based largely on the results of a
controversial series of experi-
ments during the 1970s at the Stan-
ford Research Institute in Menlo
Park, Calif. (The institute orig-
inally was affiliated with Stanford
University, but severed its connec-
tions and changed its name to SRI
International after student protests
against military research on
campus.) Researcher Russell Thrg
said much of the institute's funds
came from the federal government,
but was coy about specifics, and
most government agencies
declined to comment.
I don't think it should be dis-
missed." That is why under
Adm. Turner's tenure, from 1977
to 1980, the agency continued to
monitor developments in psychic
research both in the United States
and abroad.
Psychic phenomena -do have a
"kooky" image and are linked by
many with even more esoteric top-
ics, such as UFOs, seances and cult-
ism. Government agencies thus are
understandably shy about using the
vocabulary of parapsychology (lit-
erally "beside psychology"). It is
not a topic the military, in particu-
lar, is anxious to discuss at all.
WASHINGTON TIMES
28 August 1984
According to Ron
McRae, the author of
"Mind Wars," govern-
ment and military
reports tend to replace the
term ESP, or extrasensory
perception, with phrases
like "novel biological information
transfer systems" Thus, an accu-
?rate estimate of the U.S. govern-
ment's spending on the subject is
difficult to come by.
The National Security Council
said tersely, "We do not engage in it
[psychic' research}"
The Pentagon, however, was not
as certain.
"We don't find any items in the
budget on psychic research," Pen-
tagon spokeswoman Jan Bodanyi
said last week, after checking indi-
ces for 1983, 1984 and 1985. There
is no index, she said, for any of the
various euphemisms more likely to
have been listed.
Congress has gotten into the act
also:
A 1981 precis prepared by the
staff of the House Committee on
Science and Technology blamed
low funding for a lack of quality
research on "the physics of con-
sciousness" The brief report cited
the remote viewing experiments at
Stanford Research Institute, add-
ing:
"In the area of national defense,
there are the obvious implications
of one's ability to identify distant
sites and affect sensitive instru-
ments or other humans. A general
recognition of the degree of inter-
connectiveness of minds could have
far-reaching social and political
implications for this nation and the
world,"
One member of Congress has
risked becoming a Capitol laugh-
ingstock by not laughing at psychic
research. Rep. Charlie Rose,
D-N.C., a former member of the
House Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, is troubled by rumors that
the Soviets have the jump on tele-
pathic warfare. Some estimates
place the USSR's support at the $30
million-a-year mark.
Some military officials share his
concern about a possible "psycho
gap",
"There are weapons systems that
operate on the power of the mind
and whose lethal capacity has
already been demonstrated [in
communist-bloc research],"
according to Army Lt. Col. John B.
Alexander. The colonel is credited
by military spokesmen with spur-
ring government interest in para-
psychology.
LJt.,'.:...4
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AR't I CL
,01i YALE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONIT~
___&L__., 27 August 1984
Terrorism's new weapon: mines at sea
By Stanfield Turner
T HE mining of the Red Sea is a new, unfortunate
step in international terrorism that will bring
added costs and inconvenience to all of us. Mines
are a unique weapon, in that the terrorist can be many
miles away before a ship passes over them and they ex-
plode. By the same token, they are indiscriminate weap-
ons that cannot be aimed at a particular victim, only at a
type of ship. There are two types of mines and three
methods of planting them.
There are "contact" mines which explode only when a
ship physically hits them, and "influence" mines which
are detonated by the sounds, magnetism, or pressures a
ship generates as it moves through the water. An acoustic
mine waits until the noise rises to a peak indicating that
the ship has come close and then detonates. If the ship is
close enough, it will damage it. The mine can have a
threshold of noise set into it. A low threshold will make it
detonate when a small, quiet ship passes by; with a high
threshold the mine will wait for a big, noisy ship. Simi-
larly, magnetic mines sense the magnetic field that sur-
rounds the metal of a ship; and a pressure mine feels the
pressure created as a ship compresses the water it passes
through.
Mines can be "planted" - anchored to the bottom
with the mine floating somewhere below the water's sur-
face, or laid right on the bottom. Drifting mines are usu-
ally contact mines. They have a limited life because
winds and currents carry them in odd directions and
eventually wash them ashore. It's more common for con-
tact mines to be moored below the surface so that they
will strike the hull of the type of ship they are intended to
damage. Influence mines are usually laid on the bottom,
but can be moored below the surface when the water is
too deep for an explosion from the bottom to be effective.
Mines can be delivered by almost any ship, by
bomber, or cargo aircraft. I estimate that those in the Red
Sea are acoustic-influence mines laid on the bottom and
delivered by a ship. The fact that they have done rela-
tively little damage is because they are likely in waters
too deep for the size of the mines.
How do we go about countering mines once they've
been laid? Ships can just avoid passing near them. One
way to do that is to stick to very deep waters whenever
possible. Most of the Red Sea is too deep for mines. Only
its extremities,, the Gulf or Suez at the north, and the
Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the south, can be mined. Na-
val ships can use sonar to find the mines and tell ships
where not to go. Navies can also try to sweep mines. For
moored mines, either a helicopter or a ship tows under-
water cables which snag the mine's mooring line reaching
down to its anchor. A cutter device on the towed cable
severs the anchor line, the mine pops to the surface, and
someone has to shoot it to make it sink or explode. For
bottom mines, the helicopter or ship tows a device that
makes a noise like a ship or creates a magnetic field like
one: When the mine senses these artificial signals, it
thinks it has a ship and detonates.
The United States Navy relies heavily on helicopter
mine sweepers for just the reason that they can get places
quickly, as they have to the Red Sea in the past few days.
Mine-sweeper ships from the US would have taken al-
most three weeks to get there. Mine-sweeping by helicop-
ter is also safer, as the copter is above, rather than in, the
mine field when it tows its mine-sweeping equipment.
Over the longer run, the way to stop this form of ter-
rorism is to prevent the laying of mines in the first place.
We will have to do at sea much of what we do in airports
rto deter hijackers; that is, inspect ships before they pass
through narrow, shallow; minable waters to ensure that
they do not drop mines as they go and prevent suspicious
aircraft from passing over such waters. Those precau-
tions will be costly. If the mining of the Red Sea encour-
ages other terrorists to mine other places one way or an-
other, each one of us will pay those costs of inspections,
delays, and higher insurance rates, because the interna-
tional shipping that is affected is essential to our eco-
nomic well-being.
In the US one of the best deterrents to terrorism has
been an alert public that does not hesitate to report suspi-
cious activities. Now the world faces the challenge of re-
porting suspicious movements of ships at sea and in
ports. We all have a stake in defeating this new challenge
to world order.
Stanfield Turner is a former director of the Cen-
aTlntell ice A nc c -
aval War College from 1972 to 1974.
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